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In C-519/19 Ryanair v DelayFix, the CJEU held yesterday. The case echoes the facts in Happy Flights v Ryanair at the Belgian Supreme Court.

Following inter alia  CJEU Jana Petruchova, the (absence of) impact of substantive European consumer protection rules on the consumer section of European private international law is now fairly settled. The separation between the two sets of laws seems quite clear for the application of the consumer section itself.

However under A25 BIa, EU consumer law might still play a role in those circumstances where the conditions of the consumer Section are not met (dual-use contracts, contracts for transport (such as here) etc.) yet where one of the parties may qualify as a consumer under substantive EU consumer protection law.

A core issue of contention is the consideration of the EU unfair terms in consumer contracts Directive 2019/2161 and its predecessor Directive 93/13 , which was applicable in Ryanair v DelayFix. Via Article 25’s lex fori prorogati rule on substantive validity for choice of court, the Directive plays an important role.

In the case at issue at the CJEU, Passenger Rights, now DelayFix, a company specialised in the recovery of air passengers’ claims under the EU Regulation on air passenger rights, has requested the courts at Warsaw to order Ryanair,  to pay EUR 250 in compensation, a passenger on the relevant flight having assigned DelayFix their claim with respect to that airline.

The CJEU first of all looks at the issue from the limited extent of what is actually materially regulated by A25: the requirement of ‘consent’ (as well as the formal expression of that consent. It holds, not surprisingly, that in principle of course a jurisdiction clause incorporated in a contract may produce effects only in the relations between the parties who have given their agreement to the conclusion of that contract (referring ex multi to Refcomp).  In the case at issue,  a jurisdiction clause incorporated in the contract of carriage between a passenger and that airline cannot, in principle, be enforced by the latter against a collection agency to which the passenger has assigned the claim.

However, at 47, there is a gateway for the choice of court nevertheless to extend to third parties, namely when the third party not privy to the original contract had succeeded to an original contracting party’s rights and obligations, in accordance with national substantive law. At 49, referring to A25(1), that law is the lex fori prorogati. Here: Irish law.

Recital 20 BIa in fact instructs to include the lex fori prorogati’s conflict of laws rules (in other words: an instruction for renvoi) to be part of the referral. In the aforementioned Belgian SC ruling in Happy Flights, renvoi was simply ignored. Here, the CJEU does not mention renvoi, even if it does not expressly exclude it.

The CJEU does point out that Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts of course is part of the Irish lex fori prorogati, as it is of all the Member States. In making that reference it would seem to have answered in the negative the question whether the ‘consent’ provisions of that Directive have not been superseded in the context of the ‘consent’ requirements of Article 25 Brussels Ia, as recently discussed obiter in Weco Projects.

Per previous case-law, the capacity of the parties to the original agreement at issue is relevant for the application of the Directive, not the parties to the dispute.  Further, a jurisdiction clause, incorporated in a contract between a consumer and a seller or supplier, that was not subject to an individual negotiation and which confers exclusive jurisdiction to the courts in whose territory that seller or supplier is based, must be considered as unfair under Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 if, contrary to requirement of good faith, it causes significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. Reference is made in particular to Joined Cases C‑240/98 to C‑244/98 Océano Grupo (at 58).

It will be up to the national courts seised of a dispute, here: the Polish courts, to draw legal conclusions from the potential unfairness of such a clause (at 61). DelayFix therefore are not quite yet home and dry.

Geert.

European Private International Law, 3rd ed. February 2021, Chapter 2, para 2.240.

The European Order for Payment (EOP, Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006), the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP, Regulation (EC) No 861/2007) and the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO, Regulation (EU) No 655/2014) applied for several years in Romania without any specific implementation legislation being adopted to coordinate their interaction with the national procedural rules.

As generally regulations do not require any specific additional legislative action from the Member States to be applied at national level, Romanian authorities relied on the principle of direct application of the three instruments. However, the referral to national procedural rules in several articles of the regulations (e.g. existence of an appeal mechanisms, costs of proceedings, assistance) as well as reliance on national rules when no specific provisions are contained in the European legislation (Article 26 EOP, Article 19 ESCP, and Article 46 EAPO) can create disparities and give rise to variations in the application of these instruments even within one Member State.

Recently, this direct application approach changed. In December 2019 the Romanian Government and, subsequently, the Parliament initiated acts to amend national laws. These legislative amendments were aimed at facilitating the application of these regulations and clarifying particular procedural aspects in order to ease judicial cooperation between Member States for the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO procedures. The new national rules dedicated to the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO focus mainly on issues of jurisdiction of Romanian courts, identifying the national authorities involved in the application of the Regulations, and establishing the applicable procedural fees.

EAPO: A Guided Implementation Process to Avoid an Infringement Procedure

The amendment of national legislation regarding the EAPO has been triggered by the initiation of an infringement procedure by the European Commission. A letter of formal notice (letter C(2019) 6729 final) was sent to the Romanian authorities in 2019 – more than two years since the regulation became applicable – because the Government failed to communicate relevant information for the application of the regulation as required by Article 50 EAPO Regulation.

Following this formal notice, the Romanian Government acted expediently to avoid a possible referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union in an infringement procedure. The Government’s Note proposing the legislative amendment as well as in the Statement of Reasons for the law approving the Government Emergency Ordinance containing implementation provisions refer to this risk as well as that of hefty fines for the national budget due to non-compliance with EU law. Based on these reasons the Government moved quickly in December 2019 to adopt an Emergency Ordinance – Ordonaţa de urgenţă nr. 75 din 13 decembrie 2019 pentru completarea Ordonanţei de urgenţă a Guvernului nr. 119/2006 privind unele măsuri necesare pentru aplicarea unor regulamente comunitare de la data aderării României la Uniunea Europeană, precum şi pentru modificarea Ordonanţei de urgenţă a Guvernului nr. 80/2013 privind taxele judiciare de timbre.

Based on the Government’s Note, the Emergency Ordinance No. 75/2019 was meant to address information that had not been clearly provided for the application of the EAPO in Romania. This concerned:

• the methods that could be used to obtain account information regarding a debtor holding a bank account in Romania (Article 50(1)(c) EAPO Regulation) and
• which courts were competent to handle EAPO requests, the available means of appeal, the national authority competent to receive requests for obtaining account information about bank accounts and to provide such information, and the methods applicable to receive this information (by Romanian and authorities in other Member States).

The new article Article I8 of the Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 regarding certain measures necessary for the application of some Community Regulations after the date of accession of Romania to the European Union explicitly addresses the information requirements contained in Article 50(1) letters (a)-(d), (l) and (m) EAPO Regulation.

Based on this legislative amendment, the courts competent to issue Preservation Orders in Romania based on an authentic instrument would be the ones having jurisdiction to handle the claim at first instance (Article 1(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 6(4) EAPO Regulation). Further, any appeal against a decision to reject in whole or in part an application for a Preservation Order would be handle by the hierarchical higher court to the one that issued the initial decision (Article 1(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 21 EAPO Regulation). This means that different type of courts can have jurisdiction to receive an application for an EAPO based on the threshold of the claim. These would be either the district courts (judecătorii) for requests of up to 200.000 RON (approx. 42.000 euros) or the general courts (tribunale) for applications above this threshold. Similarly, any request to revoke or modify a Preservation Order based on Article 31(1) EAPO Regulation will be handled by the hierarchical higher court to the one that issued it (Article 1(3) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006).

The remedies available to the debtor against the enforcement of a Preservation Order according to Article 34 EAPO Regulation will rest with the enforcement court (Article 1(4) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). Again any appeal against the remedies available to the creditor and the debtor based on the provisions of Articles 33-35 EAPO will lie with the hierarchical higher courts to the courts that issued the Preservation Order (Article 1(3)-(4) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 33(1), 34 and 35 EAPO Regulation). In such circumstances, the appeal would have to be introduced within a period of 30 days from the date of communication of the decision challenged, unless the law establishes otherwise. This last part gives rise to some uncertainty, especially for foreign parties which are presumed not to be familiar with the Romanian legal system and its particularities. Hence, relying on a local practitioner would remain necessary although representation is not mandatory in the EAPO procedure (Article 41 EAPO Regulation).

Any request to obtain information and identify a debtor’s potential bank accounts in Romania according to Article 14 EAPO Regulation will be dealt with by the National Union of Judicial Enforcement Officers (Uniunea Naţională a Executorilor Judecătoreşti, UNEJ). The National Union of Judicial Enforcement Officers is the designated information authority competent to provide this information upon request. For this purpose, the Union has been granted direct and free of charge access to the Ministry of Public Finance IT system – PatrimVen (Article 2 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006).

With regard to procedural costs related to the issuance of a European Account Preservation Order, the court fees are fixed at 100 RON (approx. 21 euros) (Article 11(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees). The EAPO court fee is similar to fees applicable in other national procedures concerning protective measures. Its low value is certainly convenient, especially for high-value EAPOs.

EOP and ESCP: Implementation Legislation A Decade into their Application

The EOP and ESCP have been the testing ground for direct application of ‘second-generation’ European regulations into national procedure. This has led to interpretation difficulties (e.g. amount of court fees to be paid, appeal and review mechanisms, lack of legal assistance) and mixed results according to previously published research findings (e.g. further Luxembourg Report on Mutual Trust and Free Circulation of Judgments and Cross-Border Debt Recovery in the EU). During this initial period, the only legislative provision implicitly referring to these instruments was Article 636 New Code of Civil Procedure. The article states that European enforceable titles for which the exequatur procedure is not required are immediately enforceable in Romania without any preliminary formality.

