Agrégateur de flux

La directive 2014/42 ne s’applique pas aux procédures de confiscation de biens acquis illégalement qui ne porte pas sur la constatation d’une ou plusieurs infractions pénales. En conséquence, cette procédure ne constituant pas une mise en œuvre du droit de l’Union, la Charte des droits fondamentaux n’est pas applicable.

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The focus of this write-up is a case note on a very recent decision of the Nigerian Court of Appeal that declined to enforce an exclusive English choice of court agreement.[1] In this case the 1st claimant/respondent was an insured party while the defendant/appellant was the insurer of the claimant/respondent. The insurance agreement between the 1st claimant/respondent and defendant/appellant provided for both an exclusive choice of court and choice of law agreement in favour of England. The claimants/respondents issued a claim for significant compensation before the High Court of Cross Rivers State, Nigeria for breach of contract and negligence on the part of the defendant/appellant for failure to fully perform the terms of the insurance contract during the period the 1st claimant/respondent was sick in Nigeria. The defendant/appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court of Cross Rivers State, and asked for a stay of proceedings on the basis that there was an exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of England. The 1st claimant/respondent in a counter affidavit stated mainly at the trial court that he was critically ill, and the 2nd claimant/respondent (the employer of the 1st claimant/respondent) had serious financial difficulties in paying the 1st claimant/respondent’s salaries, so in the interest of justice a stay should not be granted.

Both opposing parties were in agreement throughout the case that it was the Brandon test,[2] as applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court[3] that was applicable in this case to determine if a stay should be granted in the enforcement of a foreign choice of court agreement. Now the Brandon test (named after an English judge called Brandon J, who formulated the test) as applied in the Nigerian context is as follows:

“1. Where plaintiffs sue in Nigeria in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the Nigerian court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the jurisdiction is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not. 2. The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing it is shown. 3. The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs. 4. In exercising its discretion the court should take account of all the circumstances of the particular case. 5. In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following matters where they arise, may be properly regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the Nigerian and foreign courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs from Nigerian law in any material respects. (c) With what country either party is connected and how closely (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiff s would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign country because they would (i) be deprived of security for that claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in Nigeria; or (iv) for political, racial, religious, or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial (v) the grant of a stay would amount to permanently denying the plaintiff any redress.”

The reported cases where the plaintiff(s) have successfully relied on the Brandon test to oppose the enforcement of a foreign jurisdiction clause are where their claim is statute barred in the forum chosen by the parties.[4] Indeed, the burden is on the plaintiff to show strong cause as to why Nigerian proceedings should be stayed in breach of a choice of court agreement; if not, Nigerian courts will give effect to the foreign choice of court agreement.[5]

The High Court (Ayade J) relying on the Nigerian Supreme Court’s decision on the application of the Brandon tests declined to uphold the exclusive choice of court agreement in the interest of justice. It is fair to say that the trial judge applied a very flexible approach on the issue of whether the exclusive English choice of court agreement should be enforced. Indeed, he was very focused on substantial justice (rather than the strong cause test), thereby stretching the criteria provided in the Brandon test.[6] Ayade J’s judgment is worth quoting thus:

“This Court is fully aware of the principles of party autonomy, freedom and sanctity of contract, the doctrine that parties should be held to their contract (pacta sunt servanda) and this puts the burden on the plaintiff to show why the proceedings should continue in Nigeria inspite of the foreign jurisdiction clause, which in the opinion of this Court, the plaintiff has rightly done.”[7]

He also interestingly remarked that:

“Let it be remarked that this Court is not unmindful, and there is no doubt that in an area of globalization, the issue of foreign jurisdiction clause and the subject of conflict of laws has a future and one of growing importance, see MORRIS: The conflict of laws, 7th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 2010 page 16. This is reflected in the expanded membership of the specialist international bodies such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law: Rome Convention on Contractual Obligations 1980, Convention on Choice of Court, 1965, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1971, Convention on International Access to Justice, The Brussel Convention and the Lugano Convention, Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligation, Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), and the various efforts at Harmonization and Unification of Law are still in the inchoate stage in this part of the world. We shall get there at a time when there shall be one law, one forum and one world.
It is for the above reasons that I am of the view that the current attitude of the Nigerian Courts to foreign jurisdiction clauses remains as stated in the Norwind. Thus, I am inclined to agree that Courts are not bound to stay its proceedings on account of a foreign jurisdiction clause in a Court.”[8]

In the final analysis, he held as follows:

“Applying the law as declared above to the instant case and after due consideration of all the circumstances of this case, and in the exercise of discretion as to whether or not to do so in this case and this Court, which endeavoured always to do substantial justice between the parties. The sole issue raised by the claimants/respondents is therefore resolved in their favour against the defendant/applicant. Accordingly, this application is hereby dismissed.”[9]

On appeal, the defendant/appellant argued that in reality the test the High Court (Ayade J) applied was one of balance of convenience, and did not properly follow the strong cause test as stipulated by the Nigerian Supreme Court in applying the Brandon test.

