Flux européens

As already announced on this blog, a conference is scheduled to take place in Bonn on 6 and 7 April 2017, under the title Politics and Private International Law (?). The aim of the initiative is to improve the exchange between young scholars of private international law.

A call for papers has now been issued to select the speakers.

The call may be found here (in German) and here (in English).

The deadline for submissions is 30 June 2016.

It has already been reported on this blog that the Council of the European Union was expected to authorise Austria to sign and ratify, and Malta to accede to, the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, “in the interest of the Union”.

A decision to this effect has in fact been adopted on at the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 10 March 2016, accompanied by a statement of the German government.

In the statement, Germany expresses its doubts as to whether the decision in question “falls within the exclusive external competence of the European Union”.

It is not clear, the statement observes, “why the future application of the Hague Service Convention to Austria and Malta could affect common rules on judicial cooperation between Member States in civil matters or alter their scope (Article 3(2) TFEU)”, since the Hague Service Convention applies in relation to third countries, whereas between European Union Member States, Regulation No 1393/2007 “clearly takes precedence over that Convention”.

In the view of the German government, the decision “should therefore not be used as a model for and should be without prejudice to any other measures in which the exclusive external competence of the European Union may play a role which may be taken by the European Union to resolve other similar cases”.

 

I have earlier reported on the referral in Universal, Case C-12/15. Szpunar AG opined today, 11 March (the English text of the Opinion is not yet available at the time I write this post) and suggests (at 37) that the Court not apply its Erfolgort /Handlungsort distinction per Case 21/76  Bier /Minnes de Potasse. He reminds the Court of Bier’s rationale: a special link between the Erfolgort and the case at hand, so as to make that place, the locus damni, the place where the damage arises, well suited to address the substantive issues raised by the claim. (He also reminds the Court, at 30, that the language of what is now Article 7(2) only refers to the harmful event; not in the slightest to damage).

In cases where the only damage that arises is purely economic damage, the locus damni is a pure coincidence (in the case of a corporation suffering damage: the seat of that corporation), bearing no relation to the facts of the case at all (lest it be entirely coincidental). The Advocate General skilfully distinguishes all relevant CJEU precedent and in succinct yet complete style comes to his conclusion.

The Court itself embraces its Bier ruling more emphatically than its AGs do (see the similar experience of Cruz Villalon AG in Hejduk).  That Universal Music is quite clearly distinguishable from other cases may sway it to follow the AG in the case at issue. However its fondness of Bier (judgment in 1976; it had been a hot summer that year) may I fear lead it to stick to its fundamental twin track of Erfolg /Handlungsort no matter the circumstances of the case.

Geert.

By a ruling of 8 March 2016, the German Federal Supreme Court declared that claims brought by German holders of Greek bonds against Greece, for damages suffered as a result of the Greek debt restructuring, were barred on grounds of State immunity (a press release may be found here, pending the publication of the full text of the decision).

The following is an excerpt of the report posted by Peter Bert at Dispute Resolution in Germany.

The bonds that the claimants had acquired – in Germany and through German Banks – where governed by Greek law. They did not contain collective action clauses. This notwithstanding, the terms of the bonds were subsequently amended by a majority vote of the bondholders and these amendments were declared binding upon all bondholders by laws passed by the Greek parliament. The measures that were implemented contained both a 53.5% haircut and an extension of the duration of the bonds.

Today, the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the actions as inadmissible (unzulässig). The Hellenic Republic was protected by the principle of sovereign immunity against these lawsuits in Germany. The international public law concept of sovereign immunity is recognized in German law (Sec. 20 para. 2 Courts Constitution Act; Art. 25 Basic Law; GG)

Raising capital by issuing bonds, according to the court, is per se not itself an sovereign act (nicht-hoheitliches Handeln; acta iure gestionis). However, whether the Hellenic Republic was protected by sovereign immunity was not only determined by the legal nature of the relationship between the parties, but also by the nature of the acts of state which are in dispute between the parties.

Accordingly, in the case at hand, it is not the issuance of bonds or the contractual relationship between the bondholders and Greece which is relevant for decision on immunity, but the legal nature of the acts that Greece took in order to restructure its debt. In particular, the dispute between the parties centred on the validity of the Greek law 4050/2012 of February 23, 2012 and the decisions of the Greek Council of Ministers dated March 9, 2012. These were the legal acts that declared the majority vote of the bondholders binding on all bondholders, and they clearly were sovereign acts (acta iure imperii).

