Agrégateur de flux

18/2020 : 27 février 2020 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-298/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/27/2020 - 10:03
Commission / Grèce (Pollution par les nitrates)
Environnement et consommateurs
Pour avoir tardé à mettre en œuvre le droit de l’Union sur la protection des eaux contre la pollution par les nitrates à partir de sources agricoles, la Grèce est condamnée à payer une somme forfaitaire de 3,5 millions d’euros

Catégories: Flux européens

17/2020 : 27 février 2020 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-240/18 P

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 02/27/2020 - 10:02
Constantin Film Produktion / EUIPO
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
L’EUIPO doit de nouveau statuer sur la demande d’enregistrement de Constantin Film du signe « Fack Ju Göhte » comme marque de l’Union européenne

Catégories: Flux européens

Rethinking Judicial Jurisdiction in Private International Law

EAPIL blog - jeu, 02/27/2020 - 08:00

Milana Karayanidi is the author of Rethinking Judicial Jurisdiction in Private International Law, the most recent release in the Hart Publishing’s series Studies in Private International Law.

The abstract reads:

This book explores the theory and practice of judicial jurisdiction within the field of private international law. It offers a revised look at values justifying the power of courts to hear and decide cross-border disputes, and demonstrates that a re-conceptualisation of jurisdiction is needed. Rather than deriving from territorial power of states, jurisdiction in civil and commercial cross-border matters ought to be driven by party autonomy. This autonomy can be limited by certain considerations of equality and critical state sovereign interests. The book applies this normative view to the existing rules of jurisdiction in the European Union and the Russian Federation. These regimes are chosen due to their unique positions towards values in private international law and contrasting societal norms that generate and accommodate these values. Notwithstanding disparate cultural and political ideas, these regimes reveal a surprising level of consistency when it comes to enforcement of party autonomy. There is, nevertheless, room for improvement. The book demonstrates to scholars, policy makers and lawmakers that jurisdiction should be re-centred around the interests of private actors, and proposes ways to improve the current rules.

For further information, see here.

Dutch Court denies jurisdiction in Chief of the Israeli General Staff case.

GAVC - jeu, 02/27/2020 - 01:01

The judgment (in first instance; expect appeal) dismissing jurisdiction in Ismail Ziada v Benjamin Gantz is out in Dutch here and in English here. Gilles Cuniberti has reviewed the immunity issues here. I shall focus on the consideration of forum necessitatis, and can so do very briefly for the court does, too.

In essence the judgment on this point means that civil procedure rules on forum necessitatis do not set aside sovereign immunity based on public international law, and that the ECtHR judgment in Naït-Liman does not alter that finding. In that case, the ECtHR nudged States to consider a forum necessitatis rule:

‘“Nonetheless, given the dynamic nature of this area, the Court does not rule out the possibility of developments in the future. Accordingly, and although it concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 in the present case, the Court invites the States Parties to the Convention to take account in their legal orders of any developments facilitating effective implementation of the right to compensation for acts of torture, while assessing carefully any claim of this nature so as to identify, where appropriate, the elements which would oblige their courts to assume jurisdiction to examine it.”

In Ismail Ziada v Benjamin Gantz the Court simply remarked that ECtHR authority on the issue all concerns immunity of international organisations not, as here, State sovereign immunity, in which consequently (in the court’s view) forum necessitatis does not have a role to play.

Geert.

 

Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in the case C-41/19, FX: Jurisdiction to rule on an application opposing enforcement of a maintenance decision

Conflictoflaws - jeu, 02/27/2020 - 01:00

In today’s Opinion, Advocate General Bobek analyses whether the courts of a Member State in which a maintenance decision delivered by the courts of another Member State is enforced have jurisdiction to rule on an application opposing the enforcement.

More specifically, the reference for a preliminary ruling originates in a dispute between a maintenance debtor residing in Germany and a maintenance creditor residing in Poland. The latter lodged with the referring court an application requesting the recognition of a Polish maintenance decision and a declaration of its enforceability in Germany in accordance with Maintenance Regulation. The referring court delivered an order for enforcement in respect of the Polish maintenance decision. On the basis of that order, the defendant sought the enforcement of this decision against the debtor in Germany. The maintenance debtor opposed the enforcement based on Paragraph 767 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (the ZPO) and argued that the claim underlying the maintenance decision has been settled by payment.