The claimant/respondent brilliantly filed a respondent’s notice to justify the High Court’s decision on other grounds. The core argument was that the action will be statute-barred in England if the action was stayed before the Nigerian Court. This argument was clearly supported by the Brandon test as applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court.[10]

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal. Shuaibu JCA in his leading judgment held that:

“In exercising its discretion to grant a stay of proceedings in a case filed in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign country, the Court would take into consideration a situation where the granting would spell injustice to the plaintiff as where the action is already time barred in the foreign country and the grant of stay would amount to permanently denying the plaintiff any redress.”[11]

In analysing the Brandon test, as applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court he held that:

“It is imperative to state here that the Brandon Test is basically a guideline to judges in exercising their discretionary power to order a stay of proceedings where as in the present case, there is a foreign jurisdiction clause in the contract. It is to be noted however that like every discretion, the judge must exercise it judicially and judiciously based on or guided by law and discretion according to sound and well considered reason. Perhaps, the most noticeable guideline which I consider more novel is that the Brandon Test enjoins Court to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant unless strong cause for not doing so is shown which places the burden of showing such strong cause for not granting the application on the respondent (claimant).”[12]

After referring to the counter-affidavit of the claimant/respondent where they mainly alleged at the trial court that the 1st claimant/respondent was sick and had financial difficulties, Shuaibu JCA adopted a similar flexible approach to the Brandon tests as Ayade J. He held that:

“What is discernible from the above is that the evidence on the issues of fact is situated and more readily available, in Nigeria and the lower Court, was therefore right in refusing to adhere to foreign jurisdiction clause on the basis that the case is more closely connected to Nigeria. In effect, the trial Court has taken into account the peculiar circumstances of the case vis-à-vis the guidelines in the Brandon Test and thus exercised its discretion judicially and judiciously in refusing to grant stay of proceedings.”[13]

Owoade JCA in his concurring judgment held that:

“In the instant case, more particularly by paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Respondents counter-affidavit in opposition to the Appellant’s motion for an order for stay, the Respondents have established that they would suffer injustice if the case is stayed. This is more so in the instant case where the Plaintiffs/1st Respondent action was statute barred in the foreign Court and the grant of stay would amount to permanently denying the Plaintiff/1st Respondent any redress.”[14]

It is difficult to fault the decision of the High Court and Court of Appeal in this case, except for Shuaibu JCA’s occasional confusion of choice of court with choice of law (a conceptual mistake some Nigerian judges make). An additional observation is that this procedural issue on foreign choice of court agreement took over 5 years to resolve so far. The issue of delay is something to look into in the Nigerian legal system – a topic for another day.

The standard test for determining if a stay should be granted in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause is the Brandon test as applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court.[15] I am in total agreement with Shuaibu JCA that the Brandon test is a guideline. In other words, it must not be followed slavishly by Nigerian courts or indeed courts of other common law countries in Africa. A judge should be able to consider the facts of the instant case and decide if there is a strong cause for not granting a stay in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause. In this case, the fact that the action will be statute-barred was a strong ground not to grant a stay in breach of the exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of England. The financial difficulties and sickness of the claimant/respondent were also factors that could be taken into account in the interest of justice, although they are not as strong as the claim that the action was statute-barred in a foreign forum. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the test of the interest of justice should not be excluded from the Brandon test analysis.[16] Of course, I agree this might create uncertainty and undermine party autonomy in some cases, but this problem can be curtailed if the burden is firmly placed at the door steps of the claimant as to why a foreign jurisdiction clause should not be enforced.

Nigeria is a growing economy, and its lawyers, arbitrators and judges should be able to benefit from international commercial litigation and arbitration business like developed countries such as England. Of course, the best way to do this is to make Nigeria attractive for litigation in matters of speed, procedural rules, content of applicable laws, honesty of judges, and competence of judges to handle cases etc. However, Nigerian courts should not blindly apply party autonomy in the enforcement of choice of court agreements despite the certainty and predictability it offers to international commercial actors.

This brings me to an even more important issue. This case involved an insurance contract. The insured party – the claimant/respondent – was obviously the weaker party in this case. The traditional common law in Nigeria has not created a clear exception for the protection of weaker parties in the enforcement of foreign choice of court agreements. The European Union has done that in the case of employees, consumers and insured persons.[17] Nigeria and the rest of common law Africa’s legal system is not an island of its own. We can learn from the EU experience and borrow some good things from them. Indeed, the Nigerian Supreme Court had held that there is nothing wrong with borrowing from another legal system.[18] I will add there should be good reasons for borrowing from another legal system especially former colonial powers.

In this connection, it is proposed that in the case of weaker parties such as insured, consumers and employees, a party domiciled or habitually resident in Nigeria should be able to sue in Nigerian courts in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause. In addition, the common law concept of undue influence could be applied so that cases where a party is presumably weak in the contractual relationship, such a party should not be bound by the foreign jurisdiction clause. Of course, there is a danger that this could create uncertainty. So I propose that in cases of business to business contracts, Nigerian and African courts should be more willing to enforce foreign choice of court agreements strictly.

