Flux des sites DIP

The CJEU has in my view taken the sensible approach in C-366/13 Profit Investment Sim, on (among others) whether choice of court included in a bond prospectus, binds not just the original transactional parties but also the buyers of such bonds on the secondary markets or via intermediaries. (An issue which many of us pondered in Kolassa but which was not sub judice there).

Parties at issue were Commerzbank (formerly Dresdner), the bond issuer; Redi, financial intermediary licensed by the UK FSA and subscriber of all relevant bonds on the primary market; and Profit, an Italian company, who bought part of the bonds of Redi, on the secondary market. Dresdner’s prospectus contains choice of court in favour of the English courts.

First, on the issue of the jurisdiction clause. The referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 23(1)(a) and (c) of Regulation 44/2001 (both now part of Article 25) must be interpreted as meaning that a jurisdiction clause, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, satisfies the formal requirements laid down in Article 23(1)(a) [‘in writing or evidenced in writing’] where (i) it is contained in a prospectus produced by the bond issuer concerning the issue of bonds, (ii) it is enforceable against third parties who acquire those bonds through a financial intermediary and (iii), in the event that the first two parts of the second question are answered in the negative, it corresponds to a usage in the field of international trade or commerce for the purpose of Article 23(1)(c).

Choice of court in the prospectus and the impact on the primary market.

The Court first of all holds that the ‘formal requirement’ of (now Article 25 a (a) ”in writing or evidenced in writing’ for the issue of choice of court between Dresdner and Redi is only met (along the lines of Colzani Case 24/76) if the contract signed by the parties upon the issue of the bonds on the primary market expressly mentions the acceptance of the clause by Redi, or contains an express reference to the prospectus. The latter in particular is quite likely.

Choice of court in the prospectus and enforceability against third parties acquiring through a financial intermediary.

Next, the Court (at 30) holds that the same two alternatives apply for the relationship between Redi and Profit. Here the court refers to Refcomp and  distinguishes it, basically by pointing to the specific examples of bills of lading and choice of court in shareholders registries, cases in which the CJEU had previously accepted transferability of choice of court to third parties, in specific circumstances. (Please refer to both the Refcomp judgment and to current judgment (at 33 ff) for detail).

The Court consequently held (at 37) that choice of court contained in a prospectus produced by the bond issuer concerning the issue of bonds may be relied on against a third party who acquired those bonds from a financial intermediary if it is established, which it is for the referring court to verify, that (i) that clause is valid in the relationship between the issuer and the financial intermediary, (ii) the third party, by acquiring those bonds on the secondary market, succeeded to the financial intermediary’s rights and obligations attached to those bonds under the applicable national law, and (iii) the third party had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the prospectus containing that clause. (Emphasis added).

The emphasis I added is quite important: the CJEU does not hold that such succession is somehow part of an EU Ius Commune.

Finally, if the answer to the first two questions is negative, is there usage in international trade or commercial custom between the parties? 

This, the Court holds, has to be determined by the national court. The CJEU (at 48) recalls its earlier case-law in particular C-106/95 MSG:  actual or presumed awareness of a usage on the part of the parties may be made out, in particular, by showing either that the parties had previously had commercial or trade relations between themselves or with other parties operating in the sector in question, or that, in that sector, a particular course of conduct is sufficiently well known because it is generally and regularly followed when a particular type of contract is concluded, so that it may be regarded as being an established practice.

The Court does though give a few more practical things which the national court needs to look out for: at 49. In order to determine, in the main proceedings, whether the insertion into the prospectus of a jurisdiction clause constitutes a usage in the sector in which the parties operate, of which those parties were aware or ought to have been aware, the referring court must take into account, inter alia, the fact that that prospectus was approved in advance by the Irish Stock Exchange and made available to the public on the latter’s website, which does not seem to have been contested by Profit in the proceedings on the merits. In addition, the referring court must take account of the fact that it is undisputed that Profit is a company active in the field of financial investments as well as of any commercial relationships it may have had in the past with the other parties to the main proceedings. The national court must also verify whether the issue of bonds on the market is, in that sector, generally and regularly accompanied by a prospectus containing a jurisdiction clause and whether that practice is sufficiently well known to be regarded as ‘established’.

Lest one forgets, the Court’s judgment is also relevant for a more general query on the nature of (now) Article 7(1): must the action seeking the annulment of a contract and the restitution of the amounts paid on the basis of a document the nullity of which is established, be regarded as ‘matters relating to a contract’ (the existence of which plaintiff seeks to dispute)? Yes, it does: if only (at 54) to ensure that Article 7(1) cannot simply be torpedoed by one party claiming that there is no contract.

(The judgment also reviews the conditions of application of (now) Article 8(1), with respect to ‘irreconcilability’ of judgments).

This judgment is quite relevant in yet again the CJEU having to defer to national law on the issue of transferability (see the emphasis I added, above). The Court very clearly does not wish to overplay its hand in trying to force a European Ius Commune in private law, via the use of private international law.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.1; Heading 2.2.11.1.a; 2.2.9.3;.2.2.9.7; 2.2.12

The “Cross-Border Litigation in Europe” conference is organised by the Centre for Business Law and Practice, University of Leeds, and the Centre for Private International Law, the University of Aberdeen. The conference is being held within the framework of a research project which is funded by the European Commission Civil Justice Programme.

