Droit international général

Mukarrum Ahmed (Lancaster University) has posted an article titled, The Nature and Enforcement of Choice of Law Agreements on SSRN. It can be freely accessed at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3177512.

This is a companion article on choice of law agreements to the author’s recent book titled The Nature and Enforcement of Choice of Court Agreements: A Comparative Study (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2017). The final version of this article will appear in the Journal of Private International Law.

The abstract of the article is reproduced below:

This article seeks to examine the fundamental juridical nature, classification and enforcement of choice of law agreements in international commercial contracts. At the outset, it will be observed that the predominance of jurisdictional disputes in international civil and commercial litigation has pushed choice of law issues to the periphery. The inherent dialectic between the substantive law paradigm and the internationalist paradigm of party autonomy will be harnessed to provide us with the necessary analytical framework to examine the various conceptions of such agreements and aid us in determining the most appropriate classification of a choice of law agreement. A more integrated and sophisticated understanding of the emerging transnationalist paradigm of party autonomy will guide us towards a conception of choice of law agreements as contracts, albeit contracts that do not give rise to promises inter partes. This coherent understanding of both the law of contract and choice of law has significant ramifications for the enforcement of choice of law agreements.

The 2018 Asia Pacific Colloquium of the Journal of Private International Law (JPIL) will be held on Monday 10 December 2018 at the Law Faculty of Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan.

Scholars, researchers, legal practitioners and other interested persons are now invited to submit abstracts in English of paper proposals for presentation at the Colloquium.  While proposals for papers to be presented at the Colloquium may be on any topic, they must have as their primary focus the private international law aspects of the chosen topic.  Recent PhD graduates in the Asia Pacific region are especially invited to submit proposals.

The Colloquium will be in the form of an all-day roundtable discussion conducted in English.  Persons whose papers have been chosen will deliver their presentations in turn.  Each presentation will run for 20 minutes and be followed by a discussion of 20 minutes in which all participants in the Colloquium (including members of the JPIL’s Editorial Board and specially-invited private international law academics from the Asia-Pacific region) will comment on the presentation. The objective of the Colloquium will be to assist presenters to improve their papers with a view to eventual publication, possibly in the JPIL subject to acceptance by its Editorial Board.

Abstracts are to be submitted by email to ntakasug@mail.doshisha.ac.jp no later than 5 pm (Japan time) on 1 July 2018.  Abstracts should be accompanied by cvs and contact details of the person making the submission.  Persons whose abstracts have been accepted will be informed accordingly by 15 July 2018.  Such persons will be expected to submit their full papers in PDF format by email to ntakasug@mail.doshisha.ac.jp no later than 5 pm (Japan time) on 1 October 2018.  Papers should be in English and between 4,000 and 10,000 words in length (inclusive of footnotes).  Accepted papers will be circulated in advance among those taking part in the Colloquium.  Persons who have not heard from the Colloquium organisers by 15 July 2018 should assume that their submissions have not been accepted.

Persons selected to make presentations should note that they will be wholly responsible for their travel to and from, and their accommodation in, Kyoto for the Colloquium.  Neither the JPIL nor the Faculty of Law Doshisha University are in a position to provide any funding in respect of a selected person’s expenses.  Further inquiries may be addressed to Professor Naoshi Takasugi at ntakasug@mail.doshisha.ac.jp.

The University of Milan (Department of International, Legal, Historical and Political Studies) will host on Thursday 21 and Friday 22 June 2018 the Summer School in International Financial Law. Participation is free of charge, but registration is compulsory at Eventbrite. The sessions will be held in English with simultaneous translation into Italian. Here is the programme (available for download):

Thursday 21 June 2018 – 14h00

14h30 Welcome Address

• Giuseppe De Luca, Deputy-Rector, University of Milan
• Ilaria Viarengo, Director of the Department of International, Legal, Historical and Political Studies

