Agrégateur de flux

In una ordinanza del 21 luglio 2015, il Tribunale di Milano si è pronunciato sull’individuazione del “luogo di esecuzione” di una decisione agli effetti dell’art. 22 n. 5 della Convenzione di Lugano del 30 ottobre 2007 sulla competenza giurisdizionale e il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile commerciale. Tale norma, pressoché identica a quella che si leggeva nell’art. 22 n. 5 del regolamento n. 44/2001 (Bruxelles I) e che ora si ritrova all’art. 24 n. 5 del regolamento n. 1215/2012 (Bruxelles I bis), attribuisce una competenza esclusiva, in materia di esecuzione delle decisioni, ai giudici dello Stato, vincolato dalla Convenzione, “nel cui territorio ha luogo l’esecuzione”.

Nella specie, si trattava di localizzare un’attività esecutiva consistente nell’espropriazione forzata di crediti presso terzi.

La domanda, avanzata da una società svizzera, riguardava un lodo arbitrale emesso in Ticino e dichiarato esecutivo in Italia, recante la condanna di un cittadino italiano residente in Tailandia. Il creditore procedente aveva allora provveduto alla notificazione di un atto di pignoramento al debitore pignorato e ad altri due soggetti debitori di costui, aventi entrambi sede in Italia. Su queste premesse, debitore e terzi sono stati citati a comparire davanti al Tribunale di Milano.

Il giudice adito, rilevata la necessità di verificare la sussistenza della giurisdizione italiana, ha ritenuto di dover fare riferimento alla Convenzione di Lugano del 2007, avendo cura di rilevare che la stessa deve interpretarsi “tenendo debitamente conto” dei principi elaborati dalla Corte di giustizia con riguardo a disposizioni analoghe contenute sia nella Convenzione di Lugano del 1988 (che la Convenzione del 2007 ha provveduto a sostituire), sia nella Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968 e nel regolamento Bruxelles I.

Riferendosi, dunque, all’art. 22 n. 5 della Convenzione, il Tribunale di Milano ha osservato, innanzitutto, che nel determinare il significato di espressioni dal tenore letterale incerto — quale può essere, appunto, “il luogo di esecuzione di una decisione” — occorre preferire, come emerge del resto dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia, un approccio autonomo, cioè sganciato dalle categorie dei singoli ordinamenti nazionali, e valorizzare la finalità perseguita dalla norma in questione, presa individualmente e nel contesto in cui è calata.

Tradizionalmente fondata sull’esistenza di un legame particolarmente stretto tra fatti e foro, la giurisdizione esclusiva dovrebbe allora ritenersi sussistente ogniqualvolta tale prossimità riesca, effettivamente, ad attribuire a questo foro una posizione privilegiata per valutare i fatti in causa, poiché, per usare le parole della Corte di Giustizia nella sentenza Sanders, “è chiaro che i giudici cui è riconosciuta competenza esclusiva [ai sensi dell’allora articolo 16 della Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968] sono quelli meglio situati per dirimere le controversie di cui trattasi”.

La “buona amministrazione della giustizia”, procede il giudice milanese, è poi, innegabilmente, un valore immanente all’intero sistema di Bruxelles e Lugano, oltre che una finalità espressamente attribuita nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia ai titoli di giurisdizione esclusiva.

Su queste basi, il Tribunale ha concluso che, ai fini dell’art. art. 22 n. 5, il luogo dell’esecuzione, in caso di espropriazione forzata di crediti presso terzi, coincida con il “luogo della sede del terzo”.

Nella specie, come detto, i debitori del debitore erano due persone giuridiche aventi sede in Italia, circostanza atta a rendere il foro italiano, stando al Tribunale, la sede maggiormente idonea a garantire un efficiente svolgimento del procedimento, specie sotto il profilo istruttorio.

Nel diritto processuale italiano, infatti, l’espropriazione del credito presso terzi presuppone una verifica incidentale dei rapporti intercorrenti tra il debitore pignorato ed il terzo, la quale, di regola, dovrebbe svolgersi in forma semplificata e meramente documentale (art. 547 del codice di procedure civile, come modificato).