In the words of the court, the very idea behind the concept of sovereign immunity is to prevent one state from ruling on the legality of sovereign acts of another state (“Der Grundsatz der Staatenimmunität will gerade Entscheidungen eines Staates über die Rechtmäßigkeit der hier maßgeblichen hoheitlichen Maßnahmen eines anderen Staates verhindern.”). But this is exactly what the German courts would have to do, were they to decide these disputes on the merits.

Thanks to Peter Bert for giving permission for the reproduction of his post.

Granted, the (bad) pun in the title would have worked better around the end of year, which is when I had originally planned this posting, before I got sidetracked. Bob Wessels has excellent overview here (including admirably swift and exact translation of core parts of the judgment). OOO PROMNEFTSTROY v Yukos at the Dutch Supreme Court is but one instalment in running litigation literally taking place across the globe.

Of particular interest to the blog is the court’s finding (at 3.4.2) that the existence of a corporation is subject to the lex incorporationis not, as the Court of Appeal had held, the lex concursus in the event of insolvency. The EU’s Insolvency Regulation does not apply for COMI is not within the EU. The Insolvency Regulation does not in so many words say the same as the Dutch Supreme Court however it is likely that under the EIR, too, this issue falls under lex societatis /lex incorporationis (see e.g. Miguel Virgos & Francisco Garcimartin, The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice, Kluwer, 2004, p.82 (par 123, f: dissolution of the company).

One can imagine of course the one or two complications arising out of the seizure of assets of a company which no longer exists.

Geert.

Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs on the EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 3a ed., Oxford University Press, 2016, ISBN 9780199687800, GBP 175.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – This practical book provides complete analysis of the revised EU
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EIR), the main Regulation on cross-border insolvencies in the EU. This is an essential work for anyone who requires knowledge of insolvency law in the UK or in any of the other 26 EU countries to which the Regulation is directly applicable. Timed to take into account the final amended version of the EIR, this third edition of the leading work contains detailed analysis and opinion on the effect of the changes to Regulation in practice. It also considers the numerous ECJ and relevant national cases which have been decided since the last edition. 

Ulteriori informazioni sul volume, che tiene conto del regolamento 2015/848, recante la rifusione del regolamento n. 1346/2000, sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

 

HeidelbergCement / Commission
Concurrence
La Cour de justice annule les décisions de la Commission relatives aux demandes de renseignements adressées aux cimentiers

Esther Bendelac, Le transfert de biens au décès autrement que par succession en droit international privé, Le choix de la loi applicable aux institutions d’estate planning, Bruylant 2016, pp. 426, ISBN-13 9782802752431, Euro 140.

[Dal sito dell’editore] Les institutions d’Estate Planning, issues des droits anglais et américain, permettent à une personne physique de transférer un bien, à son décès, à un bénéficiaire antérieurement désigné par lui, autrement que par succession. L’analyse de ces mécanismes juridiques dans leur contexte d’origine, puis la mise en œuvre de la qualification téléologique-fonctionnelle n’ont pas permis d’assimiler les institutions anglo-américaines à celles de l’ordre juridique français. Pour identifier la loi qui leur est applicable, les propositions doctrinales contemporaines ont été éprouvées. En raison des spécificités constitutives de ces institutions d’Estate Planning – le right of survivorship, le life interest et le contournement de la procédure de probate -, la transposition des actuelles règles de conflits de lois est peu pertinente : les limites du système conflictuel ont été dévoilées. La seule voie qui pouvait encore être explorée, pour accueillir ces institutions dans l’ordre juridique français, était celle de l’émancipation du droit international privé du droit interne. Afin de vérifier la pertinence de l’élaboration d’une catégorie autonome et d’un critère de rattachement qui lui est propre, il a été nécessaire de s’interroger sur l’existence de lois de police et le contenu de l’ordre public international. Aucun de ces procédés alternatif et correctif de la méthode conflictuelle ne constitue un empêchement à l’énoncé de notre proposition de règle de conflit de lois spécifique aux institutions d’Estate Planning. Cet ouvrage comprend d’une part, des développements théoriques – principalement relatifs au droit international privé et au droit européen – destinés aux théoriciens du droit et, d’autre part des développements techniques qui permettront à de nombreux professionnels de découvrir les institutions d’Estate Planning.

