Agrégateur de flux

Le Conseil d’État précise dans quels cas une demande d’asile peut être regardée comme une demande de réexamen.

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Eu égard à la marge d’appréciation des États, et à supposer même que l’article 10 de la Convention trouve à s’appliquer, l’ingérence dans l’exercice, par le requérant, de son droit à la liberté d’expression, était nécessaire dans une société démocratique.

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Deadline extended: Funding opportunities under the justice programme in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters (JUST-2022-JCOO).

The deadline for proposal submission to the call for proposals for action grants to promote judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters has been extended.

The new deadline for submission is the 30 March 2022 – 17:00:00 CET, Brussel’s time.

The total budget available for the call is EUR 5.500.000. The co-financing rate is 90%.

The key priorities for 2022 under this call are to contribute to the effective and coherent application of the EU acquis relating to judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, thus strengthening mutual trust.

In particular, the call aims to

1. facilitate and support judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters
2. promote the rule of law, independence and impartiality of the judiciary, including by supporting the efforts to improve the effectiveness of national justice systems, and the effective enforcement of decisions

The call-related documents, guidance and other instructions are available in the call page within the funding & tender opportunities portal (F&T).

Project activities under this call would in principle include:

1. facilitating cooperation between competent authorities and agencies, legal practitioners and/or service providers (including multi-disciplinary networks at international, national, regional or local levels);
2. mutual learning, identifying and exchange of best practices, development of working methods which may be transferable to other participating countries;
3. analytical activities, including data collection, surveys, research, etc.;
4. exchange and provision of information and development of information tools;
5. capacity building for professionals;
6. dissemination and awareness raising activities;
7. training activities can also be funded under this call, as long as they are of ancillary nature and not the main purpose of the project.

Any further request for information can be addressed to  EC-JUSTICE-CALLS@ec.europa.eu

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑498/20 (BMA), which is about Brussels I bis and Rome II. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version) :

« 1) L’article 7, point 2 [Bruxelles I bis] doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu d’établissement d’une société dont les dettes sont devenues irrécouvrables, parce que la société « grand-mère » de cette société a méconnu son devoir de diligence à l’égard des créanciers de celle-ci, est compétente pour connaître d’une action collective en dommages et intérêts relevant de la matière délictuelle ou quasi délictuelle, que le curateur à la faillite de cette société a introduite, dans le cadre de sa mission légale de liquidation de la masse, pour le compte, mais non pas au nom, de l’ensemble des créanciers.

2) La réponse à la première question posée à titre préjudiciel n’est pas différente s’il est tenu compte du fait que, dans l’affaire au principal, une fondation agit pour défendre les intérêts collectifs des créanciers et que l’action introduite à cette fin ne tient pas compte des circonstances individuelles des créanciers.

3) L’article 8, point 2, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que, si la juridiction saisie de la demande originaire revient sur sa décision de se déclarer compétente pour connaître de cette demande, elle perd, de ce fait, de plein droit, également sa compétence pour connaître des demandes introduites par la partie intervenante.

4) L’article 4 [Rome II] doit être interprété en ce sens que la loi applicable à une obligation de réparation au titre du devoir de diligence de la société « grand-mère » d’une société déclarée en faillite est, en principe, celle du pays où est établie cette dernière, bien que la préexistence d’une convention de financement entre ces deux sociétés, assortie d’une clause d’élection de for, soit une circonstance pouvant établir des liens manifestement plus étroits avec un autre pays, au sens du paragraphe 3 de cet article ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=255424&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686272

AG Pikamae delivered yesterday his opinion in case C‑7/21 (Lkw Walter Internationale Transportorganisation AG), which is on the Service Regulation and Brussels I bis (Slovenian decision delivered in the absence of the defendant and notified in Austria in Slovenian only and with only 8 days to oppose). The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version) :

« 1) L’article 8, paragraphes 1 et 3, du règlement (CE) nº 1393/2007 […] lu conjointement avec l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’oppose pas à une réglementation nationale du droit de l’État de condamnation selon laquelle le délai pour exercer un recours contre une décision matérialisée par un acte judiciaire signifié ou notifié conformément au règlement nº 1393/2007 commence à courir dès la signification ou la notification de l’acte en question et non uniquement lorsque le délai d’une semaine prévu au paragraphe 1 dudit article pour refuser de recevoir cet acte a expiré.

