Flux européens

Il 14 e il 15 aprile 2016 si terrà il decimo seminario internazionale di diritto internazionale privato della Universidad Complutense di Madrid.

Si parlerà degli sviluppi del diritto internazionale privato spagnolo, delle recenti codificazioni nazionali del diritto internazionale privato e del diritto internazionale privato dell’Unione europea.

Interverranno, fra gli altri, Miguel Virgós Soriano (Univ. Autónoma de Madrid), Bertrand Ancel (Univ. Paris II-Assas), Alegría Borrás (Univ. Barcellona), Jürgen Basedow (Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law), Christian Heinze (Univ. Leibniz, Hannover), Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino), Roberto Baratta (Univ. Macerata) e Thalia Kruger (Univ. Antwerpen).

Il programma completo ed ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

Steadman Jean, Sprague Steven, Common Law Contract Law. A Practical Guide for the Civil Law Lawyer, Wolters Kluwer, 2015, pp. 896, ISBN 9788821751547, Euro 81.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Il testo costituisce una guida pratica alla disciplina dei contratti nell’ambito del sistema common law e si rivolge a tutti gli operatori del settore legale che, per loro origine e formazione, fanno riferimento al sistema del diritto civile e si occupano di operazioni, transazioni e contratti regolati dal diritto inglese o americano qualunque sia l’oggetto del contratto o la nazionalità delle parti. Vengono analizzati gli istituti fondamentali del sistema common law in Inghilterra, Galles e Stati Uniti d’America, evidenziandone i tratti comuni e fornendo una dettagliata spiegazione delle principali differenze esistenti tra i due sistemi giuridici. Numerosi esempi consentono al lettore di meglio comprendere come la prassi contrattualistica trovi reale applicazione nella quotidiana pratica legale. Ogni capitolo è corredato da specifiche note esplicative. Sono presenti un dettagliato glossario e una checklist delle principali tipologie contrattuali.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

I have reported before on various schemes of arrangement which the English Courts gave the go-ahead even when they concerned non-English companies (I should flag that in two of those, Apcoa and Van Gansewinkel, I acted as expert). Thank you Arie van Hoe for bringing Indah Kiat to my attention some weeks ago.

Indah Kiat is a Dutch BV seeking an order convening a single meeting of its scheme creditors to consider and if thought fit approve a scheme of arrangement pursuant to Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006. The application is strenuously opposed by one of the Scheme Creditors, APP Investment Opportunity LLC (“APPIO”), which contests the jurisdiction of the court to entertain or sanction the Scheme. Such opposition is different from the other schemes which I mention in my previous postings.

In the first instance, APPIO simply seeks an adjournment of the Scheme Company’s application on the grounds that inadequate notice has been given to Scheme Creditors. However, it also raises a significant number of other issues concerning the adequacy of the evidence and disclosure by the Scheme Company, together with questions concerning the procedure and scope of the court’s jurisdiction to sanction creditor schemes for foreign companies in relation to debts governed by foreign law.

The Scheme Company is a special purpose vehicle which was incorporated for financing purposes in the Netherlands. It sought the COMI way to enable English courts to obtain jurisdiction over the scheme. English jurisdiction, required to carry out the Scheme, usually rests on either one of two legs: COMI, or making English law the governing law of the underlying credit agreements (if necessary by changing that governing law en route).

The COMI route to jurisdiction in many ways defies the proverbial impossibility of having one’s cake and eating it. For the establishment of a company’s centre of main interests, the courts and practice tend to refer to the EU’s Insolvency Regulation. Yet that schemes of arrangement do not fall under the Insolvency Regulation is a crucial part of the forum shopping involved in attracting restructuring advice to the English legal market. This is especially so for the aforementioned second route to jurisdiction (a change in governing law). however it is also true for the first form. Snowden J refers to that at para 85-86 of his judgment.

