Conflictoflaws

Written by Kamakshi Puri[1]

Arbitrability is a manifestation of public policy of a state. Each state under its national laws is empowered to restrict or limit the matters that can be referred to and resolved by arbitration. There is no international consensus on the matters that are arbitrable. Arbitrability is therefore one of the issues where contractual and jurisdictional natures of international commercial arbitration meet head on.

When contracting parties choose arbitration as their dispute resolution mechanism, they freely choose several different laws that would apply in case of disputes arising under the contract. This includes (i) the law that is applicable to the merits of the dispute, (ii) the institutional rules that govern the conduct of the arbitration, (iii) law that governs the arbitration agreement, including its interpretation, generally referred to as the ‘proper law of the arbitration agreement’. Similarly, contracting parties are free to choose the court that would exercise supervisory jurisdiction over such arbitration, such forum being the ‘seat’ of arbitration.

Since there is no global consensus on the matters that are arbitrable, and laws of multiple states simultaneously apply to an arbitration, in recent years, interesting questions surrounding arbitrability have presented themselves before courts adjudicating cross-border disputes. One such issue came up before the Singapore High Court in the Westbridge Ventures II v Anupam Mittal, succinctly articulated by the General Court as follows:

 

“which system of law governs the issue of determining subject matter arbitrability at the pre-award stage? Is it the law of the seat or the proper law of the arbitration agreement?”

 

In this piece, I will analyze the varied views taken by the General Court at Singapore (“SGHC”), Singapore Court of Appeal (“SGCA”) and the Bombay High Court (“BHC”) on the issue of the law(s) that would govern the arbitrability of the disputes in international commercial disputes.

The Westbridge Ventures-Anupam Mittal dispute began in 2021 when Mittal approached the National Company Law Tribunal in Mumbai (“NCLT Mumbai”) alleging acts of minority oppression and mismanagement of the company, People Interactive (India) Private Limited, by the majority shareholder, Westbridge Ventures. In response to the NCLT proceedings, Westbridge Ventures approached the Singapore High Court for grant of permanent anti-suit injunction against Mittal, relying on the arbitration agreement forming part of the Shareholders’ Agreement between the suit parties. Since 2021, the parties have successfully proceeded against one another before various courts in Singapore and India for grant of extraordinary remedies available to international commercial litigants viz anti-suit injunctions, anti-enforcement injunctions and anti-arbitration injunctions.

 

Singapore General Court Decision on Pre-award Arbitrability

 

Oppression and mismanagement claims are arbitrable under Singapore law but expressly beyond the scope of arbitration under Indian law. To determine whether proceedings before the NCLT were in teeth of the arbitration agreement, the court had to determine if the disputes raised in the NCLT proceedings were arbitrable under the applicable law. Thus, the question arose as to the law which the court ought to apply to determine arbitrability.

At the outset, the SGHC noted that the issue of arbitrability was relevant at both initial and terminal stages. While at the initial stage, non-arbitrable subject matter rendered arbitration agreements inoperative or incapable of being performed, at the terminal stage, non-arbitrability rendered the award liable to be set aside or refused enforcement. Since at the post-award stage, arbitrability would be determined by the enforcing court applying their own public policy, the lacuna in the law was limited to the issue of subject matter arbitrability at the pre-award stage.

Upon detailed consideration, the SGHC concluded that it was the law of the seat that would determine the issue of subject matter arbitrability at the pre-award. The court reasoned its decision broadly on the following grounds:

• Contracts are a manifestation of the party autonomy principle. States being asked to give effect to a contract ought to respect party autonomy but for very limited grounds, such as public policy considerations. Power of the seat court to limit the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, and consequently affect party autonomy, ought to be limited to necessary constraints posed by such seat State’s public policy;
• Since seat courts their own law at the post-award stage (in setting-aside and enforcement proceedings), it would be a legal anomaly for the same court to rely on different systems of law to determine subject-matter arbitrability at pre and post-award stages. This could also result in a situation where a subject matter, being arbitrable under the law of the arbitration agreement despite being non-arbitrable under the law of the seat, is first referred to arbitration however later the resulting award is set aside;
• Courts should, as a general position, apply their own law unless specifically directed by law to another legal system. Public interest and state policy favoured the promotion of International Commercial Arbitration. It was neither necessary nor desirable for a court to give effect to a foreign non-arbitrability rule to limit an otherwise valid arbitration agreement. Arbitrability was therefore a matter to be governed by national courts by applying domestic law.

Interestingly, despite noting that arbitrability was an issue of jurisdiction and that non-arbitrability made an agreement incapable of being performed, the SGHC distinguished the scenarios where a party’s challenge was based on arbitrability and where parties challenged the formation, existence, and validity of an agreement. The court held that for the former, the law of seat would apply, however, for the latter, the proper law of arbitration agreement could apply.

Accordingly, the SGHC held that oppression and mismanagement disputes were arbitrable under the law of the seat, i.e., in Singapore law, the arbitral tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction to try the disputes raised by the parties. An anti-suit injunction was granted against the NCLT proceedings relying on the arbitration agreement between the parties.

 

Appeal before the Singapore Court of Appeal  

 

Mittal appealed the SGHC judgment before the Singapore Court of Appeal. The first question of law before the SGCA was whether the SGHC was correct in their holding that to determine subject matter arbitrability, lex fori (i.e., the law of the court hearing the matter) would apply over the proper law of the arbitration agreement. Considering the significance of the issue, Professor Darius Chan was appointed as amicus curie to assist the court.

Professor Chan retained the view that lex fori ought to be the law applicable to the question of arbitrability. This was for reasons of predictability and certainty, which weighed on the minds of the drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Although the Model Law was silent on the question of pre-award arbitrability since it was clear on the law to be applied post-award, a harmonious reading of the law was preferable. The courts ought to generally apply lex fori at both, pre and post-award stages.

The SGCA disagreed. It held that the essence of the principle of arbitrability was public policy. In discussing issues of predictability, certainty, and congruence between law to be applied at pre and post-arbitral stages, the parties had lost sight of the core issue of public policy in considering the question of arbitrability. Public policy of which state? – it unequivocally held that it was public policy derived from the law governing the arbitration agreement. Where a dispute could not proceed to arbitration under the foreign law that governed the arbitration agreement for being contrary to the foreign public policy, the seat court ought to give effect to such non-arbitrability.

The SGCA relied on the same concepts as the General Court albeit to come to the opposite conclusion:

• Arbitration agreements are the manifestation of party consensus. When parties expressly adopt a system of law to govern their arbitration agreement, public policy enshrined under such law ought to be given effect. Further, if arbitrability is a question of jurisdiction, then it necessarily follows that the law of the agreement from which jurisdiction of the tribunal is derived be considered first.
• As regards the potential anomaly with the seat court applying different laws pre and post-award, SGCA held that non-arbitrability under the law of the seat would be an additional obstacle to the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. This could, however, not go to say that the law of the seat would be the only law to govern arbitrability. Accordingly, the SGCA upheld a composite approach:

“55. Accordingly, it is our view that the arbitrability of a dispute is, in the first instance, determined by the law that governs the arbitration agreement. … where a dispute may be arbitrable under the law of the arbitration agreement but Singapore law as the law of the seat considers that dispute to be non-arbitrable, the arbitration would not be able to proceed. In both cases, it would be contrary to public policy to permit such an arbitration to take place. Prof Chan refers to this as the “composite” approach.”

