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The Academy of European Law (ERA) will host a conference on the changes which will be brought about by Brexit with regard to the UK’s status under the Brussels Ia, Rome I & Rome II Regulations and the impact of those changes on commercial dispute resolution in London during the transitional period and afterwards. The seminar is organized by Dr Angelika Fuchs (ERA) in cooperation with the Bar Council, the European Circuit and the Hamburgischer Anwaltverein. The event will take place on 10 November 2016 in London and will be followed by a reception.

Key topics will be:

• the fate of prorogation clauses in favour of English courts
• cross-border enforceability of judgments
• consequences for choice of law agreements
• the future of London as a legal hub

The full conference programme is available here.

The speakers are:

• Barbara Dohmann QC, Barrister, Blackstone Chambers, London
• Alexander Layton QC, Barrister, 20 Essex Street, London
• Matthias Lehmann, Professor at the University of Bonn
• Ravi Mehta, Barrister, Blackstone Chambers, London
• Hugh Mercer QC, Barrister, Essex Court Chambers, London
• Michael Patchett-Joyce, Barrister, Outer Temple Chambers, London

For further information, please see the conference website. Registration forms are available here.

On Friday, 7 October 2106, the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of London will host a half-day conference on Changes and challenges in cross-border litigation after the Brexit referendum. Designed to give speakers and attendees the opportunity to reflect on topics that are or could be affected by ‘Brexit’ for better or worse, the focus of the conference will be on areas of law that are relevant to commercial law such as choice of law, dispute resolution, banking resolution and cross border securities. A comparative viewpoint will be taken to include perspectives from Scotland and England and other European legal systems. The objective is to invite fresh approaches to legal solutions as they have been manifested in European Union legislation that may benefit from rethinking in the light of the June 2016 referendum on the UK’s EU Membership. Registration is possible and requested via the conference website.

The Programme reads as follows:

Introductory Remarks: Prof. Andrew Dickinson, University of Oxford, tbc – “The future direction of private international law in the UK” 

Keynote Speaker: Prof. Giesela Ruehl, University of Jena – “Choice of law and choice court clauses after the EU Referendum”  

Prof. Sophia Tang, University of Newcastle – “Future Private International Law and Judicial Cooperation: Different Models” 

Dr Maren Heidemann, Visiting Fellow, IALS – “Identities in EU PIL – an outdated social model?”  

Dr Lorna Gillies, University of Strathclyde – “Some observations on intra-UK rules post-Brexit” 

Prof. Gerard McCormack, University of Leeds – “Insolvency litigation after Brexit”

Dr Jonathan Fitchen, University of Aberdeen – “Post-Brexit recognition and enforcement of UK civil and commercial judgments in the European Union: problems and challenges” 

Dr Mukarrum Ahmed, University of Aberdeen – “BREXIT and English Jurisdiction Agreements: The Post-Referendum Legal Landscape

It is important at the outset to clarify terminology. A variety of statements, papers and position papers on JASTA, include the doctrine of ‘State immunity’ to either reject or support the Act. The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, P-T Stoll (2011) defines State Immunity as:

“State immunity protects a State and its property from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State. It covers administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings (jurisdictional immunity), as well as enforcement measures (enforcement immunity). It reflects the sovereign equality of States as a main pillar of the contemporary international legal order. State immunity is closely related to but distinct from diplomatic immunity and the immunity of heads of States as well as the immunity of international organizations”.

This definition already shows the many levels of ‘immunity’ and the potential for confusion. The immunity at stake in JASTA is jurisdictional immunity. At the core of this immunity lies its procedural character. Immunity from jurisdiction does not mean that the subject enjoying it, is not bound by the law. States are evidently bound to apply international law. They and their agents and representatives are also bound to apply local law. Immunity from jurisdiction simply means that States cannot be pursued by the ordinary courts and tribunals of other States.

State immunity is seldom included in Treaties. It is considered to be part of customary international law. One or two Treaties have tried to codified it (e.g. the 1972 Basel Convention; and the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, adopted on 2 December 2004) however these Treaties do not have many signatories. Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions such as the United States and the United Kingdom have a purpose-made Act that specifies how State immunity (and its limited exceptions) are to be applied on their soil. Civil law countries tend not to have such Act.

The existence of jurisdictional immunity of the State was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its judgment of 3 February 2012 in Germany v Italy. Here, the ICJ noted (at 56)

Although there has been much debate regarding the origins of State immunity and the identification of the principles underlying that immunity in the past, the International Law Commission concluded in 1980 that the rule of State immunity had been “adopted as a general rule of customary international law solidly rooted in the current practice of States” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980, Vol. II (2), p. 147, para. 26).