The event will take place in the London School of Economics (New Academic Building, Lincoln’s Inn Field) on Thursday 16th June and Friday 17th June 2016.

The research study aims to consider whether the Member States’ courts and the CJEU can appropriately deal with the cross-border issues arising under the current EU Civil Justice framework. The project, which is coordinated by Professor Paul Beaumont from the University of Aberdeen, involves Dr Katarina Trimmings and Dr Burcu Yuksel from the University of Aberdeen, Dr Mihail Danov from the University of Leeds (UK), Prof. Dr. Stefania Bariatti from the University of Milan (Italy), Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein from the University of Freiburg (Germany), Prof. Dr. Carmen Otero from Complutense University of Madrid (Spain), Prof. Dr. Thalia Kruger from the University of Antwerp (Belgium), Dr Agnieszka Frackowiak-Adamska from the University of Wroclaw (Poland).

This conference is free to attend, but prior registration is required.

Programme

16th June 2016
9:00 am – 9:30 am
Paul Beaumont (Aberdeen), Mihail Danov (Leeds), Katarina Trimmings (Aberdeen) and Burcu Yuksel (Aberdeen) Evaluating the Effectiveness of the EU Civil Justice Framework: Research Objectives and Preliminary Research Findings from Great Britain

9:30 am – 11:00 am – Cross-Border Civil and Commercial Disputes: Legislative Framework
Chair: Paul Beaumont (Aberdeen)
1) Sophia Tang (Newcastle), Cross-Border Contractual Disputes: The Legislative Framework and Court Practice
2) Michael Wilderspin (European Commission, Legal Services), Cross-Border Non-Contractual Disputes: The Legislative Framework and Court Practice
3) Jon Fitchen (Aberdeen), The Unharmonised Procedural Rules: Is there a case for further harmonisation at EU level?
4) Stephen Dnes (Dundee), Economic considerations of the cross-border litigation pattern

15-minute break

11.15 am – 12.30 pm – Cross-Border Civil and Commercial Disputes: Practical Aspects
Chair: Mihail Danov (Leeds)
1) Peter Hurst (39 Essex Chambers), Litigation Costs: Cross-Border Disputes in England and Wales
2) Susan Dunn (Harbour), Litigation Funders and Cross-Border Disputes
3) Craig Pollack (King & Wood Mallesons), Cross-Border Contractual Disputes: Litigants’ Strategies and Settlement Dynamics
4) Jon Lawrence (Freshfields), Cross-Border Competition Law Damages Actions: Litigants’ Strategies and Settlement Dynamics

Lunch (12.30 pm – 1.30 pm)

1.30 pm – 3.00 pm – Cross-Border Family Disputes
Chair: Thalia Kruger (Antwerp)
1) Paul Beaumont (Aberdeen), Brussels IIa recast – a comment on the Commission’s Proposal from a member of the Commission’s Expert Group
2) Elizabeth Hicks (Irwin Mitchell), Litigants’ strategies and settlement dynamics in cross-border matrimonial disputes
3) Marcus Scott-Manderson QC (4 Paper Buildings), Cross-Border Disputes Involving Children: A View from the English Bar
4) Lara Walker (Sussex), Maintenance and child support: PIL Aspects
5) Rachael Kelsey (SKO), Arbitration and ADR: Cross-Border Family Law Disputes

15-minute break

3.15 pm – 4.45 pm – National Reports: Cross-Border Litigation in Europe
Chair: Stefania Bariatti (Milan)
1) Professor Bea Verschraegen (Universität Wien) and Florian Heindler, Preliminary Research Findings from Austria
2) Dr Teodora Tsenova and Dr Anton Petrov, Preliminary Research Findings from Bulgaria
3) Doc. Dr. Ivana Kunda, Preliminary Research Findings from Croatia
4) Professor JUDr Monika Pauknerová, Jiri Grygar and Marta Zavadilová, Preliminary Research Findings from Czech Republic
5) Professor Nikitas Hatzimihail (University of Cyprus), Preliminary Research Findings from Cyprus
6) Professor Peter Arnt Nielsen (Copenhagen Business School), Preliminary Research Findings from Denmark

15-minute break

5.00 pm – 6.15 pm – National Reports: Cross-Border Litigation in Europe
Chair: Jan von Hein (Freiburg)
1) Maarja Torga (University of Tartu), Preliminary Research Findings from Estonia
2) Gustaf Möller (Krogerus) Preliminary Research Findings from Finland
3) Professor Horatia Muir Watt (Science Po), Professor Jeremy Heymann (Lyon) and Professor Laurence Usunier (Cergy-Pontoise), Preliminary Research Findings from France
4) Aspasia Archontaki and Paata Simsive, Preliminary Research Findings from Greece
5) Dr Csongor Nagy (University of Szeged), Preliminary Research Findings from Hungary

7.00 pm – 10.30 pm Dinner (by invite only) – Old Court Room, Lincoln’s Inn
Speech by Lord Justice Vos (Court of Appeal and President of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary), The Effect of the European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) on Cross-Border Dispute Resolution

