Agrégateur de flux

Vente immobilière

Crown Van Gelder
Liberté d'établissement
Un client peut introduire un recours contre le gestionnaire du réseau national à la suite d’une panne d’électricité

Union des industries de la protection des plantes
Rapprochement des législations
La France a valablement informé la Commission de la nécessité d’adopter des mesures visant notamment à protéger les abeilles

A foreign judgment is generally not to be reviewed on the merits at the recognition and enforcement stage. Yet, an exception has always been carved out for fraud under the common law rules on the basis that ‘fraud unravels everything’ (Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702, 712 per Lord Denning). Thus, English courts allow a judgment debtor to raise fraud at the recognition and enforcement stage even if no new evidence is adduced and fraud had been considered and dismissed by the court of origin (Abouloff v Oppenheimer & Co (1882) 10 QBD 295). This seeming anomaly with the prohibition against a review of the merits of a foreign judgment has been justified on the basis that where fraud is concerned, the court of origin is misled, not mistaken (Abouloff). The Abouloff rule has been much criticized, but successive courts have refused to depart from it (see also Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7, [2012] 1 WLR 1804, [116] (Privy Council)). Further, in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd ([2019] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 450) which is a case on fraud and domestic judgments, the Supreme Court held that, generally, no requirement that the fraud could not have been uncovered with reasonable diligence in advance of obtaining the judgment would be imposed on the party seeking to set aside the judgment on the basis of fraud. As one of the oft-cited criticisms for the Abouloff rule is that it is out of step with how English courts deal with domestic judgments, Takhar may have the effect of further embedding the Abouloff rule.

In Hong Pian Tee v Les Placements Germain Gauthier ([2002] SGCA 17, [2002] 1 SLR(R) 515), the Singapore Court of Appeal criticized the Abouloff rule on the basis that it would encourage ‘endless litigation’ and ‘judicial chauvinism’ (at [27]-[28]). Drawing on Canadian and Australian authorities on fraud and foreign judgments, the Court held that insofar as intrinsic fraud (ie, fraud which goes to the merits of the case) is concerned, the foreign judgment may only be impeached where ‘fresh evidence has come to light which reasonable diligence on the part of the defendant would not have uncovered and the fresh evidence would have been likely to make a difference in the eventual result of the case’ (at [30]).

The current position on fraud and domestic judgments under Singapore law is that the fresh evidence rule applies, albeit flexibly (see, eg, Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] SGCA 31, [2007] 3 SLR(R) 673). However, the Court of Appeal recently considered Takhar in a decision concerning a domestic adjudication determination (AD). Adjudication is available under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, Rev Ed 2006) and is a quick and inexpensive process to resolve payment disputes arising from building and construction contracts. In Facade Solution Pte Ltd v Mero Asia Pacific Pte Ltd ([2020] SGCA 88), the Court of Appeal held that an AD could be set aside on the ground of fraud. The party raising fraud would have to establish that the facts which were relied on by the adjudicator were false; that the other party either knew or ought reasonably to have known them to be false; and that the innocent party did not in fact, subjectively know or have actual knowledge of the true position throughout the adjudication proceedings (at [30]). The Court emphasised that ‘there is no requirement on the innocent party to show that the evidence of fraud could not have been obtained or discovered with reasonable diligence during the adjudication proceeding’ (at [31]). It cited Takhar and the High Court of Australia decision of Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2018] HCA 12 with approval, the High Court of Australia having also rejected the reasonable diligence requirement in the context of a fraudulently obtained domestic judgment in the latter case.

The Court held (at [33]; emphasis added):

‘Where it is established that an AD is infected by fraud, it is neither material nor relevant to inquire as to whether the innocent party could have discovered the truth by the exercise of reasonable diligence. A fraudulent party cannot be allowed to claim that he could have been caught had reasonable diligence been exercised, but because he was not caught, he should be allowed to get away with it. Such a view would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and it would be unprincipled to hold in effect that there is no sanction on the fraudulent party because he could have been found out earlier. Parties dealing with the court, and in the same vein, with the adjudicator in the adjudication of their disputes under the Act are expected to act with utmost probity.’

This passage suggests that the position on fraud and domestic judgments would change in the near future. It also raises the question whether the requirement of reasonable diligence in respect of intrinsic fraud and foreign judgments would survive for long. On the one hand, the Court in Hong Pian Tee had said that: ‘There is no logical reason why a different rule should apply in relation to a foreign judgment’ (at [27]) (ie, vis-à-vis a domestic judgment). The requirement of reasonable diligence has also been criticized on the basis that the court would be ‘taking the side of the fraudster against his negligent opponent’ (Briggs, ‘Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones; Rethinking the Law on Foreign Judgments’ (2005) 8 SYBIL 1, 21). On the other hand, there was a heavy emphasis on judicial comity in Hong Pian Tee. The Court observed that: ‘It is … vitally important that no court of one jurisdiction should pass judgment on an issue already decided upon by a competent court of another jurisdiction …. It must be borne in mind that the enforcement forum is not an appellate tribunal vis-à-vis the foreign judgment’ (at [28]).

It remains to be seen whether the Singapore Court of Appeal would in future resile from Hong Pian Tee. At least, the recent developments in the domestic context intimate that the point is arguable.

On few occasions Polish tax authorities made references to the EU Succession Regulation and applied foreign law designated by its provisions, even though revenue and other administrative matters are explicitly excluded from its scope. This post presents shortly the inheritance taxation rules in Poland, explains why tax authorities felt the need to look into foreign succession laws for tax purposes and how the content of foreign law was ascertained.