2) L’article 45, paragraphe 1, sous b), et l’article 46 du règlement (UE) nº 1215/2012 […] lus conjointement avec l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux, doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’il y a lieu de refuser la reconnaissance et l’exécution d’une décision qui n’a pas été rendue dans le cadre d’une procédure contradictoire lorsqu’un recours contre la décision doit être exercé dans une langue autre que la langue officielle de l’État membre dans lequel le défendeur réside ou, s’il existe plusieurs langues officielles dans cet État membre, autre que la langue officielle ou l’une des langues officielles du lieu où il réside, et que, selon le droit de l’État membre dans lequel la décision a été rendue, le délai non renouvelable pour exercer le recours n’est que de huit jours civils.

3) L’article 18 TFUE doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’applique pas à une situation dans laquelle le destinataire d’un acte judiciaire a renoncé à exercer son droit de refuser la notification ou la signification dudit acte conformément à l’article 8, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 1393/2007 ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=255446&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686272

The Court of Justice delivered earlier this month (3 March 2022) its judgment in case C‑421/20 (Acacia Srl v BMW AG), which is about Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs and Rome II:

« Article 88(2) and Article 89(1)(d) of [Regulation (EC) No 6/2002] and Article 8(2) [Rome II] must be interpreted as meaning that the Community design courts before which an action for infringement pursuant to Article 82(5) of Regulation No 6/2002 is brought concerning acts of infringement committed or threatened within a single Member State must examine the claims supplementary to that action, seeking the award of damages, the submission of information, documents and accounts and the handing over of the infringing products with a view to their being destroyed, on the basis of the law of the Member State in which the acts allegedly infringing the Community design relied upon are committed or are threatened, which is the same, in the circumstances of an action brought pursuant to that Article 82(5), as the law of the Member State in which those courts are situated ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=254964&mode=req&pageIndex=3&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=730419

The Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) delivered on 22 February 2022 its judgment in case C‑430/21 (RS), which is about the Rule of Law, the principle of primacy of EU law and the protection of judges from disciplinary proceedings in their application of EU Law:

«  The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 and Article 4(2) and (3) TEU, with Article 267 TFEU and with the principle of the primacy of EU law, must be interpreted as precluding national rules or a national practice under which the ordinary courts of a Member State have no jurisdiction to examine the compatibility with EU law of national legislation which the constitutional court of that Member State has found to be consistent with a national constitutional provision that requires compliance with the principle of the primacy of EU law.

2. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 and Article 4(2) and (3) TEU, with Article 267 TFEU and with the principle of the primacy of EU law, must be interpreted as precluding national rules or a national practice under which a national judge may incur disciplinary liability on the ground that he or she has applied EU law, as interpreted by the Court, thereby departing from case-law of the constitutional court of the Member State concerned that is incompatible with the principle of the primacy of EU law ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=254384&mode=req&pageIndex=7&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=730419

Kadir Has University Climate Change and Law Laboratory (CCLLAB), continues its series of events on legal aspects of Climate Change. At the sixth session of Climate Change and Law Seminars, Kadir Has University Climate Change and Law Laboratory (CCLLAB) will be honored by the lecture of Prof. Dr. Sam Fankhauser on Trends in Climate Legislation. Event is open to public via Zoom. No formal registration required; we would appreciate however if you confirm your participation by sending an e-mail to ccllab@khas.edu.tr. To find out more about our lab, please visit https://ccllab.khas.edu.tr/

Sam Fankhauser is Professor of Climate Economics and Policy at the University of Oxford, where he is affiliated with the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment and the School of Geography and the Environment. He is also Research Director of Oxford Net Zero. Before moving to Oxford, Sam was Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics, where he remains a Visiting Professor. He has also worked at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility.

The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain M/T “PRESTIGE” (No. 5) [2022] EWCA Civ 238 is an appeal against The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain [2020] EWHC 1920 which I reported on here.

The issue on this appeal (tag ‘Prestige’ on this blog and ‘Prestige(@GAVClaw)’ on Twitter search will give you plenty of returns) is the very reference of the judge to the CJEU. At Kirchberg the case is known under reference C-700/20 and the hearing was held a few weeks back.

At issue is essentially whether the judge should have made reference to the CJEU at all, hence querying the ‘necessity’ of a reference to the CJEU including in this particular context of Brexit (with the Court of Appeal now longer being able to refer to Luxembourg by the time the case would have reached it).

Phillips LJ holds [47] that the reference was not necessary in light of CJEU authority on that element of necessity and that the judge should not have made it. Yet under the EU rule of law, a Court of Appeal cannot set aside the reference: [56] all the CA can do is ask the judge to reconsider, with [60] a call for fast-tracking in the event the CJEU might  rule before the judge withdraws the reference: if that latter is what he would be minded to do.

An interesting EU institutional law issue.

Geert.

