Conflictoflaws

Introductory remarks

Applications to recognize and enforce CAS awards are not part of Greek court’s daily order business. About ten years ago, the first decision of a Greek court was published, which accepted an application to declare a decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) enforceable. For this ruling, see here  (in English), and here (in Spanish). Two recent decisions are added to this short list of judgments, where the corresponding decisions of the above sports arbitration body were again declared enforceable

(Piraeus Court of first instance, decision published on 28. July 2021, and Thessaloniki Court of first instance, decision published on 26. April 2022, both unreported).

 

A summary of the new decisions

The first decision concerned a company of sport? management located in France, who initiated CAS proceedings against a football team in Greece due to non-payment of agreed fees for the transfer of a football player. The CAS granted the application and ordered the payment of 45.000 Euros and 16.391 CHF for the costs of the arbitral proceedings (case number 2018/O/5850).

The second decision concerned two accredited sports managers from Argentina against an Argentinian football player who terminated unilaterally the agreement, hence, he failed to abide by the conditions of the contract signed with the managers. They initiated arbitration proceedings before the CAS, which ordered the payment of 1 million Euros and 49.585,80 CHF for the costs of the arbitral proceedings (case number 2014/O/3726). The player appealed unsuccessfully before the Swiss Supreme Court (no reference available in the text of the decision).

 

Main findings

From the assessment of the aforementioned decisions, it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

 

• NYC: The ruler of the game. The application of the New York Convention regarding requests to recognize CAS awards is undisputable and common to all Greek decisions.

 

• National rules of Civil procedure. From the combination of Articles 3 and 4 NYC, and those of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure (Book on voluntary jurisdiction), it is clearly concluded that the true meaning of Articles 3 and 4 of the above convention is that, the one who requests the declaration of enforceability of a foreign arbitral award, is required to present the relevant decision and the arbitration agreement, either in original or in an official copy, as well as an official translation into the Greek language, during the hearing of his application, and without being obliged to file these documents at the court, when submitting the relevant application.

This because, to the eyes of Greek judges, Article 4 NYC, referring to a presentation “at the time of the application”, does not determine the procedural ‘moment’ (stage) when the documents of the arbitration agreement and the arbitral decision must be submitted to the court. It simply determines the burden of proof and the party borne with it. The procedural method and the time of presentation of the documents referred to in Article 4 § 1 NYC are still regulated by the procedural law of the trial judge, in the case at hand the Greek Code of Civil Procedure.

• Field of application of CAS. On the grounds of the decisions rendered by Greek courts, it has been confirmed that the CAS has jurisdiction over the following disputes:
• Application for arbitration by an athlete against the team in which he plays;
• Application for arbitration by the sports manager of athletes and/or coaches against the sports club.
• Application for arbitration by the sports manager against the athlete.

 

• Enforceability in the country of origin not a pre-requisite. Contrary to finality, it is not necessary to meet the condition of enforceability of the arbitral award in the state of origin, i.e., Switzerland.

 

• Enforceability of CAS Costs. The ‘order’ awarding arbitration costs, following the CAS award, must also be declared enforceable, according to Rule R.64.4 CAS Procedural Rules. The matter is noteworthy, as the above ‘order’ is issued after the award by the CAS Secretariat, not by the arbitration Panel that ruled on the dispute, and without the participation of the parties. However, it should be underlined that the letter from the CAS Secretariat merely specifies the amount of the arbitration costs awarded by the Panel; hence, it is considered as belonging to the award’s operative part. In addition, the act of awarding costs is notified to the parties in accordance with CAS rules.

 

• Irreconcilable judgments. It is not necessary to furnish a certificate of non-irreconcilability with a decision, by following the domestic model of article 903 § 5 and 323 nr. 4 Greek Code of Civil Procedure. According to the judgment of the Greek court, it is not permissible to transfuse a condition regulated by domestic arbitration law into the context of the New York Convention.

 

• No revision on the merits. Finally, although not directly stated in the text of the NYC, a revision of the foreign arbitral award by the Greek court is prohibited, the latter being unanimously accepted and labelled as the principle of non-examination on the merits.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) will be holding its annual XLV Seminar entitled “Private International Law in the conformation of a new international order” (el derecho internacional privado en la conformación de un nuevo orden internacional) from 16 to 18 November 2022. The venue is still to be determined but it is likely to be a hybrid event (online and on-site).

The main focus of the seminar will be to analyse the Proyecto de Código Nacional de Procedimientos Civiles y Familiares (draft National Code of Civil and Family Procedure, which includes Private International Law provisions and whose objective is to replace all the existing states’ legislation on the matter -32-) and the hotly debated litigation regarding non-contractual obligations arising out of a tort/delict resulting from the illicit traffic of firearms (the case of Mexico vs. Smith and Wesson), among other matters.

Potential speakers are invited to submit a paper in Spanish, English or Portuguese by 31 August 2022. Papers must comply with the criteria established by AMEDIP and will be evaluated accordingly. Selected speakers will be required to give their presentations preferably in Spanish as there will be no interpretation services but some exceptions may be made by the organisers upon request. For more information, please click here.

Participation is free of charge. A certificate of participation may be issued upon (a modest) payment.

The latest issue (2022/2) of the Dutch/English journal  Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht is dedicated to cross-border involvency.

Editorial: P.M. Veder, De Wet internationaal insolventierecht / p. 203-207

Articles

Welling-Steffens, Hoofdlijnen voor een wettelijke regeling van het commune internationaal insolventierecht. Bevoegdheid inzake, toepasselijk recht op, en erkenning van ‘derde-lands’ insolventieprocedures en aanverwante vorderingen / p. 208-226

Abstract

This article outlines a proposal on principles for future Dutch legislation on international insolvency law in relation to foreign insolvency proceedings held in so-called third countries (i.e. non-EU states). Itcommences with an overview of the current status of the Dutch national private international law rulesin respect of jurisdiction in, the applicable law to and the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and related actions held in third countries. Other than three scant provisions in the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, there is no legislation in relation to international insolvency law regarding foreign non-EU insolvency proceedings and the current rules are all based on case law, culminating in the Yukos case decided by the Dutch Supreme Court. Subsequently, the author, inspired by such Dutch case law, previous proposals on international insolvency law in the Netherlands like the 2007 legislative pre-proposal of the Kortmann Committee on insolvency, the UNCITRAL Model Laws and the various proposals put forward in Dutch legal literature, outlines a proposal on principles for legislative rules on (indirect) jurisdiction in, the applicable law to and the recognition of foreign (non-EU) insolvency proceedings.

Madaus, The German law on the recognition of foreign insolvency and restructuring proceedings / p. 227-240

Abstract

The recognition of third country insolvency proceedings in Germany does not follow the mechanisms of the EIR but falls within the scope of the respective national frameworks of international insolvency law. While Germany did not adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, §§ 335-359 InsO provide rules that in many respects even resemble those of the EIR 2000. The framework is more recognition-friendly than the Model Law and is accompanied by rules for the recognition of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters as well as Private International Law rules on the recognition of any modification of substantive rights by foreign law. Non-EU main restructuring and insolvency proceedings including their plans – in particular US Chapter 11 plans – are thereby routinely recognized in Germany without any need for court involvement. The recognition of scheme-type procedures would be available under these frameworks, but probably not under the cross-border insolvency framework.

Garcimartín & N. Bermejo, Spanish national rules on cross-border insolvency proceedings: a symmetrical approach / p. 241-251

Abstract

This paper examines the Spanish national rules on cross-border insolvency proceedings applicable vis-à-vis non-EU countries (including Denmark) laid down in Book III of the Spanish Insolvency Act. These rules aim to extend unilaterally the model of mitigated universalism enshrined in the EU Regulation outside its scope of application. According to those rules, the main insolvency proceedings will be opened in Spain if the debtor has its centre of main interests (COMI) here in Spain and, as a result, their opening, as well as their effects, conduct and closure, will be regulated by the Spanish Insolvency Act (lex fori concursus), with certain exceptions. Likewise, territorial proceedings may be opened in Spain if the debtor’s COMI is located in a third country, but it has an establishment here. Likewise, the paper studies the specific rules for the recognition in Spain of insolvency proceedings opened in foreign (non-EU) countries (including Denmark) and the rules on coordination and cooperation between proceedings. In addition, it describes the rules on the publicity of insolvency proceedings, information for foreign creditors and the submission of their claims. Finally, it analyses the rule of negative reciprocity, which constitutes a general safeguard in the event of a lack of reciprocal cooperation by the corresponding third country.

