Droit international général

This post could have also carried the title ‘Pro real seat theory. Bud is it?’ [Polbud, Probud, you see…], but with all the Brexit shenanigans going on on Twitter I am somewhat running dry of pun headlines.

I do indeed wonder the following: Kokott AG Opined in C-106/16 Polbud on 4 May, Gillis Lindemans pondered the Opinion (in Dutch) early May – I’have had the Opinion and one or two other things on my mind since.

As Ms Kokott summarises, the present request for a preliminary ruling concerns Polbud’s plan to change its legal form to that of a private limited liability company governed by Luxembourg law. Since Luxembourg, like all other Member States, requires as a condition of incorporation and continued existence under national law that companies have a statutory seat in national territory, such a plan necessarily entails the transfer of Polbud’s statutory seat. Indeed, this appears to have been achieved inasmuch as Consoil was entered in the Luxembourg Companies Register. It must now be clarified, in essence, whether the freedom of establishment precludes that arrangement. What sets the situation in this case apart is the fact that, according to the information contained in the request for a preliminary ruling, the cross-border conversion is not accompanied by a change to the centre of the company’s commercial activities. The referring court asks whether, in that context, the freedom of establishment is applicable (third question), whether that freedom has been restricted (first question) and, if so, whether that restriction is justifiable (second question).

The AG takes us through relevant precedent (readers of the blog will have seen my reviews at the time of judgment): one is best left to simply read her Opinion.  Ms Kokott concludes that the freedom of establishment provided for in Articles 49 and 54 TFEU only applies to an operation whereby a company incorporated under the law of one Member State transfers its statutory seat to another Member State with the aim of converting itself into a company governed by the law of the latter Member State, in so far as that company actually establishes itself in the other Member State, or intends to do so, for the purpose of pursuing genuine economic activity there.

In other words she most  definitely proposes a test along the lines suggested by Darmon AG in Daily Mail, but rejected by La Pergola AG in Centros. So far, so good: AG’s often propose a change of tack, most famously Poiares Maduro in Cartesio. Except, Ms Kokott suggests the Opinion is a simple confirmation of the CJEU’s case-law on the issue: no change of tack. Simply confirmation ex multi. That now does leave me puzzled: the Opinion walks and talks like confirming old precedent; but it does not, surely?

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 7.

The CJEU held yesterday in Case C-296/16P Dextro Energy (text of judgment available in French and German only at the time of posting), an appeal against the General Court’s ruling in T-100/15. The General Court had declined to annul the European Commission Regulation which refused to authorise certain health claims made on foods, other than those referring to the reduction of disease risk and to children’s development and health. Dextro Energy had wanted to include health claims such as  ‘glucose supports normal physical activity’ and ‘glucose contributes to normal muscle function’. The EC had refused: citing (in Regulation 1215/8)

‘Pursuant to Articles 6(1) and 13(1) of Regulation … No 1924/2006 health claims need to be based on generally accepted scientific evidence. Authorisation may also legitimately be withheld if health claims do not comply with other general and specific requirements of Regulation … No 1924/2006, even in the case of a favourable scientific assessment by [EFSA]. Health claims inconsistent with generally accepted nutrition and health principles should not be made. [EFSA] concluded that a cause and effect relationship has been established between the consumption of glucose and contribution to energy-yielding metabolism. However, the use of such a health claim would convey a conflicting and confusing message to consumers, because it would encourage consumption of sugars for which, on the basis of generally accepted scientific advance, national and international authorities inform the consumer that their intake should be reduced. Therefore, such a health claim does not comply with point (a) of the second paragraph of Article 3 of Regulation … No 1924/2006 which foresees that the use of claims should not be ambiguous or misleading. Furthermore, even if the concerned health claim was to be authorised only under specific conditions of use and/or accompanied by additional statements or warnings, it would not be sufficient to alleviate the confusion of the consumer, and consequently the claim should not be authorised.’

The General Court performed its standard review in the face of a wide discretionary room for manoeuvre for the EC, and decided the EC had not exceeded its authority in holding as it did – even in the face of more lenient EFSA recommendations. The Court of Justice has now entirely sided with the General Court. The Judgment is a good reminder of aforementioned standard test (no de novo or merits review; annulment in the event of manifest transgression of power or error in judgment only), and readers best refer to reading the judgment itself.