Before deciding on the merits, it was for the referring court to decide whether it has jurisdiction to rule on the application opposing the enforcement. As the Opinion explains, at point 29:

In a nutshell, it seems that the referring court understands that there are two mutually exclusive possibilities. If [the Maintenance Regulation] were applicable, that would mean that the referring court lacks jurisdiction under Article 3 of that regulation. It is only if [the Maintenance Regulation] cannot be applied that it would be possible to base jurisdiction on Article 24(5) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation], according to which the courts of the Member State of enforcement have jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with such enforcement.

Against this background, the Opinion confirms, at points 32 et 33, that while the Brussels I bis Regulation contains, in Article 24(5), an explicit rule granting exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments to the courts of the Member State in which the judgment has been or is to be enforced, the Maintenance Regulation does not contain any explicit rule on jurisdiction regarding the enforcement of decisions in matters relating to maintenance.

Disagreeing with the referring court’s understanding of the issue of jurisdiction, at point 42, the Opinion states, however, that the rules on jurisdiction provided for in the Chapter II of the Maintenance Regulation establish jurisdiction with regard to the main procedure on the merits, but not with regard to the enforcement of such decisions.

Moreover, at points 43 et seq., the Opinion explains that a rule according to which enforcement belongs to the courts of the Member State where enforcement is sought is inherent in the system of the Maintenance Regulation and is an expression of what could be considered a general principle of international law:

43. […] even though Chapter IV of [the Maintenance Regulation] does not contain any explicit jurisdictional rule with regard to enforcement, that rule can be considered inherent in the system of that regulation.

44. In general terms, international jurisdiction for enforcement belongs to the courts of the Member State where enforcement is sought. As the Polish Government points out, that rule is an expression of what could be considered a general principle of international law connected with State sovereignty: it is only the authorities of the State of enforcement that are empowered to rule on the execution of decisions, as enforcement measures can only be carried out by the authorities of the Member State(s) where the assets or persons against which enforcement is sought are situated. That rule is valid, a fortiori, where a decision has already been recognised as enforceable in the Member State where enforcement is sought.

45. Therefore, it is not necessary to have recourse to Article 24(5) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] as a supplementary provision in order to be able to establish that the courts of the Member State of enforcement also have jurisdiction with regard to the enforcement of maintenance decisions within the scope of [the Maintenance Regulation]. Indeed, that article can be considered as an expression of the general principle just mentioned. 

Next, at points 50 et seq., the Opinion addresses the question whether an application seeking to oppose enforcement based on the discharge of the debt is to be considered as appertaining, for the purposes of jurisdiction, to enforcement proceedings. The extensive analysis is followed by a summary, at point 85:

85. For those reasons, it is my view that jurisdiction to adjudicate on an action opposing enforcement based on the discharge of debt falls to the courts of the Member State where the enforcement is sought. For the sake of completeness, I wish to stress two points in lieu of a conclusion. First, the discussion in the present Opinion and the conclusion reached concerned only the ground of opposition based on the discharge of the debt. Second, beyond that specific ground, no position is taken on the overall compatibility of Paragraph 767 of the ZPO with EU law.

The Advocate General concluded, at point 86:

86. [The Maintenance Regulation] and, in particular, Article 41(1) thereof, should be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the Member State where the enforcement of a maintenance decision given in another Member State is sought have jurisdiction to adjudicate on an application opposing enforcement, in so far as it is intrinsically connected with enforcement proceedings, it does not seek the modification or review of the maintenance decision, and it is based on grounds that could not have been raised before the court that issued the maintenance decision. Those conditions appear to be fulfilled by the application of opposition to enforcement based on the discharge of the debt at issue in the present case, which is nonetheless ultimately for the referring court to verify.

The Opinion can be found here.

Monasky v. Taglieri, a Guest Post by Melissa Kucinski

Conflictoflaws - mer, 02/26/2020 - 15:57

On February 25, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which concluded that Italy was the habitual residence of an infant that was brought from Italy to Ohio by her mother in 2015, shortly after the child was born. This opinion resolved a circuit split over the definition of habitual residence. The 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention is the private international law instrument that seeks to secure the prompt return of a child removed from or retained out of its habitual residence. It is not a child custody or jurisdictional determination, and not a means of enforcing existing custody orders. Instead it is designed to restore some type of status quo so that the child’s parents can pursue a custody order from the court in the appropriate jurisdiction. It discourages forum shopping and gives the child some consistency during the parents’ custody litigation. The threshold question that a court must resolve in determining whether to return a child is that child’s habitual residence, with the treaty being premised on the fact that a child cannot be returned to a location that is not her habitual residence. The U.S. circuits have had a long-standing split on the definition of this undefined treaty term, used in numerous Hague family law conventions.