Indah Kiat has effected its change of COMI (rebutting the presumption of COMI being at its registered seat) by notifying its creditors via a number of clearing houses for the Notes concerned. APPIO contest that this notification sufficed for change in COMI. There are not enough relevant facts in the judgment to consider this objection thoroughly, however APPIO’s misgivings would not seem entirely implausible.

Snowden J notes that whilst protesting the jurisdiction, in the first instance APPIO simply seeks an adjournment of the convening hearing on the grounds that inadequate notice has been given of it to Scheme Creditors. It contends that given the complex nature of the Scheme and the factual background, there is no justification for an urgent hearing of the application. The Court agreed and the convening hearing (different from the sanction hearing, which follows later) was adjourned until 3 March. Snowden J further gave extensive argument obiter as to why the Scheme’s information was insufficient in the form as it stood at the hearing.

He then revisits (82 ff) the jurisdictional issue, which I have already signalled above: what role exactly COMI should play, how the Brussels I recast intervenes, what the impact is of likely recognition of the sanction (if any) in Indonesia, The Netherlands, and the US; and what if any role the relevant US judgments in the case should play: there will be plenty of points for discussion at the convening and sanction hearing. (I mentioned above that the convening hearing was scheduled around 3 March; I have not heard from the case since however if anyone has, please do let me know).

I do not think Indah Kiat has made the jurisdictional hurdle higher for Schemes of Arrangement involving foreign companies. Rather, the fierce opposition of an important creditor has brought jurisdictional issues into sharper perspective than had been the case before.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 5, Heading 5.4.2).

 

 

 

Kohärenz im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht der Europäischen Union, a cura di Jan von Hein e Giesela Rühl, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp. XVII+389, ISBN 9783161533501, Euro 79.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Since adopting the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the European Union has enacted a large number of regulations in the field of Private International Law and International Civil Procedure. Resultant reconciliation and coordination problems were the subject of a 2014 conference in Freiburg im Breisgau. The findings presented here shed light on incoherences, describe the requirements for a more coherent regulation and discuss perspectives for a future European codification in the field of Private International Law.

L’indice ed un estratto del volume sono disponibili qui. Ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

Il fascicolo di gennaio 2016 della rivista La Ley: Unión Europea contiene alcuni contributi su temi internazionalprivatistici.

In particolare, Angel Espiniella Menéndez è autore di uno scritto, dedicato al regolamento 2015/2421, che modifica il regolamento n. 861/2007, sulle controversie di modesta entità, intitolato La reforma de los procesos europeos monitorio y de escasa cuantía.

Appaiono altresì un commento di Santiago Álvarez Gonzáles alla sentenza pronunciata dalla Corte di giustizia il 19 novembre 2015 nella causa C-455/15, PPU, intitolato Traslado ilícito de menores, competencia judicial internacional y orden público, e un commento di María Jesús Elvira Benayas alla sentenza Corte di giustizia del 16 settembre 2015 nella causa C-519/13, Alpha Bank, intitolata El uso de los formularios (en la notificación internacional conforme al Reglamento 1393/2007) y la tutela judicial efectiva.

L’indice completo della rivista è disponibile qui.

Statistiques judiciaires 2015 : de nouveaux records de productivité et d’affaires introduites pour la Cour de justice de l’UE

Karl-May-Verlag / OHMI - Constantin Film Produktion (WINNETOU)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Le Tribunal accueille le recours de la maison d’édition Karl-May contre la décision de l’Office des marques de l’Union annulant la marque communautaire WINNETOU

In Vizcaya v Picard, the Privy Council considered the issue of consent to a choice of court clause in the event no such choice has been made verbatim. It was alleged that choice of court had been made implicitly but clearly by reference to an applicable law agreement in the underlying contract. RPC have a review of the case on their blog and I am grateful to them for bringing it to my attention.