The legislative change for these two European procedures came in July 2020. A law – Law No 132 of 15 July 2020 – was adopted by the Parliament. The law amended one more time the Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 regarding certain measures necessary for the application of some Community Regulation after the date of accession of Romania to the European Union and the Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees. Two new articles were added to facilitate the application of the EOP and ESCP Regulation in Romania – Articles I9 and I10 (see Statement of Reasons). As for the EAPO Regulation, these articles address only some of the elements that require coordination between the European rules and national legislation, namely: the requirements of Article 29(1)(a)-(b) EOP Regulation and Article 25(1)(a), (c) and (g) ESCP Regulation

For the EOP, the jurisdiction will rest with the courts that would be competent to handle the claims on the merits at first instance (Article 1 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). These would be either the district courts (judecătorii) or the general courts (tribunale). The district courts have competence for claims up to 200.000 RON (approx. 42.000 euros). The claims above this threshold will be handled by the general court as first instance court.

Any review request in the framework of the EOP Regulation will be examined by the same court that issued the EOP but in a panel of two judges (Article 2 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). Although this legislative step clarifies some organisational aspects of the review proceeding, it does not solve how the review should be handled based on various national means (see here also). The national procedures according to which the review should be handled are broader in scope than the provisions of Article 20 EOP Regulation and require some legal knowledge. This keeps the proceeding rather complex for a first-time user with little legal training.

With regard to the ESCP, the Romanian courts competent to issue the ESCP judgment are the district courts (judecătoriile) according to Article 2(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006. The ESCP judgment will be subject only to appeal before the competent general court (tribunal) and will have to be filed within 30 days from the moment the judgment was communicated to the party (Article 2(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Article 17 ESCP Regulation).

A request for review – as for the EOP procedure – will rest with the court that issued the ESCP judgment. However, unlike for the EOP, the provisions related to the ESCP do not expressly indicate that the review will be handled by a panel of judges. This difference in the drafting of the legal text is regrettable as it gives rise to potential confusions and interpretations per a contrario given the special nature of the rules.

Both EOP and ESCP provisions related to the competent courts to receive the application forms do not change the practice of the Romanian courts but confirm the already existing interpretation followed by practitioners.

For court fees, the Romanian legislator opted for a fixed court fee as for similar national procedures (ordonanţa de plată and procedura cu privire la cererile de valoare redusă). Hence, an application for an EOP will cost the applicant 200 RON (approx. 41 euros) (Article 6(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees). While the ESCP claims will vary between 50 RON (approx. 10,5 euros) for claims below 2.000 RON (or their equivalent) and 200 RON (approx. 41 euros) for claims above this threshold (Article 6(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013). The procedure following opposition to an EOP and review requests will involve an additional fixed fee of 100 RON (approx. 21 euros) (Article 6(21) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees. This legislative action is welcomed as it puts an end to the different approaches followed by Romania courts. These varied between a fixed cost identical to the equivalent national procedures and a court fee based on the value of the claim submitted.

The most important legislative development related to the application of the ESCP concerns the implementation of specific provisions regarding the assistance to the provided to the parties (Article 11 ESCP Regulation).

According to Article 1 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006, practical assistance for filling in the Claim Form (Form A) will be provided by the lawyers designated for this purpose by each local Bar Association for periods of three months (on a rotation basis). The list of lawyers to provide legal assistance and their contact details will be published online by the Union of National Bar Associations in Romania and each local Bar Association. This list is also to be communicated to each district court for publication at its premises as well as online on the website of the Romanian Courts. Finding the necessary details will remain certainly more challenging for foreign users as the information on the websites is generally available only in Romanian.

The costs for this assistance will be fixed based on a protocol of understanding establishing the representation fees for ex officio legal representation. No fee will have to be paid by the party receiving assistance in accordance with Article 11 ESCP Regulation. Although a welcomed legislative clarification such lists do not appear to have been published for the time being with the indicated national websites or their whereabouts are not easy to spot (even for a legally trained subject). Given that the legislative changes were only introduced four months ago, practical application and technical adjustments may take some time to be calibrated by the local Bar Associations and district courts.

These legislative steps undertaken by the Romanian authorities are certainly a good development for facilitating the interaction between the European and national procedural rules and the application of the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO. Domestic rules have an important influence on the manner in which the European procedures are applied and represent a key prerequisite for certainty, visibility of the procedures, and their subsequent success.

The Court of justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑519/19 (Ryanair DAC v DelayFix, formerly Passenger Rights sp. z o.o.), which is about jurisdiction clauses, assignment of passenger claim and unfair terms:

“Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to contest the jurisdiction of a court to hear and determine an action brought for compensation under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 […]  establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, […] and against an airline, a jurisdiction clause incorporated in a contract of carriage concluded between a passenger and that airline cannot be enforced by the airline against a collection agency to which the passenger has assigned the claim, unless, under the legislation of the Member State whose courts are designated in that clause, that collection agency is the successor to all the initial contracting party’s rights and obligations, which it is for the referring court to determine. Where appropriate, such a clause, incorporated, without having been subject to an individual negotiation, in a contract concluded between a consumer, that is to say, the air passenger, and a seller or supplier, that is to say, the airline, and which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts which have jurisdiction over the territory in which that airline is based, must be considered as being unfair within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts”.

Source: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=233867&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14547437

        

Witten by Abubakri Yekini, Lecturer at Lagos State University, Nigeria.

 

The idea of economic integration is not new to Africa. It is a phenomenon that has been conceived as far back as the 1960s when many African countries gained independence. In 1980, the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) came up a blueprint for the progressive development of Africa: the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000. However, the first concrete step towards achieving this objective was taken in 1991 when the African Heads of State and Government (AHSG) signed the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) (Abuja Treaty) in Nigeria.  One of the operational stages of the AEC was the creation of a Continental Free Trade Area by 2028. In 2013, the AHSG further signed a Solemn Declaration during the 50th anniversary of the African Union. The Declaration sets another blueprint for a 50-year development trajectory for Africa (Agenda 2068). Item C of that Declaration is a commitment from the Member States to the speedy implementation of the Continental Free Trade Area. At last, this is now a reality.

 

The AfCFTA was adopted 5 years later on 21st March 2018 and it became effective on 30th May 2019. It was expected that trading activities under this framework would commence in July 2020. The ongoing global pandemic and shutdown of national economies frustrated the plan. The Agreement is now scheduled to take effect from 1st January 2021.

 

Africa seems to be showing some seriousness with the AfCFTA compared to previous attempts. Concerns were initially expressed when Nigeria was reluctant to sign the Agreement (Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority, 2020; Mizner, 2019; Financial Times, 2019). Such concerns cannot be dismissed considering that Nigeria is the biggest economy in Africa and has a population of about 200 million people. Happily, the Nigerian Federal Executive Council formally approved the ratification of the Agreement on 11th November 2020(Government of Nigeria, 2020). As at today, all the African countries are members of the AfCFTA except Eritrea. We can safely say that AfCFTA has come to stay.

 

According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the AfCFTA will be the biggest single market, with a GDP of $2.5 trillion and a whooping population of 2.5 billion people across 55 countries (UNECA, 2020). By 2050, it is also projected that Africa’s population will be 2.5 billion; contributing about 26% of the world’s working-age population (UNECA, 2020). As expected, AfCFTA has been generating interesting debates. Some legal commentators have penned some thoughts on the Agreement largely from international economic/trade law perspectives (Magwape, 2018; Onyejekwe and Ekhator, 2020; Akinkugbe 2019). Only a few private international scholars have written on the framework (Theunissen, 2020; Uka, 2020).

 

Nigeria’s ratification of AfCFTA indicates that AfCFTA will become effective in Nigeria from next year, although Nigerian law requires AfCFTA to be domesticated (Abacha v. Fawehinmi [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228). AfCFTA is projected to have significant impacts on the Nigerian economy. Although Nigeria’s trade in goods and services to other African countries stands at 19.6% (export) and 2.13% (import) as indicated in the Q4 2019 statistic (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019), it is expected that this should witness a significant growth when AfCFTA becomes effective. More intra-African trading activities would potentially lead to the increase in cross border litigation in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. The relevant question is to what extent does Nigerian private international law support trade liberalisation agenda of AfCFTA?

 

The AfCFTA has a dispute settlement mechanism modelled along the WTO system. This affects only disputes between the Member States. The Agreement is conspicuously silent on cross-border disputes amongst private citizens and the divergent systems of law operating in the Member States. It thus appears that for the meantime, the divergent national private international rules which are obsolete in many Member States will continue to govern cross-border disputes. To what extent this can support the objective of intra-African trade facilitation is left to be seen.

 

For Nigeria, it is time we revamped the Nigerian private international law. As a prominent member of AfCFTA, Nigeria should take a special interest in the progressive development of private international law through multilateral platforms both under the AfCFTA and other global bodies such as the Hague Conference. The current lackadaisical attitude to multilateral private international rules needs to change. For instance, Nigeria has neither joined the Hague Conference nor acceded to any of its conventions. The Evidence and Service Conventions would have delivered a more efficient international civil procedure for Nigeria. Also, the 2005 Choice of Court Convention (and hopefully the 2019 Judgments Convention) would give Nigerian judgments wider circulation and respect. At the Commonwealth level, Nigeria did not pay any significant role in the making of the 2017 Commonwealth Model Law on Judgments and has no intention of domesticating it. The point we are making is that Nigeria needs to be responsive to international calls for the development of private international law, not just from AfCFTA when such is made, but also ongoing global private international law projects.