In the Monasky v. Taglieri case, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously concluded that a child’s habitual residence is a flexible fact-based determination that should focus on “[t]he place where a child is at home, at the time of removal or retention…”. This standard gives a trial judge significant deference, with a caution to be informed by “common sense” in reviewing the unique circumstances of the case in front of her. The Supreme Court gave little guidance on how best to weigh the different facts that will be presented to the trial judge but left that to the discretion of the judge, with the view that “[n]o single fact … is dispositive across all cases.” The Court further rejected Ms. Monasky’s argument that habitual residence requires the parents to have an actual agreement, which she, and amici curiae argued is necessary for any child born into a situation of domestic violence. In rejecting that argument, Justice Ginsburg wrote both that the 1980 Convention has mechanisms to help children who would be subjected to a grave risk of harm if returned to situations where domestic violence is an issue, and that the domestic violence itself should be more fully examined in the custody case after the child is returned. She further expressed concern that this argument would leave children, many who are vulnerable, without the ability to use the 1980 Convention because a parent could easily manipulate the facts to argue that the parents lacked an agreement.

The Court also held that the question of a child’s habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact, but only “barely so,” and with the legal standard now clear, with the trial judge reviewing a totality of the circumstances when determining a child’s habitual residence, the court is left with a completely factual analysis in determining “[w]as the child at home in a particular country at issue?” Therefore, on appeal, the appropriate standard of review is clear-error.

Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) No 4/2019: Abstracts

Conflictoflaws - mer, 02/26/2020 - 13:38


The fourth issue of 2019 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:

Costanza Honorati, Professor at the University Milan-Bicocca, La tutela dei minori migranti e il diritto internazionale privato: quali rapporti tra Dublino III e Bruxelles II-bis? (The Protection of Migrant Minors and Private International Law: Which Relationship between the Dublin III and Brussels IIa Regulations?; in Italian)

  • Few studies have investigated the relation between Migration Law and PIL. Even less have focused on the interaction between Brussels IIa and Dublin III Regulations. The present study, moving from the often declared assumption that ‘a migrant minor is first of all a minor’ focuses on the coordination between the two Regulations and the possible application of Brussels IIa to migrant minors in order to adopt protection measures to be eventually recognized in all EU Member States or to possibly place a minor in another EU Member State.

Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan, Predictability First! Fraus Legis, Overriding Mandatory Rules and Ordre Public under EU Regulation 650/2012 on Succession Matters (in English)

  • This paper aims at investigating: (i) how fraus legis, overriding mandatory rules and ordre public exceptions position themselves within the system of the Succession Regulation; (ii) whether they are meant to perform their traditional function or to pursue any alternative or additional objective; and (iii) which limits are imposed on Member States in the application of said exceptions and to what extent Member States can avail themselves of the same to preserve, if not to enforce, their respective legal traditions in this area, as acknowledged in Recital 6 of Regulation No 650/2012. The assumption here submitted is that the traditional notions to which those exceptions refer have been reshaped or, rather, adjusted to the specific needs of Regulation No 650/2012 and of the entire EU private international law system, which increasingly identifies in predictability the ultimate policy goal to pursue.

In addition to the foregoing, the following comments are featured:

Michele Grassi, Research Fellow at the University of Milan, Sul riconoscimento dei matrimoni contratti all’estero tra persone dello stesso sesso: il caso Coman (On the Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages Entered into Abroad: The Coman Case; in Italian)

  • With its judgment in the Coman case, the Court of Justice of the European Union has extended the scope of application of the principle of mutual recognition to the field of family law and, in particular, to same-sex marriages. In that decision the Court has ruled that the refusal by the authorities of a Member State to recognise (for the sole purpose of granting a derived right of residence) the marriage of a third-country national to a Union citizen of the same sex, concluded in accordance with the law of another Member State, during the period of their residence in that State, is incompatible with the EU freedom of movement of persons. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the private-international-law implications of the Coman decision and, more specifically, to assess the possible impact of the duty to recognise same-sex marriages on the European and Italian systems.