15h00 Cross-Border Company Matters

Chair: Manlio Frigo, University of Milan

• The EU Proposal for a Directive on Cross-Border Conversions, Mergers and Divisions (Bartlomiej Kurcz, DG Justice and Consumers, European Commission)
• A German Perspective (Leonhard Hübner, University of Heidelberg)
• An Italian Private International Law Perspective (Francesca C. Villata, University of Milan)
• Italian and Comparative Corporate Law Perspectives (Marco Ventoruzzo, Bocconi University)

General discussion (with the participation of Maria Vittoria Fuoco, Department on the Functioning of the Judiciary, Italian Ministry of Justice)

– – –

Thursday 21 June 2018 – 17h30

17h30 Taking Security over Shares and Other Financial Securities

Chair: Giovanna Adinolfi, University of Milan

• Investors Rights in Securities and Shareholdings in the Post-CSDR Era (Christina Tarnanidou, University of Athens of Economics and Business, Rokas, Athens)
• Securities settlement through T2S (Aranzazu Ullivarri Royuela, BME Post Trade Services, Madrid)

General discussion

– – –

Friday 22 June 2018 – 9h30

9h30 Financial Collaterals and Bonds

Chair: Giovanna Adinolfi, University of Milan

• Cross-Border Financial Collateral within the Eurosystem (Klaus Loeber, Market Infrastructures and Payments, European Central Bank)
• Bonds Issuance (Matthias Lehmann, Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn)

General discussion

10h45 – 13h00 The Proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims

Chair: Francesca C. Villata, University of Milan

• Presentation of the Proposal (Maria Vilar-Badia, DG Justice and Consumers, European Commission)
• Factoring (Christine Van Gallebaert, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas, Jones Day, Paris)
• Collateralization (Joanna Perkins, Financial Markets Law Committee, London)

General discussion

– – –

Friday 22 June 2018 – 14h00

14h00 – 17h00 The Proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims

Chair: Stefania Bariatti, University of Milan

• Securitization (Gilles Cuniberti, University of Luxembourg)
• Selected practical issues (Francisco Garcimartín Alférez, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Linklaters, Madrid)
• The Relationship with the EU Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency (Stefania Bariatti, University of Milan, Chiomenti, Milan)
• The Relationship with the EU Rules on the Cross-Border Insolvency of Banks and Insurances (Matthias Haentjens, University of Leiden)

General discussion – Closing Remarks

(Many thanks to Prof. Francesca Villata for the tip-off)

I post this item mostly as a point of reference for discussions on mandatory law, employment disputes, and the use of arbitral tribunals to circumvent limitations in domestic litigation.

In FC Black Stars Basel 4A_7/2018, the Swiss Supreme Court held in April that mandatory Swiss law on limited arbitrability of domestic employment disputes, cannot be circumvented by submitting dispute to international arbitration. Schellenberg Witmer have succinct analysis here.

Note in particular 2.3.3:

Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint es zur Vermeidung von Wertungswidersprüchen folgerichtig, den in Art. 341 OR angeordneten Schutz der sozial schwächeren Partei im Rahmen der Beurteilung der freien Verfügbarkeit nach Art. 354 ZPOinsoweit in das Prozessrecht hinein zu verlängern, als Schiedsvereinbarungen nicht uneingeschränkt zugelassen werden

Geert.

 

Erasmus School of Law (under the ERC project Building EU Civil Justice) in collaboration with the Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law Luxembourg, and the Montaigne Centre for Rule of Law and Administration of Justice (Utrecht University) are hosting the seminar ‘Innovating International Business Courts: A European Outlook’ that will take place in Rotterdam on 10 July 2018.

In relation thereto Erasmus Law Review invites submissions for its upcoming special issue on International Business Courts – a European and Global Perspective on topics relating to court specialization, specifically relating to the development of international business courts in Europe and beyond, and focusing on justice innovation and their relevance for access to justice and the judicial system, including the challenges they may pose for judicial administration, litigants and other stakeholders. Contributions can be theoretical, empirical as well as policy oriented. Interdisciplinary approaches are especially encouraged. The issue will also include papers focusing on the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (England and Wales), France, Germany, and Belgium, and deriving from the seminar.