• On the state policy to encourage International Commercial Arbitration, the court noted that principles of comity, requiring the court to respect public policy under foreign undoubtedly outweighed the policy to encourage arbitration. This was despite Prof. Chan’s concerns that expanding the grounds for refusal of reference of arbitration was “unnecessarily restrictive and not in line with the general tendency to favor arbitration”.

 

On facts, however, the court noted that the law of the arbitration agreement was in fact Singapore law itself, and Indian law was but the law of the substantive contract. Accordingly, arbitrability had to be determined under Singapore law and the appeal was dismissed.

 

Anti-Enforcement Injunction by the Bombay High Court

 

Mittal approached the Bombay High Court seeking an anti-enforcement injunction against the SGHC decision, and for a declaration that NCLT Mumbai was the only forum competent to hear oppression and mismanagement claims raised by him.

The BHC did not directly consider the issue of the law governing arbitrability, however, the indirect effect of the anti-enforcement injunction was the court determining the same. The BHC’s decision reasoned as follows – the NCLT had the exclusive jurisdiction to try oppression and mismanagement disputes in India, such disputes were thus non-arbitrable under Indian law. The enforcement of any ensuing arbitral award would be subject to the Indian Arbitration Act. An award on oppression and mismanagement disputes would be contrary to the public policy of India. Enforcement of an arbitral award in India on such issues would be an impossibility – “What good was an award that could never be enforced?”. The court noted that allowing arbitration in a case where the resulting award would be a nullity would leave the plaintiff remediless, and deny him access to justice. An anti-enforcement injunction was granted.

The BHC’s decision can be read in two ways. The decision has either added subject matter arbitrability under a third law for determining jurisdiction of the tribunal, i.e., the law of the court where the award would inevitably have to be enforced or the decision is an isolated, fact-specific order, not so much a comment on the law governing subject matter arbitrability but based on specific wording of the arbitration clause which required the arbitral award to be enforceable in India, although clearly the intent for the clause was to ensure that neither parties resist enforcement of the award in India and not to import India law at the pre-award stage.

 

Concluding Thoughts

 

The SGHC is guided by principles of party autonomy and Singapore policy to encourage International Commercial Arbitration, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal was driven by comity considerations and the role of courts applying foreign law to be bound by foreign public policy. Finally, the Indian court was occupied with ensuring “access to justice” to the litigant before it, which according to the court overrode both party autonomy and comity considerations. Whether we consider the BHC decision in its broader or limited form, the grounds for refusing reference to arbitration stand invariably widened. Courts prioritizing different concerns as the most significant could potentially open doors for forum shopping.

 

 

[1] Kamakshi Puri is an LLM graduate from the University of Cambridge. She is currently an Associate in the Dispute Resolution Practice at Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas. Views and opinions expressed in the text are the author’s and not attributable to any organization.

The Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) has issued a call for papers, in particular for private international law perspectives of public interest litigation.

 

Public interest litigation

Globally, we are witnessing an increase in what is called ‘public interest litigation’. In particular, climate change lawsuits taking place in several countries (e.g. in the Netherlands the Urgenda and Shell cases) are generating global attention. Another example of this type of litigation concerns the protection of privacy (e.g. the lawsuits against Facebook and TikTok). Although there is not yet a well-defined definition of the phenomenon, it is generally accepted that public interest litigation is understood to mean legal action that is taken on a human rights or equality issue of broad public concern.

 Call for papers

The Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) invites researchers to submit abstracts for an upcoming Special Issue devoted to Public Interest Litigation. We are interested in papers focusing on questions of private international law and/or public international law with regard to this phenomenon in a broad sense. We particularly encourage contributions that address private international law questions.

Abstracts should be no longer than 500 words and should be submitted by January 2nd 2024 to nilr@asser.nl. Submissions are limited. The selection criteria will be based on the quality of the research and its originality. We also strive to ensure a diversity of represented legal systems and topics. If an abstract is accepted, this will be communicated by February 1st 2024. After acceptance, draft papers are to be submitted at the latest by May 1st 2024. The draft papers will be assessed by the editorial board of the NILR according to standard criteria. This assessment will be communicated to the author shortly afterwards.

NILR

The Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) is one of the world’s leading journals in the fields of public and private international law. It is published three times a year, and features peer-reviewed, innovative, and challenging articles, case notes, commentaries, book reviews and overviews of the latest legal developments in The Hague. The NILR was established in 1953 and has since become a valuable source of information for scholars, practitioners and anyone who wants to remain up to date concerning the most important developments in these fields.

The third issue of 2023 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:

Pietro Franzina, Professor at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Un nuovo diritto internazionale privato della protezione degli adulti: le proposte della Commissione europea e gli sviluppi attesi in Italia (A New Private International Law on the Protection of Adults: The European Commission’s Proposals and the Developments Anticipated in Italy; in Italian)

The European Commission has presented on 31 May 2023 two proposals aimed to enhance, in cross-border situations, the protection of adults who are not in a position to protect their interests due to an impairment or the insufficiency of their personal faculties. One proposal is for a Council decision that would authorise the Member States to ratify, in the interest of the Union, the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the international protection of adults, if they have not done so yet. The decision, if adopted, would turn the Convention into the basic private international law regime in this area, common to all Member States. The other proposal is for a regulation the purpose of which is to improve, in the relationships between the Member States, the cooperation ensured by the Convention. The paper illustrates the objects of the two proposals and the steps that led to their presentation. The key provisions of the Hague Convention are examined, as well as the solutions envisaged in the proposed regulation to improve the functioning of the Convention. The paper also deals with the bill, drafted by the Italian Government and submitted to the Italian Parliament a few days before the Commission’s proposals were presented, to prepare for the ratification of the Convention by Italy and provide for its implementation in the domestic legal order. The bill, it is argued, requires extensive reconsideration as far as the domestic implementation of the Convention is concerned. Alternative proposals are discussed in the paper in this regard.

This issue also comprises the following comment:

Riccardo Rossi, Juris Doctor, Reflections on Choice-of-Court Agreements in Favour of Third States under Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012

This article tackles the absence of a provision addressing choice-of-court agreements in favour of third States under Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (“Brussels Ia Regulation”). The CJEU case law and the present structure of the Regulation leave no room for the long-debated argument of effet réflexe. In light of Arts 33 and 34 (and Recital No 24), enforcing such agreements is now limited to the strict respect of the priority rule in the trans-European dimension. The first part of the article deals with the consequences of such a scheme. Namely, forum running, possible interferences with the free circulation of judgments within the EU pursuant to Art 45(1)(d), and inconsistencies with the 2019 Hague Convention. In its second part, from a de lege ferenda perspective, the article examines the most delicate issues raised by the need for introducing a new provision enforcing jurisdiction agreements in favour of third States: from the jurisdiction over the validity of such agreements, to the applicable law, to the weight to be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum. Finally, it proposes a draft of two new provisions to be implemented in the currently discussed review of the Brussels Ia Regulation.