 

To reap the benefit of AfCFTA, the Nigerian justice system must be made to be attractive to foreign businesspersons. No doubt, foreign litigants will be more interested in doing business in countries that have in place an efficient, effective and credible legal system that enforce contracts and dispose of cases timeously. Nigeria will be competing with countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Rwanda and Ghana. In one recent empirical research carried out by Prof Yemi Osibajo, the current Vice President of Nigeria, on the length of trial time in civil cases in Lagos State, it takes an average of 3.4 years to resolve a civil and commercial transaction in Nigeria. A further period of 2.5 and 4.5 years is required if the matter proceeded to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively (Osinbajo, 2011). Excessive delays in dispute resolution may make Nigeria unattractive for resolving business disputes. The other side of the coin is the enforcement of contracts, especially jurisdiction agreements. Foreign litigants may be persuaded to trade with Nigeria if they are assured that foreign jurisdiction clauses will be respected by Nigerian courts. The current approach is not too satisfactory as there are some appellate court decisions which suggest that parties’ choice may not be enforced in certain situations (Okoli, 2020b). Some of the local statutes like the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act which grants exclusive jurisdiction over a wide range of commercial matters may equally need to be reviewed.

 

Jurisdiction and judgments are inextricably linked together. Nigerian litigants should now be concerned about how Nigerian judgments would fare in other African countries. Our jurisdictional laws need to be standardised to work in harmony with those of foreign countries. Recent decisions indicate that Nigerian courts still apply local venue rules – designed to determine which judicial division should hear a matter (for geographical and administrative convenience) within a State in Nigeria – to determine jurisdiction in matters involving foreign element; consider taking steps to release property as submission; may even exercise jurisdiction based on temporary presence (Okoli, 2020a; Okoli, 2020b; Bamodu, 1995; Olaniyan, 2012; Yekini, 2013). It is doubtful if judgments from these jurisdictional grounds will be respected in other African countries, the majority of whose legal systems are not rooted in common law. In the same vein, Nigerian courts will recognise and enforce judgments from other African countries notwithstanding that Nigeria has not extended its statutory enforcement scheme to most African countries (Yekini, 2017). Nigerian judgments may not receive similar treatment in other African states as our reciprocal statute can be misconstrued to mean that their judgments are not enforceable in Nigeria without a treaty. Nigerian government should either discard the reciprocity requirement or conclude a treaty with other African states to guarantee the enforcement of Nigerian judgments abroad.

 

Boosting investors’ confidence requires some assurances from the Nigerian government for the respect of rule of law. The government’s rating is not too encouraging in this regard. In its 2020 Rule of Law Index, the World Justice Project ranked Nigeria 108 out of 128 countries surveyed (World Justice Project, 2020). This should not surprise practitioners from Nigeria.  For instance, the Nigerian government does have regard for ECOWAS judgments although court sits in Abuja, Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory. Such judgments are hardly recognised and enforced thereby contravening art 15(4) of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty which stipulates that judgments of the court shall be binding on Member States (Adigun, 2019).

 

Lastly, AfCFTA should spark the interest of Nigerian practitioners, judges, academia, policymakers and other stakeholders in private international law matters. Nigeria cannot afford to be a spectator in the scheme of things. It should leverage on its status in Africa to drive an Afrocentric and global private international law agenda. More awareness should be created for the subject in the universities. Government and the business community should fund various programmes and research on the impact of AfCFTA, and subsequent frameworks that will be rolled out to drive AfCFTA, on the Nigerian legal system, its economy and people.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Administrative Court of the City of Sofia, Bulgaria, has recently submitted a request for a preliminary revolving around the recognition of a foreign birth certificate issued by another EU Member State (Case C-490/20):

The case concerns a refusal of a municipality in Sofia to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate to a child of two female same sex mothers of Bulgarian and UK nationality who entered into a civil marriage in Gibraltar, UK. The child was born in Spain, where a birth certificate  was issued on which it was recorded that mothers of the child were both a Bulgarian national, designated ‘Mother A’, and a UK national, designated ‘Mother’, both persons being female. The municipality refused to issue the requested birth certificate because the applicants did not point out who was the biological mother, intending most probably to issue the certificate only for one mother. Bulgaria is one of the few EU Member States without access to either same sex marriage or any type of civil partnership.

The Bulgarian mother brought legal proceedings before the Administrative Court of the City of Sofia against the refusal by the Sofia municipality, where the court referred  the following questions to the CJEU for a for preliminary ruling:

1. Must Article 20 TFEU and Article 21 TFEU and Articles 7, 24 and 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that the Bulgarian administrative authorities to which an application for a document certifying the birth of a child of Bulgarian nationality in another Member State of the EU was submitted, which had been certified by way of a Spanish birth certificate in which two persons of the female sex are registered as mothers without specifying whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological mother, are not permitted to refuse to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate on the grounds that the applicant refuses to state which of them is the child’s biological mother?

2. Must Article 4(2) TEU and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that respect for the national identity and constitutional identity of the Member States of the European Union means that those Member States have a broad discretion as regards the rules for establishing parentage? Specifically:
– Must Art. 4(2) TEU be interpreted as allowing the Member State to request information on the biological parentage of the child?
– Must Article 4(2) TEU in conjunction with Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that it is essential to strike a balance of interests between, on the one hand, the national identity and constitutional identity of a Member State and, on the other hand, the best interests of the child, having regard to the fact that, at the present time, there is neither a consensus as regards values nor, in legal terms, a consensus about the possibility of registering as parents on a birth certificate persons of the same sex without providing further details of whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological parent? If this question is answered in the affirmative, how could that balance of interests be achieved in concrete terms?

3. Is the answer to Question 1 affected by the legal consequences of Brexit in that one of the mothers listed on the birth certificate issued in another Member State is a UK national whereas the other mother is a national of an EU Member State, having regard in particular to the fact that the refusal to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate for the child constitutes an obstacle to the issue of an identity document for the child by an EU Member State and, as a result, may impede the unlimited exercise of her rights as an EU citizen?

4. If the first question is answered in the affirmative: does EU law, in particular the principle of effectiveness, oblige the competent national authorities to derogate from the model birth certificate which forms part of the applicable national law?

 

Thank you, Boriana Musseva, for the tip-off!

 

Dimitry Kochenov (University of Groningen) and Uladzislau Belavusau (T.M.C. Asser Institute) have posted on After the Celebration: Marriage Equality in EU Law post-Coman in Eight Questions and Some Further Thoughts on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

This article provides a detailed critical analysis of the case of Coman, where the Court of Justice of the EU clarified that the meaning of the term ‘spouse’ in Directive 2004/38 was gender-neutral, opening up the door for same-sex marriage recognition for immigration purposes all around the EU, thus destroying the heteronormative misinterpretations of the clear language of the Directive practiced in a handful of Member States. The state of EU law after Coman is still far from perfect, however: we underline a line of important questions which remain open and which the Court will need to turn to in the near future to ensure that marriage equality in moves beyond mere proclamations in the whole territory of the Union. In particular, we: (1) Question the effectiveness of the Commission as an effective guardian of the Treaties, puzzled by its failure to make basic EU citizenship rights available to EU citizens who are in a same-sex relationship. (2) Interrogate the deficiencies of single-purpose marriage recognition and question the speed of the eventual spill-overs of such recognition into other fields outside immigration per se. (3) We demonstrate that Coman is a textbook example of the free-movement paradigm of non-discrimination at work, which is, besides obviously being accepted in EU law, also deeply questionable, since those who do not move within the internal market might also want to have a family. (4) Issues of coherence among different instruments of secondary EU law equally arise, (5) just as the issue of ‘genuine residence’, which Coman brings up, whatever this might mean in the 21st century with its fast pace of life and increasing numbers of people – not all of them heterosexual – living between countries and homes. (6) Numerous questions arise as a result of the natural conflict, which is omnipresent, between principles of EU law and private international law approaches. (7) The CJEU’s language of ‘strengthening family life’ is both dangerous and out of place, in our respectful opinions, informed by the desire to keep the Court out of Europeans’ (and Americans’, as in Coman) spousal beds. (8) The last issue we raise is the question of ‘what’s next?’ for others who are still arbitrarily persecuted by EU and national law and for whom (and how many of them) they love. Once the principle is established that states should not interfere with our sexuality without imperative reasons of the public good – what the LGBTQ community has been subjected to abundantly and still suffers from, and to which Coman is a wonderful illustration – the same test is bound to apply in other contexts, especially polygamy and other persecuted or ‘non-recognised’ loving relationships. But first we turn back to the facts and the context of the case, and praise the Court for a significant achievement, which righted the failure of the Commission to ensure the basic applicability of the Directive 2004/38 to gay European citizens.

The paper is forthcoming in the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law.

KCA Deutag UK Finance PLC, Re (In the Matter of the Companies Act 2006) [2020] EWHC 2977 (Ch) is in most part a classic scheme of arrangement sanctioning hearing, with the scheme proposed by a UK-incorporated company with COMI undisputedly there, too. See a range of posts on the blog for the classic jurisdictional analysis.

What is slightly out of the ordinary is the contractual commitment by the creditors not to oppose the scheme in foreign jurisdictions.  Snowden J, at 33:

In this case, two things give me that comfort. The first is that there was an overwhelming vote by Scheme Creditors in favour, and a very large number of such creditors entered into a lock-up agreement which bound them contractually to support the Scheme and not to do anything to undermine it. It is very difficult to see how such creditors who contractually agreed to support the Scheme and/or who voted in favour could possibly be allowed to take action contrary to the Scheme in any foreign jurisdiction, and the number and financial interests of those who did not vote in favour is comparatively very small indeed. That alone is sufficient to demonstrate to me that the Scheme is likely to have a substantial international effect and that I would not be acting in vain if I were to sanction it.

