GAVC

A post suited to be this year’s last, given the religious context of the current holiday period: Wahl AG advised late November in C-426/16. See my previous posts on the issue. A European Regulation (1099/2009) provides for an unclear, and conditional,  exemption from a requirement of stunning animals for religious slaughter. (Regularly the practise is also called ‘ritual’; including in current Opinion. ‘Religious’ must be the preferred term).

Practised in particular by the Jewish (Shechita; leading to ‘kosher’ meat) and Muslim (Zabihah; with halal meat) faith, a core aspect of the practice is that animals are not stunned prior to slaughter. The science on the effect of stunned or unstunned slaughter is equivocal. What is certain is that neither stunned nor unstunned slaughter, when carried out incorrectly (well documented in the case of stunned slaughter) aids the welfare of the animal.

The Flemish Minister responsible for animal welfare announced that, from 2015 onwards, he would no longer issue approvals for temporary slaughter plants at which religious slaughtering could be practised during the Islamic Feast of the Sacrifice because such approvals in his view were contrary to EU legislation, in particular the provisions of Regulation 1099/2009. The muslim community objects to the discontinuation of temporary slaughter plants.

The Advocate-General’s Opinion is lengthy, and there is a lot to chew on.  There is little point in rehashing all the AG’s points: readers are best referred to the Opinion itself. Of note however is

• Firstly, the AG’s attempt strictly to delineate the issue.

The case he suggests is simply about what material conditions, in terms of equipment and operating obligations, must accompany unstunned slaughter in order for it to comply with the relevant EU rules. He suggests a rephrasing of the referring court’s questions in that direction. Along these lines he also in substance refuses to entertain the questions as to the validity of Regulation 1099/2009 itself, or the exemption from the duty to use approved slaughterhouses under the Regulation’s ‘cultural’ exception. (See footnote 13). In my view the Regulation is very vulnerable on this issue: sporting and cultural events are entirely excluded from its scope of application; religious rites are subject to a qualified exemption. That to me cannot survive a discrimination test.

The Brussels court had given the case a much wider scope: it suggested that the contested Flemish decision creates a limitation on the exercise of freedom of religion and undermines Belgian customs relating to religious rites, since it obliges Muslims to perform the ritual slaughter of the Islamic Feast of the Sacrifice in slaughterhouses that have been approved in accordance with Regulation No 853/2004. In the opinion of that court, this limitation is neither relevant nor proportionate in order to attain the legitimate objective of protecting the welfare of animals and human health (at 20). The AG however sees no limitation of freedom of religion at all, resulting from the general obligation to use approved slaughterhouses.

• Despite the attempt at delineation, the background to the case is undeniable and filters through in the Opinion.

If only because the AG has to complete the analysis should the CJEU disagree with his view that freedom of religion is not being limited, he does review the legality of a total ban on slaughtering other than in plants that have been approved in accordance with the rules established in Annex III to Regulation No 853/2004.

First of all he refers to European Commission audits of the previously approved temporary slaughterhouses to make the point that they protected animal welfare sufficiently. He directly criticises the Regulation for its arguably disproportionate criteria in this respect: see in particular at 127.

Religious slaughter falls squarely within the European Convention of Human Rights Article 9’s freedom of religious expression. It is clear that the AG believes that the ban on unstunned slaughter other than in approved abattoirs, in the name of animal welfare or otherwise,  offends freedom of religious expression to such a degree that it simply must not pass: para 133 and the preceding argumentation is very clear.

The AG’s reasoning holds all the more for a total ban un unstunned slaughter full stop. That is the clear implication of this Opinion and one which must be welcomed.

Guten Rutsch ins neue Jahr!

Geert.

Apologies for late reporting. Bot AG opined end of October in C‑210/16 Fansites. [The official name of the case is Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, in the presence of Facebook Ireland Ltd, Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht. It’s obvious why one prefers calling it Fansites].

The Advocate-General summarises (para 2-3) the case as involving ‘proceedings between the Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, a company governed by private law and specialising in the field of education (‘the Wirtschaftsakademie’), and the Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein, a regional data-protection authority in Schleswig-Holstein (‘ULD’) concerning the lawfulness of an order issued by the latter against the Wirtschaftsakademie requiring it to deactivate a ‘fan page’ hosted on the website of Facebook Ireland Ltd. The reason for that order was the alleged infringement of the provisions of German law transposing Directive 95/46. Specifically, visitors to the fan page were not warned that their personal data are collected by the social network Facebook (‘Facebook’) by means of cookies that are placed on the visitor’s hard disk, the purpose of that data collection being to compile viewing statistics for the administrator of the fan page and to enable Facebook to publish targeted advertisements.’

The case ought to clarify the extent of the powers of intervention of supervisory authorities such as ULD with regard to the processing of personal data which involves the participation of several parties (at 13). I had flagged earlier that this case is relevant to the jurisdictional and applicable law issues involving datr cookies.

Whatever the outcome of the case, its precedent value will be limited by the imminent entry into force of the new General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR. The GDPR clearly introduces a ‘one-stop principle’ with only one lead authority (in FB’s case, Ireland’s data protection agency) having the authority to act (see also the AG’s observation of same in para 103).

