I. Introduction
In my last blog post, I made mention of a Nigerian Court of Appeal decision that applied the principle of contract law exclusively to a foreign jurisdiction clause.[1] In that case, applying the principles of Nigerian contract law, the Nigerian Court of Appeal held that the alleged choice of court agreement in favour of Benin Republic was unenforceable because the terms were not clear and unambiguous in conferring jurisdiction on a foreign forum.[2]
The purpose of this blog post is to analyse a more recent Nigerian Court of Appeal decision where the court gave full contractual effect to the parties’ choice of court agreement by strictly enforcing a Dubai choice of court agreement.[3]
II. Facts
Damac Star Properties LLC v Profitel Limited (“Damac”)[4] was the fall out of an investment introduced to the 1st plaintiff/respondent by the 2nd respondent allegedly on behalf of the defendant/appellant wherein the 1st plaintiff/respondent paid a deposit of 350,000.00 US Dollars for 9 apartments in Dubai and being 20% of the total cost of the apartments. The contract between the 1st plaintiff/respondent and defendant/appellant contained an exclusive choice of court clause in favour of Dubai. There was a dispute between the parties as to some of the terms of the contract. This resulted in the defendant/appellant selling the apartments to another buyer. The 1st plaintiff/respondent requested for a refund of the deposit that was paid to the defendant/appellant, but its request was declined. As a result of this, the 1st plaintiff/respondent initiated a suit for summary judgment in High Court, Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria, against the defendant/appellant, and got an order to serve the defendant/appellant through the 2nd respondent, its alleged agent in Nigeria. At this stage, the defendant/appellant did not appear and was unrepresented in proceedings at the High Court. The High Court proceeded to hear the suit and entered judgment against the defendant/appellant with an order to refund the sum of 350,000.00 US Dollars with 10% interest from date of judgment till the judgment sum was fully liquidated. The defendant/appellant applied to the High Court to set aside the judgment, but the court dismissed the application.
III. Decision
The defendant/appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal. The Court of Appeal held on the basis of the exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of Dubai – which it regarded as valid – the lower court should not have assumed jurisdiction.
IV. Judicial Statements in support of Damac
As stated in my last blog post, there is now a trend among appellate Courts in Nigeria (Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) to give choice of court agreements a contractual function. Damac Star Properties LLC (supra) is one of the cases where the Court of Appeal simply gives a choice of court agreement a contractual function without considering whether the choice of court agreement ousted the jurisdiction of the Nigerian courts, or whether Nigeria was the forum conveneins for the action.[5] This point is important, as it appears that there is now some movement in Nigerian jurisprudence towards giving choice of court agreements a contractual function. Given that Nigeria is a common law jurisdiction, it is worth quoting statements from some Nigerian Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges that have given a choice of court agreements a contractual function.
Nnamani JSC opined that: “I think that in the interest of international commercial relations courts have to be wary about departing from fora chosen by parties in their contract. There ought to be very compelling circumstances to justify such a departure.”[6]
Tobi JSC observed: “The bill of lading contains the contractual terms [foreign jurisdiction clause] between the parties and therefore binding on the parties. Parties are bound by the conditions and terms in a contract they freely enter into… The meaning to be placed on a contract is that which is the plain, clear and obvious result of the terms used… When construing documents in dispute between two parties, the proper course is to discover the intention or contemplation of the parties and not to import into the contract ideas not potent on the face of the document… Where there is a contract regulating any arrangement between the parties, the main duty of the court is to interpret that contract and to give effect to the wishes of the parties as expressed in the contract document… The question is not what the parties to the documents may have intended to do by entering into that document, but what is the meaning of the word used in the document… While a contract must be strictly construed in accordance with the well-known rules of construction, such strict construction cannot be aground for departing from the terms which had been agreed by both parties to the contract… It is the law that parties to an agreement retain the commercial freedom to determine their own terms. No other person. Not even the court, can determine the terms of contract between parties thereto. The duty of the court is to strictly interpret the terms of the agreement on its clear wordings… Finally, it is not the function of a court of law either to make agreements for the parties or to change their agreements as made.”[7]
In Conoil Plc v Vitol SA,[8] the Supreme Court Justices were unanimous on the contractual effect of a choice of court agreement. Nweze JSC in his leading judgment stated that: “In all, the truth remains that if parties, enter into an agreement, they are bound by its terms.”[9] Okoro JSC concurred that: “The law is quite’ settled that parties are bound by the contract they voluntarily enter into and cannot act outside the terms and conditions contained in the said contract. When parties enter into a contract, they should be careful about the terms they incorporate into the contract because the law will hold them bound by those terms. No party will be allowed to read into the contract terms on which there has been no agreement. Any of the parties who does so violates the terms of that contract…. Having agreed that any dispute arising from the contract should be settled at the English court, the appellant was bound by the terms of the contract.”[10] Eko JSC also concurred that: “Where parties, fully cognizant of their rights, voluntarily elect and nominate the forum for the resolution of any dispute arising from their contract, with international flavour as the instant, the courts always respect and defer to their mutual wishes and intention. The courts only need to be satisfied that, in their freedom of contract, the parties negotiated and agreed freely to subject their dispute to the laws and country of their choice.”[11]
Owoade JCA held that: “…it is pertinent to observe that as a general rule in the relationship between national law and international Agreements, freely negotiated private international agreement, unsullied by fraud, undue influence or overwhelming bargaining power would be given full effect. This means that, where such contract provides for a choice of forum, such clause would be upheld unless upholding it would be contrary to statute or public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought.”[12]
In Beaumont Resources Ltd v DWC Drilling Ltd,[13] the Court of Appeal Justices were unanimous on the contractual effect of a choice of court agreement. Otisi JCA held that: “…it is settled that, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation and illegality, parties to an agreement or contract are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract they signed… It is also well established that the Court cannot make contracts for the parties, rewrite the contract or go outside the express terms of the contract to enforce it…”[14] Sankey JCA concurred that: “The Court of law, on the other hand, must always respect the sanctity of the agreement of the parties – the role of the Court is to pronounce on the wishes of the parties and not to make a contract for them or to rewrite the one they have already made for themselves. The judicial attitude or disposition of the Court to terms of agreement freely entered into by parties to contract is that the Court will implement fully the intention of the contracting parties. This is anchored on the reasoning that where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the duty of the Court is to give effect to them and on no account should it re-write the contract for the parties. In the absence of fraud, duress or misrepresentation, the parties are bound to the contract they freely entered into.”[15]
The above judicial statements are replete with applying the principles of Nigerian contract law to the terms of a choice of court agreement. In essence, parties are bound by the clear and unambiguous terms of a choice of court agreement, which the Nigerian court will strictly enforce. On this score, Damac is on strong footing and unassailable.