I would intuitively have felt quite the opposite, although detail is lacking (e.g. was the commitment given as a blank cheque before the details of the scheme were known): such contractual commitment even if valid under (presumably; no details are given) English law as the lex contractus of the commitment, could serve to undermine international effectiveness. For I would not be surprised if creative counsel on the continent could find a range of laws of lois de police or ordre public character, to try and object to contractual commitment to sign away the right to oppose.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5. Third edition forthcoming February 2021.

Scheme of arrangement, sanctioned
Company UK incorporated, & UK COMI
Number of creditors domiciled ex-UK
Novelty is that these contractually committed to not opposing the scheme in foreign jurisdictions
Expert evidence of enforceability in US, DE, NOR, RUS, Oman also considered https://t.co/mi8ruTIgPR

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 6, 2020

In preparation of the Conference on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention on 13/14 September 2021, planned to be taking place on campus of the University of Bonn, Germany, we are offering here a Repository of contributions to the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. Please email us if you miss something in it, we will update immediately…

We all benefited from your contributions at the Video Pre-Conference Roundtable on 29 October 2020. Our sincere thanks go to all the speakers and participants who pushed further the frontiers of our knowledge and understanding.

Update of 17 November 2020: New entries are printed bold.

Please also check the “official” Bibliograghy of the HCCH for the instrument.

 

1. Explanatory Reports

Garcimartín Alférez, Francisco;
Saumier, Geneviève „Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters: Explanatory Report“, as approved by the HCCH on 22 September 2020 (available here) Garcimartín Alférez, Francisco;
Saumier, Geneviève “Judgments Convention: Revised Draft Explanatory Report”, HCCH Prel.-Doc. No. 1 of December 2018 (available here) Nygh, Peter;
Pocar, Fausto “Report of the Special Commission”, HCCH Prel.-Doc. No. 11 of August 2000 (available here), pp 19-128

 

1. Bibliography

Balbi, Francesca “La circolazione delle decisioni a livello globale: il progetto di convenzione della Conferenza dell’Aia per il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle sentenze straniere” (Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2019; available: here) Beaumont, Paul “Forum non Conveniens and the EU rules on Conflicts of Jurisdiction: A Possible Global Solution”, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 2018, pp 433-447 Beaumont, Paul R. “Judgments Convention: Application to Governments”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 121-137 Blom, Joost “The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act and the Hague Judgments and Jurisdictions Projects”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal 55 (2018), pp 257-304 Bonomi, Andrea “European Private International Law and Third States”, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2017, pp 184-193 Bonomi, Andrea “Courage or Caution? – A Critical Overview of the Hague Preliminary Draft on Judgments”, Yearbook of Private International Law 17 (2015/2016), pp 1-31 Bonomi, Andrea;
Mariottini, Cristina M. “(Breaking) News From The Hague: A Game Changer in International Litigation? – Roadmap to the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention”, Yearbook of Private International Law 20 (2018/2019), pp 537-567 Borges Moschen, Valesca Raizer;
Marcelino, Helder “Estado Constitutional Cooperativo e a conficaçao do direito internacional privado apontamentos sobre o ’Judgement Project’ da Conferência de Haia de Direito Internacional Privado”, Revista Argumentum 18 (2017), pp 291-319

(Cooperative Constitutional State and the Codification of Private International Law: Notes on the “Judgment Project” of the Hague Conference on Private International Law) Brand, Ronald A. “The Circulation of Judgments Under the Draft Hague Judgments Convention”, University of Pittsburgh School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2019-02, pp 1-35 Brand, Ronald A. “Jurisdictional Developments and the New Hague Judgments Project”, “in HCCH (ed.), A Commitment to Private International Law – Essays in honour of Hans van Loon”, Cambridge 2013, pp 89-99 Brand, Ronald A. “New Challenges in Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments”, in Franco Ferrari, Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law – Contemporary Challenges and Continuing Relevance, Cheltenham/Northampton 2019, pp 360-389 Brand, Ronald A. “Jurisdiction and Judgments Recognition at the Hague Conference: Choices Made, Treaties Completed, and the Path Ahead”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 3-17 Çali?kan, Yusuf;
Çali?kan, Zeynep “2 Temmuz 2019 Tarihli Yabanci Mahkeme Kararlarinin Taninmasi ve Tenfizine Iliskin Lahey Anlasmasinin Degerlendirilmesi”, Public and Private International Law Bulletin 40 (2020), pp 231-245

(An Evaluation of 2 July 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters) Clavel, Sandrine; Jault-Seseke, Fabienne “La convention de La Haye du 2 juillet 2019 sur la reconnaissance et l’exécution des jugements étrangers en matière civile ou commerciale: Que peut-on en attendre?”, Travaux du comité français de Droit international privé, Vol. 2018-2020, forthcoming (Version roviso ire de la communication présentée le 4 octobre 2019 available here) Clover Alcolea, Lucas “The 2005 Hague Choice of Court and the 2019 Hague Judgments Conventions versus the New York Convention – Rivals, Alternatives or Something Else?”, Mc Gill Journal of Dispute Resolution 6 (2019-2020), pp. 187-214 Coco, Sarah E. “The Value of a New Judgments Convention for U.S. Litigants”, New York University Law Review 94 (2019), pp 1210-1243 Cuniberti, Gilles “Signalling the Enforceability of the Forum’s Judgments Abroad”, Rivista di diritto internazionale private e processuale (RDIPP) 56 (2020), pp 33-54 de Araujo, Nadia; de Nardi, Marcelo;
Spitz, Lidia “A nova era dos litígios internacionais”, Valor Economico 2019 de Araujo, Nadia;
de Nardi, Marcelo;
Lopes Inez;
Polido, Fabricio „Private International Law Chronicles“, Brazilian Journal of International Law 16 (2019), pp 19-34

  de Araujo, Nadia;
de Nardi, Marcelo „Consumer Protection Under the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 67-79 de Araujo, Nadia;
de Nardi, Marcelo „22ª Sessão Diplomática da Conferência da Haia e a Convenção sobre sentenças estrangeiras: Primeiras reflexões sobre as vantagens para o Brasil da sua adoção“, Revista de la Secretaría del Tribunal Permanente de Revisión 7 No. 14 (2019), páginas 198-221

(22nd Diplomatic Session of The Hague Conference and the Convention on Foreign Judgments: First Reflections on the Advantages for Brazil of their Adoption) Dotta Salgueiro, Marcos “Article 14 of the Judgments Convention: The Essential Reaffirmation of the Non-discrimination Principle in a Globalized Twenty-First Century”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 113-120 Douglas, Michael;
Keyes, Mary;
McKibbin, Sarah;
Mortensen, Reid “The HCCH Judgments Convention in Australian Law”, Federal Law Review 47 (2019), pp 420-443 Efeç?nar Süral Possible Ratification of the Hague Convention by Turkey and Its Effects to the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Public and Private International Law Bulletin 40/2 (2020), pp. 785 et seq. Fan, Jing “On the Jurisdiction over Intellectual Property in the Draft Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, Chinese Yearbook of Private International Law and Comparative Law 2018-02, pp. 313-337 Franzina, Pietro; Leandro, Antonio

  “La Convenzione dell’Aja del 2 luglio 2019 sul riconoscimento delle sentenze straniere: una prima lettura”, Quaderni di SIDIblog 6 (2019), pp 215-231, available at http://www.sidi-isil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Quaderni-di-SIDIBlog-6-2019.pdf

(The Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition of Foreign Judgments: A First Appraisal) Fuchs, Felix “Das Haager Übereinkommen vom 2. Juli 2019 über die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausländischer Urteile in Zivil- oder Handelssachen“, Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht (GWR) 2019, pp 395-399 Garcimartín, Francisco “The Judgments Convention: Some Open Questions”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 19-31 Goddard, David „The Judgments Convention – The Current State of Play”, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 29 (2019), pp 473-490 He, Qisheng “The HCCH Judgments Convention and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments pertaining to a State”, Global Law Review 3 (2020), pp 147-161 He, Qisheng “Unification and Division: Immovable Property Issues under the HCCH Judgement Convention”, Journal of International Law 1 (2020), pp 33-55 Jacobs, Holger “Der Zwischenstand zum geplanten Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen – Der vorläufige Konventionsentwurf 2016“, Zeitschrift für Internationales Privatrecht & Rechtsvergleichung (ZfRV) 2017, pp 24-30 Jang, Junhyok “The Public Policy Exception Under the New 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 97-111 Jang, Junhyok “2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters”, Korea Private International Law Journal 25 (2019), pp. 437-510. Jovanovic, Marko Thou Shall (Not) Pass – Grounds for Refusal of Recognition and

Enforcement under the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention, YbPIL 21 (2019/2020), pp. 309 – 332 Jueptner, Eva “The Hague Jurisdiction Project – what options for the Hague Conference?”, Journal of Private International Law 16 (2020), pp 247-274 Kessedjian, Catherine “Comment on the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters. Is the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 a useful tool for companies who are conducting international activities?“, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR) 2020, pp 19-33 Khanderia, Saloni „The Hague judgments project: assessing its plausible benefits for the development of the Indian private international law”, Commonwealth Law Bulletin 44 (2018), pp 452-475 Khanderia, Saloni “The Hague Conference on Private International Law’s Proposed Draft Text on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Should South Africa Endorse it?”, Journal of African Law 63 (2019), pp 413-433 Liakopoulos, Dimitris “The Convention of the Hague of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition of Foreign Sentences: Approaches and Comments”, Acta Universitatis Danubius Juridica 2019-2, pp. 5-19 Mariottini, Cristina „Establishment of Treaty Relations under The 2019 Hague Judgments