L’indice dell’opera è reperibile qui. Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

The Department of Law of the University of Ferrara hosts a series of seminars, organised by Alberto De Franceschi, under the title New Features of European Contract Law – Towards a Digital Single Market.

The seminars, in English, will run from 9 March to 25 May 2015 2016.

Speakers include Michael Lehmann (Ludwig Maximilian Univ. of Munich and Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition), Christian Twigg-Flesner (Univ. of Hull), Rodrigo Momberg Uribe (Univ. of Oxford), Herbert Zech (Univ. of Basel), Fryderyk Zoll (Univ. of Kraków and Univ. of Osnabrück), Geraint Howells (City Univ. of Hong Kong), Reiner Schulze (Univ. of Münster), Peter Kindler (Ludwig Maximilian Univ. of Munich), Martin Gebauer (Univ. of Tübingen) and Jorge Morais Carvalho (Univ. Nova of Lisbon).

Two seminars are specifically concerned with private international law issues: on 13 May 2016, Peter Kindler will talk about The law applicable to contracts in the Digital Single Market, while, on 18 May 2016, Martin Gebauer will speak of Contracts concluded by electronic means in cross-border transactions.

The complete programme may be downloaded here.

Attendance is free. For more information: alberto.defranceschi@unife.it.

 

As I have reported in December, the Gerechtshof Den Haag confirmed jurisdiction against Shell’s Nigerian daughter company. The proceedings can be joined with the suit against the mother company Royal Dutch Shell (RDS, headquartered in The Netherlands whence easily sued on the basis of Article 4 Brussels I Recast (Article 2 of the Regulation applicable to the proceedings)). I have finally gotten round to properly reading the court’s judgment (which deals with jurisdiction issues only). As I have pointed out, Article 6(1) (now 8(1) of the Brussels I Recast) cannot be used against defendants not domiciled in the EU. Dutch rules on joinders applied therefore. The Gerechtshof however took CJEU precedent into account, on the basis that the preparatory works of the relevant Dutch rules on civil procedure reveal that they were meant to be so applied. Consequently a lot of CJEU precedent is reviewed (the most recent case quoted is CDC). The Gerechtshof eventually holds that lest it were prima facie established that liability of RDS for the actions committed by its Nigerian daughter is clearly unfounded, use of RDS as an anchor can go ahead. Only clearly abusive attempts at joinders can be sanctioned. (A sentiment most recently echoed by the CJEU in Sovag).

The Gerechtshof Den Haag, without being definitive on the issue, also suggested that applicable law for considering whether merger operations inserting a new mother company were abusive (merely carried out to make Royal Dutch Shell escape its liability), had to be addressed using ‘among others’ the lex incorporationis (at 3.2). That is not undisputed. There are other candidates for this assessment.

The judgment being limited to jurisdiction, this case is far from over.

Geert.

Antonio Leandro, Le procedure concorsuali transfrontaliere, in Trattato delle procedure concorsuali, a cura di Alberto Jorio, Bruno Sassani, volume III, Giuffrè, 2016, ISBN 9788814201899, Euro 90, pp. 740-875.

