Flux européens

La Quadrature du Net e.a. (Données personnelles et lutte contre la contrefaçon)
Rapprochement des législations
Premier avocat général Szpunar : une autorité nationale devrait pouvoir accéder à des données d’identité civile couplées à des adresses IP lorsque ces données constituent le seul moyen d’investigation permettant d’identifier les titulaires de ces adresses soupçonnés d’atteintes aux droits d’auteur sur Internet

Proximus (Annuaires électroniques publics)
Rapprochement des législations
Le responsable du traitement de données personnelles est tenu de prendre des mesures raisonnables afin d’informer les moteurs de recherche sur Internet d’une demande d’effacement par la personne concernée

Whether orders for penalty payment my constitute a ‘judgment’ is an issue under Brussels Ia (A55, see also below). It is also under the EU account preservation order Regulation 655/2014 (the ‘APO’ Regulation or simply ‘APO’) and it is on the latter that Szpunar AG opined last week in C‑291/21 Starkinvest (no English version is as yet available).

Per A7 APO, confirmed in CJEU C-555/18 H.K., when the applicant for an APO  (the creditor) does not (yet) have a judgment, court settlement or authentic instrument requiring the debtor to pay the creditor’s claim, creditor must submit sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that he is likely to succeed on the substance of his claim against the debtor: that is the ‘fumus boni juris’ (literally ‘the smoke of a solid right’) requirement.

Under Belgian civil procedure rules, a creditor need not return to the court to have the final amount of a periodic penalty payment confirmed before being able to seize assets commensurate to the amount due: the judgment itself, which for that reason must clearly detail the parameters for the payment’s calculation, serves as enforceable title; the bailiff seizes following her /his own calculation, and the attachment judge confirms the final amount. The point of the exercise is to guarantee sufficient asset seizure, pending the final confirmation of the amount due.

In essence the question is whether this security also works in an international context. The discussion of course triggered discussion of A55 Brussels Ia and its relationship with APO: ‘A judgment given in a Member State which orders a payment by way of a penalty shall be enforceable in the Member State addressed only if the amount of the payment has been finally determined by the court of origin.’

The AG (and with him, the EC and the Member States that intervened) zooms in on the A7(2( APO condition: the debtor must have obtained ‘a judgment, court settlement or authentic instrument requiring the debtor to pay the creditor’s claim‘  (emphasis added): not just ‘a judgment’ as defined in A4(8) APO: “‘judgment’ means any judgment given by a court of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, including a decision on the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court”. This focus is then followed by a discussion of the word ‘claim’, for which reference is made to the relevant forms prescribed by Commission Implementing Regulation 2016/1823 . This form refers to an amount ‘awarded’ and an ‘amount set out in’ the judgment.

The AG ends his Opinion with the suggestion that the judgment which imposed the penalty payment, together with confirmation eg by a bailiff that the debtor did not meet with the requirements to escape the payment, form a sound basis for the A7(2) APO route of fumus boni iuris.

It is clear that penalty payments could have done with more specific consideration in APO, and  the spirit of the APO Regulation could in my view support a different conclusion. However the textual anchors for the AG’s Opinion would seem strong.

Geert.

Opinion Szpunar AG this morning, whether order to pay periodic penalty payment without determination of the final amount, is a judgment viz the European Account Preservation Order

Starkinvest SRLhttps://t.co/t5a7rPGnzy

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 20, 2022

Banca Intesa Sanpaolo SPA & Anor v Comune Di Venezia [2022] EWHC 2586 (Comm) is an excellent illustration of the relevance of characterisation and of the international harmonisation of same. It also discusses the application of the ‘purely domestic contracts’ rule of Article 3(3) Rome Convention, carried over into the Rome Regulation.

Background is long-running litigation involving derivative transactions used by Italian municipalities to hedge their interest rate risk, as Sarah Ott summarises the context here (she discusses Dexia Crediop SpA v Provincia di Pesaro e Urbino [2022] EWHC 2410 (Comm), a case with many similar issues).

Venice contends that, for various reasons, it lacked the substantive power to enter into the Transactions as a matter of Italian law, and that, applying English conflict of law principles, that means that it did not have capacity to enter into the Transactions and that they are not valid. It also contends that the Transactions breached various rules of Italian law which have the status of “mandatory rules of law” for the purposes of A3(3) Rome Convention 1980 (which is applicable and not the Rome I Regulation) and that as a result the Transactions are void and/or unenforceable.