Exclusion of Taxes from the scope of the EU Succession Regulation

The EU Succession Regulations states in its Article 1(1) that it does not apply to revenue, customs or administrative matters. Recital 10 makes reference to taxes in particular. It explains that it is for national law to determine how taxes are calculated and paid. The question is how to proceed if national tax law makes a direct reference to succession law concepts.

It might be reminded that inheritance taxes in Member States were once subject to an EU-sponsored study (which might be consulted here).

Inheritance Taxation in Poland

Inheritance taxation in Poland is regulated by a separate statute (available here – in Polish only). It provides that the acquisition of goods located in Poland and rights exercised in Poland by an individual as a result of inter alia succession is subject to taxation. Acquisition of goods located abroad or rights exercised abroad is subject to taxation, provided that at the moment of opening of the succession the beneficiary was a Polish national or had habitual residence in Poland. The acquisition of ownership of movable property located in Poland or rights exercised in Poland is not subject to taxation, provided that neither the beneficiary, nor deceased were Polish nationals and had habitual residence in Poland.

There are numerous exemptions from inheritance tax, including the one for the closest family members. The beneficiary is the taxpayer. The tax point arises at the moment of the acceptance of the succession. If the acquisition was not reported to tax authorities the tax point (re)arises at the moment when a document in writing is produced. If it is a court decision the tax point arises at the moment the decision becomes final. The tax base is the net worth of the estate calculated in the prescribed manner. The tax due depends on the degree of affinity or kinship between the deceased and beneficiary and varies between 3% to 20% of the tax base exceeding certain thresholds. Taxpayers are obliged to file a tax return, based on which tax authorities issue a decision indicating tax to be paid.

Tax Point Linked to the Acceptance of the Succession

As mentioned above, the tax point with respect to succession arises at the moment of its acceptance. This clearly refers to the acceptance of the succession, an institution known in the substantive succession law regulated by the Polish Civil Code (here). It states that an heir acquires the estate at the moment of the opening of the succession. Nevertheless, the heir may accept the estate without limitation of liability for debts, with limitation of that liability or may renounce the succession. The time limit for such statement is six months counting from the moment when an hair have learned about his/her title of acquisition.

It is simple to indicate a tax point for inheritance taxation in a purely domestic case. However, inheritance taxation comes into play also in cases which are less intensively connected to Poland. For example, acquisition of an immovable property located in Poland is taxed, even if both the deceased and the beneficiary are foreign nationals with habitual residence abroad. In those cases, in accordance with the EU Succession Regulation, succession is governed by foreign law. The doubt as to the tax point might occur in instances when lex successionis does not know the concept of an acceptance of succession.

Acceptance of Succession when Foreign Law is Applicable

While assessing the tax point tax authorities stated that the concept of an acceptance of succession used for tax purposes must take into account the law applicable to civil law aspects of the particular case. This law should be designated in accordance with the EU Succession Regulation.

In the recent tax ruling of 27 August 2020 (signature: 0111-KDIB2-3.4015.112.2020.1.AD) the tax authority analysed English law (as the deceased was habitually resident in the UK). It was explained that in the UK succession case is dealt with differently than in Poland. It is an appointed executor, who is responsible for assessing the value of the estate, payment of debts and payment of inheritance taxes in the UK. The executor is responsible also for sending documents to the probate court. Once the decision of the probate court is delivered, the estate might be transferred to heirs. As a result a final decision of the probate court may be perceived as an equivalent to the acceptance of succession. In an earlier tax ruling of 31 December 2019 (signature: 0111-KDIB4.4015.114.2019.2.MD) the tax authority analysed US succession procedure and also stated that the decision of the court is conclusive for tax purposes in Poland.

Please note that the above are not decisions in particular tax proceedings, but tax rulings, which only interpret the law on the taxpayer’s application and are issued based on information and explanations provided by the taxpayer. Hence, while issuing a tax rulings tax authorities are not establishing the content of foreign law. Tax rulings may be found by their signatures in the public database (accessible here – in Polish only).

Ascertainment of the Content of Foreign Law

In the tax proceeding concerning succession governed by Australian law tax authorities went even further and lined the tax point to the actual transfer of funds from Australia to Poland. The taxpayer was arguing that the tax point have arisen earlier, at the moment of the opening of succession (as the foreign exchange rate used for calculating tax due was more favourable at that time). The decision resulted in a dispute and the tax decision was appealed to the administrative court. The court in its judgement of 26 June 2018 (signature: I SA/Wr 164/18; it may be found by its signature in the public database here – in Polish) set aside the tax decision due to procedural faults, in particular when it comes to ascertainment of the content of foreign law.

The court stated that it is not enough that the tax authorities have asked Polish Consulate in Sidney for information on Australian law and that the decision has indicated provisions of the South Australia Administration and Probate Act 1919 as the basis for conclusions. The court suggested that indeed the tax point arose earlier than at the moment of the bank transfer, but in order to indicate this moment a careful analysis of Australian succession law must be made. For this purpose tax authorities should ask Ministry of Finance for guidance, which might in turn, within the framework of legal aid procedure, contact Australian tax authorities. Australian succession law should be applied as it would be applied by Australian tax authorities in similar cases. Also an expert witness may be appointed.

The above shows the relevance of private international law for the work of administrative authorities, influence of lex successions designated by the EU Succession Regulation on tax matters, but also reveals that tax authorities are not necessarily competent to proceed with the ascertainment of the content of foreign law.