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On 6 November 2020 (13:30 – 16:30 CET) the Royal Netherlands Society of International Law (KNVIR) will be holding its Annual Meeting online via Zoom. This year the invited legal experts will be focusing on the theme of adaptability of (private) international law to the digital environment.

In their presentations Marjolein Busstra, Wieteke Teeuwen (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ybo Buruma (Netherlands Supreme Court and Radboud University Nijmegen), and Jerker B. Svantesson (Bond University; Swedish Law & Informatics Research Institute, Stockholm University, Sweden and Masaryk University) will be discussing whether the concepts and ideas developed in the ‘predigital era’ still fit the digital world. In doing so the speakers will analyse whether international law (both public and private) is ready for the digital era or whether law has been a rather ‘fragmented follower of developments’ and we should be fundamentally rethinking a number of notions and approaches.

Marjolein Busstra and Wieteke Teeuwen will focus on International Law in the Context of Cyber Operations. Ybo Buruma will look at internet from the perspective of International Law and Cyberspace – Issues of Sovereignty and the Common Good. Finally, Jerker B. Svantesson will be discussing whether International Law [Is] Ready for the (Already Ongoing) Digital Age: Perspectives from Private and Public International Law.

Registration is open until 3 November 2000 at info@knvir.org.

The reports (preadviezen) prepared by the legal experts have been published in November by Asser Press under the title International Law for a Digitalised World. You can find more information about this here.

Shenzhen Senior Technology Material Co Ltd v Celgard, LLC [2020] EWCA Civ 1293 concerns an appeal against service out of jurisdiction (the judgment appealed is [2020] EWHC 2072 (Ch)). Celgard allege that the importation and marketing by Senior of battery separator film involves the misuse of Celgard’s trade secrets.

Senior (of China) contend that the judge fell into error in concluding, first, that Celgard (incorporated in Delaware) had established a serious issue to be tried (here part of the jurisdictional threshold) assuming that English law applies to its claims and, secondly, that England is the proper forum to try the claims. As to the latter the core argument is that in limiting its claims to remedies in respect of acts in the UK, Celgard could not establish the requisite degree of connection to England. As for the former, they argue the law applicable to Celgard’s claims is Chinese law, which would count against jurisdiction.

Strategically, Celgard’s case against Senior is not based on breach of the NDA applicable between Celgard and one of its former employees,  Dr Zhang who, when he left Celgard, told its then COO that he was going to work for General Electric in California, which does not compete with Celgard in the field of battery separators. It later transpired that he had in fact joined Senior in China, where he was using the false name “Bin Wang”. This element of the facts triggers the question whether Senior is liable for the acts of another, even if that other is its employee.

The Celgard – Zhang NDA is governed by the law of South Carolina, application of which would also have triggered A4(3)(b) or (c) of the Trade Secrets Directive 2016/943. Celgard do rely on the NDA as supporting its case that the trade secrets were confidential. Rather Celgard claim that Senior’s employee acted in breach of an equitable obligation. This engages Rome II,  specifically Article 6(2) because Celgard’s claims are concerned with an act of unfair competition affecting exclusively the interests of a specific competitor, namely Celgard. In such circumstances, Article 6(2) provides that “Article 4 shall apply”.

Of note is that this is one of those cases that show that Rome II applies to more than just tortious obligations: as Arnold LJ notes at 51, as a matter of English law, claims for breach of equitable obligations of confidence are not claims in tort.

Celgard’s case, accepted by Trowe J at the High Court, is that A4(1) leads to English law because the ‘direct damage’ (per Rome II and CJEU Lazard indirect damage needs to be ignored) caused by the wrongdoing it complains of has occurred (and will, if not restrained, continue to occur) in the UK, that being the country into which the infringing goods (namely the shipment to the UK Customer and any future shipments of the same separator) have been (and will be) imported, causing damage to Celgard’s market here.

Senior’s case is that confidential information is intangible property and that damage to intangible property is located at the time and place it became irreversible (support is sought in extracts from Andrew Dickinson’s Rome II volume with OUP). At 58 ff Arnold LJ gives 7 reasons for rejecting the position. I will not repeat them all here. Of note is not just the (most justifiable) heavy leaning on the travaux but also the support sought in secondary EU law different from private international law (such as the Trade Secrets Directive 2016/943) as well as in the consistency between Brussels Ia and the Rome Regulations [on which Szpunar AG has written excellently in Burkhard Hess and Koen Lenaerts (eds.), The 50th Anniversary of the European Law of Civil Procedure]. This is not an easy proposition however given the lack of detail in Rome I and the need for autonomous EU interpretation, understandable.

The Trade Secrets Directive is further discussed at 65 ff for in A4(5) it makes importation of infringing goods an unlawful use of a trade secret “where the person carrying out such activities knew, or ought, under the circumstances, to have known that the trade secret was used unlawfully within the meaning of paragraph 3”. One of the possibilities embraced by paragraph 3 is (a), the person “having acquired the trade secret unlawfully”. Arnold LJ then asks: what law is to be applied to determine whether it was acquired “unlawfully”? Is A4(5) read together with A4(3)(a) an implicit choice of law rule pointing to the law of the place where the trade secret was acquired? Arnold LJ suggests this is not acte clair and may need CJEU clarification however not at this stage for his provisional view (with an eye on the jurisdictional threshold test) is that the Directive is not an implicit choice of law rule and that per Rome II, English law applies.

Plenty applicable law issues to discuss at the merits stage.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.6.2. Third ed. forthcoming February 2021.

 

 

Service out of jurisdiction with core role for applicable law considerations: Article 6 junto 4 Rome II, unfair competition. https://t.co/BUUjFlzY9P

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 9, 2020

The author of this post is Jorg Sladič, associate professor of International and European Law at the European Faculty of Law in Ljubljana.

On 11 August 2020, the Slovenian Supreme Court dismissed an appeal challenging the enforcement of an Austrian judgement compelling the judgment debtor to pay levies to the Austrian Construction Workers’ Annual Leave and Severance Pay Fund, known as BUAK (Bauarbeiter-Urlaubs- und Abfertigungskasse). The sums (claims for wage supplements regarding annual leave pay) to be paid to BUAK even though rather a matter of Austrian public law are under interpretation of Brussels I bis Regulation a civil and commercial matter (case Cpg 8/2020, ECLI:SI:VSRS:2020:CPG.8.2020).

Facts

A Slovenian judgment debtor was condemned by an Austrian court upon application of the Austrian person of public law BUAK to pay a sum of money as capital and a levy for claims for wage supplements regarding annual leave to BUAK on 3 May 2018.

The Austrian judgment-creditor moved to enforce the judgment. A Slovenian court granted a writ of execution on 16 June 2019. The judgement-debtor appealed and the appeal arrived at the Slovenian Supreme Court and raised among others a plea in law according to which such an Austrian judgement is contrary to Slovenian public policy. As it was alleged that the liabilities to be paid under the Austrian judgement were already paid under Slovenian law, the enforcement would mean a double payment of the same obligation. Anyhow, according to the judgment-debtor the said Austrian judgment is not a civil or commercial matter governed by Brussels I bis Regulation as the judgment-creditor BUAK is a legal person of public law, the obligation to be paid under the said Austrian judgement (claim for wage supplements regarding annual leave pay) is an obligation of public law or even a levy

Ruling

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the following grounds.

Civil and Commercial Matters

Article 1(1) of the Brussels I Regulation provides that it applies to civil and commercial matters, but does not cover tax, customs or administrative matters or the State’s liability for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii). Point (c) of the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Regulation explicitly states that it does not apply to social security.

As the Court of First Instance rightly explained, the question of the applicability of the Brussels I bis Regulation has already been settled by the Court of Justice in a preliminary ruling in the case of Korana, decided in 2019 (Case C-579/17). The Court of Justice clarified that the term “civil and commercial matters” must be interpreted autonomously under the regulation and that the fact that BUAK has the status of a collective body governed by public law is not decisive. The legal basis of the relationship from which the claim originates shall be decisive.

The employer’s obligation to pay wage supplements regarding annual leave claimed by BUAK before the Austrian forum is inextricably linked to the employees’ right to annual leave paid under civil law, so the nature of BUAK’s claim is also that of a right under civil law. In addition, a distinction must be made between cases where BUAK itself can issue a certificate of unpaid debts, which is an enforceable title, and cases – such as the case under consideration – where BUAK has to claim unpaid wage supplements regarding annual leave belonging to posted workers not having their habitual place of work in Austria before a court, which is also an argument in favour of the nature of the claim as being a claim of civil law.

The Court of Justice of the EU has in addition also ruled that this is not a benefit in the sense of the“social security” exception, which would also be excluded from the scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation. A social security benefit exists where it would be granted to beneficiaries on the basis of a legally defined position without any individual or discretionary assessment of personal needs. In the present case, however, the issue is the remuneration for annual leave, which in turn depends on the wage supplements, which are the legal basis for employer’s payment. Remuneration for annual leave in connection with work performed by a posted worker must be paid by the employer, even if the payment is made through the BUAK.

Decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU on preliminary questions are binding on the national courts of the Member States, therefore the applicants’ disagreement with the position of the Court of Justice cannot lead to different conclusions than those already reached by the Court of First Instance in the contested order. The Brussels I bis Regulation also applies to claims of BUAK for wage supplements regarding annual leave of posted workers, as these claims are of a civil nature.

Ordre public defense

The applicants’ plea that the levies or contributions claimed by the judgement-creditor in the enforcement proceedings referring to the Austrian judgment had already been paid in Slovenia, as a result the recognition and enforcement of the judgment of the Republic of Austria is allegedly contrary to Slovenian ordre public does not have any merits. In the appeal, the appellants (judgment-debtors) themselves claim that the Slovenian legal order does not provide for the payment wage supplements regarding annual leave of posted workers in the construction sector, as foreseen in Austrian law, therefore as a consequence the performance of obligations under the challenged judgement cannot already notionally constitute a double payment of the same claim. The mere fact that the Slovenian legal system does not legislate on a certain contribution or that it enacts contributions differently does not mean that the payment of a claim under the impugned judgment is contrary to the Slovenian ordre public. Namely, ordre public does not include all mandatory provisions of domestic law, but only those imperative legal norms and moral rules, the violation of which would endanger the integrity of the Slovenian legal order. However, the payment of contributions in favour of workers does not justify such opposition.

Conclusion

The ruling does completely comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice in the 2019 Korana case. The Slovenian and the ECJ cases both refer to Slovenian posted workers in the construction sector in Austria (Slovenia and Austria are neighbouring countries). At the economic level both cases show how the freedom of movement and freedom to provide services operate between East- and West EU. Whereas the Korana case concerned a litigation before the Labour and Social Court of Vienna, the discussed Slovenian case shows the next stage, i.e. the enforcement of Austrian rulings in Slovenia.

The only surprising element in this case is the timing. The Korana case was decided by the ECJ on 28 February 2019, the first ruling by the highest national court of another EU Member State where an enforcement of Austrian judgements based on that ruling is sought was handed down already on 11 August 2020. Considering the translation issues, the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters between two EU Member States and then the Coronavirus pandemics, the cross-border cooperation between Slovenia and Austria seems to work quite fast.

On Monday, 16 November 2020, starting at 9.15 am CET, the Young EU Private International Law Research Network of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL), organizes a webinar on “Overriding Mandatory Rules in the Law of the EU Member States”.

In two sessions, Young PIL researchers from various EU Member States will discuss selected issues related to overriding mandatory rules, such as their explicit legislative characterization in recent EU directives and their application by arbitral tribunals.

Subsequently, the General Report of the second Young EU PIL project, namely “The Application of Overriding Mandatory Norms outside the Scope of Application of the EU Private International Law Regulations” as well as some national perspectives will be presented. The concluding discussion of the webinar is dedicated to future initiatives and projects of the Research Network.

All young PIL researchers who are interested in joining the webinar and/or the Young EU Private International Research Network are cordially invited to send an e-mail to youngeupil@gmail.com. Attendance is free of charge. Details regarding the virtual attendance will be sent to all registered participants.

The programme reads as follows:

9.15 am   Opening of the conference – Tamás SZABADOS (ELTE)

Session I – Chair: Florian HEINDLER (Sigmund Freund University Vienna)

9.20 am   Ennio PIOVESANI (University of Turin/University of Cologne): Overriding Mandatory Rules in the Context of the Covid-19 Pandemic

9.35 am   Martina MELCHER (University of Graz): Substantive EU Regulations as Overriding Mandatory Provisions?

9.50 am   Johannes UNGERER (University of Oxford): Explicit Legislative Characterization of Overriding Mandatory Provisions in EU Directives

10:05 am   Uglješa GRUŠI? (University College London): Some Recent Developments Regarding the Treatment of Mandatory Rules of Third Countries

10.20-10:35 am   Discussion

Session II – Chair: Dr. Eduardo Alvarez-Armas (Brunel University London)

10.45 am   Katarzyna BOGDZEVI? (Mykolas Romeris University): Overriding Mandatory Provisions in Family Law and Personal Status Issues

11.00 am   Markus PETSCHE (Central European University): The Application of Mandatory Rules by Arbitral Tribunals

11.15 am   István ERD?S (ELTE): Imperative Rules in Investment Arbitration

11.30-11.45 am   Discussion

Young EU PIL Project: The Application of Overriding Mandatory Norms outside the Scope of Application of the EU Private International Law Regulations

2.00 pm   Tamás SZABADOS (ELTE): Presentation and Discussion of the General Report

2.15 pm   Stefano DOMINELLI (University of Genoa) and Ennio PIOVESANI (University of Turin/University of Cologne): Italian Perspective

Holger JACOBS (University of Mainz): German Perspective

Dora ZGRABLJI? ROTAR (University of Zagreb): Croatian Perspective. Overriding Mandatory Rules and the Proposal on the Law Applicable to the Third-party Effects of Assignments of Claims

3.00 -3.30 pm   Future of the Young EU Private International Law Network (Chair: Martina MELCHER and Tamás SZABADOS)

Professor Chris Thomale, University of Vienna and Roma Tre University, has kindly provided us with his thoughts on the recent EP Draft Report on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability.

 

In recent years, debate on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has picked up speed, finally reaching the EU. The Draft Report first and foremost contains a draft Directive on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability, which seems a logical step ahead from the status quo developed since 2014, which so far only consists of reporting obligations (see the Non-Financial Reporting Directive) and sector specific due diligence (see the Regulations on Timber and Conflict Minerals). The date itself speaks volumes: Precisely, to the very day (!), 8 years after the devastating fire in the factory of Ali Enterprises in Pakistan, which attracted much international attention through its follow-up litigation against the KiK company in Germany, the EU is taking the initiative to coordinate Member State national action plans as required under the Ruggie Principles. Much could be said about this new Directive in terms of company law and business law: The balancing exercise of on the one hand, assuring effective transparency of due diligence strategies and, on the other hand, avoiding overregulation in particular with regard to SMEs still appears somewhat rough and ready and hence should see some refinement in due course. The same applies to the private enforcement of those due diligence duties: By leaving the availability and degree of private enforcement entirely to the Member States (Art. 20), the Directive seems to gloss over one of the most pressing topics of comparative legal debate. The question of availability, conditions and extent of private liability imposed on parent companies for human rights violations committed in their value chains abroad, must be addressed by the EU eventually.

To this forum, however, the private international implications of the Draft Report would appear even more important:

As regards the conflicts of laws solution, the proposed Art. 6a Rome II Regulation seeks to make available, at the claimant’s choice, several substantive laws as conveniently summarized by Geert van Calster in the terms of lex loci damni, lex loci delicti commissi, lex loci incorporationis and lex loci activitatis. Despite my continuous call for a choice between the first two de regulatione lata, to be reached by applying a purposive reading of Art. 4 para 1 and 3 Rome II (see JZ 2017 and ZGR 2017), the latter two, lex loci incorporationis and lex loci activitatis, seem very odd to me. First, they are supported, to my humble knowledge, by no existing Private International Law Code or judicial practice. Second, the lex loci incorporationis has no convincing rationale, why it should in any way be connected with the legal relationship as created by the corporate perpetrator’s tort. Lex loci activitatis is excessively vague and will create threshold questions as well as legal uncertainty. Third, I would most emphatically concur with Jan von Hein’s opinion of a quadrupled choice being excessive and impractical in and of itself.

The solution proposed in terms of international jurisdiction, I will readily admit, looks puzzling to me. I fail to see, which cases the proposed Art. 8 para 5 Brussels Ibis Regulation is supposed to cover: As far as international jurisdiction is awarded to the courts of the “Member State where it has its domicile”, this adds nothing to Art. 4, 63 Brussels Ibis Regulation. In fact, it will create unnecessary confusion as to whether this venue of general jurisdiction is good even when there is no “damage caused in a third country [which] can be imputed to a subsidiary or another undertaking with which the parent company has a business relationship.” Thus, we are left with the courts of “a Member State […] in which [the undertaking] operates.” As already pointed out, this term itself will trigger a lot of controversy regarding certain threshold issues. But there is more: Oftentimes this locus activitatis will coincide with the locus delicti commissi, e.g., when claimants want to rely on an omission of oversight by the European parent company. In that case, Art. 7 No. 2 Brussels Ibis Regulation offers a venue at the very place, i.e. both in terms of international and local jurisdiction, where that omission was committed. How does the new rule relate to the old one? And, again, which cases exactly are supposed to be captured by this provision? In my view, this is a phantom paragraph that, if anything, can only do harm to the fragile semantic and systematic architecture built up by the Brussels Ibis Regulation and CJEU case law.

