Droit international général

The book Le Brexit, Enjeux régionaux, nationaux et internationaux (Bruylant, 2017), edited by Pr. Charles Bahurel, Pr. Elsa Bernard and Associate Pr. Marion Ho-Dac, has just been published. It includes a foreword, an introduction and papers from a three-days symposium on legal aspects of Brexit which took place in February and March 2017 in different universities.
The book is divided in three parts. The first is dedicated to the policy and institutional issues of Brexit and deals with Brexit preparation and post-Brexit relationships. The second part concerns EU citizenship and economic issues and deals with internal market and judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters (see, inter alia, the contribution of Gilles Cuniberti on international economic aspects with a discussion paper by Emmanuel Guinchard and the contribution of Jean Sagot-Duvauroux on international family law aspects). It also focuses on some major actors of Brexit: EU citizens, students, patients, bankers and lawyers. The third part is devoted to criminal and immigration issues.

The abstract reads as follows:
Moins d’un an après le referendum britannique sur le retrait du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne, de nombreuses questions d’ordre économique, politique, juridique et social se posent quant à cet événement sans précédent dans l’histoire de la construction européenne.
Compte tenu des conséquences régionales, nationales et internationales du Brexit, il était nécessaire que des spécialistes viennent éclairer les multiples zones d’ombre qui subsistent sur des sujets aussi divers que l’engagement du retrait, les modèles de coopération possibles entre le Royaume-Uni et l’Union européenne, l’avenir politique, juridique et économique de cette Union, les enjeux migratoires du Brexit mais aussi ses enjeux pour les citoyens européens et pour les opérateurs économiques que sont, par exemple, les banques ou les entreprises.
Cet ouvrage s’adresse aux praticiens spécialisés en droit européen (avocats, notaires, fiscalistes, banquiers) ainsi qu’aux universitaires et aux membres des collectivités territoriales.

Foreword of the editors: here

Tables of contents: here

The University of Milan will recruit a postdoctoral researcher in Private International Law, starting in January 2018, for a duration of 24 months (renewable once).

The researcher will work on the project ‘Private International Law and New Technologies’.

Eligible candidates must hold a doctorate in law or have comparable
research experience. They must have a good/excellent command of Italian.
Good command of English is an additional asset. Additional accommodation funding for candidates relocating from abroad is available.

Deadline for applications: 16 October 2017.

More details can be found here

The Central and Eastern European Company Law Research Network is organising an international conference on the Arbitrability of Company Law Disputes in Central and Eastern Europe that will take place at the Department of Law of the Sapientia University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania). The event will be on 20 October 2017. Speakers include distinguished academics from various Central and Eastern European countries. The conference is open to the public. For the programme, registration and further details, please click here.

The International Law Association has launched the following Call for Papers:

„In 2018, the Australian Branch of the International Law Association will be hosting the biennial ILA conference. The conference, which is being held in Sydney, Australia, from 19-24 August 2018, is a major international event that will bring together hundreds of judges, academics, practitioners and officials of governments and international organisations from all around the globe. The Australian Branch of the ILA is calling for paper and panel proposals as part of the program for the conference.
The objectives of the International Law Association include ‘the study, clarification and development of international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect for international law’. Yet how are we to anticipate the development of international law, and particularly understanding and respect for international law, in an ever-changing world? There are a myriad of international challenges facing global society—sharpening economic divides, nationalist assertions of boundaries, climate change, cycles of war and poverty, new uses of technology. The 2018 ILA conference will address diverse cutting-edge issues in international law as part of its ongoing study of international law, as well as through dialogue on pressing questions of public and private international law.
The ILA biennial conferences provide an opportunity for members of the ILA Committees to meet and advance their work on discrete areas of international law. The current work of the ILA Committees may be found here. Open sessions will be held on these topics to provide all attendees with the opportunity to learn of the Committees’ work and to contribute to the development of the program of work.
In addition, a program will run for all attendees on the core theme of the conference: Developing International Law in Challenging Times. To this end, proposals are sought either for individual paper presentations or for panel presentations on specific themes. Higher degree research (PhD) students are also encouraged to submit poster presentation proposals. A networking and social program is also being organised to run during the conference for international and inter-state visitors.
For paper and poster proposals, speakers are to submit a title and 150-200 word abstract, along with a 150 word biography for potential inclusion in the program. A one-page CV should also be submitted. For panel proposals, the title of the panel and the titles of each paper are to be submitted with a 200 word abstract of the discussions of the panel and a statement on the proposed format for the panel. A biography and one-page CV should also be sent for each proposed speaker on the panel.
Submissions are to be emailed to info@ila2018.org.au by 1 November 2017.
We look forward to welcoming you to Sydney in 2018!“

When I cannot add anyting sensible to others’ analysis, I let theirs speak for itself. Enjoy.