V. Judicial decisions that might be against Damac
Some of the above stated judicial cases, though giving a choice of court agreement a contractual function also considered whether such agreements oust the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court, and whether Nigeria was the more appropriate forum to resolve such disputes despite the presence of a choice of court agreement. Damac is one of the few Court of Appeal cases that exclusively give a choice of court agreement a contractual function without a consideration of whether it is an ouster clause or the Nigerian Court is the forum conveniens.[16]
A. Ouster Clause
In the early case of Ventujol v Compagnie Francaise De L ’ Afrique Occidentale,[17] Ames J held that in a contract of employment which was entered into in France to be performed in Nigeria, where the defendant also had agents (in Nigeria), the clause for submission of disputes to a Tribunal de Commerce de Marseilles (a French Court at that time) was an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the court and of no effect. Similarly, in Allied Trading Company Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Line,[18] the plaintiff sought to recover damages for non-delivery of goods. The defendant entered an unconditional appearance, admitted the goods were lost, and denied liability on the grounds, inter alia, that the court had no jurisdiction since the parties had agreed that all disputes arising under or in connection with the bill of lading should be determined in the People’s Republic of China. It was held, inter alia, that this provision purported to oust the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court entirely and was therefore contrary to public policy. In Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Partenreedri MS Norwind[19] Oputa JSC opined that as a matter of public policy Nigerian Courts “should not be too eager to divest themselves of jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution and by other laws simply because parties in their private contracts chose a foreign forum … Courts guard rather jealously their jurisdiction and even where there is an ouster clause of that jurisdiction by Statute it should be by clear and unequivocal words. If that is so, as is indeed it is, how much less can parties by their private acts remove the jurisdiction properly and legally vested in our Courts? Our courts should be in charge of their own proceedings. When it is said that parties make their own contracts and that the courts will only give effect to their intention as expressed in and by the contract, that should generally be understood to mean and imply a contract which does not rob the Court of its jurisdiction in favour of another foreign forum.”[20]
If the above judicial postulations were given literal effect by the Court of Appeal in Damac the exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of Dubai would be regarded as null and void. In effect, treating a choice of court agreement as an ouster clause has the effect of making a choice of court agreement illegal, unlawful or at best unenforceable. Recently, Nweze JSC has interpreted the concept of ouster clause to the effect “that our courts will only interrogate contracts which are designed to rob Nigerian courts of their jurisdiction in favour of foreign fora or where, by their acts, they are minded to remove the jurisdiction, properly and legally, vested in Nigerian courts.”[21] I will interpret Nweze JSC’s statement to mean that where a Nigerian court as a matter of state interest is exclusively vested by statute, the constitution or common law with a subject matter, then no foreign court can have jurisdiction in such matters.[22] Under common law, a clear example of this is a matter relating to immovable property, where the Nigerian court has exclusive jurisdiction. So the implication of this is that the concept of ouster clause has very limited effect in Nigerian jurisprudence. In effect, the choice of court agreement in Damac will likely not be regarded as an ouster clause by the Nigerian Supreme Court.
B. Brandon Tests
Damac did not consider the application of the Brandon tests in Nigerian jurisprudence. The Brandon test is a form of application of forum non conveniens to choice of court agreements.
Brandon J, in The Eleftheria,[23] delivered a brilliant decision on this subject. The decision provided comprehensive guidelines that the English court should take into account in deciding whether to give effect to a foreign jurisdiction clause. This is often referred to as “the Brandon test” in Nigerian jurisprudence. Nigerian courts have regularly referred to the Brandon test and utilised it with approval in decided cases.[24] The test is stated hereunder as follows (as it has been referred to and applied) in the Nigerian context: 1. Where plaintiffs sue in Nigeria in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the Nigerian court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the jurisdiction is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not. 2. The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing it is shown. 3. The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs. 4. In exercising its discretion the court should take account of all the circumstances of the particular case. 5. In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following matters where they arise, may be properly regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the Nigerian and foreign courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs from Nigerian law in any material respects. (c) With what country either party is connected and how closely (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiff s would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign country because they would (i) be deprived of security for that claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in Nigeria; or (iv) for political, racial, religious, or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial (v) the grant of a stay would amount to permanently denying the plaintiff any redress.
The only reported cases where the plaintiff(s) have successfully relied on the Brandon test is where their claim is statute barred in the forum chosen by the parties.[25] Indeed, the burden is on the plaintiff to show strong cause why Nigerian proceedings should be stayed in breach of a choice of court agreement; if not Nigerian courts will give effect to the choice of court agreement.[26]
In Damac, the plaintiff did not demonstrate strong reasons why the choice of court agreement should not be enforced. So even if the Brandon test was considered by the Court of Appeal, the claimant will not have succeeded.
VI. Some Reservations
There are three reservations I have about the Court of Appeal’s decision in Damac. First, the Court of Appeal should have ordered a stay of proceedings rather than holding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction. This is what is done in other common law countries. There is wisdom in this approach. If it turns out that the claimant cannot institute its claims in Dubai, the Nigerian forum should remain available to promptly institute its actions against the defendant in this case.
Second the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. This statement only applies to substantive jurisdiction. Procedural jurisdiction cannot be raised on appeal for the first time. Thus, if it is established that the defendant/appellant did not promptly raise the issue of choice of court in favour of Dubai at the High court, this might be a ground upon which the defendant/appellant can successfully challenge the decision of the Court of Appeal. This is because the issue of choice of court is a procedural matter and a claimant that wants to raise the issue of choice of court agreement must do so promptly, or it will be deemed to have waived its right by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court.
Finally, the Court of Appeal made wrong reference to choice of venue rules[27] as applicable, assuming the choice of court agreement in this case is invalid. Choices of venue rules are only applicable to determine the judicial division to institute a matter for geographic convenience. For example, Lagos State has four judicial divisions: Lagos, Ikeja, Epe and Ikorodu. In the event there is a dispute as to which of the judicial divisions should hear a matter, the rules of court are to be relied on.[28] Choice of venue rules do not apply to determine private international law matters as in this case.
VII. Conclusion
Damac is a recent trend among Nigerian courts to give a choice of court agreement a contractual function. Indeed, Damac is one of the few cases where issues of ouster clause and forum non conveniens no longer feature in the judgment of the court. There are good reasons why a choice of court agreement should be strictly enforced contractually. It promotes certainty and enhances the efficacy of international commercial transactions. However, giving contractual enforcement to a choice of court agreement should only be regarded as a general rule and not an absolute rule. Nigerian courts should retain its discretion not to enforce choice of court agreements in deserving cases such as in the interest of justice and the protection of economically weaker parties.
[1]Kashamu v UBN Plc (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746) 90.
[2] Ibid 114-6.
