European Civil Justice

The Court of Justice delivered on 7 April 2022 its judgement in case C‑236/20 (PG), which is about the working conditions of the Judges of the Peace in Italy. Progressively, with this case and previous ones on working conditions of judges, along with several judgments on the Rule of Law (e.g. touching on the recruitment of judges, or disciplinary proceedings against judges), the Court of Justice is building a European framework of the status of judges.

“1. Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, Clause 4 of the framework agreement on part-time work […] and Clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work […] must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide for an entitlement for magistrates to 30 days’ paid annual leave or to a social security and pension scheme deriving from the employment relationship, such as that provided for ordinary judges, if that magistrate comes within the definition of ‘part-time worker’ within the meaning of the framework agreement on part-time work and/or ‘fixed-term worker’ within the meaning of the framework agreement on fixed-term work and is in a comparable situation to that of an ordinary judge.

2. Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work […] must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which a fixed-term employment relationship can be renewed a maximum of three times successively, each renewal being for a duration of four years, for a total duration that does not exceed 16 years, and which does not provide for the possibility of penalising in an effective and dissuasive way the abusive continuance of the employment relationship”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=257484&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2654588

AG Collins delivered on 31 March 2022 his opinion in case C‑18/21 (Uniqa Versicherungen AG v VU), which is about the European Order for Payment:

“Articles 16, 20 and 26 of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure do not preclude the adoption, in the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, of a national measure that interrupted the 30-day time limit for lodging a statement of opposition to a European order for payment contained in Article 16(2) thereof”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=256962&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=1171245

The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered this week (29 March) its judgment in case C-132/20 (BN and alii), which is about the Rule of Law and Fair Trail requirements for Courts composed for part of judges originally appointed under totalitarian (Communists) regimes or by a body created on the ground of legislation later declared unconstitutional. The judgment is currently available in selected EU official languages only (and therefore not in English). Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

“1) L’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE, l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne ainsi que l’article 7, paragraphes 1 et 2, de la directive 93/13/CEE du Conseil, du 5 avril 1993, concernant les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec les consommateurs, doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la circonstance que la première nomination d’un juge dans un État membre à un tel poste ou sa nomination ultérieure dans une juridiction supérieure résulte d’une décision adoptée par un organe d’un régime non démocratique qu’a connu cet État membre avant son adhésion à l’Union européenne, y compris lorsque les nominations de ce juge dans des juridictions après que ce régime a pris fin étaient fondées notamment sur l’ancienneté acquise par ledit juge au cours de la période durant laquelle ledit régime était en place ou lorsqu’il a prêté le serment judiciaire uniquement lors de sa première nomination en tant que juge par un organe de ce même régime, n’est pas en soi de nature à susciter des doutes légitimes et sérieux, dans l’esprit des justiciables, quant à l’indépendance et à l’impartialité de ce même juge, ni, partant, à remettre en cause la qualité de tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi préalablement par la loi, d’une formation de jugement dans laquelle il siège.

2) L’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE, l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux ainsi que l’article 7, paragraphes 1 et 2, de la directive 93/13 doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils ne s’opposent pas à ce que soit qualifiée de tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi préalablement par la loi, une formation de jugement relevant d’une juridiction d’un État membre dans laquelle siège un juge dont la première nomination à un poste de juge ou sa nomination ultérieure dans une juridiction supérieure est intervenue soit à la suite de sa sélection comme candidat au poste de juge par un organe composé sur le fondement de dispositions législatives ultérieurement déclarées inconstitutionnelles par la juridiction constitutionnelle de cet État membre, soit à la suite de sa sélection comme candidat au poste de juge par un organe régulièrement composé mais au terme d’une procédure qui n’était ni transparente, ni publique, ni susceptible de faire l’objet d’un recours juridictionnel, dès lors que de telles irrégularités ne sont pas d’une nature et d’une gravité telles qu’elles créent un risque réel que d’autres branches du pouvoir, en particulier l’exécutif, puissent exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire indu mettant en péril l’intégrité du résultat auquel conduit le processus de nomination et semant ainsi, dans l’esprit des justiciables, des doutes sérieux et légitimes quant à l’indépendance et à l’impartialité du juge concerné ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=768367F474045381829A4693E86C265D?text=&docid=256761&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6822307

The Court of Justice delivered last week (24 March 2022) its judgment in case C‑723/20 (Galapagos BidCo. Sàrl), which is about the Insolvency bis Regulation:

“Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that the court of a Member State with which a request to open main insolvency proceedings has been lodged retains exclusive jurisdiction to open such proceedings where the centre of the debtor’s main interests is moved to another Member State after that request has been lodged, but before that court has delivered a decision on it. Consequently, in so far as that regulation is still applicable to that request, the court of another Member State with which another request is lodged subsequently for the same purpose cannot, in principle, declare that it has jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings until the first court has delivered its decision and declined jurisdiction”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=256469&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6830618

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑498/20 (BMA), which is about Brussels I bis and Rome II. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version) :

« 1) L’article 7, point 2 [Bruxelles I bis] doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu d’établissement d’une société dont les dettes sont devenues irrécouvrables, parce que la société « grand-mère » de cette société a méconnu son devoir de diligence à l’égard des créanciers de celle-ci, est compétente pour connaître d’une action collective en dommages et intérêts relevant de la matière délictuelle ou quasi délictuelle, que le curateur à la faillite de cette société a introduite, dans le cadre de sa mission légale de liquidation de la masse, pour le compte, mais non pas au nom, de l’ensemble des créanciers.

2) La réponse à la première question posée à titre préjudiciel n’est pas différente s’il est tenu compte du fait que, dans l’affaire au principal, une fondation agit pour défendre les intérêts collectifs des créanciers et que l’action introduite à cette fin ne tient pas compte des circonstances individuelles des créanciers.

3) L’article 8, point 2, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que, si la juridiction saisie de la demande originaire revient sur sa décision de se déclarer compétente pour connaître de cette demande, elle perd, de ce fait, de plein droit, également sa compétence pour connaître des demandes introduites par la partie intervenante.

4) L’article 4 [Rome II] doit être interprété en ce sens que la loi applicable à une obligation de réparation au titre du devoir de diligence de la société « grand-mère » d’une société déclarée en faillite est, en principe, celle du pays où est établie cette dernière, bien que la préexistence d’une convention de financement entre ces deux sociétés, assortie d’une clause d’élection de for, soit une circonstance pouvant établir des liens manifestement plus étroits avec un autre pays, au sens du paragraphe 3 de cet article ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=255424&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686272

AG Pikamae delivered yesterday his opinion in case C‑7/21 (Lkw Walter Internationale Transportorganisation AG), which is on the Service Regulation and Brussels I bis (Slovenian decision delivered in the absence of the defendant and notified in Austria in Slovenian only and with only 8 days to oppose). The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version) :

« 1) L’article 8, paragraphes 1 et 3, du règlement (CE) nº 1393/2007 […] lu conjointement avec l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’oppose pas à une réglementation nationale du droit de l’État de condamnation selon laquelle le délai pour exercer un recours contre une décision matérialisée par un acte judiciaire signifié ou notifié conformément au règlement nº 1393/2007 commence à courir dès la signification ou la notification de l’acte en question et non uniquement lorsque le délai d’une semaine prévu au paragraphe 1 dudit article pour refuser de recevoir cet acte a expiré.

2) L’article 45, paragraphe 1, sous b), et l’article 46 du règlement (UE) nº 1215/2012 […] lus conjointement avec l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux, doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’il y a lieu de refuser la reconnaissance et l’exécution d’une décision qui n’a pas été rendue dans le cadre d’une procédure contradictoire lorsqu’un recours contre la décision doit être exercé dans une langue autre que la langue officielle de l’État membre dans lequel le défendeur réside ou, s’il existe plusieurs langues officielles dans cet État membre, autre que la langue officielle ou l’une des langues officielles du lieu où il réside, et que, selon le droit de l’État membre dans lequel la décision a été rendue, le délai non renouvelable pour exercer le recours n’est que de huit jours civils.

3) L’article 18 TFUE doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’applique pas à une situation dans laquelle le destinataire d’un acte judiciaire a renoncé à exercer son droit de refuser la notification ou la signification dudit acte conformément à l’article 8, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 1393/2007 ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=255446&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686272

The Court of Justice delivered earlier this month (3 March 2022) its judgment in case C‑421/20 (Acacia Srl v BMW AG), which is about Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs and Rome II:

« Article 88(2) and Article 89(1)(d) of [Regulation (EC) No 6/2002] and Article 8(2) [Rome II] must be interpreted as meaning that the Community design courts before which an action for infringement pursuant to Article 82(5) of Regulation No 6/2002 is brought concerning acts of infringement committed or threatened within a single Member State must examine the claims supplementary to that action, seeking the award of damages, the submission of information, documents and accounts and the handing over of the infringing products with a view to their being destroyed, on the basis of the law of the Member State in which the acts allegedly infringing the Community design relied upon are committed or are threatened, which is the same, in the circumstances of an action brought pursuant to that Article 82(5), as the law of the Member State in which those courts are situated ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=254964&mode=req&pageIndex=3&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=730419

The Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) delivered on 22 February 2022 its judgment in case C‑430/21 (RS), which is about the Rule of Law, the principle of primacy of EU law and the protection of judges from disciplinary proceedings in their application of EU Law:

«  The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 and Article 4(2) and (3) TEU, with Article 267 TFEU and with the principle of the primacy of EU law, must be interpreted as precluding national rules or a national practice under which the ordinary courts of a Member State have no jurisdiction to examine the compatibility with EU law of national legislation which the constitutional court of that Member State has found to be consistent with a national constitutional provision that requires compliance with the principle of the primacy of EU law.

2. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 and Article 4(2) and (3) TEU, with Article 267 TFEU and with the principle of the primacy of EU law, must be interpreted as precluding national rules or a national practice under which a national judge may incur disciplinary liability on the ground that he or she has applied EU law, as interpreted by the Court, thereby departing from case-law of the constitutional court of the Member State concerned that is incompatible with the principle of the primacy of EU law ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=254384&mode=req&pageIndex=7&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=730419

The CJEU delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑595/20 (UE v ShareWood Switzerland AG, VF), which is about Rome I :

« Article 6(4)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I’) must be interpreted as meaning that a contract of sale, including a lease agreement and a service agreement, relating to trees planted on leased land for the sole purpose of being harvested for profit, does not constitute a ‘contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property’ within the meaning of that provision ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=253728&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2334998

The CJEU delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑522/20 (OE v VY), which is about Article 18 TFEU and Brussels II bis :

« The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, enshrined in Article 18 TFEU, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation in which the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in the territory of which the habitual residence of the applicant is located, as provided for in the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of [Brussels II bis] is subject to the applicant being resident for a minimum period immediately before making his or her application which is six months shorter than that provided for in the fifth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation on the ground that the person concerned is a national of that Member State ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=253726&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2334783

The UK Ministry of Justice opened this week (2 February 2022) a consultation on whether the UK should sign and ratify the Singapore Convention on Mediation 2018. The consultation closes at 23:59 on 1 April 2022. A Consultation document (with questions to the public) is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/the-singapore-convention-on-mediation

The Court of Justice delivered two days ago (3 February 2022) its judgment in Case C‑20/21 (JW, HD, XS v LOT Polish Airlines), which is about Article 7(1)(b) Brussels I bis :

« The second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in respect of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking for the entire journey and divided into two or more legs on which transport is performed by separate air carriers, where a claim for compensation, brought on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 […] arises exclusively from a delay of the first leg of the journey caused by a late departure and is brought against the air carrier operating that first leg, the place of arrival for that first leg may not be classified as a ‘place of performance’ within the meaning of that provision ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=253283&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=1413659

AG Szpunar delivered yesterday his opinion in case C‑617/20 (T. N., N.N. v E.G.), which is about the Succession Regulation. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version).

« Les dispositions des articles 13 et 28 du règlement (UE) no 650/2012 […] doivent être interprétées en ce sens que l’exigence, prévue par la loi applicable à la succession, consistant à faire une déclaration concernant la renonciation au tribunal de la succession, c’est-à-dire à la juridiction du lieu de résidence habituelle du défunt au moment de son décès, est une condition de validité quant à la forme de cette déclaration. Partant, lorsque la validité quant à la forme de la déclaration faite est appréciée au regard de la loi visée à l’article 28, sous b), de ce règlement, le non‑respect de cette exigence n’entraîne pas l’invalidité de la déclaration faite devant la juridiction compétente en vertu de l’article 13 dudit règlement ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=252466&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=351236

AG Collins delivered yesterday his opinion in Case C‑430/21 (RS), which is about the Rule of Law in Romania.

Suggested decision : « The principle of the independence of the judiciary, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, precludes a provision or a practice of national law of a Member State according to which national courts have no jurisdiction to examine the conformity with EU law of a provision of national law that has been found to be constitutional by a decision of the constitutional court of that Member State. That same principle precludes the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the application of disciplinary penalties in respect of a judge arising from such an examination ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=252467&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=350416

The CJEU (Grand Chamber) delivered on 21 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑251/20 (Gtflix Tv), which is about Brussels I bis:

« Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a person who, considering that his or her rights have been infringed by the dissemination of disparaging comments concerning him or her on the internet, seeks not only the rectification of the information and the removal of the content placed online concerning him or her but also compensation for the damage resulting from that placement may claim, before the courts of each Member State in which those comments are or were accessible, compensation for the damage suffered in the Member State of the court seised, even though those courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on the application for rectification and removal ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=251510&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5320006

Earlier on, on 16 September 2021, AG Hogan had suggested: “Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a claimant who relies on an act of unfair competition consisting in the dissemination of disparaging statements on the internet and who seeks both the rectification of the data and the deletion of certain content and compensation for the non-material and economic damage resulting therefrom, may bring an action or claim before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content published online is or was accessible, for compensation only for the damage caused in the territory of that Member State. In order, however, for those courts to have the requisite jurisdiction it is necessary that the claimant can demonstrate that it has an appreciable number of consumers in that jurisdiction who are likely to have access to and have understood the publication in question” (https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=246102&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2104).

The CJEU (Grand Chamber) delivered on 21 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑124/20 (Bank Melli Iran v Telekom Deutschland GmbH), which is about Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 (Protection against the effects of the extraterritorial application of legislation adopted by a third country):

« 1. The first paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 […] must be interpreted as prohibiting persons referred to in Article 11 of Regulation No 2271/96, as amended, from complying with the requirements or prohibitions laid down in the laws specified in the annex to that regulation, even in the absence of an order directing compliance issued by the administrative or judicial authorities of the third countries which adopted those laws.

2. The first paragraph of Article 5 of Regulation No 2271/96, as amended by Regulation No 37/2014 and Delegated Regulation 2018/1100, must be interpreted as not precluding a person referred to in Article 11 of that regulation, as amended, who does not have an authorisation within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 5 of that regulation, as amended, from terminating contracts concluded with a person on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, without providing reasons for that termination. Nevertheless, the first paragraph of Article 5 of the same regulation, as amended, requires that, in civil proceedings relating to the alleged infringement of the prohibition laid down in that provision, where all the evidence available to the national court suggests prima facie that a person referred to in Article 11 of Regulation No 2271/96, as amended, complied with the laws specified in the annex to that regulation, as amended, without having an authorisation in that respect, it is for that same person to establish to the requisite legal standard that his or her conduct was not intended to comply with those laws.

3. Regulation No 2271/96, as amended by Regulation No 37/2014 and Delegated Regulation 2018/1100, in particular Articles 5 and 9 thereof, read in the light of Article 16 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding the annulment of the termination of contracts effected by a person referred to in Article 11 of that regulation, as amended, in order to comply with the requirements or prohibitions based on the laws specified in the annex to that regulation, as amended, even though that person does not have an authorisation, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 5 of the same regulation, as amended, provided that that annulment does not entail disproportionate effects for that person having regard to the objectives of Regulation No 2271/96, as amended, consisting in the protection of the established legal order and the interests of the European Union in general. In that assessment of proportionality, it is necessary to weigh in the balance the pursuit of those objectives served by the annulment of the termination of a contract effected in breach of the prohibition laid down in the first paragraph of Article 5 of that regulation, as amended, and the probability that the person concerned may be exposed to economic loss, as well as the extent of that loss, if that person cannot terminate his or her commercial relationship with a person included in the list of persons covered by the secondary sanctions at issue resulting from the laws specified in the annex to that regulation, as amended ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=251507&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5321152

AG Pikamae delivered on 16 December 2021 his opinion in case C‑568/20 (J), which is about the incorrect use of Brussels I bis by the court of origin. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version).

Question : « À la suite de la délivrance, par la juridiction de l’État membre d’origine, du certificat prévu à l’article 53 du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 (2), attestant du caractère exécutoire de la décision rendue et de l’applicabilité de ce règlement, la juridiction de l’État membre requis, saisie d’une demande de refus d’exécution de cette décision par la personne contre laquelle l’exécution est sollicitée, peut-elle y faire droit au motif d’une appréciation erronée quant au caractère applicable dudit règlement, dans la mesure où la procédure suivie devant la juridiction de l’État membre d’origine visait à déclarer exécutoires des jugements rendus dans un État tiers ? ».

