Droit international général

In GDE LLC & Anor v Anglia Autoflow Ltd [2020] EWHC 105 (Comm) (31) the Rome I Regulation does not apply ratione temporis; the Agency Agreement was concluded on about 9 April 2009 which is a few months before the kick-off date of the Regulation (note there is no default rule for agency in Article 4 Rome I in the event of lack of lex voluntatis). Dias DJ therefore turns to the 1980 Rome Convention.

Parties are in dispute as to the governing law of the Agency Agreement by which the claims should be determined. AAL alleges that the governing law is that of Ontario while the Claimants allege that the Agency Agreement is governed by English law. The point is of critical importance because the Claimants concede that, if AAL is correct, their claim is time-barred under Ontario law: although this, as readers know, assumes statutes of limitation are subject to the governing law – which is far from certain: see Jabir v KIK and Spring v MOD.

Parties’ arguments are at 10 and 11 and of course they reverse engineer. In essence (at 20) claimants say that there was an implied choice of English law. Alternatively, if that is not correct, the presumption in Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention, which would otherwise point to Georgia law, falls to be disapplied in favour of English law. The Defendant says that there was no implied choice and that application of Article 4(2) leads to Ontario law. Alternatively, if (which it denies) the presumption in Article 4(2) leads to any other governing law, the presumption is to be disapplied in favour of Ontario.

At 21 ff follows a rather creative (somewhat linked to the discussion of ex officio Rome Convention application in The Alexandros), certainly unexpected (yet clearly counsel will do what counsel must do) argument that essentially puts forward that under the common law approach of foreign law = fact hence must be proven, any discussion of a law as governing law, not suggested by the parties (here: the laws of (the US State of) Georgia) that is not English law (which clearly the English curia does ‘novit’), cannot go ahead. At 22 Dias DJ already signals that ‘once the wheels of the Convention had been put in motion, they could not be stopped short of their ultimate destination. The idea that the process dictated by the Convention should be hijacked halfway, as it were, on the basis of a pleading point was, to my mind, deeply unattractive.’

At 31 she sinks the argument. I think she is right.

Having at length considered the facts relevant to the contract formation, discussion then turns again to the Rome Convention with at 105 ff a debate on the role to be played by factors intervening after contract formation with a view to establishing [implicit, but certain: see at 117 with reference to the various language versions of the Convention and the Regulation essentially confirming the French version] choice of law or closest connection. (Dias J refers to the Court of Appeal in Lawlor v Sandvik Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers and Screens Ltd, [2013] EWCA Civ 365; [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 98 where, at paragraphs 21-27, it pointed out that the common law approach frequently blurred the distinction between the search for the parties’ inferred intention and the search for the system of law with which the contract had its closest and most real connection).

At 120: the hurdle is high: choice of law implicitly made must have nevertheless been made: ‘The court is not looking for the choice that the parties probably would have made if they had turned their minds to the question.’ at 122: In the present case the evidence established that there was no reference by the parties to the question of governing law at all. Choice of court for England does not change that. At 160 ff therefore follows the discussion of Article 4 of the Rome Convention, leading to a finding of the laws of Ontario as the lex contractus under Article 4(1). Article 4(5) does not displace it.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.4, Heading 3.2.6.

The author of this post is François Mailhé (University of Picardy – Jules Verne).

“Nul n’a de droit à l’enfant”, that is, no one has a right to a child. This is the first amendment the French Senate has recently added to the latest reform of the Bioethics Act 1994 under discussion in Parliament this month, and which is intended to introduce Title VII of the First book of the civil code “on filiation”.

The Senate is the higher chamber of Parliament, with members elected by elected officials from local governments. It participates in the discussion of all legislative projects with the National Assembly (lower chamber), but the latter would ultimately prevail in case of conflict.

I reported earlier on the three judgments of the French supreme court for civil and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) which, on 18 December 2019, extended the recognition on foreign surrogacies in France. These judgments were expressly based on an advisory opinion concerning the recognition of legal parent-child relationships between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother, given by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in April 2019.

Surprisingly, the Cour de cassation had gone much further than the ECtHR, though, allowing direct recognition of the filiation for all parents appearing on the birth certificate, while the ECtHR had only required for the recognition of the biological father one.

What happened next is even more surprising if not unique in French legislative history.

On 7 January 2020, the Senate chose to oppose the Cour de cassation case-law, on a private international law issue, to better align French law on the ECHR solution. Amendment No 333 to the Bioethics Act reform would, if passed, create a new article 47-1 of the Code civil, drafted as follows:

Any civil status record or judgment for a French citizen or a foreigner made in a foreign country and establishing the filiation of a child born as a result of a surrogacy agreement shall not be transcribed in the registers in so far as it refers as mother to a woman other than the one who gave birth or when it mentions two fathers.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the partial transcription of this act or judgment or the establishment of a second parent-child relationship under the conditions of Title VIII of this Book [on adoption], where such conditions are met.

The Amendment would in fact bring the French system back to what it was after the rulings rendered by the Cour de cassation in July 2017, and in line with the ECtHR opinion of April 2019. In practice, the biological father would be the only “intended parent” to be recognised as such through direct transcription. His husband or wife would only have a right to adopt the child at a later stage (as long as the procedure of adoption is not unreasonably long, which should not be the case under French law for the adoption of the husband’s child).

As the government backed a similar amendment, though milder than the one eventually adopted, it seems probable the National Assembly will not much alter it.

The change brought about by the rulings of the Cour de cassation of 4 October and 18 December 2019 may therefore be short-lived.

Foreign surrogacy agreements may not be so much welcome in France after all.

I seem to be having my environment cap firmly on this week so I am happy to thank Le Monde for flagging the judgment of the French Constitutional Court 2019-823 of 31 January in which it sanctioned (against the wishes of applicants, the Union des industries de la protection des plantes, essentially Bayer, Syngenta, BASF)  the Government’s ban on the manufacturing of and exportation of pesticides banned for use in France but hitherto available for export, mostly to Africa.

The case I would suggest is one that is also very suited to a business ethics class. Interestingly the Act also mentions that it applies to the degree it is not incompatible with WTO rules – the WTO is not addressed in the judgment.

Applicants’ case is grounded on the freedom of ‘enterprise’ or ‘commerce’, as expressed in the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen – but also the Decret d’Allarde 1791. To the mix of objectives to be balanced, the Court adds the protection of public health (Constitutional recital, 1946) and the Environment Charter 2004, from which the court deduces that environmental protection, as common heritage of mankind, is a Constitutionally ringfenced objective.