In addition to the foregoing, this issue includes a chronicle by Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan, Il regolamento (UE) 2023/1114 relativo ai mercati delle cripto-attività: prime note nella prospettiva del diritto internazionale privato (Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Market in Crypto-Assets: First Remarks from a Private International Law Perspective; in Italian).

Finally, the following book review by Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan, is featured: Gabriele CARAPEZZA FIGLIA, Ljubinka KOVA?EVI?, Eleonor KRISTOFFERSSON (eds), Gender Perspectives in Private Law, Springer Nature, Chan, 2023, pp. XV-242.

The latest issue of RabelsZ has just been released. It contans the following articles:

Horatia Muir Watt: Alterity in the Conflict of Laws. An Ontology of the In-Between
[18th Ernst Rabel Lecture, 2022] [OPEN ACCESS], 433–464, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2023-0063

The conflict of laws can serve heuristically to underscore two established but radically opposing models of modernist legal ordering: multilateralism and statutism. Such a prism is helpful if we want to rethink (as we must!) our late-modern legality’s deep epistemological settings in the shadow of the »catastrophic times« to come, whether in terms of environmental devastation or political dislocation. Both phenomena are profoundly linked and indeed constitute two faces of alterity, natural and cultural, from which modernity has progressively taught us to distance ourselves. Importantly, law encodes the conditions that produce these dual somatic symptoms in our contemporary societies. This chasm between nature and culture has produced humanity’s »ontological privilege« over our natural surroundings and a similar claim of superiority of modern (Western) worldviews over »the rest«. In this respect, the main achievement of the moderns, as Bruno Latour wryly observed, has been to universalise the collective blindness and amnesia that allow our »anthropocentric machine« to hurtle on, devastating life in its path and devouring the very resources it needs to survive.

Anton S. Zimmermann: Kriegskollisionsrecht. Ein Beitrag zum international-privatrechtlichen Umgang mit Gebietseroberungen (War and the Conflict of Laws – Private International Law’s Treatment of Territorial Conquest), 665–496, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2023-0058

 The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a breach of a fundamental consensus in public international law: states have authority over their territory. One element of territorial sovereignty is the right to legislate in the field of private law. If a territory is conquered, this right is – in breach of public international law – usurped by the conquering state. This article examines how private international law deals with such changes in factual power. It demonstrates that private international law is more flexible than is commonly assumed and that it can provide a differentiated and adequate reaction to occupations and annexations.

Wenliang Zhang, Guangjian Tu: Recent Efforts in China’s Ambition to Become a Centre for International Commercial Litigation, 497–531, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2023-0064

The last decade or so has witnessed intensifying efforts by China to reshape its legal framework for international commercial litigation. These efforts echo its advancement of the »One Belt and One Road Initiative« and a policy of strengthening the foreign-related rule of law. But the measures so far have been piecemeal and were adopted mainly by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). Leading lower Chinese courts, the SPC has zealously advanced the reform of international commercial litigation by devices such as international commercial courts (ICCs), anti-suit injunctions, forum non conveniens and de jure reciprocity favouring recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Such efforts may help modernize China’s mechanism for international commercial litigation, and more are expected. Although what the SPC has been doing moves closer to the global mainstream and is on the right track, deep reforms are still needed before the Chinese international commercial litigation regime can »go global«.

Mathias Habersack, Peter Zickgraf: Sorgfaltspflichten und Haftung in der Lieferkette als Regelungsmodell: Rechtsentwicklung – Rechtsvergleichung – Rechtsökonomik – Rechtsdogmatik (Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and Supply Chain Liability as a Regulatory Model: Legal Developments – Comparative Assessment – Economic Analysis – Legal Theory), 532–607, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2023-0060

The proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive significantly exceeds the German Supply Chain Act (LkSG) not only in terms of its scope of application and the protected interests, but also regarding the enforcement mechanism in the event of a violation of a due diligence duty. While the LkSG has taken a stand against private enforcement in its § 3 para. 3 s. 1, Art. 22 of the proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive makes companies civilly liable for misconduct committed by their subsidiaries and business partners. The present article deals with the conceptual fundamentals of this regulatory model: From a comparative perspective, the proposed duties and accompanying civil liability mark a departure from the independent contractor rule which is deeply rooted in the tort laws of the German and Anglo-American legal families; the proposed regulatory model thus brings about a sector-specific paradigm shift in the law of non-contractual liability. From a law and economics perspective, however, the proposed regulatory model is justifiable given the special factors present in typical cases. The liability risks associated with the regulatory model appear to be manageable for companies if the pre-conditions of their potential civil liability are more clearly specified.

 

BOOK REVIEWS

As always, this issue also contains several reviews of literature in the fields of private international law, international civil procedure, transnational law, and comparative law (pp. 608–640).

Two books on international litigation and arbitration have recently been published that might be of interest to the CoL Community and PIL research.

The first book by Mihail Danov (University of Exeter) is the latest contribution to Hart’s renowned “Studies in Private International Law” series (Volume 37) and examines the challenging interaction of “Private International Law and Competition Litigation in a Global Context“. The blurb reads as follows:

This important book analyses the private international law issues regarding private antitrust damages claims which arise out of transnational competition law infringements. It identifies those problems that need to be considered by injured parties, defendants, judges and policy-makers when dealing with cross-border private antitrust damages claims in a global context. It considers the post Brexit landscape and the implications in cross border private proceedings before the English courts and suggests how the legal landscape should be developed. It also sets out how private international law techniques could play an increasingly important role in private antitrust enforcement.

For all interested conflict of laws.net readers, Hart Publishing is kindly offering a discount price of £76. If you order online at www.bloomsbury.com, just use the code GLR AQ7 to get 20% off!

In the second treatise, Mohamed F. Sweify (Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP) takes an in-depth look at the increasingly important issue of “Third Party Funding in International Arbitration“. Edward Elgar Publishing provides the following content description:

The author of Third Party Funding in International Arbitration challenges the structural inconsistencies of the current practices of arbitration funding by arguing that third party funding should be a forum of justice, rather than a forum of profit.

By looking at the premise, rather than the implication, the author presents the arcane areas of intersection between access to justice, as a foundational theory for third party funding, and the arbitration funding practice that lacks a unifying framework. The author introduces a new methodology with an alternative way of structuring third party funding to solve a set of practical problems generated by the risk of claim control by the funder.

This book will be of interest to third party funders, arbitrators, lawyers, arbitral institutions, academics, and law students.

The third issue of the Journal du Droit international-Clunet of 2023 was released in July. It contains three articles and many case notes.