[3] Damac Star Properties LLC v Profitel Limited (2020) LPELR-50699(CA).
[4] Ibid.
[5]For an extended analysis see generally CSA Okoli and RF Oppong, Private International Law in Nigeria (Hart, 2020) 107 – 125.
[6]Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Partenreedri MS Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520, 541.
[7] Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008 ) 16 NWLR 509, 542-3.
[8] ( 2018 ) 9 NWLR 463, 489.
[9] Ibid
[10]Ibid 500-1.
[11]Ibid 502.
[12] Captain Tony Nso v Seacor Marine ( Bahamas) Inc ( 2008 ) LPELR-8320 (CA) 12-3.
[13]( 2017 ) LPELR-42814.
[14] Ibid 30.
[15]Ibid 49-50.
[16] See also Megatech Engineering Limited v Sky Vision Global Networks Llc (2014) LPELR-22539 (CA); Kashamu v UBN Plc (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1746) 90; Unipetrol Nigeria Ltd v Prima Alfa Enterprises (Nig) Ltd ( 1986 ) 5 NWLR 532.
[17] (1949) 19 NLR 32.
[18] (1980) (1) ALR Comm 146.
[19](1987) 4 NWLR 520.
[20] Ibid 544-5.
[21] Conoil Plc v Vitol SA ( 2018 ) 9 NWLR 463, 489
[22]See generally CSA Okoli and RF Oppong, Private International Law in Nigeria (Hart, 2020) 117 – 124.
[23]The Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ship or Vessel ‘ Elftheria ’ v ‘ The Elftheria ’ (Owners), ‘ Th e Elft heria ’ [1969] 1 Lloyd ’ s Rep 237.
[24] See generally GBN Line v Allied Trading Limited ( 1985 ) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 74 ; Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520 ; Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation ( 2008 ) 16 NWLR 509 ; Captain Tony Nso v Seacor Marine ( Bahamas ) Inc ( 2008 ) LPELR-8320 (CA) ; Beaumont Resources Ltd v DWC Drilling Ltd ( 2017 ) LPELR-42814 (CA) .
[25] Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520.
[26] Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509.
[27] In applying the choice of venue rules of Abuja on matters of contract, it considered where the contract was made, place of performance and residence of the parties as prescribed in the rules of court.
[28] Order 4 of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 (formerly Order 2 of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules 2012).
Jie (Jeanne) Huang, University of Sydney Law School, Australia
Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd. v. Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII is a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of California on April 2, 2020. The certiorari to the Supreme Court of the US was denied on 5 October 2020. It is a controversial case concerning the interpretation of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of November 15, 1965 (the “Hague Service Convention”) for service of process in China.
Changzhou SinoType Technology Co. (SinoType) is based in China. Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII (Rockefeller) is an American investment firm. In February 2008, they signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which provided that:
“6. The parties shall provide notice in the English language to each other at the addresses set forth in the Agreement via Federal Express or similar courier, with copies via facsimile or email, and shall be deemed received 3 business days after deposit with the courier.
7. The Parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Federal and State courts in California and consent to service of process in accord with the notice provisions above.
8. In the event of any disputes arising between the Parties to this Agreement, either Party may submit the dispute to the Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Service in Los Angeles for exclusive and final resolution pursuant to according to [sic] its streamlined procedures before a single arbitrator who shall have ten years judicial service at the appellate level, pursuant to California law, and who shall issue a written, reasoned award. The Parties shall share equally the cost of the arbitration. Disputes shall include failure of the Parties to come to Agreement as required by this Agreement in a timely fashion.”
Due to disputes between the parties, in February 2012, Rockefeller brought an arbitration against SinoType. SinoType was defaulted in the arbitration proceeding. According to the arbitrator, SinoType was served by email and Federal Express to the Chinese address listed for it in the MOU. In November 2013, the arbitrator found favorably for Rockefeller.
Instead of enforcing the award in China according to the New York Convention,[1] Rockefeller petitioned to confirm the award in State courts in California. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1290.4(a) provides that a petition to confirm an arbitral award “shall be served in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement for the service of such petition and notice.” Therefore, Rockefeller transmitted the summons and its petition to SinoType again through FedEx and email according to paragraph 7 of the MOU. SinoType did not appear and the award was confirmed in October 2014. SinoType then appeared specially and applied to set aside the judgment. It argued that the service of the Californian court proceeding did not comply with the Hague Service Convention; therefore, it had not been duly served and the judgment was void.
The California Supreme Court rejected SinoType’s argument.
The Court discerned three principles for the application of the Hague Service Convention. First, the Convention applies only to “service of process in the technical sense” involving “a formal delivery of documents”. The Court distinguished “service” and “notice” by referring to the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention, published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (‘Handbook’). The Court cited that
“the Convention cannot—and does not—determine which documents need to be served. It is a matter for the lex fori to decide if a document needs to be served and which document needs to be served. Thus, if the law of the forum states that a notice is to be somehow directed to one or several addressee(s), without requiring service, the Convention does not have to be applied.”[2]
Second, the law of the sending forum (i.e. the law of California) should be applied to determine whether “there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”
Third, if formal service of process is required under the law of the sending forum, the Hague Convention must be complied for international transmission of service documents.
The court held that the parties have waived the formal service of process, so the Hague Service Convention was not applicable in this case.[3]
The Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd has a number of interesting aspects and has been commented such as here, here and here.
First, the Hague Service Convention is widely considered as ‘non-mandatory’ but ‘exclusive’.[4] Addressing the non-mandatory nature of the Convention, the Handbook states that “the Convention can not—and does not—determine which documents need to be served. It is a matter for the lex fori to decide if a document needs to be served and which document needs to be served.”[5] However, this statement does not necessarily mean, when judicial documents are indeed transmitted from a member state to another to charge a defendant with notice of a pending lawsuit, a member state can opt out of the Convention by unilaterally excluding the transmission from the concept of service. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v Schlunk decided by the Supreme Court of the US and Segers and Rufa BV v. Mabanaft GmbH decided by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) are the two most important cases on the non-mandatory nature of the Convention. Both cases concentrate on which law should be applied to whether a document needed to be transmitted abroad for service.[6] However, Rockefeller is different because it is about which law should be applied to determine the concept of service when the transmission of judicial documents takes place in the soil of another member state. The Handbook provides that the basic criterion for the Convention to apply is “transmission abroad” and “place of service is determining factor”.[7] When judicial documents are physically transmitted in the soil of a member state, allowing another member state to unilaterally determine the concept of service in order to exclude the application of the Convention will inappropriately expand the non-mandatory character of the Convention. This will inevitably narrow the scope of the application of the Convention and damage the principle of reciprocity as the foundation of the Convention. The Hague Convention should be applied to Rockefeller because the summons and petitions were transmitted across border for service in China.