As prof Lorna Woods in excellent analysis observes, the issue comes down to the interpretation of the phrase from Art. 4(1)(a), ‘in the context of the activities of an establishment’. Dan Svantesson has most superb analysis of Article 4(1)(a) here, anyone interested in the issue will find his insight most helpful.

Now, the Advocate-General leans heavily on Weltimmo however I would suggest its precedent value for the Fanpages case is constrained. Weltimmo concerned a company set up in Slovakia but with no relevant activities at all in that Member State. Indeed as the Court itself observed (at 16-18) , the company was effectively male fide (my words, not the CJEU’s) moving its servers and creating fog as to its exact whereabouts. In other words a case of blatant abuse. There is no suggestion of abuse in Fanpages. Moreover according to the CJEU in C-230/14 Weltimmo the phrase ‘in the context of the activities of an establishment’ cannot be interpreted restrictively (AG’s reference in para 87), yet that CJEU holding in Weltimmo cross-refers to Google Spain in which the crucial issue was whether EU data protection laws apply at all. That is very different in Weltimmo and in Fanpages. That EU authorities have jurisdiction and that EU privacy law applies is not at issue.

There is sufficient argument to find in the Directive, even before its transformation into the GDPR, that in cases such as these the same processing operation ought to be governed by the laws of just one Member State. It would be good for the CJEU to recognise that even before the entry into force of the GDPR.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2.5.

I explained the issue in [2017] EWHC 3104 (Pat) Eli Lily v Genentech in my posting on Chugai v UCB. A defendant in a patent infringement case often tries to make the case that the suit is about patent infringement really: for this obliges the court per GAT v Luk to refer (only the) invalidity issue to the court with exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24(4) Brussels I Recast.

Here, Eli Lily seek a declaration of non infringement of a bundle of European patents held by Genentech, a US-incorporated firm.

Birss J in the case summarises all relevant precedent, including Chugai, to reach the conclusion that the suit can stay in the UK.

Of note is his holding on costs. The English courts do not just review whether the case is currently about validity but also what the likelihood is that it will become one on validity. For if it does later on, Birss J suggests ‘this entire exercise will have been something of a charade‘ (at 84). (Which is not quite the case: even if the validity issue needs to be temporarily outsourced to different courts, the infringement issue may later return to the courts of England).

On this point, Eli Lilly refuse to disclose whether they may seek a ruling on the validity of the patents: they would rather wait to see Genentech’s defence. Not an unacceptable position, but one, High Court does warn, which will have an impact on costs. At 87: ‘I am satisfied that these unusual circumstances mean that it would not be fair to pre-empt what each party may decide to do. There are sufficient uncertainties that the right thing to do is wait and see what happens. However in my firm but necessarily provisional view that wait should be at Lilly’s risk as to costs. If Genentech does counterclaim for infringement, and validity of the non-UK patents is put in issue (here or abroad) in response, then it is very likely that Lilly should bear the whole costs of this application even if they win it in its form today.‘

That latter point is interesting. It’s twice now this week that judgments come to my attention where jurisdictional considerations are clothed in costs implications.

Geert.

(Handbook of ) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.7.

In [2017] EWHC 2541 (IPEC) Pablo Star Media v Richard Bowen the issue was one over copyright infringement relating to a photograph of Dylan Thomas. Of interest to this blog is not the copyright issue or the height of damages relating to same – I am not a specialist in that area. (As far as the jurisdictional issues are concerned, there is a slightly muddled reference to the Brussels I Recast and various other Regulations including Regulation 542/2014 which I discussed here).

What did trigger my interest, though, is the ruling on costs.

At 33-34 Hacon J quotes the District Judge’s reasoning for obliging claimant (Pablo Star) to pay part of the defendant’s cost, despite having won the case. In that cost award, the District Judge scolds claimant for having initiated proceedings in Ireland as well as the UK, and for considering (or threatening, as the case may be) litigation in the US. The High Court at 38 and 41 leaves aside the proceedings in Ireland as a factor to consider, and now limits the reasoning for the award on cost to the potential proceedings in the US.

Now, costs determination largely is within the realm of national rules of civil procedure. Sometimes, EU and /or international law has a direct impact on cost determination, such as for instance in the case of Aarhus and environmental litigation; or, importantly for the case at issue, Directive 2004/48 on intellectual property rights enforcement (the enforcement Directive). This Directive provides in Article 14 on legal costs

‘Member States shall ensure that reasonable and proportionate legal costs and other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a general rule, be borne by the unsuccessful party, unless equity does not allow this.’

That Directive was applied in CJEU C-57/15 UVP v Telenet, expressly condemning Belgium’s restrictive regime on cost recovery in intellectual property cases. The High Court’s finding on cost may to my mind be at odds with that ruling.

