Agrégateur de flux

Casino, Guichard-Perrachon et AMC / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal annule partiellement des décisions d’inspection de la Commission faisant suite à des soupçons de pratiques anticoncurrentielles par plusieurs entreprises françaises du secteur de la distribution

Situations exist where a judicial document addressed to a person based abroad may be communicated to a lawyer representing that person in the forum State, instead of being served abroad on the addressee himself or herself. This usually applies to service occurring after the act instituting the proceedings has been served on the defendant in conformity with either the Service Regulation or the Hague Service Convention.

In fact, the described situation may also arise in the framework of proceedings brought by a foreign claimant against a defendant based in the forum. In this case, the defendant may reasonably presume that the lawyer signing the claim on behalf of the foreign litigant is eligible for receiving documents related to the case.

While the latter assumption would generally seem to be accurate, the admissibility of service on the lawyer  depends on the kind of documents that the latter is in fact allowed to receive on behalf of the client.

In 2019, the Greek Supreme Court issued an interesting ruling on the matter.

The Facts

After longstanding business collaboration between a Greek company and a Finnish telecommunications giant, a decade of confrontation began in 2010. In a series of proceedings, the parties fought through all court instances.

The first stage was a successful application for a freezing order filed by the Finnish company. An actio pauliana was filed in parallel by the same company, which was dismissed by the Athens Court of First Instance. The appeal lodged by the Finnish company, instead was successful. The losing party filed cassation against the Athens Court of Appeal ruling.

Almost at the same time, the Greek company lodged an application to reverse the freezing order, which was filed to the Supreme Court, in accordance with domestic Civil Procedure Rules (Article 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

As in previous stages of the litigation, the document was served on the lawyer representing the Finnish company. The latter did not appear in the hearing.

The Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that the application was inadmissible because it was not served on a lawyer instructed by the foreign company to accept service on its behalf at a business address within the jurisdiction [Supreme Court Nr. 470/2019, unreported]. The reasoning of the court may be summarised as follows:

• Proper indirect service (in the case at hand, service to a lawyer representing a party), must be demonstrated by the party instructing the process server to deliver the document in this fashion.
• Pursuant to Greek law, a foreign party may appoint a representative ad litem in the following ways: by a declaration addressed to the clerks of the Athens Court of First Instance; by a specific clause in a contract; by appointing a lawyer as a representative ad litem pursuant to Article 96 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure [i.e. orally before the court and prior to the hearing, or in written by means of a private power of attorney, upon the condition that the signature has been certified by a public authority or another attorney at law].
• Pursuant to Article 143(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, all documents addressed to a foreign party must be served on the representative ad litem, if properly appointed, provided they fall within the set of cases covered by the power of attorney for the purpose of service.
• The Supreme Court found, however, that the application by the appellant to reverse the freezing order before the Court itself was not related to the set of cases for which the lawyer of the Finnish company was appointed. In particular, the lawyer’s appointment concerned the main dispute (which reached the Supreme Court), not the provisional measures (freezing order).
• Therefore, service of the application to reverse the freezing order to the lawyer who received the writ on behalf of the Finnish company was inadmissible.
• The above result is free of doubt, notwithstanding the same lawyer acted and received documents on behalf of the Finnish company in a number of occasions, such as: representation before the Athens Court of First Instance and Court of Appeal; representation before the court which issued the freezing order; filing on behalf of the Finnish company of an application for declaring the Greek company insolvent, and representing the same party before court in the bankruptcy proceedings.

Comments

Almost ten years after the start of litigation, and following a number of hearings where the Finnish company was represented by the same lawyer, the Supreme Court considered that the latter had no powers of representation in a case initiated by his own application, followed by his appearance before the court, and his instruction to serve the freezing order to the losing party.

The ruling of the Supreme Court rests upon a formalistic construction of the law; contradicts to the factual situation of the dispute; causes additional costs to the applicant with no apparent reason; endangers the right to judicial protection, given that service from Greece to Finland is not business as usual.

Last but not least, the Supreme Court did not utter a word about the actual applicable rules, i.e those in the Service Regulation. It failed to take into account Recital 8 of the Preamble and the pertinent case law of the CJEU. Finally, it missed the chance to address the matter to the European Court of Justice, by filing a preliminary request for an issue which continues to puzzle academia and practice alike.

The 2021 winter course of the Hague Academy of International Law will be held online from 11 to 29 January 2021.