The Court considers that the rule of State immunity occupies an important place in international law and international relations. It derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States, which, as Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations makes clear, is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order. (at 57)

And ibidem

Exceptions to the immunity of the State represent a departure from the principle of sovereign equality.

‘Sovereign equality’ lies at the core of the principle of State immunity. In one of the pivotal early cases on the doctrine, The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812), Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court emphasised the functional character of the principle. Other States sovereigns, their bodies and their agents need to be unencumbered in the pursuit of their mission. Just as the home nation expects its sovereign and its representatives to be treated in such way in other nations.

National courts in ordinary are not equal to the sovereign’s status and often diplomatic missions, which is exactly why those activities should not be hampered by law suits having to be entertained in local courts.

It may at first sight seem as if the doctrine of State immunity, like many century old concepts, surely ought not to stand in modern society. In 1951, Professor Sir Hersch Lauterpacht QC called State immunity an essentially insignificant and artificial problem (Lauterpacht, 1951). He supplemented his thoughts with a proposal to all but abolish the immunity of foreign States before domestic courts. In 1988, Professor (now emeritus) Christoph Schreuer published a volume on ‘recent developments’ in State immunity (Schreuer, 1988) in which he demonstrated that, defying Sir Hersch’s predictions, State immunity continued to exist. Now, nearly 30 years after that latter volume and a full 65 years following prof Lauterpacht’ s article, State immunity continues to exercise legislators and the judiciary worldwide, with increased attention to the citisens’ (including corporations) rights  of access to justice.

The boundaries and implications of State immunity are more than ever challenged. States and State extensions (public private partnerships; autonomous public undertakings; privatised utilities with public interest duties; State-funded and /or State run corporations…) play an increasingly relevant role in today’s integrated global economies.

Privatisation, outsourcing, and the general trend in many jurisdictions to downsize the government apparatus, means that in recent years more than ever before, boundaries between ‘the State’ and ‘the private sector’ have become increasingly blurred. Yet in litigation, both at the jurisdictional and at the enforcement stage, the conceptual difference between State parties involved in litigation, and ‘commercial’, private parties, continues to exist.

The increasing presence of ‘the State’(in the broad sense) in general economic life has led to a need for renewed statutory and judiciary response to issues as diverse as vulture funds litigation involving sovereign debt, enforcement of arbitral proceedings against States (and similar entities), …

Italian and Belgian courts were among the first to distinguish, in the application of a principle of sovereign immunity, between States acting iure imperii, and acting iure gestionis. The difference being that in the latter, the State pursues commercial activities just like companies and individuals and, the theory goes, they should therefore not enjoy immunity from jurisdiction.

The limited exceptions to state immunity such as in the case of acta iure gestionis may suggest that State immunity faces un unstable path. In 2012, as noted, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) supported state immunity by ruling that Germany could benefit from the principle to avoid paying damages for war crimes and violation of ius cogens (Germany v. Italy). A year later, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was less favourable by stating that an absolute interpretation of the principle violates article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Oleynikov v. Russia). However that latter case concerned the iure gestionis exception: The case concerned a Russian national who complained about the refusal by the Russian courts to examine his claim concerning the repayment of a loan to the Trade representation of North Korea. The Court held that the limitation of Mr Oleynikov’s right of access to court had pursued the legitimate aim of promoting good relations between States through the respect of national sovereignty. However, it concluded that the Russian courts had failed to examine whether the nature of the transaction underlying the claim was of a private law nature and to take into account the provisions of international law in favour of restrictive immunity.

The point about State immunity from jurisdiction is that it operates blindly. It can only fulfil its function if it is entirely blind to the merits of the underlying case. Except if the case might conceivably involve commercial activities of the State concerned, a court should simply not entertain the case at all. This is all the more relevant in cases which involve topical international relations issues, such as in particular the fight against international terrorism. By lifting that procedural bar, JASTA makes sovereign States, including those of the European Union, subject to the full weight of American civil procedure, including pre-trial discovery, trial by jury, attorneys fees etc. Exactly the kind of distraction which Justice Marshall would have called an unjustified and unhelpful complication in Sovereign States pursuing their business, as States.

A unilateral change to the theory and practice of sovereign immunity such as proposed by JASTA, in my view does not reflect international law on the issue. It would undermine the very foundation of international diplomacy and law. I believe European nations would be well advised to protest against it, and to protest loudly.

There is no such thing as ‘sovereign immunity-light’. From the moment the principle is eroded, even for what seems a good or justified cause, it is damaged beyond repair.

Geert.

