
La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme estime, à une très courte majorité, qu’il résulte de la mise en balance des différents intérêts en jeu, valablement effectuée par les juridictions internes, que les motifs retenus par ces dernières pour justifier la primauté de la liberté d’information étaient suffisants et pertinents pour justifier l’ingérence litigieuse et qu’il n’y a pas eu violation de l’article 8 de la Convention.
HCCH Monthly Update: September 2025
Conventions & Instruments
On 18 September 2025, Argentina deposited its instrument of ratification of the 1996 Child Protection Convention. With the ratification of Argentina, the Convention now has 58 Contracting Parties. It will enter into force for Argentina on 1 January 2026.More information is available here.
Meetings & Events
On 11 and 12 September 2025, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH hosted a Roundtable and Training on the application of the 1980 Child Abduction and 1996 Child Protection Conventions, in particular concerning the children of Ukraine. More information is available here.
From 17 to 19 September 2025, the Experts’ Group (EG) on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) held its fourth working meeting. Pursuant to its mandate, the EG made further progress on the study of the applicable law and jurisdiction issues raised by the cross-border use and transfers of CBDCs. More information is available here.
On 25 and 26 September, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH hosted training on the HCCH’s core family law Conventions and projects for a group of judges and court officials from 16 States. The training was organised in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network. More information is available here.
On 26 September 2025, the second meeting of the Working Group (WG) established to finalise the Model Forms pertaining to Chapter II of the 1970 Evidence Convention was held online.
Upcoming Events
Registration is now open to the public for online participation in the “HCCH-IDLO Dialogue on Digitalisation of Public Services and Justice”. The event will be held on Friday 10 October 2025, from 10.00 to 11.30 a.m. (CEST). Interested persons should register no later than Tuesday 7?October 2025 via this registration form. More information is available here.
Vacancies
Applications are now open for the position of Legal Officer. The deadline for the submission of applications is 1 November 2025. More information is available here.
Applications are now open for the position of Finance / Human Resources Assistant. The deadline for the submission of applications is 11 October 2025. More information is available here.
These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.
Appelée à se prononcer sur la conformité au droit de l’Union du droit espagnol relatif à la prescription des actions du contentieux privé, la Cour de justice a saisi l’occasion de consolider et de préciser sa jurisprudence portant sur la fixation du dies a quo. S’appuyant sur le principe d’effectivité, la Cour impose aux autorités nationales d’instituer un régime de la prescription qui permette aux actions en indemnisation intentées à la suite d’infractions au droit de la concurrence de prospérer. Ainsi, lorsque les victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles entendent fonder leurs demandes sur une décision de sanction prononcée par une autorité nationale de concurrence, le dies a quo ne saurait être fixé avant que la décision de sanction ne devienne définitive. De manière générale, il semble être de bonne méthode de faire courir le délai de prescription à compter de la date de publication de l’arrêt qui confirme la décision prononcée par l’autorité de concurrence.
The University of Hamburg has announced its second Call for Applications for the Lindemann Fellowship for Private International Law. Eligible are researchers based in Europe who recently completed or are close to completing their PhD studies, with a main research focus on conflict of laws and/or international civil procedure.
Becoming a Lindemann Fellow means having a 3-year grant within a vibrant European network, fully funded annual meetings to present and discuss your research, and publication in an open-access collected volume.
More information about the Fellowship is available at the webpage: https://www.jura.uni-hamburg.de/duden/60-fellowship-lindemann.html
Applications (combined into a single PDF) must be submitted by 1 November 2025 to lindemann-fellowship@uni-hamburg.de.
by Jean-Charles Jais, Guillaume Croisant, Canelle Etchegorry, and Alexia Kaztaridou (all Linklaters)
On 17 September 2025, the French Cour de cassation handed down its decision on the Lastre case. This followed a landmark preliminary ruling of February 2025 from the CJEU, which laid out the conditions for a valid asymmetric jurisdiction clause under article 25 of the Brussels I recast regulation.