Second, as part of its accession to the Hague Convention, China expressly stated that it does not agree to service by mail. Indeed, the official PRC declarations and reservations to the Hague Convention make it clear that, with the limited exception of voluntary service on a foreign national living in China by his country’s own embassy or consulate, the only acceptable method of service on China is through the Chinese Central Authority. Therefore, although China has recognized monetary judgments issued in the US according to the principle of reciprocity, the judgment of Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd probably cannot be recognized and enforced in China.
The California Supreme Court decision has important implications. For Chinese parties who have assets outside of China, they should be more careful in drafting their contracts because Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd shows that a US court may consider their agreement on service by post is a waiver of China’s reservation under the Hague Service Convention. For US parties, if Chinese defendants only have assets in China for enforcement, Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co, Ltd is not a good case to follow because the judgment probably cannot be enforced in China.
[1] China is a party to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (“New York Convention”).
[2] Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention (4th ed. 2016) par. 54, p. 23, fn. Omitted.
[3] The Court emphasized that their conclusions should be limited to Section 1290.4, subdivision (a): “Our conclusions as to California law are narrow. When parties agree to California arbitration, they consent to submit to the personal jurisdiction of California courts to enforce the agreement and any judgment under section 1293. When the agreement also specifies the manner in which the parties “shall be served,” consistent with section 1290.4, subdivision (a), that agreement supplants statutory service requirements and constitutes a waiver of formal service in favor of the agreed-upon method of notification. If an arbitration agreement fails to specify a method of service, the statutory service requirements of section 1290.4, subdivisions (b) or (c) would apply, and those statutory requirements would constitute formal service of process. We express no view with respect to service of process in other contexts.”
[4] Martin Davies et al., Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia 36 (10th ed. 2020).
[5] Paragraph 54 of the Handbook.
[6] Ibid., paragraphs 31-45, and 47.
[7] Ibid., paragraph 16.
Forum non conveniens featured not just in Municipio de Mariana at the High Court yesterday but also in Qatar Airways Group QCSC v Middle East News FZ LLC & Ors [2020] EWHC 2975 (QB).
Twenty Essex have good summary of the background and decision. Context is of course the blockade on Qatar, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar Airways Group (QAG) sue on the basis of tort, triggered by a rather chilling clip aired by Al Arabiya which amounted to a veiled threat against the airline.
Saini J at 27 notes what Turner J also noted in Municipio de Mariana and what Briggs LJ looked at in horror in Vedanta, namely the spiralling volume and consequential costs in bringing and defending a jurisdictional challenge. (Although at least for Vedanta and Municipio de Mariana the issues discussed are matters of principle, which may eventually settle once SC (and indeed CJEU) authority is clear).
The judgment recalls some principles of international aviation law under the Chicago Convention (with noted and utterly justifiable reference a 77 ff to an article on the opiniojuris blog by prof Heller) which is important here because (at 61) it is the starting point of QAG’s case that anyone who had taken steps to inform themselves of the legal position would have known that contrary to what (it argues) is the message of the Video, there was no real risk of any internationally legitimate interception, still less legitimate shooting at or down, of a QAG scheduled service in flight along one of the defined air corridors. At 88 Saini J concludes on that issue that there is an arguable case as to meaning and falsity.
On good arguable case, reference is to Kaefer v AMS, Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco, and Brownlie.
At 164 ff the judge discusses the issue of pleading foreign law at the jurisdictional threshold of making a good arguable case. Here, Saini J holds on the basis of the assumption that malicious falsehood is not covered by Rome II, which is the higher threshold for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction. He does suggest that it is likely that in fact malicious falsehood is covered by Rome II and not by the exception for infringement of personality rights (at 166: ‘Malicious falsehood is not a claim for defamation, and what is sought to be protected is not Qatar Airways’ reputation or privacy rights, but its economic interests’).
As for applicable law for conspiracy, that is clearly within the scope of Rome II and poses the difficulty of determining locus damni in a case of purely economic loss. Here, at 169 Saini J suggests preliminarily that parties agreed “damage” for the purposes of Article 4(1) of Rome II to have been suffered in the place where the third parties (that is, potential passengers) failed to enter into contracts with QAG (which they otherwise would have done) as a result of the video. Location of purely economic damage under Rome II as indeed it is under Brussel Ia is however not settled and I doubt it is as simple as locating it in the place of putative (passenger) contract formation.
Of long-term impact is the judge’s finding that for jurisdictional threshold purposes, he is content for claimant to proceed with a worldwide claim for tort on the basis of any foreign law that might be applicable having the same content as English law.
Of note in the forum non analysis is that not just the obvious alternative of the UAE was not good forum, but neither would the DIFC be. At 374:’the UAE is not an appropriate forum is what I would broadly call “access to justice” considerations in what has clearly become a “hostile environment” for Qataris in the UAE.’ And at 379, re the DIFC: ‘The DIFC courts are a sort of “litigation island” within the UAE, created to attract legal business by their perceived superior neutrality, and higher quality, compared to the local courts. But as such, they have no superiority compared to the English courts, also a neutral forum. The English courts have the other connections to the case, which the DIFC courts do not.’
Geert.
409 paras of jurisdictional challenge based on serious issue to be tried and forum non conveniens.
Dismissed (with summary judgment re one of the defendants).
Discussion of international aviation law (with reference to article on @opiniojuris). https://t.co/Qz2GpqgLoF
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 9, 2020
I am instructed for claimants in the case hence my post here is a succinct report, not a review and it must not be read as anything else.
Turner J yesterday struck out (not just: stayed) the case against the companies jointly operating the facilities that led to the 2015 Brazilian dam break and consequential human and environmental loss in Município De Mariana & Ors v BHP Group Plc & Anor [2020] EWHC 2930 (TCC). I reported on the case before here.
Eyre J’s earlier Order had identified the threefold jurisdictional challenge: 1. Forum non conveniens for non-EU defendants; 2. Article 34 Brussels IA for the EU-based defendants; 3. Abuse of process, case management for both.
In his judgment Turner J makes abuse of process the core of the case, hinging his subsequent obiter analysis of forum non and of Article 34 on his views viz abuse. At the centre of his abuse analysis is his interpretation of AB v John Wyeth & Brother (No.4), also known as the benzodiazepine litigation, with the points he takes from that judgment (even after the subsequent CPR rules wre issued) summarized at 76.
At 80 ff is a discussion (see e.g. my earlier review of Donaldson DJ in Zavarco) on the use of case-management powers, including abuse, against EU-domiciled defendants post CJEU Owusu (the ‘back-door analogy per Lewison J in Skype technologies SA v Joltid Ltd [2009] EWHC 2783 (Ch) ).