[Indice sommario] 1. Osservazioni introduttive. — 2. Impostazioni teoriche del fenomeno: unificazione di forum e ius alla luce del principio di territorialità della legge processuale e del nesso di strumentalità tra obiettivi della procedura e situazioni da regolare al suo interno. — 3. Segue: contrapposizione e bilanciamento tra universalità e territorialità del fallimento. —4. Segue: altre ricostruzioni teoriche sulla unificazione di forum e ius nell’insolvenza transfrontaliera. — 5. Il reg. 1346/2000: osservazioni generali e àmbito di applicazione. — 6. La giurisdizione sulla domanda di apertura della procedura principale: la determinazione del COMI soprattutto in caso di società. — 7. Segue: la natura del COMI e gli interessi rilevanti. — 8. Segue: l’insolvenza di gruppo. — 9. Segue: il trasferimento del COMI prima e dopo la domanda di apertura. I trasferimenti “fittizi” di sede. — 10. Fasi e vicende interne alla procedura principale: l’accertamento dei presupposti dell’apertura. — 11. Segue: l’individuazione dei soggetti legittimati a domandare l’apertura. —12. Segue: l’individuazione delle “autorità” della procedura. —13. Segue: gli accertamenti sui crediti. L’insinuazione.—14. Segue: la liquidazione dei beni. —15. La giurisdizione sui processi interni alla procedura: la vis attractiva sulle azioni ancillari. — 16. La procedura secondaria/territoriale. — 17. Segue: i soggetti legittimati a domandare l’apertura. Differenze tra procedura “secondaria” e procedura “territoriale”. — 18. L’accertamento dello stato di insolvenza. — 19. Il coordinamento tra le procedure. Gli obblighi dei curatori e il difetto di regole di coordinamento tra i fori. — 20. Il diritto applicabile nel corso della procedura: l’applicazione della lex concursus agli effetti sul debitore. — 21. Gli effetti nei confronti di creditori e terzi: osservazioni generali. — 22. Segue: la compensazione dei crediti nel corso della procedura. — 23. Segue: verifica e insinuazione dei crediti.—24. Segue: gli effetti sulle azioni individuali e sui procedimenti pendenti. Rinvio. — 25. La determinazione del grado dei crediti: conflitto e coordinamento tra le varie leges concursus. — 26. La salvaguardia dei diritti reali su beni situati all’estero. — 27. La riserva di proprietà. — 28. Gli effetti sui rapporti giuridici pendenti. — 29. Gli atti pregiudizievoli. — 30. Segue: la disciplina della revocatoria (fallimentare).—31. La disciplina speciale per taluni atti a titolo oneroso.—32. Considerazioni conclusive sul richiamo di leggi diverse dalla lex concursus. —33. Segue: normativa fallimentare o normativa comune? — 34. L’assenza di prescrizioni sull’ordine pubblico e sulle c.d. norme di applicazione necessaria. — 35. L’efficacia delle decisioni: osservazioni introduttive. — 36. Segue: la nozione di decisione di apertura. — 37. Segue: la natura principale o secondaria della procedura aperta. — 38. Il momento dell’apertura. La priorità della decisione (e della procedura) in base al principio del riconoscimento automatico. — 39. L’efficacia esecutiva. — 40. L’esercizio transfrontaliero dei poteri del curatore. — 41. Assimilazione e differenze di ordine quantitativo tra Stato d’origine e Stato richiesto circa gli effetti della decisione di apertura. — 42. Segue: gli effetti sui procedimenti pendenti all’estero. Considerazioni conclusive e riepilogative sul trattamento delle azioni individuali dei creditori. — 43. L’efficacia di decisioni diverse da quella di apertura: il caso del concordato.—44. La revoca dell’apertura. — 45. Considerazioni conclusive e riepilogative sui rapporti e sul coordinamento tra i curatori nominati in distinte procedure. — 46. L’ordine pubblico come limite alla circolazione degli effetti di decisione e procedura.—47. Le novità del reg. 2015/848. — 48. Cenni sulla disciplina residuale di diritto comune.

Maggiori informazioni sul volume sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

Grèce / Commission
Aide d'État
La Cour confirme l’obligation pour l’État grec de récupérer auprès des agriculteurs grecs l’aide d’État illégale de 425 millions d’euros versée à la suite de mauvaises conditions climatiques

The Council of the European Union is expected to adopt a decision authorising Austria to sign and ratify, and Malta to accede to, the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters.

The Hague Service Convention is already in force for all Member States, with the exception of Austria and Malta. The two countries have expressed their willingness to become a party to the Convention. The Council, for its part, considered that it is in the interest of the Union that all Member States are parties to the Convention.

As stated in the preamble of the draft Council decision, the Convention comes with the external competence of the Union, “in so far its provisions affect the rules laid down in certain provisions of Union legislation or in so far as the accession of additional Member States to the Convention alters the scope of certain provisions of Union legislation”, such as Article 28(4) of Regulation No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels Ia).

The Union, however, is not in a position to accede to the Convention, as the latter is only open to States, not to international organisations. Hence the decision to authorise Austria and Malta to ratify, or accede to, the Convention “in the interest of the European Union”.

