Agrégateur de flux

The Supreme Court of Canada has released its decision in Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melancon LLP v Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016 SCC 30 (available here).  The decision builds on the court’s foundational decision in Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, which altered the law on taking jurisdiction in cases not involving presence in the forum or submission to the forum.

In Club Resorts the court held that to take jurisdiction in service ex juris cases the plaintiff had to establish a presumptive connecting factor (PCF) and it identified four non-exhaustive PCFs for tort claims.  The fourth of these was that a contract connected with the dispute was made in the forum.  This was viewed as unusual: there was very little precedential support for considering such a connection sufficient to ground jurisdiction in tort cases.  Commentators expressed concern about the weakness of the connection, based as it was on the place of making a contract, and about the lack of a clear test for determining whether such a contract was sufficiently connected to the tort claim.  Both of these issues were squarely raised in Lapointe Rosenstein.

The majority (6-1) agreed with the motions judge and the Court of Appeal for Ontario that this PCF was established on the facts of this case.  Justice Cote dissented, concluding both that the contract was not made in Ontario and that it was not sufficiently connected with the tort claim.

The facts are somewhat complex.  After the 2008 financial crisis the Canadian government bailed out General Motors of Canada Ltd (GM Canada).  In return for this financial support, GM Canada agreed to close dealerships (ultimately over 200) across Canada.  Each dealership being closed was compensated under a Wind-Down Agreement (WDA) between GM Canada and the dealer.  The WDA was governed by Ontario law and contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause for Ontario.  The WDA required each dealer to obtain independent legal advice (ILA) about the consequences of signing the WDA.

Some time after the dealerships closed over 200 dealers brought a class action in Ontario against GM Canada disputing the legality of the WDAs.  They also sued Cassels Brock & Blackwell, the lawyers for the Canadian Automobile Dealers Association, for negligent advice to the dealers.  In turn, Cassels Brock brought third-party claims against 150 law firms which had provided the ILA to the dealers.  Many of the law firms, including those in Quebec, challenged the court’s jurisdiction over the third-party claim.  Cassels Brock argued that the WDAs were contracts made in Ontario and that the WDAs were connected with the tort claim Cassels Brock was advancing in the third-party claim (which was for negligence in providing the ILA).

The court had the chance to adjust or move away from this PCF, given the criticism which it had attracted (see para 88).  But it affirmed it.   Worse, the Court of Appeal for Ontario had at least expressed a willingness to be flexible in determining the place of making of the contract (which in part got around the central weakness in this PCF).  In contrast the majority stresses the “traditional rules of contract formation” (para 31).  Insisting on the traditional rules is what gives rise to the core difference between the majority (Ontario: paras 42-43) and the dissent (Quebec: paras 74-80) on where the WDAs were made.  Those rules mean the dissent is right to point out (para 81) that related connections between the WDAs and Ontario (such as the applicable law and the jurisdiction clause: see para 48) do not, strictly speaking, have anything to do with where the contract is made and so must be ignored on that issue.  The more robust approach of the Court of Appeal allows more to be assessed and thus for an easier (more consensual) conclusion that the WDAs were “made” in Ontario.  There is reason to be quite concerned that the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach will lead to more disputes about where a particular contract has been made, focusing on technical rules, which is unwelcome.

The court also splits on whether the contract, if made in Ontario, is connected to the tort claim.  I am inclined to think the majority gets it right when it finds that it is.  Note, though, that I think it is wrong to claim, as the majority does (para 47 last sentence), that somehow the law firms were brought “within the scope of the contractual relationship” by providing the advice about it.  The best part of the dissent is the demolition of that claim (para 86).  The real problem is that a close enough connection should be available to be found even in the absence of bringing the defendant “within” that contractual relationship.  This PCF, if the misguided narrow focus on place of contracting could be overcome, can be broader than that and thus broader than the dissent would make it (para 87).