More generally, the District Judge’s reference to claimant’s Irish proceedings contributing to the judge’s finding on cost, without a doubt is an infringement of the effet utile of the EU’s jurisdictional regimes. Claimant has a certain right to sue in Ireland and that possibility must in no way be disciplined.  Hacon J at the High Court, purposely or not, may have insulated himself from criticism at this point, by leaving the Irish proceedings outside the consideration and only referring to the threat of US proceedings as relevant for partially shifting costs to the plaintiff.

Absolute numbers in the case are not high. Yet the principle to my mind deserves right to appeal at the CA and, from there on, potentially to the CJEU.

Geert.

I was delighted to learn something I had not been aware of in Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-467/16 Brigitte Schlömp: namely the slightly diverging approach to the notion of ‘court’ in Brussels cq Lugano.

The AG also opines on the question of lis alibi pendens, suggesting (at 48) that since the conciliation procedure before the Behörd constitutes an integral part of proceedings before a(n) (ordinary) court, the moment of seizure of the Schlichtungsbehörde is the determining moment under the lis alibi pendens provisions of Articles 27 and 30 of the Lugano II Convention. [He also refers to [2014] EWHC 2782 (Ch) Lehman Brothers Finance AG v Klaus Tschira Stiftung GmbH & Anor  which followed the same approach].

Is the Swiss ‘Schlichtungsbehörde’ or conciliation authority, intervening in disputes between local councils and relatives with respect to maintenance and social care payments, a ‘court’ under Lugano?

Ms Schlömp, who resides in Switzerland, is the daughter of Ms H.S., who receives supplementary social assistance from the Landratsamt Schwäbisch Hall (administrative authority of the district of Schwäbisch Hall) in Germany because of her care requirements. Under German law (indeed similarly in many a Member State), benefits handed out by social welfare bodies, are claim back from children of recipients, subject to ability to pay. To assert its claim for recovery, the German welfare body lodged an application for conciliation in regard to Ms Schlömp with the conciliation authority (‘Schlichtungsbehörde’), competent under Swiss law. What follows is a series of procedures left, right, even centre. Their exact order is outlined by the AG, they matter less for this post: what is relevant to my own insight, is whether a Schlichtungsbehörde under Swiss law is covered by the term ‘court’ within the scope of Articles 27 and 30 of the Lugano II Convention.

Here comes my moment of surprise: at 58: ‘the concept of ‘court’ in the Lugano II Convention differs from that in Regulations No 44/2001 and No 1215/2012, as that Convention contains an article which has no parallel in the latter two instruments: Article 62 of the Lugano II Convention states that the expression ‘court’ is to include any authorities designated by a State bound by that convention as having jurisdiction in the matters falling within the scope of that convention.’ Like in recent case-law under the Brussels I Recast, bodies which prima facie are outside the judicial system, may be considered ‘courts’. A confirmation of the functional as opposed to the formal classification approach.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.1.

Thank you Tom Whitton and Helen Kavanagh  for flagging Algeco Scotsman PIK SA [2017] EWHC 2236 (Ch). Algeco has COMI in Luxembourg.  This was clear when the relevant scheme of arrangement (‘SAR’) was being discussed. To manage potential problems at the jurisdictional stage, Hildyard J at 22 lists the precautions the company and the majority of the lenders took:

‘Accepted by the relevant 75 per cent or more, was first, the amendment of the governing law clause in the PIK Loan Agreement to change the governing law from New York law to English law; secondly, the amendment of the jurisdiction clause to submit the parties to the non-exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of England; and thirdly, a waiver of any restrictions under the PIK loan agreement so as to permit the company to take all steps necessary to confirm or establish sufficient connection with England including, if appropriate, to take steps to ensure that its COMI is in England.’

When the unsuspected reader sees ‘COMI’ of course (s)he is forgiven for immediately pondering application of the EU’s Insolvency Regulation – quod certe non: for it is clear (ia as a result of schemes of arrangement not being included in relevant Annex) that SARs fall under company law. Hildyard J’s jurisdictional kick-off at 43 is telling: ‘Dealing first with jurisdiction, the primary question is whether this Luxembourg company, the subject of the scheme, is a qualifying company so to be subject to section 895 of the Companies Act’. Idem at 45.

At 47 the High Court then applies the jurisdictional test viz the Brussels I Recast Regulation arguendo: if it were to apply (which the English Courts have taken no definitive stance on), would an English court have jurisdiction? Yes, it is held: under Article 8 (anchor defendants) and under Article 25 (choice of court).

Yet this in my view is where recourse to SARS in the English courts continues to be exposed: loan agreements and facilities agreements now routinely adopt choice of court and law in favour of English courts and ditto law. Yet where they do not, or did not, the ‘willing’ creditors consent to a change in the agreement in favour of the English courts, with the unwilling creditors left behind. Whether this holds scrutiny under Rome I is far from certain. As for Article 8, its use here may be seen as a form of abuse, disciplined under the Regulation.

Hildyard J considers the case one of ‘good forum shopping’ (at 57-58), with reference to Apcoa which I review here. The concerns above continue in my view to highlight weaknesses in the construction, which so far have not led to any collapse of this restructuring tourism. At 58 the High Court emphasises that there are cases of inappropriate forum shopping in this context (one of that includes haste) yet the role of Rome I in this context has so far played little of a role.