Asymmetric jurisdiction clauses allow one party to initiate proceedings in multiple courts or any competent court, while the other party has fewer options or is restricted to a specific jurisdiction. Such clauses are common in financial agreements (read more in our previous blog post here).
In the latest development of the Lastre case in France, the French Supreme Court opted for a pro-contractual autonomy stance, favouring the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses.
Background to the decision
A French company had entered into a contract for the supply of cladding panels for a construction project with an Italian supplier. The supplier’s general terms and conditions provided for the jurisdiction of the Italian court of Brescia but reserved its right to proceed against the buyer before “another competent court in Italy or abroad”.
Following defects in the works in late 2019, proceedings were initiated before French courts against all contractors, including the Italian supplier. The latter challenged the jurisdiction of the French courts, relying on the above-mentioned jurisdiction clause.
Consistent with previous precedents, the French First Instance Court and Court of Appeals dismissed the objection. These courts found that the clause granted the Italian supplier discretionary authority to select jurisdiction, rendering it invalid due to its failure to satisfy the foreseeability criterion outlined in article 25 of the Brussels I recast regulation.
The case was further appealed before the French Supreme Court, which referred preliminary questions to the CJEU. In its preliminary ruling, the CJEU clarified that the validity of asymmetric clauses was to be assessed using autonomous criteria derived from article 25 of the Regulation and set out the conditions for such clauses to be valid.
A pragmatic application of the CJEU’s three-fold approach to “any other competent court” clauses
In last week’s ruling, the French Supreme Court sought to follow the CJEU’s three-fold approach in examining the validity of asymmetric clauses and recalled that such clause must (i) designate courts competent under the Brussels I recast regulation and/or the Lugano Convention; (ii) identify sufficiently precise objective criteria to allow the court seized to determine its competence; and (iii) not conflict with special or exclusive jurisdiction rules set out in the Brussels I recast regulation or the Lugano Convention.
The French Supreme Court then held that the CJEU leaves it to national courts to interpret asymmetric clauses which allow one party to initiate proceedings before “any other competent court”, in accordance with the principles of party autonomy and practical effectiveness (effet utile).
On this basis, the French Supreme Court concluded that, in a case where the contractual relationship has no objective connecting factor with non-EU and non-Lugano States (i.e., third-party states), the jurisdiction clause designating “any other competent court” must be interpreted as referring to competent courts under the general rules of jurisdiction laid out in the Brussels I recast Regulation and the Lugano Convention. The clause thus complied with the first condition set by the CJEU, even if it did not expressly refer to these two instruments.
Accordingly, the French Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ decision and upheld the validity of the asymmetric jurisdiction clause.
Practical implications for asymmetric jurisdiction clauses
What does this ruling imply for parties wishing to rely or already relying on asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, particularly in cross-border contracts within the EU?
A more favourable treatment of asymmetric clauses
The French Supreme Court’s Lastre decision illustrates the Court’s pro-contractual autonomy approach to jurisdiction clauses. This will reassure parties seeking flexibility in drafting these clauses, particularly in light of certain earlier decisions which adopted a more cautious approach towards one-sided jurisdiction clauses.
The French Supreme Court’s contractual autonomy stance also appears in three decisions issued on the same day.
In one case, the Court followed its Lastre reasoning and upheld a bank’s clause granting exclusive jurisdiction to Luxembourg courts, while allowing the bank to bring proceedings at the client’s domicile or “other competent courts”.
In two other cases, the Court found that the clauses which designated a specific EU court and provided an objective criterion for determining the alternative jurisdiction available to one of the parties were sufficiently precise. These criteria were the location of the guarantor’s assets (case no. 23-18.785) and one of the parties’ registered office or that of its branch (case no. 23-16.150). This is in line with previous decisions validating asymmetric clauses, such as, for instance, the eBizcuss decision, which rely on objective criteria and generally supports the enforceability of asymmetric clauses.
Limitations for clauses with links to third-party states
While the French Supreme Court’s decision is a positive development for legal certainty and party autonomy, limitations and uncertainties remain.