Excuse the attempt at pun in the title (which readers may have even missed. ‘Green’ v carte ‘Blanche’. It’s Thursday, and these are busy weeks). Apologies also to the readers who are new to the debate. The legality of support schemes for renewable energy  EU law has occupied mine and others’ mind for a little while now. One may want to refer eg to my paper on the Vindkraft et al judgment or to various postings on this blog. Specifically, for the latter, my post on the AG’s Opinion in Essent 2.0, case C-492/14., judgment issued today.

Bot AG had opined, very very reluctantly, that the Court’s case-law meant that Flanders could indeed reserve the benefit of the free distribution of electricity produced from renewable energy sources solely to generating installations directly connected to the distribution systems located in Flanders, thereby excluding generating installations located in other Member States.

The Court itself has now distinguished its own case-law: the EU has not harmonised the national support schemes for green electricity; this means that it is possible in principle for Member States to limit access to such schemes to green electricity production located in their territory. However the Court’s sympathy is now limited to schemes that support producers only. Green energy support schemes, whose production costs seem to be still quite high as compared with the costs of electricity produced from non-renewable energy sources, are inherently designed in particular to foster, from a long-term perspective, investment in new installations, by giving producers certain guarantees about the future marketing of their green electricity (at 110, with reference to Vindkraft).

However it is not the purpose of the Flemish scheme to give direct support to producers of green electricity. Rather, the free distribution of green electricity constitutes a financial advantage conferred primarily on the supplier of such electricity, which may, in certain circumstances, depending notably on the sale price which the consumer is charged by the supplier for his electricity, to a certain extent and indirectly also benefit the consumer (at 112).

Such a support mechanism offers no certainty that the economic advantage thus obtained for suppliers will ultimately actually and essentially be required to benefit producers of green electricity, particularly the smallest local generating installations which the Flemish Region claims to have wanted to support, which are not both producers and suppliers (at 113).

The Court is not game to assist the AG with his call for an explicit recognition of the potential to use discriminatory measures within the context of mandatory requirements (the implications of Cassis de Dijon). That is a pity, but not a surprise.

Overall, the Court’s judgment is a welcome safeguard to its more open-ended sympathy for renewable energy support schemes. Those who challenge such schemes in future, know what to do. They need to show that there is no certainty that the economic advantage obtained for suppliers will ultimately actually and essentially be required to benefit producers of green electricity, as opposed to distributors or consumers.

Next-up: a reversal of T-351/02 Deutsche Bahn?

Geert.

Thank you Govert Coppens for alerting me to the PCIA award‘s publication. I had reported earlier on this case in which  the Canadian owner of an eco-tourist facility in Barbados sued the Government of Barbados for an alleged breach of the full protection and security provision (among other provisions) in the Canada- Barbados bilateral investment treaty. Peter Allard argues in his claim that Barbados breached its treaty obligations by failing to enforce its domestic environmental laws, which he alleges led to the environment being spoilt and a loss of tourist revenues at his eco-resort.

The Tribunal is careful not to phrase the case as a pioneering case or a case in any way anything but run of the mill. This is evident from its very consideration (at 53) that ‘underlying the claims is a fundamental factual disagreement as to whether the Claimant has suffered loss or damage as a result of any actions or inactions of Barbados.’

This subsequently leads the Tribunal into what is effectively peer review of parties’ opposing expert reports on variety in fish and bird species, salinity, the health of crabs, etc., coming down in favour of Barbados: no convincing case of deterioration was made by claimant. One must bear in mind that the burden of proof lies with the latter. Next the Tribunal concluded that, even if it had found that there was a degradation of the environment at the Sanctuary during the Relevant Period (which it did not), it would not have been persuaded that such degradation was caused by any actions or inactions of Barbados.

The Tribunal further found that, being aware of the environmental sensitivities of the Sanctuary, Barbados took reasonable steps to protect it (at 242). It formulates Barbados’ BIT duties here as being a duty of care, not strict liability. It then undertook due diligence of the steps Barbados had taken to address known environmental concerns for the area and concluded (at 249) that ‘Barbados’ approach in addressing the Sluice Gate and general pollution issues at the Sanctuary as part of its governance of the entire area does not fall short of what was appropriate and sufficient for purposes of the duty of due diligence required by Article II(2)(b) of the BIT.‘

This tribunal was clearly not in a law-making mood but that arguably does not matter. The analysis it undertakes unequivocally and matter of factly establishes that countries’ indifference (quod non in casu) to take steps necessary to contain and remedy environmental degradation are a clear breach of BITS’ core requirements.

Geert.

By an individual application, the Turkish Constitutional Court for the first time examined an allegation of violation of rights secured under the Turkish Constitution in the proceedings before the Turkish courts in relation to the 1980 Hague International Child Abduction Convention. The Court decided by majority that the applicant’s right to respect for family life, which is guaranteed under Art 20 of the Constitution, was violated.

