Agrégateur de flux

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑249/19 (JE v KF), which is about Rome III.

Context: “11 JE and KF, who are Romanian nationals, married in Iași (Romania) on 2 September 2001.

12 On 13 October 2016, JE applied for a divorce to the Judecătoria Iași (Court of First Instance, Iași, Romania).

13 By judgment of 31 May 2017, that court declined jurisdiction to hear that application in favour of the Judecătoria Sectorului 5 București (Court of First Instance of the Fifth District of Bucharest, Romania).

14 By a judgment of 20 February 2018, that court, on the basis of the nationality of both spouses referred to in Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003, established that the Romanian courts had general jurisdiction to hear the application for divorce made by JE. Furthermore, on the basis of Article 8(a) of Regulation No 1259/2010, it designated Italian law as the law applicable to the dispute of which it was seised, on the ground that, on the date on which the application for divorce was filed, the habitual residence of the spouses was in Italy.

15 In that regard, that court held that, under Italian law, an application for divorce made in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings could be filed only if a legal separation of the spouses had previously been established or declared by a court and if at least three years had elapsed between the date of that separation and the date on which the application for divorce was filed with the court.

16  Given that the existence of a court decision establishing or pronouncing such a separation had not been proven and that Romanian law does not provide for legal separation proceedings, that court held that those proceedings had to be conducted before the Italian courts and that, consequently, any application to that effect made to the Romanian courts was inadmissible.

17 JE lodged an appeal against that judgment before the referring court, claiming, inter alia, that the court at first instance should have applied Article 2600(2) of the Civil Code, which constitutes the transposition into Romanian law of Article 10 of Regulation No 1259/2010.

18 In that regard, JE is of the opinion that, since Italian law is restrictive as regards the conditions required for divorce, Romanian law should apply to the application for divorce.

19 In JE’s view, that solution also flows from the fact that the application of Italian law is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum and that, consequently, that application must, in accordance with Article 12 of that regulation, be disapplied”.

Question refered to the Court of Justice: “‘Is the expression “the law applicable pursuant to Article 5 or Article 8 makes no provision for divorce”[, in Article 10 of Regulation No 1259/2010,] to be interpreted (a) in a strict, literal manner, that it is to say only in respect of a situation where the foreign law applicable makes no provision for any form of divorce, or (b) more broadly, as also including a situation where the foreign law applicable permits divorce, but does so in extremely limited circumstances, involving an obligatory legal separation procedure prior to divorce, in respect of which the law of the forum contains no equivalent procedural provisions?’”.

Decision of the Court of Justice: “Article 10 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 […] must be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘where the law applicable by virtue of Article 5 or Article 8 makes no provision for divorce’ applies only where the foreign law applicable makes no provision for divorce in any form”.

Source: here

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑253/19 (MH, NI v OJ, Novo Banco SA), which is about the Insolvency bis Regulation:

“The first and fourth subparagraphs of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that the presumption established in that provision for determining international jurisdiction for the purposes of opening insolvency proceedings, according to which the centre of the main interests of an individual not exercising an independent business or professional activity is his or her habitual residence, is not rebutted solely because the only immovable property of that person is located outside the Member State of habitual residence”.

Source: here

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑80/19 (E. E. with the presence of: Kauno miesto 4-ojo notaro biuro notarė Virginija Jarienė, K.-D. E.), which is about the Succession Regulation. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« 1) Le règlement (UE) no 650/2012 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que relève de la notion de « succession ayant une incidence transfrontière » une situation dans laquelle le défunt, ressortissant d’un État membre, résidait dans un autre État membre à la date de son décès, mais n’avait pas rompu ses liens avec le premier de ces États membres, dans lequel se trouvent les biens composant sa succession, tandis que ses successibles ont leur résidence dans ces deux États membres. La dernière résidence habituelle du défunt, au sens de ce règlement, doit être fixée par l’autorité saisie de la succession dans un seul desdits États membres.

2) L’article 3, paragraphe 2, du règlement no 650/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que, sous réserve d’une vérification par la juridiction de renvoi, les notaires lituaniens n’exercent pas des fonctions juridictionnelles lors de la délivrance d’un certificat national d’hérédité. Toutefois, il appartient à la juridiction de renvoi de déterminer si ces notaires agissent par délégation ou sous le contrôle d’une autorité judiciaire et, en conséquence, peuvent être qualifiés de « juridictions », au sens de cette disposition.