One remarkable feature of the Academy’s winter courses is that they jointly cover topics belonging (or traditionally labelled as belonging) to both public and private international law.

The General Course will be delivered by Maurice Kamto under the title International Law and Normative Polycentrism.

Special courses include: Evidence in International Adjudication by Chester Brown, The Protection of Religious Cultural Property in Public and Private International Law by José Angelo Estrella Faria, and The Regulation of the Internet by Inger Österdahl.

The winter course’s full programme is available here.

Registration will open on 8 October 2020. Further information is available on the Academy website.

La Cour de cassation applique le principe selon lequel deux décisions sont inconciliables, au sens de l’article 34 du règlement Bruxelles I, si elles entrainent des conséquences juridiques qui s’excluent mutuellement.

en lire plus

Brentwood Industries v. Guangdong Fa Anlong Machinery Equipment Co., Ltd?–A third way to enforce China-seated arbitral awards made by foreign arbitration institution

by Jingru Wang

Wuhan University Institute of International Law

Background

Nationality of an arbitral award marks the source of the legal validity of the award. Most countries generally divide the awards into domestic awards and foreign awards, and provide different requirements for their recognition and enforcement. It is a common practice to determine the nationality of the arbitral award by the seat of arbitration, which is the so-called “territorial theory”. However, Chinese law adopts the “institutional theory”, which raises controversy concerning the nationality of the arbitral award made by foreign arbitration institutions located in mainland. After long-term debate in practice, the Brentwood Case[1] finally confirmed that China-seated arbitral awards made by a foreign arbitration institution shall be regarded as Chinese foreign-related awards.

 

Fact and decision

Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court (hereinafter, “the court”) delivered the judgment on Brentwood Industries v. Guangdong Fa Anlong Machinery Equipment Co., Ltd. on 6 Aug 2020[2]. After DUFERCOS Case[3], it is another landmark case that granted the enforcement of arbitral award made by a foreign arbitration institution in mainland China.

Brentwood Industries (hereinafter, “plaintiff”) concluded a sales contract with three Chinese companies (hereinafter, “defendants”) and agreed that “any dispute arising out of or in relation to the agreement shall be settled by amiable negotiation. If no agreement can be reached, each party shall refer their dispute to the International Commercial Chamber (hereinafter, “ICC”) for arbitration at the site of the project in accordance with international practice.” Due to the defendants’ delay in payment, theplaintiff submitted their disputes to the ICC for arbitration. Since the “project” mentioned in the arbitration clause was the “Guangzhou Liede Sewage Treatment Plant Phase IV Project” listed in Article 3 of the “Supplementary Agreement”, located in Guangzhou, China, the seat of arbitration shall be Guangzhou, China. After defendants refused to perform the award, which was in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff resorted to the court for recognition and enforcement.

Under current Chinese law, there are two possible ways to enforce the arbitral award made by a foreign arbitration institution in mainland China: (1) Classify such an award as a foreign award by the location of the arbitration institution under Art. 283 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter, “Civil Procedure Law”), which provides that an award made by a foreign arbitration institution must be recognised and enforced by a people’s court pursuant to international treaties or the principle of reciprocity. (2) Classify such award as non-domestic award provided by the last sentence of Art. 1(1) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter, “New York Convention”), which provides that the convention shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.

Besides the aforementioned choices, the court provided a third way. It ruled that the arbitral award made by a foreign arbitration institution in mainland China shall be regarded as Chinese foreign-related arbitral award. If a party fails to perform the arbitral award, the other party may refer to Art. 273 of the Civil Procedure Law for recognition and enforcement. Under Art. 273 of the Civil Procedure Law, after an award has been made by an arbitration institution of the People’s Republic of China for foreign-related disputes, no party may file a lawsuit in a people’s court. If a party fails to perform the arbitral award, the other party may apply for enforcement to the intermediate people’s court of the place where the domicile of the person against whom an application is made is located or where the property is located.

 

Comment

Since Long Lide Case[4], Chinese court had affirmed the validity of arbitration agreements providing arbitration proceedings conducted by a foreign arbitration institution in mainland China. But in practice, arbitral awards based on these agreements still face the dilemma in recognition and enforcement. Because in China, different from international practice, the nationality of an arbitral award is determined by the location of the arbitration institution instead of the seat of arbitration, which is referred to as the “institutional theory”. Under Art. 283 Civil Procedure Law, to recognise and enforce an award made by a foreign arbitration institution by a people’s court, the people’s court shall handle the matter pursuant to international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. It impliedly refers to the New York Convention. However, concerning the determination of the nationality of the arbitral award, the New York Convention adopts the “territorial theory”, which provides: “this Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought”. The “territorial theory” adopted by the New York Convention collides with the provision of the Civil Procedure Law. The confusion on application of law has not yet been dispelled.