17th June 2016
8.30 am – 10:00 am – National Reports: Cross-Border Litigation in Europe
Chair: Carmen Otero (Madrid)
1) Maebh Harding (Warwick), Preliminary Research Findings from Ireland
2) Dr Irena Kucina (Ministry of Justice, Latvia), Preliminary Research Findings from Latvia
3) Kristina Praneviciene, Preliminary Research Findings from Lithuania
4) Céline Camara (Max Planck Istitute), Preliminary Research Findings from Luxembourg
5) Clement Mifsud-Bonnici, Preliminary Research Findings from Malta
6) Professor Aukje van Hoek (Universiteit van Amsterdam), Preliminary Research Findings from the Netherlands

15-minute break

10.15 am – 11.30 am – National Reports: Cross-Border Litigation in Europe
Chair: Agnieszka Frackowiak-Adamska (Wroclaw)
1) Professor Elsa Oliveira (Universidade de Lisboa), Preliminary Research Findings from Portugal
2) Dr Ileana Smeureanu (Jones Day, Paris), Lucian Ilie (Lazareff Le Bars) and Ema Dobre (CJEU) Preliminary Research Findings from Romania
3) Doc JUDr M. Duris, JUDr M Vozaryova, Dr M Burdova, Preliminary Research Findings from Slovakia
4) Professor Suzana Kraljic, Preliminary Research Findings from Slovenia
5) Professor Michael Bogdan and Ulf Maunsbach, Preliminary Research Findings from Sweden

15-minute break

11.45 am – 1.00 pm – National Reports: Cross-Border Litigation in Europe
Chair: Alex Layton QC
1) Thalia Kruger (Antwerp) and Eline Ulrix (Antwerp), Preliminary Research Findings from Belgium
2) Jan Von Hein (Freiburg), Preliminary Research Findings from Germany
3) Stefania Bariatti (Milan), Preliminary Research Findings from Italy
4) Agnieszka Frackowiak-Adamska, Agnieszka Guzewicz and ?ukasz Petelski (Wroclaw), Preliminary Research Findings from Poland
5) Carmen Otero (Madrid), Preliminary Research Findings from Spain

Lunch (1.00 pm – 2.00 pm)

2.00 pm – 3.30 pm – Shaping the development of the EU PIL Framework
Chair: Paul Beaumont (Aberdeen)
1) Jacek Garstka (EU Commission, DG Justice), Drafting Legislative Instruments in a Diverse Union 2) Pascale Hecker (Référendaire, CJEU), Cross-Border Litigation: Challenges for EU Judiciary
3) Lady Justice Black (Head of International Family Justice), International Family Justice: Challenges in an EU context
4) Paul Torremans (Nottingham), Cross-Border IP Disputes: Specific Issues and Solutions

15-minute break

3.45 pm – 4:30 pm – The way the EU PIL framework is shaping the litigants’ strategies in a cross-border context
Chair: Mihail Danov (Leeds)
1) Alex Layton QC (20 Essex Chambers), Cross-Border Civil and Commercial Disputes: PIL issues – a view from the English Bar
2) Christopher Wagstaffe QC (29 Bedford Row), Cross-Border Matrimonial Disputes: PIL issues – a view from the English Bar
3) Sophie Eyre (Bird & Bird), Remedies and Recoveries in a Cross-Border Context

4:30 – 5:30 pm – The Way Forward: The research partners’ views
1) Thalia Kruger (Antwerp) and Eline Ulrix (Antwerp), Preliminary Views from Belgium
2) Jan Von Hein (Freiburg), Preliminary Views from Germany
3) Stefania Bariatti (Milan), Preliminary Views from Italy
4) Agnieszka Frackowiak-Adamska, Agnieszka Guzewicz and ?ukasz Petelski (Wroclaw), Preliminary Views from Poland
5) Carmen Otero (Madrid), Preliminary Views from Spain
6) Paul Beaumont (Aberdeen), Mihail Danov (Leeds), Katarina Trimmings (Aberdeen) and Burcu Yuksel, Addressing the Challenges: Is there a case for Reform?

The much awaited decision Avotinš v. Latvia of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR was finally delivered yesterday. The decision can be found here. A video of the delivery is also available.

The European Court of Human Rights held by a majority that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court reiterated that, when applying European Union law, the Contracting States remained bound by the obligations they had entered into on acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights. Those obligations were to be assessed in the light of the presumption of equivalent protection established by the Court in the Bosphorus judgment and developed in the Michaud judgment. The Court did not consider that the protection of fundamental rights had been manifestly deficient  such that the presumption of equivalent protection was rebutted in the case at hand.

While at first sight the decision comes as a relief for all those who have been holding breath, fearing the worst after the CJEU Opinion 2/13, a careful reading (immediately undertaken by the academia: the exchange of emails has already started here in Luxembourg) reveals some potential points of friction. Following the advice of both Patrick Kinsch and Christian Kohler I would like to draw your attention in particular to para. 113-116.

Judge Lemmens and Judge Briede expressed a joint concurring opinion and Judge Sajó expressed a dissenting opinion, all three annexed to the judgment.