3) L’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous g) du règlement no 650/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que, dans le cas où la juridiction de renvoi considérerait que les notaires lituaniens peuvent être qualifiés de « juridictions », au sens de ce règlement, le certificat d’hérédité qu’ils délivrent, peut être considéré comme étant une « décision », au sens de cette disposition, de telle sorte que, aux fins de le délivrer, ces notaires peuvent appliquer les règles de compétence prévues au chapitre II dudit règlement.

4) Les articles 4 et 59 du règlement no 650/2012 doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’un notaire d’un État membre, qui n’est pas qualifié de « juridiction », au sens de ce règlement, peut, sans appliquer les règles générales de compétence prévues par ledit règlement, délivrer les certificats nationaux d’hérédité. Si la juridiction de renvoi considère que ces certificats remplissent les conditions prévues à l’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous i), du même règlement, et peuvent, dès lors, être considérés comme étant des « actes authentiques », au sens de cette disposition, ceux-ci produisent, dans les autres États membres, les effets que l’article 59, paragraphe 1, et l’article 60, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 650/2012 attribuent aux actes authentiques.

5) Les articles 4, 5, 7 et 22 ainsi que l’article 83, paragraphes 2 et 4, du règlement no 650/2012 doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la volonté du de cujus ainsi que l’accord entre ses successibles peuvent conduire à la détermination d’une juridiction compétente en matière de successions et à l’application d’une loi successorale d’un État membre autre que celles qui résulteraient de l’application des critères dégagés par ce règlement ».

Source : here

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑73/19 (Belgium v Movic BV, Events Belgium BV, Leisure Tickets & Activities International BV), which is about Brussels I bis. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

Context : « Le 2 décembre 2016, les autorités belges ont assigné en justice devant le président du rechtbank van koophandel Antwerpen-afdeling Antwerpen (tribunal de commerce, division d’Anvers, Anvers, Belgique), en formation de référé, Movic, Events Belgium et Leisure Tickets & Activities International, en demandant à titre principal, d’une part, de faire constater que ces sociétés pratiquaient la revente, en Belgique, au moyen de sites Internet gérés par elles, des titres d’accès à des événements pour un prix supérieur à celui initial, activité constitutive des infractions aux dispositions de la loi du 30 juillet 2013 et du CDE, et, d’autre part, d’ordonner la cessation de ces pratiques commerciales.

18 À titre accessoire, les autorités belges ont demandé d’ordonner des mesures de publicité de la décision prononcée aux frais desdites sociétés, d’imposer une astreinte de 10 000 euros par infraction constatée à partir de la signification de cette décision et de dire pour droit que les infractions futures pourront être constatées par simple procès–verbal dressé par un fonctionnaire assermenté de la direction générale de l’inspection économique, conformément au CDE.

19 Les trois sociétés en cause ont soulevé une exception d’incompétence internationale des juridictions belges, en soutenant que les autorités belges avaient agi dans l’exercice de la puissance publique, de sorte que leurs actions ne relevaient pas du champ d’application du règlement no 1215/2012 »

Decision : “L’article 1er, paragraphe 1, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que relève de la notion de « matière civile et commerciale », figurant à cette disposition, une action opposant les autorités d’un État membre à des professionnels établis dans un autre État membre dans le cadre de laquelle ces autorités demandent, à titre principal, à ce que soit constatée l’existence d’infractions constituant des pratiques commerciales déloyales prétendument illégales et ordonnée la cessation de celles-ci, ainsi que, à titre accessoire, à ce que soient ordonnées des mesures de publicité et à ce que soit imposée une astreinte ».

Source : here

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case  C‑658/18 (UX v Governo della Repubblica italiana), which is about the status of Judges of the Peace and a judicial victory for the latter with rather wide financial consequences for Italy and beyond. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

“1) L’article 267 TFUE doit être interprété en ce sens que le Giudice di pace (juge de paix, Italie) relève de la notion de « juridiction d’un des États membres », au sens de cet article.

2) L’article 7, paragraphe 1, de la directive 2003/88/CE […] concernant certains aspects de l’aménagement du temps de travail, et l’article 31, paragraphe 2, de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’un juge de paix qui, dans le cadre de ses fonctions, effectue des prestations réelles et effectives, qui ne sont ni purement marginales ni accessoires, et pour lesquelles il perçoit des indemnités présentant un caractère rémunératoire, peut relever de la notion de « travailleur », au sens de ces dispositions, ce qu’il appartient à la juridiction de renvoi de vérifier.