In response to the conflict between domestic legislation and international convention, judicial practice has shown inclination to convert towards the “territorial theory”. For example, in DMT case[5], the nationality of an arbitral award made by ICC in Singapore was deemed Singapore rather than France. But in line with the “territorial theory”, arbitral awards made in mainland China shall therefore be deemed as Chinese awards. Under the “reciprocity reservation” filed by China, the New York convention shall only be applied to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another contracting state. Hence, the New York Convention shall not be applied to China-seated arbitral awards.

As early as DUFERCOS Case, the court defined the arbitral award made by the ICC in Beijing as non-domestic and therefore enforced it under the New York Convention. However, it failed to clarify what exactly constitutes a non-domestic award and how to interpret the reciprocity reservation. Originally, both non-domestic awards and reciprocity reservation were methods to encourage the acceptance and enlarge the application of the New York Convention. Conversely, their coexistence has impaired the effect of the New York Convention.

From this perspective, the Guangzhou Intermediate Court did find another way out by completely avoiding such conflict. The current Chinese law divides arbitral awards into: (1)domestic awards; (2)Chinese foreign-related awards; (3)foreign awards. Compared with domestic awards, Chinese foreign-related awards take into account the particularity of foreign-related factors, and the review standards for recognition and enforcement are less strict, subject to procedural review only. Compared with foreign awards, Chinese foreign-related awards can be set aside by Chinese court, which makes them under more restrictive supervision. That is reason why some argued that China-seated arbitral awards will be subject to stricter supervision by Chinese court because there are more diversified judicial review channels.[6] Indeed, arbitral awards made by Chinese foreign-related arbitration institution are under triple supervision carried out by the seat of arbitration, the place of recognition and enforcement, and China. But it should be noted that when it comes to China-seated arbitral awards made by foreign arbitration institution, China, as the seat of arbitration, has the inherent power to review the arbitral award and set it aside. Moreover, according to Art. 70 and Art. 71 of the Chinese Arbitration Law, reasons for setting Chinese foreign-related arbitral awards aside do not exceed the scope of reasons for refusing recognition and enforcement of these awards. Therefore, they are not imposed with any additional burden by being regarded as Chinese foreign-related arbitral awards. Concerning the recognition and enforcement of Chinese foreign-related award, Art. 274 of the Civil Procedure Law provided a more tolerant standard than the New York Convention. Compared with Art. 5 of the New York Convention, the legal capacity of the parties to the agreement and the final effect of the award are no longer obstacles to recognition and enforcement. Since arbitral awards made by foreign arbitration institutions are regarded as Chinese foreign-related award, they are treated more favorably than foreign awards concerning recognition and enforcement. Left the legal problems behind, it showed China’s effort to support the arbitration within the current legislative framework.

However, Chinese foreign-related arbitral award itself is a distorting product of the conflicts between “institutional theory” and “territorial theory”. Application of Art. 273 of the Civil Procedure Law can only temporarily ease the tension. “Institutional theory” stipulated by Chinese law is an issue left over from history. “Foreign-related arbitration institutions” historically referred to the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (hereinafter referred to as CIETAC) and China Maritime Arbitration Commission (hereinafter referred to as CMAC). They were established respectively in 1954[7] and 1958[8]. At that time, only CIETAC and CMAC can accept foreign-related arbitration cases, while domestic arbitration institutions can only accept domestic arbitration cases. Accordingly, arbitral awards made by different arbitration institutions were divided into Chinese foreign-related arbitral awards and domestic arbitral awards. However, nowadays, such restrictions are extinct in practice. In 1996, the State Council of People’s Republic of China issued a document stating that: “The main responsibility of the newly established arbitration institution is to accept domestic arbitration cases; if the parties to a foreign-related arbitration case voluntarily choose the newly established arbitration institution for arbitration, the newly established arbitration commission can accept the case.”[9] In fact, there is no longer division of foreign-related arbitration institution and domestic arbitration institution. Hence, the “institutional theory” can no longer meet the needs of practice. Under the “territorial theory”, the arbitral awards are divided into domestic awards, non-domestic awards and foreign awards. We may wonder whether China would revoke the reciprocity reservation, the obstacle in recognition and enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards, in the future. Would China-seated arbitral awards made by foreign arbitration institution be defined as non-domestic awards by then? To get out of the dilemma once for all, the responsibility remains on the shoulder of legislative body.