 

As readers will be aware, the Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, harmonises Member States’ governing law rules on non-contractual obligations (not entirely accurately known in short as ‘tort’). Article 15 clarifies that the scope of the law applicable is very wide, and indeed includes matters which may otherwise be considered to be procedural (hence subject to lex fori): I explained this mechanism in my posting on Wall.  Syred V PZU again concerns Article 15(c) Rome II:

Article 15. Scope of the law applicable
The law applicable to non-contractual obligations under this Regulation shall govern in particular:
…(c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed;…

The case concerns contributory negligence and quantum of this claim by Mr Syred for injury loss and damage suffered in consequence of a road traffic accident in Poland on 10 February 2010. He and his then girlfriend Kate Cieslar were rear seat passengers in a Fiat Punto, driven by her brother Mr Michal Cieslar, which was involved in a collision with a BMW, being driven by Mr Waclaw Bednorz. The collision caused Mr Syred to be ejected from the Fiat and in consequence to suffer serious injuries, in particular to his brain. He has no memory of the accident. Judgment on primary liability against the Defendants was entered by consent in the two actions on 25 September 2012 and 1 July 2014. Ms Cieslar’s claim in respect of her injuries has been settled.

There is no dispute between the experts for the defence and the plaintiff that a rear seat passenger who fails to wear a seat belt is at fault and negligent for the purpose of the passenger’s civil claims for compensation under Polish law. The experts also agree that the next question in Polish law is whether such negligence caused the injuries or made them worse. They also agree that Polish law in respect of damages for non-pecuniary loss (i.e. the equivalent of general damages for pain and suffering) provides no fixed scales or guidelines relevant to the case and that the judge should seek to assess a reasonable sum taking into account the injuries suffered by the claimant and all the circumstances of the case. Common practice of the Polish civil courts, it was said, is to calculate the non-pecuniary element on the basis of a 2002 table contained in the Ordinance of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy. The Supreme Court of Poland had criticised this practice in civil courts, as too slavish to a social insurance scheme.

In Wall, the CA held that the word ‘law’ in Article 15 of Rome II should be construed broadly and includes practice, conventions and guidelines; so that the assessment of damages should be on that basis. That, Soole J notes here, leaves the question of what the English Court should do if the evidence shows that the foreign courts continue to follow a particular practice despite criticism from the Supreme Court of that country. It is noticeable that the High Court does not wish to impose a precedent rule where there is none (Poland following civil law tradition). However it would be equally impertinent to ignore the criticism of that Supreme Court, that the 2002 table must not be slavishly followed. Soole J therefore ends up taking guidance from the 2002 table, without slavishly following it.

What remains to be seen (as also noted by Matthew Chapman, who alerted me to the case) is whether the High Court may now serve as inspiration for the Polish court. Precedent outsourcing, as it were.

Geert.

Con la sentenza n. 24244 del 27 novembre 2015, le Sezioni unite della Corte di cassazione hanno avuto modo di pronunciarsi sulla portata applicativa dell’art. 5 n. 1 del regolamento n. 44/2001 sulla competenza giurisdizionale e il riconoscimento delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I), corrispondente, oggi, all’art. 7 n. 1 del regolamento n. 1215/2012 (Bruxelles I bis).

La norma in parola istituisce un foro speciale per le liti “in materia contrattuale”, attribuendo la cognizione delle relative domande al giudice del luogo in cui l’obbligazione dedotta in giudizio è stata o dev’essere eseguita. La lett. b) della disposizione precisa peraltro che tale luogo deve per regola essere identificato, in caso di compravendita di beni, nel luogo in cui i beni sono stati o avrebbero dovuto essere consegnati in base al contratto, e, in caso di prestazione di servizi, nel luogo in cui i servizi sono stati o avrebbero dovuto essere forniti in base al contratto.

Si trattava, nella fattispecie, delle domande proposte da una società italiana nei confronti di una società francese volte a ottenere, in relazione alle pretese avanzate da quest’ultima sulla base di alcuni contratti di compravendita che essa affermava di aver concluso con la prima, l’accertamento “dell’insussistenza di qualsivoglia vincolo contrattuale e/o obbligatorio tra le parti” e, in subordine, la “declaratoria della nullità, inesistenza, annullabilità, inefficacia dei contratti tra le stesse asseritamente conclusi”, nonché, in via ancor più gradata, la “loro risoluzione per eccessiva onerosità sopravvenuta”.