Francesco Pesce, Associate Professor at the University of Genoa, La nozione di «matrimonio»: diritto internazionale privato e diritto materiale a confronto (The Notion of ‘Marriage’: Private International Law and Substantive Law in Comparison; in Italian)

  • This paper tackles the topical and much debated issue of the notions of ‘marriage’ and ‘spouse’ under EU substantive and private international law. Taking the stand from the different coexisting models of family relationships and from the fragmented normative approaches developed at the domestic level, this paper (while aware of the ongoing evolutionary trends in this field) focuses on whether it is possible, at present, to infer an autonomous notion of ‘marriage’ from EU law, either in general or from some specific areas thereof. The response to this question bears significant consequences in terms of defining the scope of application of the uniform rules on the free movement of persons, on the cross-border recognition of family statuses and on the ensuing patrimonial regimes. With specific regard to the current Italian legal framework, this paper examines to which extent characterization issues are still relevant.

Carlo De Stefano, PhD, Corporate Nationality in International Investment Law: Substance over Formality (in English)

  • Since incorporation is usually codified in IIAs as sole criteria for the definition of protected corporate ‘investors’, arbitral tribunals have traditionally interpreted and applied such provisions without requiring any thresholds of substantive bond between putatively covered investors and their alleged home State. By taking issue with the current status of international investment law and arbitration, the Author’s main proposition is that States revise treaty provisions dealing with the determination of corporate nationality so as to insert real seat and (ultimate) control prongs in coexistence with the conventional test of incorporation. This proposal, which seems to be fostered in the recent state practice, is advocated on the grounds of legal and policy arguments with the aim to combat questionable phenomena of investors’ ‘treaty shopping’, including ‘round tripping’, and, consequently, to strengthen the legitimacy of investor-State dispute settlement.

Ferdinando Emanuele, Lawyer in Rome, Milo Molfa, Lawyer in London, and Rebekka Monico, LL.M. Candidate, The Impact of Brexit on International Arbitration (in English)

  • This article considers the effects of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on international arbitration. In principle, Brexit will not have a significant impact on commercial arbitration, with the exception of the re-expansion of anti-suit injunctions, given that the West Tankers judgment will no longer be binding. With respect to investment arbitration, because the BITs between the United Kingdom and EU Member States will become extra-EU BITs, the Achmea judgment will no longer be applicable following Brexit. Furthermore, English courts will enforce intra-EU BIT arbitration awards pursuant to the 1958 New York Convention. Investment treaties between the EU and third countries will not be applicable to the United Kingdom.

Finally, the issue features the following case notes:

Cinzia Peraro, Research Fellow at the University of Verona, Legittimazione ad agire di un’associazione a tutela dei consumatori e diritto alla protezione dei dati personali a margine della sentenza Fashion ID (A Consumer-Protection Association’s Legal Standing to Bring Proceedings and Protection of Personal Data in the Aftermath of the Fashion ID Judgment; in Italian)

Gaetano Vitellino, Research Fellow at Università Cattaneo LIUC of Castellanza, Litispendenza e accordi confliggenti di scelta del foro nel caso BNP Paribas c. Trattamento Rifiuti Metropolitani (Lis Pendens and Conflicting Choice of Court Agreements in BNP Paribas v. Trattamento Rifiuti Metropolitani; in Italian)

Gaetano Vitellino, Research Fellow at Università Cattaneo LIUC of Castellanza, Note a margine di una pronuncia del Tribunale di Torino in materia societaria (Remarks on a Decision of the Turin Tribunal on Corporate Matters; in Italian)



Change in German International Adoption Law

Conflictoflaws - mer, 02/26/2020 - 11:06

Last week the German parliament approved a reform of the German adoption law. The reform was triggered by a decision of the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG) declaring provisions unconstitutional that did not allow a stepchild adoption for non-marital couples (English translation of the decision here).

The legislator took the opportunity to adapt the conflict of law provisions. The relevant rule, article 22 Introductory Act to the Civil Code (EGBGB) only applies to adoptions in Germany and those abroad that were not established by a foreign court or authority. In the latter case the rules on recognition of court decisions apply. Furthermore, the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption prevails. The new rule, thus, mainly determines the law applicable on the acceptance of an adoption by private agreement that occurred abroad.