 

[1] https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/website/wenshu/181107ANFZ0BXSK4/index.html?docId=bded4e3c31b94ae8b42fac2500a68cc4

[2]  https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/website/wenshu/181107ANFZ0BXSK4/index.html?docId=bded4e3c31b94ae8b42fac2500a68cc4

[3] https://www.pkulaw.com/specialtopic/61ffaac8076694efc8cef2ae6914b056bdfb.html

[4] https://www.pkulaw.com/chl/233828.html

[5] http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx/pay/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=bd44ff4e02d033d0bdfb

[6]Good News or Bad News? Arbitral Awards Rendered in China by Foreign Arbitral Institutions Being Regarded as Chinese Awards available at: https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/a/good-news-or-bad-news-arbitral-awards-rendered-in-china-by-foreign-arbitral-institutions-being-regarded-as-chinese-awards?from=timeline

[7] http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=2

[8] http://www.cmac.org.cn/%E6%B5%B7%E4%BB%B2%E7%AE%80%E4%BB%8B

[9] http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/218/62/83/440.html

 

 

 

As announced in a previous post, the UK has (again) joined the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the 2007 Child Support Convention. On 2 October 2020, the Depositary has officially notified of the new UK instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and of the new UK instrument of ratification of the Child Support Convention, including the new UK declarations and reservations. And yes both Conventions have been extended to Gibraltar from the outset.

As you may remember, the previous UK instruments of accession to and ratification of the above-mentioned Conventions were withdrawn because the United Kingdom and the European Union signed, ratified and approved a Withdrawal Agreement. Such an agreement entered into force on 1 February 2020, and included a transition period that started on the date the Withdrawal Agreement entered into force and which will end on 31 December 2020. In accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement, during the transition period, European Union law, including the HCCH Conventions, will continue to be applicable to and in the United Kingdom.

While from a public international law standpoint the UK has joined the HCCH Conventions above-mentioned three times (by EU approval, by accession/ratification – instruments that were later withdrawn, and by accession/ratification in September 2020), the view of the UK is that the HCCH Conventions have applied seamlessly since October 2015 regarding the HCCH Choice of Court Convention and since August 2014 regarding the HCCH Child Support Convention. In this regard, the UK declares:

With respect to the Choice of Court Convention: “Whilst acknowledging that the Instrument of Accession takes effect at 00:00 CET on 1 January 2021, the United Kingdom considers that the 2005 Hague Convention entered into force for the United Kingdom on 1 October 2015 and that the United Kingdom is a Contracting State without interruption from that date.”

With regard to the Child Support Convention: “Whilst acknowledging that the Instrument of Ratification takes effect at 00:00 CET on 1 January 2021, the United Kingdom considers that the 2007 Hague Convention entered into force for the United Kingdom on 1 August 2014 and that the United Kingdom is a Contracting State without interruption from that date.”

Before referring to the UK declarations and reservations, perhaps our readers may find it interesting to get a recap of the unorthodox process by which the UK joined the two HCCH Conventions.

• On 1 October 2015, the UK was bound by the Choice of Court Convention by virtue of its membership of the European Union which approved the Convention on behalf of its Member States;
• On 1 August 2014, the UK was bound by the Child Support Convention by virtue of its membership of the European Union which approved the Convention on behalf of its Member States;
• On 28 December 2018, the UK deposited an instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and an instrument of ratification of the Child Support Convention in the event the Withdrawal Agreement would not be ratified and approved by the UK and the European Union
• On several occasions, the UK suspended the legal effect of the accession/ratification, stating that as the European Council agreed a further extension of the period for withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union. During the Extension Period, the United Kingdom remains a Member State of the European Union. As a Member State, European Union law, including the Agreement, will remain applicable to and in the United Kingdom. See our previous posts part I, part III;
• The UK extended its accession/ratification to Gibraltar in the event the Withdrawal Agreement would not be ratified and approved by the UK and the European Union. See our previous post here;
• The Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the European Union was signed and approved and entered into force on 1 February 2020:
• On 31 January 2020, the UK withdrew its instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and its instrument of ratification of the Child Support Convention (incl. declarations and reservations and extension to Gibraltar). See our previous post here;
• On 28 September 2020, the UK deposited a new instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and a new instrument of ratification of the Child Support Convention, incl. declarations and reservations

While this process may seem to be undesirable from a legal standpoint (or just a legal nightmare!), the UK has acted in this way out of an abundance of caution and because of the lack of legal certainty surrounding Brexit.