At 6 the Court without much ado posits that the French Government in pursuing environmental policy, justifiably may take into account the extraterritorial environmental consequences of activities on French soil.

Having referred to the EU ban on the use of the substances at issue, based on scientific considerations discussed at length in the run-up to the EU law at issue, the Court at 9-10 refers to the principle that it should not overzealous in second-guessing the exercise by Parliament of its balancing exercise. At 11, it notes that the 3-year transitionary period gives corporations ample transitionary time in line with their freedom of commerce.

To the Court, it’s all very much self-evident. For environmental policy and extraterritoriality, its findings are quite relevant.

Geert.

 

Environment, territoriality.
French Constitutional court upholds ban on manufacturing and exportation of pesticides banned for use in France but hitherto available for export, mostly to Africa.
Rejects Bayer, Syngenta, BASF action aimed particularly at herbicide atrazine. https://t.co/KMH0QuKpL7

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 31, 2020

 

Written by Jonathan Fitchen

The UK’s intention to attempt to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention is apparently proceeding apace. Though the events leading up to Friday 31st January, when the UK left the EU,  rather overshadowed this fact, the UK Government had already announced that its intention to accede by a posting on 28th January 2020 that may be found here https://www.gov.uk/government/news/support-for-the-uks-intent-to-accede-to-the-lugano-convention-2007   As will be remembered, the 2007 Lugano Convention is open to non-EU third States if the consent of all the existing Convention parties can be first secured. The UK Gov posting records that the UK has secured statements in support of it joining the 2007 Convention from the Swiss, the Norwegians and Iceland. So now all that is required is to secure the consent of the EU to this course of action. Assuming that such consent can be secured, the UK Gov posting records that it is the intention of the UK Government to accede to the 2007 Convention at the end of the transition period (currently scheduled / assumed for 23.00 GMT on 31st December 2020).

In 2009, AGL, a dual Italian-Israeli citizen, and SRL, an Israeli citizen, married in Milan. The spouses, who were both Jews, married religiously.

Jewish religious marriages celebrated in Italy may be given effect in the Italian legal order provided that certain requirements, set forth in an understanding concluded between the Italian government and the Union of the Italian Jewish Communities, are met. The requirements in question basically refer to the marriage process. In particular, a notice of marriage must be filed with the local civil status office prior to celebration, in accordance with the Italian civil code.

In the circumstances, the prior notice and other requirements had not been complied with. As a result, the marriage of AGL and SRL was, from the standpoint of the Italian legal system, a purely religious one.

A few months later, the spouses – who always resided in Israel – seised the Rabbinical Court of Tel Aviv seeking a declaration that their marriage was valid.

Rabbinical Courts are part of the Israeli judiciary. They deal, inter alia, with matters concerning marriage and divorce, parental responsibility and succession. Their rulings have force in the legal system of Israel.

The Tel Aviv Rabbinical Court declared the marriage between AGL and SRL to be valid.

Next, the couple sought to have the Rabbinical Court judgment recognised in Italy. Based on the provisions of the Italian Statute on Private International Law concerning the (automatic) recognition of foreign judgments, they asked the civil status officer of Milan to record the judgment in the civil status registries, so that the marriage could be regarded as producing civil  effects in Italy, as well.

The officer denied the request. He argued that the rules on the recognition of judgments had no role to play in the circumstances. At issue, in his view, was whether the marriage celebrated in Milan in 2009 ought to be given effect in Italy, not whether the Rabbinical Court’s judgment ought to be recognised. The latter, he contended, merely acknowledged that the marriage had taken place and that it had been performed in accordance with the relevant Jewish rules — two circumstances that were already known to Italian authorities and were, as such, uncontroversial.

In any case, the officer contended, the judgment given by the Tel Aviv Rabbinical Court ought to be denied effect in Italy on grounds of public policy. By seeking a judicial statement of the existence of their marriage, the spouses aimed in fact to evade the Italian provisions that determine the conditions subject to which a Jewish religious marriage may be given effect in the Italian legal system.

By a decision of 29 January 2020, the Court of Appeal of Milan, seised of the matter, ruled in favour of the couple.

The Court conceded that the marriage between AGL and SRL was initially, as a matter of Italian law, devoid of civil effects. However, as a result of the Tel Aviv judgment, the marriage had acquired civil effects in the legal system of Israel. Based on this finding, the Court of Appeal found that, contrary to the civil status officer’s opinion, what was at issue was indeed the recognition of the Rabbinical Court’s judgments, and of the civil effects it added to the marriage.

The Court went on to assess whether the conditions contemplated in the Italian Statute on Private International Law for the recognition of foreign judgments were met in the circumstances. It found that the Tel Aviv judgment complied all such conditions. In particular: the judgment originated from the country of residence and nationality of the spouses at the time when the Rabbinical Court was seised; it represented the outcome of fair proceedings; it did not contradict any previous Italian judgment.

Furthermore, the Court observed, the judgment could not be characterised as inconsistent with the ordre public of Italy. The public policy defence, it recalled, operates as an exception and can only be invoked where the recognition of a foreign judgment or the application of a foreign law would be at odds with the fundamental principles of the Italian legal order.

In the Court’s view, this did not occur in the circumstances. The non observance of the Italian rules on the marriage process does not amount, as such, to a violation of the public policy of Italy, as long as it is established that the spouses’ consent was expressed freely by each of them.

The Court noted that the fundamental principles of Italy would rather be challenged if the judgment were denied recognition. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in Wagner v Luxembourg and other rulings, indicates that family status validly created abroad, insofar as they correspond to an established social reality, cannot be denied recognition unless very strong reasons require otherwise.

— Thanks to Marzia Ghigliazza, family lawyer and mediator in Milan, for drawing my attention to the ruling of the Court of Appeal.

In C-654/18 Interseroh Sharpston AG opined on 30 January, in answer to a German court wishing to ascertain whether a waste stream composed principally of paper products should be categorised as so-called ‘green’ waste and therefore subject to the flexible control procedure provided in the EU’s Waste Shipment Regulation 1013/2016. The referring court also asks whether such waste can still be categorised as ‘green’ if it contains up to 10% impurities.

The Regulation combines rules of purely EU origin, with a sometimes complex combination of OECD and 1989 Basel Convention rules. It generally employs a listing system with corresponding light signals (green and amber, previously also red) with the green list being the most desirable to exporters: these only require compliance with the same rules as ordinary commercial transactions.