The Banks deny that the entry into the Transactions contravened any provisions of Italian law, on the basis of arguments as to the effect of Italian law and its application to the facts of this case, and further deny that any such contravention would deprive Venice of capacity to contract as a matter of English conflict of laws principles in any event.

Capacity to enter into contractual relationship itself is not caught by the Rome Convention as a result of the Convention’s carve-out of Article 1(2) c (most legal systems make such capacity subject to the lex incorporationis, and [115] is determined by reference to the law in force when the Transactions were entered into). Foxton J refers as authority to Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2014] EWHC 3103 (Comm) [185].

Who then is to decide whether a particular issue of Italian law raises a question of capacity, or authority, or some other kind of legal challenge to the validity and efficacy of the Transactions? Here Foxton J wrongly in my view simply refers to lex fori, English law. In reality of course it is the Rome Convention that does so, although as I have pointed out before, neither the Rome Convention nor Rome I excels at clarifying.

[129] ff then follows lengthy analysis of the issues of capacity under Italian law as the lex causae, with the conclusion being that Venice did indeed so lack capacity under Italian law.

The issue of mandatory Italian law replacing the English lex contractus as a result of Article 3(3) Rome Convention’s ‘purely domestic contracts’ rule, is dealt with obiter. It fails at the first hurdle with Foxton J holding [341] that the scenario is not purely domestic. He does not much entertain the issue of whether under Italian law (lack of) a theory of contractual consideration might be of mandatory nature, referring [356] to the similar issues of consideration and privity of contracts under English law (which in effect might subsequently become relevant under the overriding mandatory rules of the forum).

An interesting judgment.

Geert.

Capacity under IT law to enter into financial transactions; Qualification whether 'capacity' is at stake is subject to lex fori, EN law
(Non)application of A3(3) Rome Convention purely domestic contracts rule

Banca Intesa Sanpaolo ea v Comune Di Venezia https://t.co/lrSv1v4E5b

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 14, 2022

In an interesting judgment, the CJEU yesterday held (no English edition yet) in C-604/20 ROI Land Investments Ltd v FD on protected categories suing a defendant not formally associated with the claimant by a clear contract of employment. That the defendant is not domiciled in the EU is in fact of less relevance to the issues.  I had somehow missed Richard de la Tour AG’s Opinion on same (it happens to the best of us).

Claimant in the main proceedings is FD, domiciled in Germany. Defendant is not his current employer and is not domiciled in a Member State. Yet by virtue of a letter of comfort it is directly liable to the employee for claims arising from an individual contract of employment with a third party. The gist of the case is whether an employee can sue this legal person under the employment title if the contract of employment with the third party would not have come into being in the absence of the letter of comfort.

The slightly complex three part construction, transferring relationships of employment, essentially is one of tax optimisation via Switserland. FD used to be employed by ROI Investment, a Canadian corporation, before his contract was transferred to R Swiss, a Swiss SPV created for the very purpose of the operation. ROI Investment via a letter of comfort effectively guaranteed the outstanding wages due to FD. FD’s contract with Swiss was ended, a German court held this to have been done illegally and ordered Swiss to pay a substantial sum whereupon Swiss went into insolvency. FD now wishes to sue the Canadian ’employer’.

CJEU Bosworth is the most recent case which extensively discusses the existence of ’employment’, referring to CJEU Shenavai and Holterman. In ROI Land the CJEU [34] instructs the national court in particular to assess whether there is a relationship of subordination between individual and corporation, even if subordination is actually only one of the Shenavai /Holterman criteria.

Erik Sinander has already noted here (his post came in as I was writing up mine) that this is a different emphasis from the AG: he had suggested a third party who was directly benefitting from the work performed by the employee (“un intérêt direct à la bonne exécution dudit contrat”) should be considered an employer. That to my mind is way too large a criterion and the CJEU is right to stick to the earlier ones.

[35] the CJEU suggests relevant circumstances in the case most probably confirming the relationship of subordination hence of employment: the activities which FD carried out for his two respective employers stayed the same, and the construction via the  SPV would not have been entered into by FD had it not been for his original employer’s guarantee.

The forum laboris in the case at issue is then I assume (it is not discussed quite so clearly in the judgment) determined by the place of habitual performance of the activities for the third party, the formal (now insolvent) employer, not the activities carried out for the issuer of the letter of comfort: for there are (no longer) such activities.