Potrebbe tuttavia rendersi necessario, localmente, il compimento di altre attività istruttorie – nonché la comparizione in udienza – nel caso, non infrequente, di mancanza o contestazione della dichiarazione del terzo, sulla quale il suddetto accertamento è “fisiologicamente” basato.

L’argomento determinante nel ragionamento del giudice è dunque costituito dalla necessità di garantire quella specifica declinazione dell’economia procedurale data dalla “efficacia della prova”. Il rilievo che, nella giurisprudenza europea, tale profilo sia emerso principalmente nella diversa sede dell’interpretazione del foro dell’illecito (come nella sentenza Mines de Potasse d’Alsace o nella sentenza Marinari) nulla toglie alla valenza generale di questa indicazione, derivante dal carattere integrato delle norme giurisdizionali uniformi.

La soluzione adottata per concretizzare il criterio dettato dall’art. 22 n. 5 avrebbe inoltre, secondo l’ordinanza, il merito aggiunto di soddisfare le esigenze di prevedibilità del foro, altro obiettivo dichiarato del regime di Bruxelles e Lugano. La sede del terzo è un dato della realtà oggettiva, per di più dipendente dalla scelta di un soggetto posto in posizione di tendenziale equidistanza rispetto ad entrambe le parti del procedimento esecutivo. Il riferimento a tale circostanza sembra dunque realizzare un duplice vantaggio: in primo luogo, garantisce la disponibilità di un foro prevedibile e certo, ancorato ad un elemento fattuale sottratto a eventuali condizionamenti del debitore pignorato; in secondo luogo, l’individuazione di un tale foro sarebbe resa immediata ed obiettiva, basandosi su una circostanza neutra, indifferente rispetto alla natura del rapporto intercorrente tra debitore pignorato e terzo, spesso ignota al creditore procedente.

(I am grateful to Prof. Francesca Villata – University of Milan – for the following presentation of the latest issue of the RDIPP)

The second issue of 2015 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features one article and two comments.

In her article Costanza Honorati, Professor at the University of Milano-Bicocca, examines the issue of child abduction under the Brussels IIa Regulation in “La prassi italiana sul ritorno del minore sottratto ai sensi dell’art. 11 par. 8 del regolamento Bruxelles II-bis” (Italian Practice on the Return of the Abducted Child Pursuant to Art. 11(8) of the Brussels IIa Regulation; in Italian).

The vast majority of return applications filed with the Italian Central Authority under the 1980 Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction concern children who are habitually resident in Italy and have been wrongfully removed to a foreign State (so-called “outgoing cases”). Therefore, it is not surprising that some of the foreign decisions refusing to return a child on the grounds of Article 13(1)b of the Convention were challenged before Italian courts with the special procedure provided under Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIa Regulation. Indeed, Italy stands out as one of the very few EU States that provide some case law on Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIa Regulation. However, it does come as a surprise that in most of these cases Italian courts, after a thorough analysis of the facts, including what was produced in the foreign proceedings, have confirmed the foreign non-return order and dismissed the request for return. In fact, only in a small number of cases the court has found the foreign decision to be ill-founded and has adopted a «trumping» return order. The present article aims at reviewing and analysing both groups of decisions, showing, on one side, how the time factor is often crucial and rightly kept into consideration by the court of habitual residence when deciding for non-return. On the other side, time is of the essence also in cases where the court of habitual residence orders for the children to be returned. When such order is not complied with or enforced in a very short time, it is here assumed that best interest of the child would call for a subsequent review of the decision rendered by the court of the place of the child’s habitual residence.

In addition to the foregoing, the following comments are also featured:

Elisabetta Bergamini, Associate Professor at the University of Udine, discusses status of children in a private international law perspective in “Problemi di diritto internazionale privato collegati alla riforma dello status di figlio e questioni aperte” (Questions of Private International Law Related to the Status of Children and Open Issues; in Italian).