10One consideration however, I should like to highlight: Dextro Energy had suggested the health claims needed to be assessed in light of the target group (determined in the product’s advertising), which, it was suggested, were physically active people for whom consumption of the glucose tablets in question is not harmless. The Court rejected this approach: the population as a whole, for whom the product is available, are the group which the EC justifiably seeks to protect. The manufacturer’s target group is not the relevant group to consider (do bear in mind that this is a product which is widely available and not restricted in any way at points of sale):

At 76-77: si les allégations de santé en cause étaient autorisées, elles s’adresseraient à la population en général, pouvant ainsi encourager la consommation de sucres par les personnes autres que les hommes et les femmes bien entraînés. Dans ces conditions, le Tribunal n’a pas commis d’erreur de droit lorsqu’il a rejeté, au point 57 de l’arrêt attaqué, l’argument de Dextro Energy, selon lequel c’était le groupe cible qui importait aux fins de l’appréciation des allégations de santé en cause.

Geert.

The Répertoire Dalloz has just published the voice “Droit international privé et droit de l’Union européenne” (in French), by J.S. Bergé, D. Porcheron and G. Vieira da Costa Cerqueira. Here is the English summary. The ToC is also available here.

The law of the European Union offers itself as a new legal context in which the constructions of private international law are now massively deployed. In addition to pre-existing national contexts and pre-established international or transnational environments, the European Union is likely to dramatically change the substance and conditions of the implementation of conflicts of laws. The changes brought about by the emergence of this new European legal reference framework are far from having delivered all their manifestations. The three generations of European law which have so far succeeded are not sufficient to shed light on all the areas of shadow left behind by the two major legal areas of the European Union, namely the internal market space and the area of ??freedom, security and justice. But the process is on the way, which suggests dialectical games which can reasonably be expected to be well established today.

These dialectical reports, at the first level, present a confrontation of the methods and solutions of private international law and the legal system of the European Union. A historical approach requires a distinction between the three major stages that marked the Europeanization of private international law. The question of the competence of the European Union to legislate in this area must also be asked. There remains the crucial question of methods: the irreducibility of the two subjects of European law and private international law suggests a cross-game of influence on one another. At the second level, the construction of private international law at a European level needs to be re-examined. The presence of a European judge and the European codification movement are likely to explain the transformations currently taking place.

Another posting for the ‘comparative conflicts /dispute resolution’ binder. In order not to be found to have voluntary appeared (‘submitted to jurisdiction’), civil procedure rules worldwide require defendants to flag their opposition to jurisdiction early on in the proceedings. Indeed at the threshold of the litigation: in limine litis.

In EU law, the Court of Justice ruled in Elefanten Schuh that where civil procedure of the Member States requires a defence on the merits at the very earliest opportunity, such defence does not jeopardise objection to jurisdiction made at the same occasion. (Case-law now reflected in the wording of the Brussels I Regulation and its Recast successor).

There is as yet however no CJEU case-law on what level of interaction with the courts leads to submission.

In England, Zumaz Nigeria v First City [2016] EWCA Civ 567 recently held that application for disclosure does not entail submission: for one may need those very documents to contest jurisdiction.

Thank you RPC for now flagging Shenzhen CTS International Logistics Co Ltd v Dajiang International Investment Co Ltd. The court found that by applying to strike out the claim and seeking security for costs (to include the period after the hearing of the stay application), defendant had invoked the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts. As always of course the decision was based on factual merit which RPC’s David Smyth and Hannah Fletcher  summarise very well in the posting hyperlinked above.

Beware before you engage with the courts, if you do not wish to be seen as having submitted.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.7.

The University of Milano-Bicocca will host on June 8th and 9th a Judicial Training on International Child Abduction as part of the Project “EU Judiciary Training on Brussels IIa Regulation: from South to East”, co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union.

The Project, carried out by a net of four Universities led by Professor Costanza Honorati, aims to promote uniformity in the application of Regulation No 2201/2003 on Separation, Divorce and Parental Responsibility, through the organization of training events and the realization of a final handbook.