La clause 2, point 1, de l’accord-cadre sur le travail à durée déterminée conclu le 18 mars 1999, qui figure à l’annexe de la directive 1999/70/CE du Conseil, du 28 juin 1999, concernant l’accord-cadre CES, UNICE et CEEP sur le travail à durée déterminée, doit être interprétée en ce sens que la notion de « travailleur à durée déterminée », figurant à cette disposition, peut englober un juge de paix, nommé pour une période limitée, qui, dans le cadre de ses fonctions, effectue des prestations réelles et effectives, qui ne sont ni purement marginales ni accessoires, et pour lesquelles il perçoit des indemnités présentant un caractère rémunératoire, ce qu’il appartient au juge de renvoi de vérifier.

La clause 4, point 1, de l’accord-cadre sur le travail à durée déterminée conclu le 18 mars 1999, qui figure à l’annexe de la directive 1999/70, doit être interprétée en ce sens qu’elle s’oppose à une réglementation nationale qui ne prévoit pas le droit pour un juge de paix à bénéficier d’un congé annuel payé de 30 jours, tel que celui prévu pour les magistrats ordinaires, dans l’hypothèse où ce juge de paix relèverait de la notion de « travailleur à durée déterminée », au sens de la clause 2, point 1, de cet accord-cadre, et où il se trouverait dans une situation comparable à celle d’un magistrat ordinaire, à moins qu’une telle différence de traitement ne soit justifiée par les différences de qualifications requises et la nature des tâches dont lesdits magistrats doivent assumer la responsabilité, ce qu’il incombe à la juridiction de renvoi de vérifier »

Source : here

L’article 10, § 2, ne laissant guère de place pour des restrictions à la liberté d’expression dans le domaine du discours politique ou de questions d’intérêt général, la condamnation des requérants pour provocation à la discrimination pour avoir appelé au boycott des produits venant d’Israël, faute de reposer sur des motifs pertinents et suffisants, a violé le droit à la liberté d’expression.

en lire plus

As announced earlier, Erasmus School of Law is recruiting five researchers for a project on Affordable Access to Civil Justice in Europe, financed by the Dutch Research Council. The deadline for application has been extended till 27 July 2020. See our previous post.

The EU Regulations on the Property Regimes of International Couples – A Commentary has been published by Edward Elgar in its “Elgar Commentaries in Private International Law” series.

The publisher’s abstract reads: This article-by-article Commentary on EU Regulations 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 critically examines the uniform rules adopted by the EU to deal with the property relations of international couples, both married and in registered partnerships. Written by experts from a variety of European countries, it offers a comprehensive side-by-side discussion of the two Regulations to provide context and a deeper understanding of the issues of jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition of judgements covered.

Edited by Ilaria Viarengo and Pietro Franzina, this commentary features contributions by Giacomo Biagioni, Andrea Bonomi, Beatriz Campuzano Díaz, Janeen Carruthers, Sabine Corneloup, Gilles Cuniberti, Elena D’Alessandro, Pietro Franzina, Martin Gebauer, Christian Kohler, Silvia Marino, Cristina M. Mariottini, Dieter Martiny, Csongor I. Nagy, Jacopo Re, Carola Ricci, Andres Rodríguez Benot, Lidia Sandrini, Ilaria Viarengo and Patrick Wautelet.

Further info here

Mutualité sociale agricole

Sécurité sociale, accident du travail

Responsabilité délictuelle ou quasi délictuelle

The author of this post is Giulio Monga, a PhD student at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan. The editors of the EAPIL blog encourage scholars and practitioners to share their views on the Court’s judgment and its implications. Those interested in submitting guest posts are invited to get in touch with the blog editors at blog@eapil.org. 

On 16 July 2020 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment on the Schrems II case (a press release is available here). The ruling is part of the judicial saga between Facebook and the Austrian data protection advocate Max Schrems relating to transfers of personal data from the EU to the US. It follows the judgment of 2015 whereby the CJEU invalidated the so-called ‘Safe Harbour’, later replaced by the ‘EU-US Privacy Shield’, the adequacy of which had been established by the European Commission by a Decision of 2016.