[37] ff the Court entirely correctly holds that more protective national rules cannot trump Brussels Ia’s jurisdictional provisions for the  protected categories: both clear statutory language and statutory purpose support that  conclusion.

[52] ff the CJEU entertains the subsidiary issue raised in the national proceedings as to whether the contract may be considered a consumer contract. It holds that the concept of ‘a purpose outside (a natural person’s) trade or profession’ does not just apply to a natural person in a self-employed capacity but may also apply to an employee. [56] seeing as FD would not have signed the new employment agreement without the letter of comfort, the employment agreement cannot be considered to be outside FD’s profession. Therefore it cannot qualify as a consumer contract.

Geert.

 

#CJEU this morning on the application of the protective rules for employees, both in Brussels Ia and Rome I, in the event of an employer not domiciled in the EU

ROI Land Investments v FDhttps://t.co/Ne7LQalAFJ

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 20, 2022

 

Commission / CK Telecoms UK Investments
Concurrence
Contrôle des concentrations : l’avocate générale Kokott précise les exigences de preuve de l’existence d’effets non coordonnés remplissant la notion d’« entrave significative à une concurrence effective » sur un marché oligopolistique en l’absence de position dominante de l’entité fusionnée

IG Metall et ver.di
Liberté d'établissement
La transformation d’une société de droit national en société européenne (SE) ne doit pas réduire la participation des syndicats à la composition du conseil de surveillance

Soleymani v Nifty Gateway LLC [2022] EWCA Civ 1297 is the appeal against [2022] EWHC 773 (Comm) which I reviewed here. That post will give readers the necessary background. The Court of Appeal partially overturned. The judge had issued a stay of English proceedings under s9 Arbitration Act 1996, effectively allowing a US arbitrator to decide the validity of the arbitration agreement. That stay has now been lifted and E&W proceedings on that issue will go ahead.

Of note is that the discussion takes place under retained EU law, with the relevant provisions in ia s15b of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (as amended) mirroring the consumer section of Brussels Ia and Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as amended.

A first ground of appeal concerned the core of the Brussels Ia issue: whether the Court had jurisdiction under s. 15B CJJA because the exception for arbitration under Article 1(2)(d) of the Recast Regulation did not apply to the Arbitration Claim. In other words whether the exclusion for arbitration is engaged when a consumer, ordinarily protected by the forum actoris provisions in A17 ff BIa, calls upon that protection to seize a UK court.

The first instance judge held that the principal focus and subject matter of Mr Soleymani’s claim is whether he is legally obliged to arbitrate, hence engaging the arbitration exception. The Court of Appeal agrees for largely the same reasons as the judge, and with Popplewell J [89] indicating no change in his views following CJEU Prestige. The CA’s own finding in [2021] EWCA Civ 1589 The Prestige is recalled:  “the question is whether a principal focus of the proceedings is arbitration, the essential subject matter of the claim concerns arbitration, or the relief sought can be said to be ancillary to the arbitration process, these being alternative ways of expressing the same idea”.

The Court of Appeal’s focus seems to be on avoiding abuse by the consumer, who could circumvent the arbitration exception by bringing his claim within the scope of BIa hence characterising it as a claim to enforce his consumer rights.

I continue to find the alternative more convincing: that the consumer section could be easily circumvented, particularly by non-EU based traders and /or in the event of arbitration outside the EU, simply by inserting an ADR clause in the contract, depriving the consumer of the forum actoris. Claimant’s counsel’s nine reasons [51] in my view have convincing appeal, and not Popplewell J’s suggestion [93] ff that in practice the consumer would be protected anyways, either by the ability to sue in the UK and have the ADR clause declared void under consumer protection law, or by the ability to have any foreign award declared unenforceable under the New York Convention’s ordre public exception. The very case at hand show the real difficulties (and costs) the consumer will be put through if and when the business party to the transaction decides to pursue the arbitration proceedings abroad.

The second ground of appeal was dismissed for it relied on s. 15D(1) being construed as invalidating the arbitration clause, which the Court had already held it did not, however ground 3 was accepted, for reasons formulated by Birss LJ.

Mr Soleymani’s claim consisted of claims for three distinct declarations: (i) a declaration that the arbitration clause was unfair and not binding, (ii) a declaration that the governing law clause was unfair and not binding, and (iii) a declaration that the contract formed in the auction was illegal under the Gambling Act 2005.