The case is a fall-out of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, carried out through Mr Madoff’s company Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”), a New York corporation. After Madoff’s fraud came to light in 2008, Irving Picard (“the trustee”) was appointed as trustee in BLMIS’s liquidation in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (“the New York BankruptcyCourt”). The trustee commenced proceedings under the anti-avoidance provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code against investors who had been repaid before the fraud was discovered, including the appellant, Vizcaya Partners Limited (“Vizcaya”), a BVI (British Virgin Islands) company which carried on business as an investment fund, and which invested about US$328m with BLMIS between January 2002 and December 2008, but was repaid US$180m before the fraud was discovered.

The Appeal before the Privy Council concerns primarily the content and scope of the rule in common law that a foreign default judgment is enforceable against a judgment debtor who has made a prior submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court (as distinct from a submission by appearance in the proceedings).  Brussels I or the Recast was not applicable to the case. In that Regulation (Article 25), the expression of consent with choice of court must take one of thee forms: essentially: written (or oral but confirmed by written agreement); in accordance with lex mercatoria; or in accordance with established business practice simply between the parties.

The question in the case at issue is whether the agreement to submit must be express, or can also be implied or inferred. The Privy Council settled the uncertainty which would seem to have existed for some time in the common law, in favour of an answer in the affirmative. Consent to jurisdiction can be implied. What needs to be shown though is real ‘agreement’, or ‘consent’ (in European private international law with respect to the similar discussion re choice of law (Rome I) I would say the test is one of ‘clearly established’), quod non in casu. Choice of law (here: in favour of New York law) can be a factor but not a solely determinant one. Moreover, choice of court viz one’s business transactions does not imply automatic extension to insolvency proceedings.

Crucial precedent, it would seem. Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9

Johannes Schilling, Das Internationale Privatrecht der Transportverträge, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp. XXXV+468, ISBN 9783161542534, € 79,00

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Das internationale Transportrecht ist durch eine unübersichtliche Anzahl von materiellen Einheitsrechtsakten gekennzeichnet. Während im Gütertransport die völkerrechtlichen Konventionen, wie die CMR oder das MÜ, zum Tragen kommen, werden bei der Personenbeförderung in erster Linie die europäischen Fahrgastrechteverordnungen relevant. Mittlerweile ist auch das für Beförderungsverträge maßgebliche Kollisionsrecht auf europäischer Ebene vereinheitlicht, und zwar in Art. 5 Rom I-VO. Angesichts dessen geht Johannes Schilling der Frage nach, welches Recht auf internationale Beförderungsverträge Anwendung findet. Im Fokus stehen dabei sowohl die Auslegung als auch das praktische Anwendungsfeld des neuen europäischen IPR für Beförderungsverträge. Darüber hinaus wird das supranationale Kollisionsrecht zu dem internationalen Einheitsrecht der Güter- und Personenbeförderung ins Verhältnis gesetzt.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.

Mirza
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice ASIL
Le règlement Dublin III permet aux États membres d’envoyer un demandeur de protection internationale vers un pays tiers sûr, indépendamment qu’il s’agisse de l’État membre responsable du traitement de la demande ou d’un autre État membre

Ruijssenaars et Jansen
Transport
Les autorités nationales exercent une surveillance de caractère général afin de garantir les droits des passagers aériens, mais ne sont pas tenues d’agir suite à des plaintes individuelles

Mc Fadden
SERV
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, l’exploitant d’un magasin, d’un bar ou d’un hôtel qui propose gratuitement au public un réseau Wi-Fi n’est pas responsable des violations de droits d’auteur commises par un utilisateur

Venerdì 8 aprile 2016, si terrà a Firenze un corso di aggiornamento su I titoli esecutivi ‘europei’: procedure a confronto, organizzato dal Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Firenze, in collaborazione con la Fondazione per la Formazione Forense dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Firenze.