Regardless of whether or not wastes are included on the list of wastes subject to the Green Control Procedure (Appendix 3 of the EU Regulation), they may not be subject to the Green control procedure if they are contaminated by other materials to an extent which (a) increases the risks associated with the wastes sufficiently to render them appropriate for submission to the amber control procedure, when taking into account the criteria in Appendix 6 to this Decision, or (b) prevents the recovery of the wastes in an environmentally sound manner’.

In the dispute at issue Interseroh collects used sales packaging (lightweight packaging) from private final consumers throughout Germany which it then consigns to recovery. It ships the prepared waste paper across the border for recycling in a paper factory in Hoogezand (Netherlands). New paper and new paperboard is produced from the waste paper. The Netherlands purchaser, ESKA stipulates that the waste paper must meet the following specifications. It should be composed of at least 90% used, residue-drained, system-compatible paper, paperboard or cardboard (PPC) articles and PPC-based combinations, with the exception of liquid packaging board including packaging parts such as labels etc. Also, the waste stream must contain no more than 10% impurities (‘the mixture of wastes at issue’).

The Dutch and German import cq export authorities differ as to the inclusion or not of the transported wastes at issue, with the Dutch taking a more relaxed approach on the basis of the Dutch version of the relevant Basel entry B3020.

• The Dutch version reads „De volgende materialen, mits deze niet vermengd zijn met gevaarlijke afvalstoffen:
  Oud papier en karton:
  – ongebleekt papier en karton of gegolfd papier en golfkarton; – overig papier en karton, hoofdzakelijk gemaakt van gebleekt chemisch pulp, dat niet in bulk is gekleurd; – papier en karton hoofdzakelijk gemaakt van mechanisch pulp (bv. kranten, tijdschriften en soortgelijk drukwerk); – overige, met inbegrip van: 1. gelamineerd karton, 2. ongesorteerd afval
• The German version: “Folgende Stoffe, sofern sie nicht mit gefährlichen Abfällen vermischt sind:
  Abfälle und Ausschuss von Papier und Pappe
  – ungebleichtes Papier und Wellpapier und ungebleichte Pappe und Wellpappe; – hauptsächlich aus gebleichter, nicht in der Masse gefärbter Holzcellulose bestehendes anderes Papier und daraus bestehende andere Pappe; – hauptsächlich aus mechanischen Halbstoffen bestehendes Papier und daraus bestehende Pappe (beispielsweise Zeitungen, Zeitschriften und ähnliche Drucksachen); – andere, einschließlich, aber nicht begrenzt auf: 1. geklebte/laminierte Pappe (Karton) , 2. nicht sortierter Ausschuss.
• The English version: The following materials, provided they are not mixed with hazardous wastes:
  Waste and scrap of paper or paperboard of:
  – unbleached paper or paperboard or of corrugated paper or paperboard; – other paper or paperboard, made mainly of bleached chemical pulp, not coloured in the mass; – paper or paperboard made mainly of mechanical pulp (for example, newspapers, journals and similar printed matter); – other, including but not limited to: (1) laminated paperboard, (2) unsorted scrap.

According to the wording of the German-language version, point 2 of the fourth indent covers ‘nicht sortierten Ausschuss’ (‘unsorted scrap’) and not ‘nicht sortierte Abfälle’
(‘unsorted waste’), as the Dutch Supreme Court held on the basis of the Dutch language version (‘ongesorteerd afval’). The term ‘scrap’ is not synonymous with the terms ‘waste’ or ‘mixture’. In addition, a distinction is drawn in the French language version between ‘mélange de déchets’ and ‘rebuts non triés’, just as in the English-language version between ‘mixture of wastes’ and ‘unsorted scrap’. The terms ‘scrap’ and ‘waste’ are therefore not synonymous. Since, in the Dutch language version of the heading of Basel Code B3020, the term ‘waste’ is not used, but it instead reads ‘papier, karton en papierproducten’, the term ‘afval’ in point 2 of the fourth indent in the Dutch-language version does not cover the entire entry, but only what does not come under the first three indents.

Specifically, on 20 May 2015, the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands) ruled in proceedings involving ESKA that a waste paper mixture, regardless of the presence of impurities, comes under Basel Code B3020. Accordingly, any such mixture of wastes constituted ‘Green’ listed waste and came within the list of wastes subject to the Green control procedure under Article 18 of Regulation No 1013/2006. It did so on the basis of the Dutch language version of Basel Code B3020. ESKA had previously been employing the stricter prior notification procedure under Article 4 of the Regulation.

Interseroh then brought an action before the referring German court seeking a declaration that it is entitled to ship the mixture of wastes at issue to other EU Member States in accordance with the Green control procedure.

Sharpston AG at 27 starts by pointing out that the shipments at issue are kosher commercial and regulatory transactions: at least 90% of the mixture is made up of what can be described generically as paper, paperboard and paper product wastes. The waste also includes a maximum of 10% impurities. This, in other words, is not a cowboyesque trafficking practice. She then explores the legislative history of the amended Annexes, paying less attention to the linguistic analysis perhaps than one might expect – object and purpose is, after all, a guiding principle in the interpretation of texts with seemingly diverging language versions. She concludes from that assessment (please refer to her Opinion itself; there is little point in me paraphrasing it here) that the lighter, green list procedure can only apply if the notifier shows with scientific evidence that the level of impurities does not prevent the recovery of the wastes in question in an environmentally sound manner. She also acknowledges at 72 (as the EC already did in its 2009 FAQs) that clarity on the issue is wanting: ‘establishing what is a tolerable level of contamination is a matter that is due (perhaps, overdue) for examination’. However given the lack of formal regulatory guidance on the issue, the Article 28 procedure of Regulation applies: where the competent authorities of the Member State of dispatch and the Member State of destination cannot agree on the classification of a particular consignment of wastes (and hence on whether the more flexible Green control procedure in Article 18 may be used), the Annex IV amber list procedure must be applied.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Waste Law, 2nd ed 2015, Chapter 4.

(Opinion earlier signalled here)

In 2016, an application for the recognition of a judgment rendered by the Southern District Court of New York against the State of Iran, some of its emanations and other non-State parties was filed with a Luxembourg court.

If recognised, this U.S. judgment, which awarded 1.3 billion USD of compensatory damages and 4.7 billion USD of punitive damages to the victims of the terrorist attacks of 9 September 2001 and/or their families, would have enabled the claimants to seize Iranian assets held with a Luxembourg-based clearing house.