First, the clause reviewed in the Lastre case conferred jurisdiction to the courts of a Member State (Brescia, in Italy), while reserving the possibility for one party to start proceedings before “any other competent courts”. As a result, the French Supreme Court did not address the validity of clauses that would also include the possibility for one party or both of them to start proceedings before one or several third-party state court(s), such as London or New York, a common feature in finance and banking contracts. The position on this remains uncertain.
Second, the ruling reinforces the material risk, stemming from the CJEU’s Lastre decision, that a clause designating “any competent court” could be deemed invalid where the contract has significant objective connecting factors with third-party states.
Third, the French Supreme Court’s interpretation is not binding on the courts of third-party states. However, in the scenario considered by the court (where there are no objective connecting factors to a third-party state), it is unlikely that a court in, for example, London or New York would accept jurisdiction. It would probably decline to hear the case under its own private international law rules.
Finally, this judgement does not guarantee a harmonised EU approach. It remains to be seen whether other Member State courts will adopt the same interpretation.
The White Paper on “Digital Product Passports and Critical Raw Materials for Batteries: Legal Conflicts and Principles for Cross-Border Cooperation” is now formally published on the UNECE website!
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe White Paper identifies and analyses the critical legal challenges in implementing Digital Product Passports (DPPs) for Critical Raw Materials (CRMs), including cobalt, copper, lithium, and nickel. These materials are essential for Energy Transition, for example, electric vehicles.
Yet, tracing their journey from mines to markets to recycling is legally complex and globally inconsistent. This fragmentation hinders sustainability and transition to circular economy.
The White Paper provides policymakers and businesses with: An analysis of conflicting legal frameworks in implementing DPPs; Guiding principles for cross-border cooperation in CRM-Battery value chains.
Read the full White Paper here.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
In Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch) there was succinct pondering whether a claim based on knowing receipt falls within A4 or A10 of Rome II.
Parties do not seem to have pushed the issue and the debate it seems is quickly settled as being covered by English law. In coming to this conclusion Vos DJ does cut a few corners. Firstly despite it not having been intense, there does seem to have been debate and no agreement per A14 Rome II.
Further, the judge and parties discuss the issue of qualification of the claim and whether this should be done using lex fori or (putative) lex causae ([405] in the case at issue, Liechtenstein law would seem to qualify the underlying breach of duty by a director in a similar way to a contractual claim). Under Rome II of course the answer to that question is: neither. Qualification in areas covered by harmonising instruments takes place under an autonomous, EU law concept. Post Brexit of course a relevant question is whether this general principle of EU (PrivInt) law continue to apply when UK Courts apply the ‘assimilated’ Rome I and II instruments. In the case at issue seemingly the answer is ‘not at all’, for with reference to Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader (No3) [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271) the conclusion is taken that a relationship which exists under foreign law should be examined to determine whether the duties which are owed would be characterised as fiduciary duties under English law, and that only if they are, a claim in knowing receipt can be brought in England.
[403] the judge holds that the application of A4 and 10 is likely to lead to the same result of English law being lex causae, and [404] that in any event, the circumstances are manifestly more closely connected with England than any other country, hence triggering the escape clause of A4(3) or (10)4. That as I have said before, is a topsy turvy way to go about a Rome II analysis. The ‘proper law of the tort’ exercise is only a narrow escape valve in Rome II (and I): not a general principle.
Geert.
Claim in knowing receipt. Most succinct ponder as to whether covered by A4 or 10 Rome II.Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…
— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-09-09T06:34:10.507Z
Now I know I have a blog queue at times but this one is unforgivably late. See here the report by Kathleen Garnett and myself on essential use in key international, US (federal) and EU law.
The concept of essential and non-essential use has been gaining traction in the broader context for chemicals policy. The authors of this report have analysed the concepts of “essential” and “non-essential” use under selected parts of International law, EU law, and US federal law with particular focus given to derogations/exemptions to a general prohibition/restriction which are (i) granted based on essentiality (or equivalent concepts) or (ii) are not granted because of non-essentiality (or equivalent concepts).