Burcu Yüksel, post-doctoral researcher at the University of Aberdeen and manager of the EUPILLAR project has written an article on this topic. It is published in International Family Law Journal, issue 3 of 2016.

A short version of the article is available here.

The last part of this title is a bit of a stretch, apologies: soundbite beats nuance. I reported earlier on the High Court’s referral to the CJEU in the Cosmetics Regulation case, C-592/14 . The Court held last week, 21 September. Much like in C-366/10, the emissions trading /aviation case, the Court was unimpressed with accusations of extraterritoriality (‘territory’ is not discussed in the judgment) and does not even flag WTO concerns (Bobek AG had, and simply suggested this is an issue that solely lies with the WTO itself to resolve).

Referring to the need to interpret the Regulation with a view to its object and purpose, the Court insists that in particular to avoid easy circumvention of the Regulation, data obtained from animal testing carried out outside the EU, cannot be employed for the marketing of cosmetics in the EU, even if those tests had to be performed so as to meet the regulatory requirements of third countries.

Of course in WTO jargon, this recalls the discussion of non-product incorporated production processes and -methods (n-PR PPMs) however the Court is more concerned with regulatory efficiency.

Geert.

Following up on last week’s post on the Second Circuit’s comity decision in the Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation case, Professor Bill Dodge of UC Davis has the following thoughts (also cross-posted on Opinio Juris here)

American law has many doctrines based on international comity—doctrines that help mediate the relationship between the U.S. legal system and those of other nations. The Second Circuit’s decision last week in the Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation case correctly identified an international comity issue. But did it choose the right comity tool to address that issue?

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, two Chinese companies, participated in a cartel to fix the price of vitamin C exported to the United States in violation of U.S. antitrust law. Defendants did not deny the allegations, but argued that Chinese law required them to coordinate export prices. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce backed the defendants in an amicus brief explaining Chinese law. The district court, however, declined to defer to the Ministry’s interpretation of Chinese law, awarding the plaintiffs $147 million in damages and permanently enjoining the defendants from further violations of U.S. antitrust laws.

On appeal, defendants argued that the district court should have dismissed on grounds of foreign state compulsion, international comity, act of state, and political question. While the political question doctrine rests on separation of powers, the other three grounds are all doctrines of prescriptive comity. As I have explained in a recent article, American law is full of international comity doctrines, each with its own specific requirements.

To avoid confusion, it is worth noting at the outset that although the Second Circuit repeatedly framed the question as whether the district court should “abstain from exercising jurisdiction,”Vitamin C was clearly not an international comity abstention case. International comity abstention is a doctrine of adjudicative comity, or deference to foreign courts. The Second Circuit has held that it is available only if parallel proceedings are pending in a foreign court. See Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Canada v. Century Intern. Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2006). The same is true in most other circuits that have adopted the doctrine (the cases are collected here at pp. 2112-14). The main exception is the Ninth Circuit, whose decision in Mujica v. Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014), applied a broad and uncertain comity abstention doctrine that conflicts with its own precedents, those of other circuits, and even the Supreme Court’s. Because no parallel antitrust claims against these defendants were pending in Chinese courts, international comity abstention would not have been an appropriate ground on which to dismiss this case.

Instead, the Second Circuit properly viewed the Vitamin C case as raising questions of prescriptive comity—deference to foreign lawmakers—which U.S. law has developed a number of different doctrines to address (for discussion see here at pp. 2099-2105). The court relied particularly on an interest-balancing, comity doctrine commonly associated with Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), and Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. In the court’s view, this doctrine authorized it to “balance the interests in adjudicating antitrust violations alleged to have harmed those within our jurisdiction with the official acts and interests of a foreign sovereign in respect to economic regulation within its borders” (slip op. at 4). The idea that U.S. courts are institutionally capable of balancing the interests of foreign governments against our own has the subject of significant criticism over the past three decades.

Moreover, it is hard to see how this particular prescriptive comity doctrine survives the Supreme Court’s later decisions in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), and F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), both of which declined to apply a multi-factor balancing approach in antitrust cases. The Second Circuit read Hartford “narrowly” (slip op. at 20) not to preclude such an approach, particularly when compliance with both U.S. and foreign law was impossible. But the Second Circuit did not even mention Empagran, which expressly rejected case-by-case balancing as “too complex to prove workable.” Empagran recognized that ambiguous statutes should be construed “to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations,” but it also said in no uncertain terms that “application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused.” Plaintiffs unquestionably alleged domestic antitrust injury in Vitamin C, making the application of U.S. law reasonable and consistent with prescriptive comity, at least has the Supreme Court has understood these concepts in the antitrust context.