Authors of selected papers will be exempt from registration fees for the seminar and will have the opportunity to present a poster during the drinks after the seminar.

Please submit an abstract in English of no more than 500 words to Erlis Themeli (themeli@law.eur.nl) and Alexandre Biard (biard@law.eur.nl) before 10 June 2018. Please include your name, affiliation, and a link to your research profile. You will be informed on the outcome on 24 June 2018 at the latest. Responsible issue editors are Xandra Kramer (Erasmus University Rotterdam/Utrecht Utrecht) and John Sorabji (University College, London).

The final paper should be 8,000-12,000 words in length (including footnotes) and must comply with the Erasmus Law Review’s Authors Guidelines. Selected papers will go through the regular double-blind peer review process and publication is subject to the outcome of this review process. The deadline for submission of the paper is 1 October 2018.

For more information see the Call for Papers.

I reported earlier on Sulamerica and the need properly and preferably, expressly to provide for choice of law vis-a-vis arbitration agreements, in particular vis-a-vis three elements: lex arbitri, lex curia, lex contractus. In Shagang the High Court added its view on the possible relevance of a fourth factor: the geographical venue of the arbitration, and its impact in particular on the curial law: the law which determines the procedure which is to be followed.

Atlas Power Ltd -v- National Transmission and Despatch Co Ltd  [2018] EWHC 1052 is another good illustration of the relevance (but in practice: rarity) of the proper identification of all four factors.

Bracewell excellently identify the four take away points from Atlas Power:

1. It is the seat of arbitration that determines the curial law of the arbitration, not the governing law of the contract.
2. (To English Courts) the choice of the seat of arbitration is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of the place designated as the seat of the arbitration having the supervisory role over the arbitration.
3. The English courts can and will use their powers to grant anti-suit injunctions to prevent a party from commencing foreign proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement.
4. Complex drafting increases the risk of satellite litigation and the accompanying delay and expense.

The core point which Atlas Power illustrates is that specific identification of arbitration venue, curial law, lex contractus and lex arbitri is best done in simple terms. Overcomplication, particularly variance of any of these four points, is a truly bad idea. Specifically: the arbitration clause in the contracts between the parties (text from Bracewell’s overview)

1. Started by providing that the “arbitration shall be conducted in Lahore, Pakistan”.
2. Then stated that if the value of the dispute was above a certain threshold or fell within a certain category, either party could require that the arbitration be conducted in London.
3. Finally, the clause provided that, notwithstanding the previous sentences, either party may require that the arbitration of any dispute be conducted in London, provided that if the dispute did not satisfy the threshold or category requirements set out earlier in the clause the referring party would pay the costs of the arbitration incurred by the other party in excess of the costs that would have been incurred had the arbitration taken place in Pakistan.

 

Various procedural events led to Phillips J essentially having to decide: whether the parties had validly and lawfully chosen London as the seat of the arbitration (answer: yes); and whether, in light of Pakistani law (which was the law governing the contracts), the choice of London as the seat of arbitration did not result in the English courts having exclusive supervisory jurisdiction with the effect that the courts of Pakistan had at least concurrent jurisdiction (answer: no, for this would result in an unsatisfactory situation where more than one jurisdiction could entertain challenges to an award)

Variation of any litigation relevant articles really does open all sorts of cans of worms.

Geert.

 

Professor Hannah Buxbaum has recently published an important report (see here), prepared for the International Academy of Comparative Law’s International Congress, on forum selection clauses.  Below is the abstract.

Abstract

A forum selection clause is a form of contractual waiver. By this device, a contract party waives its rights to raise jurisdictional or venue objections if a lawsuit is initiated against it in the chosen court. The use of such a clause in a particular case may therefore raise a set of questions under contract law. Is the waiver valid? Was it procured by fraud, duress, or other unconscionable means? What is its scope? And so on. Unlike most contractual waivers, though, a forum selection clause affects not only the private rights and obligations of the parties, but something of more public concern: the jurisdiction of a court to resolve a dispute. The enforcement of such a clause therefore raises an additional set of questions under procedural law. For instance, if the parties designate a court in a forum that is otherwise unconnected to the dispute, must (or should) that court hear a case initiated there? If one of the parties initiates litigation in a non-designated forum that is connected to the dispute, must (or should) that court decline to hear the case?

