Flux européens

Commission / France
Liberté d'établissement
Le Conseil d’État aurait dû saisir la Cour d’une question préjudicielle en interprétation du droit de l’Union, afin de déterminer s’il y avait lieu de refuser de prendre en compte l’imposition subie par une filiale non-résidente sur les bénéfices sous-jacents à des dividendes redistribués par une société non-résidente

Kamenova
Environnement et consommateurs
Une personne qui publie sur un site Internet un certain nombre d’annonces de vente n’a pas automatiquement la qualité de « professionnel »

Società Immobiliare Al Bosco Srl
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le règlement Bruxelles I ne s’oppose pas à ce qu’une réglementation d’un État membre prévoyant l’application d’un délai pour l’exécution d’une ordonnance de saisie conservatoire soit appliquée en présence d’une telle ordonnance adoptée dans un autre État membre et revêtue du caractère exécutoire dans l’État membre requis

Feniks
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
L’action d’un créancier visant à lui rendre inopposable l’acte de disposition passé par son débiteur en fraude de ses droits relève de la « matière contractuelle » au sens du règlement concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale

L.E.G.O.
Environnement et consommateurs
L’obligation de présenter des certificats de durabilité, imposée par l’Italie aux intermédiaires qui n’entrent pas physiquement en possession des bioliquides faisant l’objet de la transaction dans laquelle ils interviennent, est conforme au droit de l’Union

Dicu
SOPO
Une disposition nationale qui, pour la détermination de la durée du congé annuel payé garanti à un travailleur, exclut la durée d’un congé parental pris par ce travailleur est conforme au droit de l’Union

Many thanks to Filbert Lam, a former student of mine, for alerting me to another interesting case in comparative conflict of laws: the story of Li Shengwu is recalled here.

The Singapore Prime Minister’s nephew made remarks in a Facebook post, which were allegedly contemptuous of the judiciary. When he made those remarks, he was located in the US, where he intends to stay (and work). The Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) wants to serve the summons on him in the US. Under what circumstances can this be done and what is the impact of a procedural law seemingly assisting the AGC in serving the summons, but which would have to be applied retroactively in the case at issue?

The Court of Appeal proceeding will be one to look out for.

Geert.

France / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le Parlement européen peut exercer une partie de ses pouvoirs budgétaires à Bruxelles, au lieu de Strasbourg, si des impératifs liés au bon fonctionnement de la procédure budgétaire l’exigent

Ministerio Fiscal
DFON
Les infractions pénales qui ne sont pas d’une particulière gravité peuvent justifier un accès aux données à caractère personnel conservées par des fournisseurs de services de communications électroniques dès lors que cet accès ne porte pas une atteinte grave à la vie privée

[2018] EWCA Civ 1889 Committeri v Club Med , appeal against Dingeman J’s findings in [2016] EHWC 1510 (QB) featured in a recent resit exam of mine, slightly later reporting therefore. Dingeman J’s analysis was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Mr Committeri lived and worked in London. He was injured when climbing an ice wall in Chamonix in France in 2011. He brought proceedings in England against Club Med and their insurers: they had provided the relevant travel and accommodation pursuant to a ‘team-building’ contract with the appellant’s employers, a Bank. The claim is pleaded by reference to that contract and Article L211-16 of the French Code de Tourisme (which imposes strict (safety) liability upon the providers of tourist accomodation: une obligation de résultat); contrary to English law which foresees in une obligation de moyens).

French law has considered that “proper performance of the contract” in a package holiday setting requires the absolute safety of the consumer, so that (unless the exceptions in the Code apply) when there is an injury on a package holiday the organiser will be liable.

The central issue is the proper characterisation of that claim. If it is a contractual claim then English law applies (the lex contractus agreed between the Bank and Club Med) and it is common ground that it will fail. If it is properly characterised as a non-contractual claim, French law applies and it is agreed that it will succeed.

CJEU authorities considered by Coulson LJ were in particular Brogsitter, Ergo, Verein Fur Konsumenteninformation v Amazon, and flightright. 

At 52 Coulson LJ summarises the modus operandi per the European precedents as follows:

‘(a) The mere fact that a contracting party brings a civil liability claim against the other party does not by itself mean that the claim concerns “matters relating to a contract” but it will be sufficient if the conduct complained of may be considered a breach of contract (Brogsitter [24]) or if the purpose of the claim is to seek damages, the legal basis for which can reasonably be regarded as a breach of the rights and obligations set out in the contract (Brogsitter [26]).

(b) Only an obligation freely consented to by one person towards another and on which the claimant’s action is based is a ‘matter relating to contract’ (Ergo [44]).