At 99 ff Turner J pays a lot of attention to the impact of accepting jurisdiction on the working of the courts in England, discusses some of the practicalities including language issues, and decides at 141 in an extract which has already caught the attention of others, that ‘In particular, the claimants’ tactical decision to progress closely related damages claims in the Brazilian and English jurisdictions simultaneously is an initiative the consequences of which, if unchecked, would foist upon the English courts the largest white elephant in the history of group actions.’
At 146 ff follow the obiter considerations of the remaining grounds, Article 34 Recast, forum non conveniens and case management stay. On Article 34 viz BHP Plc, the issue of ‘relatedness’ is discussed with reference of course to Euroeco and the tension between that case and Privatbank, as I flag ia here, holding at 199 in favour of Privatbank as the leading authority (hence focus on desirability of hearing cases together rather than on practical possibility). On relatedness, Turner J does not follow the approach of either Zavarco or Jalla, both of course first instance decisions.
At 206 Turner J takes the instructions of recital 24 Brussels Ia’s ‘all circumstances of the case’ to mean including circumstances which would ordinarily be part of a forum non consideration, despite Owusu, and at 231 Jalla is distinguished (at least practically; Jalla is not authority for the judge here) and i.a. at 221 Turner J lists his reasons for allowing an Article 34 stay (again: these are obiter views). As already noted, these echo his findings on abuse of process.
The forum non conveniens analysis viz BHP Ltd at 235 ff, applying Spiliada, delivers inter alia on an inherent implication of Lord Briggs’ suggestions in Vedanta: that a commitment of defendants voluntarily to submit to the foreign alternative jurisdiction, hands them the key to unlock forum non. At 241: ‘In this case, both defendants have offered to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of Brazil. Thus the force of any suggestion that there may be a risk of irreconcilable judgements against each defendant is attenuated.’
Conclusions, at 265:
(i) I strike out the claims against both defendants as an abuse of the process of the court;
(ii) If my finding of abuse were correct but my decision to strike out were wrong, then I would stay the claims leaving open the possibility of the claimants, or some of them, seeking to lift the stay in future but without pre-determining the timing of any such application or the circumstances in which such an application would be liable to succeed;
(iii) If my finding of abuse were wrong, then I would, in any event, stay the claim against BHP Plc by the application of Article 34 of the Recast Regulation;
(iv) If my finding of abuse were wrong, then I would, in any event, stay the claims against BHP Ltd on the grounds of forum non conveniens regardless of whether the BHP reliance on Article 34 of the Recast Regulation had been successful or not;
(v) If my findings on the abuse of process point were wrong, then a free-standing decision to impose a stay on case management grounds would probably be unsustainable.
Appeal is of course being considered.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.
3rd ed. forthcoming February 2021.
Jurisdiction denied in core #bizhumanrights case on the basis of abuse of process, Article 34 Brussels Ia and /or forum non conveniens.
For background to the case see https://t.co/CzkMFH98yH https://t.co/h9AjvJ6JIR
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 9, 2020
The third issue of 2020 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:
Ilaria Viarengo, Professor at the University of Milan, Planning Cross-Border Successions: The Professio Juris in the Succession Regulation (in English)
The following comment is also featured:
Edoardo Benvenuti, PhD Candidate at the University of Milan, La tutela collettiva risarcitoria dei consumatori nelle controversie transfrontaliere: diritto interno e prospettive di armonizzazione (‘Cross-Border Consumer Collective Redress: Domestic Law and Prospects for Harmonisation’; in Italian)
In addition to the foregoing, this issue features the following book review by Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan: Chris Brummer (ed.), Cryptoassets: Legal, Regulatory and Monetary Perspectives, Oxford University Press, New York, 2019, pp. XIII-441.
In a recent e-mail exchange, Paul Beaumont and Jayne Holliday (both working now at the University of Stirling) drew my attention to Article 14 of the Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. The provision is certainly a rarity in the field of ascertaining and applying foreign law, and of recognition. It reads as follows
In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.
The logic of Article 14 appears to be twofold. It is first and foremost a practical rule: it should lead to speedy decisions on the return of a child, which are fundamental to the working of the Convention.
Its second rationale seems to be dogmatic. According to the Convention’s explanatory report by Elisa Pérez-Vera, at para 119, Article 14 does not address cases of application of foreign law in the narrow sense; it rather “takes it into account” to check whether the claim of wrongful removal is correct:
Since the wrongful nature of a child’s removal is made to depend, in terms of the Convention, on its having occurred as the result of a breach of the actual exercise of custody rights conferred by the law of the child’s habitual residence, it is clear that the authorities of the requested State will have to take this law into consideration when deciding whether the child should be returned. In this sense, the provision in article 13 of the preliminary draft Convention that the authorities ‘shall have regard to’ the law of the child’s habitual residence, could be regarded as superfluous. However, such a provision would on the one hand underline the fact that there is no question of applying that law, but merely of using it as a means of evaluating the conduct of the parties (…)” (emphasis added)
In a similar vein, judicial or administrative decisions on custody rights, the breach of which entails the wrongfulness of the removal (or of the retention, as the case may be), are not really recognized, but work as a piece of proof in the proceedings at the requested State:
… while on the other hand, in so far as it applied to decisions which could underlie the custody rights that had been breached, it would make the Convention appear to be a sort of lex specialis, according to which those decisions would receive effect indirectly in the requested State, an effect which would not be made conditional on the obtaining of an exequatur or any other method of recognition of foreign judgments.
There is no way to dispute the usefulness of Article 14 in practice. I have more doubts regarding the correctness of the conceptual distinction between “applying” a foreign law and “taking [it] into account” (which is usually understood as taking into account “as a matter of act”). The operations are possibly the same in nature; the difference between them, just a question of degree. Furthermore, I believe that in the context of Article 14 foreign law is actually applied. The conduct of the parties cannot be evaluated without looking into what that law prescribes; the authority in the requested State draws the corresponding consequences as to who is the holder of the rights of custody in the case at hand. The assessment of the parties’ conduct comes afterwards. In the same vein, I believe that a decision on custody rights is recognized, in the proper sense of the term, as a decision, and not as a piece of documentary evidence.
What makes the difference is therefore not “what is done” with the foreign law/foreign decision in the context of child abduction. It is rather the limited goal of the application of that law, and of the recognition of the foreign decision, which allows to proceed without resorting to the specific procedures for the proof of foreign law (or for the recognition of foreign decisions), which would normally apply.
Be it as it may, what really matters is what the alternative method – that of taking notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, of the State of habitual residence of the child before removal or retention- means vis-à-vis quality. That foreign law is not, strictly speaking, applied, does not entail a lesser need for certainty about its contents. The authority in the requested State does indeed not determine the rights of custody. However, her understanding of the foreign legal system is not innocuous: it has immediate effects on the child in terms of return/not return, and therefore, of residence; these, in turn, affect the question of international jurisdiction for a claim on the merits. Furthermore, the view of the requested authority on the custody issue sets a precedent (in a non-technical sense, for it is not binding) for future discussions about parental responsibility.