This paper examines the Italian law reforming the status of children (Law No 219/2012), which finally abolished all discriminations between children born in and out of wedlock, and the consequences such abolishment entails at a private international law level. The first part of the paper analyses the reform, its principles and the problems related to the definition of the rules on the unity of the status of the child as “overriding mandatory provisions”. The second part tackles some of the most relevant unsolved problems related to children status, such as the establishment of the parental link in case of medically assisted reproduction, the regime applicable to surrogate motherhood, and the legal vacuums affecting children of same-sex couples. In this regard, particular attention is paid to the Italian case-law, as well as its relationship with the ECtHR and the EU case-law, and to the possible solutions to the non-recognition of the personal status acquired in a foreign country.

Silvia Marino, Researcher at the University of Insubria, tackles choice-of-court agreements in parental responsibility matters in “La portata della proroga del foro nelle controversie sulla responsabilità genitoriale” (The Scope of Choice-of-Court Agreements in Disputes over Parental Responsibility; in Italian).

This article examines two recent judgments of the European Court of Justice concerning choice of forum in matters related to parental responsibility. These decisions offer the opportunity to reflect on the pre-conditions for the validity of the choice of forum clause, i.e. the agreement, the proximity, the interest of the child and the connection with another proceeding, and the relationships between different bases of jurisdiction (habitual residence and forum non conveniens). Analysing the peculiar facts of the cases and the clarifications provided by the ECJ, the article tackles those pre-conditions from a practical and concrete standpoint with a view to understanding when and how the different bases of jurisdiction can be used. Some final considerations are devoted to the concrete range of the choice of the parties.

Indexes and archives of RDIPP since its establishment (1965) are available on the website of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale. This issue is available for download on the publisher’s website.

The publishing house C.H. Beck has recently released the “Gedächtnisschrift für Hannes Unberath”. Edited by Stefan Arnold and Stephan Lorenz the volume contains, among others, four German language contributions relating to private international law and international civil procedure:

• Frank Bauer, Art. 59 EuErbVO: Verfahrensrechtliche Kollisionsnorm zur Sicherung des freien Verkehrs öffentlicher Urkunden (pp. 19 ff.)
• Wolfgang Hau, Zivilsachen mit grenzüberschreitendem Bezug (pp. 139 ff.)
• Peter Kindler, Der europäische Vertragsgerichtsstand beim Warenkauf im Lichte der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes (pp. 253 ff.)
• Gerald Mäsch, Patrick Battistons Jackettkronen und das Kollisionsrecht, oder: Das Deliktsstatut bei Verletzungen im Rahmen von internationalen  Sportgroßveranstaltungen (pp. 303 ff.)

For more information see the publisher’s website.

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Colmar, 12 février 2015

Non renvoyée au Conseil constitutionnel

…For the Spanish lawmaker to fulfill the promise, made in 2000, of a Ley de cooperación juridical internacional en material civil.

The new Act can be downloaded here. It will come into force  in twenty days.

Many thanks to Dr. Cristian Oró for the hint.

Durant les vacances parlementaires et judiciaires, la rédaction de Dalloz actualité prend quelques congés. Le service de l’actualité sera interrompu du 1er au 30 août 2015.

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Dr. Agnieszka Oko?ska, LL.M. (Leipzig), has just published a monumental comparative study on “The Counterclaim in the Civil Procedural Law of the European Union and its Member States” (Die Widerklage im Zivilprozessrecht der Europäischen Union und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2015, XLVI, 672 pages; Veröffentlichungen zum Verfahrensrecht Vol. 118, € 99.00). The laws on civil procedure of all European Union member states and the contracting states of the Lugano Convention are familiar with the counterclaim. Agnieszka Oko?ska examines meticulously the interaction between national provisions and those contained in the EU Regulations on counterclaims (the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Small Claims Regulation and the Maintenance Regulation). The author identifies pervasive conflicts and offers solutions to them. Her analysis is based on a thorough comparative analysis of various European legal orders, in particular Germany, Austria, France, England and Poland. The author also looks at the counterclaim in public international and ecclesiastical law. Her study was accepted by the law faculty of the University of Trier as a doctoral dissertation “summa cum laude” under the supervision of Professor Dr. Jan von Hein (now University of Freiburg/Germany). For further information, see here.