The same seems true of the proposed Art. 26a Brussels Ibis: First, there is no evident need for such a forum necessitatis, rendering Member State courts competent to hear foreign-cubed cases with no connection to the EU whatsoever. To the contrary, recent development of the US Alien Torts Statute point in the opposite direction. Second, the EU might be overreaching its legislative jurisdiction: Brussels Ibis Regulation is based on the EU’s competence to legislate on judicial cooperation in civil matters (Art. 81 para 2 TFEU). Such a global long-arm statute may not be covered by that competence, if it is legal at all under the public international confines incumbent upon civil jurisdiction (for details, see here). Third, it will be virtually anybody’s guess what a court seized with a politicised and likely emotional case like the ones we are talking about will deem a “reasonable” Third State venue. In fact, this would be a forum non conveniens test with inverted colours, i.e. the very test the CJEU, in 2005, deemed irreconcilable with the exigencies of foreseeability and legal certainty within the Brussels Ibis Regulation.

 

A webinar, organised by the Young EU Private International Law Research Network (an EAPIL activity), will take place on 16 November 2020, from 9.15 to 15.30. The webinar’s topic is Overriding Mandatory Rules in the Law of the EU Member States.

Speakers include Katarzyna Bogdzevič (Mykolas Romeris University), Stefano Dominelli (University of Genoa), István Erdős (ELTE), Uglješa Grušić (University College London), Holger Jacobs (University of Mainz), Martina Melcher (University of Graz, co-chair of the Network), Markus Petsche (Central European University), Ennio Piovesani (University of Turin/University of Cologne), Johannes Ungerer (University of Oxford), Tamás Szabados (ELTE, co-chair of the Network), Dora Zgrabljić Rotar (University of Zagreb).

The sessions will be chaired by Florian Heindler (Sigmund Freud University Vienna) and Eduardo Alvarez-Armas (Brunel University London).

The full of programme of the event is available here.

Attendance is free of charge, but those interested in attending are asked to register via email at youngeupil@gmail.com before 12 November 2020.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention:

Prospects for Judicial Cooperation in Civil and
Commercial Matters between the EU and Third Countries

Pre-Conference Video Roundtable
University of Bonn / HCCH

Thursday, 29 October 2020, 6.30 p.m. (UTC+1) (via Zoom)

 

Speakers:

Dr Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary General of the HCCH

Colin Brown, Unit Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of Trade Policy, DG Trade, European Commission

Dr Alexandra Diehl, White & Case LLP, Frankfurt, Chair of the Arbitration/Litigation/Mediation (“ALM”) Working Group of the German-American Lawyers Association (DAJV)

Dr Veronika Efremova, Senior Project Manager GIZ, Open Regional Funds for South East Europe-Legal Reform

Andreas Stein, Head of Unit, DG JUST – A1 “Civil Justice”, European Commission

Dr Jan Teubel, German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection

Moderators:                         

Dr João Ribeiro-Bidaoui, First Secretary, HCCH

Prof Dr Matthias Weller, University of Bonn

The largest proportion of EU economic growth in the 21st century is expected to arise in trade with third countries. This is why the EU is building up trade relations with many states and other regional integration communities in all parts of the world. The latest example is the EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement concluded on 28 June 2019. With the United Kingdom’s exit of the Union on 31 January 2020, extra-EU trade with neighbouring countries will further increase in importance. Another challenge for the EU is China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, a powerful global development strategy that includes overland as well as sea routes in more than 100 states around the globe. The USA are currently the largest trade partner of the EU. The increasing volume of trade with third states will inevitably lead to a rise in the number and importance of commercial disputes. This makes mechanisms for their orderly and efficient resolution indispensable. China is already setting up infrastructures for commercial dispute resolution alongside its belts and roads. In contrast, the EU still seems to be in search of a strategy for judicial cooperation in civil matters with countries outside the Union. The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention may be a valuable tool to establish and implement such a strategy, in particular alongside the EU’s external trade relations. These prospects will be discussed by the speakers and a global audience in this Pre-Conference Video Roundtable.

We warmly invite you to participate and discuss with us. In order to do so, please register with sekretariat.weller@jura.uni-bonn.de. You will receive the access data for the video conference via zoom per email, including our data protection concept, the day before the event.

If you have already registered and received a confirmation from our office (please allow us a couple of days for sending it back to you), your registration is valid and you do not need to re-register.

Please do not hesitate to forward our invitation to friends and colleagues if you wish.

 

Main Conference “The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, 13 and 14 September 2021

Our event intends to prepare the main conference on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention at the University of Bonn (Professors Moritz Brinkmann, Nina Dethloff, Matthias Lehmann, Wulf-Henning Roth, Philipp Reuss, Matthias Weller), co-hosted by the HCCH (Dr Chistophe Bernasconi, Dr João Ribeiro-Bidaoui), on 13 and 14 September 2021 (originally scheduled for 25 and 26 September 2020, but rescheduled to avoid Covid-19 risks). At this conference on the campus of the University of Bonn, leading experts will present on the legal concepts and techniques of the Convention, and policy issues will be further developed.

Speakers will include (listed chronologically):

Hans van Loon (key note), Former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague;

Prof Dr Xandra Kramer, Erasmus University Rotterdam;

Prof Dr Wolfgang Hau, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich;

Prof Dr Pietro Franzina, Catholic University of Milan;

Prof Dr Francisco Garcimartín Alférez, Autonomous University of Madrid;

Dr Ning Zhao, Senior Legal Officer, HCCH;

Prof Paul Beaumont, University of Stirling;

Prof Dr Marie-Elodie Ancel, University Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas;

Dr Pippa Rogerson, Reader in Private International Law, Faculty of Law, Cambridge;

Ass. Prof Dr Ilija Rumenov, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia;

Dr Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Director of Internationalisation, Senior Lecturer in International Private Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh;

Prof Zheng (Sophia) Tang, University of Newcastle;

Jose Angelo Estrella-Faria, Principal Legal Officer and Head, Legislative Branch International Trade Law Division, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, Former Secretary General of UNIDROIT.

 

For the full programme see https://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/professur-prof-dr-weller/conference-on-the-hcch-2019-judgments-convention-on-13-and-14-september-2021/. You will receive an invitation for registration in due time. A registration fee of € 100.- will be asked for participating.

The Universities of Genoa, Valencia, Turiba, the Institute of Private International Law in Sofia, the European Association for Family and Succession Law, and Defence for Children Italy are currently conducting a research Project to collect and develop best practices on the right of the child to information in cross-border family proceedings.

The “MiRI Project” (Minor’s Right to Information in EU civil actions), co-funded by the European Union (JUST/2018/JCOO/AG/CIVI/831608), foresees the involvement of lawyers and judges which may contribute to a truthful reconstruction of how children are effectively informed of their rights, of the circumstances litigated before courts, of the consequences following specific decisions, etc. during cross-border proceedings.

Lawyers and judges may provide their knowledge and expertise by fulfilling a questionnaire – answers to the questionnaire will help Partners to the Project to identify, disseminate already existing good practices, and possibly elaborate new ones.

The questionnaire is available in English, Spanish, Bulgarian, Latvian, French and Italian.

Answering the questionnaire takes approximately 25-30 minutes; consultations are open until the end of November 2020. Answers are anonymous and will not be published. Answers can be sent to info@europeanfamilylaw.eu

The Partners to the Project appreciate your involvement!

The October issue of International and Comparative Law Quarterly was recently published. It features two articles on private international law:

S Donelly, “Conflicting Forum-Selection Agreements in Treaty and Contract” (2020) 69  International and Comparative Law Quarterly 759 – 787.

When an investor submits a claim to arbitration under a treaty that falls within the scope of an existing, contractual forum-selection clause between it and the host State, which prevails: the agreement to arbitrate under the treaty or the contractual clause? This is a vexed and commonly arising question. This article argues that by placing it in the context of both private and public international law and reasoning from first principles it is possible to arrive at a coherent, reliable and satisfactory approach. The true question is whether the contractual clause is a waiver of the investor’s right to recourse to an investment tribunal.

 

TC Hartley, ““Recent Developments under the Brussels I Regulation” (2020) 69  International and Comparative Law Quarterly 779 – 790.

This article considers recent CJEU case law on the Brussels I Regulation. Two aspects of Article 7(1) (which applies to matters relating to a contract) are considered: the first is whether the contract must be between the parties to the case; the second is whether membership of an association should be regarded as constituting implied consent to be bound by decisions of the association so that jurisdiction to enforce them may be taken under Article 7(1). The article also discusses recent case law on who counts as a ‘consumer’ in terms of Article 17.

Complaints about the inefficiency of enforcement mechanisms at national and transnational level are not new. The insufficiency of existing national and international legal frameworks is a growing cause for concern at all levels. Academics and practitioners acknowledge the fundamental importance of procedures and mechanisms for the effective enforcement of creditors’ claims both in domestic and in cross border situations. They also agree on the existence of numerous obstacles for enforcement in most jurisdictions, and on the need for a comprehensive and  detailed international instrument providing for guidance for national legislators to overcome such challenges.

In the agenda UNIDROIT (the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) has published for the triennial period 2020 – 2022, transnational principles of civil procedure are included with
– high priority:  Formulation of regional rules;
– medium priority : Principles of effective enforcement (NoA: priority was moved to “high” by the UNIDROIT Governing Council at its 99th session);
– low priority:  International Civil Procedure in Latin America.