La Corte ha affermato, innanzitutto, l’applicabilità al caso in esame dell’art. 5 n. 1, lett. b), del regolamento.

Pur riconoscendo “che la norma sembra riferirsi alle sole azioni indirizzate all’adempimento, e non a quelle volte alla dissoluzione del vincolo, e che d’altra parte le disposizioni sulla competenza derogative del principio generale del foro del convenuto non possono essere interpretate in modo da conferire al regime derogatorio una portata che vada oltre i casi contemplati dalla Convenzione”, il Supremo Collegio ha ritenuto decisivo il fatto che, in fondo, “anche le impugnative per invalidità, inefficacia, inesistenza del negozio, attengono alla ‘materia contrattuale’, in quanto postulano una originaria, effettiva o putativa, assunzione volontaria di un obbligo, del quale tendono in vario modo e con varie formule a conseguire la caducazione”.

Su questa base, rilevato che le domande si riferivano a dei contratti che, stando alla documentazione acquisita al processo, avrebbero comportato la consegna delle merci in questione in territorio francese, la Corte ha asserito l’insussistenza della giurisdizione italiana, rigettando così il ricorso proposto contro la sentenza d’appello pronunciatasi negli stessi termini.

 

Il 3 marzo 2016, i Presidenti della Camera e del Senato hanno provveduto alla nomina del nuovo Garante per l’infanzia e l’adolescenza, nella persona di Filomena Albano.

Il Garante è stato istituito — con la legge 12 luglio 2011, n. 112 — al fine di “assicurare la piena attuazione e la tutela dei diritti e degli interessi delle persone di minore età”, in conformità a quanto previsto dalla Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul diritto del fanciullo, dalla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, dalla Convenzione europea sull’esercizio dei diritti dei fanciulli nonché dal diritto dell’Unione europea e dalle norme costituzionali e legislative nazionali.

Le competenze che la legge attribuisce Garante possono essere esercitate in relazione ad un’ampia gamma di situazioni in cui siano in gioco i diritti fondamentali delle persone minorenni, comprese le situazioni caratterizzate da elementi di internazionalità. Proprio in relazione a queste ultime il nuovo Garante può contare su una speciale competenza, maturata, fra le altre cose, come membro della Commissione per le adozione internazionali istituita ai sensi dell’art. 38 della legge 4 maggio 1983, n. 184, come direttore dell’Ufficio che si occupa di relazioni internazionali in senso alla Direzione generale della Giustizia civile del Ministero della Giustizia, oltre che come giudice, da ultimo presso il Tribunale di Roma.

Il 4 marzo 2016 il Principato di Monaco ha depositato il proprio strumento di ratifica della Convenzione dell’Aja del 13 gennaio 2000 sulla protezione internazionale degli adulti. La Convenzione — che reca un’articolata disciplina internazionalprivatistica di istituti come la tutela e l’amministrazione di sostegno — vincola attualmente Austria, Estonia, Finlandia, Francia, Germania, Repubblica Ceca, Regno Unito (limitatamente alla Scozia) e Svizzera, ed entrerà in vigore per il Principato il 1° luglio 2016.

Un passo analogo a quello compiuto da Monaco potrebbe essere realizzato nel prossimo futuro da altri paesi, dove sono state completate le procedure parlamentari dirette appunto alla ratifica della Convenzione: il riferimento è, in particolare, a Irlanda e Portogallo.

In altri paesi, come la Svezia, o autonome entità politiche, come l’Irlanda del Nord, la Convenzione ha formato l’oggetto di studi approfonditi commissionati dalle istituzioni, a conclusione dei quali è stata espressa l’opportunità di procedere alla ratifica.

In Italia, dopo la firma della Convenzione, risalente al 2008, un disegno di legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica ed esecuzione è stato presentato alla Camera il 23 dicembre 2014, senza peraltro ricevere, da allora, alcun seguito (v. più diffusamente, in proposito, questo post): in questi quattordici mesi, le Commissioni Giustizia e Affari esteri della Camera, a cui la proposta è stata assegnata, non hanno ancora avuto modo di iniziarne l’esame.