T.H.D. Struycken, Grensoverschrijdende insolventieprocedures en rechten op goederen in andere landen / p. 251-276

Abstract

Article 8 of the EU Insolvency Regulation (2015 recast) dominates the current thinking on insolvency proceedings in relation to rights in rem in assets situated in other jurisdictions. Implicit in the rule is the assumption that recognition of foreign security interests is too complicated. Hence, rights in assets in other EU Member States are de facto excluded from the insolvency proceedings. This article analyses the justification for the rule in Article 8, and rejects it. Recognition of foreign rights in rem is, and should be, the basic principle in the Netherlands, both outside and inside cross-border insolvency proceedings. The author proposes not to mirror Article 8 when codifying the PIL rules for cross-border insolvency proceedings outside the scope of the EU Insolvency Regulation, and formulates a first draft for a possible statutory rule.

P.M. Veder, Verrekening in de Wet internationaal insolventierecht / p. 277-287

Abstract

The Dutch government has announced that it will prepare draft legislation to address the cross-border aspects of insolvency proceedings that fall outside the scope of the EU Insolvency Regulation. This article examines which rules should be included in such draft legislation concerning set-off. It critically analyzes the approach to set-off in the European Insolvency Regulation and looks at the current state of play at UNCITRAL. The conclusion is that, even though the approach to set-off in Article 9(1) EIR is not convincing – there is no sound justification for offering protection to a creditor on the basis of the law applicable to the insolvent debtor’s claim – the Dutch legislator would nevertheless be well advised to follow the rules in the EIR concerning the applicable law, including Article 9(1) EIR, as much as possible. By following the rules in the EIR on the applicable law, insolvency proceedings and their effects are governed by the same law, regardless of whether the EU Insolvency Regulation applies or not. This promotes legal certainty and the practical applicability of a statutory regulation of cross-border insolvency proceedings in Dutch customary private international law.

C.G. van der Plas, Informatievergaring door buitenlandse curatoren in Nederland – heden en toekomst / p. 288-302

Abstract

It is not uncommon for foreign bankruptcy trustees to encounter Dutch entities or Dutch bank accounts when settling the bankruptcy. Think, for example, of a foreign bankruptcy in which the bankrupt entity has siphoned off assets through a web of entities in various jurisdictions. In order to be able to follow the bankrupt’s trail across the border, the bankruptcy trustee needs information about those entities. This article examines the means of discovery available to a bankruptcy trustee in a foreign (non-EU) bankruptcy in the Netherlands. After identifying the problems that a foreign bankruptcy trustee may be confronted with under the current Dutch system, the possibilities offered by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency will be examined. The article concludes with a recommendation for a future amendment to the Dutch Bankruptcy Act.

Pepels, Het Nederlandse internationaal groepsinsolventierecht – cause for concern? / p. 303-318

Abstract

Following the drafting of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act in the 1890s, the manner in which large enterprises are legally organized has undergone significant changes. Multinational groups of companies have become an important driving force behind the Dutch and the European economies. Dutch domestic international insolvency law, however, does not address the issues that are specific to cross-border group insolvencies. In this article, the author sets out to analyze whether there is any need for a Dutch domestic law on cross-border group insolvencies and, if so, what the contours thereof should be. In doing so, the article discusses the provisions on cross-border group insolvency as introduced by the 2017 EU Insolvency Regulation (recast) and UNCITRAL’s 2019 Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency. As the Dutch legislator is currently evaluating the options to revise the Dutch Bankruptcy Act on the topic of domestic cross-border insolvency law, the article concludes with various recommendations on group insolvencies that could align the legal treatment of insolvent multinational groups of companies more with the economic reality.

written by Abhishek Trivedi, Institute of Legal Studies and Research, GLA University, Mathura, India

(Publication of this book was announced earlier over here. 

Written by Dr Abhishek Trivedi, the book review of Indian Private International Law has been published in the Asian Journal of International Law, Volume 12, Issue 2 in its July 2022 issue.

Preview: 
This timely required up-to-date book provides a systematic detailed study about all-encompassing Private International Law (PIL) issues concerning jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments/decrees/arbitral awards in India. Considering the new developments in the field of technology and the internet, the book seems to be useful, and thus, can be relied upon by judiciary and policy and lawmakers in India and South Asian countries in order to develop a coherent and robust jurisprudence on PIL. It will consequently help enhance transparency, foster predictability, and harmonise the rules/principles of PIL in India.

A detailed review of the book may be found here.

 

A comprehensive and detailed volume by Dr. Lenka Válková was just released providing a dedicated analysis of the private international law framework as it applies to jurisdiction agreements in the framework of the EU Regulations in family and succession matters.

The blurb reads:

Party autonomy has been traditionally considered as one of the leading principles used in cross-border trade law. In fact, choice-of-court agreements have been embedded into the majority of EU Regulations governing civil and commercial matters. On the other hand, mandatory approach to family and succession law slowed down the progress of recognition of party autonomy in these fields. Only in recent years, the trend towards acknowledging choice-of-court agreements has spread into almost all areas of international family and succession law. This publication follows this development: firstly, it analyses the reasons and concerns of the recognition of choice-of-court agreements in civil and commercial matters, whereby it is questioned whether the considerations established in relation to commercial contracts may apply also for personal relationships. Consequently, different treatment of choice-of-court agreements family and succession law, where the freedom to choose the competent court is far from being unlimited, is examined. Accordingly, the attention must be paid to functions of choice-of-court agreements in family law. The second chapter subsequently investigates the position of parties in personal law relations and their protection. In particular, partial and full exclusion of party autonomy, formal and substantive validity, time limits, substantive review and public policy and overriding mandatory rules are considered as tools for protection of vulnerable parties in family and succession law relations when entering into choice-of-court agreements. Finally, last chapter provides for in-depth analysis of rules on choice-of-court agreements under different EU Regulations (the Brussels IIa and Brussels IIter Regulations, Maintenance Regulation, Regulations on Property Regimes and Succession Regulation), where the strengths and gaps of the rules are highlighted. This analysis includes also an attempt to clarify the problem of derogation from jurisdiction in favour of Third States in presence of choice-of-court agreements. Lastly, effectiveness of the rule on lis pendens in stress-tested.

Overall, in her manuscript Dr. Válková successfully combines complex theoretical analysis with concrete propositions in a multifaceted and developing area of the law. Notably, Dr. Válková exemplifies the contribution of party autonomy in private international law in addressing the challenges arising in the context of family relations in the cross-border context: in doing so, she illustrates the complex status quo of party autonomy in this area of the law, its limitations, and how policies may be promoted via private international law. As such, her book is a highly recommended source for academics, notaries, and legal practitioners.

Lenka VÁLKOVÁ, Choice-of-Court Agreements under the EU Regulations in Family and Succession Matters (Wolters Kluwer / CEDAM, 2022), 548 pp., available for purchase here.

This volume is a welcome addition to Wolter Kluwer / CEDAM’s already thriving ‘Studi e pubblicazioni della Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale’ series.

Even after Brussels IIb‘s coming into force (that we reported on last week), the Court of Justice of the EU issued its judgment in case C-501/20. The case remains relevant, also under the new Regulation. The Court had the opportunity to not only add to its case law on habitual residence, but also to clarify three other matters: first, the Regulation’s and the Maintenance Regulation‘s relation to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, specifically with regard to diplomatic immunity; second, the Brussels IIa‘s relation to domestic bases of jurisdiction; and third (and related to the second point), the forum necessitatis.

The case concerned the divorce and related disputes between a Spanish national and a Portuguese national. The couple had two children, who had dual Spanish-Portuguese nationality. The family lived first in Guinea-Bissau and later in Togo. The parents were posted at these places as EU delegates of the European Commission. They separated factually while still living in Togo. The mother then brought divorce proceedings, including the issues of parental responsibility and maintenance, in Spain. This court had to decide on its jurisdiction, which raised various issues.

Concerning the habitual residence, which is the first stop to determine jurisdiction (Art. 3 and 8 of Brussels IIa and Art. 3 of the Maintenance Regulation), the Court reiterated the two main factors to determine the habitual residence of adults: “first, the intention of the person concerned to establish the habitual centre of his or her interests in a particular place and, second, a presence which is sufficiently stable in the Member State concerned” (para 44, referring to its case C-289/20 interpreting the Rome III Regulation on the law applicable to divorce proceedings). The Court added that the definition of habitual residence in the Brussels IIa and Maintenance Regulations should be “guided by the same principles and characterised by the same elements” (para 53). (The Court here did not refer to Rome III, but the same is true as we know from previous case law.) Both factors of habitual residence were absent in this case. First, there was no intention to move back to Spain. Second, the parents were physically absent from Spain for this period (except for the birth of the children and periods of leave). Therefore, they could not have been habitually resident in this Member State.