Giesela Rühl, The Role of Economic Efficiency in European Private International Law, di prossima pubblicazione in S. Leible (a cura di), General Principles of European Private International Law, 2015, disponibile su SSRN a questo indirizzo.

[Abstact] – In recent years, a growing number of contributions have devoted attention to the “general part” of European private international law: in a number of articles academics have either examined how legal concepts traditionally categorized as “general” (e.g. characterization, choice of law, preliminary questions, ordre public, renvoi) are designed in the Regulations thus far enacted by the European legislature. Or they have asked whether and how these concepts could be codified in a Rome 0 Regulation or, more generally, in a Code of European Private International Law. The following article adds to this debate by looking at European private international law from an economic perspective. It analyses whether and to what extent economic efficiency has been considered by the European legislature when enacting the pertaining Regulations and whether and to what extent it should be considered when revising the Regulations currently in place or when adopting a Rome 0 Regulation. The article finds that the TEU and TFEU permit – and in fact demand – that economic efficiency be taken into account in formulating European choice-of-law rules. However, it also finds that European law-makers have not oriented their efforts on economic efficiency in the past. This, in turn, means that efficiency is unlikely to be given any methodological or systematic regard when the relevant provisions are interpreted and applied, for it is only those objectives which the European legislature actually had in mind which may be taken into account when interpreting the pertaining rules and regulations. In the face of the informative value of the economic efficiency criterion this is, of course, to be regretted. The article, therefore concludes, that European law-makers should pay greater attention to economic efficiency in the future than they have done in the past, particularly when enacting a Rome 0 Regulation.

L’absence d’union civile pour les couples de même sexe est contraire au droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale. 

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Cour d'appel de Saint-Denis de la Réunion, Chambre de l'instruction, 15 juillet 2015

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Caen, Chambre correctionnelle, 17 juin 2015

The Institute of European and Comparative Law at the University of Oxford is organising a conference on “General Principles of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives” that will be held at St Anne’s College Oxford and the Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford, on 25-26 September 2015.

The description of the conference on the Institute’s website reads as follows:

” ‘General principles of law’ are one of the most visible areas of intersection between EU law and comparative law: as long as they are understood as ‘the general principles common to the laws of the Member States’ (Art 340(2) TFEU) their fleshing out requires careful comparative preparatory work. True, more often than not, the general principles of EU law were not developed on the basis of thorough and textbook style analysis. This does not make it less interesting to look at the interaction of EU law and comparative law in this particular field. Those working together in elaborating general principles of EU law tend to be responsive to input from national laws, and the laws of the Member States have no choice but to be responsive to the general principles developed at EU level.

It is the purpose of this conference to look at this particular interaction from the perspectives of EU law and comparative law alike. Leading scholars and practitioners from both fields will come together to discuss the most recent developments in the field.

The conference will be held on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Oxford Institute. It will bring together current and former members, visitors and friends of the Institute, as well as those who might belong to one of these categories in the future. Celebration will be an essential part of the proceedings!”

Further information, including the full programme and registration details can be found here.

La loi sur le renseignement a été publiée au Journal officiel du dimanche 26 juillet 2015, après avoir été validée en majeure partie par le Conseil constitutionnel, qui a tout de même censuré trois dispositions du texte, notamment celle introduisant la procédure d’urgence dite « opérationnelle » qui permettait à l’autorité administrative de de se passer d’une autorisation préalable du premier ministre ou de l’un de ses délégataires, ainsi que de l’avis de la commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement pour mettre en place les mesures de surveillance prévues par le

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Le projet de loi relatif à l’adaptation de la procédure pénale au droit de l’Union européenne, adopté définitivement, vise à transposer diverses décisions-cadres européennes.

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Thank you Eiríkur Thorláksson (whose expert report fed substantially into the Court’s findings) for flagging and for additional insight: In Tchenguiz v Kaupthing, the High Court had to review the insolvency exception to the Lugano Convention, combined with Directive 2001/24 on the reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions. Directive 2001/24 applies to UK /Iceland relations following the EFTA Agreement. See my earlier post on Sabena, for Lugano context. Mr Tchenguiz is a London-based property developer. He claims against Kaupthing; Johannes Johannsson, a member of Kaupthing’s winding-up committee; accountants Grant Thornton; and two of its partners.