Back to the case at hand, it is not unlikely that this case might come before the Nigerian Supreme Court on appeal. The Nigerian Court of Appeal has applied varied approaches to the enforcement of foreign choice of court agreements in Nigeria. Indeed, I noted three inconsistent decisions of the Nigerian Court of Appeal in this area of the law as recent as 2020.[19] On the one extreme hand, there is the contractual approach that strictly treats a choice of court agreement like any ordinary commercial contract.[20] This approach is good in that it promotes party autonomy, but the problem with this approach is that it ignores the procedural context of a choice of court agreement and might spell injustice due to its rigid approach. On the other extreme hand, there is the ouster clause approach that strictly refuses to enforce a foreign choice of court agreement.[21] Though this approach might favour litigation in Nigeria and other African countries, it dangerously undermines party autonomy, and international commercial actors are likely to lose confidence in a legal system that does not uphold party autonomy. The other approach is the middle ground of the Brandon test, which upholds a choice of court agreement except strong reason is demonstrated to the contrary. This is standard approach the Nigerian Supreme Court has applied.[22]

It is recommended that if this case goes to the Nigerian Supreme Court, it should continue its endorsement of the Brandon test. It should also consider the addition of the interest of justice approach as was utilised by some of the High Court and Court of Appeal judges in this case. What is missing in the Nigerian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is a common law test that protects weaker parties like insured, consumers, and employees, as can be utilised in this case to protect the insured party (the 1st claimant/respondent). The time to act is now.

[1]BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA).

[2] The Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ship or Vessel ‘ Elftheria ’ v ‘ The Elftheria ’ (Owners), ‘ The Elftheria ’ [1969] 1 Lloyd ’ s Rep 237 (Brandon J).

[3] Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520; Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509.

[4]Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520. See also Hull Blyth (Nig) Ltd v Jetmove Publishing Ltd (2018) LPELR-44115 (CA).

[5]Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509. See also Captain Tony Nso v Seacor Marine (Bahamas) Inc (2008) LPELR-8320 (CA); Beaumont Resources Ltd & Anor v DWC Drilling Ltd (2017) LPELR-42814 (CA).

[6]Compare Adesanya v Palm Lines Ltd (1967) NCLR 133, which is one of the earliest cases where the interest of justice test was applied in enforcing foreign choice of court agreements.

[7]Cited in BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 3.

[8]Cited in BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 3-4.

[9] Cited in BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 5.

[10] Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520.

[11]BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA).21.

[12]BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA).

[13] BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 28.

[14] BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 30.

[15] Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520; Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509.

[16]CSA Okoli, “Analysis of Choice of Court Agreements in Nigeria in the Year 2020” (2021) 21 Dutch Journal of Private International Law 292, 305.

[17]See Article 10 – 23 of Brussels I Regulation Recast (Council Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 [2012] OJ L351/1.). See also recital 19 to Brussels I Regulation Recast.

[18]Caribbean Trading & Fidelity Corporation v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2002) 34 WRN 11 (Ayoola JSC, Mohammed JSC (as he then was), Ejiwunmi JSC).

[19]CSA Okoli, “Analysis of Choice of Court Agreements in Nigeria in the Year 2020” (2021) 21 Dutch Journal of Private International Law 292 – 305.

[20] Damac Star Properties LLC v Profitel Limited (2020) LPELR-50699(CA). See also Conoil Plc v Vitol SA (2018) 9 NWLR 463, 489 (Nweze JSC), 500-501 (Okoro JSC), 502 (Eko JSC).

[21]A.B.U. v VTLS (2020) LPELR-52142 (CA). See also Conoil Plc v Vitol SA (2018 ) 9 NWLR 463, 489 (Nweze JSC); Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Partenreedri MS Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520, 544-5 (Oputa JSC); LAC v AAN Ltd (2006) 2 NWLR 49, 81 (Ogunbiyi JCA as she then was); Ventujol v Compagnie Française De L’Afrique Occidentale (1949) 19 NLR 32; Allied Trading Company Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Line (1980) (1) ALR Comm 146.

[22]Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520; Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509.

 

Puigdemont i Casamajó e.a. / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le viceprésident du Tribunal de l’Union européenne rejette la nouvelle demande de suspension de la levée de l’immunité parlementaire de MM. Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó et Antoni Comín i Oliveres ainsi que de Mme Clara Ponsatí i Obiols

Daniel B. Listwa (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) and Lea Brilmayer (Yale Law School) have posted Jurisdictional Problems, Comity Solutions: Lessons for the Restatement (Third) on SSRN:

American choice of law is today portrayed as a story of how a more modern and functionalist methodology came to overthrow the long dominant territorial system. Against this background, the situs rule—the territorial rule requiring that all property-related issues be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located—is seen as an unusual straggler of a now-debunked theory. Central to this narrative is the idea that the vested rights theory, which was embraced by the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and assumed away the possibility for overlapping jurisdictions, represented “traditional” choice of law, going back to Justice Joseph Story, the father of American conflicts law. This is the perspective adopted by the now-in-the-works Restatement (Third), which aims to usher in a new era for American conflict of laws by cutting out all vestiges of the “traditional” model—the situs rule included.