 

1/2 EU rule of law
LDN Steam-Ship Owners' Mutual Insurance v Spain re Prestige [2022] EWCA Civ 238
Held CJEU referral should not have been made and judge must reconsider his reference to Luxembourghttps://t.co/tIAj7hmU8o
For judgment appealed see https://t.co/LgOFOXsRmo

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 4, 2022

 

You are kindly invited to the online conference on “Cross-border portability of refugees’ personal and family status – a plea for better interplay between private international law and migration law” by Prof. Dr. Jinske Verhellen on March 16, 2022, Wednesday between 12.30-13.30 (GMT+3). The conference is organized by Bilkent University as a part of the Talks on Migration Series within the Jean Monnet Module on European and International Migration Law. It will be held via zoom, free of charge. Please contact us (Jmmigration@bilkent.edu.tr) for participation.

Biography:
Jinske Verhellen is a Professor of Private International Law and Head of the Institute for Private International Law at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of Ghent University (Belgium). She is a member of the Ghent University Interfaculty Research Group CESSMIR (Centre for the Social Study of Migration and Refugees) and of the Ghent University Human Rights Research Network. She has published on various aspects of private international law, international family law, migration law, and nationality law.
Abstract:
The lecture will address several legal problems encountered by refugees with regard to their personal and family status acquired in one country and transferred to another country (such as the absence of documentary evidence, the issue of limping legal relationships). It will focus on the interactions between international refugee law (relating to the rights and obligations of States regarding the protection of refugees) and private international law (dealing with private relationships in a cross-border context). These two sets of rules still operate in very different and even separated universes. The following issues will be covered: specific private international law hurdles that refugees have to take, the concept of personal status (age, parental status, marital status) in international refugee law, and the role of private international law conventions in the international protection of refugees.

On 1 January 2021, the divorce between the United Kingdom and the European Union became effective. Where do we stand one year later?

The Spanish journal La Ley-Unión Europea chose this topic to celebrate its number 100 issue, published last February. Under the title “La Unión Europea tras el primer año del brexit” (The European Union one year after Brexit), this monograph gathers the analysis of almost 40 reputed Spanish law professors and professionals.

It is therefore marked by the wide range of subjects covered, all pertaining to legal areas affected by the withdrawal: transport, the world of business, international cooperation against tax fraud, VAT, social security of temporarily posted workers, environmental policies, intellectual property or cybersecurity…, and, of course, cross-border civil and commercial matters.

A timely topic, well chosen for a well-deserved celebration; and a widely shared conclusion to my question above. In a nutshell: first, although Brexit has by no means gone unnoticed (my experience: buy now a scientific book, have it shipped from the UK, and look at the custom fees), in many respects its consequences are still far from being ascertainable. Second, as regards legal production in areas not regulated by the Withdrawal Agreement, there is not much to report.

International cooperation in civil and commercial matters has undergone a substantial transformation since the UK left the European Union. Nonetheless, as Sixto Sánchez Lorenzo points out, to this day the practical impact of Brexit in cross-border relationships looks rather limited. At the same time, the lack, in the negotiating process, of a serious treatment of the issues raised by the breaking off of judicial cooperation in civil matters foretells a future scenario of “conventional patches and legal poultices” (my translation of the, most probably, non-translatable expression of the author: “remiendos convencionales y cataplasmas jurídicas”). The Supreme Court’s magistrate Juan María Díaz Fraile confirms, listing in detail EU instruments no longer applicable in the relations UK/EU, together with their replacements: international conventions or national law, as the case may be.

Further contributions provide illustrations in line with Professor Lorenzo’s views, mapping the muddled legal landscape academics have described and deplored since June 2016. No one can claim lack of knowledge of the risks, for cross-border commercial and personal relationships, of a Brexit without some kind of cooperation agreement. To no avail. Nothing has happened during 2021 to put a remedy, though it would be wrong to pretend nothing has happened: as we know, the “Lugano” way is over.

In terms of legal certainty, and for obvious reasons, the status quo post-Brexit appear at first sight less desperate where an already existing multilateral convention fills the gap. That is why Ángel Espiniella Menéndez describes post-Brexit cross-border insolvency as a “leap in the dark”, and regrets the absence of an international convention to make up for the loss of the European Insolvency Regulation.