The first article Regard québécois sur le projet de Code de droit international privé français (A view from Quebec on the project of a french private international law Code) is authored by Prof. Sylvette Guillemard (Université Laval). The abstract reads as follows:

A draft of a French private international law code project was presented to the Minister of Justice in March 2022. As soon as it was submitted, it was immediately commented on by various parties ; its qualities are admired as much as its shortcomings are pointed out. In 1994, the Quebec legislator adopted a book dedicated to private international law in its new Civil Code. After nearly 30 years, it was able to reveal its flaws and demonstrate its advantages. Therefore, neither too old nor too young, it appeared to us as an excellent object of comparison with the French project. At the end of the exercise, we may conclude that French law can only emerge as the winner of this “operation of shaping the rules [of private international law] into a whole”, to borrow the words of Rémy Cabrillac.

Dr Djoleen Moya (Université catholique de Lyon) is the author of the second article Vers une redéfinition de l’office du juge en matière de règles de conflit de lois ? (Towards a redefinition of the obligation for a judge to apply choice-of-law rules?). Dr Moya is continuing the reflection of her doctoral work L’autorité des règles de conflit de loi – Réflexion sur l’incidence des considérations substantielles, recently published. The abstract reads as follows:

The latest developments in matters of divorce, both in domestic law and in private international law, have largely renewed the question of the obligation for a judge to apply choice-of-law rules. Traditionally, the Cour de cassation considers that in matters of divorce, judges must apply, if necessary ex officio, the applicable conflict rule, because unwaivable rights are concerned. However, this solution is under discussion. First, the qualification of divorce as an unwaivable right is questionable, especially since the admission of a purely private divorce by mutual consent in French law. But above all, the Europeanisation of the applicable choice-of-law rules seems likely to call for a new definition the judges’ procedural obligations. If we add to this the recent reorientation of the Cour de cassation’s position and the solutions stated in the draft Code of Private of International Law, the question undoubtedly calls for a reassessment.

The third article is authored by Prof. Sara Tonolo (Università degli Studi di Padova) and deals with Les actes de naissance étrangers devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme – à propos de l’affaire Valdís Fjölnisdóttir et autres c/ Islande (Foreign birth certificates before the European Court of Human Rights – about the Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and others v/ Iceland case). The abstract reads as follows:

The European Court of Human Rights ruled on the recognition of the filiation status within surrogacy in the Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and others v. Iceland case. This perspective leaves many questions unanswered and prompts further reflection, particularly with regard to the role that private international law can play in the protection of human rights, in the context of the difficult balance between the protection of the right to private and family life and the margin of appreciation reserved to member states.

The full table of contents is available here.

 Written by Seung Chan Rhee and Alan Zheng

Suppose a company sells tickets for cruises to/from Australia. The passengers hail from Australia, and other countries. The contracts contain an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause nominating a non-Australian jurisdiction. The company is incorporated in Bermuda. Cruises are only temporarily in Australian territorial waters.

A cruise goes wrong. Passengers, Australian and non-Australian, want relief under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). They commence representative proceedings alleging breaches of consumer law, and negligence in the Federal Court of Australia. The Australian court must first resolve the conflict of laws problems posed – problems as sustained as they have been complex in the history of private international law.

These are the facts at the heart of the Ruby Princess cruise, and her 2,600 passengers. The story was reported widely. A COVID-19 outbreak prematurely terminated the cruise. Many passengers contracted COVID-19; some died. Unsurprisingly, the cruise then spawned an inquiry and a class action against Carnival plc (Carnival) as charterer and operator of the Ruby Princess, and Princess Cruise Lines Ltd, the Bermuda-registered subsidiary and vessel owner.

Statute has left little of the common law untouched. This short note analyses the interaction between a mandatory law and an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the context of the case. The note observes the tension between the selection of the statutist approach or conventional choice of law rules as an analytical starting point, in difficult consumer protection cases.

Background

The Ruby Princess’ passengers contracted on different sets of terms and conditions (US, UK and AU). The US and UK terms and conditions contained exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses favouring the US and English courts respectively (PJ, [26], [29]). US customers also waived their rights to litigate in representative proceedings against Carnival (the ‘class action waiver’) (PJ, [27]). In aid of these clauses, Carnival sought a stay of the proceedings vis-à-vis the UK and US passenger subgroups.

Whether a stay is granted under Australian law turns on whether the Australian court is ‘a clearly inappropriate forum’ (See Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay at 247–8) (Oceanic Sun Line). In Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (Renault v Zhang), the High Court (at [78]) described the test as requiring the applicant to show the Australian proceeding:

would be productive of injustice, because it would be oppressive in the sense of seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging, or vexatious …

In Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (Voth), a majority observed (at 566):

the extent to which the law of the forum is applicable in resolving the rights and liabilities of the parties is a material consideration … the selected forum should not be seen as an inappropriate forum if it is fairly arguable that the substantive law of the forum is applicable in the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties.

Through these cases the High Court elected not to follow the English approach (see Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd) which requires that another forum is clearly or distinctly more appropriate. The Australian test, after Voth poses a negative test and a more difficult bar.

First Instance

Stewart J found the Federal Court was not a clearly inappropriate forum and declined to stay the proceedings. A critical plank of this conclusion was the finding that the exclusive foreign jurisdiction and class action waiver clauses were not incorporated into the contracts (PJ, [74]). Even if the clauses were incorporated, Stewart J reasoned in obiter that the class action waiver was void as an unfair contract term under s 23 of the ACL (PJ, [145]) and the Federal Court was not a clearly inappropriate forum.

As noted in Voth and Oceanic Sun Line, simply because the contract selected the US or UK as the particular lex causae did not end the analysis (PJ, [207]) — the US and UK subgroups were not guaranteed to take the benefit of the ACL in the US and English courts, notwithstanding Carnival’s undertaking that it would not oppose the passengers’ application to rely on the ACL in overseas forums (PJ, [297], [363]). Ultimately, there remained a real juridical advantage for the passengers to pursue representative proceedings together in Australia.

Carnival appealed.

Full Court

The majority (Derrington J, Allsop CJ agreeing) allowed Carnival’s appeal, staying the US subgroup’s proceedings. Unlike the primary judge, the majority reasoned the clauses were incorporated into the US subgroup contracts. Further, a stay should be refused because the US and English courts had similar legislative analogues to the ACL (FCAFC, [383]-[387]). Although he US passengers would lose the benefit of the class action, that was a mere procedural advantage and the question of forum is informed by questions of substantive rights (FCAFC, [388]).

Rares J dissented, upholding the primary judge’s refusal of a stay (FCAFC, [96]).

The passengers appealed to the High Court.

The Interaction between a Mandatory Law and an Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause

Statutes generally fall into one of three categories (see Maria Hook, ‘The “Statutist Trap” and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction’ (2017) 13(2) Journal of Private International Law 435). The categories move in degrees of deference towards choice of law rules. First, a statute may impose a choice of law rule directing the application of the lex fori where a connecting factor is established. Second, a statute may contain, on its proper construction, a ‘self-limiting’ provision triggered if the applicable law is the lex fori. Third, a statute may override a specified lex causae as a mandatory law of the forum. An oft-repeated refrain is that all local Australian statutes are mandatory in nature ([2023] HCATrans 99).