But this narrative, while broadly held, is wrong. It is a mistake to associate choice of law during the early Republic with an early twentieth-century model of territorialism. In this Essay, we explain that the early American choice-of-law model, as described by Justice Story, was not territorial, but rather intensely functional, with its prime focus being resolving the uncertainty created by the constitutional law governing the limits of personal jurisdiction and the recognition of sister-state judgments. In this context, the persistence of the situs rule appears to be not an anachronism but rather an indication that “modern” choice-of-law theories misunderstand the forces shaping conflict–of–laws doctrine today. Using the situs rule as a window into the foundations of choice of law, this Essay thus calls into question the standard narrative underlying contemporary choice-of-law literature and challenges the approach of the proposed Restatement (Third).

The article is forthcoming in the Texas Law Review.

Dans le sillage du contrôle exercé par les juridictions internes, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme confirme la proportionnalité de la confiscation d’un immeuble appartenant au requérant, condamné pour récidive d’association de malfaiteurs, en application d’une peine complémentaire permettant la confiscation générale du patrimoine.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code pénal 2022, annoté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Le RSA alloué à l’accompagnant d’un citoyen de l’Union européenne ne peut pas bénéficier à l’accompagnant d’un citoyen français.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile 2022, annoté et commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Ditto Ltd v Drive-Thru Records LLC [2021] EWHC 2035 (Ch) discusses the contract and tort gateways for jurisdiction in England and Wales (they need to be met for claimant to hold onto an earlier granted permission for ‘service out’ of the jurisdiction). The dispute concerns the world of music catalogues, advance royalties and (marketing) services rendered, or not, in regard to the  catalogued artists. Defendants are both based in California, claimant is England-incorporated. Concurrent proceedings are underway in New York.

Of interest to the blog is firstly the contractual gateway, which is to some degree assessed under retained EU law, for as part of its argument, claimant argues the lex contractus is English law.  That determination of the applicable law is done under (retained( EU law and Francis DM holds that it is not English law. No choice of law had been made per Article 3, which (in the absence of any protected categories) brings us into the cascade of A4 Rome I. It is worthwhile to repeat counsel argument in full [56-57]

Ms Lacob [for defendants] contended that the law of the agreements should be determined in accordance with paragraph (2) as being that of the State of California. That was on the basis that the party which was required to effect the characteristic performance of each of the agreements was Drive-Thru and War Road respectively, and their country, or (in this case) territorial unit, of habitual residence, being the place where they had their central administration, was California. She identified the performance which was characteristic of each of the agreements as being Drive-Thru and War Road’s obligations to licence the exploitation of their portfolio works, to remaster and remix their recordings or the release new recordings, as the case may be, and (in the case of War Road) to sign up new bands; in contrast, Ditto’s only obligation was to pay money which was not the performance which was characteristic of the agreements.

Mr Kitson for Ditto [claimant] took issue with this. He pointed to the fact that Drive-Thru and War Road themselves contended in the New York proceedings that Ditto was in breach of its obligations (whether express or implied) under the agreements to take possession of the recordings and to distribute the same so as to earn royalties for the parties’ joint benefit. Thus, he argued, the performance characteristic of the agreement was not all on the side of Drive-Thru and War Road.

The reference to the arguments in the New York proceedings is interesting for it suggests ‘form’. However the judge agreed [58] with defendants that

these agreements are ones under which there were substantial performance obligations (other than simply the payment of money) on both sides. In reality, the agreements were joint ventures for the development and exploitation of Drive-Thru’s and War Road’s existing and future portfolio works for their mutual benefit. They are the type of agreements which Mann J refers to in his judgment in Apple Corps at paragraph 54 where it is not possible to identify a characteristic performance provided by one only of the parties.

Even the centre of gravity rule (recital 19, which the judge does not refer to) does not assist here hence the analysis needs to jump to A4(4)’s ‘proper law of the contract’ rule.  [59]

What then is the country or territorial unit with which the agreements are most closely connected? On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that it is the State of California. That was where Drive-Thru and War Road were based and where for the most part they would perform their obligations under the agreements. In contrast, Ditto’s own obligations relating to the digital distribution of the portfolio works were not ones which, on the evidence, fell to be performed in England to any particular extent, even if Ditto’s central administration was based in England. Instead, Ditto’s rights to exploitation of the portfolio works, and any corresponding obligations relating to the distribution of such works, were worldwide, reflecting the global reach of the Ditto Music brand.

Conclusion is that California law is the lex contractus.