Here a local Quebec law firm is asked by its local client to provide it with advice about the client’s entering into the WDA.  The terms of the WDA expressly say that to so enter into it the client has to get that advice.  The WDA is clearly very connected to Ontario.  It seems to me right to say that the WDA is a contract related to any subsequent negligent advice claim the client would advance against the firm.  The WDA is not just context, bearing peripherally on the advice.  The advice entirely centers on the WDA and whether the client should enter into it.  The WDA is what the advice is about.  The majority gets all of this right in para 47 except for its last sentence.  Of the 11 judges who addressed this issue in the three levels of court, only Justice Cote finds the connection between the contract and the tort claim to be insufficient.

So I think the decision is right but the majority errs by stressing the traditional rules of contract formation for assessing the place of making and by using the “within the scope of the contractual relationship” test for the requisite connection.

Some smaller points:

1.  I am somewhat puzzled by the idea (para 31) that parties would expressly think about how they would go about making their contracts so as to have them made in a particular place so as to get to subsequently take advantage of this PCF.  Do parties think like that?  Did they before this PCF was created?  I suppose it is easier to say they now do think like that since they are being told to do so by the court.

2.  For future debates about where contracts are made, I worry about some of the court’s language.  One example is para 40’s reference to where the acceptance “took place”.  Is that compatible with the postal acceptance rule which looks, for some contracts, at the place of posting rather than place of receipt?  Would we say the acceptance in such a case “took place” at the place of posting?  See in contrast para 73.

3.  Justice Cote’s dissent could be seen as a covert attempt to eliminate this PCF.  She insists on a very tight connection between the contract and the tort claim.  She refers to circumstances in which “the defendant’s breach of contract and his tort are indissociable” (para 95; emphasis in original) and states that this PCF “only provides jurisdiction over claims where the defendant’s liability in tort flows immediately from the defendant’s own contractual obligations” (para. 90).  In such cases, this PCF (tied to the place of contracting) might safely be abolished and replaced with other, better PCFs relating to tort and contract claims (especially in light of para 99 of Club Resorts).  It would not be needed for the court to be able to take jurisdiction, as it was on the facts of Club Resorts and Lapointe Rosenstein.  I am sympathetic to a desire to eliminate this PCF, but I think that result needed to be confronted directly rather than indirectly.  In the wake of the majority decision, it is now unlikely to happen at all.

 

Kotnik e.a.
Aide d'État
La communication de la Commission concernant les aides au secteur bancaire est valide

Tele2 Sverige
Rapprochement des législations
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, une obligation générale de conservation de données imposée par un État membre aux fournisseurs de services de communications électroniques peut être compatible avec le droit de l’Union

Il 30 giugno 2016, la Commissione europea ha presentato la proposta di revisione del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza, al riconoscimento e all’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e in materia di responsabilità genitoriale (“Bruxelles II bis”). La proposta, accompagnata da un comunicato stampa e da una scheda che ne delinea i caratteri principali, interviene dopo una lunga fase di studio (l’agenda dei lavori e l’esito degli incontri del gruppo di esperti a tal fine designato possono essere consultati a questo indirizzo), nell’ambito della quale è stata prodotta, in particolare, una valutazione d’impatto che ha evidenziato le criticità della disciplina esistente, soprattutto con riguardo alla sottrazione internazionale dei minori.

La Commissione suggerisce di rifondere l’attuale regime in un regolamento nuovo, che manterrebbe sostanzialmente invariate le disposizioni in tema di divorzio, separazione personale e annullamento del matrimonio, introducendo, viceversa, una serie di novità sul terreno dei procedimenti in tema di responsabilità genitoriale e di sottrazione.

Il testo risultante dalla prospettata rifusione tiene conto dei molti gli strumenti normativi adottati dall’Unione europea nel campo del diritto internazionale privato della famiglia dopo l’elaborazione del regolamento Bruxelles II bis (in particolare, i regolamenti relativi alle obbligazioni alimentari, alla legge applicabile a separazione e divorzio, nonché, recentemente, ai regimi patrimoniali tra coniugi e agli effetti patrimoniali delle unioni registrate), oltre che della pronunce rese dalla Corte di giustizia per interpretare il regolamento.