As a matter of fact, UNIDROIT has been actively working towards a soft harmonisation of civil procedural rules – mainly to be applied in transnational disputes but also meant to provide guidance in domestic law reforms- already for a while. In 2004, the Governing Council of UNIDROIT adopted the so-called ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (ALI=American Law Institute), which the organization itself defines as its “landmark instrument in this area”.

The ‘Principles’ consist of 31 provisions accompanied by a commentary. They aim to reconcile differences among various national rules of civil procedure, taking into account the peculiarities of transnational disputes as compared to purely domestic ones. They are intended to serve as guidelines for code projects in countries without long procedural traditions; also, as a basis for reform in countries with long and high-quality procedural traditions. They may also be applied by analogy in international commercial arbitration.

In 2013, UNIDROIT and the European Law Institute (ELI) started working together towards the development of European Rules of Civil Procedure. The ELI – UNIDROIT Rules were presented in an International Workshop Webwinar held as a closing event of the 99th session of the UNIDROIT Governing Council, on 25 September 2020.

In addition, UNIDROIT Work Programme 2017-2019 envisaged the preparation of Transnational Principles of Effective Enforcement to bridge the gaps of the ALI/ UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure in this regard. A preliminary feasibility study was conducted by Rolf Stürner, Emeritus Professor at the University of Freiburg (Germany) and former co-reporter of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, and submitted to the Governing Council at its 95th session (2016). According to its final conclusion

Principles will set common minimum standards of enforcement, they will motivate legislatures to evaluate and improve the quality of their laws and thereby strengthen the efficiency of enforcement in foreign countries. Common minimum standards will be a source of increasing harmonization of enforcement laws, as well as predictability of the results of enforcement measures in foreign countries and facilitation of enforcement in cross border cases. A certain degree of harmonization is a necessary precondition of international cooperation in the field of cross border enforcement, which is designed to avoid conflicts of sovereignty and conflicting or superfluous parallel and cost intensive enforcement measures. Worldwide, there is sufficient common ground for specific principles of individual modes of enforcement and for overarching general principles of an overall system of efficient civil enforcement. The variety of organizational structures should not be considered a decisive obstacle to harmonizing principles. It will be possible to develop principles, which define managerial standards to be met by the enforcement mechanisms and the individual enforcement authorities and which at the same time leave necessary leeway for successful regional traditions and local needs. Co-operation with other organizations dealing with the harmonization of law could result in a helpful increase of human and financial resources. The experience of the first joint project with the American Law Institute was very encouraging.

At the time, the topic was nevertheless accorded low priority, which meant the work would only commence after the completion of the preparation of European Rules of Civil Procedure. In this context, the Secretariat received in December 2018 a proposal for the 2020-2022 Work Programme by the World Bank regarding a project on the “Development of a Working Paper to Outline Best Practices on Debt Enforcement”, which it presented on the occasion of the discussion of the 2020-2022 Work Programme at the 98th Session of the Governing Council. The proposal was discussed as a continuation, and a refinement, of the scope of the  “Principles of Effective Enforcement”, and eventually included in the new Work Programme by the General Assembly.

On 21 September 2020, the UNIDROIT Secretariat, as mandated by the Governing Council at the first meeting of the 99th  session, convened an internal consultation workshop on the project on Best Practices of Effective Enforcement. The UNIDROIT Governing Council, at its 99th session, approved the guidelines provided by the Secretariat regarding the proposed scope of the project, and authorised the establishment of a Working Group, to meet in Rome and on Zoom on 30-November – 2 December 2020. The composition of the group has not yet been disclosed; the MPI Luxembourg will be represented as an observer.

If the initial schedule is kept, the project will be a quick one, coming to an end already in 2022. No doubt it is worth to follow its development and to reflect on its potential impact on the law and practice of cross-border enforcement within the EU and beyond.

Ilaria Viarengo and Francesca C Villata recently published a new book titled: “Planning the Future of Cross Border Families: A Path Through Coordination“ under the prestigious Hart Studies in Private International Law. The abstract reads as follows:

This book is built upon the outcomes of the EUFam’s Project, financially supported by the EU Civil Justice Programme and led by the University of Milan. Also involved are the Universities of Heidelberg, Osijek, Valencia and Verona, the MPI in Luxembourg, the Italian and Spanish Family Lawyers Associations and training academies for judges in Italy and Croatia. The book seeks to offer an exhaustive overview of the regulatory framework of private international law in family and succession matters. The book addresses current features of the Brussels IIa, Rome III, Maintenance and Succession Regulations, the 2007 Hague Protocol, the 2007 Hague Recovery Convention and new Regulations on Property Regimes.
The contributions are authored by more than 30 experts in cross-border family and succession matters. They introduce social and cultural issues of cross-border families, set up the scope of all EU family and succession regulations, examine rules on jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition and enforcement regimes and focus on the current problems of EU family and succession law (lis pendens in third States, forum necessitatis, Brexit and interactions with other legal instruments). The book also contains national reports from 6 Member States and annexes of interest for both legal scholars and practitioners (policy guidelines, model clauses and protocols).

This CEPEJ report, published on 22nd October 2020, contains data on the functioning of the judicial systems of 45 European States and 3 Observer States (Morocco, Israel and Kazakhstan). The findings are the following:

“Budget

– In 2018, European States spent on average more than 1 billion Euros for their judicial systems, equal to 72 € per inhabitant (8 € more than in 2016) and 0,33% of GDP. On average, member States allocated 65% of judicial system budget to courts, 24% to prosecution services and 11% to legal aid. Switzerland and Monaco are the countries that spend the most significant amount per inhabitant (220 € and 197 €), while Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina dedicate to judicial system the highest percentage of their GDP (0.88% and 0.72%).

– Countries with a higher GDP per capita invest more per inhabitant in judicial systems, while less wealthy countries allocate more budget as a percentage of GDP, showing a greater budgetary effort for their judicial systems.

– Between 2010 and 2018, the member States and entities have slightly increased the average budget allocated to the judicial system. In 2018, all States and entities have increased the budget allocated to their judicial systems (+8%). The most significant increase (between 2016 and 2018), equal to 13% on average, has been recorded for courts’ budget and it concerns, in particular, investments in new buildings and computerisation.

– Less wealthy countries invest proportionally more on prosecution services (32% on average), while States and entities with higher GDP per capita spend relatively more in legal aid (19% on average).

– The budget allocated to courts seems to be related not only to the wealth of the country, but also to the number of courts. This may seem logical given that 65% of the court budget is spent on salaries.

– In order to rationalise budgetary resources of courts and, at the same time, reinforce specialisation and expertise, an increasing trend to outsource certain services is confirmed.

– Generally speaking, all the countries have implemented a legal aid system in criminal and other than criminal matters (representation by a lawyer before the court or legal advice), in compliance with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the European Court which advocates an appropriate legal aid system to ensure access to justice for everyone.

– Some countries tend to have a low cost per legal aid case and a high number of cases granted legal aid, while others choose to provide a higher amount for a smaller number of cases.

Professionals

– While the number of professional judges remains globally stable, 21 judges per 100 000 inhabitants on average, significant differences are still noticed between States and entities (from 3.1 in UK-England and Wales to 101.8 in Monaco per 100 000 inhabitants). The latter can be partly explained by the diversity of judicial organisations, use of occasional professional judges and/or lay judges. Variations over the years have not led towards harmonisation.

– The number of prosecutors is tending to increase, on average 12 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants (in 2018, the number varies from 2.2 in Ireland to 25.1 in Ukraine).

– 31 Member States of 47 declared that public prosecutors are statutorily independent.

– While the number of prosecutors increased, their workload decreased since 2010 from 4.2 to 3.1 cases per 100 inhabitants.

– The trend towards the feminisation of judges and prosecutors is confirmed but the glass ceiling remains a reality: in 2018, at the level of all instances, there was 46% of men and 54% of women judges but 66 % male court presidents as opposed to 34 % of female court presidents; for the prosecutors : 48% of men and 52% of women but 64% of male and 36 % of female head of public prosecution offices. More and more States and entities seem to be focusing on the topic of specific provisions in favour of

– gender parity in the procedures for the recruitment and promotion of judges and prosecutors. Taking measures to promote gender balance in the higher and highest justice functions should be encouraged.

– The ratio between non-judge staff and professional judges is about 4 in 2018, this figure being quite stable through the years, the minimum being 1 in Luxembourg and the maximum 10 in UK – Northern Ireland.16 European States set up Rechtspfleger.

–  Salaries of judges vary widely between States and entities, but also between instances. The changes in salaries in recent years are not uniform and do not lead to harmonisation. The ratio between salaries of judges and national average salary shows significant disparities in Europe: from 0.9/1.6 in Germany (at the beginning /the end of career) to 4.8/31.5 in Ukraine (at the beginning /the end of career).

– Meaningful disparities also persisted in the salaries of prosecutors. The ratio between salaries of prosecutors and national average salary shows significant disparities in Europe: from 0.8 in Ireland and 4.0 in Romania (at the beginning of the career); 1.6 in Germany and 6.4 in Italy (at the end of the career). 

– Prosecutors’ salaries are, on average, lower than those of judges.