Convention“, YbPIL 21 (2019/2020), pp. 365-380 Mariottini, Cristina “The Exclusion of Defamation and Privacy from the Scope of the Hague Draft Convention on Judgments, YbPIL 19 (2017/2018), pp 475-486. Meier, Niklaus “Notification as a Ground for Refusal”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 81-95 Nielsen, Peter Arnt “The Hague 2019 Judgments Convention – from failure to success”, Journal of Private International Law 16 (2020), pp 205-246 North, Cara “The 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention: A Common Law Perspective”, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2020, pp 202-210 North, Cara “The Exclusion of Privacy Matters from the Judgments Convention”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 33-48 Oestreicher, Yoav “ ’We’re on a Road to Nowhere’ – Reasons for the Continuing Failure to Regulate Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, The International Lawyer 42 (2008), pp 59-86 Pasquot Polido, Fabrício B. “The Judgments Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law: a way forward for a long-awaited solution”, in Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Maria Blanca Noodt Taquela (eds.), Diversity and integration in Private International Law, Edinburgh 2019, pp. 176-199 Pertegás Sender, Marta “The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention: Its Conclusion and the road ahead”, in Asian Academy of International Law (publ.), Sinergy and Security: the Keys to Sustainable Global Investment: Proceedings of the 2019 Colloquium on International Law, 2019 Hong Kong, pp 181-190 Pertegás, Marta “Brussels I Recast and the Hague Judgments Project”, in Geert Van Calster (ed.), European Private International Law at 50: Celebrating and Contemplating the 1968 Brussels Convention and its Successors, Cambridge 2018, pp 67-82 Qian, Zhenqiu “On the Common Courts Provision under the Draft Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, Wuhan University International Law Review
2019-01, pp. 59-74 Qian, Zhenqiu;
Yang, Yu “On the Interpretation and Application of the Cost of Proceedings Provision under the Hague Judgment Convention”, China Journal of Applied Jurisprudence 2020-04, pp. 96-108 Reyes, Anselmo „Implications of the 2019 Hague Convention on the Enforcement of Judgments of the Singapore International Commercial Court”, in Rolf A. Schütze, Thomas R. Klötzel, Martin Gebauer (eds.), Festschrift für Roderich C. Thümmel zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin 2020, pp 695-709 Ribeiro-Bidaoui, João “The International Obligation of the Uniform and Autonomous Interpretation of Private Law Conventions: Consequences for Domestic Courts and International Organisations”, Netherlands International Law Review 67 (2020), pp 139 – 168 Rumenov, Ilija “Implications of the New 2019 Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments on the National Legal Systems of Countries in South Eastern Europe”, EU and Comparative Law Issues and Challenges Series (ECLIC) 3 (2019), pp 385-4040 Sachs, Klaus;
Weiler, Marcus “A comparison of the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions under the 1958 New York Convention and the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention”, in Rolf A. Schütze, Thomas R. Klötzel, Martin Gebauer (eds.), Festschrift für Roderich C. Thümmel zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin 2020, pp 763-781 Saumier, Geneviève “Submission as a Jurisdictional Basis and the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 49-65 Schack, Haimo “Wiedergänger der Haager Konferenz für IPR: Neue Perspektiven eines weltweiten Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommens?“, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEUP) 2014, pp 824-842 Schack, Haimo „Das neue Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2020, pp 1-96 Senicheva, Marina “The Relevance and Problems of the Hague Convention of July 2, 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Ratification by the Russian Federation”, Advances in Law Studies 8 (2020), online (available: here) Shchukin, Andrey Igorevich “Indirect International Jurisdiction in the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judments of 2019 (Part 1)”, Journal of Russian Law No. 2020-7, pp. 170-186 Shen, Juan “Further Discussion on the Drafts of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and Considerations from Chinese Perspective”, Chinese Review of International Law 2016-06, pp. 83-103 Silberman, Linda “Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled?”, DePaul Law Review 52 (2002), pp 319-349 Solomon, Dennis “Das Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen von 2019 und die internationale Anerkennungszuständigkeit“, in Rolf A. Schütze, Thomas R. Klötzel, Martin Gebauer (eds.), Festschrift für Roderich C. Thümmel zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin 2020, pp 873-893 Spitz, Lidia „Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments on Public Policy Grounds in the Hague Judgments Convention – A Comparison with The 1958 New York Convention“, YbPIL 21 (2019/2020), pp 333-364 Stein, Andreas „Das Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen 2019 – Was lange währt, wird endlich gut?“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2020, pp 197-202 Stewart, David P. „Current Developments: The Hague Conference adopts a New Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters”, American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 113 (2019), pp 772-783 Sun, Xiaofei;
Wu, Qiong “Commentary and Outlook on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters”, Journal of International Law 2019-01, pp. 155-164+170 Taquela, María Blanca Noodt; Abou-Nigm, Verónica Ruiz “News From The Hague: The Draft Judgments Convention and Its Relationship with Other International Instruments”, Yearbook of Private International Law 19 (2017/2018), pp 449-474 Teitz, Louise Ellen “Another Hague Judgments Convention? – Bucking the Past to Provide for the Future”, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 29 (2019), pp 491-511 Tian, Xinyue;
Qian, Zhenqiu;
Wang, Shengzhe “The Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Draft) and China’s Countermeasure – A Summary on the Fourth Judicial Forum of Great Powers”, Chinese Yearbook of Private International Law and Comparative Law 2018-01, pp. 377-388 van der Grinten, Paulien;
ten Kate, Noura „Editorial: The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention”, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR) 2020, pp 1-3 van Loon, Hans “Towards a global Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters”, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR) 2020, pp 4-18 van Loon, Hans “Towards a Global Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters”, Collection of Papers of the Faculty of Law, Niš 82 (2019), pp 15-35 van Loon, Hans “Le Brexit et les conventions de La Haye”, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 2019, pp 353-366 Wagner, Rolf “Ein neuer Anlauf zu einem Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2016, pp 97-102 Wang, Quian “On Intellectual Property Right Provisions in the Draft Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, China Legal Science 2018-01, pp. 118-142 Weidong, Zhu “The Recognition and Enforcement of Commercial Judgments Between China and South Africa: Comparison and Convergence”, China Legal Science 2019-06, pp 33-57 Weller, Matthias “The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: New Trends in Trust Management?”, in Christoph Benicke, Stefan Huber (eds.), Festschrift für Herbert Kronke zum 70. Geburtstag, Bielefeld 2020, pp 621-632 Weller, Matthias “The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention – The Jurisdictional Filters of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, Yearbook of Private International Law 21 (2019/2020), pp 279 – 308 Weller, Matthias “Das Haager Übereinkommen zur Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausländischer Urteile”, in: Thomas Rauscher (ed.), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht, Munich, 5th ed., forthcoming Weller, Matthias Die Kontrolle der internationalen Zuständigkeit im Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen 2019, in Christoph Althammer/Christoph Schärtl, Festschrift für Herbert Roth, in Vorbereitung. Wilderspin, Michael;
Vysoka, Lenka “The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention through European lenses”, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR) 2020, pp 34-49 Xu, Guojian “Comment on Key Issues Concerning Hague Judgment Convention in 2019 “, Journal of Shanghai University of Political Science and Law 35 (2020), pp 1-29 Xu, Guojian “To Establish an International Legal System for Global Circulation of Court Judgments”, Wuhan University International Law Review 5 (2017), pp 100-130 Xu, Guojian “Overview of the Mechanism of Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements Established by HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, China Journal of Applied Jurisprudence No. 2020-02, pp 65-77 Yeo, Terence “The Hague Judgments Convention – A View from Singapore”, Singapore Academy of Law Journal (e-First) 3rd August 2020 (available here) Zhang, Wenliang;
Tu, Guangjian “The 1971 and 2019 Hague Judgments Conventions: Compared and Whether China Would Change Its Attitude Towards The Hague”, Journal of International Dispute Settlement (JIDS), 2020, 00, pp. 1-24 Zhao, Ning “Completing a long-awaited puzzle in the landscape of cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments: An overview of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, Swiss Review of International and European Law (SRIEL) 30 (2020), pp 345-368

Chukwudi Ojiegbe has just published a book titled: “International Commercial Arbitration in the European Union: Brussels I, Brexit and Beyond” with Edward Elgar Publishing.

The abstract reads as follows:

This illuminating book contributes to knowledge on the impact of Brexit on international commercial arbitration in the EU. Entering the fray at a critical watershed in the EU’s history, Chukwudi Ojiegbe turns to the interaction of court litigation and international commercial arbitration, offering crucial insights into the future of EU law in these fields.

Ojiegbe reviews a plethora of key aspects of the law that will encounter the aftermath Brexit, focusing on the implications of the mutual trust principle and the consequences for the EU exclusive competence in aspects of international commercial arbitration. He explores the principles of anti-suit injunction and other mechanisms that may be deployed by national courts and arbitral tribunals to prevent parallel court and arbitration proceedings. Advancing academic debate on the EU arbitration/litigation interface, this book suggests innovative solutions to alleviate this longstanding and seemingly intractable issue.

Arriving at a time of legal uncertainty, this book offers crucial guidance for policymakers and lawyers dealing with the interaction of court litigation and international commercial arbitration in the EU, as well as academics and researchers studying contemporary EU and commercial law.