Concerning the habitual residence of the children, the Court referred to the factors in its previous case law, including the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child’s stay, the child’s nationality, school and family and social relationships (para 73). To establish a habitual residence, it is essential that the child is physically present in this Member State (para 75). The mother’s nationality and the pace where she lived prior to her marriage (and prior to the child’s birth) are not relevant (para 76). The child’s nationality and the place where they are born, are relevant but not decisive (para 77).

Any diplomatic immunity cannot change this conclusion, as the Spanish court does not have jurisdiction (paras 61 and following). Even though Recital 14 states that “[t]his Regulation should have effect without prejudice to the application of public international law concerning diplomatic immunities,” this refers to a situation where a court in a EU Member State would have jurisdiction but cannot exercise it due to diplomatic immunity. In short, the existence of diplomatic immunity cannot grant jurisdiction.

The residual jurisdiction under Arts 6 and 7 of Brussels IIa, and specifically the situation that factual scenario that arose in this case, have long caused confusion. The legislator attempted to rectify this in Brussels IIb (Art. 6). The problem was that Art. 6 stated that if a spouse who is habitually resident in or a national of a Member State, may only be sued on the bases of jurisdiction in the Regulation, while Art. 7 referred to domestic bases of jurisdiction where no court in an EU Member State has jurisdiction. So, what is to be done where a spouse is a national of an EU Member State (Portugal in this instance) but there are no available bases of jurisdiction in the Regulation (as neither of the spouses are habitually resident in the EU and they do not have a common EU nationality)? Which provision should prevail? The Court found that Art. 7, and thus domestic bases of jurisdiction, cannot be used in this case; only the residual bases of jurisdiction of the Member State of the defendant’s nationality can come into play (Portugal in this instance). See also the Opinion of Advocate-General Szpunar.

The same contradiction does not exist in the case of jurisdiction over children: Art. 14 simply states that where no court in a Member State has jurisdiction on the basis of the Regulation, domestic jurisdiction rules apply. Thus, Spanish residual bases of jurisdiction could be used concerning the parental responsibility.

The Maintenance Regulation does not have such reference to domestic bases of jurisdiction, but contains a complete harmonisation of jurisdiction, for all situations. It is in this context that there is also a forum necessitatis: if no court in a Member State has jurisdiction and it would be impossible or cannot reasonably expected of the parties to bring the proceedings in the third State to which the dispute is connected, a court in a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case (Art. 7). The Court explained that this can only come into play if no court in a Member State has jurisdiction, also not on the basis of the link of the case to the status or parental responsibility, and also not on the basis of the choice of the parties (para 101 and following). If this is the case, it is not required that the parties first attempt to institute proceedings in the third State, but the court “cannot rely solely on general circumstances relating to deficiencies in the judicial system of the third State, without analysing the consequences that those circumstances might have for the individual case” (para 112).

Greece still forms part of the EU Member States group not recognizing same-sex marriage. Same-sex couples do enjoy however some rights. The latest challenging issue concerned custody rights of a same-sex couple married abroad. The Thessaloniki Court of Appeal reversed the first instance ruling, and recognized an English custody order [Thessaloniki CoA, decision published on January 24, 2022, unreported].

FACTS: The appellant (Parent A) is a woman of Greek and American nationality. Her partner was a woman of American national (Parent B). They registered their partnership in the UK on 20 August 2013. Nearly a month later, Parent B gave birth to a child. The partners married in January 2015. Parent A. filed an application for child custody and parenting arrangements order in the UK. The court granted the application, and ordered that the child stays with the psychological (non-biological) mother on the basis of previous decisions concerning parental responsibility rights issued in the same country. In addition, the court ordered that the child reside with Parent A., and it issued an order to remove the child permanently to Greece. Finally, the same court arranged the contact rights of the biological mother. The UK order was issued by the High Court – Family Division in Chelmsford, and it was final. Parent A. filed an application for the recognition and enforcement of the UK order before the Court of First Instance in Thessaloniki.

The Court refused recognition. It entered into an analysis of the public policy defense, culminating in the conclusion, that the forum judge is obliged to defend national public policy, while at the same time demonstrating respect towards the state’s international obligations. To that end, a proportionality test of the domestic public policy with Article 8 ECHR standards is imperative. Following the above introduction, the court declared that same-sex marriage, and any subsequent relations emanating thereof are not allowed in Greece. A detailed presentation of the first instance court reasoning may be found here.

Parent A appealed.

THE DECISION: Unlike the lower instance court, the Thessaloniki CoA primarily underlined the European context of the dispute, citing Articles 21 et seq of the Brussels II bis Regulation. It then referred to a significant number of pertinent provisions, such as: Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights; articles 23 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); articles 7 and 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; the Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation; Greek Civil Union law nr. 4356/2015; article 21 of the Greek Constitution, on the protection of family; directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; and finally, articles 2 and 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified in Greece by law nr. 2101/1992.

On the grounds of the above references, the CoA found no violation of the Greek public policy, and reversed the ruling of the first instance court. In particular, the CoA emphasized two points:

• The diversity of views, i.e., the non-recognition of same sex marriage in Greece may not result to the infringement of the child’s best interests, reflected in the UK court findings.
• The ruling of the first instance court results to the discrimination of children on the grounds of their parents’ sexual orientation.

The battle for full equality is not yet won. A couple of days after the decision of the Thessaloniki CoA was published, the Athens CoA refused recognition to a South African adoption decree issued upon the application of a same-sex (male) couple. Yet again, public policy was the defense hindering recognition. To sum up: Same sex couples may not marry or adopt children in Greece; they may however be appointed as foster parents, and exercise custody rights. Hence, equality evolves in a piecemeal fashion. And last but not least, let us not forget: the Supreme Court has the final word.

The International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS / CIEC in French) is organising a conference on 21 September 2022 entitled: ICCS plurilingual forms Present and future of international cooperation in civil status matters.

This event is being held on the occasion of the entry into force of the Convention (n°34) relative à la délivrance d’extraits et de certificats plurilingues et codés d’actes de l’état civil for the following States: Belgium, Germany and Switzerland (as of 1 July 2022).

Speeches and discussions will be in French or English with simultaneous interpretation.

The venue of the conference is Château de Pourtalès, 161, rue Mélanie, 67000 STRASBOURG – France.

Registration is free of charge but mandatory. Interested persons should send a message to:

ciec-sg@ciec1.org

Below is the agenda (see also here Conference program):

8.30 am : Welcome speech

Jeannine Dennewald, President of the ICCS

8.40 am : Opening speech

Hans van Loon, former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

Morning session : 9.00 – 12.15 am : Improving plurilingual forms

Chair : Paul Lagarde, Emeritus professor, University Paris I, former secretary general of the ICCS

9.00 – 10.30 am : workshop n°1 : Plurilingual forms and sex of persons: same-sex couples, neutral sex and third sex

Speaker : Patrick Wautelet, Professor, University of Liège

Discussion : Dr Bojana Zadravec, President of the Slovenian Association of Administrative Staff, EVS (European Association of Registars)

10.30 – 10.45 am : break

10.45 am – 12.15 pm : workshop n°2 : Plurilingual forms and filiation: the relevance of adapting to diversity

Speaker : Olivier Guillod, Professor, University of Neuchâtel

Discussion : Hague Conference representative

12.15 – 12.30 pm : The ICCS: dynamic transition to the future

Nicolas Nord, Secretary General of the ICCS

Afternoon session : 2.00 – 6.00 pm : Optimizing the circulation of plurilingual forms

Chair : Anatol Dutta, Professor, University of Munich

2.00 – 2.30 pm : workshop n°3 : Plurilingual forms and European rights: from the public documents regulation to the recognition of situations

Speaker : Camille Reitzer, Deputy Secretary General of the ICCS

Discussion : Marie Vautravers, European Commission

3.30 – 4.00 pm : break

4.00 – 5.30 pm : workshop n°4 : Plurilingual forms, digitization and data protection: the need for a specific regime

Speaker : Guillermo Palao Moreno, Professor, University of Valencia

Discussion : ANUSCA representative – Alexander Schuster, University of Graz

5.30 – 6.00 pm : General conclusion

Andreas Bucher, Emeritus Professor, University of Geneva

 

Starting from 1 August 2022, the Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 29 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast)(Brussels II ter Regulation) became applicable, replacing the Brussels II Regulation.

As nearly two decades has passed since the Brussels II Regulation itself became applicable, it seemed important to record its retirement also on CoL and to welcome its successor. Special thanks need to go to Mayela Celis who rang the bell timely.

For further discussion on the new Regulation and the changes its brings, I am happy to refer our readers to the special volume of Polish quarterly on civil procedure („Polish Civil Procedure”, „Polski Proces Cywilny”), which we brought to your attention a while ago.

Although repealed, the „old” Regulation does not completely loose its relevance. Under Article 100 of the Brussels II ter Regulation, the former is still applicable in particular to the legal proceedings instituted prior to 1 August 2022 and to the decisions given in such proceedings.