In the High Court, Carnival contended that if contracting parties select a lex causae other than the forum law, the forum statute will not apply unless Parliament has expressly overridden the lex causae.

The passengers (supported by the Commonwealth Attorney-General and ACCC, as interveners) took a different starting point — the threshold question is whether the forum law, as a matter of interpretation, applies to the contract irrespective of the parties’ usage of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. In this case, several factors supported the ACL’s application including s 5(1)(g) of the CCA, and the need to preserve the ACL’s consumer protection purpose by preventing evasion through the insertion of choice of law clauses.

The parties adopted unsurprising positions. The passengers’ case was conventionally fortified by the statutist approach, prioritising interpretation in determining the forum statute’s scope of application. Carnival relied on the orthodox approach, prioritising choice of law rules in controlling when and to what extent forum statutes will apply, and more aligned with comity norms and party autonomy the selection of the governing law of private agreements. The orthodox approach was exemplified in Carnival’s submission that ‘[i]t was not the legislature’s purpose to appoint Australian courts as the global arbiter … of class actions concerning consumer contracts across the world’ (See Respondent’s Outline of Oral Argument, p. 3).

Against that view, it was said that party autonomy should be de-emphasised where contracts are not fully negotiated, involve unequal bargaining power and standard terms (contracts of ‘adhesion’ as here provide a good example): see [2023] HCATrans 99 and the exchange between Gordon J and J Gleeson SC.

As scholars have noted, differences between the two approaches can be almost imperceptible. Characterisation is a ‘species of interpretation’ (Michael Douglas, ‘Does Choice of Law Matter?’ (2021) 28 Australian International Law Journal 1). However, the approach taken can lead to different outcomes in hard cases.

The key obstacle to the statutist approach is uncertainty. If interpretation of a statute’s extraterritorial scope controls the choice of law, then how do contracting parties ensure their selection of law prevails and that they are complying?

Interpretation (both in the choice of law sense and statutory interpretation) invites reasonable arguments that cut in both directions requiring judicial adjudication. Take, for example, Carnival’s response to the passengers’ argument that the ACL’s consumer protection policy weighs against the use of choice of law clauses to evade liability. Carnival contended any evasion can be controlled by a two-step approach: firstly, applying the ACL’s unfair contract provisions to the choice of law clause itself and, if it the clause is void, only then secondly applying the provisions to the contract as a whole. However, this only shifts the application of statutory interpretation to an anterior stage, namely how and when a given choice of law clause, on its face, might be considered unfair. To the extent any determination of unfairness could be made, this turns on the consequences of the clause per se than any particular manner of wording. Such an outcome equally produces unpredictability as to the anticipated effect and application of the forum law.

There is another example on point. Section 5(1)(g) extends the ACL to the ‘engaging in conduct outside Australia’ by bodies corporate carrying on business in Australia. Carnival’s expressio unius-style argument that s 5(1)(g) does not support the passengers’ case because the unfair contracts prohibition is not predicated on ‘engaging in’ any conduct, whereas ACL prohibitions apply to ‘conduct’. Accordingly, taking up a point made by the Full Court majority (FCAFC, [301]), Carnival contended a limitation should be read into s 5(1)(g) else it capriciously apply to companies like Carnival whose business were entirely engaged outside of Australia’s territorial limits.

Nevertheless, as the appellants pointed out (relying on drafting history), ‘when the unfair contract terms legislation was first introduced … s 5(1) was specifically amended to apply to those provisions’ (See Appellant’s Written Submissions, p. 6).  It is therefore apparent how the statutist approach invites a certain level of textual skirmishing.

Choices are available to judges under both the statutist approach and in the application of choice of law rules (see Michael Douglas, ‘Choice of Law in the Age of Statutes’ in Michael Douglas, Vivienne Bath, Mary Keyes and Andrew Dickinson, Commercial Issues in Private International Law: A Common Law Perspective (Hart Publishing, 2019) ch 9). However, it does not follow that there are comparable levels of certainty in the two approaches. Characterisation of a case as contract or tort (to take a very general example) invites a narrower range of choices than the entire arsenal of statutory interpretation techniques deployable analysing words in a statutory provision. That is so because characterisation is controlled by matters external to submissions, namely pleadings and the facts as objectively found (e.g. where was the defective product manufactured, or where was the injury sustained). Interpretation, particularly through the modern focus on text, context and purpose, is not disciplined by facts or pleadings. Instead, it is shaped by submissions and argumentation actuated by the connotative ambiguity found in statute.

That has led the High Court to observe that choice of law rules uphold certainty. In Renault v Zhang, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated ([66]-[67]):

The selection of the lex loci delicti as the source of substantive law meets one of the objectives of any choice of law rule, the promotion of certainty in the law.  Uncertainty as to the choice of the lex causae engenders doubt as to liability and impedes settlement.

Against the aim of certainty (and deference to choice of law clauses) are the countervailing considerations arising from legislative policy and the higher-order status of statute over choice of law rules sourced from the common law (see Douglas, ‘Choice of law in the Age of Statutes’). The interveners put it as an ‘unattractive prospect’ if the ‘beneficial’ aspects of the ACL regime could be defeated by expedient foreign jurisdiction clauses.

Insofar as the legislature evinces an intent to confer the benefit of legislation beyond Australia’s territorial bounds, courts bound by an interpretive obligation to give effect to that legislative intention will not be able to defer to choice of law rules. In the case of the CCA and the ACL, s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) enjoins courts to prefer the interpretation ‘that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act)’. Douglas and Loadsman (see ‘The Impact of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts’ (2018) 19(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 1) observe that:

It is consistent with this purposive approach to statutory interpretation that Australian courts take a broad approach to the geographical scope of Australian statutes. In an environment where Australian lives and businesses increasingly cross borders on a regular basis, it would defeat the purposes of many pieces of Australian legislation if courts were to take a territorially-limited approach to statutes’ scope of operation.

No doubt there is some truth to Carnival’s submission that Parliament did not intend to render Australian courts the global arbiters of consumer contracts. However, subject to a pronouncement to the contrary from the High Court, the judgments to date in Karpik v Carnival plc suggest a statutist analysis, however uncertain, difficult or comity-ablating, will be a necessary precondition to determining the weight given to the wording of a choice of law clause. This is ultimately a consequence of the premium placed on a purposive construction to mandatory laws arising out of the home forum. For better or worse (and a strong case has been made for worse – see Maria Hook, ‘The “Statutist Trap” and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction’ (2017) 13(2) Journal of Private International Law 435), ‘[i]f the purposive approach to statutory interpretation gives rise to forum shopping in favour of Australian courts, so be it’ (see Douglas and Loadsman, 20).