 

Anyone interested in the interface between commercial arbitration and the Brussels I regime should read this book. It is highly recommended.

More information may be found here and  here

On 29 April 2020, the (national) Court of Appeal of Luxembourg ruled that the conditions of res judicata are determined by uniform European rules and not by national law. In particular, the court held that the triple identity requirement developed in the context of lis pendens equally applies to define the conditions of res judicata.

Background

In 1985, a Luxembourg company installed a storage machine in a warehouse in Weissenau, Germany. In 1988, a fire broke out in the warehouse and destroyed it. Three German insurance companies covered the losses and, after being subrogated in the rights of the insured, sued the Luxembourg company in Munich, Germany, for DEM 3.885.395, DEM 12.054.105 and DEM 67.820 (about € 6 million in total).

The German companies sued on both contractual and tort grounds. Although the issue was debated in the Luxembourg proceedings, it seems that the German court declined jurisdiction with respect to the contractual claim. With respect to the tort claim, the German court found that the claim was admissible but dismissed it. The first instance judgment was rendered in 1994.

While the German insurers were (unsuccessfully) appealing through the German court system up until the German Federal Court (BGH), the Luxembourg defendant initiated proceedings in 1998 in Luxembourg against one of its French subscontractor, seeking a declaration that, should the Luxembourg defendant be found liable of the loss, the French subcontractor should indemnify it. A few months later, the German insurers also initiated proceedings against the Luxembourg defendant in the same Luxembourg court seeking payment of the exact same sums (DEM 3.885.395, DEM 12.054.105 and DEM 67.820). Their claim was primarily for breach of contract, and subsidiarily in tort.

The Luxembourg party argued that the recognition of the German judgment in Luxembourg prevented relitigation of the same dispute in Luxembourg courts. On appeal, it also challenged the jurisdiction of Luxembourg courts to entertain the action on the ground of lis pendens.

Lis Pendens

The Luxembourg Court of Appeal dismissed the jurisdictional challenge in a first judgment of 8 July 2015. First, it noted that the issue had not been raised before the court of first instance. Secondly, it ruled that the Luxembourg proceedings had been initiated after the German court not only had been seized but had actually delivered its judgment. It held that the lis pendens doctrine did not apply if the second proceedings were initiated after a judgment had been rendered.

Res Judicata

The key question was therefore whether the German judgment prevented relitigation in Luxembourg. Remarkably, both parties primarily argued that the conditions and scope of res judicata were governed by the Brussels Convention, and should thus be determined autonomously. However, both parties had also filed with the court expert evidence on the conditions and scope of res judicata under German law.

The court noted that the parties agreed that EU law governs and ruled that the Brussels Convention defines the scope and conditions of res judicata. It therefore declared the expert reports on German law irrelevant.

The court identified and applied two rules of EU law.

The first was deduced from the Gothaer case (C-456/11). It relates to the scope of res judicata. The issue was whether the reasons of the judgment could be taken into consideration to determine the scope of the foreign judgment, or whether the court should only look at the operative part of the judgment (dispositif).  The court suggested that the following part of Gothaer was of general application:

the concept of res judicata under European Union law does not attach only to the operative part of the judgment in question, but also attaches to the ratio decidendi of that judgment, which provides the necessary underpinning for the operative part and is inseparable from it.

The second rule identified by the Luxembourg Court of Appeal was the triple identity requirement. The court did not explain which judgment of the CJEU supported this conclusion. I can certainly think of a number of judgments defining the requirements for lis pendens, but I am not sure the CJEU has ever ruled that the same requirements were also applicable in the context of a European concept of res judicata in civil and commercial matters.

The Court then conducted a close analysis of the German judgment, that it compared to the claims made in Luxembourg. It underscored certain important differences between the German and Luxembourg laws of liability which explain why a claim could be made on a tort basis under German law, while it could only be made on a contractual basis in Luxembourg. It eventually concluded that the German judgment was res judicata in Luxembourg and declared the claims of the insurance companies inadmissible.

Assessment

The most interesting part of the judgment is no doubt the proposition that a European concept of res judicata exists under the Brussels Convention. As far as I am aware, the vast majority of scholars in Europe debate whether res judicata should be governed by the law of the state of origin or the law of the requested state.

Gothaer is certainly authority for the proposition that the res judicata of jurisdictional rulings should be defined at European level, but the court insisted that the rationale was the uniform application of European rules, i.e. jurisdictional rules provided by the Brussels I Regulation. In the present case, the issues debated before the German and Luxembourg courts were governed by national law (German tort law and Luxembourg contract law).

This being said, would it be illogical to resort to the same requirements to define lis pendens and res judicata? Both doctrines aim at avoiding conflicting decisions.

The 9th Journal of Private International Law Conference was due to be hosted by the Singapore Management University in 2021. Due to the ongoing pandemic, the Editors of the Journal (Professor Jonathan Harris QC of King’s College, London and Professor Paul Beaumont FRSE of the University of Stirling) and the conference organiser (Associate Professor Adeline Chong, Singapore Management University) have decided to postpone the conference to 2022 (tentatively June 2022). We will announce further details in due course.

Rome I and Rome II in Practice, a volume edited by Emmanuel Guinchard focusing on the application of the theoretically uniform rules of Rome I and Rome II by the national courts of the Member States, has recently been published by Intersentia. A true treasure trove for scholars of comparative private international law, the book features national reports from 20 Member States and the UK drafted by specialist authors as well as a review of the case law of the CJEU and extensive conclusions by the editor. Each national report contains both general remarks on the jurisprudence of the national courts as well as a structured review of the application of the two Regulations to a wide range of specific questions.

Several of the national reports have been provided by current or former editors of this blog, including Apostolos Anthimos (Greece), Matthias Weller (Austria & Germany), and Pietro Franzina (Italy).

Further information and the table of contents can be found here.

This brief note considers aspects of the recent litigation over the identification of an unspecified applicable law of an arbitration agreement having an English seat. Though the UK Supreme Court concluded that the applicable law of the arbitration agreement itself was, if unspecified, usually to be the same as that of the contract to which the arbitration agreement refers, there was an interesting division between the judges on the method of determining the applicable law of the arbitration agreement from either the law of the arbitral seat (the view favoured by the majority) or from the applicable law of the underlying contract (the view favoured by the minority). As will become clear, the author of this note finds the views of the minority to be more compelling than those of the majority.

In a simplified form the facts were that, in February 2016, a Russian power station was damaged by an internal fire. ‘Chubb’, insurer of the owners of the power station, faced a claim on its policy. In May 2019, Chubb sought to sue ‘Enka’ (a Turkish subcontractor) in Russia to recover subrogated losses. Enka objected to these Russian proceedings claiming that under the terms of its contract of engagement any such dispute was to be arbitrated via the ICC in England: in September 2019, it sought declaratory orders from the English High Court that the matter should be arbitrated in England, that the applicable law of the arbitration agreement was English, and requested an English anti-suit injunction to restrain Chubb from continuing the Russian litigation.

Neither the arbitration agreement nor the contract by which Chubb had originally engaged Enka contained a clear provision specifically and unambiguously selecting an applicable law. Though it was plain that the applicable law of the underlying contract would, by the application of the provisions of the Rome I Regulation, eventually be determined to be Russian, the applicable law of the arbitration agreement itself could not be determined as directly in this manner because Art. 1(2)(e) of the Regulation excludes arbitration agreements from its scope and leaves the matter to the default applicable law rules of the forum.

After an unsuccessful interim application in September 2019, Enka’s case came before Baker J in December 2019 in the High Court. It seems from Baker J’s judgment that Enka appeared to him to be somewhat reticent in proceeding to resolve the dispute by seeking to commence an arbitration; this, coupled with the important finding that the material facts were opposite to those that had justified judicial intervention in The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87, may explain Enka’s lack of success before the High Court which concluded that the correct forum was Russia and that there was no basis upon which it should grant an anti-suit injunction in this case.

In January 2020, Enka notified Chubb of a dispute and, by March 2020, had filed a request for an ICC arbitration in London. Enka also however appealed the decision of Baker J to the Court of Appeal and duly received its requested declaratory relief plus an anti-suit injunction. The Court of Appeal sought to clarify the means by which the applicable law of an arbitration agreement should be determined if an applicable law was not identified expressly to govern the arbitration agreement itself. The means to resolve this matter, according to the court, was that without an express choice of an applicable law for the arbitration agreement itself, the curial law of the arbitral seat should be presumed to be the applicable law of the arbitration agreement. Thus, though the applicable law of the underlying contract was seemingly Russian, the applicable law of the arbitration agreement was to be presumed to be English due to the lack of an express choice of Russian law and due to the fact of the English arbitral seat. Hence English law (seemingly wider than the Russian law on a number of important issues) would determine the scope of the matters and claims encompassed by the arbitration agreement and the extent to which they were defensible with the assistance of an English court.

In May 2020, Chubb made a final appeal to the UK Supreme Court seeking the discharge of the anti-suit injunction and opposing the conclusion that the applicable law of the arbitration agreement should be English (due to the seat of the arbitration) rather than Russian law as per the deduced applicable law of the contract to which the arbitration agreement related. The UK Supreme Court was thus presented with an opportunity to resolve the thorny question of whether in such circumstances the curial law of the arbitral seat or the applicable law of the agreement being arbitrated should be determinative of the applicable law of the arbitration agreement. Though the Supreme Court was united on the point that an express or implied choice of applicable law for the underlying contract usually determines the applicable law of the arbitration agreement, it was split three to two on the issue of how to proceed in the absence of such an express choice.