But, in fact, the existence of conventions is unlikely to suffice. In relation to choice of court agreements, Pedro de Miguel Asensio recalls that the 2005 Hague Convention is binding on the EU and the UK. Nonetheless, he immediately notices the shortcomings of the instrument when compared to the Brussels Regulations. Similarly, Pilar Jiménez Blanco states: “Brexit has weakened the effectiveness of the choice of the British courts. Whether the practical evolution of the 2005 Hague Convention will compensate for this weakening is uncertain but doubtful, due to the very limitations of the convention” (my translation). In the field of family law, Santiago Álvarez says, referring to Regulation 2201/2003: “Its void can hardly be filled by the 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction and the 1996 Hague Convention on  Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, which also bind all EU Member States. This change, despite some peculiar, very peculiar, opinions (…), is a step backwards, especially with regard to the illicit transfer or retention of a minor. The system of the Regulation is simply better than the one of the Convention” (my translation). Only in relation to the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations is the impact of Brexit less harsh, according to Manuel Penadés Fons: conflict of law rules can operate unilaterally and universally; the Rome I and Rome II Regulations have “remained” in the UK through the European Union (Withdrawal) Act and the (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 No. 834.

While the outcome of the analysis conducted and published may deceive, the effort made by the authors is by no means worthless. The threat of Brexit kept all us busy; so did the Withdrawal Agreement. Now we are “there”; the challenge is following up, looking in as much as possible at the reactions of all sides (EU, the UK – England and Wales or Scotland-, the single Member States) .

The special issue of La Ley-Unión Europea is preceded by an editorial by Professor Fernández Rozas, editor-in chief almost from the foundation. To all those who can read Spanish, I recommend joining him in his journey along the thirty-seven years of the journal: the same period Spain has been a EU Member State. With his distinctive style, Professor Rozas presents the history and evolution of the periodical in parallel to the most relevant developments of the European Communities, later the Union. To my mind, a piece of specific interest, in particular, to the younger generations of Spanish academics.

La Ley-Unión Europea is nowadays a well-established journal, characterized by a rare combination: a quickness of reaction to the legal developments in the European Union (something that only monthly monthlies can achieve), which is not detrimental to the quality of the contributions. Congratulations, Professor Rozas; go for the next hundred issues.

La France préside le Conseil de l’Union européenne pour six mois. À cette occasion, la Délégation des Barreaux de France et Lefebvre Dalloz s’associent pour vous proposer ce podcast dont la vocation est de sensibiliser sur les travaux et les actions conduites dans le domaine de la justice au plan européen.

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Un État membre de l’Union européenne peut exercer sa faculté, prévue par la directive 2013/32/UE, de rejeter une demande de protection internationale comme étant irrecevable au motif que le demandeur s’est déjà vu accorder le statut de réfugié par un autre État membre, même si ce demandeur est le père d’un enfant mineur non accompagné ayant obtenu le bénéfice de la protection subsidiaire dans le premier État membre. Mais, les pays européens ont l’obligation de veiller au maintien de l’unité familiale.

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This Thursday AG Pikamäe delivered his Opinion in the case LKW Walter, C-7/21. The request for a preliminary ruling originates in the proceedings on a litigation malpractice action, between a company established under Austrian law and the lawyers established in that Member State, who represented the said company in the proceedings in which it acted as a defendant.

By this request, the referring court seeks the interpretation of the Brussels I bis Regulation, of the Service Regulation and of the Article 18(1) TFEU (interdiction of discrimination on the grounds of nationality).

 

Legal and factual context

In litigation malpractice actions, a court seized with such action has usually to establish the hypothetical outcome of the litigation within which the malpractice allegedly had place, assuming that it did not happen. Thus, these actions have the potential of giving rise to a so-called “litigation within litigation” scenario.

The particularity of the case LKW Walter, C-17/21, results from the specific object of action brought before the Austrian courts. Here, the alleged malpractice is supposed to result from the negligence that, according to the claimant, have occurred in the proceedings pending before Slovenian courts.

In fact, a decision on enforcement, in Slovenian, adopted in these proceedings, has been served, by post, to the Austrian company. Under Slovenian law, a reasoned objection against such decision on enforcement must be lodged within eight days.

However, the lawyers – now the defendant lawyers – failed to lodge the reasoned objection within the time limit provided for in Slovenian law. It happened within twelve days of service of the decision. Ultimately, the Austrian company settled in full the debt established by the decision on enforcement.

The Austrian company brought the action against its lawyers before the courts of that Member State. Here, the defendant lawyers argue, in particular, that the time limit set by the Slovenian legislator is not compatible with EU law.

Faced with that line of defence, the Austrian court decided to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. As an outcome, by its preliminary questions, the referring court in the present case seeks the interpretation of EU law in order to benchmark against it the provisions of Slovenian law. That configuration may bring to mind the judgment of the Court in the case Werynski, C-283/09.