– The number of lawyers is also continuing to increase in Europe, with an average of 164 lawyers per 100 000 inhabitants, with important disparities between States (in 2018, from 16 per 100 000 inhabitants in Azerbaijan to 488 per 100 000 inhabitants in Luxembourg). This constant increase between 2010 and 2018 (27%) is mainly due to economic growth.

– Recent developments suggest that the topic of gender balance with regard to lawyers is being taken into account by an increasing number of States and entities. Currently, however, European lawyers are still predominantly male.

Courts

– Between 2010 and 2018 there was a reduction in the number of courts in Europe, both in terms of legal entities (-19% on average for the first instance courts of general jurisdiction) and geographical locations (-10 % on average).

–  For the same period, we can also notice an increase in the specialization of courts (the average share of specialized courts increased from 21% to 26,7% from 2010 to 2018).

– Small claims were only slightly affected by the above-mentioned developments. Only the average amount of what constitutes a small claim has increased (from 4 029 € in 2016 to 4 836 € in 2018).

Court users

– More and more member States provide specific information to users, both on the judicial system in general and on individual court proceedings.

– States address more and more specific information and arrangements to vulnerable categories of users (the complaints procedures regarding functioning of justice exist in 43 States, implementation of compensation systems (the average amount of compensation is 6 353 € in 2018), user satisfaction surveys, establishment of monitoring mechanisms in respect of violations of the European Convention on Human Rights).

– In order to improve further social responsibility and trust in the judicial system, member States should devote additional resources and staff to improvecommunication with the users of justice.

– The analyses and use of data, gathered through quantitative and qualitative research into the satisfaction of court users, increases the legitimacy of judicial systems and helps court leaders and administrations provide a better and more efficient service of justice.

– The use of information systems to support such activities is crucial. However, it is “interactional justice “- the human touch, the treatment of all involved in judicial proceedings with dignity and respect, that substantially helps to provide just decisions and consequently build trust in justice.

Information and communication technology (ICT)

–  ICT has become a constitutive part of justice service provision. States have focused their efforts on court and case management tools, more then on decision support and communication tools. The general ICT index (court and case management, decision support and communication with courts) varies from 1.52 in Cyprus to 9.79 in Latvia.

– European judicial systems are increasingly moving from paper-based procedures to electronic ones. This is true for the activities carried out within the courts, as well as for the communication exchanges between courts and all parties.

– The economic cost of this innovation should be considered with caution as the ICT budget may vary considerably during the development, deployment and maintenance phases.

– Court systems with comparatively higher resources generally tend to invest a higher percentage of the court budget in ICT.

– ICT are an integral component of the judicial systems, which is reflected both in the regulatory and governance choices implemented by the member States.

– Member States and entities have set up various solutions regarding leadership in ICT governance: most States tend to consider both of them equally relevant, with a slight prevalence of the judicial one.

– As basic technologies are now generally fully deployed in member States and entities, this analysis has focused on court and case management tools, decision support tools and tools for communication between courts, professionals and/or court users, showing very high levels of deployment.

– The high levels achieved in the areas of decision support, e-communication and remote proceedings increase the need to monitor the impact of these tools on principles such as fairness, impartiality and judicial independence.

Justice in the context of the Covid-19 crisis

– ICTs have proven to be valuable and even indispensable tools for the continued work of judicial systems during the COVID-19 crisis in Europe.

– In many cases, their use has required not only changes in legislation but also technical improvements, as has been observed in member States and entities.

– Concerns have been expressed about the use of certain ICT tools in court proceedings, but it is still too early to assess their actual impact on the parties’ rights.

– To address these issues, the CEPEJ has adopted on 10 June 2020 a  Declaration on lessons learnt and challenges faced by the judiciary during and after the Covid-19 Pandemic.

Efficiency

– The clearance rates give a generally positive balance sheet (stable and close to 100%) and conclusions can be more usefully drawn from the disposition time analysis. Criminal justice is the most effective at all three levels of court (disposition time at first instance: 122 days; second instance: 104 days ; third instance: 114 days) and the second instance courts appear as the most efficient in all areas (disposition time in civil and commercial cases: 141 days; administrative cases: 209 days; criminal cases: 104 days). It should be noted that although the results are unquestionably positive, they have deteriorated over time in several States and entities analysed.

– Conversely, it is at first instance and in the field of administrative law that the courts have proven to be the least efficient. Administrative cases tend to record the highest DT (241 days at 1st instance, 209 days at 2nd instance, 228 days at 3rd instance) with, however, considerable disparities between States and entities.

– Cases concerning asylum seekers and the right to entry and stay for aliens continue to have a strong impact on European jurisdictions. Many States and entities reported productivity problems related to these case types. In 2018, States received 291 443 cases concerning asylum seekers or 8 % fewer than in 2016. 183 920 incoming cases pertaining to the right to entry and stay for aliens represent an increase of 84 %. The highest number of incoming cases concerning asylum seekers was recorded in Germany, 149 593 cases. The second highest inflow is in France which received 58 671 asylum seekers cases and 79 807 right of entry and stay for aliens cases. Italy, then, received 48 891 asylum seekers cases and 2 224 right of entry and stay for aliens cases.

– The share of cases older than two years is available for a limited set of States and entities. Within these, the shares of cases older than two years do not vary over time.

– A number of States and entities have undergone or are currently undergoing significant justice sector reforms which have influenced the performance of their systems. The results of these States and entities need to be monitored cautiously and with an understanding of the context”.

Source: https://rm.coe.int/link-to-the-presentation-note-en/16809fdc75

For further information, see https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/special-file-publication-of-the-report-european-judicial-systems-cepej-evaluation-report-2020-evaluation-cycle-2018-data-

The ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (ILA Dutch Branch) is online accessible on Friday 6 NOVEMBER 2020 (13:30 – 16:30 CET).  

 Over the decades, international law adapted in many ways to the quickly evolving, multi-facetted digital reality, and one of the central questions now is whether or not concepts and ideas developed in the ‘predigital era’ still fit the digitalised world. Is international law, both public and private, ready for the digital era or has it rather been a ‘fragmented follower of developments’ and should it fundamentally rethink a number of notions and approaches? 

Four speakers will present their papers on the adaptability of (private) international law to the digital environment. Two officials of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (M. BUSSTRA and W. THEEUWEN) will give an overview on “International Law in the Context of Cyber Operations”. Y. BURUMA, a Justice of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands, will present his views on “International Law and Cyberspace – Issues of Sovereignty and the Common Good”, while D. SVANTESSON, Professor at the University of Bond (Australia) will consider whether “International Law [Is] Ready for the (Already Ongoing) Digital Age: Perspectives from Private and Public International Law”. 

There is ample room for debate after these presentations. Given the topical theme and the open debate with public and private international lawyers, this event may be of interest to some readers of this blog. Should you be interested, please register no later than 3 November 2020 by sending an email to info@knvir.org.

Thanks to Marta Pertegás Sender for providing the text

In the very recent case of Yankey v Austin (2020) LPELR-49540(CA)  the Nigerian Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of whether a court in the United State has jurisdiction to make an order affecting immovable property in Lagos, Nigeria.

The facts of the case was that the claimant/respondent previously sued the defendant/appellant before the Family Court Division, of the District of the Fourth Judicial District, County of Hennepin, State of Minnesota (“US Court”) – where they resided at the time, for dissolution of their marriage that was celebrated in Nigeria. The defendant/appellant as respondent before the US Court did not contest the dissolution of the marriage. They entered into a Mutual Termination Agreement, which is called Terms of Settlement in the Nigerian legal system. There was no trial and no evidence was adduced. Their homestead at 4104 Lakeside Avenue, Brooklyn Center, Minesota was awarded exclusively to the claimant/respondent as petitioner before the US Court. It did not end there.

The claimant/respondent subsequently instituted proceedings before the Lagos State High Court, Nigeria, and claimed joint ownership of the defendant/appellant’s property situated in Lagos, by relying on the US judgment. The lower court granted the claim.

The defendant/appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which unanimously allowed the appeal by overturning the decision of the lower court. The Court of Appeal (Ogakwu JCA) thoroughly analysed the documents which were in issue: (1) Mutual Termination Agreement, (2) Judgment of the US Court, and (3) petition for the dissolution of the parties marriage in the US Court. The Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that there was nothing in the documents in issue which suggests that the US judge granted joint ownership of the defendant/appellant’s landed property with the plaintiff/respondent. It also held that based on the principle of lex situs the US Court cannot make an order affecting immovable property in Nigeria.

The decision in Yankey  is an important decision from the perspective of public and private international law. Based on the principle of territorial sovereignty, a foreign court cannot make an order affecting immovable property in another country.  This rule as applied in Nigeria  –  often referred to as the  Mocambique  rule  –  is derived from the English case of British South Africa Company v Companhia de Mocambique [1893] AC 602. In that case, the plaintiff s’   statement of claim alleged that they were rightful owners of large tracts of land in South Africa, yet agents of the defendants unlawfully took possession of the lands and displaced the plaintiff  company and its servants, agents, and tenants. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants not only stole the plaintiff s’  personal property, but also assaulted and imprisoned some of them. It was held that an English court would not entertain an action to recover damages for a trespass to land situated abroad.