With regard to the UK declarations, and in addition to the extension to Gibraltar, they seem to be exactly the same as those submitted previously, perhaps with some minor improvements.

The Depositary’s notifications are available here for the Child Support Convention and here for the Choice of Court Convention.

Fortunately, the process of joining the above-mentioned Conventions by the UK has finally come to an end.

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Cayenne, 15 juillet 2020

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Lyon, 9 juillet 2020

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Chambéry, 21 janvier 2020

On Tuesday, October 6, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its fourth monthly virtual workshop in private international law at 11:00-12:30. Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilian University Munich) will speak in German family law and multicultural society, followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

This is the fourth such lecture in the series, after those by Mathias Lehmann in June, Eva-Maria Kieninger in July, and Giesela Rühl in September. The designated November speaker is Marc-Philippe Weller (Heidelberg). So far, all presentations have been in German, but in the future we plan to alternate between German and English, in order to enable more interested scholars to participate.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de

 

On 30 September Belgium ratified the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults. This means that the Convention will enter into force for Belgium on 1 January 2021. The Convention will then have 13 Contracting States. All of them are in Europe (EU or neigbouring States): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Monaco, Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (only Scotland). The Convention has additionally been signed by a number of other States (all EU): Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland.

The European Parliament has attempted to have the Commission adopt EU legislation on this topic (see its resolutions of 2008 and of 2017). The European Law Institute has conducted a study on which we reported earlier (here). Although the Commission has not initiated legislation, they are following up the signing and ratifying of the Convention by Member States. They seem to have success.

Belgium has been preparing the implementation legislation since 2019 and initially planned to ratify the convention a year earlier, but the process was delayed due to the setting up of an electronic central register of protected persons.

(On the same day Belgium’s new federal government was sworn in after 493 days, but that is unrelated!)

Thank you Irene Pietropaoli for alerting me to the European Parliament’s draft proposal for a mandatory human rights due diligence Directive. The official title proposed is a Directive on Corporate Due Diligence and Corporate  Accountability). Parliament also proposes insertions in both Brussels Ia and Rome II. For the related issues see a study I co-authored on the Belgian context, with links to developments in many jurisdictions.

I do not in this post go into all issues and challenges relating to such legislation, focusing instead on a first, preliminary analysis of the conflicts elements of the proposal.

A first issue of note in the newly proposed Directive is the definitional one.  The proposal’s full title as noted uses ‘corporate due diligence and corporate accountability’. However in its substantive provisions it uses ‘duty to respect human rights, the environment and good governance’ and it defines each (but then with the denoter ‘risk’) in Article 3. For human rights risks and for governance risks these definitions link to a non-exhaustive list of international instruments while for the environment no such list is provided.

The proposed Directive points out the existence of sectoral EU due diligence legislation e.g. re timber products and precious metals, and suggests ‘(i)n case of insurmountable incompatibility, the sector-specific legislation shall apply.’ This is an odd way to formulate lex specialis, if alone for the use of the qualifier ‘insurmountable’. One assumes the judge seized will eventually be the arbitrator of insurmountability however from a compliance point of view this is far from ideal.

As for the proposed amendment to Brussels Ia, this would take the form of a forum necessitatis as follows:

Article 26a
Regarding business-related civil claims on human rights violations within the value chain of a company domiciled in the Union or operating in the Union within the scope of Directive xxx/xxxx on Corporate Due Diligence and Corporate Accountability, where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under this Regulation, the  courts of a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if the right to a fair trial or the right to access to justice so requires, in particular: (a) if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted or would be impossible in a third State with which the dispute is closely related; or (b) if a judgment given on the claim in a third State would not be entitled to recognition and enforcement in the Member State of the court seised under the law of that State and such recognition and enforcement is necessary to ensure that the rights of the claimant are satisfied; and the dispute has a sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised.