(c) The classification of an obligation for the purposes of Rome I or Rome II depends on the (contractual or non-contractual) source of that obligation (Amazon, AG’s opinion [48]). A contractual obligation implies at the very least an actual and existing commitment (Amazon [50]).’

I would have added what I called Sharpston AG‘s ‘pedigree’ (one of my students seems to have mistakenly noted this down as ‘Paddy Pee’), ‘ancestry’, or ‘centre of gravity’ test in Ergo.

At 53: ‘On an application of all or any of those principles, it is clear that the pleaded strict liability claim can only be characterised as a contractual claim. …That contract is the source of the relevant obligations and imposed the necessary commitments. To put it another way, to use Judge Waksman’s words in AXA ([2015] EWHC 3431 (Comm), the contract was not “a stepping stone to the ultimate liability of [the respondent but] the basis for the obligation actually relied upon…”.

A very useful reminder of the relevant precedents.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.1.

Wahl AG advised  last week in Case C-497/17, Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs. In this case an NGO requests a certification body to stop certifying as ‘organic’, products obtained from religious slaughter, even though neither Council Regulation 834/2007 nor the Commission implementing Regulation 889/2008 on organic production and labelling of organic products with regard to organic production, labelling and control, mention stunned or unstunned slaughter.

I suggested earlier that the case turns around scope of application, albeit that the shadow of the human rights implications hangs over it. The Advocate General agrees: at 33: ‘the Court is therefore not strictly speaking required to rule on a question of interference with the freedom to manifest one’s religion’. In essence, what is not forbidden is allowed: the legislation on organic farming is silent on the question of ritual slaughter; (at 91) this silence on the matter is not the result of oversight for the ‘slaughter’ of animals is mentioned on several occasions in the legislation – is it just simply not regulated.

I believe the AG is right. I also, on substance, believe that unstunned slaughter, properly carried out, meets with the ethos of organic farming.

Geert.

 

 

 

Rittinger e.a.
Aide d'État
L’avocat général Campos Sánchez-Bordona propose à la Cour de déclarer que la modification du critère d’exigibilité de la contribution qui finance les organismes publics de radiodiffusion en Allemagne n’est pas constitutive d’une aide d’État illégale

Philips et Philips France / Commission
Concurrence
Dans le cadre de l’entente sur le marché des puces pour cartes, la Cour renvoie l’affaire d’Infineon Technologies au Tribunal afin que celui-ci apprécie la proportionnalité de l’amende infligée et rejette le pourvoi formé par Philips

In C-343/17 Fremoluc the CJEU held last week. It features as counsel no less than 3 fellow faculty at Leuven Law: 4 if one counts prof Cloots whom we foolishly let escape to elsewhere. Had we had either one of my two collegae proximi who serve as judges on the CJEU assigned to the case, there would have been more residents of Collegium Falconis at Kircherg on the day of any hearing then there have recently been at Faculty meetings. But I digress.

The case essentially concerns services of general economic interests (SGEIs), as applied to the social housing sector: what kind of measures may a Member State roll-out to support the provision of such housing, in light of the free movement of not just persons but also services and capital. By extension, the case-law is also relevant to property rights restrictions across the EU.

In the case at issue applicant had seen a purchase of land torpedoed by the right of pre-emption of a relevant agency, relating to building land situated in areas earmarked for house renovation and house-building in 26 municipalities in its operating area. Fremoluc suggested the condition in the underlying decree that ‘as regards the provision of homes or land in a social housing project…, absolute priority must be given, at any stage of the project, to prospective tenants, leaseholders or buyers who have strong social, economic or socio-cultural ties with the operating area in question’, constitute an illegal condition under EU law. Consequently, it argued, the right of pre-emptive purchase itself was illegal.

The CJEU however, with reference to relevant case-law (please refer to the text of the judgment for same), held that the case was inadmissible, for it is purely internal: at 28-29: ‘it is not sufficient for the referring court to state that it is not inconceivable that nationals established in other Member States were or are interested in making use of Union provisions on fundamental freedoms to carry out activities in the territory of the Member State which enacted the national legislation in question and, consequently, that that legislation, applicable without distinction to nationals and to nationals of other Member States, is capable of producing effects which are not confined to that Member State.’ ‘The request for a preliminary ruling must clearly set out specific factors, that is, not hypothetical considerations but specific evidence, such as complaints or applications brought by operators situated in other Member States or involving nationals of those Member States, on the basis of which the required connecting link may be positively established. More particularly, the referring court may not merely submit to the Court evidence suggesting that such a link cannot be ruled out or which, considered in the abstract, could constitute evidence to that effect, and must, on the contrary, provide objective and consistent evidence enabling the Court to ascertain whether such a link exists.’