This report, prepared for the International Academy of Comparative Law in connection with its XXth International Congress, analyzes the approach to these questions in the United States. The bottom line is straightforward: almost always, in consumer as well as commercial contracts, forum selection clauses will be enforced. Navigating the array of substantive, procedural, and conflicts rules whose interplay yields that result, though, is far less straightforward. That is the task of this report. Following a short background, it surveys current state law on their use, in consumer as well as commercial contracts. The report then discusses the interpretation and enforcement of forum selection clauses in both state and federal courts. It analyzes their effect on jurisdiction as well as on doctrines involving venue, such as removal and forum non conveniens. The report also covers choice of law problems, particularly as they arise in the course of litigation in federal courts.

To celebrate its 30th Private International Law Day, the SICL is holding a conference devoted to the new challenges of what is sometimes described as the “collaborative” or “sharing” economy. It will take place in Lausanne on 28th June 2018.

The concept of economy includes crowdfunding, “Uberisation” and all other intermediary activities using a digital platform. These mass phenomena, witnessed on a global scale, put in question the very notion of the territorial division of state borders. Is the digital space in which these platforms operate a true space, capable of being delineated and regulated at the national level, and which falls into the territorial scope of application of a law? Or is it rather a volatile cloud, globalised, delocalised, incapable of being pinned down on such a territorial basis? Is it still possible for nation states to guarantee their citizens and/or residents legal protection with regard to the intermediaries who employ them or who offer them their services? Or has it not become essential, even urgent, that a supranational law be devised and placed in the same cloudy skies in which the platform operates? Further still: is it possible to require platforms and their operators to be measured against the particular requirements of a state, notably those concerning the protection of workers and consumers? What role can contemporary private international law play in this regard?

All these questions present a challenge to the supposed neutrality sought by private international law and bring to the fore its potential political and protective role. In this respect, the state can use private international law in order to guarantee cross border protection to the weakest actors in the marketplace – notably, workers and consumers – who reside within its territory (and/or its citizens). On the other hand, however, it may be argued that state interference aimed at constraining those who operate in the digital economy may lead to harmful distortions of the global market. In this regard, what guarantees should be afforded to the freedom of the internet and, at the same time, to that of workers, whose decisions to join and work with a digital platform are made of their own free will? These considerations therefore demand that we draw on the traditional principles of party autonomy and decisional harmony. Speakers include Janine Berg, ILO Genève, Andrea Bonomi, Université de Lausanne, Miriam Cherry, University of St. Louis, Valerio De Stefano, KU Leuven, Marie-Cécile Escande Varniol, Université Lumière, Lyon II, Pietro Franzina, Università degli Studi di Ferrara, Ljupcho Grozdanovski, Université de Genève, Florence Guillaume, Université de Neuchâtel, Tobias Lutzi, University of Oxford, Anne Meier, MSS Law, Edmondo Mostacci, Università Bocconi, Etienne Pataut, Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, Ilaria Pretelli, Institut suisse de droit comparé, Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Gian Paolo Romano, Université de Genève, et Gerald Spindler, Georg-August-Universität.

Click here for whole program and further information.

The European Commission has published yesterday two communications, proposing the amendment of the Evidence and Service Regulations (1201/2000 & 1393/2007 respectively).

The texts can be retrieved here  & here.

The key amendments suggested by both proposals have been summarized by Prof. Emmanuel Guinchard here & here.

‘Reading’ Arica Victims v Boliden Mineral (I have a copy of the case, but not yet a link to ECLI or other database; however there’s a good uncommented summary of the judgment here] leaves me frustrated simply for my lack of understanding of Swedish. Luckily Matilda Hellstorm at Lindahl has good review here (including a hyperlink to her earlier posting which alerted me to the case in 2017).