The facts

Max Schrems lodged a complaint against Facebook Ireland Ltd. before the Irish Supervisory Authority (the Data Protection Commissioner, DPC) over the transfer of personal data relating to him by Facebook Ireland to Facebook Inc., the latter’s parent company established in the US.

In particular, Mr Schrems claimed that the inclusion of the controller-to-processor Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) approved by the EU Commission through Decision 2010/87 in a data transfer processing agreement between Facebook Ireland, acting as a controller with the meaning of Article 4(7) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and Facebook Inc., acting as a processor with the meaning of Article 4(8) GDPR, did not justify the transfer of the personal data relating to him to the US. Under US law, Schrems argued, Facebook Inc. is required to make the personal data of its users available to US authorities, such as the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the context of surveillance programmes that preclude the exercise of the rights enshrined in Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter). On that basis, Mr Schrems asked that DPC suspend the transfer of data.

The DPC, as well as the referring Irish High Court, noted that it was impossible to adjudicate Mr Schrems’ complaint unless the CJEU examined the validity of the Decision 2010/87. Furthermore, the referring High Court also asked CJEU to rule on the validity of the Decision 2016/1250 establishing the ‘EU-US Privacy Shield’.

The Legal Framework

Pursuant to Articles 25-26 of the repealed Directive 95/46/EC and to Articles 44-50 of the GDPR,  transfer of personal data to a third country may, in principle, take place only if the third country in question ensures an adequate level of data protection.

According to Article 45 GDPR, the Commission may find that a third country ensures, by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments, such an adequate level of protection. With regard to the US, the EU Commission, by Decision 2000/520/EC, firstly established that adequate protection was ensured by companies joining the so-called ‘Safe Harbour’ mechanism, which was invalidated under the first Schrems ruling. Later, with the new adequacy Decision 2016/1250 the EU-US Privacy Shield has been established.

In the absence of an adequacy decision, transfers of personal data to third countries may take place only if the personal data exporter established in the EU has provided appropriate safeguards provided by for Article 46, which may arise, among others, from standard contractual clauses adopted by the EU Commission. Standard Contractual Clauses, depending on the circumstances, might be controller-to-processor SCC such as those used by Facebook Ireland or controller-to-controller SCC approved by EU Commission through Decisions 2001/497/EC and 2004/915/EC.

In addition to the adoption appropriate safeguards, Article 46 GDPR also requires that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available.

The Judgment

The Court began with considering that the GDPR applies to the transfer of personal data for commercial purposes by an economic operator established in a Member State to another economic operator established in a third country, even if, at the time of that transfer or thereafter, that data may be processed by the authorities of the third country in question for the purposes of public security, defence and State security. The Court added that this type of data processing by the authorities of a third country cannot preclude such a transfer from the scope of the GDPR.

As in Schrems I, the CJEU stated that, according to the relevant rules of GDPR, data subjects whose personal data are transferred to a third country pursuant to Standard Contractual Clauses must be afforded a level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU by the GDPR, read in the light of the Charter. The Court specified that

[t]he assessment of the level of protection afforded in the context of such a transfer must, in particular, take into consideration both the contractual clauses agreed between the controller or processor established in the European Union and the recipient of the transfer established in the third country concerned and, as regards any access by the public authorities of that third country to the personal data transferred, the relevant aspects of the legal system of that third country. (para. 105)

The Decision on the Standard Contractual Clauses

In light of the foregoing, the CJEU Court considered that the validity of Decision 2010/78 is not called into question by the mere fact that the SCC therein approved do not bind the authorities of the third country to which data may be transferred. In fact,

[t]hat validity depends, however, on whether, in accordance with the requirement of Article 46(1) and Article 46(2)(c) of the GDPR, interpreted in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter, such a standard clauses decision incorporates effective mechanisms that make it possible, in practice, to ensure compliance with the level of protection required by EU law and that transfers of personal data pursuant to the clauses of such a decision are suspended or prohibited in the event of the breach of such clauses or it being impossible to honour them. (para. 137)

The CJEU found that Decision 2010/87 establishes such mechanisms. Namely, the CJEU pointed out that the decision imposes an obligation on a data exporter and the recipient of the data to verify, prior to any transfer, whether that level of protection is respected in the third country concerned and that the decision requires the recipient to inform the data exporter of any inability to comply with the standard data protection clauses, the latter being, in turn, obliged to suspend the transfer of data and/or to terminate the contract with the former. The Court concluded that nothing affected the validity of Decision 2010/87.