[Descrizione del corso] – Il corso si propone di fornire ai partecipanti gli strumenti teorici e pratici necessari ai fini di garantire una corretta ed agevole tutela del credito in Europa. L’Unione europea prevede la facoltà, in capo a società e individui, di ricorrere a strumenti di diritto internazionale privato e processuale volti a facilitare il recupero del credito all’interno degli Stati membri, consentendo, da una parte, di attribuire “carattere europeo” alle decisioni interne relative a crediti non contestati (regolamento (CE) n. 805/2004 istituivo di un titolo esecutivo europeo per i crediti non contestati) ed istituendo, dall’altra, veri e propri procedimenti europei per il recupero transfrontaliero del credito e per controversie di modesta entità (regolamenti (CE) nn. 1896/2006 e 861/2007). Tali regolamenti pongono questioni di coordinamento con altri strumenti dell’Unione, in particolare con il recente regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 (c.d. “Bruxelles I-bis”), che ha sostituito il regolamento n. 44/2001 (“Bruxelles I”), in un quadro frammentario e settoriale che richiede un’approfondita conoscenza del settore della cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile promossa dall’Unione (articoli 67 e 81 del TFUE). La peculiarità che caratterizza tutte queste procedure di recupero del credito risiede nell’eliminazione della procedura di exequatur. Le decisioni emesse nel quadro di ciascuno dei suddetti regolamenti, infatti, circolano in Europa attraverso un canale preferenziale che, attraverso un efficace sistema di formulari reperibili on-line, semplifica, accelera e riduce i costi dei procedimenti: tali provvedimenti sono dunque eseguiti nello Stato membro richiesto alla stregua delle decisioni emesse dai giudici interni, senza necessità di alcun previo procedimento volto a dichiararne l’esecutività. Secondo la Relazione della Commissione europea, presentata al Parlamento europeo il 13 ottobre 2015, recante una statistica dell’applicazione, negli Stati membri, del regolamento (CE) n. 1896/2006 istitutivo di un procedimento europeo di ingiunzione di pagamento, l’Italia si colloca tra gli ultimi posti. Ciò, afferma la Commissione, è dovuto essenzialmente alla mancata consapevolezza, da parte degli operatori giuridici, dell’esistenza di tali meccanismi e del funzionamento delle rispettive procedure. Così, la mancata o errata conoscenza di strumenti concepiti per agevolare la circolazione delle decisioni – e, pertanto, per promuovere i rapporti transfrontalieri e la circolazione delle persone in Europa – pregiudicandone i rispettivi obiettivi, finisce col realizzare un risultato del tutto opposto, frustrando le aspettative dei creditori e le prospettive di futuri rapporti transnazionali. Inoltre, il 24 dicembre 2015 è stato pubblicato sulla Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea il regolamento (UE) 2015/2421 del 16 dicembre 2015, che ha apportato rilevanti modifiche ai regolamenti n. 861/2007 e n. 1896/2006. Il corso fornirà ai partecipanti le conoscenze necessarie alla “gestione” delle procedure di recupero del credito istituite dai regolamenti menzionati. All’illustrazione del quadro normativo esistente, sarà affiancata una metodologia didattica di carattere pratico, ricorrendo a tal fine all’esame della giurisprudenza dell’Unione ed interna, nonché all’illustrazione dei metodi di reperimento e compilazione dei moduli.

Interverranno come relatori Francesco Salerno (Univ. Ferrara), Olivia Lopes Pegna (Univ. Firenze), Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino) ed Ester di Napoli (Univ. Magna Graecia Catanzaro).

Le domande dovranno essere inviate (compilando questo modulo) all’indirizzo perfezionamenti@adm.unifi.it entro il 1° aprile 2016.

Il programma completo del corso ed ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili qui e qui.

Mc Fadden
SERV
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, l’exploitant d’un magasin, d’un bar ou d’un hôtel qui propose gratuitement au public un réseau Wi-Fi n’est pas responsable des violations de droits d’auteur commises par un utilisateur

Dextro Energy / Commission
Environnement et consommateurs
Le Tribunal confirme que plusieurs allégations de santé relatives au glucose ne peuvent pas être autorisées

The Body Shop International / OHMI - Spa Monopole (SPA WISDOM)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
The Body Shop ne peut pas enregistrer « SPA WISDOM » comme marque communautaire

Il fascicolo 2/2015 della rivista Contratto e Impresa / Europa ospita una serie di contributi dedicati all’introduzione del certificato successorio europeo, istituito dal regolamento n. 650/2012, dall’angolatura di alcune esperienze giuridiche nazionali.