Boliden Mineral exported toxic waste to Chile in the ’80s, prior to either Basel or EU or OECD restraints (or indeed bans) kicking in. A first issue for consideration was determination of lex causae. Rome II does not apply ratione temporis (it only applies to tortious events occurring after its date of entry into force) – residual Swedish private international law applies, which determined lex causae as lex loci damni. The Court found this to include statute of limitation. This would have been 10 years under Swedish law, and a more generous (in Matilda’s report undefined) period under Chilean law. Statute of limitation therefore following lex causae – not lex fori.

Despite this being good for claimants, the case nevertheless failed. The Swedish court found against liability (for the reasons listed in Matilda’s report). (With a small exception seemingly relating to negligence in seeing waste being uncovered). Proof of causality seems to have been the biggest factor in not finding liability.

Leave for appeal has been applied for.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8.

 

 

I promised a post on C-560/16 E.ON v Dědouch sooner than I have been able to deliver – I have reviewed Wathelet AG’s Opinion here. I do not evidently hold the magic key to the optimal interpretation of Article 24(2) Brussels I Recast’s. Yet regular readers of the blog indeed my students will know I  am not much of a fan of Article 24 full stop – let alone its extensive interpretation.

Briefly, the facts. By a resolution of 8 December 2006, the general meeting of the company incorporated under Czech law, Jihočeská plynárenská, established in the Czech Republic, decided on the compulsory transfer of all the participating securities in that company to its principal shareholder E.ON, established in Munich (Germany). A group of minority shareholders contest not the validity of the sale, but purely the price paid. Czech law moreover holds that any finding on the reasonableness of the price paid cannot have an impact on the very validity of the transfer.

Lower Czech courts consecutively entertained and accepted cq rejected jurisdiction on the basis of Article 6(1) [no details are given but presumably with Jihočeská plynárenská as the anchor defendant, 24(2) (but then presumably with , 7(1) [again no details given but presumably a consequence of the purchase of shares by the minority shareholders]. Both Wathelet AG suggests, and the CJEU holds that the action for review of the reasonableness of the consideration that the principal shareholder of a company is required to pay to the minority shareholders of that company in the event of the compulsory transfer of their shares to that principal shareholder, comes within the scope of application of (now) Article 24(2). Both refer extensively to C‑372/07 Hassett and Doherty, among others.

The general line of interpretation is: secure Article 24’s effet utile, but apply restrictively (like all other exceptions to the actor sequitur forum rei rule).  I do not think that the CJEU honours restrictive interpretation in E.ON. Readers best consult the (fairly succinct – ditto for the Opinion) judgment in full. A few observations.

In the majority (not quite all) of the cases of exclusive jurisdictional rules,  Gleichlauf is part of the intention. That generally is a proposition which goes against the very nature of private international law and should not in my view be encouraged. Particularly within the EU there is not much reason not to trust fellow courts with the application of one’s laws – indeed quite regularly these laws may be better applied by others.

Generally at least three of Article 24 Jurisdictional rules (rights in rem; the corporate exception; and IPR) refer at least in part to the issue of publicity (of public records) and their availability in the Member States whose courts haven been given exclusive jurisdiction. That argument in my view is sooo 1968 (which indeed it is). I see little reason to apply it in 2018.

Further, in accordance with the Jenard report, the principal reason for Article 24(2) is to avoid conflicting decisions of EU courts on the existence of the company or the validity of the decisions of its organs. This goal of course may be equally met by the lis alibi pendens rule – Article 24 does not play a unique role here.