Such evidence of course in practice is easily engineered. A similar case therefore is bound to return to Luxembourg at some point soon.

Geert.

 

Psara / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme le refus du Parlement d’accorder l’accès aux documents relatifs aux indemnités journalières, aux indemnités de frais de voyage et aux indemnités d’assistance parlementaire des eurodéputés

Wahl AG’s Opinion in C-378/17 Workplace Relations Commission provides a great tutorial on the principles of primacy, and Member States’ duty to ensure equivalence and effectiveness in the implementation of EU law.

At issue is the compatibility with the principle of the primacy of EU law of a rule dividing jurisdiction in specific cases between the High Court and a statutory body, the Workplace Relations Commission (‘the WRC’). The latter has no jurisdiction and has to yield to the High Court, when the case requires disapplication of a provision of national (primary or secondary) legislation.

Wahl advises that the rule does not infringe the primacy of EU law, and in doing so runs us through the principles of primacy and its implications on national procedural autonomy.

Note the Advocate-General’s remark (at 87) that ‘It is increasingly common that the resolution of conflicts arising from day-to-day life, such as consumer disputes and conflicts in the workplace, are ‘out-sourced’ from courts to specialised bodies with (limited) powers to mediate and/or adjudicate expediently such disputes (FN omitted). It is equally commonplace that, as is the case of adjudication officers at the WRC, persons resolving conflicts in such bodies do not necessarily have a legal qualification. Arguably, such bodies are better placed than courts to provide low-cost, speedy and effective solutions to conflicts of that kind.‘

At 89: ‘jurisdiction in a specific field of EU law may be divided between different bodies, provided that the rights in question are adequately protected’: an important precondition of course is that the national system guarantees that cases where national or EU legislation needs to be disapplied where they would clash with citisens’ rights, are properly adjudicated by the courts who are empowered to set aside the law: and not just swept under the carpet under the guise of the assessment being ‘factual’ only.

Geert.

 

Reference to the similar law in New York was made in Dankor: see https://wp.me/p289fR-1l2.
This judgment puts pressure on the use of ordre public to enforce ‘local courts only’ rules, although prima facie at least the finding is limited to the FAA hence arbitration proceedings.

Constructlaw.com

Sachse Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Affirmed Drywall, Corp., 2018 Fla App. Lexis 9998 (July 18, 2018)

Sachse Construction, a Michigan-based general contractor, entered into a subcontract (the “Subcontract”) with Affirmed Drywall Corp. (“Affirmed”), a Florida drywall subcontractor, to perform work on a property in Florida.  The Subcontract provided that all disputes be resolved by mediation and/or arbitration in Southfield, Michigan, or within 20 miles thereof, pursuant to the Construction Industry Rules of the American Arbitration Association and in accordance with Michigan laws.  However, under Section 47.025 of the Florida Statutes, a venue provision in a contract involving a Florida-based contractor or subcontractor, etc., for the improvement of real property located in Florida is considered void as a matter of public policy if it requires that legal action be brought outside of Florida.

Affirmed filed an action in Florida state court alleging claims for breach of contract against Sachse and to…

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OTP Bank et OTP Faktoring
Environnement et consommateurs
Le caractère abusif d’une clause contractuelle non claire qui fait peser le risque de change sur l’emprunteur et qui ne reflète pas des dispositions législatives peut faire l’objet d’un contrôle juridictionnel

Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs
Agriculture
L’avocat général Wahl propose à la Cour de juger que les produits issus d’animaux ayant fait l’objet d’un abattage rituel sans étourdissement préalable peuvent se voir délivrer le label européen « agriculture biologique »

This post can be classified under ‘better late than never’. Thank you Irina Timp for flagging in December, Inversiones v Cancun at the Dutch Hoge Raad. The case concerned alleged dilution of one company’s (Inversiones) shareholding in another as a result of increased emission of shares orchestrated by another shareholder (Cancun). Note that exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24(2), justifiably, was not suggested.

The Hoge Raad focused on the discussion concerning (now) Article 8(3)’s provision for counterclaims: courts even if not the court of domicile of the defendant have jurisdiction ‘on a counter-claim arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the original claim is pending;’ C-185/15 Kostanjevec is the main reference. Of particular note was the language issue: the Dutch version of the text employs ‘rechtsfeit’: suggestion a narrower interpretation than the English version (‘facts’) just quoted. The Hoge Raad justifiably followed the linguistic implications of the majority of language versions (e.g “facts”, “Sachverhalt”. “fait”) and held in favour of jurisdiction on the basis of a counterclaim.

The result of that finding is that it did not further entertain the consequences of Universal Music on the location of the locus damni for diluted shareholdings: what other factors are needed to have the shareholder’s corporate domicile qualify for same?

Geert.