On June 8th the workshop will focus on the Hearing of the Child, a very sensitive issue and an essential part of a modern protection of children’s rights. Qualified Judges, Psychologists and Social Services will explore on all relevant concrete issues. Experts include, in particular: Martina Erb-Klünemann (Judge at the District Court Hamm, Liaison Judge of the Hague Network and ENJ Member), Maria Domenica Maggi (Psychologist, Honorary Judge Juvenile Court of Milan), Sara Lembrechts & Katrien Herbots (KeKi – Children’s Right Knowledge Centre, Ghent), Michael Ford (MiKK – International Mediation Centre for Family Conflict and Child Abduction).

On June 9th, Italian and foreign academics will address to International Child Abduction. Speakers include: Prof. Costanza Honorati (University of Milano-Bicocca), Prof. Maria Caterina Baruffi (University of Verona), Prof. Cristina Gonzalez Beilfuss & Dr. Maria Alvarez Torné (University of Barcellona), Prof. Mirela Zupan (University J. J. Strossmayer of Osijek), Prof. Ivana Kunda (University of Rijeka), Dr. Agne Limante (Law Institute of Lithuania).

Judges and Lawyers will solve practical cases and discuss with trainers, bringing their professional experience and working methods to the benefit of all participants.

Further information and the flyer of the initiative are available here.

The International Law Association (ILA) has a new website (please click here) with an improved look. The ILA hopes that visitors will find the site more informative and easier to navigate; in particular, the Members Only Area has been upgraded and will continue to be developed in order to provide members with more targeted and relevant information.

The ILA was founded in Brussels in 1873. Its objectives, under its Constitution, are “the study, clarification and development of international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect for international law”. The ILA has consultative status, as an international non-governmental organisation, with a number of the United Nations specialised agencies. For further information and a welcome address from ILA chairman Lord Mance, please click here.

The German branch of the ILA will hold its annual meeting on 23 June, 2017, in Frankfurt (Main). This year’s topic is „Human Rights in International Business”. The list of distinguished speakers will include Professors Marc-Philippe Weller (Heidelberg) and Karsten Nowrot (Hamburg) as well as lawyers Dr. Birgit Spießhofer and Prof. Dr. Remo Klinger (both from Berlin). You may find the full programme and further information here.

I have reported earlier on the action of MNL Capital against the Belgian Vulture Fund Act of 12 July 2015 (Offical Gazette here, my EN translation here), on which I have a paper here.

Thank you Quentin Declève for alerting me to the Constitutional Court’s judgment on a related action (where MNL were joined by Yukos) namely against the act of 23 August 2015 which introduced Article 1412quinquies in the Belgian Judicial Code. It is noteworthy that the action against the Act of July has not yet been decided by the Court (that case number, for the aficionados, is 6371), at the least I have not been able to locate any judgment).

As Quentin summarises, as a general rule, Article 1412 quinquies of the Belgian Judicial Code provides that assets located in Belgium that belong to a foreign State are immune from execution and cannot be subject to enforcement proceedings by creditors. Exceptions to that rule are possible if very strict conditions are met: a party wishing to seize the assets belonging to a State needs to obtain a prior authorisation from a judge. This judge will only authorise the seizure if (i) the foreign State has “expressively” and “specifically” consented to the seizure of the assets; (ii) the foreign State has specifically allocated those assets to the enforcement of the claim which gives rise to the seizure; and (iii) the assets are located in Belgium and are allocated to an economic or commercial activity.

The Court has now annulled the word ‘specifically’ but has otherwise left the Act intact. Quentin summarises how the Court found that this proviso is not part of international law on State immunity.

Now, picking up where Quentin left: part of applicants’ arguments relate to Brussels I Recast. The argument is made that Belgium with its Act re-introduces exequatur, now that is has been abolished by the Recast. Belgium’s Government seems to argue that the law relating to seizure has public order character and hence is covered by the ordre public exception of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, and that seizure in Belgium which would go against public international customary law on State immunity, along the same lines would be covered by the ordre public exception of the Recast (para A.5.2, p.6).