The assumption that Article 14 supports lower standards of proof of the foreign law (and more lenient conditions of recognition) is only this: an assumption. To date, INCADAT lists 39 national decisions on the provision. In fact, in some of them Article 14 is simply mentioned . The remaining decisions have been rendered in different jurisdictions (Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, US, Switzerland): the sample is hence not good enough for a study aimed at finding out the differences with the usual methods to ascertain foreign law, nor to make any assessment about quality.
Still, it might not be a useless effort. For, if Article 14 proves to work, it may be worth trying it elsewhere (the suggestion, with a question mark, is actually from Professor Beaumont).
Thank you Angus Macinnis for flagging RCD Holdings Ltd & Anor v LT Game International (Australia) Ltd [2020] QSC 318 in which Davis J upheld choice of court in favour of the courts at Macau and held against a stay. The judgment is a good one for comparative purposes.
Claimants, ePayment Solutions Pty Ltd (EPS) and RCD Holdings Ltd (RCD), in their contract with the defendant, LT Game International (Australia) Ltd (LT) (a BVI domiciled company), agreed that any dispute between them would be litigated in Macau. However, when a dispute did arise they commenced proceedings in Queensland. LT entered a conditional appearance and now applies to strike out the claim, or alternatively, to have it stayed as being commenced in this court contrary to the contract.
Article 10 of the contract carries the title Governing law but actually is a choice of court clause – an oddity one sees more often than one might expect in B2B contracts: ‘Any dispute or issue arising hereunder, including any alleged breach by any party, shall be heard, determined and resolved by an action commenced in Macau. The English language will be used in all documents.”
Comparative insight includes the issue of whether A10 us a non-exclusive (an agreement not to object when proceedings are brought in the court designated) or exclusive (an agreement only to bring proceedings in the court designated) choice of court. Davis J settled for exclusive which would also seem to have been the position of both parties, despite some ambiguity at the start of proceedings.
Lex contractus is disputed, and at 27 Davis J settles for Macanese law, based upon factual construct of the contractual intention of the parties. Clearly that choice of court was made for Macau was an important factor – as it is in Rome I for consideration of so-called ‘implied’ choice of law in the event of choice of court made.
A stay on the basis of Covid19 impracticability (ia because of alleged difficulties for witness testimony) is dismissed, ia (at 34) because it is uncertain whether current travel restrictions will still be in place when the case in Macau might be heard. Davis j does suggest that a renewed application for a stay must not be ruled out in light of Covid19 developments, however will be seen against abuse of process: in other words claimants had best not do so lightly.
Geert.
RCD Holdings & Aor v LT Game [2020] QSC 318
Davis J noting that claimants can re-apply, should #Covid19 unduly frustrate proceedings in Macau https://t.co/00DH1VQf9j
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 3, 2020
Today (9 November 2020) ASADIP and UNCITRAL are organising a preparatory conference to the first edition of UNCITRAL Day in Latin America and the Caribbean region (UNCITRAL LAC DAY 2020 – la primera edición del Día de UNCITRAL en América Latina y el Caribe). For more information see here. Free registration here. For other events on UNCITRAL Day click here.
David Hodson is the author of Family Law Leaves the EU – A Summary Guide for Practitioners, published by Jordan Publishing. The book aims to provide family law practitioners with an accessible guide to the law and practice which will apply on the UK’s final departure from the EU on 31 December 2020. The publisher’s blurb reads as follows.
The government has indicated that the UK will not be party to any further EU laws, instead relying on existing international laws (eg Hague Conventions) to which we will be a party in our own right. There will also be new provisions in national law, where previously EU law existed, and some court procedures will change. This invaluable title will provide an overview of the legal position and the practical issues which will arise in all areas of family law, including the preparatory steps which lawyers should take in readiness for departure, so as to advise clients effectively.
More information available here.
The programme of the XLIII Seminar of the Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is now available here. As previously announced, the XLIII Seminar will take place on 19-20 November 2020 for the first time online.
Among the topics to be discussed are the 1996 HCCH Child Protection Convention, the 1980 HCCH Child Abduction Convention, the 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention, the 2005 HCCH Choice of Court Convention, the HCCH Guide to Good Practice on the Use of Video-link, Human rights and PIL, the brand new T-MEC / US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), digital justice, COVID-19, and alternative dispute resolution.
The meeting will be held via Zoom.
Access details:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/5554563931?pwd=WE9uemJpeWpXQUo1elRPVjRMV0tvdz09
ID: 555 456 3931
Password: 00000
It will also be transmitted live via AMEDIP’s Facebook page.
Participation is free of charge. The language of the seminar will be Spanish.
For more information, see AMEDIP’s website.
The European Parliament released today a study on “40 years of the Hague Convention on child abduction – legal and societal changes in the rights of a child” and another one on “The Child Perspective in the Context of the 1980 Hague Convention”.
They are attached to this post.
40-years-of-the-hague-convention-on-child-abduction-legal-and-societal-changes-in-the-rights-of-a-childDownload the-child-perspective-in-the-context-of-the-1980-hague-conventionDownloadThe International Commercial Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris (France) delivered a few days ago (3 Novemberr 2020) a decision (RG 19/17529) on the law applicable to insurance with questions involving lois d’application immediate and ordre public.
Summary: “The ICCP-CA, which was seized on referral after a proceeding before the French Cour de cassation, held that the dispute concerning the conditions of the guarantee applicable under an insurance contract concluded between an insurance company and a company both governed by Polish law should be subject to Polish law, pursuant to the general rules of private international law on contractual obligations applicable in this case (§§ 51 to 60). The court dismissed the claim to set aside this law in favor of French law, on the basis of both French mandatory provisions (§ 44 to 48) and French international public policy (§ 61 to 68)”.
The decision is attached to this post.
3-novembre-2020-ccip-ca-rg-1917529DownloadBanco San Juan Internacional Inc v Petroleos De Venezuela SA [2020] EWHC 2937 (Comm) is a lengthy judgment which I report here for its discussion of Rome I Article 9’s provisions on overriding mandatory laws /lois de police. The discussion is similar to the consideration of A9 in Lamesa Investments, to which reference is made.
The Claims comprise two substantial claims in debt by claimant BSJI, a bank incorporated in Puerto Rico, against defendant PDVSA, the Venezuelan state-owned oil and gas company. PDVSA arue inter alia that payment obligations fall to be performed in the US and contends that US sanctions ought to be regarded as part of the order public (sic) of US law. It is said these are a central component of US foreign policy and its political and economic aims as regards Venezuela. It is argued that the terms of the Executive Orders themselves make clear that they are reactions to perceived political and human rights injustices in Venezuela and describe this as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States“.