It is worth mentioning that in Nigeria, an  exception to the Mozambique rule exists where the action between the parties is founded on some personal obligation arising out of a contract or implied contract, a fiduciary relationship, fraud or other unconscionable conduct, and does not depend on the law of the  locus  of the immovable property to exist (British Bata Shoe Co Ltd v Melikian   ( 1956 )  1 FSC 100;     Aluminium Industries Aktien Gesellschaft  v Federal Board of Inland Revenue   ( 1971 )  2 ALR Comm 121   , (1971) 2 NCLR 1)

The Mozambique rule has been applied  by the Nigerian  Supreme Court only in inter-state matters such as in Lanleyin v Rufai  ( 1959 )  4 FSC 184. Yankey is the first case where it was applied in a case with truly international dimensions. Admittedly, the Court of Appeal did not explicitly mention the Mozambique rule or the Nigerian Supreme Court cases that have applied it in inter-state matters. The truth is that there was no need for the Court of Appeal to do so. Based on the facts of the case, the US Court never made an order for joint ownership of landed property in Lagos.

Yankey is a most welcome decision. If the lower court’s decision was allowed to stand, it would mean that any foreign court can generally make an order affecting landed property in Nigeria. The Court of Appeal was therefore right to hold that the US Court never made an order for joint ownership of landed property for the parties in this case. It was also right to hold that a foreign court cannot make an order of joint ownership of immovable property in Nigeria.

Written by Bastian Brunk, research assistant at the Humboldt University of Berlin and doctoral candidate at the Institute for Comparative and Private International Law at the University of Freiburg.

 

In April of 2020, EU Commissioner Didier Reynders announced plans for a legislative initiative that would introduce EU-wide mandatory human rights due diligence requirements for businesses. Only recently, Reynders reiterated his intentions during a conference regarding “Human Rights and Decent Work in Global Supply Chains” which was hosted by the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs on the 6. October, and asseverated the launch of public consultations within the next few weeks. A draft report, which was prepared by MEP Lara Wolters (S&D) for the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, illustrates what the prospective EU legal framework for corporate due diligence could potentially look like. The draft aims to facilitate access to legal remedies in cases of corporate human rights abuses by amending the Brussels Ibis Regulation as well as the Rome II Regulation. However, as these amendments have already inspired a comments by Geert van Calster, Giesela Rühl, and Jan von Hein, I won’t delve into them once more. Instead, I will focus on the centre piece of the draft report – a proposal for a Directive that would establish mandatory human rights due diligence obligations for businesses. If adopted, the Directive would embody a milestone for the international protection of human rights. As is, the timing could simply not be better, since the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) celebrate their 10th anniversary in 2021. The EU should take this opportunity to present John Ruggie, the author of the UNGPs, with a special legislative gift. However, I’m not entirely sure if Ruggie would actually enjoy this particular present, as the Directive has obvious flaws. The following passages aim to accentuate possible improvements, that would lead to the release of an appropriate legal framework next year. I will not address every detail but will rather focus on the issues I consider the most controversial – namely the scope of application and the question of effective enforcement.

 

General Comments

 

To begin with a disclaimer, I believe the task of drafting a legal document on the issue of business and human rights to be a huge challenge. Not only does one have to reconcile the many conflicting interests of business, politics, and civil society, moreover, it is an impossible task to find the correct degree of regulation for every company and situation. If the regulation is too weak, it does not help protect human rights, but only generates higher costs. If it is too strict, it runs the risk of companies withdrawing from developing and emerging markets, and – because free trade and investment ensure worldwide freedom, growth, and prosperity – of possibly inducing an even worse human rights situation. This being said, the current regulatory approach should first and foremost be recognised as a first step in the right direction.

 

I would also like to praise the idea of including environmental and governance risks in the due diligence standard (see Article 4(1)) because these issues are closely related to each other. Practically speaking, the conduct of companies is not only judged based on their human rights performance but rather holistically using ESG or PPP criteria. All the same, I am not sure whether or not this holistic approach will be accepted in the regulatory process: Putting human rights due diligence requirements into law is difficult enough, so maybe it would just be easier to limit the proposal to human rights. Nonetheless, it is certainly worth a try.

 

Moving on to my criticism.

 

Firstly, the draft is supposed to be a Directive, not a Regulation. As such, it cannot impose any direct obligations on companies but must first be transposed into national law. However, the proposal contains a colourful mix of provisions, some of which are addressed to the Member States, while others impose direct obligations on companies. For example, Article 4(1) calls upon Member States to introduce due diligence obligations, whereas all other provisions of the same article directly address companies. In my eyes, this is inconsistent.

 

Secondly, the Directive uses definitions that diverge from those of the UNGPs. For example, the UNGPs define “due diligence” as a process whereby companies “identify, prevent, mitigate and account for” adverse human rights impacts. This seems very comprehensive, doesn’t it? Due diligence, as stipulated in the Directive, goes beyond that by asking companies to identify, cease, prevent, mitigate, monitor, disclose, account for, address, and remediate human rights risks. Of course, one could argue that the UNGP is incomplete and the Directive fills its gaps, but I believe some of these “tasks” simply redundant. Of course, this is not a big deal by itself. But in my opinion, one should try to align the prospective mechanism with the UNGPs as much as possible, since the latter are the recognised international standard and its due diligence concept has already been adopted in various frameworks, such as the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the ISO 26000. An alignment with the UNGP, therefore, allows and promotes coherence within international policies.

 

Before turning to more specific issues, I would like to make one last general remark that goes in the same direction as the previous one. While the UNGP ask companies to respect “at minimum” the “international recognized human rights”, meaning the international bill of rights (UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR) and the ILO Core Labour Standards, the Directive requires companies to respect literally every human rights catalogue in existence. These include not only international human rights documents of the UN and the ILO, but also instruments that are not applicable in the EU, such as the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, the American Convention of Human Rights, and (all?) “national constitutions and laws recognising or implementing human rights”. This benchmark neither guides companies nor can it be monitored effectively by the authorities. It is just too ill-defined to serve as a proper basis for civil liability claims or criminal sanctions and it will probably lower the political acceptance of the proposal.

 

Scope of Application

 

The scope of application is delineated in Article 2 of the Directive. It states that the Directive shall apply to all undertakings governed by the law of a Member State or established in the territory of the EU. It shall also apply to limited liability undertakings governed by the law of a non-Member State and not established within EU-territory if they operate in the internal market by selling goods or providing services. As one can see, the scope is conceivably broad, which gives rise to a number of questions.

 

First off, the Directive does not define the term “undertaking”. Given the factual connection, we could understand it in the same way as the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (2014/95/EU) does. However, an “undertaking” within the scope of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive refers to the provisions of the Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU), which has another purpose, i.e. investor and creditor protection, and is, therefore, restricted to certain types of limited liability companies. Such a narrow understanding would run counter to the purpose of the proposed Directive because it excludes partnerships and foreign companies. On the other hand, “undertaking” probably does mean something different than in EU competition law. There, the concept covers “any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status” and must be understood as “designating an economic unit even if in law that economic unit consists of several persons, natural or legal” (see e.g. CJEU, Akzo Nobel, C-97/08 P, para 54 ff.). Under EU competition law, the concept is, therefore, not limited to legal entities, but also encompasses groups of companies (as “single economic units”). This concept of “undertaking”, if applied to the Directive, would correspond with the term “business enterprises” as used in the UNGP (see the Interpretive Guide, Q. 17). However, it would ignore the fact that the parent company and its subsidiaries are distinct legal entities, and that the parent company’s legal power to influence the activities of its subsidiaries may be limited under the applicable corporate law. It would also lead to follow-up questions regarding the precise legal requirements under which a corporate group would have to be included. Finally, non-economic activities and, hence, non-profit organisations would be excluded from the scope, which possibly leads to significant protection gaps (just think about FIFA, Oxfam, or WWF). In order to not jeopardise the objective – ensuring “harmonization, legal certainty and the securing of a level playing field” (see Recital 9 of the Directive) – the Directive should not leave the term “undertaking” open to interpretation by the Member States. A clear and comprehensive definition should definitely be included in the Directive, clarifying that “undertaking” refers to any legal entity (natural or legal person), that provide goods or services on the market, including non-profit services.

 

Secondly, the scope of application is not coherent for several reasons. One being that the chosen form of the proposal is a Directive, rather than a Regulation, thus providing for minimum harmonisation only. It is left to the Member States to lay down the specific rules that ensure companies carrying out proper human rights due diligence (Article 4(1)). This approach can lead to slightly diverging due diligence requirements within the EU. Hence, the question of which requirements a company must comply with arises. From a regulatory law’s perspective alone, this question is not satisfactorily answered. According to Article 2(1), “the Directive” (i.e. the respective Member States’ implementation acts) applies to any company which has its registered office in a Member State or is established in the EU. However, the two different connecting factors of Article 2(1) have no hierarchy, so a company must probably comply with the due diligence requirements of any Member State where it has an establishment (agency, branch, or office). Making matters worse (at least from the company’s perspective), in the event of a human rights lawsuit, due diligence would have to be characterised as a matter relating to non-contractual obligations and thus fall within the scope of the new Art. 6a Rome II. The provisions of this Article potentially require a company to comply with the due diligence obligations of three additional jurisdictions, namely lex loci damni, lex loci delicti commissi, and either the law of the country in which the parent company has its domicile (in this regard, I agree with Jan von Hein who proposes the use not of the company’s domicile but its habitual residence as a connecting factor according to Article 23 Rome II) or, where it does not have a domicile (or habitual residence) in a Member State, the law of the country where it operates.