It is noteworthy that in my view (and I so testified in re Apcoa) even a wrong view of the English courts on Rome I’s impact, would not suffice for jurisdictions outside of the UK to refuse to recognise the scheme under Brussels I – all with the huge Brexit caveat evidently.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 5.

Appreciation of the title of this piece of course depends on how one as an individual likes Bauhaus, or not. A November 2017 European Parliament Study on looted works of art and cultural goods is something of  a treasure trove for public and private international lawyers alike. The study looks at substantive law on the issue in the Member States (not the cup of tea for this blog) but kicks off with good overview of the challenges of sovereign immunity; applicable law (particularly with respect to choice of law; with inspiration being sought in the Belgian Private International Law Act, Article 90 (lex furti as a principle – the place from which the object was removed, but with corrections), and the issue of the application of foreign public international law by the courts.

Parliament is quite active on this issue. In May 2016 it had already published a study with more focus on the specific issue of art looted in times of conflict, and alternatives to court litigation but nevertheless with a short forray into conflict of laws (and reference to one or two interesting national cases).

Together the two studies are a good exercise for the conflicts mind.

Geert.

Thank you Dan Svantesson for sharing preparatory work for a February 2018 conference on access to digital evidence in the cloud. The document, written by a group which comprises academia, relevant companies (including Apple, Google, Facebook and Microsoft) as well as regulators (including the EC and the USDJ), at this stage does not offer solutions. Rather, it sets out principles along which a future framework could be set out, including the concept of data control (not to be confused with data controller) and actual provision of service.

One of the issues to look out for is how a future international approach to access and jurisdiction in criminal matters may differ from courts’ and regulators’ approach in civil jurisdiction (including data protection and privacy).

Geert.

I have reported before on the relevance of lex curia /curial law and other lex causae decisions to be made in the arbitration context. I have also reported on the qualification of ‘international‘ for conflict of law /private international law purposes. And finally of course privity of choice of court and -law is no stranger in my postings either. All these considerations apply in the arbitration context, too.

Thank you Herbert Smith for flagging CS(COMM) 447/2017 GMR Energy, in which all these issues featured in the arbitration context. The judgment would not seem to add anything new (mostly applying precedent) however it is a usual reminder of the principles. As reported by HS (and with further factual background there), GMR Energy argued

• on the plain reading of the arbitration clauses, Singapore was not the seat of arbitration but only the chosen place or venue for hearings; Not so, the High Court found: reference to SIAC rules and to Singapore  points to Singapore as the curial seat;
• the parties being Indian, choice of a foreign seat for arbitration would be in contravention of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 which provides that agreements which restrain parties’ rights to commence legal proceedings are void (save for those which do so by way of an arbitration agreement) – GMR Energy contended that an agreement between Indian parties to arbitrate offshore would fall foul of this provision. This, too, the High Court rejected: per precedent, offshore arbitration is compatible with the Act. (It is also particularly useful for Indian subsidiaries of foreign companies); and
• for two Indian parties to choose an overseas seat for their arbitration (thereby disapplying Part I of the Arbitration Act) would amount to a derogation from Indian substantive law, and therefore would not be permissible. This, the High Court ruled, is not a decision to make at the stage of jurisdictional disputes between the parties.

Further, on  the issue of privity, Doosan India ‘contended that GMR Energy should be party to the SIAC Arbitration proceedings by virtue of common family ownership and governance, lack of corporate formalities between the companies, common directorships, logos and letterheads, and GMR Energy’s past conduct in making payments towards GCEL’s debts’ (I am quoting HS’s briefing here). This is referred to as the alter ego doctrine and the High Court upheld it. Liability for affiliated undertakings’ actions is to be discussed on the merits (here: by the arbitral tribunal). But a the level of jurisdiction (including reference to arbitration), Doosan India’s arguments were upheld: the common ownership between the entities; the non-observance of separate corporate formalities and co-mingling of corporate funds; and GMR Energy’s undertaking to discharge liabilities of GCEL (and the fact that it had made part payments towards the same) all conspire to the conclusion that GMR Energy is bound by the arbitration agreement.

An interesting confirmation of precedent and ditto application of the alter ego doctrine.

Geert.

Thank you Bob Wessels for again alerting us timely to two recent decisions by the Dutch courts, applying the Insolvency Regulation 2015, on the determination of COMI – Centre of Main Interests. Bob’s review is excellent per usual hence I am happy to refer for complete background. In short, the decisions are

• in Powerstorm: textbook applications on the public expression (hence ascertainability by third parties, to use the CJEU’s phrase of words) of COMI, which third parties have to rely on. Here: to displace the presumption of COMI in the United States (place of incorporation; in re Powerstorm) in favour of Amsterdam.
• in Bezuijen BV against X, a natural person: with extensive reference to the recitals of the EIR 2015, that the Dutch courts have to consider jurisdiction proprio motu, evidently, and that they need serious evidence to uphold jurisdiction against a natural person who, both parties agree, no longer has his residence in The Netherlands (where it is, is in dispute but it is probably somewhere in the vicinity of Paris).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.6.1.