However Article 9(3) Rome I comes with a sizeable amount of discretion: ‘Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.’
At 118 Cockerill J decides not to use the discretion for the same reason she had earlier dismissed application of the Ralli Bros principle. That rule was recently discussed in Colt v SGG. (As summarised here by Mrs Justice Cockerill at 77) it ‘provides that an obligation under an English law contract is invalid and unenforceable, or suspended in the case of a payment obligation, insofar as the contract requires performance in a place where it is unlawful under the law of that required place of performance.’ And at 79: ‘The doctrine therefore offers a narrow gateway: the performance of the contract must necessarily involve the performance of an act illegal at the place of performance. Subject to the Foster v Driscoll principle [also discussed in Colt and of no relevance here, GAVC], it is no use if the contract could be performed some other way which is legal; and it is no use if the illegal act has to be performed somewhere else’ and at 84 ‘it is only illegality at the place of performance which is apt to provide an excuse under the Ralli Bros doctrine; it also makes clear that the party relying on the doctrine will in general not be excused if he could have done something to bring about valid performance and failed to do so.’
The lex contractus is English law which already has the Ralli Bros rule. At 120 Cockerill J suggest that if the court in question has no equivalent rule of law, Article 9(3) will have a significant impact. But not if the lex contractus is English law.
I have to give this some further thought and I am not sure it would make much difference in practice but could it not be said that A9(3) Rome I exhaustively regulates the use of overriding mandatory law to frustrate a contract? This would mean that where Rome I applies, Ralli Bros and even Foster v Driscoll must not apply and must not be entertained. That is a question of some relevance, even after Brexit albeit with a complication: for to the extent (see discussions elsewhere) the Rome Convention re-applies to the UK post Brexit, that Convention’s Article 7 rule on mandatory rules ordinarly applies – albeit the UK have entered a reservation viz A7(1) on which see also here. That article gives a lot of freedom for the forum to apply mandatory laws of many more States than the lex loci solutionis [Article 7(1) Rome Convention: ‘ When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application’].
At the very least an exhaustive role for A9 Rome I (and again in future for UK courts, potentially A7 Rome Convention; but see the note on reservation) would require from the judge a different engagement of the issues than under Ralli Bros. Again, whether indeed, and per Cockerill J’s suggestion here (she applies both Ralli Bros and A9) in the case of England that would make much difference in outcome is uncertain. Update 6 November 10:20 AM: see prof Dickinson’s impromptu contribution to the issue here.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.8, Heading 3.2.8.3.
3rd ed. forthcoming February 2021.
Alfonso Luis Calvo Caravaca (University Carlos III, Madrid) and Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia) are the author of a treatise on private international law, in Spanish, titled Tratado de Derecho Internacional Privado.
The three-volume work, published by Tirant lo Blanch, aims to provide an updated, systematic and comprehensive account of the discipline.
Private international law is presented through the analysis of legal rules, case law and scholarly writings, with more than 7.500 references to judicial decisions. The book provides an in-depth insight into European and Spanish private international law in force both for practitioners and students. It illustrates private international law in an accessible way by showing its rules ‘in motion’, i.e., as they actually work.
On 26 October 2020, Saint Kitts and Nevis acceded to the HCCH Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, which will enter into force for Saint Kitts and Nevis on 1 February 2021.
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=765
Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling), Dr Mihail Danov (University of Exeter) and Dr Jayne Holliday (University of Stirling) are delighted to be able to host the final AHRC funded Research Network workshop in partnership with the Journal of Private International Law.
Please note that you are welcome to attend as much or as little of the workshop as you are able.
Programme for Thursday 26 November 2020Chair – Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling and co-editor of the Journal of Private International Law)
10.00-10.30 The Opportunities of Brexit for the development of Private International Law in the Commonwealth
Speaker – Professor Reid Mortensen (University of South Queensland)
10.30-10.45 Questions and discussion
10.45-11.15 Some Reflections to be drawn from the Pilot Study and Future Research Project/s
Speaker – Dr Mihail Danov (University of Exeter)
11.15-11.30 Questions and Discussion
11.30-11.45 Coffee Break
Chair – Dr Jayne Holliday (University of Stirling)
11.45-12.15 Connecting Factors in Private International Law – a global perspective
Speakers – Professor Susanne Goessl (University of Kiel) and Dr Ruth Lamont (University of Manchester)
12.15-12.30 Questions and Discussion
12.30-14.00 Lunch break
Chair – Dr Mihail Danov
14.00-14.45 Pluses and minuses of the UK being a party to the Lugano Convention after Brexit
Speaker – Professor Fausto Pocar (University of Milan)
14.45-15.00 Questions and discussion
Programme for Friday 27 November 2020Chair – Professor Jonathan Harris QC (King’s College London, co-editor of the Journal of Private International Law and Serle Court)
10.30-10.50 Keynote speech by Lord Mance former UK Supreme Court Judge
10.50-11.15 Questions and Discussion and Comments by the Chair
11.15-11.45 Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction after Brexit at a global level
Speaker – Dr Ardavan Arzandeh (University of Bristol and soon to be National University of Singapore)
11.45-12.00 Questions and Discussion
Chair – Dr Jayne Holliday
12.00-12.30 The Hague Adults Convention 2000 and the role of the UK and the EU in the Hague Conference after Brexit
Speaker – Professor Pietro Franzina (Catholic University, Milan)
12.30-12.45 Questions and Discussion
Lunch Break
Chair – Dr Mihail Danov
15.00-15.30 Private International Law of Arbitration – a global perspective and the impact of Brexit on arbitration in the UK
Speaker – Professor Giuditta Cordero-Moss (University of Oslo)
15.30-15.45 Questions and Discussion
15.45-16.15 The AHRC Research Network on Private International Law: Some reflections on the way ahead for global private international law.
Speaker – Professor Paul Beaumont
16.15-16.30 Questions and Discussion
Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling), Dr Mihail Danov (University of Exeter) and Dr Jayne Holliday (University of Stirling) are delighted to be able to host the third of four public AHRC workshops on Private International Law after Brexit from global, European, Commonwealth and intra-UK perspective.
Please note that you are welcome to attend as much or as little of the workshop as you are able.