The Court (at B.29.1 ff, .34 ff) deals with the Brussels I arguments very very succinctly: it refers to Article 41(1) which other than the substantive requirements of title III, makes recognition and enforcement subject to the law of the State of enforcement. The Court also says enforcement is not entirely obstructed: some of the foreign entities’ assets remain subject to seizure; and there are other ways of enforcement other than seizure. Finally the Court suggests that the Brussels I Recast surely must not be applied in a way which would be incompatible with international customary law. By rejecting the suggestion for a prelimary reference to Luxembourg (suggestion made by the Belgian State, unusually), the Court clearly believes that call is not one that has to be made by Luxembourg. Pitty: that would have been an interesting reference.

Again, NML Capital’s action against the Vulture Fund Act is still ongoing, lest I have missed withdrawal. As I noted in my paper, this Act I believe is wanting on various grounds, including some related to the New York Convention and the Brussels I Recast.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16, Heading 2.2.16.1.4.

The Seminar on Private International Law organized since 2007 at the Universidad Complutense of Madrid by Professors Fernández Rozas and De Miguel Asensio is an annual meeting devoted to private international law. This year the Seminar goes to Barcelona, where it will held on October 26 and 27, 2017.

This edition of the Seminar, entitled “Regulating economic activity in the international sphere and freedom of establishment (corporate law, tax law, competition law, private law and arbitration law)”, will deal with the regulation of the economic activity in an international framework and its relationship with the freedom of establishment recognized by EU law. The goal is to bring together specialists in private international law, tax law and commercial law as well as law practitioners in order to analyze the current situation of the regulation of economic activity in Europe.

In addition to this central issue, there will be room for the study of the regulation of economic activity in other geographical areas (America, Asia …), and of arbitration as a fundamental tool both for resolving conflicts between economic operators, as well as between investors and states.

The Seminar welcomes the presentation of papers on any topic related to one of the panels, in Spanish, English or French. A summary (900 words) and a basic bibliography must be submitted to the Scientific Committee before September 15, to this address: rafael.arenas@uab.cat. The Scientific Committee will select the papers to be presented at the Seminar by September 29. The final version must be delivered on October 20 at the latest.

The Seminar will include the following panels:

1. Establishment of Companies (perspective of PIL)

Main speaker: Prof. Dr. Jessica Schmidt, Professor of Civil Law and German, European and International Law of Companies and Capital Markets (University of Bayreuth, Germany)

2. Establishment of Companies (perspective of Commercial Law)

Main speaker: Prof. Dr. Andrés Recalde Castells, Professor of Commercial Law at the Autonomous University of Madrid

3. Tax issues

Main speaker: Prof. Dr. Cristina García Herrera-Blanco, Financial and Tax Law Adviser, Institute of Fiscal Studies

4. Economic law (free competition, unfair competition and administrative regulation of economic activity)

Main speakers: Prof. Dr. Amadeo Petitbó Juan, Professor of Applied Economics; Prof. Dr. Barry Rodger, Professor of Law at Strathclyde University in Glasgow (United Kingdom).

5. Freedom of establishment and private law

Main speaker: Prof. Dr. Gerry Maher, Professor of Law at the University of Edinburgh (UK)

6. Regulation of economic activity and private law outside the EU

Main speaker: to be confirmed

7. Arbitration

Main speaker: Prof. Dr. José Carlos Fernández Rozas, Professor of Private International Law at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

L’8 e il 9 giugno 2017 si terrà all’Università di Milano-Bicocca un seminario pratico sul tema della sottrazione internazionale di minori, nel quadro del progetto EU Judiciary Training on Brussels IIa Regulation: from South to East, co-finanziato dalla Commissione europea e guidato da Costanza Honorati.

Intervengono Martina Erb-Klünemann (Tribunale di Hamm), Maria Domenica Maggi (psicologa e giudice onorario presso il Tribunale dei minorenni di Milano), Sara Lembrechts e Katrien Herbots (KeKi – Children’s Right Knowledge Centre di Ghent), Michael Ford (MiKK – International Mediation Centre for Family Conflict and Child Abduction), Costanza Honorati (Univ. Milano-Bicocca), Maria Caterina Baruffi (Univ. Verona), Cristina Gonzalez Beilfuss e Maria Alvarez Torné (Univ. Barcellona), Mirela Zupan (Univ. Osijek), Ivana Kunda (Univ. Rijeka), Agne Limante (Law Institute of Lithuania).