Col crescere del numero degli Stati parti della Convenzione dell’Aja del 2000, crescono anche le ragioni (già di per sé consistenti) che dovrebbero indurre l’Italia a guardare con favore alla prospettiva della ratifica.

Basti qui dire, fra i tanti possibili rilievi, che l’applicabilità della Convenzione in Stati che accolgono un gran numero di cittadini italiani emigrati — solo in Germania, Svizzera e Francia se ne contano ben oltre un milione e mezzo (e il dato è in crescita) — pone un concreto problema di coordinamento fra l’azione svolta dalle autorità degli Stati in questione (che sono per regola competenti a proteggere, ai sensi dell’art. 5, par. 1, della Convenzione, chiunque risieda abitualmente nel rispettivo territorio) e l’azione che può essere svolta in questa stessa materia dalle autorità italiane (che, in forza dell’art. 44 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, letto anche alla luce dell’art. 29 del decreto legislativo 3 febbraio 2011 n. 71, sull’ordinamento e le funzioni degli uffici consolari, possono operare in questo campo a tutela dei cittadini italiani residenti all’estero).

La Convenzione prefigura ampie opportunità di comunicazione e coordinamento fra autorità di Stati diversi, ma le riserva, come è naturale, alle autorità degli Stati contraenti. Rimanere estranei al regime dell’Aja significa, per l’Italia, rinunciare ad avvalersi di strumenti (ormai collaudati) capaci di accrescere in modo significativo l’effettività della protezione degli adulti vulnerabili.

The Department of Law of the University of Naples “Federico II” and the Institute for Research on Innovation and Services for Development of the National Research Council of Italy (IRISS) are working jointly on the analysis of the link between migration and development, and have decided to publish a collective volume on this subjects.

[From the presentation of the volume] – The ongoing debate on international migration and development is particularly relevant in current times. The recent events concerning the increased migratory flows in the Mediterranean have pushed the issue of international migration to the top of the global political agenda. The attention is focused more on the questions regarding admission / rejection of migrants on the territory of receiving countries than on the general topic of the contribution of migrants to the financial, social and cultural development of societies (of origin, transit or destination). In the last decades, States, international and intergovernmental organizations have fostered a dialogue at national, regional and international level. In September 2015, the United Nations included the question of migration in its post-2015 Development Agenda. The goal of the volume on Migration and Development is to give an overview of the main legal issues connected to the change of modern societies in order to answer the quest of a human-oriented management of migratory flows. The call for papers aims to offer an opportunity for experts, scholars and policy makers, with a view to discussing (primarily from an international law perspective) outcomes, implications and achievements regarding international migration and development.

Those wishing to contribute to the volume may submit abstracts of no more than 500 words, in English or French, no later than 15 March 2016, to migrationandevelopment@gmail.com.

For more information see here.

Trade Usages and Implied Terms in the Age of Arbitration, a cura di Fabien Gélinas, Oxford University Press 2016, pp. 328, ISBN 9780199916016, GBP 75.

[Dal sito dell’editore] If a dispute between commercial parties reaches the stage of arbitration, the cause is usually ambiguous contract terms. The arbitrator often resolves the dispute by applying trade usages, either to interpret the ambiguous terms or to determine what the given contract’s terms really are. This recourse to trade usages does not create many problems on the domestic level. However, international arbitrations are far more complex and confusing. Trade Usages and Implied Terms in the Age of Arbitration provides a clear explanation of how usages, and more generally the implicit or implied content of international commercial contracts, are approached by some of the most influential legal systems in the world. Building on these approaches and taking account of arbitral practice, this book explores possible conceptual frameworks to help shape the emerging transnational law of trade usage. Part I covers the treatment and conceptual grounding of usages and implied terms in the positive law of influential jurisdictions. Part II defines the approach to usages and implied terms adopted in the design and implementation of important uniform law instruments dealing with international business contracts, as well as in the practice of international commercial arbitration. Part III concludes the book with an outline of what the conceptual grounding of trade usages could be in the transnational law of commercial contracts.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

In Kokott AG’s words, ‘following the West Tankers case…in the present case the Court is once again confronted with a specific procedural feature of the Anglo-American legal system.’