So… Exit the Regulation (but not fully), enter the Regulation. Anyway, Long Live to the Latter ?

A. Introduction

During the Summer of 2019, I attended one of the two flagship courses organised by the Hague Academy of International Law – the annual Summer Courses on Private International Law.

I quite vividly recall that, during the opening lectures, one of the Professors welcomed the participants at the premises of the Academy, a few steps from the Peace Palace itself, and made an observation that, at that time, seemed as captivating as remote.

As my precise recollection of his words may be far less accurate than the memory of the impression they made on me, I paraphrase: when it comes to education in general, in years to come – he noted – it will be a privilege to be able to benefit from a physical presence of a teacher or professor, being there, in front of you, within the reach of your hand and of your questions.

At that time, just a few months prior to the beginning of the worldwide spread pandemics, even the Professor himself most likely did not realize the extent to which his words would soon prove prophetic.

That was, however, not the sole lecture that I recall vividly.

Among others, Professor Matthias Weller (University of Bonn, one of two general editors of CoL.net) presented his course titled ‘Mutual Trust’: A Suitable Foundation for Private International Law in Regional Integration Communities and Beyond?

The present post is not, however, an account of this Hague experience. It is an account of a different and more recent one that resulted from the lecture of the freshly published Volume 423 of Recueil des Cours of the Hague Academy of International Law and of the Course by M. Weller within its pages.

 

B. Structure of the Course

The Course, in its just published incarnation, is composed of eight chapters.

Details about the Course and the Volume within which it is contained can be found here, on the website of its publisher, Brill. I can also refer the readers to the post on EAPIL by Elena Alina Otanu who also reported about the publication.

Thus, in this post, I will refrain from detailing the content of every Chapter and rather present and discuss its main and/or most interesting themes. Please be warned though that their selection is highly subjective, as there is far more to uncover within the pages of the Volume.

Chapter I (“Introduction”) sets the scene for the analysis provided for in the following Chapters. Here Weller also builds up the main hypothesis of his work (see section C below).

I digress but from a methodological standpoint, the Course is very thoughtful and may serve as an example of how to deal with a matter of comparative private international law that is highly difficult to conceptualise.

The methodological awareness is most visible in Chapter I, as well as in Chapter III (“Regional integration communities and their private international law”), which furtherly explains how the analysis is conducted through the text.

Between those two, lies Chapter II (“Private international law: a matter of trust management”), where the Author explores one of his core ideas that private international law may be conceived as a matter of “trust management”. As this is an innovative paradigm with which the Author approaches his main hypothesis, it calls for some additional exposition and discussion (see section D below).

The Author devotes next four chapters (Chapters IV – VII) to the specific regional integration communities, namely: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Central African Economic and Monetary Community (OHADA), El Mercado común del sur (MERCOSUR) and EU. Here, I found the Chapter on EU to be highly innovative – at least to my knowledge, this is the first comprehensive attempt to look at the plethora of heavily-discussed private international law mechanics from “trust”-oriented perspective (see section E below).

Chapter VIII (“General conclusions”) closes the book, recaps the Author’s findings and provides food-for-thought for future research in the field.

 

C. Hypothesis under scrutiny in the Course

The Course starts off with a series of references showing the relevance of “mutual trust” for various aspects of functioning of the EU and its legal framework, in particular – for its private international law.

Quoting J. Basedow who stated that the EU is the “experimental laboratory of private international law”, Weller sets the main hypothesis of his work (para. 5): there might be a fundamental relevance of mutual trust to the private international law of any regional community.

To test this hypothesis, the Author delves into analysis of selected “regional integration communities”. Doing so, Weller aims to examine whether and to what extent mutual trust is of relevance for the private international law of those communities, be it as a foundation or guiding principle, triggering more intensive cooperation (in presence of mutual trust) or preventing it (in the lack of it).

The Author also hints the possibility to take his main hypothesis even further, although this aspect does not constitute the focal point of the Course: there might even be something fundamental in “mutual trust” for private international law as it is, also where it does not operate within a framework explicitly created for the purposes of regional integration communities (to use the term employed by the Author, also where it comes to “extracommunity efforts on private international law”, para. 127). Indeed, I would argue that, at present, no system of private international law should be conceived as operating in isolation, blind to the global reach of the situations that it aims to govern.

Back to the Course itself and the hypothesis:

Weller explores and employs, as he puts it, an EU “product” – the notion of “mutual trust” (para. 8), to verify his main hypothesis in the context of various regional integration communities.

The readers should not be misled though. The Course is not built around the idea that the EU private international law, with its concept of ‘mutual trust’, constitutes an ultimate form of private international law system or a pinnacle of achievement of some sorts, and that any other regional integration communities efforts have to be benchmarked against the “EU model”. Far from that.

In fact, Weller uses the concept of “trust”, and its qualified form of “mutual trust” as a tool that allows him to research the main hypothesis of his Course.

Doing so, the Author explicitly refrains from adopting a solely EU-oriented perspective. He goes so far as to state that “not everything that comes from experiments ends up in good results, let alone the best solution for everyone”. “Not even ‘integration’ as such may be considered a priori the most suitable avenue for all states and regions in the world” (para. 8). This becomes even clearer if we read into the Chapter III. Here, the Author goes so far as to call “naive” the belief according to which “progress” boils down to increasing degrees of mutual trust (para. 126).

Also, even where Weller refers to notion of “mutual trust” and calls it at some instances an EU “product”, he also makes it clear that “mutual trust” is not an EU invention: rather, he roots it in the German regional economic community of the nineteenth century, the German Union (paras. 432 and 482).

 

D. Paradigm of the Course: Private international law as a matter of “trust management”

In Chapter II (“Private international law: a matter of trust management”) the Author exposes and explores the paradigm that he proposes and researches in the following Chapters, with regards to selected regional integration communities.

In order to do so, he divides the Chapter into two sections.

In the first section of this Chapter, Weller explores the concept of “trust”: what it is and what purpose it serves, not only in the field of private international law.

The Author manages to seamlessly transit from “trust” as a societal phenomenon, deeply researched and explained both by sociological and economic (think: risk management) theory, with its qualified form (“mutual trust”) that became so crucial for the EU and beyond.

Within the first section, Weller also juxtaposes “trust” to “knowledge” arguing, in essence, that the former allows to act (even) where information is deficient. Trust relates, he explains, to the predictability of the actions of another. He builds up another dichotomy on that observation: in the lack of information, there is a choice between “trust” and “control”, and it is the former that appears to be a better candidate for governance of private international law issues.

In the second section Weller exposes the paradigm he proposes: for him, as mentioned above, private international law may be conceived as a matter of “trust management”. In other terms, as he puts it: to trust or not to trust – this is the question of private international law (para. 123).

To make his point, the Author looks closely at what J. Basedow called the “ultimate and most far-reaching form of judicial cooperation between States” – the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (para. 40).

He elaborates on various tools of “trust management” with regards to foreign judgments: from “total control” (no effects of foreign judgments at all), through revision au fond, doctrine of obligation, letter rogatory and far-reaching trust with residual control via exequatur proceedings to full faith and credit among federal states and, finally,“full trust”. He argues that all of them represent a specific amount of “trust” that is given to the judicial system of another State, complemented by “control” mechanics of some sorts.

Furthermore, Weller does not shy away from exploring other aspects of private international law through the mutual trust-tinted lens. He addresses also, inter alia, authentication of foreign documents and their service or taking evidence abroad (paras. 85 et seq.), as well as application of foreign law (paras. 104 et seq.).

I digress again: reading initially into first section of Chapter II, I had a (false) impression that the views on trust are too one-sided and do not take into account that both “trust” and “mutual trust” are not (and cannot be) blind to the various circumstances that occur within the framework to which the trust applies.

Trust is first and foremost a societal phenomenon and not a religious one. In this perspective, there is something to say about what distinguishes “trust” from “faith” – the latter is not (or at least should not be) undermined by lack of feedback; it can even “fuel” more faith and intensify it. By contrast, when it comes to “trust”, a systematic lack of positive feedback, replaced by feedback that calls for concern, needs to results into reconsideration as to whether the trust must still be given and the control waived.

My initial false impression was, however, quickly dispersed. Weller recognizes the dynamics of trust too. In the paragraphs that follow, he quotes and comments extensively on one of the key elements of this research, building up on the consideration of K. Lenaerts according to which “mutual trust cannot be confused with blind trust” (para. 90). This becomes even clearer when we read into Chapter VII on EU private international law.

 

E. “Trust management” in EU private international law and beyond

I turn now to aforementioned Chapter VII, devoted to EU private international law or, if we read into this Chapter more attentively, to EU law in general.