 

Preliminary questions

The referring court in the present case asks:

1) Are Articles 36 and 39 of [the Brussels I bis Regulation], read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principles of effectiveness and equivalence [principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU], to be interpreted as precluding a provision of a Member State [under which] an objection [against a decision of enforcement] must be lodged within eight days in the language of that Member State, even if the decision on enforcement is served in another Member State in a language which the addressee does not understand, and the objection is already rejected as being out of time if it is lodged within twelve days?

2) Is Article 8 of [the Service Regulation], read in conjunction with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, to be interpreted as precluding a national measure which provides that, upon service of the standard form set out in Annex II informing the addressee of his or her right to refuse to accept the document within a period of one week, the period also begins to run in respect of bringing the appeal provided for against the decision on enforcement served at the same time, for which a period of eight days is laid down?

3) Is Article 18(1) TFEU to be interpreted as precluding a provision of a Member State which provides for, as the remedy against a decision on enforcement, an objection, which must be lodged within eight days, and that time limit also applies where the addressee of the decision on enforcement is established in another Member State and the decision on enforcement is not written either in the official language of the Member State in which the decision on enforcement is served or in a language which the addressee of the decision understands?

 

Assessment of the preliminary questions provided for in the Opinion

In his Opinion, AG Pikamäe proposes to the Court to address, in the first place, the second preliminary question on the interpretation of Article 8 of the Service Regulation.

In his view, Article 8(1) and (3) of the Service Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, does not preclude a provision of a Member Stater under which the time limit for lodging an objection against a decision embodied in a judicial document served in accordance with Service Regulation begins to run from the time of service of the document in question, and not only after the expiry of the one-week time limit provided for in Article 8(1) for refusing to accept the document (point 56).

As a reminder, Article 8(1) of the Regulation provides that it is possible to refuse to accept the document at the time of service or by returning the document to the receiving agency within one week if it is not written in, or accompanied by a translation into, a language which the addressee understands or the official language of the Member State addressed. The Austrian company, represented by the defendant lawyers, did not exercise such right of refusal after being served with the Slovenian decision on enforcement (see point 99).

 

 

Concerning the first preliminary question, AG debates the admissibility of the question. He considers that the Court should answer it: the question benefits from the presumption of its relevance and the referring court seeks the interpretation of EU law in order to pronounce itself on the line of defence put forward by the defendant lawyers (point 59). I can speculatively imagine that the defendant lawyers could argue that it was not necessary to satisfy the debt established by the decision on enforcement as it was not enforceable in Austria or, in the alternative, it was possible to contest its enforcement in that Member State (and, thus, in the extension of this logic, the Austrian company prematurely settled the debt and/or contributed to the damage it incurred).

In any case, according to AG, the second preliminary question calls for its reformulation. He considers that the referring court in actuality seeks the interpretation of Articles 45(1)(b) and 46 of the Brussels I bis Regulation (ground for refusal of enforcement, based on the improper service of the decision), read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter (point 62). In essence, he proposes to consider that these provisions call for a refusal of enforcement of the decision in circumstances such as those of the present case (point 93).

 

Finally, as to the third preliminary question, AG takes that view that Article 18(1) TFEU does not apply to a situation in which the addressee of a judicial document has waived his (her) right to refuse service of that document in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Service Regulation (point 101).

 

The Opinion can be consulted here (no English version yet).

The EAPIL Board has been closely monitoring the evolving situation in Ukraine during the past two weeks and established contact with the Ukrainian members of EAPIL. Some members have left the country, others are still in Ukraine. All are in need of support.

Several academic institutions in Europe offer funding or have established scholarships for refugee scholars and scientists. The funding is either available for refugee scholars from any country, for refugee scholars from Ukraine only, or for refugee scholars from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. The EAPIL Board has collected information on those funding opportunities, which appear below. The list is certainly not complete. We, therefore, invite all readers of the blog to let us know if there are further funding opportunities not yet mentioned.

In addition, the EAPIL wishes to communicate that some members are looking for a way to finance their living through remunerated work. If you know of any opportunities (notably work that can be done remotely from Ukraine or other places) please let us know.

The list below is reproduced (and will be updated, as the case may be) here.

For all further details and information please get in touch with the Secretary General at secretary.general@eapil.org.