At the end of October the Rechtbank Amsterdam held that ‘booze bikes’ can be kept from parts of Amsterdam. The municipality had resorted to the ban both to address congestion (the bikes are slow and chunky; the roads in the part of Amsterdam concerned, narrow) and rowdiness (the bikes are often used for stag parties and let’s just say that the ‘bike’ part of the trip is not the one that attracts its users). In my experience (from a resident’s point of view) these bikes are a bit like Brexit: attractive for five minutes to some; a right nuisance for the remainder of the journey.

In 2009 I wrote a short piece reflecting on use restrictions from an EU point of view. In it I refer ia to C-142/05 Mickelsson and to C-110/05 Commission v Italy (motorcyle trailers) – my analysis and that of Peter Oliver may be applied here mutatis mutandis. The degree to which lawfully marketed products may be restricted in their use has so far not entertained the Court of Justice in great numbers. Yet the use of such restrictions is bound to increase, with local authorities in particular imposing restrictions for environmental, public health and other ‘sustainable development’ purposes. Witness e.g. Venice banning wheeled suitcases, historic city centres banning diesel cars etc.

In the booze bike case the Court at Amsterdam (at 2.9) simply said that applicants should have provided detail of their argument as to why the ban might contravene EU law. Expect a second round on similar cases at some point.

Geert.

Others have studied the EU’s legal basis for energy policy much better than I have. Chiefly among them prof Leonie Reins. e.g.  for RECIEL here and in her Phd here. The impact of this discussion is high: since the introduction of an energy Title in the EU Treaties (following Lisbon) whether so designed or not, the prospect of that Title’s requirement on unanimity for measures which ‘have a significant effect on a Member State’s choice between different energy sources’ looms heavily over the EU’s environment policy. The EU’s emissions trading system – ETS is the prime candidate for falling victim to an extensive interpretation of Article 192(2)c TFEU, which harbours the unanimity requirement.

In C-5/16 Poland v EP and Council Mengozzi AG Opined last week. At issue is Poland’s opposition to a MSR – a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme, essentially a long-term parking for surplus allowances to enable the ETS to safeguard collapse of prices in the event of excess supply. The resulting increase in the price of allowances was inter alia intended to encourage fuel switching and to discourage investments in coal-fired power stations (hence of course Poland’s interest).

Relevant to future reference is especially the AG’s view at 25, which I include in full: ‘as a derogation, Article 192(2)(c) TFEU is to be interpreted strictly, especially since an efficient modern environment policy cannot ignore energy questions. I share the fears expressed by the defendants and the interveners that the applicant’s proposed interpretation of Article 192(2)(c) TFEU and the conclusions which it draws from that interpretation for the examination of the legal basis of the contested decision would effectively block any legislative initiative by recognising a right of veto for Member States, as the Union would adopt measures inviting them only to rationalise their CO2-consuming activities. Furthermore, such an interpretation would doom the ETS to failure as it would prevent the EU legislature from correcting its structural deficiencies. In addition, although I would point out that the goal of introducing the MSR is not to form the price of allowances but simply to ensure the efficiency of the ETS, in any event, an operator’s choice of a certain energy source or production technology cannot depend on that price alone, which does not in itself define the production costs, which are determined by a variety of factors. Even with the introduction of the MSR, the choice of technology still remains in the hands of operators and is not dictated by the European Union.’

I am not sure to what degree the Court’s judgment will enable us to draw criteria with wider impact than just the current case – but it would certainly be helpful. Mengozzi AG firstly emphasises strict interpretation of the ‘energy mix’ exception. Further, in the paras preceeding the aforecited one, links amendments to existing laws largely to the latter’s legal basis. Supports the Institutions and Spain, France and Sweden (intervening; the position of Germany, also intervening, was not made clear) in their warning against veto power in the energy /climate change context; and finally further dilutes the exception by looking at policies as they work in practice, not just in theory. On this point, the AG looks at the ETS specifically however his view has broader appeal: it would essentially mean that when Member States’ and individuals’ /undertakings’ behaviour is determined by regulatory intervention, some of which clearly based on a legal basis other than Article 192(2)c TFEU, the latter is not determinant in deciding proper legal basis.

This is an important case for the future of EU environment and energy policy.

Geert.

In [2017] EWHC 2932 (Fam) Radseresht v Radsheresht-Spain Cohen J is asked to recognise a divorce (and ensuing financial arrangements) granted under Dubai law.

I will not discuss the merits of the case (Justice Cohen does so proficiently, not just to my lay eye but I am assuming also the expert eye; he decides there was an intention to continue to stay married). Rather, the case is an interesting example to show those having to get used to conflict of laws. The High Court has no hesitation to apply Dubai law with all its in and outs (part of the judgment queries whether there were continued sexual relationships between the (ex?) spouses), in a court in London.

Of note is also that the High Court suggests that but for the very late raising of the issue, it could have queried whether the courts at Dubai had jurisdiction in the first place, habitual residence of the parties not having been at the UAE (the suggestion seems to have been made by counsel of the husband that the relevant criterion would have been nationality anyway).