As it happens, the application was not not successful.

A recently published Working Paper of the MPI Luxembourg series (also available on SSRN) puts the American decision into a broader context and provides for an in-depth analysis of the grounds for refusal from the point of view of both private and public international law.

The paper takes stock of the attempts made by the families of the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to enforce the New York judgment in Europe.

It brings together four different contributions, focusing on specific aspects of the Havlish saga.

To set the scene for the proper understanding of the Havlish litigations, Stephanie Law analyses the development of the U.S. legal framework on the state-sponsored terrorism exception and its impact on the U.S. proceedings, which resulted in the judgment whose recognition and enforcement is being sought in Europe.

The ruling given in March 2019 by the Luxembourg court is analysed by Vincent Richard and Edoardo Stoppioni, who deal in turn with the arguments set forth vis-à-vis non-State parties and with the use, by the Luxembourg Court, of the law on State immunity as it applies to the Iranian State and its emanations (see further on this judgment Burkhard Hess “Keine juristische Fussnote: Klagen aus 9/11 vor Luxemburgischen Gerichten”, IPRax, 5/2019, p. 442-446).

Finally, Martina Mantovani addresses the parallel attempts made by the U.S. claimants to enforce the Havlish judgments in other European Jurisdictions, which have given rise to ongoing exequatur procedures in England and in Italy.

[2020] EWHC 98 (Ch) Wilson and Maloney (bankruptcy trustees of Michael McNamara),  concerns mostly Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment) and Article 24(1) of the Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/38 (equal treatment). (At 114) the critical question is whether the exclusion of pension rights on bankruptcy is something that can impact on the right of establishment, or is otherwise within the scope of Art 49 TFEU.

The substantive case at issue concerns the inclusion or not of in investment in a certain pension scheme, into the bankruptcy. My interest in the judgment lies in the succinct reference to forum shopping under insolvency regimes.

Mr McNamara was made bankrupt on 2 November 2012 on his own petition, presented that day. Prior to his bankruptcy Mr McNamara had been a high profile property developer operating primarily, if not exclusively, in the Republic of Ireland. But he and his wife had moved to London in July 2011, and the Court accepted that he had moved his centre of main interests (or COMI) from Ireland to England by the date of presentation of the petition.

Nugee J decided to refer to the CJEU for preliminary review (this having happened on 23 January, clearly one of the last if not the last UK reference to go up to the CJEU). Whether COMI was moved for forum shopping purposes is not likely to feature in the eventual judgment – for there does not seem to be any suggestion that the move of COMI to England had been properly established.

Geert.

 

Symeon Symeonides posted on SSRN the Annual Survey of American Choice-of-Law Cases for 2019, now in its 33rd year.

This is the Thirty-Third Survey of American Choice-of-Law Cases. It was written at the request of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws. It is intended as a service to fellow teachers and to students of conflicts law, both inside and outside of the United States. Its purpose remains the same as it has been in the previous 32 years: to inform, rather than to advocate. This Survey covers cases decided by American state and federal appellate courts during 2019 and posted on Westlaw by December 31, 2019. Of the 1,404 appellate cases that meet these parameters, the Survey focuses on those cases that may contribute something new to the development or understanding of conflicts law—and in particular choice of law. The Survey proceeds in four parts. The first describes fourteen cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. The second part discusses judgments delineating the reach of federal law in cases with foreign elements (extraterritoriality). The third part focuses on the choice-of-law part of conflicts law, in both interstate and international cases. The fourth part deals with the recognition of sister state and foreign country judgments, as well as domestic and international arbitral awards.

In C-15/19 A.m.a. – Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA v Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti, Kokott AG opined mid-January. Her opinion relies heavily on the specific provisions which the Landfill Directive 1999/31 includes for what one could effectively call legacy issues in waste management: how does one roll-out stricter requirements, including with respect to polluter pays, unto landfill sites that were already in existence?

I shall not repeat said provisions for the Advocate General does so extensively. Suffice to say that her reasoned roll-out of the polluter pays principle (she puts the onus on the landfill sites’ operators; principles of legal certainty do not allow to charge those having deposited the waste at the site retroactively to pay for longer aftercare) is based to a large degree on the window which the Directive foresaw for Member States to close down sites whom they did not think could be expected to meet the new Directive’s stricter obligations before its lenghthy implementation periods; and on the fact that the operators of these sites, unlike the depositors of waste, can be expected to be properly au fait with its aftercare requirements and hence also of the proper amount of charges to be invoiced to users of the site.

Another good example of EU environmental /waste law not quite being the environmental zealot which its critics often try to make of it.

Geert.

Kokott AG #CJEU C-15/19 https://t.co/ktkeQlqP6X.#Waste, landfill Directive, polluter pays
Application of aftercare provisions to landfill sites in use before Dir entered into force (EIF & passing on increased costs for same to waste holders who used the site before that same EIF

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 16, 2020

Compared to January (with the hearings I had announced here, plus AG Szpunar’s opinion on Rina, delivered on the 14th), February 2020 will be a quiet month at the Court in terms of private international law, with just AG Bobek’s opinion in FX v GZ (case C-41/19) being scheduled for the 27th.

The case concerns both the Maintenance Regulation and the Brussels I bis Regulation, in the context of judicial proceedings instituted in Germany whereby the applicant, residing in Germany, tries to resist the enforcement of a Polish decision to pay monthly maintenance for his daughter.

As grounds for his application, the applicant argues that the defendant’s maintenance claim underlying the Polish decision had been settled by payment (for the record, the Polish judgment was given in 2009; the request for enforcement in Germany was filed in 2016).

The referring court hesitates about its jurisdiction. If the application opposing enforcement made by the applicant constitutes a matter relating to maintenance for the purposes of Article 1 of the Maintenance Regulation, then no international jurisdiction of the court seised results from the Regulation, since the conditions of Article 3 of the Maintenance Regulation are evidently not satisfied.

By contrast, the courts in Poland, where the order was made, would, pursuant to Article 3(a) and (b) of the Regulation, be directly called upon to deal with the applicant’s defence of fulfilment. Conversely, the view that applications opposing enforcement are not matters relating to maintenance within the meaning of the maintenance Regulation is the prevailing opinion in Germany, where it is argued that the objective of an application against opposing enforcement is directed solely against the enforcement itself, which is not covered by the manintenance Regulation.