The Invalidation of EU-US Privacy Shield

Lastly, the CJEU examines the validity of Decision 2016/1250 establishing the EU-US Privacy Shield.

In that regard, the CJEU notes that that Decision enshrines the position, as did Decision 2000/520, that the requirements of US national security, public interest and law enforcement have primacy, thus condoning interference with the fundamental rights of persons whose data are transferred under the Privacy Shield framework.

In the view of the Court,

[t]he limitations on the protection of personal data arising from the domestic law of the United States on the access and use by US public authorities of such data transferred from the European Union to the United States, which the Commission assessed in the Privacy Shield Decision, are not circumscribed in a way that satisfies requirements that are essentially equivalent to those required, under EU law, by the second sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter. (para. 185)

The Court pointed out that, in respect of certain surveillance programmes, those provisions do not indicate any limitations on the power they confer to implement those programmes, or the existence of guarantees for potentially targeted non-US persons. The Court adds that, although those provisions lay down requirements with which the US authorities must comply when implementing the surveillance programmes in question, the provisions do not grant data subjects actionable rights before the courts against the US authorities.

The Ombudsperson mechanism

As regards the requirement of judicial protection, the CJEU focused its reasoning on the Ombudsperson mechanism provided for by the EU-US Privacy Shield Decision, which the EU Commission found as capable to ensure data subjects with level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.

The CJEU stressed that data subjects must be given an opportunity to seise an independent and impartial court in order to have access to their personal data, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data.

The CJEU observed in particular that the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson,

[a]lthough described as ‘independent from the Intelligence Community’, was presented as ‘[reporting] directly to the Secretary of State who will ensure that the Ombudsperson carries out its function objectively and free from improper influence that is liable to have an effect on the response to be provided’. (para. 195)

Furthermore, the CJEU noted that nothing in Decision 2016/1250 indicates that the dismissal or revocation of the appointment of the Ombudsperson is accompanied by any particular guarantees, which is such as to undermine the Ombudsman’s independence from the executive.

Similarly, the Court, noted that

[a]lthough recital 120 of the Privacy Shield Decision refers to a commitment from the US Government that the relevant component of the intelligence services is required to correct any violation of the applicable rules detected by the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, there is nothing in that decision to indicate that that ombudsperson has the power to adopt decisions that are binding on those intelligence services and does not mention any legal safeguards that would accompany that political commitment on which data subjects could rely.

The CJEU found that

[t]he Ombudsperson mechanism to which the Privacy Shield Decision refers does not provide any cause of action before a body which offers the persons whose data is transferred to the United States guarantees essentially equivalent to those required by Article 47 of the Charter.

In light of the foregoing, the CJEU invalidated Decision 2016/1250 on EU-US Privacy Shield.

The ruling is expected to have a very significant impact on the transfer of personal data from the EU to third countries.

Concerning the immediate effects of the judgment, the Court made the following remarks:

As to whether it is appropriate to maintain the effects of that decision for the purposes of avoiding the creation of a legal vacuum … the Court notes that, in any event, in view of Article 49 of the GDPR, the annulment of an adequacy decision such as the Privacy Shield Decision is not liable to create such a legal vacuum. That article details the conditions under which transfers of personal data to third countries may take place in the absence of an adequacy decision under Article 45(3) of the GDPR or appropriate safeguards under Article 46 of the GDPR (para. 202).

I reviewed Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-73/19 Belgische Staat v Movic BV et al here. The CJEU held this morning. At the time of posting an English version of the judgment was not yet available. The case at issue concerns enforcement of Belgium’s unfair trading act by the public authorities of the Member State. Movic BV of The Netherlands and the others defendants practices ticket touting: resale of tickets for leisure events.

The court is more succinct than the AG in its analysis yet refers repeatedly to points made by Szpunar AG without itself therefore having to refer to so extensive an analysis.

The fact that a power was introduced by a law is not, in itself, decisive in order to conclude that the State acted in the exercise of State authority (at 52). Neither does the pursuit of the general interest automatically involve the exercise of public powers (at 53). With respect to the authorities’ powers of investigation, it would seem that the Court like the AG reads (at 57) C‑49/12 Sunico as meaning that to exclude proceedings from the scope of ‘civil and commercial matters’, it must be determined, in concreto, whether the public authority uses evidence which it has in its possession as a result of its public powers of investigation, hence putting it in a different position as a person governed by private law in analogous proceedings. Collecting evidence in the same way as a private person or a consumer association could, does not fall within that category (at 58).