La locandina dell’evento è disponibile qui.

Ergo, Brogsitter, Granarolo...There is a long list of cases in which the CJEU is asked to decide whether a relationship between parties is contractual, with special jurisdiction determined by Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, or one in tort, subject to Article 7(2) of same.

In C-249/16 Saale Kareda v Stefan Benkö Bot AG opined end of April. The Court is asked to rule on whether a recourse claim brought between jointly and severally liable debtors under a credit agreement constitutes a contractual claim. And if it is, the Court will have to examine whether such an agreement may be classified as an agreement for the provision of services, which will, as the case may be, lead it to determine the place of performance of its characteristic obligation.

I still think that what I dubbed the ancestry or pedigree test of Sharpston AG in Ergo, is a most useful litmus test to distinguish between 7(1) and 7(2):  what is the ancestry of the action, without which the parties concerned would not be finding themselves pleading in a court of law?: she uses ‘centre of gravity’ (‘the centre of gravity of the obligation to indemnify is in the contractual obligation’); ‘rooted in’ (‘the recourse action by one insurer against the other…is rooted in the contracts of insurance’); and ‘intimately bound up’ (‘[the action] is intimately bound up with the two insurers’ contractual obligation‘). (at 62 of her Opinion in Ergo). I am not sure though whether the Court itself follows the test.

Before the Austrian courts, Stefan Benkö, an Austrian national, is bringing a recourse claim against Saale Kareda, an Estonian national and his former partner, seeking payment of EUR 17 145.41 plus interest and costs. While they were living together in Austria, the applicant and the defendant bought a house in 2007 and for that purpose took out three loans totalling EUR 300 000 (‘the loan’) from an Austrian bank. They were both borrowers and the referring court states that they were both jointly and severally liable debtors. Ms Kareda broke up with Mr Benkö, moved back to Estonia, and ceased her loan payments. Being sued for the arrear payments by MR Benko, she now claims that the Landesgericht St. Pölten (Regional Court, St. Pölten), the court seised by the applicant, lacked territorial jurisdiction in so far as the loan was made by an Austrian bank and the place of performance for that loan, the bank’s registered office, is not located in the judicial district of that court.

Is it possible to ‘detach’ from the credit agreement the legal relationships arising between jointly and severally liable debtors following the conclusion of that agreement, or does this form an inseparable whole? (at 28) Bot AG suggests it is the latter and I believe he is right. I agree that it would be artificial, for the purposes of the application of the Brussels I Recast. to separate those legal relationships from the agreement which gave rise to them and on which they are based.

I am less convinced by the reference, at 32 and 33, to the need for consistency between Brussels I Recast and Rome I: regular readers of this blog will not be surprised by this. (But I believe I am fighting a losing battle there). The AG refers to Article 16 of Rome I, entitled ‘Multiple liability’, which provides inter alia that, ‘[i]f a creditor has a claim against several debtors who are liable for the same claim, and one of the debtors has already satisfied the claim in whole or in part, the law governing the debtor’s obligation towards the creditor also governs the debtor’s right to claim recourse from the other debtors’.

Having decided that the issue is contractual, the AG suggests the credit agreement is an agreement for the provision of services, and that in the context of a credit agreement, the characteristic obligation leading to jurisdiction is the actual granting of the sum loaned. The other obligation entailed by such an agreement, namely the borrower’s obligation to repay the sum loaned, exists only through the performance of the service by the lender, as repayment is merely its consequence.

The final element to consider is then the actual place of performance of the characteristic obligation. In the AG’s view, only the place where the creditor has its place of business is capable of ensuring that the rules are highly predictable and of satisfying the objectives of proximity and standardisation pursued by the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012.  That place will be known by the parties from the time of the conclusion of the agreement and will also be the place of the court having the closest connection with that agreement. (at 46).

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9

Il 23 giugno 2017 si terrà a Lucca un seminario pratico sul regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I bis).