Il certificato successorio, come si dice all’art. 63, par. 1, del predetto regolamento, “è destinato a essere utilizzato dagli eredi, dai legatari che vantano diritti diretti sulla successione e dagli esecutori testamentari o amministratori dell’eredità che, in un altro Stato membro, hanno necessità di far valere la loro qualità”. Il suo compito è, in sostanza, quello di agevolare l’esercizio delle prerogative spettanti ai soggetti sopra indicati in uno Stato membro diverso da quello in cui il certificato è stato rilasciato.

Questi gli scritti raccolti nel fascicolo: Paul Lagarde, Le certificat successoral européen dans l’ordre juridique français (p. 405 ss.); Heinrich Dörner, Il certificato successorio europeo da un punto di vista tedesco. Disposizioni attuative e questioni aperte (p. 424 ss.); Patrick Wautelet, Elise Goossens, Le certificat successoral européen – Perspective belge (p. 434 ss.); Francisco Lledo Yagüe, Arantzazu Vicandi Martínez, Il certificato successorio europeo e la sua applicazione in Spagna: l’ordinamento giuridico spagnolo è pronto? (p. 449 ss.); Salvatore Patti, Il certificato successorio europeo nell’ordinamento italiano (p. 466 ss.).

L’indice completo del fascicolo è disponibile a questo indirizzo.

Nella sentenza 26 febbraio 2016, n. 3802, le Sezioni unite della Corte di cassazione si sono pronunciate sull’interpretazione dell’art. 5 n. 1 del regolamento n. 44/2001 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I), e sulla rilevanza, in rapporto ad essa, dell’art. 31 della Convenzione di Vienna del 1980 sulla compravendita internazionale di beni mobili (CISG).

La prima delle norme richiamate, oggi sostituita dall’art. 7 n. 1 del regolamento n. 1215/2012 (Bruxelles I bis), istituisce un foro speciale delle liti in materia contrattuale, concorrente con il foro generale del domicilio del convenuto. In forza di tale disposizione, il convenuto, domiciliato in uno Stato membro, può essere attratto, in un diverso Stato membro, dinanzi al giudice del luogo in cui l’obbligazione dedotta in giudizio è stata o deve essere eseguita (locus solutionis), con la precisazione, indicata al primo trattino della lett. b) della norma, che, in caso di compravendita di beni, tale luogo deve intendersi coincidere con quello in cui i beni “sono stati o avrebbero dovuto essere consegnati in base al contratto”.

La Convenzione di Vienna, recante norme materiali internazionalmente uniformi in tema di vendita internazionale di merci, nel dettare la disciplina delle obbligazioni del venditore, precisa all’art. 31 che, quando la vendita implichi il trasporto dei beni, il venditore assolve il suo obbligo di consegna — in mancanza di diverse pattuizioni — rimettendo le merci al primo vettore.

Nella fattispecie si faceva questione di un contratto di somministrazione concluso fra una società italiana e una società spagnola. I beni forniti da quest’ultima alla società italiana erano stati rimessi a un vettore in Spagna per essere fatti pervenire alla società italiana. La consegna, agli effetti della Convenzione di Vienna, doveva quindi ritenersi perfezionata in quel paese.

La Cassazione, rifacendosi alla propria giurisprudenza e a quella della Corte di giustizia (segnatamente, per quest’ultima, alla sentenza Car Trim), ha affermato che in assenza di uno specifico accordo sul luogo della consegna, tale luogo dev’essere identificato, ai fini della giurisdizione, nel luogo di destinazione finale delle merci, quello in cui l’acquirente consegue o dovrebbe conseguire la disponibilità materiale, e non soltanto giuridica, dei beni. Le regole sostanziali applicabili al contratto sono, in questo caso, prive di rilievo ai fini dell’individuazione del locus solutionis.