Finally the CJEU remarks at 34 ‘In the present case, while it is true that, under Czech law, proceedings such as those at issue in the main proceedings may not lead formally to a decision which has the effect of invalidating a resolution of the general assembly of a company concerning the compulsory transfer of the minority shareholders’ shares in that company to the majority shareholder, the fact nonetheless remains that, in accordance with the requirements of the autonomous interpretation and uniform application of the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001, the scope of Article 22(2) thereof cannot depend on the choices made in national law by Member States or vary depending on them.’ To cross-refer to the aforementioned Jenard Report: if Article 24(2)’s goal is to avoid conflicting decisions on life and death etc. And if that life and death of a national company depends on the applicable national law as the Court acknowledges here and ditto in Daily Mail and Cartesio/Polbud), then of course the lex causae must have an impact on the application of Article 24(2) .

The Court’s finding on 24(2) meant it did not get to the Article 7 analysis – which I did review in my post on the AG’s Opinion.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016. Heading 2.2.6.5.

 

Edited by Delphine Porcheron, Mélanie Schmitt and Juliette Lelieur

The University of Strasbourg is organizing workshop series on the protection of Human Rights in transnational situations. The research is conducted in criminal law, labour law, and private international law. After the first meeting which took place last January with the presence of Horatia Muir Watt, Dominique Ritleng and Patrick Wachsmann, the second one will be held in Strasbourg on June 5, focusing on civil and environmental liabilities and private international law.

 

Speakers include :

• Bénédicte Girard, University of Strasbourg
• Marie-Pierre Camproux, University of Strasbourg
• Pauline Abadie, University of Paris Sud
• Fabien Marchadier, University of Poitiers
• Patrick Kinsch, University of Luxembourg, Attorney at law Luxembourg
• Louis d’Avout, University of Paris II
• Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, University of Lyon III
• Caroline Kleiner, University of Strasbourg

For more information click here.

Both the English and French versions of the HCCH Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments have been just uploaded onto the Hague Conference website (< www.hcch.net >). See News and Events here.

This text will form the basis of the discussions at the Diplomatic Session meeting in 2019.

David Restrepo Amariles (HEC Paris), Eva Mouial Bassilana (Université Côte d’Azur) and Matteo Winkler (HEC Paris) have posted on SSRN an article titled The Impact of the French Doctrine of Significant Imbalance on International Business Transactions. The paper is forthcoming on the Journal of Business Law.

The abstract reads as follows.

This article examines the concept of “significant imbalance” (SI) under French law and its impact on international business transactions. “Significant imbalance” is a legal standard meant to assess whether a contractual clause is unfair (abusive). Although initially restricted to consumer law, it has been extended to general contract law with the implementation of a reform entered into force on 1 October 2016. Previously, the Commercial Court of Paris in the ruling Ministry of Economy v Expedia, Inc (2015) had qualified SI as an “overriding mandatory provision” (“loi de police”) under Regulation 593/2008 on the applicable law to contractual obligations (Rome I). As a consequence, SI became operative in respect of international contracts despite an express choice of a foreign governing law made by the parties to the transaction. This article argues that, as a result of Expedia and the 2016 reform, French courts can interfere with international business transactions by striking down contractual terms that they deem unfair according to the SI standard. The analysis focuses on two key issues. On the one hand, notwithstanding recent judicial precedents, SI still fails to provide a reliable test for predicting which clauses or contracts are at risk of being deemed unfair. On the other hand, the legal arsenal supporting the French legislator’s disapproval of SI allocates great power to French courts and the French Government to pursue tort lawsuits against foreign companies allegedly oppressing their commercial partners with SI clauses. Empirical evidence shows that these actions are highly successful compared with those commenced by private actors. The article concludes that all these aspects, together with SI’s turbulent case law throughout the years, will give rise to uncertainty in international business transactions and may eventually disadvantage France in the global competition in such a field.

The programme of the 2018 edition of the International Seminar on Private International Law organized by Prof. Fernández Rozas and Prof. De Miguel Asensio, has been released and is available here. In this occasion, the Seminar is jointly organized with Prof. Moura Vicente and is to be held at the Law Faculty of the University of Lisbonne on 13-14 September 2018. The Seminar, which is closely connected to the legal journal Anuario Español de Derecho internacional privado, will be structured in five sections: Family and Successions; International Commercial Arbitration: International Business Law; Private International Law and IT Law; and Codification of PIL with a special focus on Latin America. The Conference will bring together around fifty speakers from more than twelve countries. Additional information about the seminar is available here.