Durante il seminario, organizzato nel contesto del progetto European Civil Procedure for Lawyers (su cui vedi questo post), gli avvocati saranno chiamati a partecipare attivamente alla discussione e risoluzione di casi pratici in applicazione del regolamento n. 1215/2012.

Tra i relatori Giampaolo Benedetti Pearson (foro di Lucca), Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino) e Silvana Dalla Bontà (Univ. Trento).

La locandina dell’evento è reperibile qui.

Many thanks to Jan von Hein for flagging the ultimate judgment (the link is to a press release) of the Bundesarbeitsgericht in Nikiforidis. I had of course reported earlier my serious misgivings about the CJEU’s judgment in same, upon preliminary review.

The judgment eventually declined to employ the opening left by the CJEU, to take Greek law into account ‘as a matter of fact’. Thank you, but no thank you: there was no suitable point of entry in German law to take account of the Greek austerity laws. Still, as Jan points out, the judgment in Luxembourg undoubtedly will feature as precedent in future cases.

Geert.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (Rapporteur Tadeusz Zwiefka) published their Draft Report on the Commission’s Proposal for the Recast of EC Regulation 2201/2003 (Brussels IIa or Brussels IIbis).

Regarding the jurisdiction, the main points are:

• moving back to the perpetuatio fori in cases where the child moves, while the Commission has proposed to insert: “Where a child moves lawfully from one Member State to another and acquires a new habitual residence there, the authorities of the Member State of the new habitual residence shall have jurisdiction.“
• Inserting a rule that provisional measures lapse automatically only after the final judgment has been notified to the authority in another Member State that took the provisional measures, rather than when they are issued.

Other than this, there are more obligations on mutual cooperation and direct communication to enhance the effectiveness of proceedings. For instance, the rule that a court may ask a court in another Member State on which date it was seised for purposes of lis pendens and that this other court must respond, is taken over from Brussels I (Recast).

This is not the end of the long and windy recasting road, but merely another step on it.

The Draft Report, 2016/0190(CNS), is available here.

The Commission’s Proposal, COM(2016) 411 final, which you will have to read together with the Draft Report, is available here.

The Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law has just published a symposium issue on the importance of international law and comparative law for the American Law Institute’s new Conflict of Laws Restatement project.  Professors Ralf Michaels and Christopher Whytock have a Foreword entitled Internationalizing the New Conflict of Laws Restatement.  Here is the Table of Contents for the complete issue:

International Conflict of Laws and the New Conflict of Laws Restatement

Donald Earl Childress III

Determining the Territorial Scope of State Law in Interstate and International Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third) and on the Role of Party Autonomy

Hannah L. Buxbaum

The Transnational Case in Conflict of Laws: Two Suggestions for the New Restatement Third of Conflict of Laws—Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants and Party Autonomy in International Contracts

Linda J. Silberman and Nathan D. Yaffe

How “International” Should a Third Conflicts Restatement Be in Tort and Contract?

Patrick J. Borchers

Marriage and Divorce Conflicts in the International Perspective

Ann Laquer Estin

Children Crossing Borders: Internationalizing the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws

Louise Ellen Teitz

In the recent issue of the Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) three articles on private international law issues were published.

Peter Mankowski (The European World of Insolvency Tourism: Renewed, But Still Brave?, NILR 2017/1, p. 95-114) discusses the cross border insolvency tourism under the Insolvency Regulation. He also pays attention to the upcoming changes after Brexit to the Recast Insolvency Regulation.

The abstract of his article reads:

“Insolvency tourism and COMI migration have become key features in modern European international insolvency law. Fostered, in particular, by the ingenuity of the English insolvency industry. Yet it has not gone unanswered. The Recast European Insolvency Regulation introduces a not insignificant number of counter-measures as well as an antidote in the shape of a look-back period. Furthermore, as a prospective aftermath of Brexit, the race is on once more in the field of pre-insolvency restructuring measures.”