The jurisdiction issues under Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal relate only to the first of these three, the arbitration clause claim. The judge as discussed decided that the Arbitration Claim was within the arbitration exception which now forms part of the CJJA (and had its origin in the Brussels Convention and the later Recast Regulation), and the appeal from that decision was dismissed.

The judge however also decided that the other two claims, that is the Governing Law Claim and the Gambling Act Claim were not clearly within the arbitration exception, yet she stayed the E&W proceedings to give way to the arbitration in New York. Therefore these claims were at least capable of falling within the jurisdiction gateway provided for in s15B(2)(b) CJJA 1982.  Ground 3 argued that the first instance judge erred in staying these proceedings under section 9 of the arbitration Act without determining the fairness question or directing a trial before the English Court on the issues raised by that objection.

That ground was upheld for three reasons [151] ff which all go towards limits to Kompetenz Kompetenz in consumer (and other?) cases.

Firstly, the public importance of decisions vindicating (or not) consumers’ rights. The case Mr Soleymani is seeking to make has implications for  consumers in general in this jurisdiction and it is important that they are considered and ruled upon in public in a court. Therefore it was held the s9(4) issues should be decided at a trial and not left to be decided in the arbitral tribunal.

Further [152] the consumer protection rights under UK law involve domestic concepts which UK court are far better placed to adjudicate upon than a New York arbitrator. Even if it were certain that the New York Tribunal would apply UK law (a late proffered undertaking to do so was made and discussed [155] ff), it engages principles which are the subject matter of our domestic jurisprudence, not simply some general notion of fairness.

Thirdly whether the arbitration agreement does in fact operate unfairly on Mr Soleymani is not suited to summary determination. “If the invalidity argument is good, the very reasons which make it good, namely that it places an unfair burden on Mr Soleymani, weigh against allowing the tribunal to decide the issue under its Kompetenz-Kompetenz jurisdiction. The Judge’s finding that there would be nothing unfair about leaving it to the arbitrator to decide that issue is inconsistent with her recognition that there was a triable issue whether this was an unfair arbitration agreement.”

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.3.2, and 2.2.9.2.

Highly relevant judgment under retained EU law on possibility for consumers to enjoy jurisdictional protection of EU rules to avoid #arbitration outside of the EU
Review of the first instance judgment here https://t.co/G1wCZbigfs
Soleymani v Niftyhttps://t.co/3h8nGbIgGZ

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 6, 2022

Towercast
Concurrence
L’avocate générale Kokott estime qu’une concentration entre entreprises qui n’a pas fait l’objet d’un contrôle ex ante au titre de la législation sur le contrôle des concentrations peut faire l’objet d’un contrôle a posteriori sur la base de l’interdiction de l’abus de position dominante prévue par le droit primaire

S.C.R.L. (Vêtement à connotation religieuse)
Principes du droit communautaire
La règle interne d’une entreprise interdisant le port visible de signes religieux, philosophiques ou spirituels ne constitue pas une discrimination directe si elle est appliquée de manière générale et indifférenciée à tous les travailleurs

The Court of Justice delivered last month (15 September 2022) its judgment in case C‑18/21 (Uniqa Versicherungen AG v VU), which is about the EOP and COVID-19:

“Articles 16, 20 and 26 of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 […] must be interpreted as not precluding the application of national legislation, which was adopted when the COVID‑19 pandemic arose and which interrupted the procedural periods in civil matters for approximately five weeks, to the 30-day time limit laid down by Article 16(2) of that regulation for the defendant to lodge a statement of opposition to a European order for payment”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=265546&mode=req&pageIndex=6&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=1393109

flightright (Transport aérien de Stuttgart à Kansas City)
Transport
Le droit à indemnisation des passagers aériens pour retard important s’applique aux vols avec correspondances composés de vols assurés par des transporteurs aériens effectifs distincts

Szef Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej
Fiscalité TVA
Les services financiers fournis au titre d’un contrat de sous-participation sont exonérés de la TVA

Espagne / Commission
Aide d'État
L’avocat général Pikamäe propose d’annuler partiellement l’arrêt du Tribunal ainsi que la décision de la Commission sur le « régime espagnol de leasing fiscal »

LOT (Indemnisation imposée par l’autorité administrative)
Transport
L’autorité nationale chargée de l’application du règlement sur les droits des passagers aériens peut, à la suite de plaintes individuelles, obliger un transporteur à indemniser des passagers

Agrofert / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
La décision du Parlement de refuser l’accès à deux documents relatifs à l’enquête contre M. Andrej Babiš, ancien Premier ministre tchèque, pour utilisation abusive des fonds européens et conflits d’intérêts potentiels est valide

The (first instance) court at Rotterdam has upheld anchor jurisdiction and refused an application for an Article 34 Brussels Ia stay. The case concerns victims of earthquakes in the Brasilian Maceió region, which they argue are caused by the mining activities of Braskem. The judgment is only available in Dutch.