General Sources

• ASEES
• The Ukraine Network
• Lviv Center
• German Funding for Researchers
• Israeli Universities’ Emergency Fellowships for Ukrainians

Germany

• Philipp Schwartz Initiative
  • Funding for refugee scholars and scientists from all countries
  • 24 (+12) months fellowship in Germany

• Volkswagen Stiftung
  • Funding for refugee scholars and scientists from Ukraine
  • Nomination for Ukrainian scholars due March 18

• Gerda Henkel Foundation
  • Grants totalling 2 million euros for Ukrainian (Belarussian and Russian) scholars

• DAFI (Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative) Scholarship programme
• Leibniz Institute for educational media fellowship (Braunschweig)
• Universität Bremen/Forschungsstelle Osteuropa
  • Funding for scholars from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (Hans Koschnick Stipendien)

• HessenFonds for refugees and researchers at risk
  • Funding for researchers at risk for 12 months
  • Nomination due by 23 March

• LMU Munich
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers at LMU

• University of Tübingen
  • 10 Research@Tübingen scholarships for Ukrainian scholars (for up to 12 months)

Western / Central Europe

• Austrian Academy of Sciences (Austria)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• University of Graz (Austria)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• Le Collège de France PAUSE Solidarity with Ukraine (France)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• Swiss National Science Foundation (Switzerland)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• KU Leuven (Belgium)
  • KU Leuven is setting up a fund for the accommodation of Ukrainian students and researchers looking for shelter, or for necessary extensions of stay for those already at KU Leuven; contact: ukraine@kuleuven.be
• University of Reading (UK)
  • Sanctuary scholarships for refugee scholars

Northern Europe

• Aarhus Institute for Advanced Studies (Denmark)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

• Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (Sweden)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian researchers

Eastern Europe

• Polish Academy of Sciences (Poland)
• Polish Young Academy PAS(Poland)
  • Help for scholars from Ukraine arriving in Poland

• Polish Sociological Association(Poland)
  • Organizes accommodation and transportation from the Polish border for Ukrainian scholars and others.

Others

• NEP4DISSENT
  • EU-funded, international scholarly network dedicated to research on resistance and dissent in former socialist countries
  • Emergency Funding for Ukrainian scholars

• Threatened Scholars Integration Initiative (TSI)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian scholars

• Tel Aviv University Emergency Fund (Israel)
  • Emergency funding for Ukrainian students

Further Resources

• Scholars at Risk
  • Assists with placement, doesn’t fund scholars
• Article 26 Backpack at UC Davis
  • Provides digital storage of important academic documents for displaced scholars and students
• NAFSA Immigration Resources: Ukraine

ˮGrossmaniaˮ
Libre circulation des capitaux
Les personnes déchues, en méconnaissance du droit de l’Union, de leurs droits d’usufruit sur des terres agricoles en Hongrie doivent pouvoir réclamer la réinscription de ces droits au registre foncier ou une compensation

Meeting of the Council on General Affairs and Policy

The Council on General Affairs and Policy of the HCCH met online from 28 February to 4 March 2022, with over 450 participants. Over the course of five days, HCCH Members reviewed progress made to date and agreed on the work programme for the year ahead in terms of normative, non-normative and governance work. More information is available here.

Several important developments relating to Membership and HCCH Conventions occurred during the meeting:

• El Salvador deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Statute, becoming the 91stMember of the HCCH.
• Ecuador signed the 2007 Child Support Convention and 2007 Maintenance Obligations Protocol and deposited its instrument of ratification of both instruments, which will enter into force on 1 July 2022.
• The United States of America signed the 2019 Judgments Convention, becoming its sixth signatory.

More information on these developments is available here.

 

Other developments

 

Conventions & Instruments

On 1 January 2022, the HCCH 1965 Service Convention entered into force for Georgia. It currently has 79 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.

On 18 February 2022, the Philippines signed the 2007 Child Support Convention. The Convention will enter into force for the Philippines further to the deposit of its instrument of ratification. More information is available here.

 

Meetings & Events

From 11 to 20 January 2022, the International Hague Network of Judges (IHNJ) met via videoconference, with the participation of judges from 35 States. Established in 1998, the IHNJ facilitates international cooperation and communication between judges on the cross-border protection of children. More information is available here.

On 28 January 2022, the HCCH participated in the panel discussion “Thailand and the HCCH Core Conventions: Connecting Possibility and Approach”, organised by the Ministry of Justice of Thailand.

From 7 to 9 February 2022, the International Transfer of Maintenance Funds Experts’ Group met via videoconference. The Group continued its work discussing good practices and identifying possible future improvements in relation to the cross-border transfer of child support payments, with a view to facilitating the most cost-effective, transparent, prompt, efficient and accessible cross-border transfer of funds. More information is available here.

From 14 to 18 February 2022, the second meeting of the Working Group on Matters Related to Jurisdiction in Transnational Civil or Commercial Litigation was held via videoconference. The Group made further progress on the development of draft provisions on parallel litigation in civil or commercial matters, which may occur when separate proceedings are instituted before the courts of different States. More information is available here.

 

Publications and Documentation

On 22 February 2022, the Permanent Bureau launched consultations on the draft Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 2000 Protection of Adults Convention. More information is available here.