Marek Zilinsky (Mutual Trust and Cross-Border Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters in the EU: Does the Step-by-Step Approach Work?, NILR 2017/1, p. 116-139)  deals with the question on the implementation of the principle of mutual trust in different EU instruments in the field of cross border recognition and enforcement of judgments. He points out that the EU legislator has chosen different approaches for implementation. Special attention is paid to three instruments: the Brussels I Regulation Recast, the Brussels IIbis Regulation and the Maintenance Regulation.

The abstract of this article reads:

“Mutual trust is one of the cornerstones of cooperation in the field of European Union private international law. Based on this principle the rules on the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments in the European Union are still subject to simplification. The step-by-step approach of the implementation of this principle led to the abolition of the exequatur, often accompanied by a partial harmonization of enforcement law to improve and support the smooth working of cross-border enforcement without exequatur. In this regard, it seems that the Member States still want to have control over the ‘import’ of judgments which results in maintaining the ground for non-recognition and the possibility of relying on them in the Member State of enforcement. This article considers the implementation of the principle of mutual recognition in three areas of justice: civil and commercial matters, family law and maintenance. In these areas the European Union legislator has chosen three different approaches for the implementation of this principle.”

Jacobien Rutgers (NILR 2017/1, p. 163-175) discusses the VKI/Amazon Case of the European Court of Justice (Case C-191/15) where the Court gave its interpretation of Art 6(1) of the Rome II regulation and Art 6(1) Rome I Regulation in a procedure started by a consumer organization based on allegedly unfair terms in general terms and conditions of the seller.

The abstract to this article reads:

“In Amazon the CJEU decided which conflict rules applied to a claim in collective proceedings that was initiated by a consumer organization to prohibit allegedly unfair terms contained in the general terms and conditions of a seller. The terms were used in electronic b2c contracts, where the seller targeted consumers in their home country. The CJEU distinguished between the conflict rule concerning collective action, Article 6(1) Rome II, and the conflict rule concerning the fairness of the term, Article 6(2) Rome I. In addition, the CJEU introduced a new test to assess the fairness of a choice-of-law term under Directive 93/13 on unfair contract terms. In the note, it is argued that the CJEU’s distinction between those two conflict rules is unnecessary and that the test that the CJEU formulated to assess whether a choice-of-law term is unfair, is less favourable to the consumer than the tests formulated in prior decisions.”

The text of the articles is free available on the website of the publisher of the Netherlands International Review.

Thanks go to Marek Zilinsky for providing the above-noted abstracts.

Professor Hannah L. Buxbaum of Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law hast just released an article adressing the treatment of geographic scope restrictions in state law in the current draft of the Restatement (Third) of Conflicts of Law.

The article begins by analyzing the role of the presumption against extraterritoriality in supplying implied restrictions on the scope of law. It considers the role of the presumption in both international and interstate conflicts of laws, and argues that the Restatement (Third) should differentiate clearly between those two contexts. It then turns to the question whether geographic scope restrictions should properly be considered part of a state’s internal law. The paper analyzes that question through the lens of a common problem: a contract dispute involving a transaction or event that falls outside the scope of the law chosen by the parties to govern their agreement. On the basis of that analysis, it concludes that forthcoming sections will need to address the implications of the draft’s categorical treatment of legislative scope.

The Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 372 is available on SSRN and will be published in the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Vol. 27, 2017.

The 59th edition of the Urbino annual seminar on comparative and European Law will run from 21 August to 2 September 2017. The program is available here. For further information, see here.

Si svolgerà ad Urbino, dal 21 agosto al 2 settembre 2017, il 59ème Séminaire de droit comparé et européen. Il programma della nuova edizione è disponibile qui. Per ulteriori informazioni si veda a questo indirizzo.

Il 30 maggio 2017 l’Università di Valencia ospita il convegno BRIaTra: Brussels Ia and Transport. In occasione dell’evento verranno esposti i risultati di una ricerca finanziata dall’Unione europea nel quadro del programma Giustizia civile. Maggiori informazioni sono disponibili nel flyer, reperibile qui.

On 30 may 2017 the University of Valencia will host the conference ‘BRIaTra: Brussels Ia and Transport’. The outcome of a research project supported by the Civil Justice Program of the European Union will be presented during the event. Further information is available here.