The act of state doctrine is a separate and distinct manifestation of international comity, requiring that the acts of foreign sovereigns performed within their own territories be deemed valid. But the Supreme Court has made clear that the act of state doctrine applies only when a U.S. court must “declare invalid, and thus ineffective as ‘a rule of decision for the courts of this country,’ the official act of a foreign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). To find that the defendants fixed the price of vitamin C, the district court did not have to find any part of Chinese law invalid or even to evaluate the conduct of the Chinese government. It only had to find that Chinese law did not immunize the defendants’ own conduct from liability under U.S. law.

The best fitting tool to address the prescriptive comity issue in Vitamin C would seem to be the doctrine of foreign state compulsion (also known as foreign sovereign compulsion), which sometimes allows a U.S. court to excuse violations of U.S. law on the ground that the violations were compelled by foreign law. That is precisely what defendants had argued in this case. Although the exact contours of this doctrine are uncertain, the U.S. government has recognized it as a defense in antitrust cases. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations ¶ 3.32 (1995). China represented that its law compelled the defendants to coordinate export prices for vitamin C, and the Second Circuit considered itself bound by China’s interpretation of its own laws (slip op. at 30), which seems reasonable at least in these circumstances.

Unfortunately for the defendants, there are at least two potential problems with foreign state compulsion in this case. First, it appears that defendants may have asked the Chinese government to mandate their price fixing. See slip op. at 36-37. At least some authority suggests that a defendant wishing to claim foreign state compulsion as a defense must try in good faith to obtain relief from the compulsion from the foreign state. See, e.g., Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-09, 213 (1958). Second, it appears that defendants may have fixed prices at levels higher than those mandated by the Chinese government. See slip op. 38. The Second Circuit found this irrelevant to its “comity” analysis but seemed to acknowledge that such facts would preclude a foreign compulsion defense. See id.

U.S. courts have many tools at their disposal to address international comity issues. But sometimes no tool fits. “International comity” is not a universal wrench offering unlimited judicial discretion to dismiss cases that seem problematic. It is a principle underlying specific doctrines, with specific requirements, developed over many years to keep judicial discretion within bounds.

With many conflict of laws classes fresh underway, it is good to be reminded of the classics. Forum non conveniens was at issue in Kaynes v BP, at the Court of Appeal for Ontario. There is a pending class action in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas. The class in that proceeding includes current plaintiff and other Canadian investors who purchased BP securities on the NYSE.

The judgment has ample and concise background, please refer to it for same. The Court of appeal has now lifted a stay, previously put in place on forum non conveniens ground, in light of changed circumstance. The U.S. District Court judge ruled that as the moving party and his proposed Canadian class were members of the class represented by the lead plaintiffs, he was not entitled to now assert a separate class action based upon a claim that the lead plaintiffs had not pursued. Second, the U.S. District Court judge ruled that the moving party’s claim was time-barred under the Ontario Securities Act. Plaintiff and other members of his proposed class are free to pursue individual claims in the U.S. District Court (not already represented in the class action) based on Ontario securities law, subject to any defences BP may advance, including a limitations defence. (Note that the US court therefore holds limitations to be part of the lex causae, not lex fori).

Since the US court do not claim exclusive jurisdiction over the litigation, and given that if a case were to go ahead in the US, it would be subject to Ontario law, the stay was lifted.

The case is a good illustration that forum non conveniens is live and evolving, not static.

Geert.

The German Notary Institute and the Chair of Civil Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law at the University of Regensburg are hosting a joint conference on the new Matrimonial Property Regulations for spouses and registered partners. The conference (in German language) will take place on 10 February 2017 in Würzburg. Speakers include:

• Professor Andrea Bonomi, Université de Lausanne
• Professor Michael Coester, Ludwig Maximilians University Munich
• Dr Christoph Döbereiner, Notary Public in Munich
• Professor Anatol Dutta, University of Regensburg
• Dr Andreas Köhler, University of Passau
• Professor Christian Kohler, Europa-Institut at the Saarland University
• Professor Stephan Lorenz, Ludwig Maximilians University Munich
• Professor Peter Mankowski, University of Hamburg
• Joanna Serdynska, European Commission, Brussels
• Dr Rembert Süß, German Notary Institute, Würzburg
• Dr Johannes Weber, German Notary Institute, Würzburg

The programme can be downloaded here.

During the months of October-December 2016, Professor Christian Kohler (Europa-Institut, University of Saarbrücken) will give a series of doctoral seminars on European Private International Law at the University of Padova, where he will be a Visiting Scientist during this period.

The programme can be found here.

Professor Bernardo Cortese, who has organized the series, warmly invites applications from PhD students with a focus on International and EU Law.