Corporate Finance Lab

On September 14th 2017, the CJEU ruled on the Panayi Trust case (Case C-646/15), to which we have already referred in an earlier blog post. The CJEU’s ruling in the Panayi Trust case will provide ample opportunity for debate and reflection in the near future, especially with Brexit coming into view.

However, in this blog post we will restrict ourselves to a brief presentation of the case and some first observations regarding the question whether trusts can indeed come under the scope of the freedom of establishment.

View original post 1,502 more words

This blog post presents a condensed version of an article by Dr Mukarrum Ahmed (Lancaster University) and Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Aberdeen) in the August 2017 issue of the Journal of Private International Law. The blog post includes specific references to the actual journal article to enable the reader to branch off into the detailed discussion where relevant. It also takes account of recent developments in the Brexit negotiation that took place after the journal article was completed.    

On 1 October 2015, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (‘Hague Convention’) entered into force in 28 Contracting States, including Mexico and all the Member States of the European Union, except Denmark. The Convention has applied between Singapore and the other Contracting States since 1 October 2016. China, Ukraine and the USA have signed the Convention indicating that they hope to ratify it in the future (see the official status table for the Convention on the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s website). The Brussels Ia Regulation, which is the European Union’s device for jurisdictional and enforcement matters, applies as of 10 January 2015 to legal proceedings instituted and to judgments rendered on or after that date. In addition to legal issues that may arise independently under the Hague Convention, some issues may manifest themselves at the interface between the Hague Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation. Both sets of issues are likely to garner the attention of cross-border commercial litigators, transactional lawyers and private international law academics. The article examines anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of Brexit in the context of the Hague Convention and its relationship with the Brussels Ia Regulation. (See pages 387-389 of the article)

It is argued that the Hague Convention’s system of ‘qualified’ or ‘partial’ mutual trust may permit anti-suit injunctions, actions for damages for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements and anti-enforcement injunctions where such remedies further the objective of the Convention. (See pages 394-402 of the article) The text of the Hague Convention and the Explanatory Report by Professors Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi are not explicit on this issue. However, the procès-verbal of the Diplomatic Session of the Hague Convention reveal widespread support for the proposition that the formal ‘process’ should be differentiated from the desired ‘outcome’ when considering whether anti-suit injunctions are permitted under the Convention. Where anti-suit injunctions uphold choice of court agreements and thus help achieve the intended ‘outcome’ of the Convention, there was a consensus among the official delegates at the Diplomatic Session that the Convention did not limit or constrain national courts of Contracting States from granting the remedy. (See Minutes No 9 of the Second Commission Meeting of Monday 20 June 2005 (morning) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Intersentia 2010) 622, 623–24) Conversely, where the remedy impedes the sound operation of the Convention by effectively derailing proceedings in the chosen court, there was also a consensus of the official delegates at the meeting that the Convention will not permit national courts of the Contracting States to grant anti-suit injunctions.

However, intra-EU Hague Convention cases may arguably not permit remedies for breach of exclusive choice of court agreements as they may be deemed to be an infringement of the principle of mutual trust and the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) which animate the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order of the Brussels Ia Regulation (see pages 403-405 of the article; C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565). If an aggrieved party does not commence proceedings in the chosen forum or commences such proceedings after the non-chosen court has rendered a decision on the validity of the choice of court agreement, the recognition and enforcement of that ruling highlights an interesting contrast between the Brussels Ia Regulation and the Hague Convention. It appears that the non-chosen court’s decision on the validity of the choice of court agreement is entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Brussels Ia Regulation. (See C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548) The Hague Convention does not similarly protect the ruling of a non-chosen court. In fact, only a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States. (See Article 8(1) of the Hague Convention) Therefore, the ruling of a non-chosen court is not entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Hague Convention’s system of ‘qualified’ or ‘partial’ mutual trust. This provides a ready explanation for the compatibility of anti-suit injunctions with the Hague Convention but does not proceed any further to transpose the same conclusion into the very different context of the Brussels Ia Regulation which prioritizes the principle of mutual trust.