Thanks to Héloïse Meur, Lilia Aït Ahmed and Estelle Gallant for this post.

On June 21, 2018 a full-day colloquium will take place in Paris on the protection of unaccompanied minors at the former Courthouse.

The colloquium will see the participation of high-hand speakers from institutions facing the issue of unaccompanied minors :

• French public authorities (French authority to protect human rights and civil liberties, French national consultative committee on human rights), • French Supreme Court, • The Paris Bar, • Major civil associations (GISTI, ECPAT, La Cabane juridique), • French and Belgian professors and Phd candidates in law and geography.

The speakers will discuss the root causes of the migration flows of unaccompanied minors, the limits of their treatment by French authorities, the difficulties to coordinate with other EU member States, and envisage the possible room for improvements, notably vis-à-vis what is done abroad, and especially in Belgium.

The program is available here. For registration send an email to colloquemna@gmail.com.

 

Even Advocate-General Bobek has not managed to turn jurisdictional issues re prospectus liability into the prosaic type of analysis which many of us have become fond of. His Opinion in C-307/17 Löber v Barclays is a lucid, systematic and pedagogic review of the CJEU’s case-law on (now) Article 7(2)’s jurisdiction for tort in the context of ‘prospectus liability’ aka investment misrepresentation. Starting with the direct /indirect damage distinction; and focusing of course on the determination of pure economic loss.

Ms Helga Löber invested in certificates in the form of bearer bonds issued by Barclays Bank Plc. In order to acquire those certificates, the corresponding amounts were transferred from her current (personal) bank account located in Vienna, Austria to two securities accounts in Graz and Salzburg. Payment was then made from those securities accounts for the certificates at issue.

Note immediately that the jurisdictional discussion is a result of Article 7(2) not just identifying a Member State: it identifies specific courts within that Member State. Here: claimant brought her claim before a court in Vienna, the place of her domicile. This is also where her current bank account is located, from which she made the first transfer in order to make the investment. The first- and second-instance courts in Vienna however decided that they did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The case is now pending before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria). That court is asking, in essence, which of the bank accounts used, if any, is relevant to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear the claim at issue.

Close reference is made to Kolassa. In my posting on that case at the time, I noted that the many factual references which the Court built in in its decision, gave it dubious precedent value. Bobek AG in Löber necessarily therefore distinguishes many factual situations. The almost sole focus lies on 7(2): unlike in Kolassa, contracts neither consumer contracts are an issue.

Here are a few things of note:

First, in his review of the existing case-law the AG at 38 points out like I did at the time of the judgment, that the CJEU’s finding in CDC that locus damni for a pure economic loss, in the case of a corporation, is the place of its registered office, is at odds with precedent (he made the same remark in flyLAL).

Next, on locus delicti commissi, the AG suggests that despite Article 7(2)’s instruction, a single ldc within the Member State cannot be determined. The relevant point in his view is the moment from which the prospectus can, by operation of law, start influencing the investment behaviour of the relevant group of investors. In the present case, and considering the national segmentation of the capital market regulation at issue, that relevant group is made up of investors on secondary markets in Austria. At 65:  once it became possible to offer the certificates on the Austrian secondary market, that possibility was immediately available for the whole territory of Austria. ‘The nature of the tort of misrepresentation at issue does not allow for the identification of a location within the national territory because once the author of the tort is allowed to influence the given national territory, that influence immediately covers the whole territory, irrespective of the actual means used for the publication of a specific prospectus.’ As we know from CDC, the Court does not readily accept that a single ldc cannot be determined.