The contractual gateway was however found to have been fulfilled on the basis of CPR PD6B paragraph 3.1 ‘contract made within the jurisdiction’. The judge finds that the contracts were ‘made’ both in CAL and in E&W [54] although he does lament [48] the artificial nature of the issue as the law currently stands: were contracts are ‘made’. I find this is especially relevant in a contemporary context of electronic correspondence, Zoom meetings and the like. Where a contract is ‘made’ seems fairly nugatory these days.

The tort gateway is discussed without reference to UKSC Brownlie for that was en route at the time of the discussions in current case. It is at any rate held to be met [[71] for claimant has quite clearly sustained damage in England as a result of the alleged misrepresentations.

At [72] ff follows an interesting, brief discussion on the location of intellectual property with finally the curtain drawn on English proceedings as a result of forum non [80 ff].

Geert.

 

1/2 Ditto v Drive-Thru Records [2021] EWHC 2035 (Ch) (17 November 2021)
Permission to serve out set aside
Contract gateway discussed viz retained EU law, A4(4) Rome I (leading to CAL law)
Tort gateway upheld: damage sustained in E&W
Obiter discussion of…

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 18, 2021

The German Federal Bar Association (Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer – BRAK) and the German Israeli Lawyer’s Association (DIJV) will host a comparative, English-language workshop on legal tech in legal education. Confirmed Speakers are Professor Ruth Janal (University of Bayreuth), Dr. Aviv Gaon (Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University, IDC Herzliya) and Professor Christian Wolf (Leibniz University, Hanover). The workshop will take place via Zoom on 2 December 2021. For further information and registration, see here.

 

Under Article 32(2) of the Regulation No 1346/2000 (the “old” Insolvency Regulation, now repealed by the Regulation 2015/848), “the liquidators in the main and any secondary proceedings shall lodge in other proceedings claims which have already been lodged in the proceedings for which they were appointed, provided that the interests of creditors in the latter proceedings are served thereby, subject to the right of creditors to oppose that or to withdraw the lodgement of their claims where the law applicable so provides”.

The Regulation No 1346/2000 does not expressly stipulate the point in time when the claims already lodged in the proceedings for which a liquidator has been appointed should be brought in such other proceedings. That being said, its Article 4, for the purposes of the main proceedings, and its Article 28, for the purposes of secondary proceedings, clarify that, unless otherwise provided for in the Regulation, the law of the State in which proceedings are opened (lex concursus) is to apply to all proceedings.

As put by AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona in his Opinion presented back in May, that is why, in the case ALPINE BAU, C-25/20, a Slovenian court asked the Court of Justice whether the liquidator in the main insolvency proceedings conducted in Austria, who is seeking to file, in secondary proceedings conducted against the same debtor in Slovenia, claims which he already filed in the former proceedings, is subject to the time limits (and the consequences of failure to comply with those time limits) laid down in Slovenian law.

A different interpretation that the referring court also put into consideration consists on the idea that the Regulation lays down, in Article 32(2), a special right for a liquidator to lodge claims in other insolvency proceedings without being bound by any time limit (see point 13 of the request available here).

Another rival interpretation seemed to be, at least in the light of point 28 of the Opinion, implicitly endorsed by the liquidator in the main insolvency proceeding in the written observations. According to that interpretation, the time limits for lodging claims in any other proceedings are determined in accordance with the lex concursus of the main proceedings.

 

Opinion of AG

In his Opinion, AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona pronounced himself in favor of the first interpretation and proposed to the Court to consider that where the liquidator for the main insolvency proceedings lodges claims in secondary proceedings, the time limits for the lodgement of those claims, and the consequences of lodging claims out of time, are governed by the law of the State in which the secondary proceedings were opened.

 

Judgment of the Court

This Thursday, the Court delivered its judgment in the case at hand. In essence, the Court agreed with the answer proposed in the Opinion. More precisely, it held that Article 32(2) of the Regulation No 1346/2000, read in conjunction with Articles 4 and 28 of the Regulation (these two provisions did not, however, appear in the preliminary question, yet the Court seemingly considered it necessary to introduce them in its reading of the question and consequently in its answer, see paragraph 26 of the judgment), is to be interpreted as meaning that the time limits for the lodgement of the claims, and the consequences of lodging claims out of time, are governed by the law of the State in which the secondary proceedings were opened (paragraph 42).

The judgment itself is all the more interesting as it also deals – and ultimately rejects – the other two interpretations mentioned above, at its paragraphs 34-40 and 41, respectively.

The judgment is available here, in French.

In its judgment delivered this Thursday in the case IB, C-289/20, the Court of Justice addresses the issue of multiple places of residence under the Brussels II bis Regulation in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling originating from the proceedings for a divorce.

As a reminder, the preliminary question referred to the Court in this case reads as follows:

Where, as in the present case, it is apparent from the factual circumstances that one of the spouses divides his time between two Member States, is it permissible to conclude, in accordance with and for the purposes of the application of Article 3 of [the Brussels II bis Regulation] that he or she is habitually resident in two Member States, such that, if the conditions listed in that article are met in two Member States, the courts of those two States have equal jurisdiction to rule on the divorce?