Notwithstanding this, another difficulty with Carnival’s submissions in favour of the choice of law approach is that it functionally revives the common law presumption of non-extraterritorial application of laws and elevates the rebuttability threshold of that presumption to something made ‘manifest’ by parliament (which has been keenly disputed in the High Court: see Respondent’s Submissions, [10]).

It is important to recall that the presumption was always couched in the language of construction. In Wanganui-Rangitiei Electric Power Board v Australian Mutual Provident Society, Dixon J stated (at 601):

The rule is one of construction only, and it may have little or no place where some other restriction is supplied by context or subject matter.

Rebuttability does not arise at all if the context or subject matter of the forum statute, as a matter of interpretation, supplies a relevant territorial connection. If it so supplies, that territorial connection operates as a restriction.

Dixon J also went on to state (at 601):

But, in the absence of any countervailing consideration, the principle is that general words should not be understood as extending to cases which, according to the rules of private international law administered in our courts, are governed by foreign law.

Most recently in BHP Group Ltd v Impiombato, Kiefel CJ and Gageler J (at [23]) considered the common law presumption resembled a ‘presumption in favour of international comity’ rather than one against extraterritorial operation – although it is worth noting that three other judges recognised (at [71]) the common law presumption was ultimately a statutory construction rule which did not always require reference to comity. Nevertheless, an important factor for Kiefel CJ and Gageler J in finding the class action provisions of Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) were not restricted to Australian residents by the presumption was the fact no principle of international law or comity would be infringed by a non-consenting and non-resident group member being bound by a judgment of the Federal Court in relation to a matter over which that court had jurisdiction.

Conversely, as Derrington J noted on appeal (FCAFC, [300]), the extension of s 23 to the transactions of companies operating in overseas markets as a result of their ancillary dealings in Australia would have been an ‘anomalous result’. Such a result would not have promoted comity between Australia and other national bodies politic, where the ACL would have had the result of potentially subjecting foreign companies to obligations additional to those imposed by the laws of their home country. As Carnival put it in the High Court:

if a company happens to carry on business in Australia, all of its contracts with consumers (as defined) all over the world are then subject to Part 2-3 of the ACL. It would mean, for example, that contractual terms between a foreign corporation and consumers in Romania under standard form contracts can be deemed void under s 23 (Respondent’s Submissions, [36]).

Without an expressed intention to the contrary, it was unlikely that Parliament had intended to ‘legislate beyond the bounds of international comity’ – into an area that would ordinarily be expected to be governed by foreign law.

To some extent, the judgments to date, despite their differing conclusions, suggest in common that an entirely non-statutist outcome (insofar as the CCA and ACL is concerned) is something of a will-o’-the-wisp. If it is accepted that matters of high forum public policy can supervene the contractual arrangements of the parties, expressed in no uncertain terms, then a court must always evaluate legislation in a statutist manner to determine how contractual arrangements interact with that policy. This is so even if, as in Derrington J’s view in Carnival plc v Karpik, the conclusion would be that the policy would not be advanced by applying the mandatory law.

The High Court’s decision will not only clarify the ambit of the CCA regime; it will materially bear upon the desirability of Australian courts as a forum for future transnational consumer law class actions. Coxtensively, companies with Australian operations liable to be on the respondent end of such class actions will be watching the developments closely before drafting further exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses.

Judgment is reserved in the High Court.

Seung Chan Rhee is a solicitor at Herbert Smith Freehills. Alan Zheng is an Australian-qualified lawyer at Linklaters LLP. The views in this note are the views of the authors alone. The usual disclaimers apply.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Written by Ugljesa Grusic, Associate Professor at University College London, Faculty of Laws

Dr Ugljesa Grusic and Prof Alex Mills are pleased to announce that, alongside the UCL Faculty of Laws Research Scholarships which are open to all research areas, this year we have an additional scholarship specifically for doctoral research in private international law. The scholarship covers the cost of tuition fees (home status fees) and provides a maintenance stipend per annum for full time study at the standard UKRI rate. The annual stipend for 2023/24 (as a guide) was £20,622. The recipient of the scholarship will be expected to contribute to teaching private international law in the Faculty for up to 6 hours per week on average, and this work is remunerated in addition to the stipend received for the scholarship.

We particularly welcome applications with research proposals in fields that fall within our areas of interest, which are broad and include the following sub-topics within private international law: protection of weaker parties; environmental protection; business and human rights; sustainable development; digital technology; party autonomy; the relationship between public and private international law; private international law theory and/or methodology; colonialism; and private international law issues in arbitration and foreign relations law.

More information about UCL Faculty of Laws, our PhD programme, the process of applying and the scholarship is available here, here and here. Applicants should apply through the normal UCL Faculty of Laws PhD application process. All applicants within the relevant subject areas will be considered, but we recommend that applicants also specify in their application that they wish to be considered for these scholarships. The deadline date for applications for the 2024/25 academic year is 16 November 2023.

Prospective students are welcome to get in touch with either Dr Grusic at u.grusic@ucl.ac.uk or Prof Mills at a.mills@ucl.ac.uk.

 

Recently, the Hague Academy of International Law published the 2024 programme of its renowned Summer Courses in Public International Law (8-26 July) and Private International Law (29 July – 16 August).

Following the Inauguaral Lecture by Lord Lawrence (former Justice of the UK Supreme Court), this year’s General Course in Private International Law will focus on “The Metamorphoses of Private International Law” and will be delivered by Charalambos Pamboukis (University of Athens).

Furthermore, Special Courses will be offered in English by Jack Coe (Pepperdine Law School), Andrew Dickinson (University of Oxford), Carlos Esplugues (University of Valencia) and Natalie Y. Morris-Sharma (Attorney General’s Chambers Singapore), while Eva Lein (University of Lausanne) and Alessandra Zanobetti (University of Bologna) will deliver their presentations in French. As always, all lectures will be simultaneously interpreted into English or French and vice versa.

Advanced Students, especially those who are ambitious to sit for the prestigious Diploma Exam, are highly encouraged to apply for the Academy’s Directed Studies as well. The French edition of these interactive afternoon seminars will be directed by Fabien Marchadier (University of Potiers), while English-speaking candidates are taught by Jacco Bomhoff (London School of Economics).

Registration is open from 1 November 2023 to 31 January 2024 via the institution’s own Online Registration Form . For further information on the HAIL 2024 Summer Courses and the Academy in general, please consult the HAIL Homepage or refer to the attached PDF Programme.

The Asian Private International Law Academy (APILA) will be holding its second conference at Doshisha University, Kyoto, on 9 and 10 December 2023. The keynote addresses will be delivered by Professor Emerita Linda Silberman on 9 December and Professor Gerald Goldstein on 10 December. The first day of the conference will comprise presentation and discussion of works-in-progress. The conference will devote most of 10 December to discussion and finalisation of the Asian Principles on Private International Law (APPIL) on three topics: (1) recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, (2) direct jurisdiction, and (3) general choice of law rules. Persons interested in attending or wishing further information should email reyes.anselmo@gmail.com to that effect.  Please note that, while APILA can assist attendees by issuing letters of invitations in support of Japanese visa applications, APILA’s available funding is limited.  In the normal course of events, APILA regrets that it will not be able to provide funding for travel and accommodation expenses.