The dynamics of the relationship between Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation and Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention is mapped in the article (at pages 405-408). In a case where the Hague Convention should apply rather than the Brussels Ia Regulation because one of the parties is resident in a non-EU Contracting State to the Convention even though the chosen court is in a Member State of the EU (See Article 26(6)(a) of the Hague Convention) one would expect Article 6 of the Convention to be applied by any non-chosen court in the EU. However, the fundamental nature of the Article 31(2) lis pendens mechanism under the Brussels Ia Regulation may warrant the pursuance of a different line of analysis. (See Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV EU:C:2013:858, [2014] I.L.Pr. 10, [36]; See also to similar effect, Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG EU:C:2010:243, [2010] I.L.Pr. 35, [49]) It is argued that the Hartley–Dogauchi Report’s interpretative approach has much to commend it as it follows the path of least resistance by narrowly construing the right to sue in a non-chosen forum as an exception rather than the norm. The exceptional nature of the right to sue in the non-chosen forum under the Hague Convention can be effectively reconciled with Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. This will usually result in the stay of the proceedings in the non-chosen court as soon as the chosen court is seised. As a consequence, the incidence of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments are curbed, which are significant objectives in their own right under the Brussels Ia Regulation. It is hoped that the yet to develop jurisprudence of the CJEU on the emergent Hague Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation will offer definitive and authoritative answers to the issues discussed in the article.

The implications of Brexit on this topic are not yet fully clear. (See pages 409-410 of the article) The UK is a party to the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention as a Member State of the EU, the latter having approved the Convention for all its Member States apart from Denmark. The UK will do what is necessary to remain a party to the Convention after Brexit.  In its recently published negotiating paper – only available after the article in the Journal of private International Law was completed – the UK Government has explicitly stated that:

“It is our intention to continue to be a leading member in the Hague Conference and to participate in those Hague Conventions to which we are already a party and those which we currently participate in by virtue of our membership of the EU.”  (see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework (PDF) at para 22).

The UK will no doubt avoid any break in the Convention’s application. Brexit will almost certainly see the end of the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation in the UK. The reason being that its uniform interpretation is secured by the CJEU through the preliminary ruling system under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  The UK is not willing to accept that jurisdiction post-Brexit (“Leaving the EU will therefore bring an end to the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK, because the CJEU derives its jurisdiction and authority from the EU Treaties.” see  Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 20). So although the UK negotiators are asking for a bespoke deal with the EU to continue something like Brussels Ia (“The UK will therefore seek an agreement with the EU that allows for close and comprehensive cross-border civil judicial cooperation on a reciprocal basis, which reflects closely the substantive principles of cooperation under the current EU framework” see  Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 19) it seems improbable that the EU will agree to such a bespoke deal just with the UK when the UK does not accept the CJEU preliminary ruling system.  The EU may well say that the option for close partners of the EU in this field is the Lugano Convention. The UK Government has indicated that it would like to remain part of the Lugano Convention (see Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 22). In doing so it would continue to mandate the UK courts to take account of the jurisprudence of the CJEU -when that court is interpreting Brussels Ia or the Lugano Convention – when UK courts are interpreting the Lugano Convention (see the opaque statement by the UK Government that “the UK and the EU will need to ensure future civil judicial cooperation takes into account regional legal arrangements, including the fact that the CJEU will remain the ultimate arbiter of EU law within the EU.” see  Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 20). However, unless the Lugano Convention is renegotiated it does not contain a good solution in relation to conflicts of jurisdiction for exclusive choice of court agreements because it has not been amended to reflect Article 31(2) of Brussels Ia and therefore still gives priority to the non-chosen court when it is seised first and the exclusively chosen court is seised second in accordance with the Gasser decision of the CJEU (see Case C-116/02 [2003] ECR I-14693).  Renegotiation of the Lugano Convention is not even on the agenda at the moment although the Gasser problem may be discussed at the Experts’ Meeting pursuant to Article 5 Protocol 2 of the Lugano Convention on 16 and 17 October 2017 in Basel, Switzerland (Professor Beaumont is attending that meeting as an invited expert).  Revision of the Lugano Convention would be a good thing, as would Norway and Switzerland becoming parties to the Hague Convention.  It seems that at least until the Lugano Convention is revised and a means is found for the UK to be a party to it (difficult if the UK does not stay in EFTA), the likely outcome post-Brexit is that the regime applicable between the UK and the EU (apart from Denmark) in relation to exclusive choice of court agreements within the scope of the Hague Convention will be the Hague Convention. The UK will be able to grant anti-suit injunctions to uphold exclusive choice of court agreements in favour of the courts in the UK even when one of the parties has brought an action contrary to that agreement in an EU Member State. The EU Member States will apply Article 6 of the Hague Convention rather than Article 31(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation when deciding whether to decline jurisdiction in favour of the chosen court(s) in the UK.