Programme for 19 November 202014:00 – 14:10 – The Workshop and its Context
Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling), AHRC Network on UK Private International Law post Brexit: Project Objectives and Workshop Aims
14:10 – 16:00 – Cross-Border Litigation: Specific Issues in some specific sectors
Chair: Alex Layton QC (King’s College London and Twenty Essex)
Dr Jenny Papettas (University of Birmingham), Cross-Border Motor Claims After Brexit
Professor Yvonne Baatz (Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London), Brexit and Cross-Border Maritime Disputes
Professor Rob Merkin QC (University of Exeter), Cross-Border Dispute Resolution – Insurance Sector: Brexit Implications
Tom Sprange QC (King & Spalding), High-Value Disputes: A US Law Firm’s Perspective on Brexit
Dr Mihail Danov (University of Exeter), Cross-Border Litigation: New Data, Initial Brexit Implications in England and Wales and Long-Term Policy Choices
Questions and discussion
Programme for 20 November 2020
10:00 – 12:00 Global and Commonwealth Perspectives on Private International Law in the UK after Brexit (not restricted to commercial law)
Chair: Professor Paul Beaumont
Professor Mary Keyes (Griffith University, Australia), How Brexit may affect Commonwealth PIL: A View from Australia
Dr Christophe Bernasconi (Secretary General of the Hague Conference), A Global Perspective from the HCCH – the global international institution on private international law
Iain Mackie (Macfarlanes), A London Law Firm Perspective on international and commonwealth litigation after Brexit
Questions and discussion
Break
13:30 – 15:00 – EU/EEA and Intra-UK Commercial PIL: Brexit Challenges and Opportunities
Chair: Professor Eva Lein (University of Lausanne, Switzerland)
Alex Layton QC, Interim Remedies
Professor Barry Rodger (University of Strathclyde), Re-designing (or not) the UK landscape in relation to PIL: An Intra-UK perspective on Brexit
Lindsey Clegg (Freeths), Re-designing (or not) the UK landscape in relation to PIL: A Regional Law Firm Perspective on Brexit
Questions and discussion
20-minute break
15:20 – 16:50 – Brexit and Cross-Border Competition Litigation
Chair: Professor Barry Rodger
Omar Shah (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP), Brexit and Cross-Border Collective Redress
Nick Frey (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP), Brexit – A Defendant’s Perspective on Competition Litigation
Dr Mihail Danov, Cross-Border Competition Litigation: Brexit Opportunities?
Questions and discussion
16.50 – 17.15 Prof Paul Beaumont and Dr Mihail Danov, Concluding Remarks and Next Steps
Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling), Dr Mihail Danov (University of Exeter) and Dr Jayne Holliday (University of Stirling) are delighted to be able to host the following AHRC funded Research Network workshop.
How to join the online workshop:
Any queries please contact Dr Jayne Holliday at j.holliday@stir.ac.uk
The Development of Private International Law in the UK post Brexit
AHRC Research Network Workshop II – Family Law – Programme
Friday 6 November 2020
10.00-10.15 – Welcome and introduction by Dr Jayne Holliday (University of Stirling)
10.15-10.45 – Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention – how it should be interpreted and applied by Laura Martínez-Mora (Secretary, Hague Conference on Private International Law)
10.45-11.00 – Discussion
11.00-11.15 – Break
11.15-11.45 – Private International Law of Family Agreements after Brexit by Alexandre Boiché (French advocate, member of the Experts’ Group on Family Agreements at the Hague Conference on Private International Law)
11.45-12.15 – International Surrogacy and International Parentage – hopes for a global solution by Professor Giacomo Biagioni (University of Cagliari)
12.15-12.30 – Discussion
12.30-13.30 – Break for lunch
13.30-14.00 – Private International Law of Parental Responsibility (Custody and Access) after Brexit by Professor Thalia Kruger (University of Antwerp)
14.00-14.30 – Private International Law of Divorce after Brexit by Dr Máire Ní Shúilleabháin (University College Dublin)
14.30-14.45 Discussion
14.45-15.00 Break
15.00-16.00 – Keynote speech by Lord Justice Moylan ‘International Family Justice – Where are we Going?’
16.00-16.30 – Concluding remarks incorporating some comments on maintenance after by Brexit by Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling)
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle (University College London & European Corporate Governance Institute – ECGI), Federico M. Mucciarelli (Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia – UNIMORE), Edmund Schuster (London School of Economics) and Mathias Siems (European University Institute – EUI, Durham University and European Corporate Governance Institute – ECGI) have posted Making the Case for a Rome V Regulation on the Law Applicable to Companies on SSRN.
The abstract reads:
There is significant legal variation and uncertainty in the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies in the EU. While the case law of the Court of Justice on the freedom of establishment has clarified some questions, it is evident that case law cannot provide for an adequate level of legal certainty. The main recommendation of this paper is that private international company law in the EU should be harmonised. The paper discusses the main challenges that a future regulation to this effect – called here ‘Rome V Regulation on the Law Applicable to Companies’ – would have to overcome. Some of those are of a political nature: for instance, countries may fear that it may become easier for companies to evade domestic company law (eg, rules of employee co-determination), and there are specific considerations that concern companies established in third countries. Another challenge is that a future regulation on the law applicable to companies has to be consistent with existing EU conflict of laws rules as regards, for example, insolvency and tort law, while also complying with the freedom of establishment of the Treaty. It is the aim of this paper to discuss these questions in detail, notably the general considerations for harmonisation in this field, a potential harmonisation based on the ‘incorporation theory’, how it may be possible to overcome some contentious issues such as the definition of the lex societatis or the relationship between the lex societatis and other areas of law, and the prospects of future international harmonisation.
A revised version of the paper will be published in the Yearbook of European Law.
“The collective defence of consumers’ rights has come a step closer. Following the agreement reached with the European Parliament in June 2020, the Council today adopted its position at first reading on a draft directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers within the EU.
The directive requires member states to put in place a system of representative actions for the protection of consumers’ collective interests against infringements of Union law. It covers actions for both injunctions and redress measures.
It empowers qualified entities designated as such by member states to seek injunctions and/or redress, including compensation or replacement, on behalf of a group of consumers that has been harmed by a trader who has allegedly infringed one of the EU legal acts set out in the annex to the directive. These legal acts cover areas such as financial services, travel and tourism, energy, health, telecommunications and data protection.
The directive distinguishes between qualified entities entitled to bring actions in the member state where they have been designated (domestic representative actions) and those entitled to bring actions in any other member state (cross-border representative actions). For domestic actions a qualified entity will have to fulfil the criteria set out in the law of its member state of designation, whereas for cross-border actions it will have to fulfil the harmonised criteria set out in the directive.
As a safeguard against abusive litigation, the directive provides clear rules on the allocation of judicial costs in a representative action for redress based on the ‘loser pays’ principle. Furthermore, with a view to avoiding conflicts of interest, it imposes on qualified entities a number of transparency requirements, in particular as regards their funding by third parties.
The directive will apply to representative actions brought on or after the date of its application”.
The text of the directive as of 21 October 2020 is attached to this post.
collective-redress-21-october-2020Download
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