The Japanese Institute for International Arbitration Research and Training (JIIART) will be holding an online seminar investigating use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in insolvency this Saturday 21 October 2023 at 14:00-16:00 Japan Standard Time. The event is free to attend but registration is required. You may register here. Details of the programme and speakers can be found in the event poster.

US Supreme Court Fellowship applications open Fellows conduct independent research and work with one of four offices – the Office of the Counselor to the Chief Justice, the Administrative Office, the Sentencing Commission, and the Federal Judicial Center (the education and research arm of the US federal judiciary).

Applications are due 17 November 2023.  More information is found below. https://www.supremecourt.gov/fellows/apply.aspx

ACICA Announces First Scholarship Program from Education Fund Established following ICCA Congress

The Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA) has just announced a new scholarship program supported by the Education Fund Established following the ICCA Congress in Sydney in 2018.  The program includes two biennial scholarships to legal practitioners who are admitted in South Pacific Island jurisdictions. Applications will open in 2024, and recipients will be: “- awarded the opportunity to attend AAW including the ACICA & Ciarb Australia International Arbitration Conference, the lead event of AAW; – supported by the ACICA Secretariat to obtain an understanding of ACICA’s work; – offered the opportunity to be a part of an ADR practitioner network that ACICA seeks to encourage in the South Pacific; and – offered the opportunity to learn more about and participate in ICCA activities directed at aspiring arbitration practitioners, such as the Young ICCA mentoring program, the ICCA Inclusion Fund and the Johnny Veeder Fellowship Program. provided with information or inclusion in relevant ICCA programs.” For more, see  https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/_yjWCBNqjlCDXpGQoFkYzxS?domain=acica.org.au or https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/2MiXCANpgjCZKLQyYupsjoq?domain=acica.org.au

 

On Tuesday, November 7, 2023, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its 38th monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00-12:30 (CET). Christine Budzikiewicz (Phillips-Universität Marburg) will speak, in German, about

The Proposal for the Creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

Fresh from the print comes the book titled Cross-Border Trade Secret Disputes in the European Union: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law authored by Lydia Lundstedt, Senior Lecturer in Private International Law at the Stockholm University and Senior Lecturer in Intellectual Property Law at the Linköping University.

The book is offering an EU perspective on one of the important ways the companies are protecting their intellectual property and information in general. This book examines different approaches to trade secret protection in the EU Member States, and focuses on the jurisdiction and applicable law under Brussels I bis, Rome I and Rome II.

The book is available here, and code LUND35 will secure a 35% discount on the book price.

The second issue of the Revue critique de droit International privé of 2023 was released in August. It contains four articles and several case notes.

The first part of the issue features the doctrinal work of two young authors, who confront PIL techniques with contemporary developments in social sciences.

The first article Pour une approche décoloniale du droit international privé (A Decolonial Approach to Private International Law) is authored by Dr Sandrine Brachotte (Université Saint-Louis & Université de Lille). Following her doctoral work on The Conflict of Laws and Non-secular Worldviews: A Proposal for Inclusion (see presentation over at EAPIL), Dr Brachotte discusses colonial studies’ implications for PIL scholarship. She examines how plural normativities challenge the traditional conception of conflict of laws and then outlines the potential form of a decolonial PIL. An English translation of the article is available on the website of the editor. Its abstract reads as follows:

This article presents the decolonial approach to private international law, which has recently entered the list of pressing topics for the discipline, not only in colonised countries but also in Europe. In France, the subject may not yet be addressed as such, but it at least appeared in a Ph. D. thesis defended at the Sciences Po Paris Law School in May 2022, entitled “The Conflict of Laws and Non-secular Worldviews: A Proposal for Inclusion”. This thesis argues for an alternative theorisation of the notions of party autonomy, recognition, and international jurisdiction to make them more inclusive of non-occidental worldviews. After having offered a description of the decolonial approach and the current enterprise of decolonisation of private international law, this contribution summarises the essential points of the Ph. D. thesis in this respect and identifies the broader questions that it raises for private international law, especially as regards the notions of “law”, “foreign” and “conflict”.

Dr Élie Lenglart (Université Paris II Panthéon Assas) signed the second article on Les conflits de juridictions à l’épreuve de l’individualisme (Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Individualism). Dr Lenglart prolongs the reflection of his doctoral work on La théorie générale des conflits de lois à l’épreuve de l’individualisme (The General Theory of Conflicts of Laws Confronted with Individualism) in the field of conflicts of jurisdiction. He shows how the rules on jurisdiction and circulation of foreign judgments have been progressively liberalized, the satisfaction of individual interest becoming the gravity centre of PIL. The abstract reads as follows :

Individualism is one the characteristic features of modern legal theories. The emergence of the individualistic approach is profoundly linked to a special perception and evaluation of the reality based of the superiority of the individual. This conception has had decisive consequences in private international law. The impact of this tendency should not be underestimated. Its influence is noticeable in the first place on the determination of international competency of French jurisdictions, both via the provision of available courts to individuals and via the individuals’ propensity to extend their choices of jurisdictions based on their personal interests. It also influences the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments by imposing the legal recognition of individual statuses under extremely liberal conditions, reorganizing in turn the whole system around the individual.

In the third article, Prof. David Sindres (Université d’Angers) shares some Nouvelles réflexions sur les clauses attributives de compétence optionnelles (New Reflections on Optional Jurisdiction Clauses). He successively discusses the principles and conditions of liceity of both the jurisdiction clauses of optional application and the clauses that establish an option between designated jurisdictions under Brussel 1 recast (from a French law perspective).

The fourth article is dedicated to a selective account of French and European developments in immigration law. Prof. Thibaut Fleury Graff (Université Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines) and Inès Giauffret (Ph. D. candidate at Université Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines) discuss recent case law on the “age border” (cases about the appreciation of minority and the rights of detained minors) and the “state border” (cases about measures of placement in waiting zones, detention, and expulsion in French law) in a tensed international context.

The full table of contents is available here.

Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2022) are available on Cairn.

This national conference will be held on 21 February 2024 at The University of Sydney Law School in Australia.

Business compliance in international transactions across the Asia-Pacific region holds immense importance for organizations seeking to expand their activities within this dynamic and evolving landscape. Multinational corporations operating in Asia Pacific often confront unique compliance challenges due to the swiftly changing regulatory and geopolitical environment in the region.

We welcome scholars, irrespective of their career stage, to submit paper or panel proposals for presentation at the conference. The event will take place at the Camperdown campus of the University of Sydney Law School in Sydney, Australia, on February 21, 2024 in a hybrid format (in-person or online presentation). The conference is specifically designed to provide researchers with the opportunity to present their work-in-progress papers to fellow scholars. The primary language of the conference will be English.