Whilst the Hague Convention only offers a comprehensive jurisdictional regime for cases involving exclusive choice of court agreements, it does give substantial protection to the jurisdiction of UK courts designated in such an agreement which will be respected in the rest of the EU regardless of the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. Post-Brexit the recognition and enforcement regime for judgments not falling within the scope of the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention could be the new Hague Judgments Convention currently being negotiated in The Hague (see Working Paper No. 2016/3- Respecting Reverse Subsidiarity as an excellent strategy for the European Union at The Hague Conference on Private International Law – reflections in the context of the Judgments Project? by Paul Beaumont). Professor Beaumont will continue to be a part of the EU Negotiating team for that Convention at the Special Commission in the Hague from 13-17 November 2017. It is greatly to be welcomed that the UK Government has affirmed its commitment to an internationalist and not just a regional approach to civil judicial co-operation:

“The UK is committed to increasing international civil judicial cooperation with third parties through our active participation in the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law… We will continue to be an active and supportive member of these bodies, as we are clear on the value of international and intergovernmental cooperation in this area.” See Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework at para 21.

One good thing that could come from Brexit is the powerful combination of the EU and the UK both adopting a truly internationalist perspective in the Hague Conference on Private International Law in order to genuinely enhance civil judicial co-operation throughout the world.  The UK can be one of the leaders of the common law world while using its decades of experience of European co-operation to help build bridges to the civil law countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Sabbagh v Khoury at the High Court was the subject of a lengthy review in an earlier post. The Court of Appeal has now considered the issues at stake, in no lesser detail.

In line with my previous post (readers unfamiliar with it may want to refer to it; and to very good Hill Dickinson summary of the case), of particular consideration here is the jurisdictional test under (old) Article 6(1) Brussels I, now Article 8(1) in the Recast, in particular the extent of merits review; and whether the subject matter of the claim comes within the succession exception of Article 1(2)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation.

As for the latter, the Court, after reviewing relevant precedent and counsel argument (but not, surprisingly, the very language on this issue in the Jenard report, as I mention in my previous post) holds in my view justifiably that ‘(t)he source of the ownership is irrelevant to the nature of the claim. ..The subject matter of the dispute is not whether Sana is an heir, but whether the defendants have misappropriated her property.‘ (at 161).

With respect to the application of Article 6(1) – now 8(1), the majority held in favour of a far-reaching merits review. Lady Justice Gloster (at 166 ff) has a minority opinion on the issue and I am minded to agree with her. As she notes (at 178) the operation of a merits test within Article 6(1) does give rise to risk of irreconcilable judgments, which can be demonstrated by reference to the present facts. She successfully, in my view, distinguishes the CJEU’s findings in Kolassa and in CDC, and the discussion at any rate one would have thought, merits CJEU review.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1

I am in Wuhan 2 1/2 days this week, where I am pleased to be engaging in three of my favourites: a class on environmental law, at Wuhan University’s unparalleled Research Institute of Environmental Law; a session on best practices for PhD research at same; and a conference presentation on conflict of laws at the solidly A+++ ‘Global Forum’ of the Chinese Society of Private International Law and Wuhan University’s Institute of International Law.

Anyways, on my way I inter alia wrote following intro to a volume on Waste to Energy, edited by Harry Post. I thought would share.

The European Union purports to be moving towards a Circular Economy (CE). If recent experience in environmental and energy law is anything to go by, the rest of the world will look with interest to its progress. It is fashionable to say that in the CE ‘waste’ will no longer exist. This is however not relevant beyond semantics. What really matters is how the EU and others after or before it, create the economic and regulatory environment that enables the innovation which a CE requires.

Regulatory circles have ample sympathy for business implementing and bringing to market the many exciting ideas which engineers continue to develop. At the same time one must not be blind to the excess which unchecked engineering imagination does have on society, in all pillars of sustainable development: social, economic and environmental. We must not compromise on a robust regulatory framework which looks after what public health and environmental protection require: two Late Lessons from Early Warnings reports tell us that we would do so at our own peril. However we do have to question continuously whether our existing laws are best practice in reaching that desired outcome. It would be a particular affront if innovative products and services that truly may boost environmental protection, were not to be rolled-out because of anxiety over their legal status.