The majority of three (Lords Kerr, Hamblen and Leggatt) favoured the location of the seat as determinative in this case. This reasoning did not proceed from the strong presumption approach of the Court of Appeal (which was rejected) but rather from the conclusion that since there had been no choice of applicable law for either the contract or for the arbitration agreement, the law with the closest connection to the arbitration agreement was the curial law of the arbitral seat. As will be seen, the minority (Lords Burrows and Sales) regarded there to have been a choice of applicable law for the contract to be arbitrated and proceeded from this to determine the applicable law of the arbitration agreement.

The majority (for the benefit of non-UK readers, when there is a majority the law is to be understood to be stated on this matter by  that majority in a manner as authoritative as if there had been unanimity across all five judges) considered that there was no choice of an applicable law pertinent to Art.3 of Rome I in the underlying contract by which Enka’s services had been engaged. It is true that this contract did not contain a helpful statement drawn from drafting precedents that the contract was to be governed by any given applicable law; it did however make many references to Russian law and to specific Russian legal provisions in a manner that had disposed both Baker J and the minority in the Supreme Court to conclude that there was indeed an Art.3 choice, albeit of an implied form. This minority view was based on a different interpretation of the facts and on the Giuliano and Lagarde Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (OJ EU No C 282-1). The majority took the view that the absence of an express choice of applicable law for the contract must mean that the parties were unable to agree on the identity of such a law and hence ‘chose’ not to make one. The minority took the view that such a conclusion was not clear from the facts and that the terms of the contract and its references to Russian law did indicate an implied choice of Russian law. As the majority was however unconvinced on this point, they proceeded from Art.3 to Art.4 of Rome I and concluded that, in what they regarded as the absence of an express or implied choice of applicable law for the contract, Russian law was the applicable law for the contract.

For the applicable law of the arbitration agreement itself, the majority resisted the idea that on these facts their conclusion re the applicable law of the contract should also be determinative for the applicable law of the arbitration agreement. Instead, due to the Art.1(2)(e) exclusion of arbitration agreements from the scope of the Regulation, the applicable law of the arbitration agreement fell to be determined by the English common law. This required the identification of the law with which the arbitration agreement was ‘most closely connected’. Possibly reading too much into abstract notions of international arbitral practice, the majority concluded that, in this case, the applicable law of the arbitration agreement should be regarded as most closely connected to the curial law of the arbitral seat. Hence English law was the applicable law of the arbitration agreement despite the earlier conclusion that the applicable law of the contract at issue was Russian.

As indicated, the minority disagreed on the fundamental issue of whether or not there had been an Art.3 implied choice of an applicable law in the underlying contract. In a masterful dissenting judgment that is a model of logic, law and clarity, Lord Burrows, with whom Lord Sales agreed, concluded that this contract contained what for Art.3 of Rome I could be regarded as an implied choice of Russian law as ‘… clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case’. This determination led to the conclusion that the parties’ implied intentions as to the applicable law of the arbitration agreement were aligned determinatively with the other factors that implied Russian law as the applicable law for the contract. Russian law was (for the minority) thus the applicable law of the underlying contract and the applicable law of the ICC arbitration (that, by March, 2020 Enka had acted to commence) was to take place within the English arbitral seat in accordance its English curial law. Lord Burrows also made plain that if had he concluded that there was no implied choice of Russian law for the contract, he would still have concluded that the law of the arbitration agreement itself was Russian as he considered that the closest and most substantial connection of the arbitration agreement was with Russian law.

Though the views of the minority are of no direct legal significance at present, it is suggested that the minority’s approach to Art.3 of the Rome I Regulation was more accurate than that of the majority and, further, that the approach set out by Lord Burrows at paras 257-8 offers a more logical and pragmatic means of settling any such controversies between the law of the seat and the law of the associated contract. It is further suggested that the minority views may become relevant in later cases in which parties seek a supposed advantage connected with the identity of the applicable law of the arbitration. When such a matter will re-occur is unclear, however, though the Rome I Regulation ceases to be directly applicable in the UK on 31 December 2020, the UK plans to introduce a domestic analogue of this Regulation thereafter. It may be that a future applicant with different facts will seek to re-adjust the majority view that in the case of an unexpressed applicable law for the contract and arbitration agreement that the law of the seat of the arbitration determines the applicable law of the arbitration agreement.

As for the anti-suit injunction, it will surprise few that the attitude of the Court of Appeal was broadly echoed by the Supreme Court albeit in a more nuanced form. The Supreme Court clarified that there was no compelling reason to refuse to consider issuing an anti-suit injunction to any arbitral party who an English judge (or his successors on any appeal) has concluded can benefit from such relief. They clarified further that the issuance of an anti-suit injunction in such circumstances does not require that the selected arbitral seat is English. The anti-suit injunction was re-instated to restrain Chubb’s involvement in the Russian litigation proceedings and to protect the belatedly commenced ICC arbitration.

 

Napag Trading Ltd & Ors v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SPA & Anor [2020] EWHC 3034 (QB) engages (and refers to) the issues I previously reported on in inter alia Bolagsupplysningen, Saïd v L’Express,

It is worthwhile to list both claimants and defendants.

On the claimants side, Napag Trading Limited (“the First Claimant”) is an English-domiciled company. Napag Italia Srl (“the Third Claimant”) is an Italian-domiciled subsidiary of the First Claimant. Sgr Francesco Mazzagatti (“the Second Claimant”), an Italian national with his main residence in Dubai, is the CEO and sole director of, and 95% shareholder in, the First Claimant. The First Claimant trades, and the Third Claimant has traded, in petroleum-based products.

On the defendants side, Gedi Gruppo Editoriale S.p.A. (“the First Defendant”) is the publisher amongst other things of L’Espresso which is a weekly Italian-language political and cultural magazine available both in print and online in England and Wales. Società Editoriale Il Fatto S.p.A. (“the Second Defendant”) is the publisher of Il Fatto Quotidiano (“Il Fatto”), a daily Italian-language newspaper published in England and Wales only on the internet.

An earlier Brexit-anticipatory forum non conveniens challenge was waived away by Jay J at 7: ‘Only the Second Defendant saw fit to raise a forum non conveniens challenge in advance of 1st January 2021 and the relevant EU regulation no longer applying. I would have been very reluctant to rule on this sort of application on an anticipatory basis.’

Identifying a centre of interest in England and Wales, leading to full jurisdiction there for damages, per CJEU e-Date and Bolagsupplysningen and also a precondition to apply for injunctive relief (see also Bolagsupplysningen: only courts with full jurisdiction may issue such relief) is of course a factual assessment.

The Second Claimant is an entrepreneur, born in Calabria but now living in Dubai. He founded the Third Claimant in 2012. Initially, it traded in oil and petroleum products from offices in Rome. The Third Claimant dealt in particular with the Italian oil company Eni S.p.A. (“Eni”), headquartered in Rome and in part state-owned, and Eni Trading & Shipping S.p.A. (“Ets”) which is based in Rome and has a branch in London. Second Claimant incorporated the First Claimant in April 2018. His evidence is that London was a better base from which to conduct and grow his business because he was encountering resistance from some banks and financial institutions who were diffident about working with an Italian company. More specifically, the strategy was to hive off the Third Claimant’s oil and gas business into the First Claimant, and the former would devote itself to trading in petrochemicals. Additionally, the idea was to invest in an “upstream” development in the UK Continental shelf, and the first discussions about this were in November 2018.

Justice Jay revisits the CJEU’s instructions re centre of interests for natural persons per e-Date. At 29:

First, other things being equal, and certainly in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a natural person’s “centre of interests” will match his or her habitual residence. Whether or not this may accurately be described as an evidential presumption does not I think matter (in my view, no legal presumption is generated); in any case, the CJEU – subject to my second point – is not purporting to assist national courts as to the rules of law that should govern the exercise of ascertainment. Secondly, general considerations of predictability and the need for clarity militate in favour of straightforward and readily accessible criteria rather than any microscopic examination of the detail.

At 32 follows an interesting discussion of para 43 of the CJEU Bolagsupplysningen judgment

“43. It is also appropriate to point out that, in circumstances where it is not clear from the evidence that the court must consider at the stage when it assesses whether it has jurisdiction that the economic activity of the relevant legal person is carried out mainly in a certain member state, so that the centre of interests of the legal person which is claiming to be the victim of an infringement of its personality rights cannot be identified, that person cannot benefit from the right to sue the alleged perpetrator of the infringement pursuant to article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 for the entirety of the compensation on the basis of the place where the damage occurred.”

After a reference to what Justice Jay calls Bobek AG’s ‘masterly opinion’, in particular the burden of proof issues are discussed which Jay J justifiably holds are not within the scope of Brussels Ia (not at least in the sense of deciding the procedural moment at which proof must be furnished). I agree with his finding that the CJEU’s meaning of para 43 is simply that

in the event that the national court concluded that it could not identify the “centre of interests” because the evidence was unclear, article 7(2) of the RBR could not avail the claimant.

Conclusion of the factual consideration follows (probably obiter: see 150) at 161: first Claimant has the better of the argument that its “centre of interests” is in England and Wales.

Jay J then discusses at 35 ff that whether there actually is damage within E&W as a matter of domestic law to decide to good arguable case standard, that the case may go ahead. That discussion shows that  the actual concept of ‘damage’ within the meaning of Brussels Ia and indeed Rome II is not quite so established as might be hoped, and it is held at 141 that no serious damage has occurred within E&W for there to be jurisdiction.