Article 34 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 35 in the recast) enables a court, by way of derogation from the principles and objectives of the Regulation, to refuse to recognize a judgment given by a court of another Member State. The whole starting point of the Regulation and its antecedents was to avoid much recourse to refusal of recognition. Free movement of judgments lies at the very core of the foundations of European private international law.

Little wonder then that the Regulation leaves limited freedom for Member States authorities (including courts) who are asked to recognise and enforce another State’s judgment. As I noted at the time, in Trade Agency the CJEU insisted that refusal of recognition on the basis of ordre public is only possible after review of the individual merits of the case. Courts in other EU Member States may not decide that the English system as such as contrary to public policy in the state of enforcement. Relevant case-law was most recently summarised by (the same) Kokott AG in fly LAL and also in Diageo.

The exequatur procedure of the Brussels I Regulation has been amended in the Brussels I Recast. However it is exactly on issues of the rights of the defence that exequatur can never be entirely automatic, even among EU Member States.

In Case C-559/14 Meroni, at issue are Mareva injunctions: (sometimes) worldwide freezing orders issued by English courts (among others), designed to prevent a creditor being deprived of access to the debtor’s assets as a result of a prior disposal of those assets. However, as is often the case, the reputation of Mareva injunctions far exceeds their actual bite. There is no one size fits all such injunction and a number of tools are at the disposal of both the debtor affected, and third parties, to have the order varied or indeed lifted. The rights of third parties in particular are quite relevant in the current review with the CJEU. Part of the injunction are often the debtor’s participations in companies: for the recalcitrant debtor may find all sorts of useful ways to spirit value away from his companies and into vaults safe from prying English or European eyes – especially if the debtor is sole or majority shareholder.

In the case at issue, Mr A.L. is prohibited, inter alia, from disposing of assets which can be attributed directly or indirectly to his property. The injunction extends to  interests in the Latvian company VB. Mr A.L. has a direct interest in that company with only one share. According to the referring court, however, he is also the ‘beneficial owner’ of shares in at least one other company (‘Y’), which itself has substantial interests in VB. Mr Meroni is part of the management of Y. Following a seizure ordered by the relevant Latvian office, he also acts as the bailee for the interests in Y. for which Mr A.L. is the beneficial owner. Mr Meroni claims that the freezing injunction prevents the shareholder Y. from exercising its voting rights in respect of VB. This affects constitutionally protected property rights, especially since the company was not heard in the English proceedings. This, it is argued, is contrary to the principle of the right to a fair trial.

The AG Opined differently. At 44, she argues that it is not clear to what extent that injunction might be contrary to basic principles of Latvian substantive law or procedural law, especially since, as the referring court acknowledges, the Latvian legal order does permit judgments as provisional measures without a prior hearing of the party against whom enforcement is sought. Consequently measures such as Mareva orders cannot be said to be fundamentally against the Latvian ordre public. At 45: ‘ Aside from this, the English freezing injunction at issue does not provide for any irreversibly drastic measures for its enforcement overseas, in particular in so far as third persons who were not parties to the proceedings in England are concerned. Rather, the freezing injunction claims legal effects on third persons resident in other countries — and thus the companies controlled by Mr A.L. — only subject to strict requirements: first, it is to have legal effects on a without notice basis only where this is permitted by the foreign law; second, anyone served with the freezing injunction may apply to the court to vary or discharge it; and, third, compliance with contractual obligations in other countries is still to be possible notwithstanding the freezing injunction.‘ (footnotes omitted)

There is no evident breach of basic principles of the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought – breach of ordre public must therefore be rejected.

Now, earlier in the judgment, the AG also considers albeit more or less obiter (the CJEU is certain not to entertain it) what may in fact be the more important (for it tends to be less sub judice at the CJEU) part of her Opinion: whether the Mareva orders actually constitute a ‘judgment’ for the purposes of the Regulation. Ms Kokott suggests that the Denilauler criteria (easily fulfilled in the case at issue: see para 31) ought to be relaxed under the Regulation, as opposed to the stricter approach under the 1968 Convention. That is because following judgment in ASML, notwithstanding defects in service, if the person concerned fails to commence proceedings in the State of origin of the judgment to challenge the judgment issued upon default, when it was possible for him to do so, recognition may not be refused. The AG suggests to extend the ASML rule to provisional measures.

Geert.