In generale, nella prospettiva della Commissione, il futuro regolamento dovrebbe: snellire i procedimenti relativi alla responsabilità genitoriale; rafforzare la tutela e la promozione dei diritti fondamentali, in armonia col principio del superiore interesse del minore garantito dall’art. 24, par. 1, della Carta sui diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea e dall’art. 12 della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti del fanciullo; rafforzare il ruolo della Rete giudiziaria europea in materia civile e commerciale; chiarire e consolidare le funzioni delle Autorità centrali designate da ciascuno Stato membro per garantire lo spedito ritorno del minore in caso di illecito trasferimento o mancato rientro.

Tra le novità prefigurate dalla proposta si segnalano le seguenti.

1. È istituita una procedura autonoma per il collocamento dei minori a carattere transnazionale. A tal fine, è stabilito un termine di otto settimane per lo Stato membro investito della richiesta di collocamento. La proposta introduce requisiti uniformi per i documenti necessari per il collocamento del minore, tra cui un obbligo di traduzione nella lingua dello Stato membro richiesto: l’autorità richiedente deve presentare una relazione sul minore e precisare i motivi sottesi alla richiesta di collocamento.

2. Viene introdotta una disposizione ai sensi della quale, al minore capace di discernimento (“who is capable of forming his or her own views”), deve essere data la possibilità “reale ed effettiva” di esprimere liberamente le proprie opinioni durante il procedimento che lo interessa (art. 20). L’art. 22 dispone che ciascuno Stato membro concentri dinanzi ad un numero limitato di tribunali la competenza per le richieste di ritorno (e che comunichi alla Commissione tali tribunali); avverso una decisione che disponga il ritorno del minore ovvero che lo neghi, sarà ammesso un solo grado di appello (art. 23, par. 4).

3. Si prevede l’abolizione della procedura di exequatur per tutte le decisioni concernenti la responsabilità genitoriale (art. 30 e seguenti). Il canale di circolazione preferenziale che il regolamento Bruxelles II bis accorda oggi alle sole decisioni relative al diritto di visita e a certe decisioni sul ritorno del minore sarà dunque esteso anche alle decisioni per cui, come quelle concernenti l’affidamento, il regolamento richiede ancora una dichiarazione di esecutività. L’abolizione dell’exequatur è accompagnata da tutele procedurali volte a garantire il diritto del convenuto ad un ricorso effettivo e ad un giudice imparziale sancito nell’art. 47 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali (articoli 40-42).

L’impossibilité, pour le juge administratif, de contrôler que les modalités d’une interpellation ayant conduit à une rétention administrative sont conformes au droit interne est contraire au droit européen.

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La Cour de cassation rappelle que viole l’article 6, § 1er, de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, la décision des juges du fond motivée par des éléments extérieurs à la procédure pénale. 

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La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne s’associe à l’hommage rendu aux victimes de l’attentat du 14 juillet à Nice

The CJEU has confirmed the views of Szpunar AG in C-222/15 Hőszig /Hoszig, without (much as expected) entertaining the lex fori prorogati rule of the Brussels I Recast.

Can choice of court made in underlying documentation in the context of a tender, for which Hőszig entered a winning bid, be considered valid under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation (now: Article 25 Brussels I Recast)? Yes, the Court said, with explicit reference to the AG. Crucial point in the consideration is whether per Case 24/76 Colzani an explicit reference to the choice has been made, reference which can be controlled by a party applying normal diligence and where it is established that the general conditions containing the jurisdiction clause was actually communicated to the other contracting party (at 40 in Hoszig). This was so in the case at issue. The court points out that Article 23 (and now Article 25) includes mostly formal requirements (expression of consent, see the references in my posting on the AG’s Opinion) and only one substantial requirement (choice of court needs to relate to an identified legal relationship between the parties). The remainder of discussion on the substantive requirements with respect to the choice of court agreement, is subject to the lex causae of that separate choice of court agreement (exactly why the current Regulation now includes the lex fori prorogati rule; Szpunar AG’s discussion of this clause however was not required to settle the issue and therefore the Court does not look into it).