This proposal is a direct copy paste (with only the reference to the newly proposed Directive added) of the European Commission’s proposed forum necessitatis rule (proposed Article 26) at the time Brussels I was amended to Brussels Ia (COM (2010) 748). I discussed the difficulty of such a forum provision eg here (for other related posts use the search string ‘necessitatis’). The application of such a rule also provokes the kinds of difficulty one sees with A33-34 BIa (including the implications of an Anerkennungsprognose).

Coming to the proposed insertion into Rome II, this text reads

Article 6a
Business-related human rights claims
In the context of business-related civil claims for human rights violations within the value chain of an undertaking domiciled in a Member State of the Union or operating in the Union within the scope of Directive xxx/xxxx on Corporate Due Diligence and Corporate Accountability, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of the damage sustained shall be the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking  compensation for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the  damage occurred or on the law of the country in which the parent company has its domicile or, where it does not have a domicile in a Member State, the law of the country where it operates.

I called this a choice between lex locus damni; locus delicti commissi; locus incorporationis; locus activitatis. Many of the associated points of enquiry of such a proposal are currently discussed in Begum v Maran (I should add I have been instructed in that case).

A first obvious issue is that the proposed Article 6a only applies to the human rights violations covered by the newly envisaged Directive. It does not cover the environmental rights. These presumably will continue to be covered by Rome II’s Article 7 for  environmental damage. This will require a delineation between environmental damage that is not also a human rights issue, and those that are both. Neither does the proposed rule apply to the ‘good governance’ elements of the Directive. These presumably will continue to be covered by the general rule of A4 Rome II, with scope for exception per A4(3).

My earlier description of the choice as including ‘locus incorporationis’ is not entirely correct, at least not if the ‘domicile’ criterion is the one of Brussels Ia. A corporation’s domicile is not necessarily that of its state of incorporation and indeed Brussels Ia’s definition of corporate domicile may lead to more than one such domicile. Does the intended rule imply claimant can chose among any of those potential domiciles?

Locus delicti commissi in cases of corporate due diligence (with the alleged impact having taken place abroad) in my view rarely is the same as locus damni, instead referring here to the place where the proper diligence ought to have taken place, such as at the jurisdictional level in CJEU C-147/12 OFAB, and for Rome II Arica Victims. This therefore will often co-incide with the locus incorporationis.

Adding ‘locus activitis’ as I called it or as the proposal does, the law of the country where the parent company operates, clearly will need refining. One presumes the intention is for that law to be one of the Member States (much like the proposed Directive includes in its scope ‘limited liability undertakings governed by the law of a non-Member State and not established in the territory of the Union when they operate in the internal market selling goods or providing services’). Therefore it would be be best to replace ‘country where it operates’ with ‘Member State’ where it operates. However clearly a non-EU domiciled corporation may operate in many Member States, thereby presumably again expanding the list of potential leges causae to pick from. Moreover, the very concept of ‘parent’ company is not defined in the proposal.

In short, the European Parliament with this initiative clearly hopes to gain ground quickly on the debate. As is often the case in such instances, the tent pegs have not yet been quite properly staked.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.

(3rd ed forthcoming February 2020).

 

 

 

Tribunal judiciaire de Paris, 17 septembre 2020

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Rouen, 2 juillet 2020

On 14 August 2020, the Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law of the MPI Luxembourg met online with a special invitee, Steven Gee QC, joining actually from Hong Kong, where he was staying at the time.

Mr. Gee is the author of a treatise on, and entitled, Commercial Injunctions (Sweet & Maxwell, last edition 2016, a new updated one in the making). The book is mainly about UK law but at the end it addresses as well other jurisdictions. This is why Mr. Gee got in touch with the MPI (Prof. Burkhard Hess and Dr. Vincent Richard will contribute to the European part of the next edition of Commercial Injunctions), and how he ended up sharing with the researchers and MPI guests a two-hours talk on injunctions.

I thought his presentation and the following debate had been recorded but, unfortunately, it had not. Therefore, I cannot accurately report on the contents. What I can do, though, is to explain here an idea I had already in mind and was, to some extent, confirmed by Mr. Gee during the discussion.