Suggested response : «  Les articles 45 et 46 du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 12 décembre 2012 […] doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la juridiction de l’État membre requis, saisie d’une demande de refus d’exécution, peut y faire droit au motif que la décision et le certificat, prévu à l’article 53 de ce règlement, adoptés par la juridiction de l’État membre d’origine violent l’ordre public de l’État membre requis dès lors que l’erreur de droit invoquée constitue une violation manifeste d’une règle de droit considérée comme étant essentielle dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union et donc dans celui de cet État. Tel est le cas d’une erreur affectant l’application de l’article 2, sous a), et de l’article 39 dudit règlement exigeant que la décision dont l’exécution est demandée soit rendue dans un État membre.
Lorsqu’il vérifie l’existence éventuelle d’une violation manifeste de l’ordre public de l’État requis, du fait de la méconnaissance d’une règle de fond ou de forme du droit de l’Union, le juge de cet État doit tenir compte du fait que, sauf circonstances particulières rendant trop difficile ou impossible l’exercice des voies de recours dans l’État membre d’origine, les justiciables doivent faire usage dans cet État membre de toutes les voies de recours disponibles afin de prévenir en amont une telle violation ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=251315&mode=req&pageIndex=2&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=FR&cid=5321152

The Court of Justice delivered on 9 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑708/20 (BT v Seguros Catalana Occidente, EB), which is about Article 13 Brussels I bis:

« Article 13(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of a direct action brought by the injured person against an insurer in accordance with Article 13(2) thereof, the court of the Member State in which that person is domiciled cannot also assume jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 13(3) thereof, to rule on a claim for compensation brought at the same time by that person against the policyholder or the insured who is domiciled in another Member State and who has not been challenged by the insurer ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=250867&mode=req&pageIndex=4&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5332111

The Court of Justice delivered on 9 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑242/20 (Hrvatske Sume), which is about Brussels I.

Context: “proceedings between, on the one hand, HRVATSKE ŠUME d.o.o., Zagreb, a company established in Croatia, successor in title to HRVATSKE ŠUME javno poduzeće za gospodarenje šumama i šumskim zemljištima u Republici Hrvatskoj p.o., Zagreb, and, on the other, BP Europa SE Hamburg, a company established in Germany, successor in title to Deutsche BP AG, in turn successor in title to The Burmah Oil (Deutschland) GmbH, concerning the recovery, on the basis of unjust enrichment, of an amount unduly paid in enforcement proceedings which were subsequently declared invalid”.

Decision: « 1. Article 22(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not come within the exclusive jurisdiction provided for by that provision, even though it was brought on account of the expiry of the time limit within which restitution of sums unduly paid in enforcement proceedings may be claimed in the context of the same enforcement proceedings.

2. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not fall within the scope of the ground of jurisdiction laid down in that provision ».

Note paragraph 36 : « In the absence of any application for enforcement, an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not come within the scope of Article 22(5) of Regulation No 44/2001 ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=250865&mode=req&pageIndex=5&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5334182

AG Saugmandsgaard Oe had previously, on 9 September 2021, delivered the following opinion: « Article 5(1) and Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 [..] must be interpreted as meaning that a claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment:
– is not a matter ‘relating to a contract’ within the meaning of the former provision, except where it is closely linked to a prior contractual relationship existing, or deemed to exist, between the parties to the dispute; and
– is not a matter ‘relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of the latter provision » (https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=245764&mode=req&pageIndex=23&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=2104).

AG Campos Sanchez-Bordona delivered on 2 December 2021 his opinion in case C‑645/20 (V A), which is about the Succession Regulation.

Context: “1. The Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) asks the Court of Justice whether the authorities of a Member State (2) in which the deceased has assets must establish of their own motion their jurisdiction to rule on the succession as a whole under Article 10 of Regulation No 650/2012.

2. The uncertainty has arisen in the course of a dispute over succession rights between the children of a deceased French citizen whose last habitual residence in France is contested, on the one hand, and the person who was the deceased’s wife (but not the mother of his children) at the time of his death, on the other.

3. None of the parties disputes the nationality of the deceased at the time of his death, or that he was the owner of a property situated in France. The disagreement lies only in where he was habitually resident when he died

4. At first instance, a French court declared that it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim brought by the deceased’s children, who had applied for the appointment of an administrator for the estate.

5. On appeal, however, the relevant court held that the French judicial authorities lacked jurisdiction over the succession as a whole, as the deceased’s last place of residence had been in the United Kingdom.

6. On appeal in cassation, the appellants claim that, in any event, the French courts should have declared that they had jurisdiction on their own initiative, which is the issue that forms the subject of the referring court’s question”.

Suggested response: “Article 10(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case where the deceased did not have his last habitual residence in any Member State of the European Union, the court of a Member State in which a dispute in a matter of succession has arisen must declare of its own motion that it has jurisdiction to settle the succession as a whole if, in the light of facts alleged by the parties which are not in dispute, the deceased was a national of that State at the time of his death and was the owner of assets located there”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=250423&mode=req&pageIndex=5&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=5334182