Here, Weller discusses extensively the “mutual trust” and human/fundamental rights dynamics and argues that the balance between the former and the latter is nothing else but trust management (para. 360).

He shows, next, that private international law-inspired mechanics of trust management may apply beyond the field of EU private international law. This may seem as an even more perverse turn if we take into account that, as Weller observes, in the context of EU integration, judicial cooperation in civil matters developed in the shadows of judicial cooperation in criminal matters (para. 377).

Interestingly, Weller recognizes that even within the context of EU integration, the EU legislator does not cap the pre-existing trust with legislative framework within which this trust operates. By contrast, at least in some instances (he cites E-commerce and Service Directives), the EU legislator diagnosed a lack of mutual trust and then imposed an obligation of the Member States for mutual recognition as a cure (para. 371).

Then, he goes through various EU private international law provisions and case law pertaining to them in order to explore how the “trust management” is dealt with under EU law.

I mention just one piece of this exploration on public policy, operating under the Brussels I regime as a ground four refusal of enforcement.

Weller mentions the case that resulted in the German Federal Supreme Court judgment of 2018, which accepted the application of public policy exception with regards to a Polish judgment condemning ZDF to publish an apology on its main webpage after it described two concentration camps as being “Polish”. The Supreme Court considered that the obligation for ZDF to publish a preformatted text on its website contradicted freedom of speech and freedom of press as guaranteed under Article 5(1) of the German Basic Law. The enforcement was rejected on the basis of public policy exception.

The case has been extensively discussed in the literature before. However, faithful to the paradigm of the Course, Weller examines the case from trust management perspective.

Adopting this perspective, Weller argues that the German court “could have and would have better enforced just the enforceable parts of the Polish judgment” and “it seems that it would have been under an obligation from EU law to do so in order to maintain the movement of judgment within the EU as far as possible, an obligation that emanates from the effet utile of the Brussels regime (para. 405).

I might add, in line with this contention: if the right of enforcement of a foreign judgment is conceptualized as a right protected under the Charter (and – to be more specific – under its Article 47), then any interference to that right, although “provided for by law” [see: public policy exception of Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation/Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I bis Regulation], must respect the requirement resulting from Article 52(1) of the Charter. Thus, if I follow Weller paradigm, also Article 52(1) of the Charter is a “trust management” tool, that calls for proportionate and restricted (only when it is “necessary”) refusal of “trust” in the EU.

 

F. So again, why do I need “mutual trust” when I already have “comity”?

I close this post with another recollection of the Summer Course of 2019: during one of his intervention at the Hague Academy, Weller mentioned that when he had shared with one of his colleagues about this “mutual trust” research, the said colleague had asked: so again, what is the difference between “mutual trust” and “comity”?

According to my account of that conversation, Weller provided, if I recall correctly, an answer that boiled down to the following statement, I paraphrase: while “comity” allows for cooperation between States, over the heads of individuals, the concept of “mutual trust” enables the cooperation between States but with paying a particular attention to the individual; it elevates the individual and his/hers interests to the attitude, where they become a matter of true concern also to the States.

The difference between “mutual trust” and “comity” is furtherly explored in the Course, although I might be accused of reading too much in-between the lines.

On the one hand, in Chapter II, commenting on various tools of “trust management”, the Author mentions the concept of “comity” again. He explains that one of it aspects can be seen as “an abstract trust in the administration of justice by the foreign state from where the judgment emerged – it results from the acknowledgment of the sovereignty and such equality of the foreign state is concretized by the presumption that the administration of justice in the foreign state is equally well placed to produce justice in the particular case at hand”.

On the other hand, in another part of the book, he makes an interesting point: the individuals push a State towards trust, so the States cooperate on behalf of those individual when they enable and supervise judicial cooperation (paras 35 and 72). In yet another part of the book, pertaining to the application of foreign law, the Author even juxtaposes trust-based mechanics, concerned with the rights of the individuals, with the sovereignty-based (“outdated”) concepts of comity (para. 111).

Furthermore, States are, Weller argues, in obligation to optimize their trust management – doing so, they optimize the chances of the individuals when it comes to the enforcement of their rights in cross-border contexts (para. 122).

I concur. But why such obligation exists? Under Weller’s paradigm, the general concept of “comity” cannot be the justification, at least not the “outdated” one. Besides, if we follow Weller on that point, from the perspective of interest of individual, “comity” may be seen as a construct inferior to “mutual trust”.

If we read into text, the Author provides an answer though: the obligation to optimise trust management results from the imperatives of rule of law and of the fundamental right to effective access to justice; as such, it is a matter of constitution guarantees (para. 123 and 444). I might add that there is also something to say about effective protection of fundamental/human rights that underlie the substance of specific rights and/or legal situations shaped under foreign law or within foreign territory. In essence, it is necessary to optimise trust management system also because it allows to ensure recognition and enforcement of rights and legal situations that are rooted in fundamental/human rights.

EFFORTS (Towards more EFfective enFORcemenT of claimS in civil and commercial matters within the EU) is an EU-funded Project conducted by the University of Milan (coord.), the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, the University of Heidelberg, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Zagreb, and the University of Vilnius.

The ninth EFFORTS Newsletter has just been released, giving access to up-to-date information about the Project, save-the-dates on forthcoming events, conferences and webinars, and news from the area of international and comparative civil procedural law.

For information, in particular, on the EFFORTS Final Conference (30 September 2022, University of Milan), see also our previous post here.

Finally, regular updates are available via the Project website and the Project’s LinkedIn and Facebook pages.

Project JUST-JCOO-AG-2019-881802
With financial support from the Civil Justice Programme of the European Union

The deceased, living in Germany, leaving as her sole heir her son, who also lives in Germany, owned immovable property in Germany and Lithuania. Her son obtained a European Certificate of Succession from the German authorities, naming him as the sole heir of the deceased’s entire estate. He presented the certificate to the Lithuanian authorities and applied for the immovable property to be recorded in the Real Property Register. They refused to do so on the grounds that the certificate was incomplete, as the European Certificate of Succession submitted did not contain the information required under the Lithuanian Law on the Real Property Register to identify the immovable property by documents to be submitted, in that it did not list the property inherited by the applicant. The heir sought legal redress against this rejection with the Lithuanian courts. Against this background the referring court asked:

Must point (l) of Article 1(2) and Article 69(5) [of Regulation No 650/2012] be interpreted as not precluding legal rules of the Member State in which the immovable property is situated under which the rights of ownership can be recorded in the Real Property Register on the basis of a European Certificate of Succession only in the case where all of the details necessary for registration are set out in that European Certificate of Succession?

AG Szpunar first of all referred to the overall objective of the ESR as spelled out in recital 7 to facilitate the proper functioning of the internal market by removing the obstacles to the free movement of persons who want to assert their rights arising from a cross-border succession (para. 39). In doing so, the Regulation does not harmonise substantive law but has opted for harmonising private international law, choice of law in particular (para. 40) but also provides for the European Certificate of Inheritance, subject to an autonomous legal regime, established by the provisions of Chapter VI (Art. 62 et seq.) of the Regulation.

Article 68 lists the information required in a European Certificate of Succession “to the extent required for the purpose for which it is issued” and this includes “the share for each heir and, if applicable, the list of rights and/or assets for any given heir” (italic emphasis added).

Under a succession law like the German that does not provide for succession other than universal succession it is clear that the estate as a whole, rather than particular assets, is transferred as a totality. AG Szpunar concludes: “That being so, it is not necessary to include an inventory of the estate in the European Certificate of Succession, inasmuch as the situation referred to in point (l) of Article 68 of Regulation No 650/2012 by the phrase ‘if applicable’, the need for a list of assets for any given heir, does not arise” (para. 55). Thus, the phrase “if applicable” is not to be understood solely as a reflection of the wishes of the person applying for a European Certificate of Succession (para. 57). Even though the applicant is required to inform the authority issuing the certificate of its purpose, it is for that authority to decide, based on that information, whether or not an asset should be specified. The Commission Implementing Regulation No 1329/2014 (point 9 of Annex IV to Form V) does not have a bearing on this decision as it can only implement but not modify the Regulation (para. 73).

However, where the situation does not depend upon a national right of succession governed by the principle of universal succession and where the purpose of the certificate can only be achieved by indicating the share of the inheritance for the person in question, “it is most likely that the asset in question should be specified” (para 62). And even if there is no need to list assets (such as under German law), “it should be noted in that regard that, if a European Certificate of Succession is to produce its full effects, a degree of cooperation and mutual trust between the national authorities is required. That may imply that the issuing authority is required, in a spirit of sincere cooperation with the authorities of other Member States, to take account of the requirements of the law governing the register of another Member State, especially if that authority holds relevant information and elements” (para. 65).