Una sentenza del Tribunale di Bologna del 9 novembre 2015 tratta della legge applicabile alla donazione e alla ripetizione dell’indebito.

La controversia trae origine dall’erogazione di una somma di denaro da parte di una società con sede a Panama a favore di una persona fisica residente in Italia.

Nella prospettazione della società panamense, attrice in giudizio, tale somma avrebbe dovuto servire all’acquisto di un immobile sito in Italia per conto della stessa società, ma era stata trattenuta dal percipiente, senza titolo, ed utilizzata da questi per scopi personali; di qui la domanda di restituzione proposta al giudice italiano.

Il convenuto, per parte sua, contestava la fondatezza della pretesa attorea, affermando che la somma gli era stata versata in adempimento di un’obbligazione naturale, o comunque a titolo di donazione, rilevando che la dazione aveva per sfondo la lunga relazione sentimentale che lo aveva legato all’amministratrice della società panamense.

Ritenuta la propria giurisdizione e sollecitato il contraddittorio sulla questione della legge applicabile nelle forme dell’art. 101, comma 2°, del codice di procedura civile, il Tribunale di Bologna considera, dapprima, l’ipotesi che la fattispecie integri un caso di ripetizione dell’indebito e ritiene, a tal fine, di poter fare riferimento all’art. 61 della legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, in tema di obbligazioni nascenti dalla legge, ricavandone l’applicabilità della legge italiana, quale “legge dello Stato in cui si è verificato il fatto da cui deriva l’obbligazione”.

La sentenza, per la verità, non prende espressamente posizione circa la possibile applicabilità ratione temporis del regolamento n. 864/2007 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni extracontrattuali (c.d. Roma II), e in particolare del suo art. 10, relativo all’arricchimento senza causa. Si legge in motivazione, peraltro, che anche “a considerare la fattispecie come ‘illecito’, secondo la specifica nozione dell’articolo 2 [del regolamento c.d.Roma II], si avrebbe comunque applicazione del diritto italiano, essendosi la fattispecie conclusa con l’arrivo del bonifico” nella disponibilità del convenuto, in Italia.

Individuata in questo modo la legge ipoteticamente applicabile al pagamento di indebito, il Tribunale si interroga in ordine alla sussistenza o meno di un titolo che giustifichi il trasferimento della somma di denaro in grado di escludere il diritto alla restituzione dell’indebito. Viene innanzitutto osservato che la causa del pagamento non può consistere in un’obbligazione naturale — come avanzato dalla convenuta — atteso che “la imputazione della liberalità è in capo alla società attrice [che], per ovvie ragioni, non può avere avuto un rapporto sentimentale” e che, pertanto, “non è possibile che essa abbia avuto, nei confronti del [convenuto], obbligazioni naturali”.

Ritenendo, all’esito di questo riscontro, di non poter inquadrare la fattispecie nella categoria delle obbligazione naturale, il giudice passa ad analizzare la seconda ipotesi di qualificazione dedotta dalla convenuta, giungendo a scorgere nell’invio della somma di denaro una donazione.

Basandosi su questa qualificazione, il Tribunale bolognese identifica la norma di conflitto pertinente nell’art. 4, par. 2, del regolamento n. 593/2008 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali (Roma I), pervenendo così alla conclusione che la legge applicabile al rapporto litigioso è la legge panamense, non essendo dubbio — si legge nella  motivazione — “che la prestazione caratteristica della donazione sia quella del donante, che è panamense”.

Appurato che la donazione debba essere assoggettata alla legge panamense, il giudice accerta che essa è valida ed efficace in conformità alle norme di tale ordinamento. Pertanto, ritenuto nel merito che l’erogazione della somma fosse al tempo sorretta dalla causa della donazione, viene escluso il carattere indebito del pagamento, con conseguente rigetto della domanda.

Si ringrazia per la segnalazione l’avv. Claudio Pezzi.

Minori e immigrazione: quali diritti?, a cura di Caterina Fratea e Isolde Quadranti, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2015, ISBN: 9788849531008, pp. XIV+186, Euro 21.

Il volume, di cui è disponibile qui il sommario completo, affronta fra gli altri, con uno scritto di Maria Caterina Baruffi (Univ. Verona), i profili internazionalprivatistici della protezione dei minori, segnatamente alla luce della Convenzione dell’Aja del 19 ottobre 1996 sulla competenza il riconoscimento la legge applicabile l’esecuzione e la cooperazione in materia di responsabilità genitoriale e protezione dei minori.

Ulteriori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Un percorso tra i diritti – Scritti scelti di Bruno Nascimbene, Giuffrè, 2016, pp. XII + 806, ISBN: 9788814213946, Euro 95.

La raccolta è divisa in quattro sezioni, una delle quali è dedicata al Diritto internazionale privato e processuale nella dimensione europea.

L’indice completo può leggersi qui. Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Prof. Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, of Lyon, is the leading researcher of the long-term, multidisciplinary and comparative (and certainly challenging!) project giving title to this post. A summary of the project, which is funded by the Institut Universitaire de France, is provided below. More information can be found here; for an ssrn publication explaining the project click here.

Summary of the Research Project

The purpose of the research is to bring into the law a new legal concept in order to deal with the phenomenon called « full movement beyond control ».