 

Opinion of AG

As reported back in July, AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion in this case. As there is no English translation of the Opinion yet, a short reminder of its essential findings does not seem redundant.

In essence, AG proposed to the Court to consider that under the Brussels II bis Regulation a spouse may have only one place of habitual residence (points 83 et 90). If, in fact, as the preliminary question presupposes, a spouse divides his life between two Member States, it has to be considered that he or she does not have a place of habitual residence within the meaning of Article 3 of the Regulation (point 98). If that leads ultimately to the situation where no forum within the EU can hear the case for a divorce, in order to remedy situations of denial of justice, the jurisdiction might be exceptionally attributed to the courts of one of the Member State where the spouse resides (points 100 and 101).

An English translation of the answer proposed in point 101 of the Opinion is also available at the EAPIL blog due to the courtesy of Marta Requejo Isidro.

 

Judgment of the Court

In its judgment, the Court also considered that while a spouse may have multiple places of residence, that person may have only one place of “habitual residence” within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation (paragraph 51).

Reminding that it is for the national court to establish the habitual residence of the spouse, taking account of all the circumstances of fact specific to each individual case (paragraph 52), the Court provided the referring court with some further guidance as to that task. A cursory lecture of the judgment seems to reveal a suggestion according to which, following that guidance and at least a priori, it should be possible to identify a single place of habitual residence of the spouse in the circumstances of the case at hand (paragraphs 61 and 62).

As noted in the previous post, in its points 100 and 101, the Opinion seemed to endorse a forum of necessity made available to the applicant through the interpretation of the Brussels II Regulation itself. The Court did not elaborate on that issue, confining itself to the interpretation of Article 3 of the Regulation, hinting on the aforementioned a priori suggestion as to the identification of the place of habitual residence.

The judgment is available here, in French.

[UPDATE: for a press release in English, click here].

IB (Résidence habituelle d’un époux - Divorce)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Compétence juridictionnelle pour connaître d’une demande en divorce : la Cour précise le sens et la portée de la notion de « résidence habituelle » d’un époux

StWL Städtische Werke Lauf a.d. Pegnitz
Rapprochement des législations
Inbox advertising : l’affichage dans la boîte de réception électronique de messages publicitaires sous une forme qui s’apparente à celle d’un véritable courrier électronique constitue une utilisation de courrier électronique à des fins de prospection directe au sens de la directive 2002/58

Delfarma
Libre circulation des marchandises
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une réglementation nationale prévoyant l’expiration de plein droit, sans examen d’un éventuel risque pour la santé et la vie des personnes, d’une autorisation d’importation parallèle d’un médicament un an après l’expiration de l’autorisation de mise sur le marché du médicament de référence 

État luxembourgeois (Informations sur un groupe de contribuables)
Rapprochement des législations
Coopération administrative dans le domaine fiscal : une demande d’informations peut concerner un groupe de personnes identifiables, mais non nominativement et individuellement identifiées

Aldricus – Jasa rental catering begitu diperlukan untuk mengsukseskan acara terutama acara besar untuk kantor anda. Meskipun pandemic belum juga berakhir, tetapi tidak ada salahnya anda mencoba peruntungan membuka jasa rental catering untuk usaha pertama anda, asalkan protocol Kesehatan yang dilakukan sudah sebenar-benarnya untuk jasa rental catering yang anda buka sebagai usaha pertama anda. Perhatikan hal berikut ini untuk memilih jasa rental catering terbaik yang dikutip dari co create id.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik pertama untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Lakukan Riset & Sampling, Lakukan survei terlebih dahulu mengenai apa saja yang saat ini sedang diminati oleh banyak orang. Kemudian, lakukan sampling untuk mengetahui apakah masakan kamu enak dan gak membosankan. Cara ini juga bisa membantu kamu menentukan variasi menu.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik kedua untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Tawarkan Beberapa Pilihan Paket, Berikan beberapa pilihan paket agar calon pembeli bisa memilih sesuai dengan keinginan. Contohnya, pilihan paket diet, paket hemat, paket vegetarian, atau paket lainnya. Berikan harga yang lebih murah dibanding harga satuan, agar mereka tertarik untuk mencoba katering kamu.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik ketiga untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Lakukan Kesepakatan, Kesepakatan yang harus diperhatikan antara lain jam pengantaran katering. Dalam hal ini, sebaiknya kamu gak terlambat, karena keterlambatan bisa mengurangi nilai usaha sehingga ada kemungkinan pembeli memutuskan untuk gak memperpanjang kerja sama dengan kamu.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik keempat untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Perhatikan Pelanggan, Kamu juga perlu masukan mengenai masakan yang telah dibuat. Sering-seringlah melakukan survei terhadap pelanggan. Seluruh masukan dan kritik dari pelanggan bisa kamu gunakan untuk mengembangkan usaha katering.