Should the latter view on the interpretation of the maintenance Regulation be right, the question arises whether proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments within the meaning of Article 24(5) of the Brussels I bis Regulation are involved. In this regard, the German court claims that an answer is not apparent from the decisions of the Court of Justice in AS Autoteile Service (case C-220/84) and in Prism Investments (case C-139/10).

At the same time, because both decisions concerned general civil and commercial matters and were delivered before the entry into force of the Maintenance Regulation and the Brussels I bis Regulation – which, according to its Article 1(2)(e), is not intended to cover matters relating to maintenance – the court doubts they are transferable to matters relating to maintenance.

While waiting for AG Bobek’s opinion, I would like to add that another request for a preliminary ruling on the maintenance Regulation is pending (still at an early stage) where its relationship with the Brussels I bis Regulation for the purposes of interpretation is also at stake.

In an unprecedented manner, the UK has dealt with its problems around Brexit and its relations with the Contracting States to two HCCH Conventions on the international plane. The Depositary (i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) has just announced that the UK has withdrawn its instruments of ratification of the HCCH Child Support Convention and instrument of accession to the HCCH Choice of Court Convention, together with its declarations and extension to Gibraltar, which actually never came into effect and were apparently only a backup option to a no-deal Brexit; see our previous posts (“some Brexit news” part 1, part 2 and part 3 and the more recent post “Brexit: No need to stop all the clocks” here).

As stated in the notification, the reason for the withdrawal of the instruments is the following: “Since the deposit of the Instrument of [Ratification and Accession], the United Kingdom and the European Union have signed, ratified and approved a Withdrawal Agreement, which will enter into force on 1 February 2020 (the “Withdrawal Agreement”). The Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions for a transition period to start on the date the Withdrawal Agreement enters into force and end on 31 December 2020 (the “transition period”). In accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement, during the transition period, European Union law, including the Agreement, will continue to be applicable to and in the United Kingdom” (our emphasis).

In its Note, the UK adds that it intends to deposit new instruments of ratification of and accession to the above-mentioned Conventions prior to the termination of the transition period. It remains to be seen whether the UK will submit the same declarations and whether it will extend those Conventions to Gibraltar.

The Depositary’s notifications are available here for the Child Support Convention and here for the Choice of Court Convention.

The last issue of the Revue critique de droit international privé has been released. It is a special edition on the Cloud Act and the General Regulation on Data Protection.

The abstracts of the articles, authored by Marie-Elodie Ancel, Patrick Jacob, Régis Bismuth and Théodore Christakis, are available here.

A full table of contents is available here.

As of today, Brexit has become reality – one more reason to think about the EU’s Judicial Cooperation with third states:

The largest proportion of EU economic growth in the 21st century is expected to arise in trade with third countries. This is why the EU is building up trade relations with many states and other regional integration communities in all parts of the world. The latest example is the EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement concluded on 28 June 2019. With the United Kingdom’s exit of the Union on 31 January 2020, extra-EU trade with neighboring countries will further increase in importance. Another challenge for the EU is China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, a powerful global development strategy that includes overland as well as sea routes in more than 100 states around the globe.

The increasing volume of trade with third states will inevitably lead to a rise in the number and importance of commercial disputes. This makes mechanisms for their orderly and efficient resolution indispensable. China is already setting up infrastructures for commercial dispute resolution alongside its belts and roads. In contrast, there seems to be no elaborate EU strategy on judicial cooperation in civil matters with countries outside of the Union, despite the DG Trade’s realisation that “trade is no longer just about trade”. Especially, there is no coherent plan for establishing mechanisms for the coordination of cross-border dispute resolution and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments. This is a glaring gap in the EU’s policy making in external trade relations (see also, in an earlier post by Matthias Weller  on CoL on this matter: Mutual trust and judicial cooperation in the EU’s external relations – the blind spot in the EU’s Foreign Trade and Private International Law policy?).

This is why the Bonn group of PIL colleagues – Moritz Brinkmann, Nina Dethloff, Matthias Lehmann, Philipp Reuss, and Matthias Weller – are hosting a conference on Friday and Saturday, 25 and 26 September 2020, at the University of Bonn that seeks to explore ways in which judicial cooperation in civil matters between the EU and third countries can be improved by the Hague Judgments Convention of 2019 as an important driver, if not game changer, of legal certainty in cross-border commercial relations.

The list of speakers includes internationally leading scholars, practitioners and experts from the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), the European Commission (DG Trade, DG Justice), and the German Ministry of Justice and for Consumers (Bundesjustizministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz).

For the HCCH as co-host, the event will be the European stop on their roadshow around the world to discuss their new Convention. The Conference will be further co-hosted by the Zentrum für europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht at the University of Bonn and The International Litigation Exchange (ILEX).

The Organizers will kindly ask participants to contribute with € 75.- to the costs of the event.  

Date:

Friday, 25 September 2020, and Saturday, 26 September 2020.

Venue:

Bonner Universitätsforum, Heussallee 18 – 22

Draft Programme

Friday, 25 September 2020

1.30 p.m.      Registration

2 p.m.           Welcome note

Prof Dr Wulf-Henning Roth, University of Bonn, Director of the Zentrum für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht (ZEW)

2.10 p.m.      Part 1: Chances and Challenges of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019

Chairs of Part 1: Matthias Weller / Matthias Lehmann

Keynote: Hague Conference’s Perspective and Experiences

Hans van Loon, Former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague

1. Scope of application

Prof Dr Xandra Kramer, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

2. Judgments, Recognition, Enforcement

Prof Dr Wolfgang Hau, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich

Discussion

3.30 p.m.      Coffee Break

4.00 p.m.      Part 2: Chances and Challenges of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 continued

Chairs of Part 2: Nina Dethloff / Moritz Brinkman

3. Jurisdictional filters

Prof Dr Pietro Franzina, Catholic University of Milan

4. Grounds for refusal

Prof Dr Paco Garcimartín, University of Madrid

Discussion

5.30 p.m.      Part 3: Panel Discussion – Prospects for Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters between the EU and Third Countries, 60 min:

Chairs of Part 3: Matthias Weller / Matthias Lehmann

Colin Brown, Unit Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of Trade Policy, DG Trade (tbc); Andreas Stein, Head of Unit, DG JUST – A1 “Civil Justice”; Dr. Jan Teubel, German Ministry of Justice and for Consumers; RA Dr. Heiko Heppner, Attorney at Law (New York), Barrister and Solicitor Advocate (England and Wales), Chair of ILEX, Head of Dispute Resolution, Partner Dentons, Frankfurt, and perhaps more…