The former relevant provision, Article 22 para 1 EGBGB stated, cited after the translation made by Juliana Mörsdorf for the Federal Office of Justice:

Article 22 Adoption

(1) The adoption of a child is governed by the law of the country of which the adopter is a national at the time of the adoption. The adoption by one or both spouses is governed by the law which applies to the general effects of the marriage under article 14 subarticle 1. The adoption by a life partner is governed by the law which applies to the general effects of the life partnership under article 17b subarticle 1 sentence 1.

[…]

The new Article 22 para. 1 states that

“the adoption of a child in Germany is governed by German law. In all other cases the adoption is governed by the law of the country in which the adoptee has his habitual residence at the time of the adoption.“ [my translation – German federal law in general is not very aware of the use of a gender neutral wording. Of course, also female and non-binary adoptees and their habitual residences are included.]

Due to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, all references to an adoption by somebody living in a marriage or registered civil partnership were eliminated. Furthermore, the rule is a good example for some general general shifts in the German International Family law system regarding connecting factors:

  • First, in the name of procedural efficiency (according to the travaux préparatoires, BT-Drs. 19/15618, p. 8, 16), there is the tendency to distinguish between legal situations occurring in Germany or abroad and use conflict of laws more often to accept legal situations established abroad. Adoptions in Germany are always governed by German law and always require a court proceeding (sec 1752 German Civil Code for minors and sec 1767 para. 2 for adults). With the new provision, the legislative confirmed that an adoption that occurred abroad will be accepted in German according to the so-called method of “recognition by conflict of laws”, as article 22 para 1 phrase 2 exclusively provides a rule for adoptions that took place outside of Germany.
  • Second, by determining the law applicable, the German rule no longer focuses on the adopter(s) but the adoptee. This change is in accordance with the general awareness to put the child’s best interest in the centre of attention in cases involving fundamental changes to a child. While, of course, there can be adoptions of adults, the adoption of a minor is the most common (see also the travaux préparatoires, BT-Drs. 19/15618, p. 16).
  • Third, the rule also includes a temporal connecting factor. Traditionally, German conflict of laws rules do not state the temporal connection factor, thus, the rules always refer to the moment of the closure of the court hearing. This can create uncertainty as it allows a change of connecting factors over time and even in the course of a proceeding.
  • Last but not least, and maybe even more interesting, the main connecting factor changed from nationality to habitual residence. Traditionally in German International Family Law, nationality was the central connecting factor, as it is still in article 13 (law governing the conclusion of a marriage). In article 22, instead, connecting factor is the habitual residence (of the adoptee). This shows a general tendency in German conflict of laws which was mainly triggered by the harmonization of conflict of laws in the EU. Last year the central rule regarding international marriage law (article 14, losing the importance to the latest EU regulations, though) changed the “rungs” of its famous “Kegel’s ladder”: Traditionally, the first “rung” of said ladder was the spouses shared nationality or last shared nationality during marriage. Only in case there was neither, applicable was the law of the spouses’ habitual residence. Since January 2019, main connecting factor (“first rung”) is the spouses’ habitual residence, the second the spouses’ habitual residence during the marriage if one spouse has maintained that habitual residence. Only the third step refers to the shared nationality.

The new law will come into force 31 March 2020. The new provisions apply to international adoptions that were not completed before that date (article 229 § 51 EGBGB).

Work Resumes at the Hague Conference on a Possible Instrument on Direct Jurisdiction

EAPIL blog - mer, 02/26/2020 - 08:00

Following the adoption of the Judgments Convention, on 2 July 2019, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has resumed its exploratory work on the possible elaboration of an instrument dealing with jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters (the Jurisdiction Project).

From 18 to 21 February 2020, the Experts’ Group set up for this purpose met in the Hague.

The Group was pleased with the progress made and concluded that matters relating to jurisdiction, including parallel proceedings, warrant further work and study.

The Experts’ Group has recommended to the Council on General Affairs and Policy, which will meet form 3 to 6 Mars 2020, that the Group continue its work.

The US Supreme Court case on the determination of habitual residence under the Child Abduction Convention has been decided – the judgment of Monasky v. Taglieri is now available!

Conflictoflaws - mar, 02/25/2020 - 19:27

Today (25 February 2020), the US Supreme Court delivered its Opinion in the case Monasky v. Taglieri. This decision is available here.

Two of the main takeaways are:

  • A child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parents.
  • A first-instance habitual-residence determination is subject to deferential appellate review for clear error.

This would appear to be in line with the case law of other Contracting Parties. We expect to post a more detailed comment shortly. In the meantime, see our previous posts here –  #1, #2 and #3.

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