Tips Memilih jasa rental catering terbaik kelima untuk acara anda di PaDi UMKM yaitu Minta Testimoni, Testimoni bisa menjadi semacam kesaksian kalau konsumen puas terhadap masakan yang mereka dapat. Testimoni tersebut bisa digunakan sebagai tanda bahwa katering kamu enak dan terpercaya. Dengan ini, kamu jadi punya nilai lebih untuk memasarkannya ke tempat-tempat baru. Dalam beberapa bulan setelah usaha berjalan, bukan gak mungkin pemasukan dan pengeluaran kamu masih belum teratur. Ada banyak kemungkinan yang akan memengaruhi hal ini, misalnya belum memiliki banyak pelanggan setia dengan jadwal pemesanan yang teratur. Kalau begini, ada baiknya kamu memiliki tabungan khusus untuk memisahkan omzet usahamu dari simpanan pribadi. Jadi seluruh pengeluaran dan pemasukan usaha kateringmu bisa lebih terkontrol. Terlebih, jika sewaktu-waktu kateringmu mendapat pesanan dalam jumlah yang lebih banyak, kamu bisa mengambilnya kapan saja sebagai modal tambahan.

The post CALON PEMBELI, PASTIKAN JASA CATERING ANDA MEMILIKI PROGRAM INI KETIKA MELAKUKAN PENJUALAN appeared first on Aldri Blog.

This post introduces the paper by Fernando Gascón and Guillermo Schumann published in Ius Dictum, 5, 2021, The rules on lis pendens and on res judicata in the ELI/UNIDROIT Model European Rules of Civil Procedure. A pre-print version of the article is available here. Many thanks to Guillermo Schumann for the input.

Introduction

In 2020 the European Law Institute and UNIDROIT approved the European Rules of Civil Procedure (“ERCP”, also called “Model European Rules of Civil Procedure”): a set of rules intended to design a model, or, if preferred, an ideal civil procedure, with the potential to be operational in any European country. In that regard, it could be said that the ERCP aim to be a “Model Code of Civil Procedure” (although the “code” word has been purposely avoided by the Rules’ drafters) for European countries or, in a certain way, a sort of “Code of Best Practices”. Although a soft law instrument, the Rules stand as a unique text reflecting the outcome of an exhaustive and remarkable work of legal comparison by scholars and practitioners all around Europe (see on this point F. Gascón Inchausti, Las European Rules of Civil Procedure: ¿un punto de partida para la armonización del proceso civil?, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 2021).

The comparison has not only looked into national systems but has also considered existing European legislation and the acquis communautaire, as well as the case law of the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights. The intention of the drafters has been to spot the best solution to difficulties faced by all legislators when planning a fair and efficient civil process —best practices or best rules approach—.

The paper by Fernando Gascón and Guillermo Schumann is devoted in particular to the rules on lis pendens (Rules 142-146) and res judicata (Rules 147-152), taking into account their mutual functional relationship, but also their interplay with other procedural institutions in the ERCP.

Lis Pendens and Res Judicata in a System in which “All the Pieces of the Puzzle Work Together”

As stated, the ERCP map out a comprehensive model of a declaratory civil procedure in which the different parts of the Rules are interrelated and meant to work as a system on its own. Therefore, the proper understanding of each rule requires looking at it within the structure. Consequently, the solutions provided by a rule can only be considered as “the best” and as a “model” because they have been conceived to operate inside that systematic ensemble.

Lis pendens and res judicata are legal institutions belonging to the “hardcore” of all procedural legal orders and, because of that, they had to be addressed by the ERCP.

Lis pendens, the rules on related actions and res judicata tend, among other, to regulate the relationship between parallel proceedings, with the same or connected subject matters, that are ongoing or that have ended with a final judgment. This is a decisive issue for both domestic and cross-border litigation. Lis pendens aims at preserving the future negative effect of res judicata in cases of proceedings with identical subject matters, while the stay and consolidation of strongly connected proceedings serve the purpose of preserving its positive effect. Therefore, these legal institutions are necessarily connected among them, but also with others such as the very definition of the “subject matter” of the proceedings or the “preclusion of the cause of action”.

A main goal of the ERCP is indeed to provide for a complete and systematic body of rules where  all “pieces of the puzzle work together” in a coherent manner.

The Lis Pendens and Related Actions in the ERCP: A (Quasi) Transplantation of the Regime of Brussels I Regulation (Recast)

The regulation of lis pendens and related actions proposed in the ERCP is based on the Brussels I Regulation (recast) (Articles 29-32) and on the case law of the CJEU on it. The drafters of the ERCP, having in mind that the European provisions are already working within the Union, thus that the national courts are already familiar with them, considered transplantation into domestic litigation as the best option.