The University of Milan (Department of International, Legal, Historical and Political Studies) will host on Friday 14 October 2016 (14h00) a conference on “Cross border family litigation in Europe. The Brussels IIbis recast“.

Here is the programme (the sessions will be held in English and Italian):

Welcoming addresses

• Chiara Tonelli (Vice-Rector for Research, Univ. of Milan)
• Laura Ammannati (Director of the Department of International, Legal, Historical and Political Studies)

Chair: Stefania Bariatti (Univ. of Milan)

The Brussels IIbis recast

• Joanna Serdynska (Civil Justice Policy, DG Justice, European Commission): The Commission’s proposal
• Anatol Dutta (Universität Regensburg – MPI Hamburg): A comment on the Commission’s Proposal from a member of the Commission’s Expert Group

Round Table – The Commission’s Proposal: exchange of views among judges, practitioners and academics

• Giuseppe Buffone (Milan Court, Family Division)
• Monica Velletti (Rome Court, Family Division)
• Suzanne Todd (Whiters LPP, London)
• Cinzia Calabrese (President of AIAF Lombardia)
• Carlo Rimini (Univ. of Milan)
• Ilaria Viarengo (Univ. of Milan)

Closing remarks: Stefania Bariatti (Univ. of Milan)

Venue: Sala Lauree, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Economiche e Sociali, University of Milan.

(Many thanks to Prof. Ilaria Viarengo for the tip-off)

In Zulfikarpašić Case C-484/15, Bot AG opined on 8 September. At issue is the intepretation of ‘court’ and ‘judgment’ in the European enforcement order Regulation. Mutatis mutandis therefore the case has implications for most other EU private international law instruments, which employ similar terms. In all of these Regulations, the terms ‘court’ and ‘judgment’ are under- or not at all defined.

The question was submitted in the context of a dispute between Ibrica Zulfikarpašić, a lawyer established in Croatia, and Slaven Gajer, who is also domiciled in Croatia, regarding the certification as a European Enforcement Order, of a writ of execution issued by a notary based on an authentic document.  The referring court essentially inquires whether a notary who, in accordance with Croatian law, has issued a definitive and enforceable writ of execution based on an authentic document has the power to certify it as a European Enforcement Order where it has not been opposed. If the answer is no, the referring court asks whether a national court can carry out that certification where the writ of execution concerns an uncontested claim.

Article 4(1) of Regulation 805/2004 defines ‘judgment’ as ‘any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court’. Article 2(a) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation now includes exactly the same definition. Yves Bot himself summarised the CJEU’s case-law on the notion of ‘judgment’ in the Brussels I Regulation in Gothaer. He reiterates that Opinion here and I should like to refer readers to my earlier summary of the Opinion in Gothaer.

After a tour de table of the various opinions expressed ia by the EC and by a number of Member States, the Advocate General submits that the concept of ‘court’ should be interpreted, for the purposes of Regulation No 805/2004, as covering all bodies offering guarantees of independence and impartiality, deciding on their own authority by a judgment which, first, was or may be subject to an exchange of arguments before being certified as a European Enforcement Order and, second, may be challenged before a judicial authority (at 108). A functional approach, therefore (at 109).

Advocate General Bot submits therefore that an enforcement title such as a writ of execution issued by a notary based on an authentic document constitutes a judgment within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Regulation No 805/2004, provided that the notary with power to issue that writ adjudicates, in the exercise of that specific function, as a court, which requires him to offer guarantees as to his independence and impartiality and to decide on his own authority by a judgment which, first, was or may be subject to an exchange of arguments before being certified as a European Enforcement Order and, second, may be challenged before a judicial authority. 

Whether these conditions are fulfilled is for the national courts to assess.

This Opinion and the eventual judgment by the Court will also be relevant for the application of the Succession Regulation, 650/2012. In matters covered by that Regulation, notaries throughout the EU have an important say and may quite easily qualifies as a ‘court’. Bot AG refers to the Regulation’s definition of ‘court’ at 71 ff of his current Opinion.

Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.1. Chapter 6, Heading 6.2.1.

Many thanks to Alexia Pato, PhD candidate at the Universidad Autónoma, Madrid, for this piece of news. And my best wishes!

Today, blog droit européen officially celebrates the opening of its European and private international law section (hereafter, EU and PIL section), which is edited and coordinated by Karolina Antczak (Ph.D. candidate at Université de Lille), Basile Darmois (Ph.D. candidate at Université Paris Est Créteil) and Alexia Pato (Ph.D. candidate at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid). In a recently published inaugural post (available here), they present their project in detail. In particular, they expose the positive interactions between PIL and European law, as well as their friction points. Undoubtedly, the increasingly tight links that are forged between these two disciplines encourage legal experts to collaborate and exchange their views. The creation of the mentioned section in blog droit européen contributes to the achievement of this objective.