 

That leads us to the next set of questions: When does a company “operate” in a country? According to Article 2(2), the Directive applies to non-EU companies which are not established in the EU if they “operate” in the internal market by selling goods or providing services. But does that mean, for example, that a Chinese company selling goods to European customers over Amazon must comply fully with European due diligence requirements? And is Amazon, therefore, obliged to conduct a comprehensive human rights impact assessment for every retailer on its marketplace? Finally, are states obliged to impose fines and criminal sanctions (see Article 19) on Amazon or the Chinese seller if they do not meet the due diligence requirements, and if so, how? I believe that all this could potentially strain international trade relations and result in serious foreign policy conflicts.

 

Finally, and perhaps most controversially in regard to the scope, the requirements shall apply to all companies regardless of their size. While Article 2(3) allows the exemption of micro-enterprises, small companies with at least ten employees and a net turnover of EUR 700,000 or a balance sheet total of EUR 350,000 would have to comply fully with the new requirements. In contrast, the French duty of vigilance only applies to large stock corporations which, including their French subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, employ at least 5,000 employees, or including their worldwide subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, employ at least 10,000 employees. The Non-Financial Reporting Directive only applies to companies with at least 500 employees. And the due diligence law currently being discussed in Germany, will with utmost certainty exempt companies with fewer than 500 employees from its scope and could perhaps even align itself with the French law’s scope. Therefore, I doubt that the Member States will accept any direct legal obligations for their SMEs. Nonetheless, because the Directive requires companies to conduct value chain due diligence, SMEs will still be indirectly affected by the law.

 

Value Chain Due Diligence

 

Value chain due diligence, another controversial issue, is considered to be anything but an easy task by the Directive. To illustrate the dimensions: BMW has more than 12,000 suppliers, BASF even 70,000. And these are all just Tier 1 suppliers. Many, if not all, multinational companies probably do not even know how long and broad their value chain actually is. The Directive targets this problem by requiring companies to “make all reasonable efforts to identify subcontractors and suppliers in their entire value chain” (Article 4(5)). This task cannot be completed overnight but should not be impossible either. For example, VF Corporation, a multinational apparel and footwear company, with brands such as Eastpack, Napapijri, or The North Face in its portfolio, has already disclosed the (sub?)suppliers for some of its products and has announced their attempt to map the complete supply chain of its 140 products by 2021. BASF and BMW will probably need more time, but that shouldn’t deter them from trying in the first place.

 

Mapping the complete supply chain is one thing; conducting extensive human rights impact assessments is another. Even if a company knows its chain, this does not yet mean that it comprehends every potential human rights risk linked to its remote business operations. And even if a potential human rights risk comes to its attention, the tasks of “ceasing, preventing, mitigating, monitoring, disclosing, accounting for, addressing, and remediating” (see Article 3) it is not yet fulfilled. These difficulties call up to consider limiting the obligation to conduct supply chain due diligence to Tier 1 suppliers. However, this would not only be a divergence from the UNGP (see Principle 13) but would also run counter to the Directive’s objective. In fact, limiting due diligence to Tier 1 suppliers makes it ridiculously easy to circumvent the requirements of the Directive by simply outsourcing procurement to a third party. Hence, the Directive takes a different approach by including the entire supply chain in the due diligence obligations while adjusting the required due diligence processes to the circumstances of the individual case. Accordingly, Article 2(8) states that “[u]ndertakings shall carry out value chain due diligence which is proportionate and commensurate to their specific circumstances, particularly their sector of activity, the size and length of their supply chain, the size of the undertaking, its capacity, resources and leverage”. I consider this an adequate provision because it balances the interests of both companies and human rights subjects. However, as soon as it comes to enforcing it, it burdens the judge with a lot of responsibility.

 

Enforcement

 

The question of enforcement is of paramount importance. Without effective enforcement mechanisms, the law will be nothing more than a bureaucratic and toothless monster. We should, therefore, expect the Directive – being a political appeal to the EU Commission after all – to contain ambitious proposals for the effective implementation of human rights due diligence. Unfortunately, we were disappointed.

 

The Directive provides for three different ways to enforce its due diligence obligations. Firstly, the Directive requires companies to establish grievance mechanisms as low-threshold access to remedy (Articles 9 and 10). Secondly, the Directive introduces transparency and disclosure requirements. For example, companies should publish a due diligence strategy (Article 6(1)) which, inter alia, specifies identified human rights risks and indicates the policies and measures that the company intends to adopt in order to cease, prevent, or mitigate those risks (see Article 4(4)). Companies shall also publish concerns raised through their grievance mechanisms as well as remediation efforts, and regularly report on progress made in those instances (Article 9(4)). With these disclosure requirements, the Directive aims to enable the civil society (customers, investors and activist shareholders, NGOs etc.) to enforce it. Thirdly, the Directive postulates public enforcement mechanisms. Each Member State shall designate one or more competent national authorities that will be responsible for the supervision of the application of the Directive (Article 14). The competent authorities shall have the power to investigate any concerns, making sure that companies comply with the due diligence obligations (Article 15). If the authority identifies shortcomings, it shall set the respective company a time limit to take remedial action. It may then, in case the company does not fulfil the respective order, impose penalties (especially penalty payments and fines, but also criminal sanctions, see Article 19). Where immediate action is necessary to prevent the occurrence of irreparable harm, the competent authorities may also order the adoption of interim measures, including the temporary suspension of business activities.

 

At first glance, public enforcement through inspections, interim measures, and penalties appear as quite convincing. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms may be questioned, as demonstrated by the Wirecard scandal in Germany. Wirecard was Germany’s largest payment service provider and part of the DAX stock market index from September 2018 to August 2020. In June of 2020, Wirecard filed for insolvency after it was revealed that the company had cooked its books and that EUR 1.9 billion were “missing”. In 2015 and 2019, the Financial Times already reported on irregularities in the company’s accounting practices. Until February 2019, the competent supervisory authority BaFin did not intervene, but only commissioned the FREP to review the falsified balance sheet, assigning only a single employee to do so. This took more than 16 months and did not yield any results before the insolvency application. While it is true that the Wirecard scandal is unique, it showcased that investigating malpractices of large multinational companies through a single employee is a crappy idea. Public enforcement mechanisms only work if the competent authority has sufficient financial and human resources to monitor all the enterprises covered by the Directive. So how much manpower does it need? Even if the Directive were to apply to companies with more than 500 employees, in Germany alone one would have to monitor more than 7.000 entities and their respective value chains. We would, therefore, need a whole division of public inspectors in a gigantic public agency. In my opinion, that sounds daunting. That does not mean that public enforcement mechanisms are completely dispensable. As Ruggie used to say, there is no single silver bullet solution to business and human rights challenges. But it is also important to consider decentralised enforcement mechanisms such as civil liability. In contrast to public enforcement mechanisms, civil liability offers victims of human rights violations “access to effective remedy”, which, according to Principle 25, is one of the main concerns of the UNGP.

 

So, what does the Directive say about civil liability? Just about nothing. Article 20 only states that “[t]he fact that an undertaking has carried out due diligence in compliance with the requirements set out in this Directive shall not absolve the undertaking of any civil liability which it may incur pursuant to national law.” Alright, so there shouldn’t be a safe harbour for companies. But that does not yet mean that companies are liable for human rights violations at all. And even if it were so, the conditions for asserting a civil claim can differ considerably between the jurisdictions of the Member States. The Directive fails to achieve EU-wide harmonisation on the issue of liability. That’s not a level playing field. This problem could be avoided by passing an inclusive Regulation containing both rules concerning human rights due diligence and a uniform liability regime in case of violations of said rules. However, such an attempt would probably encounter political resistance from the Member States and result in an undesirable delay of the legislative process. A possible solution could be to only lay down minimum requirements for civil liability but to leave the ultimate drafting and implementation of liability rules to the Member States. Alternatively, the Directive could stipulate that the obligations set out in Articles 4 to 12 are intended to determine the due care without regard to the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. At least, both options would ensure that companies are liable for any violation of their human rights due diligence obligations. Is that too much to ask?

Published in the BRICS Law Journal by Dr Saloni Khanderia, Associate Professor – OP Jindal Global University, India; and Visiting Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg.

 

The outbreak of the COVID-19 or the coronavirus disease 2019 has severely impacted the performance of several contracts across the globe. In some situations, the outbreak may render the performance of contracts impossible as a result of governmental restrictions in the form of national lockdowns to curb its spread. Likewise, the pandemic may adversely impact the execution of the contractual obligations by dramatically affecting the price of the performance and, thus, resulting in hardship or commercial impracticability. At other times, the pandemic will be legally construed to not affect the performance of a contract. In domestic contracts, the consequences of such non-performance would depend on the principles of national law.