In an innovative environment, legal certainty is an important driver for success. Lack of clarity over the legal framework and /or the regulators’ implementation of same, leads industry either to seek out and concentrate development on those States with lax or flexible regulators only; or to stick to old and trusted products.

The European Union is particularly suited to providing that clarity. On the scientific front, by investing in research and development, especially at SME and specialised spin-offs level. On the regulatory front, it would do well to work out a regime which enables innovators to query enforcement agencies about the legality of a new product or service line without the fear of subsequently being disciplined for it.

This volume is a scholarly effort to assist with both strands of the exercise. It is to be much commended for that effort and I for one am sure both industry and legal scholars will find its content encouraging.

Geert.

I discussed this case with my students the day the judgment came out. Copy of the judgment has travelled with me far and wide. Yet I only now find myself getting round to posting on Anas v Facebook, at the courts at Würzburg back in February. Mr Anas came from Syria as a refugee and took a famous selfie with Frau Merkel. The photo later came to haunt him as fake news sites used it in connecting with accusations of terrorism. Mr Anas thereupon sued Facebook, requesting it to act more swiftly to remove the various content reporting on him in this matter. The Würzburg court obliged. I understand that in the meantime Mr Anas has halted further action against FB which I am assuming includes the appeal which FB must have launched.

Now, the interest for this blog lies not in the issue of fake news, but rather the jurisdictional grounds for the ruling. Mr Anas sued Facebook Ireland, not Facebook Inc. The latter, I would suggest, he might have done on the basis of the Brussels I Recast’s provisions on consumer contracts – albeit that the conditions for that title might not be fulfilled if Mr Anas became a FB user in Syria.

The court did not entertain the consumer title. It did uphold its jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Recast, as lex loci damni. (But without consideration of the Shevill limitation). Awkwardly, it then lest my German fails me, goes on to determine its internal jurisdiction on the basis of German civil procedure law. Plaintiff was domiciled in Berlin; not Würzburg. The judgment therefore turns into the proverbial cake and eating it: Article 7(2) does not just lay down jurisdiction for a Member State: it also identifies the very court in that MS that has jurisdiction. It cancels out internal rules of jurisdiction. With Mr Anas’ domicile in Berlin, Wurzburg as locus damni is not immediately obvious.

German speakers, if I am not reading this right please do comment.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.

The Private International Law Group from the School of Law of Carlos III University of Madrid (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, www.uc3m.es) is delighted to announce its International Congress on matters of matrimonial property regimes and property consequences of registered partnerships (from 16-17 November 2017).

Young researchers are invited to submit their papers about the subject of the Congress. Abstracts, either in Spanish or English (Word format) must be sent to mjcastel@der-pr.uc3m.es (deadline: 30th September 2017), including:

-Name and surname

-Affiliation of the submitting researcher

-Short biographical note (no more than 500 words)

-Title and Summary of the proposed paper (no more than 800 words)

The abstracts will be reviewed by the following Committee:

Alfonso L. Calvo Caravaca, Professor of Private International Law (Carlos III University of Madrid).

Esperanza Castellanos Ruiz, Associate Professor of Private International Law (Carlos III University of Madrid).

Juliana Rodríguez Rodrigo, Associate Professor of Private International Law (Carlos III University of Madrid).

The decision will be notified to the author by 15th October 2017

Successful applicants will present their papers into the Young Researchers Round Table (17th November 2017) and their papers may be published in the Journal Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional.CDT (www.uc3m.es/cdt ).

The organization will not be responsible for the expenses of young researchers’ participation in the Congress.

Back in March the the Child & Family Law Quarterly together with Cambridge Family Law hosted a conference on the the impact of Brexit on international family law (see our previous post). Some of the academic papers that were presented at this occasion have now been published in a special Brexit issue of the Child & Family Law Quarterly.

Here is the table of content:

• Brexit and international family law from a continental perspective, Anatol Dutta
• Private international law concerning children in the UK after Brexit: comparing Hague Treaty law with EU Regulations, Paul Beaumont
• Divorcing Europe: reflections from a Scottish perspective on the implications of Brexit for cross-border divorce proceedings, Janeen M Carruthers and Elizabeth B Crawford
• What are the implications of the Brexit vote for the law on international child abduction?, Nigel Lowe
• Not a European family: implications of ‘Brexit’ for international family law, Ruth Lamont

In Case C-372/16 Sahyouni SAUGMANDSGAARD ØE Opined Friday last (Opinion not yet available in EN at the time of writing of this post; the curia press release on the case helps). The case concerns the scope of application of Rome III, Regulation 1259/2010 (on enhanced co-operation Regulation on divorce and legal separation), as well as the application of its Article 10.  This Article inserts the lex fori for the lex causae, where the lex causae as identified by the Regulation makes no provision for divorce or does not grant one of the spouses equal access to divorce or legal separation on grounds of their sex.

