Agrégateur de flux

Tribunal correctionnel de Chalon-sur-Saône, 18 janvier 2019

Tribunal correctionnel de Fort-de-France, 7 janvier 2019

Entrée en fonctions d’un nouvel avocat général à la Cour de justice

Autriche / Allemagne
Citoyenneté européenne
L’avocat général Wahl propose que la Cour de justice rejette le recours formé par l’Autriche contre la nouvelle redevance d’utilisation du réseau autoroutier allemand

Written by Prof. Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, Uppsala University, Sweden

On 1 January 2019, new restrictions came into force in Sweden’s private international law legislation in respect of marriages validly concluded abroad. The revised rules are found in the Act (1904:26 p. 1) on Certain International Relationships on Marriage and Guardianship, Chapter 1 § 8a, as amended by SFS 2018:1973. The content of the new legislation is, briefly, the following: no marriage shall be recognised in Sweden if the spouses or either one of them was under the age of 18 years at the time of the marriage. By way of exception, this rule may be set aside once both parties are above 18 years of age, if there are exceptional reasons to recognise the marriage. 

The law reform is in line with a recent European trend, carried out in e.g., Germany, Denmark and Norway, to protect children from marrying and, one could claim, to ‘spare’ people who married as a child (or with a child) from their marriage.[1] The requirement of 18 years of age has been introduced not only as the minimum marriage age for concluding a marriage in the State’s own territory, i.e., as a kind of an internationally mandatory rule, but also as a condition for the recognition of a foreign marriage.

The new Swedish legislation constitutes perhaps the most extreme example on how to combat the phenomenon of child marriages. The marriage’s invalidity in Sweden does not require a connecting factor to Sweden at the time of the marriage, or that the spouses are underage upon arrival to Sweden. Theoretically, the spouses may arrive to Sweden decades after marrying, and find out that their marriage is not recognised in Sweden. The later majority of the persons involved does not repair this original defect. The only solution, if both (still) wish to be married to each other, will be to (re)marry!

It remains to be seen whether the position taken in the Government Bill, claiming that the new law conforms with EU primary law and the ECHR, is proportionate and within Sweden’s margin of appreciation, will be shared by the CJEU and the ECtHR. Swedish Parliament, in any case, shared this view and did not consider that EU citizens’ free movement within the EU required exempting underage spouses from the rule of non-recognition. The new law applies to marriages concluded as of 1 January 2019. It does not affect the legal validity of marriages concluded before that date.

To understand the effects of the Swedish law reform, the following needs to be emphasised. One of the special characteristics of Swedish family procedure law is that is does not provide for decrees on marriage annulment or the invalidity of a marriage. Divorce and death are in Sweden the only ways of dissolving a marriage! This position has applied since 1 January 1974, when the right to immediate divorce became the tool to dissolve any marriage concluded in Sweden against a legal obstacle to the marriage, e.g., a spouse’s still existing marriage or duress to marry. A foreign marriage not recognised in Sweden is, however, invalid directly by force of Swedish private international law legislation. It follows that it cannot be dissolved by divorce – as it does not exist as a marriage in the eyes of Swedish law. It does not either produce any of the legal effects of marriage, such as the right to maintenance or property rights. It does not qualify as a marriage obstacle, with the result that both ‘spouses’ are free to marry each other or anyone else.

What, then, is the impact of the legislation’s exception enabling, in exceptional circumstances, to set aside the rule of non-recognition? This is an assessment which is aimed to take place ad hoc,usually in cases where the ‘marriage’s’ validity is of relevance as a preliminary issue, whereby each competent authority makes an independent evaluation. It is required that non-recognition must produce exceptional hardships for the parties (or their children). The solution is legally uncertain and unpredictable and has been subject to heavy criticism by Sweden’s leading jurists.