The Dutch anchor defendants are intra-group suppliers of ia specialty chemicals, and finance. The main target of the claim of course is the Brasilian mother holding. Whether the latter can be brought into the proceedings is not subject to Brussels Ia but rather to Dutch residual rules. However just as in e.g. Shell, the Dutch rules are applied with CJEU authority on Article 8(1) Brussels Ia firmly in mind. In much more succinct terms than the English courts in similar proceedings, the Dutch courts [6.16] finds the cases so ‘closely related’ that it is expedient to hear the cases together. It emphasises that while the respective roles and liabilities of the various undertakings concerned is likely to be very different, there is a bundle of legal and factual questions that runs jointly throughout the various claims. [6.18] it emphasises that the decision to base the European headquarters of the group, and the finance activities at Rotterdam, implies that the concern reasonably could have foreseen it would be sued here.

Equally succinctly [6.19 ff] the Court rejects the argument that the use of the Dutch corporations as anchor defendants is an abuse of process. Such abuse must be narrowly construed and  it is far from obvious that the claim against the anchors is entirely without merit.

Seemingly defendants tried to argue forum non conveniens however [6.23] the court points out such construction does not exist in The Netherlands and obiter it adds (like the Court of Appeal in Municipio) that practical complications in either hearing of the case or enforcement of any judgment are not a reason to dismiss jurisdiction.

Request for a stay in the procedures viz the Brasilian corporations [6.26] is rejected on (Dutch CPR) lis pendens rules for the parties in the proceedings are not the same. Article 34 is dealt with in two paras (quite a contrast with the E&W courts). The pending procedures vis-a-vis Article 34 are not, it seems, Brasilian Civil Public Actions – CPAS (these were at issue in Municipio de Mariana (of some interest is that the law firm behind the claims is the same in both cases)). Rather, pending liquidation proceedings are considered as the relevant assessment points. [6.28] obiter the court finds that the cases are most probably not related. It grounds  its decision however on a stay not being in the interest of the sound administration of justice. The court holds that the Brasilian proceedings are not likely to be concluded within a reasonable time. Defendants’ commitment at hearing to speed up the process in Brasil, are met with disbelief by the court given the defendants’ attitude in the Brasilian procedures hitherto.

[6.32] permission to appeal the interim judgment on jurisdiction is denied. This means that, like in Airbus, discussion on the private international law issues is likely only to resurface at the stage of appealing the judgment on the merits, too.

An important judgment: other than Petrobas, there are to my knowledge no continental judgments discussing Article 34 in this intensity (there are E&W judgments, as readers of the blog will know).

Geert.

See also ‘Dude, where’s my EU court? On the application of Articles 33-34 Brussels Ia’s forum non conveniens- light rules’, Journal of Private International Law, forthcoming 2022.

 

Dutch court refuses Article 34 Brussels Ia lis pendens applicationhttps://t.co/F46tkOlcRe
Pollution case against #braskem will go ahead in home of Dutch mother corporation. More on the blog soonhttps://t.co/jfa1Sb5o3t @PogustGoodhead

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 26, 2022

Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Suspension administrative de la décision de transfert)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La suspension, en raison de la pandémie de Covid-19, de l’exécution d’une décision de transférer un demandeur d’asile vers l’État membre responsable n’a pas pour effet d’interrompre le délai de transfert de six mois

Országos Idegenrendeszeti Főigazgatóság e.a.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Retrait de la protection internationale suite à une atteinte à la sécurité nationale : le droit de l’Union s’oppose à la réglementation hongroise selon laquelle la personne concernée ou son représentant ne peuvent accéder au dossier qu’a posteriori, sur autorisation et sans se voir communiquer les motifs fondant la décision

France / Commission
Agriculture
Financement de la PAC et aides aux États membres : le Tribunal rejette le recours de la France contestant une correction financière d’un montant de 46 millions d’euros proposée par la Commission