In the previous Sahyouni Case C‑281/15, the request was considered inadmissible for lack of factual beef to the bone to allow the Court to apply its Dzodzi case-law (Joined Cases C‑297/88 and C‑197/89). In that case, the Court had held that the authors of the Treaty did not intend to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court requests for a preliminary ruling on a provision of EU law in the specific case where the national law of a Member State refers to the content of that provision in order to determine rules applicable to a situation which is purely internal to that State and that, on the contrary, it is manifestly in the interest of the EU legal order that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, every provision of EU law should be given a uniform interpretation irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be applied.

In the case at hand, Rome III is not generally applicable to decisions on divorce and legal separation issued by the authorities of third States. German residual private international law on the matter, however, makes it so applicable.

SAUGMANDSGAARD ØE first of all opines that the national court now does give the CJEU enough information for it to rule on the case. Contrary to what the German legislature
assumed, however, the AG suggests Rome III does not cover divorces which are declared without a constitutive decision of a court or other public authority, such as a divorce resulting from the unilateral declaration of a spouse which is registered by a religious court. Note that the AG for this purpose employs lex fori in the sense of EU law (the Regulation and its preparatory works), to determine whether such divorce is ‘private’ or not; not as might be considered an alternative in the case at hand, Syrian law. Those of us with an interest in Vorfrage may find this interesting.

Next, the AG does complete the analysis should the Court disagree with his view on scope of application. The question whether access to divorce provided for by the foreign law is discriminatory (this is the test of the aforementioned Article 10) must, in the view of the AG, be assessed in the abstract, and not specifically in the light of the circumstances of the case. Therefore, it suffices that the applicable foreign law be discriminatory by virtue of its content for it to be disapplied. This AG suggests that the EU legislature considered that the discrimination at issue, namely that based on the sex of the spouse, is so serious as to warrant unqualified rejection, without the possibility of exception on a case-by-case basis, of the entirety of the law which should have been applied in the absence of such discrimination. This interpretation differs from the standard application of another well-known mechanism, that of ordre public, where any assessment needs to be based on a case-by-case basis.

Finally, the AG examines whether the fact that the spouse discriminated against
possibly consented to the divorce allows the national court not to disapply the foreign law despite its discriminatory nature, and therefore to apply that law. He suggests that question be answered in the negative. The rule set out in Article 10 of the ‘Rome III’ Regulation, which is based on compliance with values considered to be fundamental, is mandatory in nature and therefore, as a result of the intention of the EU legislature, does not fall within the sphere in which the persons at issue can freely waive the protection of their rights.

A judgment to look out for.

Geert.

On 5/6 April 2018 Dr. Ana Mercedes López Rodríguez, Ph.D. and Dr. Katia Fach Gómez, LL.M will convene a conference to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The conference will take place at University Loyola Andalucia (Seville/Spain) and is expected to comprise 3-4 Keynote Lectures and round tables with approximately 36 speakers.

Academics, practitioners and policymakers are invited to submit extended abstracts or unpublished full papers on the referred topic to the conference directors (amlopez@uloyola.es; katiafachgomez@gmail.com) by 30 November 2017.  Practitioners at all stages of their careers and senior and junior scholars (including Ph.D. students) are encouraged to participate.

The Conference directors expect to publish an edited volume in English by a relevant legal publishing house containing the most relevant papers presented in the Conference.

Further information about the submission and publication process can be found here and at the Conference website.