Discussion

7 p.m.           Conference Dinner

Saturday

9.30 a.m.      Part 4: The context of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019

Chairs: Moritz Brinkmann/Philipp Reuss

5. Relation to the HCCH 2005 Convention Choice of Court Agreements

Prof Paul Beaumont, University of Stirlin

6. Relations to the Brussels Regime / Lugano Convention

Prof Marie-Elodie Ancel, Université Paris-Est Crétei

7. Brexit…

Dr Pippa Rogerson, Reader in Private International Law, Faculty of Law, Cambridge

Discussion

11:00 a.m.    Coffee Break

11:30 a.m.    Part 4: The context of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 continued

Chairs: Nina Dethloff / Matthias Lehman

8. South European Neighbouring and Candidate Countries

Prof Dr Ilija Rumenov, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia

9. MERCOSUR – EU

Dr Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Director of Internationalisation, Senior Lecturer in International Private Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh

10. Relations to International Commercial Arbitration

Jose Angelo Estrella-Faria, Former Secretary General of UNIDROIT, Senior Legal Officer UNCITRAL Secretariat, International Trade Law Division Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations (tbc)

Discussion

1 p.m.           Closing Remarks

                     Matthias Weller

Written by Jonathan Fitchen.

‘The time has come’; a common enough phrase which may, depending on the reader’s mood and temperament, be attributed variously to Lewis Carroll’s discursive Walrus, to Richard Wagner’s villainous Klingsor, or to the conclusion of Victor Hugo’s epigrammatic comment      to the effect that nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come. In the present context however ‘the time has come’ refers more prosaically to another step in the process described as ‘Brexit’ by which the UK continues to disentangle itself from the EU.

On the 31st of January 2020 at 24.00 CET (23.00 UK time) the UK ceases to be an EU Member State. This event is one that some plan to celebrate and other to mourn. For those interested in private international law and the conflict of laws in the EU or in the legal systems of the UK, celebration is unlikely to seem apt. Whether for the mundane reason that the transition period of the Withdrawal Agreement preserves the practical application and operation of most EU law concerning our subject in the UK and within the EU27 until the projected end point of 31st December 2020, or for deeper reasons connected with the losses to the subject that the EU and the UK must each experience due to the departure of the UK from the EU. If celebration is not appropriate must we therefore opt to mourn? This post suggests that mourning is not the only option (nor if overindulged is it a useful option) and sets out some thoughts on the wider implications for the private international laws of the UK’s legal systems and the legal systems that will comprise the EU27 consequent on the UK’s departure.

This exercise is necessarily speculative and very much a matter of what one wishes to include in or omit from the equation under construction. If too little is included, the result may be of only abstract relevance; if too much is included, the equation may be incapable of solution and hence useless for the intended purpose of calculation. Such difficulties, albeit expressed in a non-mathematical form, are familiar to private international lawyers who while engaging with their subject routinely consider the macroscopic, the microscopic and many points in between. In what remains of this post I will offer some thoughts that hopefully will provoke further thoughts while avoiding useless abstraction and (at least for present purposes) ‘useless’ incalculability.

The loudest calls for the UK to leave the EU did not arise from UK private international law, nor from its practitioners; few UK private international lawyers appear to have wished for Brexit as a means of reforming private international law. Whatever appeals to nostalgia may have swayed opinions in other sectors of the UK and may have induced those within them to vote to leave, they were not expressed with reference to matters of private international law. Few who remember or know the law as it stood in any of the UK’s legal systems prior to the implementation of the UK’s accession to the Brussels Convention of 1968 would willingly journey back to the law as it then stood and regard it as an upgrade. Mercifully, aspects of this view are, at present, apparently shared by the UK Government and account for its wish, after ‘copying and pasting’ most EU law and private international law into the novel domestic category of ‘retained EU Law’, to then amend and allow that which does not depend on reciprocity to be re-presented as a domestic private international law to be applied within and by the UK’s legal systems: thus the Rome I and Rome II Regulations will be eventually so ‘imitated’ within the legal systems of the UK. Unfortunately, many other EU provisions do require reciprocity, and thus cannot be ‘saved’ in this manner; for these provisions the news in the UK is less good.  

There are however other available means of salvage. Because the UK will no longer be an EU Member State at 24.00 Brussels Time it may, but for the Withdrawal Agreement, thereafter participate more fully in proceedings and projects at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The UK plans to domestically clarify the domestic understanding of certain existing Hague conventions, e.g. 1996 Parental Responsibility Convention, via the recently announced Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill 2019. Earlier in 2018 the UK deposited instruments of accession concerning conventions it plans to ratify at the end of the Withdrawal Agreement’s transition period to attempt to retain prospectively the salvageable aspects of certain reciprocity requiring EU private international law Regulations lost via Brexit: thus, the UK plans to ratify the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the 2007 Maintenance Convention. After these ratifications it may be that the UK will also consider the ratification of the 2019 judgment enforcement convention, particularly it the EU takes this option too. In the medium and long term however, the UK, assuming it wishes to participate in an active sense, will have to accept the practical limitations of the HCCH as it (the UK) becomes accustomed to the differences, difficulties and frustrations of private international law reform via optional instruments that all the intended parties are entitled to refuse to opt-in to or ratify.

Over the medium term and longer term, it should additionally be noted that though the UK has left the EU it has not cast-off and sailed away from continental Europe at a speed in excess of normal tectonic progress: there may therefore eventually be further developments between the two. It may be that the UK can be induced at some point in the future, when Brexit has become more mundane and less politically volatile within the UK, to cooperate in relation to private international law in a deeper sense with the EU27; whether by negotiating to join the 2007 Lugano Convention or a new convention pertaining to aspects of private international law. If this last idea seems too controversial then maybe it would be possible for the UK to eventually negotiate with an existing EU Member State as a third country via Regulation 664/2009 or Regulation 662/2009 or perhaps via another yet to be produced Regulation with a somewhat analogous effect? Brexit, considered in terms of private international law, may well re-focus a number of existing questions for the EU27 pertaining to the interaction of its private international law with third States, whether former Member States or not.   

What is however unavoidably lost by Brexit is the UK’s direct influence on the development and particularly the periodic recasting of the EU’s private international law: this loss cuts both ways. For the EU27 the UK will no longer be at the negotiating table to offer suggestions, criticisms and improvements to the texts of new and recast Regulations. For the EU27 this loss is somewhat greater than it might appear from the list of Regulations that the UK did not opt-in to as the terms of the UK’s involvement in these matters permitted it to so participate without having opted-in to the draft Regulation.   