Further, for locus damni, the AG suggests (at 78) ‘The place where…a legally binding investment obligation is factually assumed… The exact location of such a place is a matter for the national law considered in the light of available factual evidence. It is likely to be the premises of a branch of the bank where the respective investment contract was signed, which may correspond, as in the Kolassa case, to the place where the bank account is held.‘ That in my view first of all is not a warranted outcome. The investor in Löber is not a consumer within the protected categories of the Regulation. Suggesting the place of conclusion of the obligation leaves room for the claimant to manipulate the forum of any future suit in tort. This is exactly what the Court objected to in Universal Music. Moreover, note the reference to ‘the national law’. It is quite unusual to suggest such a role for lex fori in light of the principle of autonomous interpretation. Unless the AG in fact means the ‘lex contractus’, presumably to be determined applying Rome I.

In summary there are quite a few open questions here – not something of course which I would necessarily object to.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.7

 

In Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, the Canadian Supreme Court as I reported at the time confirmed the country’s flexible approach to the jurisdictional stage of recognition and enforcement actions. Following that ruling both parties files for summary judgment, evidently advocating a different outcome.

The Ontario Court of Appeal have now held in 2018 ONCA 472 Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation that there are stringent requirements for piercing the corporate veil (i.e. by execution on Chevron Canada’s shares and assets to satisfy the Ecuadorian judgment) and that these are not met in casu.

Of particular note is Hourigan JA’s argument at 61 that ‘the appellants’ proposed interpretation of the [Canadian Corporation’s] Act would also have a significant policy impact on how corporations carry on business in Canada. Corporations have stakeholders. Creditors, shareholders, and employees, among others, rely on the corporate separateness doctrine that is long-established in our jurisprudence and that is a deliberate policy choice made in the [Act]. Those stakeholders have a reasonable expectation that when they do business with a Canadian corporation, they need only consider the liabilities of that corporation and not the liabilities of some related corporation.’

Blake, Cassels and Graydon have further review here. Note that the issue is one of a specific technical nature: it only relates to veil piercing once the recognition and enforcement of a foreign ruling is sought.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8.

 

 

 

Today the fourth meeting of the Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments concluded in The Hague. Further information (incl. a revised Draft Convention text) will be uploaded on the Hague Conference website soon (< www.hcch.net >). Please check this website for the latest updates.

A background document related to the Treatment of Intellectual Property-Related Judgments under the November 2017 draft Convention was published this month by the Hague Conference (HCCH). It was drafted by the co-Rapporteurs of the draft Convention (Professors Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain and Geneviève Saumier, McGill University, Canada) and the Permanent Bureau. This document will be discussed at the Diplomatic Session (a high-level negotiation meeting with a view to adopting a final text – envisaged to take place in mid-2019) and was not meant to be discussed at this Special Commission.

For those of you who are interested in the interaction between intellectual property rights and the Judgments Project, please refer to the above-mentioned background document (instead of the Revised Preliminary Explanatory Report as this will be further revised to reflect the content of this document).

In Platinum Partners, Chapman J held that foreign discovery laws should be considered
for comity concerns, yet they are not determinative of whether discovery should be
permitted under United States law.

Foreign Representatives sought access to documents from US audit firms concerning investment funds that were debtors in Cayman Islands liquidation proceedings recognized under Chapter 15 as foreign main proceedings. Jacob Frumkin has excellent insight and I am happy to refer.

Section 1521(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a bankruptcy court may, “at the request of a foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief” … “where necessary to effectuate the purpose of [chapter 15] and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.”  The first main argument of the auditors was that Cayman law does not permit the discovery of audit work papers or materials that are not a debtor’s property and, if the Court were to grant the motion, its interests and the interests of comity would not be protected.

The Court dismissed this argument, noting that

“it is well-established that comity does not require that the relief available in the United States be identical to the relief sought in the foreign bankruptcy proceeding; it is sufficient if the result is comparable and that the foreign laws are not repugnant to our laws and policies.” and that

“requiring this Court to ensure compliance with foreign law prior to granting relief sought pursuant to chapter 15 would require the Court to engage in a full-blown analysis of foreign law each and every time a foreign representative seeks additional relief in the United States, which may result in differing interpretations of U.S. law depending on where the foreign main proceeding was pending.”

Comity considerations surface in the most technical of corners.

Geert.