The European Law Institute has approved and published its new instrument, the report on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law. The report is available on SSRN as well as on the website of the ELI. The abstract on SSRN reads as follows:

Since the global financial crisis, insolvency and restructuring law have been at the forefront of law reform initiatives in Europe and elsewhere. The specific topic of business rescue appears to rank top on the insolvency law related agenda of both the European Union (EU) and national legislators faced by a rapid growth of insolvencies, which clearly highlighted the importance of efficient mechanisms for dealing with distressed, but viable business. For the European Law Institute (ELI), this fuelled the momentum to launch an in-depth project on furthering the rescue of such businesses across Europe. The European Law Institute, established in 2011, is an independent non-profit organisation established to initiate, conduct and facilitate research, make recommendations and provide practical guidance in the field of European legal development. Building on the wealth of diverse legal traditions, ELI’s mission is the quest for better law-making in Europe and the enhancement of European legal integration. By its endeavours, ELI seeks to contribute to the formation of a more vigorous European legal community, integrating the achievements of the various legal cultures, endorsing the value of comparative knowledge, and taking a genuinely pan-European perspective. As such, its work covers all branches of the law: substantive and procedural; private and public (see http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/).

The topics addressed in the Report are intended to present a tool for better regulation in the EU, developed in the spirit of providing a coherent, dynamic, flexible and responsive European legislative framework for business rescue. Mindful of the European Commission’s commitment to better legal drafting, the Report’s proposals are formulated as comprehensibly, clearly, and as consistently as possible. Still, the recommendations are not designed to be overly prescriptive of specific outcomes, given the need for commercial flexibility and in recognition of the fact that parties will bargain in the ‘shadow of insolvency law’. The Report is addressed to the European Union, Member States of the EU, insolvency practitioners and judges, as well as scholars. The targeted group many times flows explicitly from the text of a recommendation or the context in which such a recommendation is developed and presented. The Reporters cherish the belief that the report will assist in taking a next, decisive step in the evolutionary process of the European side of business rescue and insolvency law.

The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) has just released the final French and English versions of the draft Guide to Good Practice on Article 13(1)(b) of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Child Abduction Convention) for the attention of the Special Commission meeting of October 2017 on the practical operation of the 1980 Child Abduction Convention and of the 1996 Child Protection Convention.  A Spanish translation of the document is also available.

Further information relating to the Special Commission meeting is available here: https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=6545&dtid=57

In my view, this topic will likely spark some debate at the meeting given the heightened awareness of some of the pitfalls of the Child Abduction Convention in relation to cases of domestic violence. See, for example, Taryn Lindhorst and Jeffrey L. Edleson, Battered Women, their Children, and International Law – the Unintended Consequences of the Hague Child Abduction Convention (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2012) and Honourable Brenda Hale (Baroness Hale of Richmond), “Taking Flight—Domestic Violence and Child Abduction”, Current Legal Problems (13 August 2017).

Please note that the meeting above-mentioned is open only to delegates or experts designated by the Members of the Hague Conference, invited non-Member States and International Organisations that have been granted observer status.

It does not happen too often that (the notion of) European Private International Law hits the front pages of the daily news. But on Friday it happened: Germany’s foremost (conservative) newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), addressed A.G. Saugmandsgaard’s recent opinion on the recognition of private (Sharia) divorces under the Rome III Regulation. In so doing the FAZ expressly pointed out, on page 1, that it was unclear whether “European rules on choice of law (“Europäisches Kollisionsrecht”) actually applied in the case at bar.

The A.G.’s full opinion according to which the Rome III Regulation (if it applies at all) does not allow a private divorce to be recognized as valid where the applicable foreign law is discriminatory, is available here (in a number of languages, but not in English). The official press release can be downloaded here.

Written by Veerle Van Den Eeckhout

In February 2017, the working paper “Internationaal privaatrecht in tijden van globalisering. “Neutraal” internationaal privaatrecht!?”) of Veerle Van Den Eeckhout was posted on ssrn. This paper was written in Dutch.

Meanwhile, an English, slightly extended version of the paper (“Private International Law in an Era of Globalisation. “Neutral” Private International Law? I could be brown, I could be blue, I could be violet sky”) has been made available.

The abstract reads as follows: “In times of (discussions about) globalisation, due attention must be given to the operation of rules of private international law. Examination of the ongoing developments in private international law itself and in private international law in its interaction with other disciplines from the perspective of “protection of weak parties” and “protection of planetary common goods” allows carrying out the analysis to which current developments invite.”

The English paper can be found here.

I reported earlier on Saugmandsgaard ØE’s opinion in Cases C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, Nogueira et al and Osacar v Ryanair. The CJEU yesterday held and as I put it in immediate comment on the case reported in the FT, the Court’s view clearly resonates with the current mood against social dumping.

The case here ostensibly concerns jurisdiction only, however the Rome I Regulation includes mandatory protection of the employee guaranteed by the laws of the same place where (s)he habitually carries out his /her work. Hence a finding in the context of the Brussels I Recast inevitably has an impact on applicable law, too.