The 2019 law reform follows a series of reforms carried out in Sweden since 2004. According to the established main rule, a marriage validly concluded in the State of celebration or regarded as valid in States where the parties were habitually resident or nationals at the time of the marriage, is recognised in Sweden, Chapter 1 § 7 of the 1904 Act. Since a law reform carried out in 2004, an underage marriage is, nevertheless, invalid directly by force of law in Sweden, if either spouse had a connection to Sweden through habitual residence or nationality at the time of the marriage. (The 2019 law reform takes a step further, in this respect.) Recognition can, in addition, be refused with reference to the ordre publicexception of the 1904 Act, Chapter 7 § 4. The position taken in Swedish case law is that ordre publiccapturesanymarriage concluded before both parties were 15 years of age. Forced marriages do not qualify for recognition in Sweden, since the 2004 reform. The same applies to marriages by proxy, since 2014, but only on condition that either party to the marriage had a connection to Sweden through habitual residence of nationality at the time of the marriage.

The 2019 legislation differs in several respects from the proposals preceding it, for example the proposed innovation of focusing on the underage of a spouse at the time of either spouse’s arrival to Sweden.  A government-initiated inquiry is currently pending in Sweden, the intention being to introduce rules on non-recognition of polygamous marriages validly concluded abroad.

[1] See M. JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG, ‘Non-recognition of Child Marriages: Sacrificing the Global for the Local in the Aftermath of the 2015 “Refugee Crisis”’, in: G. DOUGLAS, M. MURCH, V. STEPHENS (eds), International and National Perspectives on Child and Family Law, Essays in Honour of Nigel Lowe, Intersentia 2018, pp. 267-281.

Since Conflict of Laws became a subject section at the Society of Legal Scholars in 2017, it has been part of the Society’s annual conference. This year’s conference, which will be held in Preston, UK, from 3 September to 6 September (right before the Journal of Private International Law Conference in Munich), is no exception and the organiser’s of the Conflict of Laws section, Andrew Dickinson and Máire Ní Shúilleabháin, have kindly provided the following Call for Papers:

SLS Conflict of Laws Section: Call for Papers and Panels for 2019 SLS Annual Conference at the University of Central Lancashire, Preston

This is a call for papers and panels for the Conflict of Laws section of the 2019 SLS Annual Conference to be held at the University of Central Lancashire in Preston from Tuesday 3rd September – Friday 6th September.  This year’s theme is ‘Central Questions About Law’.

This marks the third year of the Conflict of Laws section, and we are hoping to build on the successful meetings in Dublin and London.

The Conflict of Laws section will meet in the first half of the conference on Tuesday 3rd and Wednesday 4th September.

We intend that the section will comprise four sessions of 90 minutes, with 3 or more papers being presented in each session, followed by discussion. At least three of the sessions will be organised by theme. We hope, if submissions allow, to be able to set aside one session for papers by early career researchers (within 5-years of PhD or equivalent).

We welcome proposals from scholars in the field for papers or panels on any issue relating to any topical aspect of the Conflict of Laws (private international law), including but not limited to those addressing this year’s conference theme.

If you are interested in delivering a paper, we ask you to submit a proposed title and abstract of around 300 words. If you wish to propose a panel, please submit an outline of the theme and rationale for the panel and the names of the proposed speakers (who must have agreed to participate), together with their proposed titles and abstracts. We welcome proposals representing a full range of intellectual perspectives in the subject section, and from those at all stages of their careers.

Please submit your paper abstract or panel details by 11:59pm UK time on Monday 18th March 2019.  All abstracts and panel details must be submitted through the Oxford Abstracts conference system which can be accessed using the following link – https://app.oxfordabstracts.com/stages/1028/submission – and following the instructions (select ‘Track’ for the relevant subject section). If you registered for Oxford Abstracts for last year’s conference, please ensure that you use the same e-mail address this year if that address remains current. If you experience any issues in using Oxford Abstracts, please contact slsconference@mosaicevents.co.uk.

As the SLS is keen to ensure that as many members with good quality papers as possible are able to present, we discourage speakers from presenting more than one paper at the conference.  With this in mind, when you submit an abstract via Oxford Abstracts, you will be asked to note if you are also responding to calls for papers or panels from other sections.

The SLS offers a Best Paper Prize which can be awarded to academics at any stage of their career and which is open to those presenting papers individually or within a panel.  The Prize carries a £250 monetary award and the winning paper will, subject to the usual process of review and publisher’s conditions, be published in Legal Studies.