Tale modo di intendere il concetto di luogo di consegna, ha ribadito la Corte, non è solo il più idoneo al soddisfacimento dell’obiettivo di prevedibilità. Garantendo una stretta correlazione tra il contratto e il giudice chiamato a pronunciarsi su di esso, esso risponde altresì al principio di prossimità, soddisfacendo in tal modo un altro obiettivo del regolamento Bruxelles I.

Ripercorrendo, infine, in chiusura, le argomentazioni del giudice comunitario relative al caso Electrosteel, la Corte ha sottolineato come, per verificare se le parti abbiano contrattualmente concordato il luogo di consegna delle merci, occorra aver riguardo a tutti i termini e a tutte le clausole rilevanti del contratto, compresi termini e clausole generalmente riconosciuti e sanciti dagli usi del commercio internazionale, quali gli Incoterms della Camera di commercio internazionale.

Non rinvenendosi nella specie pattuizioni di questo genere, la Corte ha rigettato il ricorso e dichiarato la giurisdizione del giudice italiano.

Marshall v MIB [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB) involved a road traffic accident that occurred in France. On 19th August 2012 an uninsured Peugeot motor car registered in France driven by Ms Bivard, a French national, hit Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard, both British nationals, as they were standing behind a Ford Fiesta motor car and its trailer, while it was being attended to by a breakdown recovery truck on the side of a motorway in France. The Ford Fiesta motor car was registered in the UK and insured by Royal & Sun Alliance (“RSA”), and the recovery truck was registered in France and insured by Generali France Assurances (“Generali”). The Peugeot then collided with the trailer shunting it into the Ford Fiesta which in turn was shunted into the vehicle recovery truck. Mr Pickard suffered serious injuries. Mr Marshall died at the scene.

This case raises points about among others (1) the law applicable to an accident involving a number of persons and vehicles; and (2) the application of the French Loi Badinter to the facts of this case, if French law applies: The second main issue is if French law applies, whether the Ford Fiesta motor car and recovery truck are “involved” within the meaning of the Loi Badinter, which it is common ground is the applicable French statute. If those vehicles are “involved” it is common ground that RSA, as insurer of the Ford Fiesta, and Generali, as insurer of the recovery truck, are liable to Mrs Marshall, and that Generali, as insurer of the recovery truck, is liable to Mr Pickard.

Two actions were commenced. The first by Mrs Marshall (Mr Marshall’s widow) against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (“the MIB”). Mrs Marshall relied on relevant English 2003 Regulations. The 2003 Regulations make the MIB liable in respect of liabilities of compensation bodies in other EEA states for losses caused by uninsured drivers. The relevant compensation body in France responsible for such losses is the Fonds de Garantie (“FdG”). The MIB denied liability, contending that the FdG would not be liable to Mrs Marshall because under the Loi Badinter Mr Pickard and RSA, as driver and insurer of the Ford Fiesta, and Generali, as insurers of the recovery truck, were liable. The second action was brought by Mr Pickard against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau relying on the 2003 Regulations. The MIB deny liability and contend that Generali, as insurers of the recovery truck, are liable to Mr Pickard.

The High Court was asked (1) what law applies per Article 4 Rome II, and (2) whether under the circumstances, Article 4(3) Rome II might have any relevance.