Of course, Point (l) of Article 1(2) of the ESR states that “any recording in a register of rights in immovable or movable property, including the legal requirements for such recording, and the effects of recording or failing to record such rights in a register” is excluded from the scope of the regulation. By its judgment in Kubicka, AG Spzunar explained, “the Court found that points (k) and (l) of Article 1(2) and Article 31 of that regulation must be interpreted as precluding refusal, by an authority of a Member State, to recognise the material effects of a legacy ‘by vindication’, provided for by the law governing succession chosen by the testator in accordance with Article 22(1) of that regulation, where that refusal is based on the ground that the legacy concerns the right of ownership of immovable property located in that Member State, whose law does not provide for legacies with direct material effect when succession takes place. As a consequence of that judgment in Kubicka, the German law disputed in the main proceedings was not applied to the transfer of ownership. However, it did not concern real property registration rules. The national property law of a Member State may therefore impose additional procedural requirements, but only inasmuch as any such additional requirements do not concern the status attested by the European Certificate of Succession.” (paras. 77 et seq).

As Advocate General Bot noted in his Opinion in Kubicka, in practice, other documents or information may be required in addition to the European Certificate of Succession where, for example, the information in the certificate is not specific enough to identify the asset the ownership of which must be registered as having been transferred. In the present case, however, AG Szpunar rightly observed, “the Lithuanian authorities have all the information needed for the purpose of making an entry in the Real Property Register: they are able to identify the person to whom the asset in question belongs or belonged and to ascertain, from the European Certificate of Succession, the status of heir of the applicant in the main proceedings”. Thus “the effet utile of the European Certificate of Succession would be undermined if Lithuanian property law were able to impose additional requirements on the applicant” (para. 81).

In other words, even though the contents of a European Certificate of Succession, due to the underlying lex successsionis, may not exactly represent what is required for documentation by the lex registrii of the requested Member State, the overarching principle of the EU’s efforts for integration, namely mutual trust, and, more concretely, the effet utile of the ESR create the obligation of the requested Member State to substitute required documents under its lex registrii as much as functionally possible – a methodical tool that may perhaps be abstractly framed as “extended substitution” and may well develop to a powerful concept for the European Succession Certificate.

Be that as it may, limited to the constellation in question, AG Szpunar concluded:

“Point (l) of Article 1(2), point (l) of Article 68 and Article 69(5) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession preclude the application of provisions of national law pursuant to which an immovable property acquired by a sole heir pursuant to a right of succession governed by the principle of universal succession can only be recorded in the Real Property Register of the Member State in whose territory that asset is located on the basis of a European Certificate of Succession if all the data required under the national law of that Member State to identify the immovable property are included in the certificate.”

The full text of the Opinion is here.

Conventions & Instruments

On 1 July 2022, the HCCH 2007 Child Support Convention and the HCCH 2007 Maintenance Obligations Protocol entered into force for Ecuador. At present, 44 States and the European Union are bound by the Convention, while 30 States and the European Union are bound by the Protocol. More information is available here.

On 8 July 2022, Pakistan deposited its instrument of accession to the HCCH 1961 Apostille Convention. The Convention, which currently has 124 Contracting Parties, will enter into force for Pakistan on 9 March 2023. More information is available here.

On 13 July 2022, Senegal deposited its instrument of accession to the HCCH 1961 Apostille Convention. The Convention, which currently has 124 Contracting Parties, will enter into force for Senegal on 23 March 2023. More information is available here.

 

Meetings & Events

From 4 to 8 July 2022, the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the 1993 Adoption Convention was held online, attended by nearly 400 participants representing HCCH Members, Contracting Parties and Observers. The meeting resulted in the adoption of over 50 Conclusions and Recommendations, providing guidance to (prospective) Contracting Parties on a wide range of issues relating to the practical operation of the 1993 Adoption Convention, including the prevention of illicit practices, post-adoption matters, intrafamily adoptions and alternatives to full adoption, technical assistance and the use of technology. More information is available here.

On 27 July 2022, the HCCH and the Asian Business Law Institute co-hosted the webinar “Cross-border Commercial Dispute Resolution – HCCH 2005 Choice of Court and 2019 Judgments Conventions”. More information is available here.

 

Upcoming Events

The inaugural CODIFI Conference will be held online from 12 to 16 September 2022. CODIFI will examine issues of private international law in the Commercial, Digital, and Financial (CODIFI) sectors, highlighting developments in the digital economy and fintech industries as well as clarifying the roles of core HCCH instruments: the 1985 Trusts Convention, the 2006 Securities Convention, and the 2015 Choice of Law Principles. More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

The Final Conference of the EFFORTS Project

• Date: Friday, 30 September 2022
• Venue: Università degli Studi di Milano – Sala Napoleonica, Via Sant’Antonio, 12 (Milan, Italy) (remote participation is also available)

The Conference is the final event of the EFFORTS (Towards more EFfective enFORcemenT of claimS in civil and commercial matters within the EU) Project, funded by the European Union and conducted by the University of Milan (coord.), the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, the University of Heidelberg, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Zagreb, and the University of Vilnius.

The Conference will provide an international forum where academics, policymakers, and practitioners discuss the Project’s key findings and exchange their views on the national implementation of – and the path forward for – the EFFORTS Regulations (i.e., the Brussels I-bis Regulation and the Regulations on the European Enforcement Order, the European Small Claims Procedure, the European Payment Order, and the European Account Preservation Order).

The Conference will tackle, in particular:

• Current challenges in the EU rules on cross-border enforcement of claims
• The interaction between the EFFORTS Regulations and national enforcement procedures
• Future perspectives for the re-drafting of EU rules on cross-border enforcement of claims

The working language is English; simultaneous translation in Italian will be available.

Registration is compulsory. More information is available here.

 

Project JUST-JCOO-AG-2019-881802
With financial support from the Civil Justice Programme of the European Union

The first issue of 2022 of Giustizia Consensuale (published by Editoriale Scientifica) has just been released, and it features:

Andrea Simoncini (Professor at the University of Florence) and Elia Cremona (PhD, University of Siena), Mediazione e Costituzione (Mediation and Constitution; in Italian)

This paper deals with the issue of the constitutional basis of mediation. After describing the currently dominant view which sees mediation as merely a ‘means’ to an end, such as reducing the judicial backlog, and as a complementary tool to in-court proceedings, the authors argue that mediation could be considered as a constitutional ‘end’ in itself. Thus, by promoting the attainment of a more cohesive society, mediation is seen as a way to fulfil the social solidarity obligations as enshrined in the Italian Constitution.

Claudio Cecchella (Professor at the University of Pisa), La negoziazione assistita nelle controversie sulla crisi delle relazioni familiari dopo la riforma con legge n. 206 del 2021 (Lawyer-Assisted Negotiation Procedure in Family Disputes Subsequent to Law No 206 of 2021; in Italian)

This paper analyses the provisions of Law No 206 of 2021 concerning the negotiation process assisted by attorneys in family disputes. The author firstly examines the provisions which entered into force on 22 June 2022, such as the extension of the scope of application of this negotiation process. Secondly, he explores the provisions that will enter into force at a later date, such as the possibility of agreeing to a lump-sum maintenance payment, the provision of legal aid and the right to take evidence during negotiations. While praising this reform, the author strongly criticizes it for not having provided for the minor’s right to be represented and heard during the negotiation process.

Juan F. Herrero (Professor at the University of Zaragoza), Accordarsi o soccombere (Reaching an Agreement or Losing the Case; in Italian)

Settlement rates are still relatively low compared to the percentage of cases that go to trial. Against this backdrop, the Spanish legislator has committed to reversing the trend. After some early efforts that were in vain, the legislator resorted to two instruments: the mandatory mediation attempt as a prerequisite to instituting judicial proceedings (as an alternative to mediation, parties may opt for other extrajudicial dispute resolution methods), and a new scheme for the allocation of judicial costs. The paper investigates correlations between judicial decisions on cost allocation and mandatory or voluntary extrajudicial settlement attempts. Furthermore, it examines the impact of the aforementioned attempts on the determination of judicial costs, with a special focus on relevant case law. Oftentimes, the risk or likelihood of obtaining an unfavourable – or only partially favourable – decision on the allocation of costs prompts the parties to reach an out-of-court settlement. In fact, if it is not the case, the winning party to litigation stands to lose more than they would gain financially.

Stefania Brun (Professor at the University of Trento), ‘Proceduralizzazione’ dei poteri datoriali e mediazione sindacale. Il laboratorio trentennale in materia di licenziamenti collettivi (Trade Union Mediation in Collective Dismissal. A Study of its Application over Three Decades; in Italian)

This article reviews the three-decade history and present-day application of Law No 223 of 1991 on collective dismissal. While providing an overall positive evaluation of this law, the article seeks to examine the role of the judicial and legislative branches in promoting best practices in its application. In this regard, it emphasizes the role of trade union mediation in the phase preceding collective dismissal as an effective means for reducing judicial scrutiny and ensuring greater legal certainty.