The Content of the European and Private International Law Section

Although the EU and PIL section has just been inaugurated, more food for thought will be uploaded soon. Readers will find articles diving into PIL issues, and we will be covering additional areas such as international civil litigation, as well as the internal market and its four freedoms. Don’t miss our upcoming co-signed article on Brexit, highlighting its legal consequences from an international perspective. Also, on its way is a post discussing the EU’s competence to adopt minimum standards of civil procedure. Additionally, the team plans to upload interviews with professors and legal experts, who debate fundamental EU and PIL matters. These interviews will be available in video format. Lastly, readers will be able to stay updated by reading our posts on the latest legal news.

Contribute to the European and Private International Law Section

In order to foster constructive debates and extract the merits of collaborative learning, we welcome any Ph.D. candidate, professor, or legal professional to voice his/her opinion on the EU and PIL section. You may submit your ideas in the form of a post (approximately 1.000 words), which consists of a critical assessment on a particular topic. Working papers, video conferences and tutorials are equally welcome (for more information on how to contribute, click here). Articles can be written in either French or English.

What is blog droit européen?

Blog droit européen is a website that provides information with an interactive touch on a broad range of legal topics such as: digital single market, Economic and monetary Union, competition law, and so on. In particular, its purpose is to gather together students, investigators, professors, and legal experts who share a common and enhanced interest for European law at large (EU, ECHR, impact of European law on States’ public and private laws). The originality of blog droit européen lies in two essential features: firstly, the blog delivers high quality and varied contents, including interviews (of ECJ members and professors), call for papers and conferences, not to mention working papers and legal columns, which critically analyse EU law. Secondly, the use of e-techniques of information sharing, like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube make this blog interactive and user friendly. From an organizational perspective, blog droit européeen is run and edited by young investigators from different legal backgrounds in different Universities across Europe (for an overview of our team, click here). Thanks to Olivia Tambou (Lecturer at Université Paris-Dauphine), our dedicated team leader and creator/editor of the blog, for connecting us and making this project possible.

See you soon on blog droit européen!

On Tuesday, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision reversing a $147.8 million price-fixing judgment against two Chinese manufacturers of Vitamin C. The plaintiffs alleged that the Chinese manufacturers engaged in price fixing and supply manipulation in violation of U.S. antitrust laws. In its first ever appearance as an amicus before a U.S. court, the Chinese government filed a formal statement asserting that Chinese law required the Chinese manufacturers to set prices and reduce the quantities of Vitamin C sold abroad. Relying on this statement, the Second Circuit held that because the Chinese manufacturers could not comply with both Chinese law and the U.S. antitrust laws, principles of international comity compelled dismissal of the case.

This case raises a host of interesting questions. First, did the Second Circuit reach the right result? Second, is this a comity case or a foreign sovereign compulsion case? Third, what level of deference is due to a foreign sovereign that appears in private litigation to explain their country’s laws? Fourth, should U.S. judges defer to such an explanation?

It will be interesting to see whether this case makes it to the United States Supreme Court.

The following information is provided by the conference organizers.  Given how rare conflict of laws conferences are in Canada, I am delighted to pass this along.

The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress

In 2016, the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act marks its tenth year in force.  Adopted in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, the CJPTA has clarified and advanced the law of judicial jurisdiction. This symposium will assess the progress made by the CJPTA across the range of issues addressed and critically evaluate the capacity of the CJPTA: to provide leadership for the law in other parts of Canada; to enable further development in the law; and to meet the needs of Canadians in the years ahead in a world of increasing cross-border dealings.

Details:

Friday, October 21, 2016 (expected to run from 9am to 4:30pm)

University Club of Toronto (380 University Avenue, just north of the American consulate)

Co-chaired by Professor Janet Walker (Osgoode) and Lisa Munro (Lerners LLP) with the assistance of Dr. Sagi Peari and Gerard Kennedy

We are excited to bring you a fantastic lineup of speakers and panelists discussing a wide range of topics pertaining to CJPTA and judicial jurisdiction.

Space is limited. Kindly RSVP to

Sagi Peari (SPeari@osgoode.yorku.ca)
or
Gerard Kennedy (GerardKennedy@osgoode.yorku.ca)

by October 3, 2016.

One cannot have one’s cake and eat it. Meaning once the cake has been eaten, it is gone and you no longer have it. (Apologies but this saying is so often misunderstood I thought I should clarify).