Firstly the Court has no mercy for the limiting choice of court agreement in the relevant contracts (at 53): in the case of employment contracts, a jurisdiction clause cannot apply exclusively and thus prohibit the employee from bringing proceedings before the courts which have jurisdiction under the protective regime of the Brussels I Recast.

The Court then essentially reiterates its AG: The concept of ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ must be interpreted as referring to the place where, or from which, the employee in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer (at 59). Referring to its earlier case-law, the Court reiterates that national courts must, in particular, determine in which Member State is situated (i) the place from which the employee carries out his transport-related tasks, (ii) the place where he returns after his tasks, receives instructions concerning his tasks and organises his work, and (iii) the place where his work tools are to be found. (at 63). The place where the aircraft aboard which the work is habitually performed are stationed must also be taken into account (at 64).

The CJEU’s judgment then zooms in particularly on the notion of ‘home base’, a term used in relevant EU civil aviation law. The concept of ‘place where, or from which, the employee habitually performs his work’ cannot be equated with any concept referred to in another act of EU law (at 65).  However that does not mean that it is irrelevant to determine the place from which an employee habitually carries out his work. In fact, the Court held, the concept is likely to play a significant role in the identification of place of habitual employment in cases as these (at 69). In fact, taking account of the facts of each of the present cases, it would only be if applications, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, were to display closer connections with a place other than the ‘home base’ that the relevance of the latter for the identification of ‘the place from which employees habitually carry out their work’ would be undermined (at 73).

Nationality of the aircraft is summarily dismissed at 75, as being of any relevance at all.

At 62, the Court, importantly, also wars against fraudulent forum shopping: ‘That circumstantial method makes it possible not only to reflect the true nature of legal relationships, in that it must take account of all the factors which characterise the activity of the employee (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, C‑29/10, EU:C:2011:151, paragraph 48), but also to prevent a concept such as that of ‘place where, or from which, the employee habitually performs his work’ from being exploited or contributing to the achievement of circumvention strategies (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 October 2016, D’Oultremont andOthers, C‑290/15, EU:C:2016:816, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).‘

The case now goes back to Mons howeer as has been reported, it is almost inconceivable for that court not to find Charleroi to be the place of habitual employment. Despite Ryanairs bravado, it is clear this judgment blows a hole in its regulatory strategy.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016, Chapter 2, Heading , Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.

Michael Broeders and Ulrike Verboom have excellent overview of the decision back in May by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal not to recognise the Russian liquidation order of 1 August 2006 regarding OAO Yukos Oil Company. The refusal to recognise is based on ordre public: in particular, a finding was made that the Russian order contravenes the principles of due process hence also ordre public. Reference was made in extenso to decisions by the European Court of Human rights against Russia in related cases in 2011 and 2014.

Michael and Ulrike also refer to previous case-law of the Dutch Supreme Court which held that on the basis of the lex concursus (here: Russian), there is no principled objection to the Russian trustee in bankruptcy to exercise his powers as such trustee in The Netherlands.

Geert.

Yummie: Dutch High Court asks the European Court of Justice for assistance in qualifying anti-avoidance /fraudulent conveyance mechanisms. (Guest blog in Dutch).

Corporate Finance Lab

De Nederlandse Hoge Raad stelde op 8 september het Europese Hof van Justitie enkele interessante prejudiciële vragen over de Peeters/Gatzen-vordering (ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2269). Voor hen die er het raden naar hebben wie die Peeters of Gatzen dan wel zijn, eerst een korte toelichting. De andere lezers kunnen gelijk naar de navolgende alinea’s scrollen.

In eerdere posts wezen we al op de actio pauliana als techniek van schuldeisersbescherming. Ze laat schuldeisers, en na faillissement de boedel, toe om handelingen niet-tegenwerpelijk te laten verklaren, mits voldaan is aan bepaalde voorwaarden. We noemen hier omwille van de bondigheid enkel de voornaamste twee:

• de ene voorwaarde is verhaalsbenadeling: het beslag op het schuldeisersvermogen wordt bemoeilijkt of uitgehold, bijvoorbeeld omdat de schuldenaar goederen wegschenkt aan vrienden;
• de andere voorwaarde is het zogenoemde subjectief element: de schuldenaar heeft de bestreden handeling verricht met “wetenschap van benadeling” of zelfs “bedrieglijke intentie”.

Soms is de pauliaanse niet-tegenwerpelijkheid…

View original post 458 more words