On 28 February 2022, the Permanent Bureau announced the publication of the HCCH 2021 Annual Report. More information is available here.

 

Vacancies

Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships from July to December 2022. The deadline for the submission of applications is 17 March 2022 (18:00 CET). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

The latest issue of the IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts) has been published. As always, it contains a number of articles and case comments on issues of jurisdiction and applicable law (including one by me). The table of contents of the issue is available here. The following abstracts have been kindly provided to us.

H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner, European Conflict of Law 2021: The Challenge of Digital Transformation

This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2021 until December 2021. It gives information on newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are presently making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore, the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss both important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU as well as important decisions from German courts pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

Wais, The Applicable Law in Cases of Collective Redress

Both the European and the German legislator have recently passed legislation aimed at establishing access to collective redress for consumers. As European conflict of law rules do not contain any specific rules on the applicable law in cases of collective redress, the existing rules should be applied in a way that enables consumers to effectively pursue collective actions. To that aim, Art. 4 (3) 1st S. Rome II-Regulation provides for the possibility to rely on the place of the event that has given rise to the damages as a connecting-factor for collective redress cases in which mass damages have occurred in different states. As a consequence of its application, all claims are governed by the same applicable law, thereby fostering the effectiveness of collective redress.

Lehmann, Locating Financial Loss and Collective Actions in Case of Defective Investor Information: The CJEU’s Judgment in VEB v BP

For the first time, the CJEU has ruled in VEB v BP on the court competent for deciding liability suits regarding misinformation on the secondary securities market. The judgment is also of utmost importance for the jurisdiction over collective actions. This contribution analyses the decision, puts it into larger context, and discusses its repercussions for future cases.

Pika, Letters of Comfort and Alternative Obligations under the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations

In its judgment of 25 November 2020 (7 U 147/19), the Higher Regional Court of Brandenburg ruled on special jurisdiction regarding letters of comfort under Article 7 No. 1 Brussels I Regulation. While the court left the decision between lit. a and lit. b of that Article open, it ruled that either way, the courts at the domicile of the creditor of the letter of comfort (in this case: the subsidiary) have no special jurisdiction. This article supports the court’s final conclusion. In addition, it assesses that Article 7 No. 1 lit. b Brussels I Regulation on services may apply to letters of comforts given the CJEU’s decision in Kareda (C-249/16).

Hess/A.J. Wille, Russian default interests before the District Court of Frankfort

In its judgment of February 2021, the Landgericht Frankfurt a.M., applying Russian law, awarded a three-month interest rate of 37% to a defendant domiciled in Germany. When examining public policy, the regional court assumed that there was little domestic connection (Inlandsbezug), as the case was about the repayment of a loan issued in Moscow for an investment in Russia. However, the authors point out that the debtor’s registered office in Hesse established a clear domestic connection. In addition, the case law of German courts interpreting public policy under Article 6 EGBGB should not be directly applied to the interpretation of Articles 9 and 21 of the Rome I Regulation.

Looschelders, Implied choice of law under the EU Succession Regulation – not just a transitional problem in connection with joint wills

The decision of the German Federal Supreme Court focuses on the question, under which conditions an implied choice of law may be assumed within the framework of the EU Succession Regulation (Regulation No 650/2012). In this particular case, an implied choice of German law as the law governing the binding effect of the joint will drawn up by the German testator and her predeceased Austrian husband was affirmed by reference to recital 39(2) of the EU Succession Regulation. Actually, the joint will of the spouses stipulated the binding effect as intended by German law. As the spouses had drawn up their will before the Regulation became applicable, the question of an implied choice of law arose in the context of transition. However, the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court will gain fundamental importance regarding future cases of implied choices of law for all types of dispositions of property upon death, too. Nevertheless, since the solution of the interpretation problem is not clear and unambiguous, a submission to the ECJ would have been necessary.

Reimann, Human Rights Litigation Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Crucial Role of the Act of State Doctrine

The Kashef case currently before the federal courts in New York shows that human rights litigation against corporate defendants in the United States is alive and well. Even after the Supreme Court’s dismantling of the Alien Tort Claims Act jurisdiction remains possible, though everything depends on the circumstances. And even after the Supreme Court’s virtual elimination of federal common law causes of action claims under state or foreign law remain possible, though they may entail complex choice-of-law issues.

Yet, so far, the most momentous decision in this litigation is the Court of Appeals’ rejection of the defendants’ potentially most powerful argument: the Court denied them shelter under the act of state doctrine. It did so most importantly because the alleged human rights abuses amounted to violations of jus cogens.