Save for Mrs Marshall’s claim for dependency which if English law applies is under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (“FAA 1976”), it is common ground that the direct damage occurred in France for all of the claims, including Mrs Marshall’s claim on behalf of Mr Marshall’s estate. In respect of the FAA 1976 claim, RSA (Mr Marshall’s insurers) submits that the direct damage occurred in the location where Mrs Marshall has suffered her loss of dependency, which is in England and Wales. Dingemans J resolves this issue of ricochet damage with reference to the AG’s Opinion in Lazar: the CJEU’s judgment in same was issued about a month after the High Court’s judgment in Marshall. The Advocate General, having regard to the relevant principles of consistency, foreseeability and certainty, in his opinion considered that “the damage occurs” for the purposes of a claim such as an FAA 1976 claim where the relevant death occurs. The AG noted that different EEA states took different approaches to the characterisation of a dependency claim. For example in both England and Italy it is considered that the damage for a loss of dependency occurs in the country where the dependant is situated, but that this is not a European wide approach. The opinion, Dingemans J notes, shows that the Advocate General was influenced by the need to avoid different Courts in different EEA states adopting different solutions to applicable law in fatal accident cases, which would lead to a diversity of approach in different jurisdictions.

The action between Mrs Marshall and Mr Pickard triggers Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation, identifying as applicable law the law of the country were both the ‘person’ claimed to be liable and the ‘person’ sustaining damage, are habitually resident at the time the damage occurs. Dingemans J rightly (at 17) dismisses the suggestion (made in scholarship) that the moment more than two ‘persons’ are involved, Article 4(2) becomes inoperable.

Turning then to Article 4(3), the escape clause of a ‘manifestly closer connection’. Dingemans J entertains the interesting proposition that Article 4(3) has to lead to a law different from the law which would be applicable per Article 4(1) or (2). This in particular would mean that once Article 4(2) is engaged, it cannot be undone by recourse to Article 4(3). Dingemans J insists that Article 4(3) must be employed generally, even if it leads to a resurrection of Article 4(1), and goes on to find French law to be applicable (at 19-20):

In my judgment this case provides an illustration of when French law is provided as the governing law under article 4(1), excluded (for part of the claims) under article 4(2), and then required again under article 4(3).

It is also common ground that article 4(3) imposes a “high hurdle” in the path of a party seeking to displace the law indicated by articles 4(1) or 4(2), and that it is necessary to show that the “centre of gravity” of the case is with the suggested applicable law. In this case there are a number of circumstances which, in my judgment, make it clear that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with France than England and Wales. These are: first that both Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard were hit by the French car driven by Ms Bivard, a national of France, on a French motorway. Any claims made by Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard against Ms Bivard, her insurers (or the FdG as she had no insurers) are governed by the laws of France; secondly the collision by Ms Bivard with Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard was, as a matter of fact and regardless of issues of fault or applicable law, the cause of the accident, the injuries suffered by Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard and the subsequent collisions; and thirdly any claims that Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard have against Generali, as insurers of the vehicle recovery truck, are also governed by the laws of France.

This judgment to my knowledge, with Winrow v Hemphill  is one of few discussing Article 4(3)’s escape clause in such detail. (The add-on being that in Marshall Article 4(3) was found as being able to override Article 4(2). A judgment which, like Winrow, does justice to both the exceptional nature of the provision, and the need to consider all relevant factors.

Geert.

Ps very soon the Supreme Court will hear further argument on the application of the Rome II Regulation in Moreno v MIB.

A report issued by the European Commission on 10 March 2016 analyses the functioning of the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (COM(2016) 129 final).

The Network was set up by Council Decision No 2001/470/EC and operates in accordance with the latter Decision, as amended by Decision No 568/2009/EC (see here for the consolidated text of the Decision). It ensures direct contacts and case-handling between national Network contact points, facilitates cross-border access to justice through information given to practitioners and the general public and evaluates and shares experience on the operation of specific Union law instruments in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters.

The report identifies a number of issues on which action should be taken to improve the Network’s functioning.

These issues relate, inter alia, to the resources and support given to contact points at national level, the synergies of the Network with other European networks pursuing similar aims, the visibility of the Network, including in the national websites of the institutions to which Network members belong to, and the Network’s role “in the full ex post evaluation of existing instruments”, which should be “further developed through the identification and collection of key statistical data based on national data collection mechanisms”.