On February 25, 2015, the German Federal Labour Court had referred questions relating to the interpretation of Art. 9 Rome I to the CJEU (see here). In the context of a wage claim made by a Greek national who is employed by the Hellenic Republic at a Greek primary school in Germany, the German Federal Labour Court faced the problem whether to apply the Greek Saving Laws No 3833/2010 and 3845/2010 as overriding mandatory provisions. The claimant, Mr. Nikiforidis, had argued that, as a teacher who is employed in Germany under a contract governed by German law, he did not have to accept the wage cuts imposed on his Greek colleagues working in the Hellenic Republic. For a closer analysis, see the earlier post by Lisa Günther here.

In its decision of October 18, 2016 – C-135/15 (available here), the CJEU held (at para 50) that Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation must be interpreted “as precluding the court of the forum from applying, as legal rules, overriding mandatory provisions other than those of the State of the forum or of the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed. Consequently, since, according to the referring court, Mr. Nikiforidis’s employment contract has been performed in Germany, and the referring court is German, the latter cannot in this instance apply, directly or indirectly, the Greek overriding mandatory provisions which it sets out in the request for a preliminary ruling “. According to the CJEU, the duty of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU does not modify this restrictive approach. The Court went on, however, to confirm the practice established by German courts of taking foreign mandatory rules into account as a matter of fact (at para 52): “On the other hand, Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation does not preclude overriding mandatory provisions of a State other than the State of the forum or the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed from being taken into account as a matter of fact, in so far as this is provided for by a substantive rule of the law that is applicable to the contract pursuant to the regulation.” Finally, the CJEU reached the conclusion (at para. 53) that “[a]ccordingly, the referring court has the task of ascertaining whether Laws No 3833/2010 and No 3845/2010 are capable of being taken into account when assessing the facts of the case which are relevant in the light of the substantive law applicable to the employment contract at issue in the main proceedings.“ For a critical evaluation of this decision, see the comment by Geert van Calster here.

On April 26, 2017, the Federal Labour Court delivered its final decision in this case (5 AZR 962/13; the German press release is available here). Although the CJEU has, as a general principle, allowed German courts to take foreign mandatory laws into account as a matter of fact, the Federal Labour Court respectfully declines to follow this path in the particular case because substantive German labour law does not provide for a suitable point of entry for the Greek saving laws. Under German labour law, an employee is – unless specifically agreed between the parties – not obliged to accept permanent wage cuts merely because his employer is in financial difficulties. Seen in this light, the preliminary reference of February 2015 has, at least partially, a certain hypothetical flavour to it – nevertheless, the methodological clarifications made by the CJEU will be helpful in future cases.

The 1965 Hague Convention on Service of Process is one of the cornerstone treaties for international litigation. It provides a simple and effective process to provide due notice of a proceeding in one signatory state to a party in another, via a designated Central Authority in each signatory state. Nevertheless, one provision has vexed U.S. courts for decades. Article 10 provides that, notwithstanding the Central Authority procedures, and “[p]rovided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with. . . the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.” By virtue of the fact that the provision says “send” and not the magic word “serve,” U.S. Courts have long disagreed over whether the Convention’s procedures preclude international service of process by mail.

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court settled the question, and held that the Hague Service Convention does not prohibit service of process by mail. This permissive reading serves to increase the practical utility of the Convention around the world.

The opinion is available here, and it is a fairly straightforward exercise in treaty interpretation by Justice Alito. He starts with the “treaty’s text and the context in which its words are used,” as well as the overall “structure of the Convention” to divine the meaning of Article 10. To buttress his permissive interpretation, he then discusses “three extratextual sources [that] are especially helpful in ascertaining Article 10(a)’s meaning”: the Convention’s drafting history, the interpretation of the U.S. Executive Branch, and that of other signatories to the Convention.

As a practical matter, though, this decision doesn’t necessarily open the mailboxes of the world to liberal service of process. Rather, service by mail is still only permissible if the receiving state has not objected to service by mail (some do by way of reservations) and if such service is authorized under otherwise-applicable law. In this case, because the Court of Appeals concluded that the Convention prohibited service by mail, it did not consider whether Texas law authorizes the methods of service. That question was sent back to the lower courts to consider on remand.