Geert.

In [2017] EWHC 2928 (Comm) Dana Gas v Deutsche Bank et al., Leggatt J treats his readers to a concise insight into islamic finance (particularly in para 10) which he needs to inform readers of the essence of the case. The operation essentially involves raising investment (with a view to restructuring), organised by the main agreement (of the ‘Mudarabah’ type), subject to UAE law, and supported by a purchase undertaking of the same date, subject to English law. The set-up therefore evidently is not one of dépeçage per se (this would require one and the same agreement being subject to different laws) however it comes close.

Inevitably following unfavourable market conditions, an anti-suit injunction was sought and obtained in the UAE, followed however by English proceedings which required the aint-suit to be lifted – something which Dana Gas did not succeed in as a result of shareholder opposition. The English proceedings were effectively saved from collapse by the involvement of a third party, BlackRock, who as a non-party to the UAE sharia proceedings, were not bound by the anti-suit injunction. The somewhat complicated result is that the English proceedings really can only limp along.

Dana Gas seek confirmation that the transaction is unlawful and all the relevant contractual obligations are unenforceable as a matter of UAE law. Leggatt J with neither emotion nor hesitation refers essentially to Rome I’s universal application: the Mudarabah agreement is subject to UAE law and he is happy to assume it is invalid under UAE law – hence not enforceable by an English court. See in this respect Article 10(1) Rome I.

That however leaves the viability of the purchase undertaking. (at 46) The fact that the contract or its performance would be regarded as invalid or unlawful under the law of some other country than England (for example, a country where one of the parties is domiciled or carries on business) is generally speaking irrelevant (reference is made to Kleinwort, Sons & Co v Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie AG [1939] 2 KB 678.

At 48, Dana Gas sets out its case for unenforceability of the purchase agreement under English law. This includes reference to ordre public but also inevitably an attempt to ‘contaminate’ the purchase agreement with the Mudarabah agreement. Leggatt J justifiably turns this around: at 54: it is apparent from the purchase agreement’s terms that the risks against which the Purchase Undertaking is intended to protect the Certificateholders include the risk that the mudarabah and the transaction documents governed by UAE law will turn out to be invalid. That is why they needed to be separated. (In that respect merging the two agreements into one and applying dépeçage might give even stronger force to this argument: however I do not know whether under UAE law such constriction would be acceptable).

Further arguments swept aside, the Court turns to ordre public: Dana Gas nb employs both ordre public and, earlier Article 9(3) Rome I: overriding mandatory law: a rare treat indeed. Relevant English precedent is Ralli Brothers: Ralli Brothers v Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 1 KB 614: an English court will not enforce an obligation which requires a party to do something which is unlawful by the law of the country in which the act has to be done. However Dana Gas later abandoned that claim for (at 80) those rules of law are only applicable if and in so far as the obligations in question have to be performed in the UAE – quod non. A switch was then made to ordre public, now with Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 as leading precedent. However, here too, it is only if a contract has as its object and intention the performance in a friendly foreign country of an act which is illegal under the law of that country that the contract will be considered (at 82 in fine) contrary to English public policy.

Conclusion:  the Purchase Undertaking is valid and enforceable.

Without claiming anything near proper competence in Islamic finance law, it would seem that Dana Gas does not introduce new principles. However in diligently applying conflicts analysis, Leggatt J in my view does practice a great service: he re-emphasises the need for parties clearly to identify locus implementi: the place of performance of an obligation.

Geert.

(Handbook) of Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016: essentially, almost every section of Chapters 2 and 3.

And I would be very happy to supervise. Thank you Nicolas Contis for flagging  Stockholm National Museum v X at the French Supreme Court /Cour de Cassation. Nul ne peut se contredire au détriment d’autrui: aka (here: procedural) estoppel. (The newly out Encyclopedia of Private international law, edited by Basedow, Ruhl, Ferrari and de Miguel Asensio, has a very good entry on it, discussing both public and private international law).

On the eve of a hearing on the ownership of an ancient artefact, a cup, defendants changed their stance and argued that the cup had belonged to their mother, for whom they were acting as representatives only. Previously, they had always presented themselves as owners. They suggested therefore that the suit was misdirected, hoping to sink it. The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants’ motion on account of procedural estoppel. The Supreme Court disagreed: its stance means, as Nicolas summarises, that ‘to face the procedural penalty of dismissal, not only must the change of stance happen throughout the judicial proceedings (ie, notably, that a contradiction including a repeated allegation made before the launching of a suit could not pass the estoppel test), but the party at fault must also have changed its ‘pretentions’ – that is, its legal claims (meaning that changing the factual allegations presented to the courts could not pass the test either)’.

I do not see entirely clear in French civil procedure law but as I saw the case reported, the thought struck me: this would be a good topic for a PhD: a comparative study in procedural estoppel, specifically in a private international law context (especially if one were also to throw a comparison with arbitration in the mix).

Happy to discuss. Geert.

This is effectively my second posting today on Article 24(2) Brussels I Recast.