Movement : persons (individuals or legal entities), goods (tangible or intangible, and more widely, services and capital) move within territories and between different territories. This movement has reached unprecedented dimension in recent times (notably for migrant, data, waste, capital) : the speed, diversity and often significant volume of flow have reached levels as yet unparalleled. Full : the movement of persons, goods, services and capital has a « full » dimension in that it engages the attention and action of all the public and private operators (States, companies, citizens) at local, national or international level, who contribute to the phenomenon in whole or in part, voluntarily or involuntarily. Beyond control : movement has an « uncontrollable » dimension in the sense that in specific or short-term situations, like those of crisis, operators, and particularly those with responsibility for such movement, do not have full control over it.

This movement beyond control results in the creation of positive and negative, legal and illegal channels within a particular sphere, making it almost possible for the operators to work together to contain it. Full movement beyond control is experiencing a paradoxical surge. More often than not, its existence is denied by those who claim to have the power to control it. However, it is putting existing frontiers at risk while simultaneously creating new ones. It is often backed up by a public whose collective conscience is shaped by a hope that regaining control is still a possibility.

By employing a multidisciplinary (Social sciences – Sciences) and comparative (Europe, Brazil, Canada) approach, this research project seeks to identify a new legal concept capable of specific legal treatment and competent to take in hand the particular issues raised by the phenomenon and the legitimate expectations it may create.

Nella cornice del ciclo di seminari Hybrid Legal Regimes, il Dipartimento di Studi giuridici dell’Università Bocconi di Milano ospita, il 25 maggio 2016, un incontro dal titolo Jurisprudence Unconfined: Legal Pluralism and the Conflict of Laws.

Dopo un’introduzione di Yane Svetiev (Univ. Bocconi), interverrà Horatia Muir Watt (SciencesPo), a cui si affiancheranno, come discussants, Alexis Galan e Kellen Trilha Schappo (Univ. Bocconi).

Le conclusioni sono affidate a Paola Mariani (Univ. Bocconi).

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Si intitola Le clausole di scelta del foro nei contratti internazionali un incontro formativo in programma a Torino il 10 giugno 2016, organizzato dall’Ordine degli Avvocati di Torino, con l’Union Internationale des Avocats e dal Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Torino.

Gli interventi, preceduti da una relazione di Margherita Salvadori (Univ. Torino), sono affidati ad esponenti di studi legali di diversi paesi europei, sotto la moderazione di Paolo Lombardi (Studio legale ELEXI).

Il programma completo e maggiori informazioni si trovano qui.

When my tweets on the CJEU are not followed quickly by a blog post, assume I got snowed under. Or that other developments require more immediate analysis. Taser, Case C-175/15, is easily dismissed perhaps as not all that stunning or shocking (puns abound), yet as often, it is worthwhile highlighting what the case does not answer, rather than what it did elucidate.

Taser International, whose seat is in the United States, entered into two non-exclusive distribution agreements with Gate 4. Under those agreements, Gate 4 and its administrator, Mr Anastasiu, undertook to assign to the other contracting party the Taser International trade marks which they had registered, or for which they had applied for registration, in Romania.

Following Gate 4’s and Mr Anastasiu’s refusal to fulfil that contractual obligation, Taser International brought an action before the District Court, Bucharest. Regardless of the existence in those contracts of clauses conferring jurisdiction on a court situated in the US, Gate 4 and Mr Anastasiu entered an appearance before the Romanian court without challenging its jurisdiction. The Court ordered them to undertake all the formalities necessary for the registration of the assignment.

The appeals court seeks clarification as to whether the Brussels I Regulation is applicable to the dispute before it, since the parties elected, for the resolution of their disputes, the courts of a third country. The referring court considers that such a clause conferring jurisdiction on a third country may, for this reason alone, preclude the tacit prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 24 (Article 26 in the Brussels I Recast). 

On the assumption, however, that that latter rule is applicable, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether it should, nevertheless, decline jurisdiction on another ground. It also queried whether the exclusive jurisdictional rules of Article 22 are applicable: does a dispute concerning an obligation to assign a trade mark, likely to result in a registration under national law, fall within paragraph 4 of that article.

The CJEU firstly recalled its finding in C-111/09 CPP Vienna Insurance Group: choice of court made per Article 23 (now Article 25) Brussels I, can be overruled by voluntary appearance. The latter in that case simply acts as an amended choice of court. In Taser (at 24) the court now adds that this applies also if that initial choice of court was made ex-EU. The deliberate, later choice, remains a deliberate choice. The Court makes no reference to discussions e.g.  in the context of Gothaer, whether the Brussels I Regulation at all should be concerned with choice of court ex-EU or should be entirely indifferent. Arguably, in the Recast Regulation, there is consideration for choice of court ex-EU, in particular in recital 24 combined with Article 33.

Intellectual property lawyers will be disappointed with the Court’s answer to the issue of whether trade mark assignment falls within Article 22(4) [now 24(4)]: Romanian courts in any event had jurisdiction. (at 29).

Plenty left open, therefore. Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, chapter 2, heading 2.2.6.7, heading 2.2.7 .