In July 2021 we completed a thorough review of essential uses approaches in 9 legal sources: The Montreal Protocol; the US Clean Air Act 1977; the EU Regulation 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases; the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants; the EU POPs Regulation 2019/1021; the EU Regulation 528/2012 on biocidal products; the EU Regulation 1107/2009 on plant protection products; the EU Directive 2011/65 on hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment; and the EU Regulation 1333/2008 on food additives.
The study concludes that deployment of an essential use justification in this complex area of the law is rare. The most common reasons for justifying a derogation and /or exemption, are:
The Montreal Protocol appears to be an outlier in the regulation of hazardous substances with an essential use approach, and our analysis of the 1978 US forerunner to that approach is a most relevant element, we submit, in the current discussions on essential uses.
Kathleen, Geert.
En présence d’un déficit budgétaire excessif, le principe d’indépendance des juges ne s’oppose pas à ce qu’un État membre abroge, après une suspension continue de longue durée, une législation en vertu de laquelle les magistrats ayant vingt ans d’ancienneté percevaient une indemnité de départ à la retraite.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
Campeau v Gottex Real Asset Fund 1 (OE) Waste SARL [2025] EWHC 2322 (Comm) is worth a flag for the discussion of CPR r. 6.33(2B) which allows a claimant not to have to seek permission to serve out of the jurisdiction in the context of choice of court under the 2005 Hague Convention. It reads
‘(2B) The claimant may serve the claim form on a defendant outside the United Kingdom where, for each claim made against the defendant to be served and included in the claim form—
(a) the court has power to determine that claim under the 2005 Hague Convention and the defendant is a party to an exclusive choice of court agreement conferring jurisdiction on that court within the meaning of Article 3 of the 2005 Hague Convention;
(b) a contract contains a term to the effect that the court shall have jurisdiction to determine that claim; or
(c) the claim is in respect of a contract falling within sub-paragraph (b).’
OE Waste’s argument is that Mr Campeau was not a party to the SPA which contains the clause, and there is no other basis, whether pursuant to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (‘the 1999 Act’) or as a matter of construction of the SPA on which Mr Campeau is to be treated as a party to, or permitted to rely on, the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the SPA. Moreover, there is no alternative basis in CPR 6.33(2B)(b) or (c) that would entitle Mr Campeau to serve the Claim Form out of the jurisdiction without permission.
Butcher J signals [28] that Mr Campeau ought to have submitted a request for permission to serve out as a subsidiary means, for under CPR PD 6B paragraph 3.1(6)(c), contract governed by English law, permission could have been granted on that basis. As it is, he decides on the basis of contractual construction that there is a good arguable case that the contractual scope of the choice of court clause did extend to a dispute over the extent of a third party’s rights under the relevant clause; and that the parties were agreed between themselves that such a dispute should be subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts.
The judgment is not particularly exciting however I decided to post anyway, seeing as it is a good example of contractual construction in the context of choice of court..
Geert.
Interesting judgment discussing choice of court (Hague 2005) and impact on claims by third parties; privity, contractual constructionCampeau v Gottex Real Asset Fund 1 (OE) Waste SARL [2025] EWHC 2322 (Comm)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…
— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-09-18T07:12:34.343Z
Le refus d’exécuter un mandat d’arrêt européen au titre de la résidence habituelle en France est subordonné à la réunion de deux conditions cumulatives. Dès lors, la chambre de l’instruction ne saurait écarter ce motif qu’au cas où l’une au moins de ces conditions ferait défaut.
The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 25 September 2025 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 22:30 (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is: A radical change in German Private International Law, the example of the naming law, which will be presented by Prof. Dr. Karl August von Sachsen Gessaphe (in Spanish).
The details of the webinar are:
Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85043670569?pwd=jJJBWFanSEfm5RpHKwS61bXI6yoSQy.1
Meeting ID: 850 4367 0569
Password: AMEDIP
Participation is free of charge.
This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX
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