In C-560/16 Dědouch, Wathelet AG Opined last week, on the scope of the exclusive jurisdictional rule of (now) Article 24(2) of Regulation 1215/2012. The issue arose in proceedings between Michael Dědouch et al, a group of minority shareholders on the one hand, and Jihočeská plynárenská a.s. (established in the Czech Republic) and E.ON Czech Holding AG (‘E.ON’) [established in Germany] on  the other, concerning the reasonableness of the sum which, in a procedure for removing minority shareholders (‘squeeze-out’), E.ON was required to pay Mr Dědouch et al following the compulsory transfer of their shares in Jihočeská plynárenská.

Mr Dědouch et al are suing both companies and are asking the Regional Court, České Budějovice, Czech Republic to review the reasonableness of the sum. In those proceedings E.ON raised an objection that the Czech courts lacked jurisdiction. E.ON argue that, in view of the location of its seat /domicile, only the German courts had international jurisdiction per (now) Article 4.

The regional court initially accepted jurisdiction on the basis of (now) Article 8(1): the anchor defendant mechanism (one of the two defendant companies being a Czech company). Eventually the High Court, Prague found that the Czech courts had jurisdiction under (old) Article 5(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation: the special jurisdictional rules for contracts.

Wathelet AG suggests the case raises the complex issue of litigation in intra-company disputes. At 21 he writes that the facts highlight a structural problem in the Regulation, namely ‘the absence of a basis of jurisdiction dedicated to the resolution of internal disputes within companies, such as disputes between shareholders or between shareholders and directors or between the company and its directors.’ That is not quite correct: it is not because the Regulation has no tailor-made regime for this type of dispute that is has no jurisdictional basis for it. That a subject-matter is not verbatim included in the Regulation does not mean it is not regulated by it.

The AG then (at 23) considers that the issue under consideration is complicated by the difficulty of applying (now) Articles 7(1) and (2), ‘since the removal of the minority shareholders and the consideration decided by a resolution of the general meeting are neither a contract nor a tort, delict or quasi-delict.’ I am not so sure. Is there no ‘obligation freely assumed’ between minority and other shareholders of the same company? Are they not bound by some kind of ‘contract’ (in the broad, Jakob Handte sense) when becoming shareholders of one and the same company? That (at 24) ‘The principle of a procedure for squeezing out the minority shareholders is that the principal shareholder can start it without their consent‘ I do not find convincing in this respect. Plenty of contractual arrangements do not limit contracting parties’ freedom to act: except, their actions may have contractual consequences. The AG in my view focuses too much on the squeeze out being one-sided. An alternative view may see a wrongful deployment of squeeze-out a breach of an earlier contractual, indeed fiduciary duty between /among shareholders.

Unlike the AG (at 26), neither do I see great obstacle in the difficulty in determination of a specific place of performance of such contractual duties between shareholders in the company law context. They may not fit within the default categories of Article 7(1), however I can see many a national judge not finding it impossible to determine a place of performance.

On the basis of these perceived difficulties the AG dismisses application of Articles 7(1) and (2) and then considers, and rejects, a strict application of Article 24(2). In other words in the AG’s view Article 24(2) is engaged here.

This is a tricky call. Justified reference is made by the AG to C‑372/07 Hassett, in which (then) Article 22(2) was held no to apply to a decision made by the Board of the Health Organisation not to indemnify two of their members in cases of medical negligence: this was found by the CJEU to be an action relating to the way in which a company organ exercises its functions – not covered by Article 24(2). In Dědouch, the action relates to the amount which the General Meeting of the company fixed as the compensation E.ON was required to pay the minority shareholders following the transfer of the shares. Notwithstanding Czech company law being the lex causae in assisting the GM in that decision, I am not convinced this engages Article 24(2) (hence reserving jurisdiction to the Czech courts).

In summary, I believe the Court should reject application of Article 24(2), and instruct the national courts to get on with the determination of jurisdiction per Article 7, or indeed 8.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.5, Heading 2.2.11.1, Heading 2.2.12.1.

I reported on submission to jurisdiction in the English legal context in re Golden Endurance, and on the issue of the application of (now) Brussel I Recast’s Article 24’s exclusive jurisdictional rules in Dal Al Arkan. In Dennis v TAG Group [2017] EWHC 919 (Ch) the High Court first of all revisits the issue of submission to jurisdiction in the context of injunction proceedings, and also held that permission for service out of jurisdiction is not required since the (now) Article 24 rules apply regardless of domicile of the parties. Clyde & Co have summary of the facts here.

Mr Dennis was the CEO of the England and Wales incorporated McLaren Technology Group Ltd. He claims he has suffered unfair prejudice as a result of suggested Board resolutions to be passed (and now passed) and relies on purported breaches of the Companies Act 2006, articles of association, shareholder agreement and service agreement to support his petition: this arguably engages Article 24(2) of the Brussels I Recast.