While Directive 2001/24 evidently is lex specialis vis-a-vis the Insolvency Regulation, much of the ECJ’s case-law under the Regulation is of relevance to the Directive, too. That is because, as Carr J notes, much of the substantial content of the Regulation has been carried over into the Directive. Carr J does emphasise (at 76) that the dovetailing between the Lugano Convention /the Judgments Regulation, and the Insolvency Regulation, carried over into the 2001 Directive does not extend to matters of choice of law. [A bit of explanation: insolvency was excluded from the Judgments Regulation (and from the Convention before it) because it was envisaged to be included in what eventually became the Insolvency Regulation. Consequently the Judgments Regulation and the Insolvency Regulation clearly dovetail when it comes to their respective scope of application]. That is because neither Lugano nor the Judgments Regulation consider choice of law: they are limited to jurisdiction.

On the substance of jurisdiction, the High Court found, applying relevant precedent (German Graphics, Gourdain, etc.), that the claims against both Kaupthing and Mr Johansson are within the Lugano Convention and not excluded by Article 1(2)(b) of that Convention. That meant that Icelandic law became applicable law by virtue of Directive 2001/24, and under Icelandic law proceedings against credit institutions being wound up come not be brought before the courts in ordinary (rather, a specific procedure before the winding-up committee of the bank applies). No jurisdiction in the UK therefore for the claim aganst the bank. The claim against Mr Johansson can go ahead.

[For the purpose of this blog, the jurisdictional issues are of most relevance. For Kaupthing it was even more important that the Bankruptcy Act in Iceland was found to have extra-territorial effect. The Act on Financial Undertakings implemented the winding-up directive and the Icelandic legislator intented it to have extra-territorial effect].

A complex set of arguments was raised and the judgment consequentially is not an easy or quick read. However the above should be the gist of it. I would suggest the findings are especially crucial with respect to the relation between Lugano /Brussels I, Directive 2001/24, and the Insolvency Regulation.

Geert.

Ont été jugées irrecevables deux requêtes qui plaidaient l’incompatibilité de l’interdiction du suicide assisté et de l’euthanasie volontaire avec le droit à la vie privée et familiale garanti par l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

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Dans un avis du 22 juillet, la section du contentieux a fermé la porte aux milliers de demandes de remboursement de la contribution au service public de l’électricité (CSPE) qui avaient été présentées au tribunal administratif de Paris. Ces demandes faisaient suite à la décision de la haute juridiction qui avait estimé, après renvoi préjudiciel à la CJUE, que l’obligation d’achat de l’électricité éolienne constituait une aide d’État (CE 28 mai 2014, n° 324852, Association Vent de colère !

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The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has recently launched a questionnaire regarding the legal effects of agreements in the area of international family law involving children, e.g., agreements in disputes regarding child custody, child support, relocation with a child, rights to visit and to have contact with a child.

[From the introduction to the questionnaire] – Agreements between parents or other family members in family disputes involving children have gained more importance and have become more frequent. This development is, in part, attributable to the enhanced promotion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as mediation, conciliation, and negotiation) to achieve agreed solutions in these cases. In addition, party autonomy in the area of family law has gained more importance and States increasingly enable parents and other family members to conclude agreements that regulate child-related matters, in particular custody and contact issues. Due to today’s increasing “internationalisation” of the family, agreements are negotiated more and more in cross-border situations (e.g., one of the parents plans to relocate to his / her country of origin with the child and contact between the child and the other parent will be carried out abroad or would require the child to travel) which may require the recognition and enforcement of the agreement in a State (hereinafter referred to as “requested State”) other than the State in which it was concluded (hereinafter referred to as “State of origin”). 

The questionnaire has been sent to government officials and to the members of the International Hague Network of Judges, but Permanent Bureau is equally seeking the views of practitioners, such as lawyers and mediators, and other experts of international family law.

The questionnaire may be completed online here before 18 September 2015.