Antonio Cassatella (Professor at the University of Trento), Il procedimento amministrativo come strumento di giustizia consensuale. Potenzialità e limiti (Administrative Procedure as a Means to Reach Consensual Justice. Strengths and Limitations; in Italian)

This paper focuses on settlements reached by an individual and the public administration in the course of an administrative procedure as governed by Law No 241 of 1990. According to the author, these types of settlement are only possible if the administrative procedure is not seen as a unilateral exercise of the public administration’s power, but rather as a way of settling disputes between the administration and citizens. The author argues that the administrative procedure can be considered an alternative dispute resolution mechanism from a theoretical point of view. However, Article 11 of the aforementioned law cannot be considered an effective legal basis for settlement between an individual and the public administration due to its intrinsic limitations. Therefore, the author proposes that the Italian legislator reforms Law No 241 of 1990 taking the German and French legislations as a model.

 

Observatory on Legislation and Regulations

Lorenzo Bianchi (PhD, University of Parma), La conciliazione giudiziale tributaria. Criticità applicative e prospettive di riforma (Judicial Conciliation in Tax Disputes. Inherent Limits and Reform Proposals; in Italian)

This paper analyzes the mechanism of judicial conciliation in tax disputes and its relationship with out-of-court dispute resolution tools. The author examines the historical evolution of judicial conciliation and its current regulation. While exploring the main characteristics of tax disputes, particular attention is given to the inherent limits on reaching an agreement between the parties to litigation and the judicial power to promote settlement. In conclusion, the analysis focuses on the recent Italian reform proposals of the judicial proceedings regarding tax disputes and conciliation mechanisms as incentivized by the Next Generation EU plan.

 

Observatory on Practices

Dilyara Nigmatullina (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Antwerp) and Ruohan Zhu (Project manager at the Shanghai Arbitration Commission), A Study on the Use of Mediation in Combination with Arbitration. The Experience of East Asia with Focus on Mainland China

The article analyses the results of an empirical study about the current use of mediation in combination with arbitration (combinations) in international commercial dispute resolution. This study follows up the original study conducted by one of the article’s authors in 2014-2015, the results of which suggested the existence of a link between the practitioners’ legal culture and their use of a combination where the same neutral acts as a mediator and an arbitrator. The follow-up study further tests the hypothesis about the existence of the mentioned link by involving practitioners based in the East Asia region, predominantly in mainland China, while those taking part in the original questionnaire practiced in Continental Europe and common law jurisdictions in the Asia Pacific region. The article discusses the results of the follow-up study in the context of the findings of the original study before concluding that these results provide further support to the hypothesis that the use of a combination where the same neutral acts as a mediator and an arbitrator varies throughout the world and can be linked to the practitioners’ legal culture.

Francesca Valastro (Case Manger, Milan Chamber of Arbitration), La mediazione in videoconferenza. Dalla situazione emergenziale agli orizzonti futuri. Dati e note a margine di un’indagine empirica (Online Mediation: From Necessity to the Norm. An Empirical Study; in Italian)

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020 affected the way mediations in civil and commercial matters were conducted, transforming online mediation into an absolute necessity. Two years on, the world has changed and in this post-Covid time, it would be advisable to assess how the pandemic has affected the practice of mediation. Will mediation return to be conducted face to face or will online mediation be the future? This article presents the results of the empirical research collected through interviews with fifty attorneys assisting clients in mediation and fifty professional mediators of the Mediation Service at Milan Chamber of Arbitration. Based on the analysis of their responses, the author argues that online mediation will have a pivotal role in the post pandemic world. However, further research and analysis is still necessary to develop best practices and guidelines for effectively managing mediation remotely.

In addition to the foregoing, this issue features the following book review by Giuseppe Buffone (Judge, Justice and Home Affairs Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Italy to the European Union, Brussels): Maria MARTELLO, Una giustizia alta e altra. La mediazione nella nostra vita e nei tribunali (Mediation in Our Courts and in Our Daily Lives. An Empowering Alternative), Roma, Paoline Editoriale Libri, 2022, 1-160.

 

 

Written by Mayela Celis, UNED

On 14 July 2022 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled on the interrelationship between the Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (Brussels II bis Regulation) and the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention. This case concerns proceedings in Sweden and the Russian Federation and deals in particular with the applicability of the perpetuatio fori principle contemplated in Article 8(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. The judgment is available here.

Facts

Mother (CC) gave birth to child (M) in Sweden. CC was granted sole custody of the child from birth.

Until October 2019 child resided in Sweden.

From October 2019 child began to attend a boarding school on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Father (VO) brought an application before the District Court of Sweden and several proceedings ensued in Sweden, holding inter alia that Swedish courts have jurisdiction under Article 8(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. CC brought an application before the Supreme Court of Sweden asking the court to grant leave to appeal and to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.

Question referred for preliminary ruling

‘Does the court of a Member State retain jurisdiction under Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 2201/2003] if the child concerned by the case changes his or her habitual residence during the proceedings from a Member State to a third country which is a party to the 1996 Hague Convention (see Article 61 of the regulation)?’

Main ruling

Article 8(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, read in conjunction with Article 61(a) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that a court of a Member State that is hearing a dispute relating to parental responsibility does not retain jurisdiction to rule on that dispute under Article 8(1) of that regulation where the habitual residence of the child in question has been lawfully transferred, during the proceedings, to the territory of a third State that is a party to the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, signed at The Hague on 19 October 1996 (our emphasis).

Analysis

This is a very welcome judgment as it allows for the proper application of the 1996 Child Protection Convention to a case involving an EU Member State (Sweden) and a Contracting Party to the 1996 Child Protection Convention (the Russian Federation).

At the outset, it should be emphasised that this case deals with the lawful transfer of habitual residence and not with the unlawful transfer (removal or retention) such as in the case of international child abduction. In the latter case both the Brussels II bis Regulation and the 1996 Child Protection Convention provide for the retention of the jurisdiction in the EU Member State / Contracting State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention.

It is also important to clarify that contrary to the Brussels II bis Regulation, the 1996 Child Protection Convention does not adopt the principle of perpetuatio fori when dealing with general basis of jurisdiction (Article 5 of the Convention; see also para. 40 of the judgment). The 1996 Child Protection Convention reflects the view that the concept of habitual residence is predominantly factual and as such, it can change even during the proceedings.

As to the principle of perpetuatio fori, the CJEU indicates:

“By referring to the time when the court of the Member State is seised, Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 is an expression of the principle of perpetuatio fori, according to which that court does not lose jurisdiction even if there is a change in the place of habitual residence of the child concerned during the proceedings” (para. 28, our emphasis).

With regard to the interrelationship between these two instruments, the CJEU says:

“In that regard, it should be noted that Article 61(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 provides that, as concerns the relation with the 1996 Hague Convention, Regulation No 2201/2003 is to apply ‘where the child concerned has his or her habitual residence on the territory of a Member State’” (para. 32).

“It follows from the wording of that provision that it governs relations between the Member States, which have all ratified or acceded to the 1996 Hague Convention, and third States which are also parties to that convention, in the sense that the general rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 ceases to apply where the habitual residence of a child has been transferred, during the proceedings, from the territory of a Member State to that of a third State which is a party to that convention” (para. 33, our emphasis).

In my view, this judgment interprets correctly Article 52 of the 1996 Child Protection Convention, which was heatedly debated during the negotiations, as well as the relevant provisions of the Brussels II bis Regulation. In particular, the formulation in both Article 61(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation “where the child concerned has his or her habitual residence on the territory of a Member State” and Article 52(2) of the 1996 Child Protection Convention “[This Convention does not affect the possibility for one or more Contracting States to conclude agreements which contain] in respect of children habitually resident in any of the States Parties to such agreements [provisions on matters governed by this Convention]” has been properly considered  by the CJEU as the habitual residence of the child is the Russian Federation.

To rule otherwise would have reduced significantly the applicability of the 1996 Child Protection Convention and would have run counter Articles 5(2) and 52(3) of the referred Convention (see para. 42 of the judgment).

As this judgment only deals with Contracting Parties to the 1996 Child Protection Convention, it only makes us wonder what would happen in the case of bilateral treaties or in the absence of any applicable treaty (but see para. 29 of the judgment).

For background information regarding the negotiations of Article 52 of the 1996 Child Protection Convention see:

–  Explanatory Report of Paul Lagarde (pp. 601-603)

– Article by Hans van Loon, “Allegro sostenuto con Brio, or: Alegría Borrás’ Twenty-five Years of Dedicated Work at the Hague Conference.” In J. Forner Delaygua, C. González Beilfuss & R. Viñas Farré (Eds.), Entre Bruselas y La Haya: Estudios sobre la unificación internacional y regional del derecho internacional privado: Liber amicorum Alegría Borrás (pp. 575-586). Madrid: Marcial Pons, pp. 582-583.