‘(T)he Paris Courts [have exclusive and final jurisdiction]’ is sufficient for the CJEU to determine the choice of court with precision: it is perfectly acceptable that it will subsequently be French civil procedure laws that will determine precisely which court will have jurisdiction.

A sensible judgment following clear Opinion of the Advocate General, together further completing the choice of court provisions of Brussels I.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9 Heading 2.2.9.4. Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.2 .

 

 

The most recent issue of the German „Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht“ (ZGR, Journal of Enterprise and Corporate Law) has just been released. The volume is based on presentations given at a conference in Königstein/Taunus in January 2016. It contains several articles dealing with the relationship between private and criminal law and its impact on corporate governance. In particular, two articles approach the subject from a conflict-of-laws perspective. Here are the English abstracts:

Marc-Philippe Weller, Wissenszurechnung in internationalen Unternehmensstrafverfahren, ZGR 2016, pp. 384–413

The article deals with the imputation of knowledge in legal entities from a private and a criminal law perspective. Several foreign criminal proceedings against domestic companies induce this question. Firstly, the article demonstrates the different ways to determine the applicable law to this imputation. Secondly, it discusses measures to limit the imputation via knowledge governance.

Jan von Hein, USA: Punitive Damages für unternehmerische Menschenrechtsverletzungen, ZGR 2016, pp. 414–436

While German Law traditionally neither accepts universal civil jurisdiction for violations of customary international law nor a penal responsibility of corporations, foreign companies have in the past been frequently sued in the United States on the basis of the Alien Tort Statute of 1789 for the payment of punitive damages for alleged human rights violations. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has severely curtailed the reach of this jurisdiction in its groundbreaking Kiobel judgment of 2013. The present article analyzes, in light of the subsequent jurisprudence, the impact of this decision on German-American legal relations and the defenses available to German corporations.

Le placement en rétention d’enfants en bas âge est contraire à l’article 3 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, a jugé la Cour de Strasbourg.

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Robert Freitag, Professor for private, European and international law at the University of Erlangen, Germany, has kindly provided us with his following thoughts on the recast Insolvency Regulation.

It is already some time since regulation Rome I on the law applicable to contractual obligations was published in the Official Journal. Some dinosaurs of private international law might still remember that pursuant to art. 29 (2) of regulation Rome I, the regulation was (as a general rule) supposed to be applied “from” December 17, 2009. Quite amazingly, art. 28 of the regulation stated that only contracts concluded “after” December 17, 2009, were to be governed by the new conflicts of law-regime. This lapse in the drafting of the regulation gave rise to a great amount of laughter as well as to some sincere discussions on the correct interpretation of the new law. The European legislator reacted in time by publishing a “Corrigendum” (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 87) clarifying that regulation Rome I is to be applied to all contracts concluded “as from” December 17, 2009.

Although one can thoroughly debate whether history generally repeats itself, it obviously does so on the European legislative level at least with regard to the intertemporal provisions of European private international law. The 2015 recast regulation on insolvency proceedings (Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 141, p. 19) has, according to its art. 92 (1), entered into force already on June, 26, 2015. However, the European legislator has accorded a lengthy transitional period to practitioners and national authorities. The recast regulation therefore foresees in art. 92 (2) that it will only be applicable “from” June 26, 2017. This correlates well with art. 84 (2) of the recast regulation, according to which “Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 shall continue to apply to insolvency proceedings which fall within the scope of that Regulation and which have been opened before 26 June 2017”. Since the old regime will be applicable only before June 26, 2017, the uninitiated reader would expect the new regime to replace the current one for all insolvency proceedings to be opened “as of” or “from” June 26, 2017. This is, hélas, not true under art. 84 (1) of the recast regulation which states that “[…] this Regulation shall apply only to insolvency proceedings opened after 26 June 2017.” The discrepancy between the two paragraphs of art. 84 is unfortunately not limited to the English version of the recast regulation; they can be observed in the French and the German text as well. The renewed display of incompetence in the drafting of intertemporal provisions would be practically insignificant if on June 26, 2017, all insolvency courts will be closed within the territorial realm of the recast regulation. Unfortunately, June 26, 2017 will be a Monday and therefore (subject to national holidays) an ordinary working day even for insolvency courts. The assumption seems rather farfetched that on one single day next summer no European insolvency regime at all will be in place and that the courts shall – at least for one day – revert to their long forgotten national laws. Art. 84 (1) of the recast regulation is therefore to be interpreted against its wordings as if stating that the new regime will be applicable “as of” (or “from”) June 26, 2017. This view is supported not only by art. 92 (2) and art. 84 (2), but also by art. 25 (2). The latter provision obliges the Commission to adopt certain implementation measures “by 26 June 2019”.