To be eligible for the Best Paper Prize:

• speakers must be fully paid-up members of the SLS;
• papers must not exceed 12,000 words including footnotes (as counted in Word);
• papers must be uploaded to the paperbank by 11.59pm UK time on Monday 26th August; and
• papers must not have been published previously or have been accepted or be under consideration for publication.

We have also been asked to remind you that all speakers will need to book and pay to attend the conference and that they will need to register for the conference by Friday 14th June in order to secure their place within the programme, though please do let us know if this is likely to pose any problems for you.  Booking information will be circulated in due course.

We note also that prospective speakers do not need to be members of the SLS or already signed up as members of a section to propose or deliver a paper.

We look forward to seeing you, as a speaker or delegate, at the Conflict of Laws session in Lancashire.

With best wishes,

Professor Andrew Dickinson, St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford
Dr Máire Ní Shúilleabháin, University College Dublin (Conveners)

La condamnation du prévenu pour refus de se soumettre au prélèvement biologique ne porte pas atteinte au droit au respect de sa vie privée dans la mesure où il existe une possibilité concrète, en cas d’enregistrement de l’empreinte génétique au fichier, d’en demander l’effacement. 

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Renvoi devant l'assemblée plénière
Arrêt n°640 du 17 décembre 2018

Comparution immédiate

[2019] EWCA Civ 10 Kaefer Aislamientos v AMS Drilling et al is a good illustration of the difficulty of privity of contract (here: privity of choice of court), and the limits to the harmonisation of the rules on choice of court under Article 25 Brussels I Recast.

Herbert Smith Freehills have analysis of the wider issues of the case (over and above Article 25) here. The appeal considers among others the approach that courts should adopt when, as will usually be the case at the interim stage when a jurisdiction challenge is launched, the evidence before the Court is incomplete. Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco as well as Brownlie were referenced.

Appellant contends that the Court has jurisdiction to determine the claim against defendants AT1 and Ezion under Article 25 Brussels I Recast. It is said that the relevant contract contains an English exclusive jurisdiction clause and the relevant contract was concluded by AMS Mexico and/or AMS on behalf of AT1 and/or Ezion as undisclosed principals and, it follows, the contract, including its jurisdiction agreement, bound AT1 and Ezion.

At 81 Lord Green refers to the Privy Council in Bols [2006] UKPC 45 which itself had referred to Colzani and Coreck Maritime (staple precedent at the CJEU; students of conflict of laws: time to worry if you read this around exam time and haven’t a clue). In Bols Lord Rodgers leading, held that CJEU precedent imposed on the court the duty of examining “whether the clause conferring jurisdiction upon it was in fact the subject of a consensus between the parties” and this had to be “clearly and precisely demonstrated“. The purpose of the provisions was, it was said, to ensure that the “consensus” between the parties was “in fact” established.

Lord Green (this is not part of the decision in Bols) adds that the Court of Justice has however recognised that the manner of this proof is essentially an issue for the national laws of the Member States, subject to an overriding duty to ensure that those laws are consistent with the aims and objectives of the Regulation. He does not cite CJEU precedent in support – but he is right: Article 25 contains essential, yet precious little bite in determining just how to establish such consensus. Prima facie complete, it leaves a vault of issues to be determined, starting with the element of ‘proof’ of consensus.

Of interest is that before deciding the issue, Lord Green notes at 85 Abela v Baardani [2013] UKSC 44 (“Abela“) at paragraphs [44] and [53] per Lord Clarke and Lord Sumption, that to view permission to service out of jurisdiction as more often than not exorbitant, is unrealistic in the modern era: routinely where service out is authorised the defendant will have submitted contractually to the jurisdiction of the domestic courts (or there would be an argument to that effect) and in any event litigation between residents of different states is a normal incident of modern global business. As such the decision to permit service out is, today, more generally viewed as a pragmatic decision predicated upon the efficiency of the conduct of litigation.