It should be noted, though, that the Brussels I Regulation (recast) aims at regulating the European lis pendens within legal orders having different understandings of the notion of the “subject matter of the dispute” – sometimes, of lis pendens itself. The main purpose of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) and of the case law of the Court of Justice is therefore to set up, from a functional perspective, a system capable to operate detached from the conceptual constructs of the member States. To do so, the Court of Justice has shaped autonomous notions as a way to keep the system operating where indispensable: lis pendens is one of these notions.

Moreover, the scope of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) is limited, both because of the legislative competence of the EU and of the scope of the legal instrument itself. By way of consequence, the EU lawmaker had to address a wide range of issues arising in situations of cross-border parallel proceedings with a limited range of legal tools. This has entailed that the CJEU has broadened (or narrowed, as the case may be) the traditional scope of legal institutions conferring upon them functions that are carried out by other means in the internal legal systems of the Member States.

By contrast, the ERCP have the possibility and the purpose of providing for a complete system. In that vein, a quasi-automatic import of the lis pendens rules from the Brussels I Regulation (recast) may not offer the best solution in all circumstances. Not surprisingly, some of the mismatches and shadows already pointed out by academia concerning the regulation of lis pendens in Brussels I Regulation (recast) appear to be present in the ERCP as well.

Having this in mind, the paper by Fernando Gascón and Guillermo Schumann tries to shed some light on how the lis pendens and related actions operate within the system of the ERCP. It examines the function of the lis pendens and its relationship with the subject matter of the proceedings, the priority principle as the general rule for lis pendens in the ERCP, the exceptions to this principle, the related-actions regime and its relationship with the consolidation of proceedings.

The Rules on Res Judicata in the ERCP

There are different ways to understand and establish the boundaries of res judicata in the many legal orders across Europe. Whether the notion is restrictive or broad usually depends on which part of a judgement becomes res judicata: whether only the operative part of it, or also the legal reasoning. There are also important differences regarding the types of judgments that become res judicata.

As has just been said, the rules on lis pendens and on the stay and consolidation of “strongly related” proceedings tend to preserve the future negative and positive effect of res judicata. Because of that, the scope of res judicata inevitably impacts the regulation of those legal institutions.

From this overall approach, the paper examines the concept of finality in the ERCP, the types of judgments that become res judicata, the material, temporal and subjective scope of res judicata and the powers of the court concerning its assessment. Special attention is paid to the attribution of res judicata to judgments on procedural issues — e.g., the CJEU decision in the Gothaer case —, and to the relationship between the material scope of res judicata and the preclusion of causes of action that, with a broader or more limited scope and following diverse conceptual constructions, is known to most European legal orders.

Conclusion

The European Rules of Civil Procedure are an exciting initiative that shows the utility of Comparative Law as a tool to improve the civil justice system and the protection of the citizens’ rights —at the end of the day, this is what it all is about—. They are a unique instrument, which, on the one hand, facilitates self-cognition in that they allow seeing oneself mirrored in the “others”; on the other, they booster the European harmonization of civil procedure on a common basis.

Pour refuser l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen, les juges doivent apprécier la proportionnalité de l’atteinte portée au droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale de la personne recherchée, et non par sa délivrance.

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The University of Turin and ILO International Training Centre’s Master in International Trade Law is pleased to announce that on Friday 10 December 2021 it will host a webinar (co-organised with UNIDROIT) on UNIDROIT’s Projects and Technology. The event will take place at 2.00 P.M. CET on Zoom via the following link: https://itcilo-org.zoom.us/j/84727714249?pwd=RC8vcFRibVZLY2pYRVpNQ0dza3JJdz09

The event will be introduced by Professor Silvia Ferreri (University of Turin). The speakers’ panel will be composed by Professor Anna Veneziano (Deputy Secretary-General, UNIDROIT, and University of Teramo), Professor Theresa Rodriguez de las Heras Ballel (University Carlos III, Madrid, and Roy Goode Scholar, UNIDROIT) and Dr. Philine Wehling (Legal Officer, UNIDROIT). Professor Cristina Poncibò (University of Turin) and Professor Gustavo Prieto (Ghent University) will participate as discussants.

Please find the event’s flyer below:

 

A webinar in English on Recent judgments on corporate responsibility for environmental damages will take place on 26 November 2021, from 15.00 to 17.00 CET, organised by the Interest Group on Private International Law of the Italian Society of International Law (SIDI).

The speakers will be Olivera Boskovic and Silvia Marino.

The event is part of a cycle titled Private International Law in Europe: New Developments on Corporate Social Responsibility and Private International Law. See here for further details.

Attendance is free. Those wishing to join the webinar are invited to send an e-mail to sidigdipp@gmail.com.

Yesterday the Mexican Senate appointed Loretta Ortiz Ahlf as a new Justice at the Mexican Supreme Court (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación de México). She is a senior member (miembro numerario) of the Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP). Loretta Ortiz Ahlf has had several political and legal positions in the Mexican government as Congress Representative, Advisor of Human Rights, among others. For more information, click here.

This appointment will certainly further the knowledge of Private International Law and Human Rights at the Mexican Supreme Court.