The case is a good illustration of the hurdle which national rules of civil procedure continue to form despite jurisdictional harmonisation under EU private international law rules.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.

Third ed. forthcoming February 2021.

 

Jurisdiction, libel over the internet.
Consideration of centre of interests per #CJEU Bolagsupplysningen (found to be E&W at good arguable case level). https://t.co/VOi2KS5qFb

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 13, 2020

You are kindly invited to the webinar “HOPINEU Lecture Series: Covid-19 & Business Interruption (BI) Insurance” on 27 November 2020 at 4:00pm (GMT+3).

This event is supported by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union and organised as part of the Jean Monnet Module project “Harmonisation of the Principles of Insurance Law in Europe” (HOPINEU) run at Koç University.

For updates on this Jean Monnet Module, please follow @hopineu1 #HOPINEU on Twitter.

 

 

Recent Developments in Turkish Family Law, edited by Prof. dr. Fatih Ibili and Prof. dr. Zeynep Derya Tarman is now available.

This book gives an overview of recent developments in Turkish family law for legal practitioners in Europe. Both the private international law and the substantive law aspects of Turkish family law is explained, with a special focus on the recognition and enforcement of foreign divorce decisions, the role of fault in divorce proceedings, the dissolution of the matrimonial regime of participation in the acquisition, the surname of women and children and joint custody after divorce. It contains up-to-date information based on recent amendments in legislation and recent case law of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court.

 

You are kindly invited for the conference on “Towards a global cooperation framework for temporary and circular migration” by Hans van Loon (Former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law) on November 18, 2020, Wednesday between 12.30-13.30 (GMT+3). The conference is organised by Bilkent University as a part of the Talks on Migration Series within the Jean Monnet Module on European and International Migration Law. It will be held via zoom, free of charge.

Click here to view the event poster

Join Zoom Meeting
https://zoom.us/j/96734230354
Meeting ID: 967 3423 0354

An online workshop under the title Private International Law in the UK after Brexit (Commercial focus) will take place on 19 and 20 November 2020, hosted by Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling), Mihail Danov (University of Exeter) and Jayne Holliday (University of Stirling).

This is the third of four public workshops funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, on Private International Law after Brexit from global, European, Commonwealth and intra-UK perspectives.

Speakers include Jenny Papettas (University of Birmingham), Yvonne Baatz (Queen Mary University of London), Rob Merkin QC (University of Exeter), Tom Sprange QC (King & Spalding), Mihail Danov (University of Exeter), Mary Keyes (Griffith University), Christophe Bernasconi (Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law), Iain Mackie (Macfarlanes), Alex Layton QC (King’s College London and Twenty Essex), Barry Rodger (University of Strathclyde), Lindsey Clegg (Freeths), Omar Shah (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP), and Nick Frey (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP).

The full programme and the details to attend the workshop are available here.

You are kindly invited to a series of six online expert seminars on the Brussels II ter Regulation (EU Regulation 2019/1111). This new Regulation on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility will only become fully applicable on 1 August 2022. Time enough, it would seem, but with its 105 articles, 98 recitals and ten annexes, the organisers considered it not too early to start preparing. Cristina González Beilfuss (University of Barcelona), Laura Carpaneto (University of Genoa), Thalia Kruger (University of Antwerp), Ilaria Pretelli (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law) and Mirela Župan (University of Osijek) will be presenting their first thoughts on the Regulation, its new enforcement regime, international parental child abduction, child protection, judicial and administrative cooperation, provisional measures and parallel proceedings. They have invited academics and practitioners to react to their thoughts and provided time for discussion. 

The seminars will be conducted on Zoom, free of charge. They are aimed at practitioners, civil servants and academics alike. Each will last 1 hour and 15 minutes.  

Please enrol if you wish to join. You will notice that the form allows you to enrol for each of the seminars separately. Only persons enrolled will be provided with the Zoom link for the event.  

Programme:

Session I: 25 November 2020

12.30 – 13.45  New Challenges under Brussels IIter

Prof. Cristina González Beilfuss, University of Barcelona

Dr. Máire Ní Shúilleabháin, University College Dublin

Mr. Michael Wilderspin, legal service of the European Commission

 

Session II: 25 November 2020

14.00 – 15.15  Enforcement

Dr. Ilaria Pretelli, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law Lausanne

Prof. Vesna Lazic, T.M.C. Asser Institute Den Haag

Advocate Véronique Chauveau, Véronique Chauveau & Associés, Paris

 

Session III: 26 November 2020

 12.30 – 13.45 Child Abduction

Prof. Thalia Kruger, University of Antwerp

Dr. Katarina Trimmings, University of Aberdeen

Advocate Kamila Zagorska, NWS-MCB Prawo Rodzinne, Warsaw

 

Session IV: 26 November 2020

14.00 – 15.15 Children under Brussels IIter

Prof. Laura Carpaneto, University of Genova

Prof. Giacomo Biagioni, University of Cagliari

Mr. Robert Fucik, Central Authority Austria

 

Session V: 3 December 2020

12.30 – 14.00  Cooperation between central authorities and between judges

Prof. Mirela Župan, J. J. University Strossmayer of Osijek

Dr. Gian Paolo Romano, University of Genève

Mr. Christian Hohn, Federal Office of Justice – Central Authority Germany

Stephan Auerbach, Médiateur FSM/SDM, assermenté par l’Etat de Genève

 

Session VI: 17 December 2020

12.30 – 13.45  Provisional measures, transfer, lis pendens 

Dr. Ilaria Pretelli, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law Lausanne & Prof. Mirela Župan, J. J. University Strossmayer of Osijek

Prof. Costanza Honorati, University of Milano-Bicocca

Judge Myriam de Hemptinne, Family Judge at the Court of Appeal of Brussels, seconded to the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law and Belgian Network judge in family matters (EJN and IHNJ)

 

Two recent rulings of the Supreme Court of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan refused recognition and enforcement of  German and Swiss judgments on maintenance on grounds of no reciprocity.

I. First case: No reciprocity with Germany

1. The facts

The applicant was the wife of the respondent, both Jordanian nationals. She filed several applications before German courts in Stuttgart, and obtained a number of final judgments ordering payments for alimony to her benefit. Due to non payment by the husband, she filed an application for the recognition and enforcement of the German judgments in Jordan.  The Court of first instance declared the judgments enforceable in Jordan in 2009. The husband appealed. The Amman Court of Appeal issued its decision January 2015, revoking the appealed decision. The wife filed a second appeal (cassation).

2. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Cassation

Initially, the Supreme Court underlined the lack of a judicial cooperation agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Germany, which leads to the application of the Jordan law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The Supreme Court stressed out that for the purposes of a foreign judgment being executed in Jordan, the conditions stipulated in the Law on Execution of Foreign Judgments No. (8) of 1952 must be met. It then referred to the provisions of Article (7/2) of the law, which states that the court may reject the application requesting the execution of a judgment issued by a court of any country whose law does not allow the recognition of judgments issued by the courts of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The Supreme Court refers then to the order of the Amman Court of Appeal to the applicant, by virtue of which the latter was invited to provide evidence whether German laws allow the recognition of judgments issued by Jordanian courts. Based on the letter received by the Ministry of Justice in December 2014, the Court of Appeal concluded that there is no reciprocity between Jordan and Germany to recognize judgments issued by their courts.

On the grounds aforementioned, the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation and confirmed the ruling of the Amman Court of Appeal [Jordan Court of Cassation, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ruling issued at 9/2 /2020].

II. Second case – No reciprocity with Switzerland

1. The facts

The parties were a Romanian wife (applicant in Jordan and claimant in Switzerland) and a Jordanian husband (defendant in Switzerland and appellant in Jordan). The applicant obtained a set of decisions against the respondent, including the right of guardianship over the child resulting from their marriage, and maintenance. In 2019, the wife filed an application for the recognition and enforcement of a number of judgments issued by Zurich courts. Both the North Amman Court of First Instance and the Amman Court of Appeal allowed the recognition of the Swiss judgments. The husband lodged a second appeal in March 2020, invoking a number of grounds for cassation. The focus is on the 9th and 10th ground, namely the following:

a.       The instance courts erred and violated the text of Article 7/2 of the Foreign Judgment Execution Law by not responding to his request, that Swiss courts do not recognize judgments issued by Jordanian courts.

b.      The Court of Appeal was mistaken by not allowing evidence to be presented, demonstrating that Swiss courts do not accept rulings issued by Jordanian courts

2. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Cassation

In response to the above, the Supreme Court stated that for the purposes of the foreign judgment being executed within the Kingdom, it is imperative that the recognition meets the conditions stipulated in the Law on Execution of Foreign Judgments No. (8) of 1952. By referring to the provisions of Article (7/2) of the same law, the Supreme Court reproduced the wording of the provision, namely, that the court may also reject the application requesting the execution of a judgment issued by one of the courts of any country whose law does not permit the recognition of judgments issued by the courts of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. What is learned from this text, the Supreme Court continues, is that reciprocity must be available, and the ruling does not violate public order.

The Supreme Court granted the appeal with the following reasoning:

• the Court of Appeal omitted to examine whether there was reciprocity between Jordan and Switzerland to mutually recognize judgments issued by their courts;
• it also failed to address the Ministry of Justice to clarify whether there was reciprocity, and that the judgments issued by the Jordanian courts are recognized by the courts of Switzerland, and then to evaluate the respective evidence.

Based on the above, the Supreme Court decided to refuse recognition of the Swiss judgments [Jordan Court of Cassation, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ruling issued at 21/9/2020].