It was eventually held that the evidence pointed against AT1 and Exion being undisclosed principals and that therefore the Court of Appeal was right in rejecting jurisdiction.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9, Heading 2.2.9.4.

Corruption continues to cast a shadow over investment law. When allegations of corruption arise in an investment dispute, the tribunal faces the difficult task of deciding whether (and how) to penalize the responsible party. It must assess the often-limited evidence and then craft an appropriate remedy. The legal and practical questions this raises remain highly contested. On Tuesday, February 19, 2019, the ILA American Branch Investment Law Committee and the Georgetown International Arbitration Society are hosting an evening conference to discuss these questions, bringing together academic and non-academic perspectives.

Panel 1: What is sufficient proof of corruption?
• Aloysius Llamzon, Senior Associate, King & Spalding
• Jason Yackee, Professor, University of Wisconsin
• Meriam Al-Rashid, Partner, Dentons

Panel 2: What is the right response when corruption is found?
• Lucinda Low, Partner, Steptoe
• Arif H. Ali, Partner, Dechert

Opening and closing:
• David L. Attanasio, Co-Chair, ILA American Branch Investment Law Committee; Associate, Dechert
• Malika Aggarwal, Georgetown International Arbitration Society

Location:
Dechert
1900 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

When:
Tuesday, February 19, 2019, with registration from 4:45 pm and the program commencing at 5:00 pm.

Space is limited, so please RSVP as soon as possible here

The forthcoming volume of the Japanese Yearbook of International Law (Vol. 61, 2018) will feature the following articles and case notes relating to private international law:

Articles

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER COLLECTIVE REDRESS

Dai Yokomizo, Introductory Note (168)

Kazuhiko Yamamoto, Special Proceedings for the Collective Redress for Property Damage Incurred by Consumers — About So-Called “Japanese Class Action” — (169)

Dai Yokomizo, Consumer Collective Redress and Japanese Conflict of Laws (190)

Stefaan Voet, Europe’s Collective Redress Conundrum (205)

Catherine Piché & Geneviève Saumier, Consumer Collective Redress in Canada (231)

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Masato Dogauchi, The Aftermath of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Accident: How Japanese Lawyers Have Been Playing Their Roles with Regard to the Nuclear Damage? (284)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN JAPAN (369ss)

Public International Law

Takamatsu High Court, Judgment, April 25, 2016

Hate Speech — The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination — Relevance of the Convention in Interpreting Domestic Laws

Nagoya High Court, Judgment, September 7, 2016

Eligibility for Refugee Status — Burden and Degree of Proof — Situation in Nepal — Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees — Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status

Nagoya High Court, Judgment, November 30, 2016

Factors to be Taken into Consideration in Determination of Special Permission to Stay — Continuous De Facto Marriage and Family Life — Criminal Offence and Extenuating Circumstances

Naha District Court (Okinawa Branch), Judgment, February 9, 2017

State Immunity — Activities of Foreign Armed Forces Stationing in the Forum State with Its Consent — Tort Exception — Relationship Between the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Customary Rules on State Immunity

Private International Law

Supreme Court (3rd Petty Bench), Judgment, December 12, 2017

Challenge to Arbitral Award — Arbitrator Conflict of Interest — Disclosure of Conflict of Interest

Supreme Court (3rd Petty Bench), Judgment, 12 December 2017

Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act — Extraterritorial Application — Price-Fixing Cartel 

Supreme Court (1st Petty Bench), Decision, December 21, 2017

International Child Abduction — Modification of the Order to Return 

Tokyo High Court, Judgment, November 25, 2015

Enforcement of Judgment — Defamation — Reciprocity

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, January 17, 2017

International Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts — Rescindment of Contracts by Fraud — Overriding Mandatory Provision

Tokyo High Court, Judgment, October 25, 2017

Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses Commercial Contracts — Public Policy — Civil Remedy— International Private Law — Limitation of Party Autonomy by Mandatory Rules — Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position — Article 24 of the Antimonopoly Act — Article 709 of the Civil Code

 

More information on the Yearbook (former Annual) and the content of its past volumes is available at http://www.ilajapan.org/jyil/.