Anyways, the Flemish tax administration had something along these lines in mind when it recently ruled in a case involving a Liechtenstein Stiftung. Many thanks to De Broeck & Van Laere for bringing the ruling to my attention. The Inland Revenue generally employ quite a lot of deference towards trusts and Stiftungs of all kind. In the case at hand however it requalified the transfer of means from the Stiftung to the heirs of the deceased, as being of a contractual nature. That is because the deceased, upon creation of the Stiftung, had issued such precise instructions in the Stiftung’s by-laws, that the hands of the trustees (or equivalent thereof) had been tied.  This essentially takes away a crucial part of the Stiftung’s nature, and no longer shields the assets from the (Flemish) taxman. The cake has been eaten.

Geert.

On the occasion of Hein Kötz’ 80th birthday in November 2015, a symposium in his honour was held at the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg/Germany. The presentations given at this event have now been published (in German) by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen: Zukunftsperspektiven der Rechtsvergleichung, ed. by Reinhard Zimmermann, 2016; XX, 267 pages.

Following an explanation by the editor as to why this is not a Festschrift, the volume contains contributions by Christiane Wendehorst (Vienna) on the comparison of legal systems, by Ralf Michaels (Duke) on religious laws and post-secular comparative law, by Giesela Rühl (Jena) on comparative law and European conflict of laws: the forgotten dimension, by Eva-Maria Kieninger (Würzburg) on principles and basic concepts of property law as objects of comparative law, by Gralf-Peter Calliess (Bremen) on the role of comparative law in the context of a competition between legal orders, by Marc-Philippe Weller (Heidelberg) on future prospects for comparative law in private international and corporate law, and by Jan von Hein (Freiburg/Br.) on market regulation by tort law from a comparative perspective. The book concludes with closing remarks by Hein Kötz.

Further information is available here.

This year does not only mark 30 years since the great reform of German private international law of 1986, but it is also the 35th anniversary of the foundation of the Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax). Therefore, Professor Heinz-Peter Mansel, President of the German Council for Private International Law, and Professor Jan von Hein, chairman of the Council’s 2nd Commission, are pleased to announce that a celebratory conference will take place on 23-24 September 2016 at the University of Cologne (Germany) under the title: “Codification of Private International Law: German Experience and European Perspectives Thirty Years After the PIL-Reform of 1986”. The conference, which will be held in German, will look at how Private International Law has evolved in the past and provide an outlook for future responsibilities and challenges of the field.

The conference programme (in German) is available here.

The Faculty of Law of the University of Rome “La Sapienza” will host a German-Italian-Spanish conference on Thursday, 13th October 2016, on International Successions in Europe. The conference has been convened for the presentation of the volume “The EU Succession Regulation: a Commentary”, edited by Alfonso-Luís Calvo Caravaca (University “Carlos III” of Madrid), Angelo Davì (University of Rome “La Sapienza”) and Heinz-Peter Mansel (University of Cologne), published by Cambridge University Press, 2016. The volume is the product of a research project on “The Europeanization of Private International Law of Successions” financed through the European Commission’s Civil Justice Programme.

Here is the programme (available as .pdf):

Welcome addresses: Prof. Enrico del Prato (Director, Department of Legal Sciences, University “La Sapienza”); Prof. Paolo Ridola (Dean, Faculty of Law, University “La Sapienza”); Prof. Angelo Davì (University “La Sapienza”).

First Session

Chair: Prof. Ugo Villani (University of Bari, President of SIDI-ISIL – Italian Society for International Law)

• Prof. Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia): La residenza abituale e la clausola di eccezione (Habitual Residence and Exception Clause);
• Prof. Cristina Campiglio (University of Pavia): La facoltà di scelta del diritto applicabile (Choice of the Applicable Law by the Testator);
• Prof. Erik Jayme (University of Heidelberg): Metodi classici e nuove norme di conflitto: il regolamento relativo alle successioni (Traditional Methods and New Conflict Rules: the EU Regulation Concerning Succession);
• Prof. Claudio Consolo (University “La Sapienza”): Il coordinamento tra le giurisdizioni (Coordination between Jurisdictions).

Second Session

Chair: Prof. Sergio Maria Carbone (University of Genova)

• Prof. Peter Kindler (University of Munich): I patti successori (Agreements as to Succession);
• Round Table: The European Certificate of Succession
  Introduction: Prof. Claudio Consolo (University “La Sapienza”);
  Participants: Dr. Ana Fernández Tresguerres (Notary in Madrid); Dr. Paolo Pasqualis (Notary in Portogruaro); Dr. Fabian Wall (Notary in Ludwigshafen).

Concluding remarks: Prof. Sergio Maria Carbone (University of Genova).

(Many thanks to Prof. Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, University of Macerata, for the tip-off)