In comparison, agreements with a foreign element (international contracts) are likely to increase the complexity of deciding claims arising from the non-performance of contracts due to the COVID-19 outbreak. The rights and liability of the parties would chiefly depend on the law that will govern the agreement – which differs across the globe. Several contracts would include a force majeure clause to exonerate the parties from performance on the occurrence of an event such as a pandemic. The courts’ interpretation of such force majeure clauses similarly differs across the globe. The laws of some countries would excuse the parties from performing their contractual obligations even if the pandemic resulted in hardship. Others would strictly construe the terms of such clauses and would invalidate them if the occurrence of the pandemic did not make the performance impossible. The purpose of this paper is to examine the non-performance of transnational contracts due to the COVID-19 outbreak when they are governed by Indian law. It highlights the situations when an international contract for the sale of goods or services whose performance has been allegedly hindered due to COVID-19 would a) frustrate and b) breach the agreement under Indian law. The paper provides a comparative analysis of Indian law with several jurisdictions such as France, Germany, Austria, China, the United Kingdom [UK], Australia and the United States [US] to demonstrate that the law of the former is not well-equipped to deal with complex lawsuits arising due to the non-performance of contracts as a result of the pandemic.

The article may be accessed here.

A collection of essays edited by Florian Heindler (Sigmund Freud University, Vienna) has recently been published by Jan Sramek Verlag, in its Interdisciplinary Studies of Comparative and Private International Law series. The book celebrates the 40th birthday of the Austrian Private International Law Act.

The essays collected are authored by scholars for various countries and focus on the possible reform of the Act and its current value.

Authors include Andrea Bonomi, Axel Flessner, Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Thomas John, Caroline Sophie Rupp, Thomas Bachner, Ena-Marlis Bajons, Wolfgang Faber, Edwin Gitschthaler, Florian Heindler, Helmut Heiss, Brigitta Lurger, Martina Melcher, Andreas Schwartze, and Bea Verschraegen.

More details available here.

The Russian Legal Information Agency has announced that Russia’s Justice Ministry, acting jointly with the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, proposed that the Government pass a recommendation to sign the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (the ‘Convention’).

Although there were previously fake news circulating on the internet in this respect, it seems that Russia may well ratify the Convention or, at the very least, that Russian elites are contemplating doing so.

But why would Russia do that?

According to the Russian Agency, the answer seems to be that Russia would want to “create conditions for the recognition and enforcement of decisions taken by Russian courts in all [contracting States] of the new Convention.”

So, Russia hopes to improve the enforcement of Russian judgments abroad. This seems quite logical. Improving the enforcement of the forum’s judgments abroad is a common rationale for entering into bilateral treaties on the enforcement of foreign judgments and for having a reciprocity requirement in the forum’s law of foreign judgments.

There is, however, a downside: by entering into a treaty on the enforcement of foreign judgments, the contracting States also commit themselves to enforcing judgments rendered by other contracting States. In other words, if Russia ratifies the 2019 Convention, it will also promise to enforce in Russia judgments rendered by the courts of other contracting States.

The Russian law of foreign judgments is not liberal. The basic rule is that Russia only enforces judgments on the basis of a treaty. While Russian courts have sometimes accepted to enforce foreign judgments in the absence of treaty under the principle of comity, Russian law remains conservative in this respect.

In contrast, many other States have a very liberal law of foreign judgments, and have enforced Russian judgements on the basis of their common law of foreign judgments, without caring for any form of reciprocity. These liberal States include, among many others, the United States and France. In the US, in particular, courts have enforced Russian judgments on numerous occasions (in 2018, Russian judgments were enforced by New York and California courts, for instance). The 2019 Convention will not improve the prospects of enforcement of Russian judgments in those states.

So the main effect of entering into the 2019 Convention may well be that Russia will commit to enforce judgments that it would not enforce today. In other words, the 2019 Convention would certainly liberalize the Russian law of foreign judgments, but it is unclear to which extent it would improve the enforcement of Russian judgments abroad.

Surely, there are other States with a conservative law of foreign judgments. If these other States ratify the Convention, Russia will have improved the prospects of enforcing its judgments in these states. But who are these states and are they planning to sign the 2019 Convention? And are these states Significant trading partners of Russia? Otherwise, why should Russia care?

Germany is no doubt one of the biggest trading partners of Russia, and there is a reciprocity requirement under the German law of foreign judgments. Maybe German courts have denied enforcement to Russian judgments, but maybe they have considered that the prospects of enforcement of German judgments in Russia were such that German courts should enforce Russian judgments. Our German readers will tell.

A major judicial partner of Russia has been, lately, England. The English common law of judgments is pretty conservative, in particular with respect to the assessment of the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Because of Brexit, England is likely to sign the 2019 Convention. By entering into the Convention as well, the enforcement of Russian judgments in England would then improve. This might be enough of an incentive for Russia to enter into the Convention.

It would be great news for the rest of the world if Russia ratified the 2019 Judgments Convention. Whether it would be good news for Russia remains to be seen.

Today (25 October 2020) is the 40th Anniversary of the HCCH Child Abduction Convention. With more than 100 Contracting Parties, the HCCH Child Abduction Convention is one of the most successful Conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). As indicated in the title, this is a time for celebration but also a time for reflection. The Child Abduction Convention faces several challenges, some of which have been highlighted in this blog. The most salient one is that primary carers (usually mothers) are now the main abductors, which many argue was not the primary focus of the deliberations in the late 70s and that the drafters assumed that primarily (non-custodial) fathers were the abductors. See the most recent statistical analysis by Nigel Lowe and Victoria Stephens (year: 2015 applications), where it shows that 73% of the abductors were mothers (most primary or joint-primary carers) and 24% were fathers.

A related issue is that custody laws continue to change and are granting custody rights to non-primary carers (e.g. unmarried fathers, ne exeat clauses, etc.), which expands the scope of the Child Abduction Convention. There is also a growing trend of joint parenting.

Another challenge is the increasing importance of human rights law and its interaction with the Child Abduction Convention (see our previous post Opening Pandora’s Box); in addition, the implementation and application of article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention also poses challenges (see our previous posts on the HCCH Guide to Good Practice on the grave-risk exception under article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention through the lens of human rights: Part I and Part II).

Moreover, other challenges have arisen in these difficult times of pandemic. In this regard, Nadia Rusinova wrote a post on the “Child Abduction in times of Corona” and another one on “Remote Child-Related Proceedings in Times of Pandemic – Crisis Measures or Justice Reform Trigger?”

Last but not least, there is much uncertainty surrounding Brexit and the new legal framework of the UK. How about all the UK case law regarding Brussels II bis and the related issues regarding the Child Abduction Convention?

Such obstacles are not insurmountable (at least, I hope). Nevertheless, much reflection is needed to continue improving the operation of the Child Abduction Convention in this ever-changing world. Undoubtedly, the Child Abduction Convention is a must-have tool for States to combat internationally removal and retention of children by their parents or someone from the inner family circle in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

For those of you who are interested in getting more information about this Convention: In addition to the Guides to Good Practice published by the HCCH (open access), some of the leading works in this area are (I will concentrate on books as there are countless articles, see also bibliography of the HCCH here. Some of the books are from Hart, click on the link on the top of the banner for more info):

Monographic works:

Schuz, Rhona. The Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis. Studies in Private International Law; Volume 13. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013.  Former Secretary General of the HCCH, Hans van Loon, wrote a very helpful book review. See Van Loon, Hans, “R. Schuz, the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis.” Netherlands International Law Review, 62, no. 1 (April, 2015): 201–206.

Beaumont, Paul R. and Peter E. McEleavy. The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. Oxford Monographs in Private International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Garbolino, James D. and Federal Judicial Center. The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges, 2015 (open access).

More specific topic:

Written by Conflictoflaws.net’s General Editor: Thalia Kruger.

Kruger, Thalia. International Child Abduction: The Inadequacies of the Law. Studies in Private International Law; Vol. 6. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011.

Works in Spanish:

Child abduction and mediation

Chéliz Inglés, María del Carmen. La sustracción internacional de menores y la mediación: Retos y vías prácticas de solución. Monografías. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2019.

Forcada Miranda, Francisco Javier. Sustracción internacional de menores y mediación familiar. Madrid: Sepín, 2015.

Within the Latin-American region

Tenorio Godínez, Lázaro, Nieve Rubaja, Florencia Castro, ed. Cuestiones complejas en los procesos de restitución internacional de niños en Latinoamérica. México: Porrúa, 2017.

Tenorio Godínez, Lázaro, Graciela Tagle de Ferreyra, ed. La Restitución Internacional de la niñez: Enfoque Iberoamericano doctrinario y jurisprudencial. México: Porrúa, 2011.

This is just a short list; please feel free to add other books that you may be aware of.

The HCCH news item is available here. The HCCH Access to Justice Convention is also celebrating its 40th anniversary. Unfortunately, this Convention is less used in practice.

Yesterday, 23 October 2020, the Republic of Serbia ratified the HCCH Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, which will enter into force for Serbia on 1 February 2021.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=757