The suggested loss of influence will however probably be felt most acutely by the private international lawyers in the UK. Despite the momentary impetus and excitement of salvaging that which may be salvaged and ratifying that which may be ratified to mitigate the effect of Brexit on private international law, the reality is that we in the UK will have lost two of the motive forces that have seen our subject develop and flourish over decades: viz. the European Commission and the domestic political reaction thereunto. Post-Brexit, once the salvaging (etc.) is done, it seems unlikely that the UK Government will continue to regard a private international law now no longer affected by Commission initiatives or re-casting procedures as retaining its former importance or meriting any greater legislative relevance than other areas of potential law reform. The position may be otherwise in Scotland as private international law is a devolved competence that devolution entrusted to the Scottish Government. It may be that once the dust has settled and the returning UK competence related reforms have been applied that the comparatively EU-friendly Scottish Government may seek to domestically align aspects of Scots private international law with EU law equivalents. For he who would mourn for the effect of Brexit on the subject of private international law, it is the abovementioned loss of influence of the subject at both the EU level and particularly at the domestic level that most merits a brief period of mourning. After this, the natural but presently unanswerable question of, ‘What now?’ occurs. Though speculation is offered above, all in the short term will depend on the progress in negotiations over an unfortunately already shortened but technically still extendable transition period during which the EU and UK are to attempt to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement: thereafter for the medium term and long term all depends on the future political relationship of the EU and the UK.

Today, 31 January 2020, at midnight (11 PM GMT), the United Kingdom will leave the European Union. This is a historic event with innumerable implications, amongst others, for private international law.

However, during the transition period – which expires earliest at the end of 2020 – most things will stay the same. This is thanks to the Withdrawal Agreement, which governs the UK’s divorce from the Union.

The UK will apply EU law, and the EU will, in principle, treat the UK as if it were a Member State (Article 127(1) and (6) of the Withdrawal Agreement). The main exceptions are some institutional provisions, e.g. the participation of the UK in EU bodies, where it will no longer have voting rights (see Article 7(1) and 128(1) of the Withdrawal Agreement).

What will happen after the end of transition period, nobody knows for sure, as the EU and the UK have just started negotiating their future relationship. However, the Withdrawal Agreement makes some provision for the post-transitional period.

Basically, the Regulations on Judicial Cooperation (Brussels I bis, II bis, Rome I, II, the Insolvency Regulation, the Maintenance Regulation, amongst others) will continue to apply to proceedings that have been “instituted” before the end of the transition period, i.e. before 31 December 2020 (Article 66-69 of the Withdrawal Agreement).

Naturally, those EU texts to which the UK was never subject will also not apply after 2020, such as the Succession Regulation.

These transitory provisions seem rather straightforward. However, as always, the devil is in the detail. For starters, it is not easy to determine when proceedings are ‘instituted’ (see this study for the European Parliament, p. 15-16). Moreover, Article 66-69 of the Withdrawal Agreement originally referred only to provisions on ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘recognition and enforcement’. The provisions regarding lis pendens have been later included at the beginning of Article 67 of the Withdrawal Agreement. This is not a model for clear drafting!

One must also not forget that Brexit will change the UK’s relation to non-EU Member States, such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. With the withdrawal from the EU, the Lugano Convention will no longer apply to the UK. As a consequence, British judgments will be subject to the recognition procedure under national law in the three Lugano States Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, and vice versa. This effect already applies as of tomorrow (1 February 2020)!

The Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK has no impact on this, as it only concerns the relationship between those two parties. Article 129(1) of the Withdrawal Agreement binds the UK to “the obligations stemming from the international agreements concluded by the Union”, but cannot impose obligations on third parties.

The UK has, however, received assurances by Switzerland, Norway and Iceland that they support the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention before the end of the transition period. What is missing so far is the EU’s consent.

One can only hope that the relevant political actors will come to their senses and reestablish the network of binding texts as soon and as comprehensively as possible. Judicial Cooperation is about much more than trade deals. It directly affects every day life of ordinary people.

The first 2020 issue RabelsZ has just been released. It features the following articles:

Magnus, Robert, Unternehmenspersönlichkeitsrechte im digitalen Raum und Internationales Privatrecht (Corporate Personality Rights on the Internet and the Applicable Law), pp. 1 et seq

Companies can defend themselves against defamatory and business-damaging statements made on the internet. German case law in this area is based primarily on the concept of a corporate right relating to personality, which has some similarities but also important differences to the personality rights of natural persons. A corresponding legal right is also recognised in European law. However, determining the applicable law for these claims proves to be difficult. First of all, it is an open though not yet much-discussed question whether the exception in Art. 1(2) lit. g Rome II Regulation for “violation[s] of privacy or personal rights” is limited to the rights of natural persons or whether it applies also to the corresponding claims of legal entities. Moreover, the determination “of the country in which the damage occurs” in accordance with Art. 4(1) Rome II Regulation is hotly debated with respect to violations of rights relating to personality, especially when the violations were committed via the internet. The thus far prevailing mosaic principle produces excessively complex results and therefore makes it unreasonably difficult to enforce the protected legal position. This article discusses alternative concepts for the determination of the applicable law for these actions and analyses the scope and background of the exception in Art. 1(2) lit. g Rome II Regulation.

Thon, Marian, Transnationaler Datenschutz: Das Internationale Datenprivatrecht der DS-GVO (Transnational Data Protection: The GDPR and Conflict of Laws), pp. 24 et seq

This article analyses the territorial scope of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and addresses the question whether Article 3 GDPR can be considered as a conflict-of-law rule. It analyses the possibility of agreements on the applicable law and argues that Article 3 GDPR qualifies as an overriding mandatory provision. It finds that the issue of the applicable national law is no longer addressed by the GDPR and that a crucial distinction should therefore be made between internal and external conflicts of law. It argues that the country-of-origin principle is the key to determining which national data protection law applies. Furthermore, the article analyses Article 3 GDPR in more detail from the perspective of private international law. It finds that the targeting criterion is helpful in mitigating the problem of information asymmetries in view of the applicable data protection law. However, it criticizes the establishment criterion because it puts European companies at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, the article proposes to incorporate a “universal” conflict-of-law rule into the Rome II Regulation which should be accompanied by a general conflict-of-law rule specifically addressing violations of privacy and rights relating to personality.