Coming from one of the most influential courts in the United States, the Second Circuit’s Kashef decision adds significant weight to the jus cogens argument against the act of state doctrine. As long as the Supreme Court remains silent on the issue, Kashef will stand as a prominent reference point for future cases. This is bad news for corporate defendants, good news for plaintiffs, and excellent news for the enforcement of human rights through civil litigation.

Samtleben, Paraguay: Choice of Law in international contracts

To date, Paraguay is the only country to have implemented into its national law the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts. Law No. 5393 of 2015, which closely follows the Hague model, owes its creation primarily to the fact that the Paraguayan delegate to the Hague was actively involved in drafting the Principles. Unlike the Principles, however, Law No. 5393 also regulates the law governing the contract in the absence of a choice of law, following the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts of Mexico. Contrary to the traditional rejection of party autonomy in Latin America, several Latin American countries have recently permitted choice of law in their international contract law. Paraguay has joined this trend with its new law, but it continues to maintain in procedural law that the jurisdiction of Paraguayan courts cannot be waived by party agreement.

Suppipat & Ors v Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Ltd & Ors [2022] EWHC 381 (Comm) repeats (and indeed refers to) the inadequate discussion of applicable law and privilege in PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov which I discuss here.

The application is for an order prohibiting respondents from using or deploying in these proceedings certain documents covered by legal professional privilege and/or containing confidential information, copies of which the respondents obtained pursuant to subpoenas in Thailand.

It is not in dispute apparently [26] and in any event Pelling J would have concluded that whether a document is capable of being privileged is a question to be determined as a matter of English conflicts law by the lex fori, which in this case is English law. That follows not undisputedly from the Rome Regulation which applies to the proceedings as either acquired or retained EU law (it is not clear when the claim form was issued).

The next question that arises is whether the Documents should be treated as privileged in this litigation notwithstanding that they have been obtained by the respondents lawfully by operation of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction in Thailand. This question is discussed as one of an alleged breach of an obligation of confidence (the subpoena in Thailand does not mean that the documents have entered the public domain) and the law that should apply to that obligation which both parties suggest must be discussed under Rome II. Thai law according to the defendants ([38-39] an unjust enrichment /restitution claim under Article 10; alternatively locus damni under the general rule of Article 4 with Thailand as the locus damni, it being the place of disclosure) , however claimants maintain that the issue is to be resolved applying English law for essentially all the reasons set out in the authorities deciding that English law applies to the question whether a particular document is privileged or not.

 

 

Pelling J [40] ff agrees with the claimants and holds that even if Rome II were to apply, both A16 Rome II’s overriding mandatory law rule and A26’s ordre public rule would trump Thai law given the robust nature of legal advice privilege in English law. That statement leads to an incorrect application of both Articles (for starters, A26 requires case-specific, not generic application).

The Rome II discussion cuts many corners and is certainly appealable. The judge’s views put the horse before the cart. Neither Article 16 nor Article 26 are meant to blow a proper Rome II analysis out off the water. Nor as I flagged, does the judgment do justice to the proper application of A16 and 26.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.81.

Documents must be treated as privileged under English lex fori notwithstanding they were obtained lawfully by court order of competent jurisdiction in Thailand
Considers comity and extraterritoriality

Suppipat v Siam Commercial Bank [2022] EWHC 381 (Comm)https://t.co/dJivtUuef4

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 4, 2022

Lord Justice Coulson the other week refused [PGI Group Ltd v Thomas & Ors (Application for Permission to Appeal) [2022] EWCA Civ 233] permission to appeal against the High Court’s refusal to grant a capped cost order – CCO in the Malawi exploitation and abuse case.

Coulson LJ firstly grants that the judge may have expressed himself more clearly on some of the technical aspects of the costs in the case however did not misapply relevant CPR rules. Secondly, on the more substantive element of the case the Court of Appeal held that the judge was right to ignore the much lower cost implications of possible Malawi proceedings for to do so, as I flagged in my post on the High Court judgment, would bring in a forum non conveniens defence via the back door of cost orders: [45]:

The costs of pursuing the claim in Malawi must be irrelevant to the making of a CCO in the UK. If a claim is validly brought in the UK, then that brings with it the reasonable/proportionate costs of pursuing those proceedings in the UK.

A good judgment.

Geert.

Lord Justice Coulson refusing permission to appeal against judgment rejecting CCO Capped Cost Order in Malawi #bizhumanrights case

PGI Group v Thomas & Ors (Application for PTO) [2022] EWCA Civ 233 https://t.co/EpGrJi6Smq

For first instance judgment see https://t.co/Em5jyZADeM pic.twitter.com/C7M8ENEETa

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 25, 2022