Happy Saint’s day to all fellow lawyers. Whatever Faith or non-Faith we profess, Dean Wigmore’s 1936’s paper is worth a read.

Geert.

The rather long judgment in T-47/15 Germany v Commission is neatly summarised by the CJEU here. I have reported before on both the State Aid and the free movement implications of the Court’s seminal findings in Preussen Elektra. In current case, the Court essentially upholds the EC’s finding of the more recent German regime amounting to illegal State aid and incompatibility with the Internal Market – in contrast with its earlier findings in Preussen Elektra.

Disappointingly, Preussen Elektra was distinguished rather than its merits called into question. Rather like Advocate-General Bot I stubbornly insist that Preussen Elektra is bad case-law and I continue to call upon the Court to scrap its findings in same.

Geert.

Sergio Carbone, Chiara Tuo, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e commerciale – Il regolamento UE n. 1215/2012, 7a ed., Giappichelli, 2016, pp. XII + 428, ISBN: 9788892103436, Euro 39.

[Dall’indice del volume] Capo I. L’evoluzione della disciplina dello spazio giudiziario europeo e il suo àmbito di applicazione. – Capo II. I criteri di distribuzione di competenza giurisdizionale nello spazio giudiziario europeo. Il foro generale e i fori speciali. – Capo III. In particolare, i fori speciali delle domande connesse e delle controversie riguardanti i contraenti deboli. – Capo IV. I fori esclusivi. – Capo V. I fori delle misure cautelari e i criteri di coordinamento dell’attività giurisdizionale. – Capo VI. La libera circolazione (in particolare gli effetti e i controlli) dei provvedimenti giurisdizionali nello spazio giudiziario europeo.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Il Dipartimento di Scienze giuridiche dell’Università degli Studi di Verona organizza una Summer School su L’industria della moda nell’Unione europea dal 20 al 25 giugno 2016. L’iniziativa rientra nell’ambito del progetto “Univr Fashion Week” co-finanziato dall’Unione europea come Modulo Jean Monnet 2015-2018, coordinato da Maria Caterina Baruffi.

La Summer School è finalizzata ad un approfondimento, sotto un profilo europeo e internazionale, di temi di interesse per il settore della moda, quali proprietà intellettuale, diritto della concorrenza, contrattualistica, responsabilità sociale d’impresa e management. Le lezioni e i workshops, tenuti da docenti universitari, professionisti ed esperti di innovazione e consulenza manageriale, intendono fornire ai partecipanti competenze spendibili per una attività professionale nell’industria della moda.

Il corso si rivolge a laureati, giovani professionisti, avvocati e praticanti, nonché a studenti dell’ultimo anno delle lauree magistrali in discipline giuridiche ed economiche.

Il programma dell’edizione 2016 è disponibile qui.

Il termine per l’iscrizione è il 15 giugno 2016. Per maggiori informazioni su iscrizioni e accreditamenti, consultare questa pagina.

Nell’ordinanza 18 marzo 2016 n. 5420, le Sezioni unite della Corte di cassazione hanno dichiarato l’insussistenza della giurisdizione italiana rispetto a un giudizio proposto ai sensi dell’art. 333 del codice civile dalla madre di un minore, cittadina italiana, per l’adozione di provvedimenti limitativi della potestà genitoriale del padre, cittadino francese, alla luce di comportamenti che sarebbero stati tenuti da quest’ultimo in pregiudizio del figlio.

La Corte è giunta a questa conclusione sulla scorta di un ragionamento in cui si intrecciano, secondo un filo logico che non è del tutto agevole dipanare, considerazioni legate — per l’appunto — alla giurisdizione del giudice italiano e considerazioni legate alla previa pendenza della medesima causa di fronte a un giudice straniero.

Il padre, autore del regolamento preventivo di giurisdizione con cui le Sezioni unite sono state chiamate a pronunciarsi sul caso, aveva rilevato, in effetti, che, al momento dell’instaurazione del procedimento italiano risultava pendente negli Stati Uniti un procedimento di divorzio fra sé e la madre, nell’ambito del quale erano stati adottati dei provvedimenti non definitivi in tema di responsabilità genitoriale, comportanti, in particolare, l’autorizzazione della madre a trasferirsi in Italia con il figlio.

Nell’ordinanza, le Sezioni unite si preoccupano innanzitutto di dichiarare la proponibilità del regolamento di giurisdizione “in ragione della pendenza presso un paese extraeuropeo del giudizio tra i genitori sull’affidamento del minore”.

Impostato il ragionamento sui binari della litispendenza, i giudici del Supremo Collegio osservano che la questione del coordinamento fra il procedimento italiano e quello statunitense non trova la sua disciplina nel regolamento n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza giurisdizionale e all’efficacia delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), dato che la fattispecie interessa un giudizio instaurato in uno Stato estraneo all’Unione europea.

La norma che viene in rilievo è semmai, per la Corte, l’art. 7 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, ai sensi del quale “quando, nel corso del giudizio, sia eccepita la previa pendenza tra le stesse parti di domanda avente il medesimo oggetto e il medesimo titolo dinanzi a un giudice straniero, il giudice italiano, se ritiene che il provvedimento straniero possa produrre effetto per l’ordinamento italiano, sospende il giudizio”.