It has to do with antisuit injunctions and the preliminary reference sent to the Court of Justice last December by the Court of Appeal (England & Wales), on the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (C-946/19). At the time I am writing these lines a settlement has been reached between the litigants in the main proceedings, and the request consequently withdrawn. A fact which strengthens my dismayed suspicion that the whole thing was a practical joke on the Court of Justice (but not only). Of course, I know I am exaggerating and, regarding the intentions of the referring court, wrong. This notwithstanding: a request relating to antisuit injunctions, i.e., to one of the most distinctive institutions of the common law tradition, already firmly rejected by the Court of Justice in ad intra situations; asking whether the injunction could (rather: had to) be mandatorily (no discretion!) granted on the basis of a crucial provision of a pivotal EU instrument [article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation], in ad extra situations (an invitation to indulge in “eurocentrism”?); sent to the Court of Justice barely one month before Brexit (and twelve months away from the end of the transitional period)? Some eyebrows have surely gone up.

The doubts of the national court regarding Article 4(1) of the Regulation read as follow:

whether the true effect of the Article is to give a right to every defendant who is domiciled in a Member State to be sued exclusively in the State of their domicile in all but the slender circumstances where that outcome is specifically excluded or some other outcome is permitted by the Judgments Regulation itself.

As a matter of fact, the Court of Appeal looked rather keen on answering in the affirmative [at 50]: ‘we acknowledge that [the antisuit injunction applicant’s] interpretation of the meaning and effect of Article 4(1) is a possible interpretation’.

The actual ground for referring the question to the Court of Justice had rather to do with the consequences of spousing such view [id. loc.]: ‘[…] but it is not one [interpretation] that we would wish to adopt in the present case unless required to do so’. Should Article 4(1) create a directly enforceable right, the Court of Appeal feared its breach would automatically lead to an antisuit injunction [id. loc.]: ‘[an]  extreme result[s] that would not be contemplated by an application of domestic law’.

In the case at hand, the Court of Appeal had already confirmed the first instance determinations in the sense that previous national case law on employment contracts, according to which Article 20(1) of the Brussels I Regulation and Article 22(1) of the Brussel I bis Regulation create a right protecting the employee against being sued in a third State by his employer, was not binding on it.

My experience with English practitioners and academics is that they do have a good knowledge and understanding of EU law. That Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation is not meant to confer an individual right is something the referring court could have easily concluded itself, without asking Luxembourg.

We – scholars- tend to be thorough and go to the bottom of the arguments: legislative intention based on history (not just the very illustrative Jenard and Schlosser Reports, but, here, also the rich publication of GAL Droz on the Brussels Convention, and all those he quotes); text; system; object and purpose of the provision; legal comparison. But for the sitting judges to decide on the dispute at stake, a look at Article 4(1) in a language other than English, coupled with a comparison between the rationale of the provisions on employment contracts and of Article 4(1), should have been enough if they wanted to move forward keeping the reasoning sober.

On the occasion of the MPI’s meeting mentioned above, Mr. Gee’s stressed a factor of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal that may help understanding the situation; he highlighted the asymmetry between the parties to the dispute. Throughout the proceedings before the Judge, both parties had been represented by solicitors and by leading and junior counsel. Before the Court of Appeal it remained so regarding the antisuit injunction’s applicant, but not the defendant, who did neither attend nor was represented, due to, allegedly, financial inability. The Court had only the written submissions previously made by his legal team to resist the antisuit injunction. They may have been enough to convince the first instance Judge not to grant the injunction; but before the Court of Appeal, and against the (slightly) more sophisticated (and, by all means, radical) submissions of Mr Cohen QC on behalf of the applicant at the hearing, he probably needed to do better.

As indicated, the case will no longer keep the Court of Justice busy. My (strictly) personal view remains that the preliminary reference was a practical joke: on the Court of Justice, and on second thought also on the Court of Appeal. Both seem to have been strategically used by one of the litigants.

In any event, I expect academics to study further the questions referred in C-946/19. For sure, I do not see any individual right “hidden” in Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. But, contrary to some scholars’ views (A. Dickinson, C.M. Clarkson and J. Hill, following A. Briggs) I believe other provisions in the Regulation may be interpreted in that way: not because they were conceived with the purpose of conferring directly enforceable rights upon persons domiciled in a Member State, but because such understanding of the jurisdictional grounds would help ensuring that specific substantive EU law is effective also extraterritorially, where needed.

(NoA: MPI Department I “Referentenrunde” have been resumed on the usual weekly basis every Wednesday via Zoom. A series of lectures is foreseen for the fall; specific dates will be announced in due time through the MPI website. Events are open to all having an interest. Contact person: michalis.spyropoulos@mpi.lu)

Yesterday (30 September 2020), Belgium ratified the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults, which will enter into force for Belgium on 1 January 2021.

Source:

here