Application for injunctive relief sought to restrain Respondents from placing Plaintiff on garden leave and delegating the authority of the board to an interim committee. At issue first is whether Respondents’ engagement with the injunctive proceedings amounted to submission of jurisdiction. Briggs CR held that it so did: language in isolated correspondence reserving rights as to jurisdiction amounts to nothing if parties keep schtum about it when it really matters: at the injunctive hearings and forms relating to same.

Briggs held that even in the alternative, had there not been submission, Article 24 (I assume what is meant is Article 24(2) given the subject of the claim) applies regardless of the domicile of the parties hence submission is irrelevant (and indeed permission for service out of jurisdiction not required  – one assumed to the (insurance) relief of Respindents’ counsel. On that point Dal Arkan had already been confirmed Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc & Alexander Vik [2017] EWHC 459 .

A good and attractively concise ruling.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.

Bobek AG must have picked up his knack for colourful language at Teddy Hall. His Opinion last week in C-498/16 Schrems v Facebook is a delight and one does best service to it by simply inviting one reads it. Now, that must not absolve me of my duty to report succinctly on its contents – the Court itself I imagine will be equally short shrift with claimant’s arugments.

When I asked my students in the August exam to comment on the case, I simply gave them the preliminary questions and asked them how the CJEU should answer them:

1 Is Article 15 of Regulation 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of that provision loses that status, if, after the comparatively long use of a private Facebook account, he publishes books in connection with the enforcement of his claims, on occasion also delivers lectures for remuneration, operates websites, collects donations for the enforcement of his claims and has assigned to him the claims of numerous consumers on the assurance that he will remit to them any proceeds awarded, after the deduction of legal costs?

2. Is Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that a consumer in a Member State can also invoke at the same time as his own claims arising from a consumer supply at the claimant’s place of jurisdiction the claims of others consumers on the same subject who are domiciled

a. In the same Member State, b. In another Member State: or c. In a non-Member State,

if the claims assigned to him arise from consumer supplies involving the same defendant in the same legal context and if the assignment is not part of a professional or trade activity of the applicant, but rather serves to ensure the joint enforcement of claims?

The long and the short of the case is whether the concept of ‘consumer’ under the protected categories of Brussels I (and Recast) is a dynamic or a static one; and what kind of impact assignment has on jurisdiction for protected categories.

On the first issue, I expected my students to point to the CJEU’s precedent of applying the Regulation with a view to predictability and legal certainty; specifically for consumers, to Gruber and the burden of proof in cases of dual use; and to the Court’s judgment in Emrek. Other than the last issue, the AG points to all. Predictability points to a static approach: I would suggest the AG is right. Bobek AG does leave the door ajar for a dynamic interpretation: at 39: in exptional cases, a ‘dynamic’ approach to consumer status should not be entirely excluded. This could be potentially relevant in the event that a contract does not specify its aim, or it is open to different uses, and it lasts a long period of time, or is even indeterminate. It is conceivable that in such cases, the purpose for which a certain contractual service is used might change — not just partially, but even completely. Social media contracts may lead to such circumstances, one imagines, however there would be many ifs and buts to such analysis: including, I would suggest, the terms of the contract wich the service provider initially drew up.

On the issue of assignment the AG’s approach is entirely logical and not surprising: evidently Herr Schrems cannot have claims assigned to him and then exercise those claims using any other jurisdictional prerogatives then present in the original claim. While these may allow him to sue in the forum actoris of the original consumer, there is no valid argument whatsoever to suggest he could join them to his own domicile. The arguments made de lege ferenda (need for forum shopping in collective consumer redress) are justifiably rejected.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2.

Thank you Stefanie Roosen for flagging the issue in what after a bit of searching I take it to be Delta Lloyd v Witsen. At issue is not immediately a conflict of laws concern however the case does highlight a discussion often occurring with respect to choice of court and choice of law: when do mere references to general terms and conditions (GTCS) become binding upon parties, all the more so when these refer to industry standards. Here: HISWA standards, the ‘Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Handel en Industrie op het Gebied van Scheepsbouw en Watersport’ est.1932.  The Netherlands are a seafaring nation: HISWA is big.

During repairs to the yacht Kontiki, the rear cable of the shipyard’s portal crane broke, the Kontiki fell and she suffered severe damage. The shipyard had in the course of negotiation, agreement and confirmation referred to no less than three different HISWA sets. The Rechtbank Noord-Holland held that as a result, none was validly incorporated into the contract (neither incidentally was a mere sign quayside, limiting liability).

As I have reported on this blog before (e.g. here), there is no magic wand when it comes to GTCS: all that is required is due diligence. Neat filing and dito reference. Electronically or otherwise: it is elementary for all things legal.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9.3.1.

Worldwide freezing injunctions are one of the civil procedure reasons for forum shopping to the English courts. [2017] EWHC 2747 (Ch) Campbell v Campbell is an excellent illustration  of the current state of the law, with Sarah Worthington QC expertly summarising and applying precedent. The application is for a freezing injunction over assets located outside England and Wales, partly in aid of domestic proceedings (partnership dissolution proceedings) and partly in aid of foreign proceedings (proceedings in Jersey re claims for 50% interest in shareholdings).

One for the comparative binder.

Geert.