Voß, Wiebke, Gerichtsverbundene Online-Streitbeilegung: ein Zukunftsmodell? Die online multi-door courthouses des englischen und kanadischen Rechts (Court-connected ODR: A Model for the Future? – Online Multi-door Courthouses Under English and Canadian Law), pp. 62 et seq

Will conflict management systems based on the model of companies such as eBay and PayPal soon become a part of civil proceedings before German state courts? Recently, some thought has been given to the development of a new “expedited online procedure” designed to provide an affordable and fast alternative to traditional civil litigation for small consumer claims, thus broadening access to justice. After a brief outline of the current barriers to the justice system and the shortcomings of the private ODR platforms consumers often turn to instead, this article explores the concept of online procedures which other legal systems have developed in response to similar challenges. The analysis of typical, trendsetting examples of e-courts – the Civil Resolution Tribunal under Canadian Law as well as the Online Court that is currently being established in England – reveals a new model of court-connected ODR that is based on the integration of private ODR structures into the justice system. By harnessing digital technologies and integrating methods of dispute prevention and consensual dispute resolution into the state-based proceedings, such online courts offer enormous potential for lay-friendly, accessible civil justice while at the same time using scarce judicial resources sparingly. On the other hand, online technology alone is not a panacea. Establishing online procedures in Germany poses challenges which go beyond the technical dimension. These procedures may conflict with constitutional requirements and procedural maxims such as the principle of open justice, the right to be heard before the legally designated court and the principle of immediacy. However, a well thought-out design and minor modifications of the English and Canadian models would avoid these conflicts without losing the benefits of the innovative procedure.

Monsenepwo, Justin, Vereinheitlichung des Wirtschaftsrechts in Afrika durch die OHADA (The Unification of Business Law in Africa Through OHADA), pp. 97 et seq

In the 1980s, legal and judicial uncertainty prevailed in most western and central African countries, thereby impeding local and foreign investments. To improve the investment climate and further legal and economic integration in Africa, fourteen western and central African States created the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, OHADA) on 17 October 1993. As per the preamble of the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, OHADA aims to harmonize business laws in Africa through the elaboration and the adoption of simple, modern, and common business law regulations adapted to the economies of its Member States. Nearly two decades after its creation, OHADA has developed ten Uniform Acts and three main Regulations, which cover several legal areas, such as company law, commercial law, security interests, mediation, arbitration, enforcement procedures, bankruptcy, transportation law, and accounting. This article analyses the historical background, the institutions, and the main provisions of some of these Uniform Acts and Regulations. It also recommends a few legal areas which OHADA should make uniform to increase legal certainty and predictability in civil and commercial transactions in Africa.

Symeon Symeonides compiled a bibliography, available on SSRN, of books and articles in English in the field of private international law published 2019.

This bibliography covers private international law or conflict of laws in a broad sense. In particular, it covers judicial or adjudicatory jurisdiction, prescriptive jurisdiction, choice of forum, choice of law, federal-state conflicts, recognition and enforcement of sister-state and foreign-country judgments, extraterritoriality, arbitration and related topics. It includes books and law journal articles that appeared in print during 2019, or earlier but were not included in the 2018 bibliography. It does not include articles or essays published in books (as opposed to journals), or writings appearing only in electronic form.

A postdoctoral fellowship at the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University is available for the academic year of 2020-2021. The position is part of the “Old Identities, New Times: Does the Common Legal Identity Withstand Modernity?”, a research project headed by Dr Sharon Shakargy and funded by the Israeli Science Foundation (grant 835/18).

The research project deals with items of personal status, such as age, sex, religion, marital status, parenthood, legal capacity, and the changes in the regulation and perception thereof. The project investigates these items of personal status comparatively, focusing on Western legal systems but not limited to them. More details on the project are available here.

Scholars interested in perusing independent work related to the questions mentioned above are invited to apply. 

Qualifications: 

• Candidates’ doctoral dissertation has focused on, or closely connected to, family law, comparative private law, private international law (conflict of laws).
• Candidates will have submitted their doctoral dissertation by the starting date of the postdoctoral position. 
• Good knowledge of German, French or English private law/ family law is an advantage.
• Candidates must have an excellent command of the English language. Other relevant languages are an advantage. No Hebrew proficiency is required. 

Position Details: 

• The position is available starting from October 18, 2020, for a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of 12 months.
• Regular participation in workshops and other academic activities is expected throughout the academic terms.
• The compensation is a stipend of 10,000 ILS/ Month (~$US 2890; €2620). Health insurance, travel, accommodation and any other expenses are not covered.

Interested applicants should submit a 2-page long research proposal, their CV and publication list, and 1-2 letter(s) of recommendation to Sharon.Shakargy@mail.huji.ac.il by March 15, 2020. Please indicate “postdoc position” in the subject line. 

The University of Milan announces the first edition of the Master Programme on International Trade Compliance Control (IntTradec) to be held in Milan at the Department of International, Legal and Historical-Political Studies,

The Programme aims to train professional figures called to work within the Export Control Program, with a specific focus on International Trade Law, Private International Law, Customs Law and Tax Law.  It includes teaching activities and workshops for a total of 500 hours, and a training period of 300 hours.

More information is available here (in Italian).

Director: Prof. Angela Lupone, University of Milan

Scientific Committee:  Prof. Giovanna Adinolfi (UNIMI), dr. Cristian Battistello (consulente aziendale), prof. Andrea Carati (UNIMI), dr. Maurizio Castello, dr. Antonio Ciavatta (Baker Hughes), dr. Simone Dossi (UNIMI), prof. Manlio Frigo (UNIMI), prof. Alessandra Lang (UNIMI), prof. Laurent Manderieux (Università Bocconi), dr. Luca Moriconi (adjunct prof.), avv. Marco Padovan (Padovan Law Firm), dr. Marco Piredda (ENI S.p.a.), prof. Marco Pedrazzi (UNIMI), prof. Francesca Villata (UNIMI).

Stages and internships: Baker Hughes, Nuovo Pignone International S.r.l., Banca Popolare di Sondrio, Caleffi Hydronic Solutions, Comecer S.p.a., Elantas Europe S.r.l; Fratelli Cosulich S.p.a.; Modo Customs Services S.r.l.; Omal S.p.a., Sabaf S.p.a., StMicroelectronics S.r.l, Studio Legale Padovan (Milano). 

Contacts: direzione.intgiurpol@unimi.it

Deadline: 3 February 2020 (2 p.m.) with possibility of extention.