 

 

In their most recent article on A Hague Convention on Parallel Proceedings, 63 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 1 (2022), Ron Brand and Paul Herrup argued that the Hague Conference on Private International Law should not undertake a project to require or prohibit exercise of original jurisdiction in national courts. Rather, the goal of current efforts should be to improve the concentration of parallel litigation in a “better forum,” in order to achieve efficient and complete resolution of disputes in transnational litigation. The Hague Conference is now taking this path. As the Experts Group and Working Group have moved forward on the Parallel Proceedings Convention project, however, there has been difficulty in leaving behind existing approaches that have not led to acceptable solutions. In particular, the work has failed to look far beyond the traditional civil law lis alibi pendens and common law forum non conveniens approaches to parallel litigation, or a focus on questions of jurisdiction.

In their new article, available here, the authors argue that the time is ripe for fresh thinking that reflects Twenty-first century realities in finding a workable approach to parallel litigation. They build on the previous article by discussing a possible architecture and some of the critical features of a parallel proceedings convention geared to moving litigation to the better forum.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) has published issue No 47 of the Revista Mexicana de Derecho Internacional Privado y Comparado (Mexican Journal of Private International and Comparative Law).  It is available here.

Click here to access the Journal page.

Below is the table of contents (including abstracts in English):

DOCTRINA

ACTOS JURÍDICOS RELACIONADOS CON BIENES MUEBLES E INMUEBLES EN EL DERECHO INTERESTATAL MEXICANO

Jorge Alberto SILVA

Abstract: This contribution is part of a larger research work on interstate Law related to property, in relation with article 121 of the [Mexican] Constitution. It reformulates the meaning of each of the sections with the treatment of assets from a merely constitutional approach based on judicial precedents and legal scholarship developed from the 19th century to the present. It ends up providing its own interpretive theses.

LA LEY APLICABLE AL CONTRATO DE INTERMEDIARIO QUE AMPARA ACTOS DE CORRUPCIÓN

James A. GRAHAM

Abstract: There is no particular reason to consider the intermediary or commission agent contract as an exception to the rule of lex contractus. The fight against corruption is in the Public Policy Law (“loi de police”), especially the foreign Public Policy Law. Despite the reluctance of judges and arbitrators to apply them due to lack of criteria, we believe that the Rome I Regulation can be used as a form of “international” criterion for both judicial and arbitral tribunals.

HACIA UNA INTERPRETACIÓN UNIFORME DEL CONCEPTO DE RESIDENCIA HABITUAL EN EL CONTEXTO DE LA SUSTRACCIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE MENORES

María Mayela CELIS AGUILAR (also known as Mayela Celis)

Abstract: This article seeks to analyze the concept of habitual residence, as well as the current trend towards its uniform interpretation in the context of international child abduction. In particular, we will try to show that habitual residence is a predominantly factual concept, and therefore flexible, and that its interpretation has an important impact, especially in times of pandemic.

PERSPECTIVAS COMPARADAS DE COMPETENCIA JUDICIAL INTERNACIONAL EN LA UE Y MÉXICO EN LAS CONTROVERSIAS ENTRE EL HUÉSPED-CONSUMIDOR Y LA PLATAFORMA DIGITAL DE ALOJAMIENTO TURÍSTICO

Silvana CANALES GUTIÉRREZ

Abstract: In a dispute arising from a digital intermediation services contract with an international element between a guest-consumer and a digital platform of tourist accommodations is not easy to establish the international jurisdiction. The response of Private International Law in both the European Union and Mexico depends on several factors that vary according to the specific case, and among them may be mentioned, whether or not the guest meets the requirements to be considered as a consumer, and the State where his domicile is located. With respect to the platform is relevant if it has an establishment in the State of domicile of the consumer or if it targets its activities to that State. If a person meets the requirements of a ”consumer”, that fact creates special rights regarding international jurisdiction for consumers domiciled in both the EU and Mexico, however the breadth of such rights reflects their Private International Law systems, which protect the consumer at different levels, on which the comparative analysis of this brief research is based.

JURISPRUDENCIA

NULIDAD DE LAUDO ARBITRAL. COMO CONSECUENCIA DE SER DECLARADA, NO PROCEDE CONDENAR A LOS ÁRBITROS A LA RESTITUCIÓN DE SUS HONORARIOS.

RESEÑAS POR LEONEL PEREZNIETO CASTRO

URUGUAY: TEXTO Y CONTEXTO. LEY GENERAL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO N.º 19.920, Uruguay, FCU, 2021, 280 pp. / Cecilia Fresnedo de Aguirre, Gonzalo A. Lorenzo Idiarte

CHILE: DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO, LEYES, TRATADOS Y JURISPRUDENCIA, Chile, Thomson Reuter, 2022, 721 pp. / Eduardo Picand Albónico

On 19 July 2022, a new Report on practices in Comparative and Cross-Border Perspective was posted on the website of EFFORTS (Towards more EFfective enFORcemenT of claimS in civil and commercial matters within the EU), an EU-funded Project conducted by the University of Milan (coord.), the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, the University of Heidelberg, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Zagreb, and the University of Vilnius.

The Report was authored by Marco Buzzoni and Carlos Santaló Goris (both Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law).

By building upon the deliverables previously published by the Project Partners (available here), the Report casts light on the implementation of five EU Regulations on cross-border enforcement of titles (namely: the Brussels I-bis, EEO, EPO, ESCP, and EAPO Regulations) in the seven EU Member States covered by the Project (Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, and Luxembourg). Against this background, the Report notably provides an in-depth analysis of national legislation and case law in an effort to identify general trends and outstanding issues regarding the cross-border recovery of claims within the European Union.

Regular updates on the EFFORTS Project are available via the Project’s website, as well as LinkedIn and Facebook pages.

Project JUST-JCOO-AG-2019-881802
With financial support from the Civil Justice Programme of the European Union

The latest issue of RabelsZ has just been released. It contains the following contributions:

 

OBITUARY

Jürgen Basedow: Ulrich Drobnig *25.11.1928 †2.3.2022, 571–576, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0052

ESSAYS

Daniel Gruenbaum: From Statehood to Effectiveness: The Law of Unrecognised States in Private International Law, 577–616, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0053

One of the functions of private international law (PIL) is to determine the law that governs a legal relationship. Yet what occurs when the rules designated by PIL emanate from an entity that has not been recognised as a state by the government of the forum? This article aims firstly to identify and describe the major prevailing approaches to applying the law of unrecognised states in contemporary PIL practice. It then critically appraises the principal reasons justifying the application of foreign law despite it emanating from unrecognised states. The article finally argues that applying the law of unrecognised states reveals the potential for PIL to grapple with non-state rules and with interactions of normative orders of all different sorts, regardless of their state pedigree.

Matthias Fervers: Die Drittwirkungen der Forderungsabtretung im Internationalen Privatrecht, 617–643, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0054

Third-Party Effects of Assignments of Claims in Private International Law. – Although Art. 14 Rome I Regulation addresses the relationship between the assignor and the assignee as well as the relationship between the assignee and the debtor, there is still no provision as to the third-party effects of assignments. The question of what law should govern these third-party effects is, correspondingly, a subject of considerable discussion. While some propose that the law governing the assigned claim should be applicable, others suggest that third-party effects should be governed by the law that applies to the contract between the assignor and the assignee; the current prevailing opinion assumes that third-party effects should be governed by the law of the habitual residence of the assignor. This article demonstrates that a limited possibility for a choice of law for assignor and assignee is the most appropriate solution.

Christoph Wendelstein: Der Handel von Kryptowährungen aus der Perspektive des europäischen Internationalen Privatrechts, 644–686, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0055

The Trading of Cryptocurrencies from the Perspective of European Private International Law. – The rules in the Rome I Regulation are used to ascertain the applicable law in cases of trades in cryptocurrencies. However, these are only partially appropriate for a predictable determination of the applicable law. While in B2B and C2C cases of “stationary” trading of cryptocurrencies via Crypto-ATMs the law at the location of the ATM still provides a predictable legal system, this is not the case for online trading with crypto-brokers or via crypto exchanges. Especially in cases of online trading via crypto exchanges, a further complication results from the fact that such platforms allow their users to trade legally under a pseudonym – in line with the historical notion of cryptocurrencies. This may complicate or even prevent the determination of the applicable law. The resulting “vacuum” is to some extent filled by the technical design of the transaction through the use of smart contracts. However, this does not dispense with the question of applicable law. The article examines these and other questions and points out possible solutions de lege lata.