Il procedimento statunitense, osserva il Supremo Collegio in funzione di quanto stabilito nell’art. 7 della legge, ha avuto inizio prima di quello italiano ed è tuttora pendente.

Solo a questo punto, la Corte rileva che, alla data dell’introduzione del giudizio italiano, il minore non aveva ancora stabilito la sua residenza abituale in Italia. Si osserva infatti nella motivazione che, a fronte di un ricorso ex art. 333 del codice civile proposto nel settembre 2014, “non viene riferito alcun episodio concreto” che segnali il continuativo svolgimento della vita personale del piccolo in Italia, dove solo nel dicembre 2014 ne è stato autorizzato dal giudice statunitense il trasferimento con la affidataria.

Sulla base di tutto quanto precede, le Sezioni unite concludono nel senso della carenza di giurisdizione del giudice italiano.

Vale la pena di aggiungere che le Sezioni unite potrebbero presto tornare ad occuparsi dell’applicabilità e degli effetti del regime comune della litispendenza rispetto a una situazione ricompresa (ai fini della giurisdizione) nella sfera applicativa del regolamento Bruxelles II bis, e sulla configurabilità della relativa questione come questione di sospensione necessaria del procedimento o come questione di giurisdizione, anche alla luce di quanto rilevato dalle stesse Sezioni unite (ma in relazione alla diversa previsione contenuta nell’art. 27 del regolamento n. 44/2001) in precedenti occasioni (come l’ordinanza 8 giugno 2011 n. 12410).

Come segnalato da Marina Castellaneta nel suo blog, la Sesta Sezione della Corte, con ordinanza 2 maggio 2016 n. 8619, ha infatti sollecitato il Presidente a investire del problema le Sezioni unite ai sensi dell’art. 374 del codice di procedura civile, in ragione della particolare importanza della questione di massima in discussione.

È disponibile il fascicolo inaugurale di European papers, un quadrimestrale on-line in lingua inglese frutto di un progetto che coinvolge studiosi del diritto dell’Unione europea provenienti da diversi paesi d’Europa.

La rivista si propone di trattare i temi afferenti al diritto dell’Unione europea, nei diversi profili della dimensione costituzionale dell’Unione europea, del mercato interno e della libertà di circolazione delle persone, dell’integrazione europea attraverso i diritti umani, della dimensione internazionale dell’integrazione europea e delle politiche dell’Unione relative allo spazio di libertà sicurezza e giustizia. In quest’ultimo ambito si inserisce la trattazione delle questioni collegate al diritto internazionale privato dell’Unione europea.

[Dal manifesto della Rivista] – Quaderni europei è l’espressione di un progetto culturale: nelle intenzioni dei suoi fondatori, essa intende costituire un luogo di riflessione sull’integrazione europea come strumento per la creazione di una nuova comunità politica. … [L]a realizzazione di un progetto culturale sul tema dell’integrazione europea comporta la necessità di riconciliare esigenze apparentemente antitetiche: da un lato, la pressante esigenza di rimeditare le categorie fondamentali di analisi dell’integrazione europea; d’altro lato, quella di seguire l’incessante dibattito che fluisce, da una varietà di fonti, su tali temi. … L’ispirazione ideale di Quaderni europei è unicamente di carattere metodologico. Essa intende offrire uno spazio pubblico nell’ambito del quale le varie ipotesi sul processo d’integrazione europeo possano essere sottoposte a vaglio critico e al dibattito aperto, scevro di condizionamenti ideologici. Quaderni europei vuole essere un laboratorio vivente per l’analisi di un fenomeno sociale la cui unicità, nell’ambito delle categorie del pensiero scientifico, è oggi ampiamente riconosciuta.

L’E-Journal, gratuitamente accessibile, è corredato da un forum inteso a promuovere “il costante aggiornamento e il dibattito ‘a seconda lettura’ sui temi europei”.

L’organico completo della direzione della rivista è disponibile a questo indirizzo.

L’archivio dei fascicoli è consultabile qui.

Si terrà a Bergamo il 30 maggio 2016, presso il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza della locale Università, un incontro dedicato al regolamento n. 650/2012 sul diritto internazionale privato delle successioni mortis causa.

Interverranno, fra gli altri, Sergio Carbone (Univ. Genova), Angelo Davì (Univ. Roma La Sapienza) e i notai Arrigo Roveda (Milano) e Guido De Rosa (Bergamo).

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Dal 23 al 27 maggio 2016 si terrà presso l’Ordine degli Avvocati di Vicenza e presso il Polo Universitario di Vicenza una summer school in tema di Transnational Commercial Agreements, Litigation and Arbitration.

Le lezioni tratteranno i temi della giurisdizione e della legge applicabile secondo il diritto dell’Unione europea e secondo il diritto statunitense, con riferimento sia alle controversie dinanzi alle giurisdizioni nazionali sia a quelle arbitrali.

La  summer school vedrà come docenti, fra gli altri, Massimo Benedettelli (Univ. Bari), Franco Ferrari (Univ. Verona), Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi (Univ. Bologna), Luca Radicati di Brozolo (Univ. Cattolica di Milano), Marco Torsello (Univ. Verona) e Francesco Cortesi (Corte di Cassazione).