We are enthusiastic about receiving proposals that delve into various aspects of business compliance in international business transactions, especially:

• Key Compliance Risk Areas:
  • Criminal Law Compliance: corporate crime, anti-corruption law, fraud and cyber fraud, anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing, etc.
  • Data Protection and Digital Trade Compliance: cross-border privacy protections, data security laws, crypto asset regulatory frameworks, governance of AI and digital trade, etc.
  • Dispute Resolution related Compliance: complex private international law issues associated with jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgement recognition and enforcement, arbitration and mediation, sanctions, foreign state sovereign immunity, etc.
  • Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Disclosure and Traceability Compliance: climate change disclosure regulations, modern slavery laws, regulations for sustainability of international supply chains in circular economy, etc.
• Compliance Expectations in these Risk Areas
• Recommended Best Practices

Other legal issues related to Business Compliance in International Commercial Transactions in Asia Pacific are also welcome.

Requirements for Abstract Submission:

For paper proposals, please submit a title and max 200-word abstract, along with a one-page CV. For panel proposals, please submit a title and max 800-word abstract, along with a three-page CV covering 3-4 panel members.

Proposal Due: 17 November 2023.
Announcement of successful submission: 4 December 2023.
Conference Date: 21 February 2024

More information can be found here.

Originally posted today on the NGPIL website.

On the 23rd November 2023, 5pm (WAT/Lagos/Abuja) the NGPIL will host our guest speaker Professor Wale Olawoyin SAN, FCIArb at this year’s conference. The event will explore the coming into force of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2023 and how, from a private international law perspective, the arbitration appeal process in Nigeria can be enhanced. Discussions will build on practice thus far, and will allow practitioners, judges and academics alike to develop knowledge and insight into its utility.

To register: https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_q5pY1JWARiaUxi1TIw8xBQ

These two volumes celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Japan Association of International Economic Law (JAIEL), which was founded in 1991. The Volumes include 30 contributions written by eminent Japanese scholars from different background, in particular, private international law, public international law, international economic law, competition law, intellectual property law etc.

 

                 

 

The blurb of the book reads as follows:

 

These two groundbreaking volumes look at complex legal issues in the changing global economy from the perspective of Asia and/or Japan. Contributors scrutinize the past, present, and future and discuss what the global legal order in economic fields could be like by navigating uncertain and turbulent times.

 

The books address six main themes: (1) Polarization and diversification of values, progress of regionalism and restructuring of multilateral rules, (2) Full-scale arrival of the digital economy and its impact, (3) Empowerment of private persons/entities, (4) Reconsideration of the concept of “territorial jurisdiction”, (5) Law of national security and rule in emergency situations, and (6) Values of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in trade and investment liberalization rules. The books also examine various legal problems under the COVID-19 crisis and suggest how the post-COVID-19 global economic order will be from the perspective of Asia and/or Japan.

 

This comprehensive insight will shed light on the intertwined and complex phenomena of world economy and allow readers of business law and international law to have a better understanding of this volatile era.

 

The two volumes are particularly interesting as they make accessible to the global community of scholars and practitioners the remarkable Japanese scholarship of international economic law. In his Preface, Prof. Takao Suami (Waseda University), pointed out three features of the two volumes’ contributions: “Firstly, all of them are characterized by their Japanese perspectives. Since all lawyers cannot avoid bringing up their understanding of law including international law in their local contexts, it is unavoidable that approaches to international economic law are not identical in different places. These articles expose such non-Western perspectives to the world. Secondly, many of them deal with newly emerging issues. Japanese scholars are sensitive to change in a global society. Therefore, they deal not only with the digitalization of the global economy but also with the impact of COVID-19 or national security on the international economic order. Thirdly, they cover subjects concerning both public and private international laws (conflict of laws). Their combination constitutes a tradition of Japanese academic approaches. Japanese scholars understand that this combination has become more important than ever under the progress of globalization.”

 

The table of content and the contributions’ abstracts are found here (Volume 1) and here (Volume 2).

Professor William S. Dodge, John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law; Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law, will give a seminar entitled ‘U.S. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-Myths and Reality’ at the Wuhan University School of Law on 15 Oct. at 15:00-16:30pm Beijing Time. This seminar will be chaired by Professor Sophia Tang, the Associate Dean of the Wuhan University Academy of International Law and Global Governance. Associate Professor Wenliang Zhang at the Renmin University, Associate Professor Xiongbin Qiao, Associate Professor Yong Gan, and Associate Professor Wenwen Liang at the Wuhan University will act as discussants. You can attend the seminar online through Tencent Meeting. Please follow the information below:

Time?2023/10/15 15:00-17:00 (GMT+08:00) Beijing Time

Meeting link?
https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/KADluwLhfmfc

Tencent Meeting ID: 991-898-184
Password: 89456

By Moses Wiepen, Legal Trainee at the Higher Regional Court of Hamm, Germany

In its decision of 21 July 2023 (V ZR 112/22), the German Federal Court of Justice confirmed that Art. 26 Brussels Ia Regulation applies regardless of the defendant’s domicile. The case in question involved an art collector filing suit against a Canadian trust that manages the estate of a Jew who was persecuted by the German Nazi regime. The defendant published a wanted notice in an online Lost Art database for a painting that the plaintiff bought in 1999. The plaintiff considers this as a violation of his property right.

In general, following the procedural law principle of actor sequitur forum rei, the Canadian trust should be brought to court in Canadian courts. Special rules are required for jurisdictions that deviate from this principle. The lower German court confirmed its authority based on national rules on jurisdiction. Under sec. 32 German Civil Procedure Code, tort claims can be brought to the court where the harmful act happened regardless of the defendant’s domicile. The German Federal Court of Justice established its jurisdiction on Art. 26 Brussels Ia Regulation as the lex specialis.

This may appear surprising as the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulations is generally limited to defendants domiciled in a member state of the EU, Artt. 4, 6 Brussels Ia Regulation. Exceptions to this rule are stated in Art. 6 Brussels Ia Regulation and – relying on its wording – limited to the Artt. 18 I, 21 II, 24 and 25 Brussels Ia Regulation. Nevertheless, due to the common element of party autonomy in Art. 25 and Art. 26 Brussels Ia Regulation, some parts of the literature – and now the German Federal Court of Justice – apply Art. 26 Brussels Ia Regulation to non-EU-domiciled defendants as well. The German Federal Court of Justice even considers this interpretation of Art. 26 Brussels Ia Regulation as acte clair and thus, it sees no need for a preliminary ruling of the CJEU under Art. 267 TFEU.

However, the Court’s argumentation is not completely persuasive. Firstly, the wording of Art. 26 Brussels Ia Regulation is open to other – even opposing – interpretations. Secondly, although it contains a party-autonomous element, Art. 26 Brussels Ia Regulation does not depend on the defendant’s choice of court. In fact, courts are not required to verify defendant’s awareness of jurisdictional risks in order to proceed in a court lacking jurisdiction. And unlike Art. 25 Brussels Ia Regulation, Art. 26 Brussels Ia Regulation can be part of a litigation strategy detrimental to the defendant

A detailed analysis on the court’s ruling in German is available here.