It would be kind of the Commission if once again it would publish a corrigendum prior to the relevant date. And it would be even kinder if the members of the “European legislative triangle”, i.e. the Commission, the European Parliament and the Counsel, would succeed in avoiding making the same mistake again in the future although there is the famous German saying “Aller guten Dinge sind drei” and it is time for an overhaul of regulation Rome II namely with respect to claims for damages for missing, wrong or misleading information given to investors on capital markets …

Rijeka Doctoral Conference is intended for doctoral candidates who wish to present and test their preliminary research findings before academics and practicing lawyers, as well as to discuss these findings with their peers. It is limited to topics of law or closely related to law, including of course private international law. RIDOC 2016 will be held on 2 December 2016 at the University of Rijeka Faculty of Law.
Details about the conference and call for papers are available here.

Promoimpresa
Liberté d'établissement
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à ce que les concessions pour l’exercice des activités touristico-récréatives dans le domaine maritime et lacustre soient prorogées de manière automatique en l’absence de toute procédure de sélection des candidats potentiels

Allemagne / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal de l’UE annule la décision de la Commission ordonnant à l’Allemagne de récupérer auprès de Deutsche Post une partie des subventions relatives aux retraites des anciens fonctionnaires postaux

Dal 16 al 27 agosto 2016 si svolgerà a Urbino il 58ème Séminaire de Droit Comparé et Européen, organizzato dal Centro di studi giuridici europei dell’Università di Urbino “Carlo Bo” in collaborazione con l’Istituto svizzero di diritto comparato.

Nell’ambito dell’iniziativa si succederanno lezioni e conferenze su temi di diritto comparato ed europeo, diritto del commercio internazionale e diritto internazionale privato.

Quest’anno il seminario ospiterà, fra le altre, le lezioni di François Mailhé (Univ. Panthéon-Assas, Paris II) su Les accords d’élection de for, vieilles questions et nouveaux territoires, di Tuto Rossi (Univ. Fribourg) sugli Sviluppi recenti delle garanzie bancarie nel commercio internazionale, di Chris Thomale (Univ. Heidelberg) dal titolo A la recherche d’une coordination des compétences universelles civiles entre l’Union européenne et les Etats tiers, di Luigi Mari (Univ. Urbino “Carlo Bo”) su Il diritto internazionale privato sammarinese; di Paolo Morozzo Della Rocca (Univ. Urbino “Carlo Bo”) su Mariage et nationalité, e di Ilaria Pretelli (Istituto svizzero di diritto comparato) su Language, law and judicial training ou bien Les relations tripartites en droit international privé.

Le iscrizioni sono aperte sino al 30 luglio 2016. Occorre, a tal fine, inviare la domanda di partecipazione, compilata e sottoscritta, a edoardo.rossi@uniurb.it.

Maggiori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo. Il flyer dell’iniziativa è consultabile qui.

Gutiérrez Naranjo
Rapprochement des législations
Selon l’avocat général Mengozzi, la limitation temporelle des effets de la nullité des clauses « plancher », insérées dans les contrats de prêt hypothécaire en Espagne, est compatible avec le droit de l’Union

Bougnaoui et ADDH
Principes du droit communautaire
Selon l’avocat général Sharpston, le règlement de travail d’une entreprise qui impose à une travailleuse d’ôter son foulard islamique lors de ses contacts avec la clientèle constitue une discrimination directe illicite