Il programma completo del corso ed il relativo modulo di iscrizione sono disponibili a questo indirizzo. Il termine per la presentazione della domanda di partecipazione scade il 21 maggio 2016.

The evidentiary effects of authentic acts in the Member States of the European Union, in the context of successions

This study was conducted in 25 EU Member States, under the coordination of the Centre for Private International Law at the University Aberdeen. It additionally includes input from the notariats of the CNUE. It sets out the typical domestic types of authentic instruments (and their usual evidentiary effects) arising in successions in the 22 Member States of origin (that allow their creation) and also deals with the ways in which they may interact with Art 59 of Regulation 650/2012 in each of the 25 Member States considered as Member States addressed. The authors looked at the meaning of ‘acceptance’  and the meaning of public policy in the context of Art 59 650/2012. They made various suggestions for improvements in best practice and for various legislative reforms of the Succession Regulation.

The abstract reads:

The EU Succession Regulation (Regulation 650/2012) allows for cross-border circulation of authentic instruments in a matter of succession. Authentic instruments are documents created by authorised authorities which benefit from certain evidential advantages. As this Regulation does not harmonise Member State substantive laws or procedures concerning succession the laws relating to the domestic evidentiary effects of succession authentic instruments remain diverse. Article 59 of the Succession Regulation requires the Member States party to the Regulation to give succession authentic instruments the evidentiary effects they would enjoy in their Member State of origin. The only limits on this obligation being public policy or the irreconcilability of the authentic instrument with a court decision, court settlement or another authentic instrument. This study, which was commissioned by the Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament upon request of the Committee on Legal Affairs, provides an information resource for legal practitioners concerning the evidentiary effects of succession authentic instruments in the 25 Member States bound by the Succession Regulation. It also makes recommendations for best practice.

Full study available here (in English, but it is being translated into French and German).

Ministry of Defence [MOD] v Iraqi civilians highlights a classic in private international law (statutes of limitation), with an interesting link to State immunity. Procedural issues are considered to be part of the lex fori. Meaning, a court always applies its own procedural rules. For the discussions in the Rome II context, see an earlier posting. However what is less settled is whether statutes of limitation fall under procedure or substantial law. If the former, then they follow the lex fori. If the latter, then they follow lex causae: the law applicable to the substantive matter at issue.

Limitation, which deprives the litigant of a forensic remedy but does not extinguish his right, was traditionally classified by the English courts as procedural. The result was that until the position was altered by statute in 1984, the English courts disregarded foreign limitation law and applied the English statutes of limitation irrespective of the lex causae. This was widely regarded as unsatisfactory, mainly because of the rather technical character of the distinction on which it was based between barring the remedy and extinguishing the right.

The Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 changed the position and provided for the English courts, with limited exceptions, to apply the limitation rules of the lex causae. 

Now, in MOD v Iraqi Civilians, on appeal from [2015] EWCA Civ 1241, the civilians claim to have suffered unlawful detention and/or physical maltreatment at the hands of British armed forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009, for which the MOD is liable in tort. It is agreed between the parties that any liability of the Ministry in tort is governed by Iraqi law. Under article 232 of the Civil Code of Iraq, the standard limitation period applicable to claims of this kind in Iraqi law is three years from the day on which the claimant became aware of the injury and of the person who caused it. The action sub judice was begun more than three years after most of the claimants must have been aware of these matters.

However, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, which had and still has the force of law in Iraq, made it impossible for claimants to sue the British government in Iraq. Section 2(1) of the Order provides that coalition forces in Iraq (including British forces) are “immune from Iraqi legal process.” Claimants argue that Order 17 needs to be seen as an ‘impediment’ within the meaning of article 435 of the Iraqi Civil Code, which is one of a number of provisions suspending the running of time in particular cases. It provides:

” Article 435 – (1) The time limit barring the hearing of the case is suspended by a lawful excuse such as where the plaintiff is a minor or interdicted and has no guardian or is absent in a remote foreign country, or where the case is between spouses or ascendants and descendants, or if there is another impediment rendering it impossible for the plaintiff to claim his right.

(2) The period which lapses while the excuse still exists (lasts) shall not be taken into account (for the running of the time limitation).”

Lord Sumption leading, held (at 11) that Order 17 is not a rule of limitation, but a particular form of state immunity, which serves as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts. It is therefore necessarily procedural and local in nature. It is not legally relevant, given the claimants have brought proceedings in England, what impediments might have prevented similar proceedings in Iraq [at 13]. Claimants could have always and did eventually sue in the UK. Claimants’ submission, if accepted, would mean that there was no limitation period at all affecting the present proceedings in England, by reason of a consideration (CPA Order 17) which had no relevance to English proceedings because it has no application outside Iraq and has never impeded resort to the English court (at 16).

The Appeal was dismissed. In the wider context of immunity, it is important precedent. Claimants faced with immunity obstacles to litigation in a jurisdiction, must not hesitate to start proceedings elsewhere, where no such obstacles exist. In proceedings before the English courts, any delay in doing so is subject to the ordinary limitation periods of the lex causae.

Geert.