Neither the request for penalty payments nor an application for an injunction makes the proceedings drop out off Brussels Ia: both instruments are available to private parties, too. That is not however the case for the observation of continued infringement by mere civil servant oath as opposed to bailiff certification. This, the Court holds like the AG, does amount to exercise of public authority (at 62) however (at 63) that element alone escapes BIA, it does not so taint the other part of the proceedings.

As I noted in my review of first Advocate General Szpunar’s Opinion, the need for highly factual considerations sits uneasily with the Regulation’s expressed DNA of predictability. However this squares with the CJEU case-law on ‘civil and commercial’. 

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Heading 2, Heading 2.2.

Back in February we reported on the Opinion presented by Advocate General Tanchev in case C-249/19, JE. Today the Court of Justice rendered its Judgment in which it confirms the interpretation provided in the Opinion.

As a reminder, the question referred to the Court of Justice originated in the proceedings pending before the Romanian courts dealing with a petition for divorce. The parties to these proceedings are Romanian nationals, habitually resident in Italy.

In these circumstances, under Article 8(a) of the Rome III Regulation, it is a priori Italian law that governs the grounds of divorce. According to Italian law, the dissolution of marriage can be pronounced only where there had been a legal separation of the spouses and at least three years have passed between this separation and the time at which the court have been seized by the applicant.

Seized of a petition for divorce, the first instance court considered that since no provision is made for legal separation proceedings under Romanian law, such proceedings must be conducted before the Italian courts and therefore any application to that effect made before the Romanian courts is inadmissible.

Yet, seized of an appeal lodged by the applicant, the second instance court focused on Article 10 of the Regulation that states, inter alia, ‘[w]here the law applicable […]  makes no provision for divorce […], the law of the forum shall apply’. That court referred a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court asking, in essence, whether Italian law could be disapplied under Article 10.

In his Opinion presented this February, AG Tanchev held that Article 10 of the Rome III Regulation calls for a strict interpretation. The expression ‘where the law applicable pursuant to Article 5 or Article 8 makes no provision for divorce’ relates only to situations in which the applicable foreign law does not recognize the institution of divorce. Italian law should therefore be applied by the Romanian courts. Despite the lack of procedural rules in relation to legal separation, these courts have to verify whether the requirement relating to separation was met.

The Judgment is in line with the Opinion: it confirms that a foreign law can be disapplied on the basis of Article 10 only when that law does not provide for any form of divorce.

As discussed in the initial post, at points 64 to 66, the Opinion seems to qualify the requirement provided for in the Italian law as a ‘procedural condition’. That qualification does not appear explicitly in the Judgment. At paragraph 43, the Judgment convincingly confines itself to stating that the substantive requirement at issue consists on a three years’ separation of the spouses and that the lack of procedural rules in relation to legal separation cannot prevent the Romanian court from verifying whether that requirement is met.

Against this background, at paragraph 40, the Judgment makes a point in the context of effectiveness of the Rome III Regulation. If the application of the requirement provided for in Italian law leads to the situation where the petitions for divorce are being rejected without their examination, the practical effectiveness of the uniform conflict of laws rules on divorce is undermined. I deem the references to the effectiveness/effet utile to be highly interesting. See paragraph 20 of the Judgment in Bier for one of the earliest occurrences of such reference. The Judgment in JE is yet another example: it presents a noteworthy take on the interaction between effet utile and conflict of laws rules. It will be interesting to see whether and how that specific line of argument will be developed in the future.

Région de Bruxelles-Capitale / Commission
Agriculture
L’avocat général Bobek préconise une interprétation plus ouverte des critères de l’affectation directe

YouTube
Liberté d'établissement
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, en l’état actuel du droit de l’Union, les exploitants de plateformes en ligne, telles que YouTube et Uploaded, ne sont pas directement responsables de la mise en ligne illégale d’œuvres protégées effectuée par les utilisateurs de ces plateformes

État belge (Regroupement familial - Enfant mineur)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La date à prendre en compte, pour déterminer si un membre de la famille d’un regroupant familial est un « enfant mineur », est la date de présentation de la demande d’entrée et de séjour

Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Les États membres doivent accorder une indemnisation à toute victime d’une infraction intentionnelle violente, y compris à celles résidant sur leur propre territoire