Conflictoflaws

On Tuesday, Nov 2, 2021, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its 15th  monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00-12:30. Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (Edinburgh University and currently a fellow at the  Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law) will speak, in English, about the topic An Intercultural Paradigm for Private International Law

What does an interculturalist perspective bring to private international law? A dialogical constructivist intercultural paradigm for private international law reflects a post-modern conception of law that embraces cultural diversity and pluralism; strives to invert its technical indifference (‘neutrality’) into technical (pluralist) commitment to normative societal changes; and promotes broader intersectional bottom-up engagement (grounded on freedom and solidarity). This rupturist yet constructive relational (engaging with the concrete other) paradigm, challenges and crosses boundaries between the public and private, mobilises the discipline towards inclusivity and against inequalities, and interlinks the local, the national, the regional and the global spheres, promoting an ethos of fruitful intercultural and inter-systemic communication (fostering deeper dialogues between different modes of thinking, and different knowledge systems), of value to our multicultural societies.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here. If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

(These abstracts can also be found at the IPRax-website under the following link: https://www.iprax.de/en/contents/)

 

T. Maxian Rusche: Available actions in the German courts against the abuse of intra-EU investor-State arbitration proceedings

The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in Achmea that intra-EU investment arbitration violates fundamental rules of EU law. However, arbitration tribunals have revolted against that judgment, and consider in constant manner that they remain competent to decide cases brought by EU investors against EU Member States. German law offers an interesting option for States to defend themselves against new intra-EU investment arbitration cases. Based on § 1032 paragraph 2 Civil Procedure Code, the German judge can decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement if a case is brought prior to the constitution of the arbitration tribunal. Recently, Croatia has successfully used that possibility in an UNCITRAL arbitration initiated by an Austrian investor on the basis of the Croatia-Austria BIT. The Netherlands have recently brought two cases in ICSID arbitrations based on the Energy Charter Treaty. If the investor refuses to comply with a finding that there is no valid arbitration agreement, Member States can seek an anti-arbitration injunction.

 

F.M. Wilke: German Conflict of Laws Rules for Electronic Securities

In June 2021, Germany introduced the option of electronic securities, doing away with the traditional principle that securities must be incorporated in a piece of paper. The blockchain-ready Electronic Securities Act (Gesetz über elektronische Wertpapiere: eWpG) comes with its own conflict of laws provision. This paper addresses the subject matter, connecting factors, and questions of the applicable law of said rule. One main challenge consists in reconciling the new rule with an existing (much-discussed, yet still quite opaque) conflict of laws provision in the Securities Account Act. While the connecting factor of state supervision of an electronic securities register may appear relatively straightforward, it is shown that it can actually lead to gaps or an accumulation of applicable laws. While the Electronic Securities Act contains a solution for the former issue, the latter proves more complicated. Finally, it is not obvious whether the new rule allows a renvoi. The author tentatively suggests a positive answer in this regard.

 

M. Pika: The Choice of Law for Arbitration Agreements

Ever since 2009, when the German choice-of-law provisions for contracts were removed and the Rome I Regulation with its carve-out for arbitration agreements entered into force, the choice of law for arbitration agreements has been debated in Germany. On 26 November 2020, the German Federal Court of Justice addressed this matter, albeit inconclusively. The court held that the enforcement provision Article V (1) lit. a New York Convention applies already before or during arbitral proceedings. Pursuant to this provision, the arbitration agreement is governed by the law chosen by the parties and, subsidiarily, the law of the seat. This leads to an internationally well-known follow-up problem: whether the parties, when choosing the law applicable to the main contract, have impliedly chosen the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. This matter was left open by the Federal Court of Justice.

 

F. Rieländer: Joinder of proceedings and international jurisdiction over consumer contracts: A complex interplay between the Brussels Regime and domestic law of civil procedure

Whether the “international nature” of a contractual relationship between two parties to a dispute established in the same Member State might possibly stem from a separate contract between the claimant and a foreign party, for the purposes of determining jurisdiction according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, continues to be a contentious issue ever since the ECJ ruling on the Maletic case (C-478/12). Particularly illuminating are two recent decisions given by the Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht. Whilst the Court, understandably enough, did not wish to deviate from the case law of the ECJ, it probably unnecessarily extended the purview of the dubious Maletic judgment in Case 1 AR 31/20. With regard to division of labour on part of the defendants there is no need for an overly expansive interpretation of the term “other contracting party” within the meaning of Article 18(1) Brussels Ibis Regulation because the “international element” of a contractual relationship between a consumer and a trader established in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile simply derives from the subject-matter of the proceedings where the contractual obligation of the trader is to be performed in another State. Taken in conjunction with its decision in Case 1 AR 56/20, the Court seemingly favours a subject-matter-related test of “international character”, while the Court at the same time, in Case 1 AR 31/20, respectfully adopts the authoritative interpretation of the ECJ in Maletic. Simply for the sake of clarity, it should be mentioned that even if the legal relationship between a consumer and one of the defendants, considered alone, bears no international character, a subsequent joinder of proceedings at the legal venue of the consumer’s place of residence is nonetheless possible pursuant to § 36(1) No 3 ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure) if jurisdiction is established in relation to at least one of the defendants according to Article 18(1) Brussels Ibis Regulation and the general place of jurisdiction of all other defendants is situated in the Federal Republic of Germany

 

M. Andrae: For the application of Art. 13 (3) No. 2 EGBGB, taking into account the spirit and purpose of the law against child marriage

Art. 13 (3) No. 2 EGBGB (Introductory Law to the Civil Code) stipulates that a marriage can be annulled under German law if the person engaged to be married was 16 but not 18 years of age at the time of the marriage. The legal norm relates to a marriage where foreign law governs the ability to marry and where the marriage has been effectively concluded under this law. The rule has rightly been heavily criticized in the scientific literature. As long as the legal norm is applicable law, it should be interpreted in a restrictive manner, as far as the wording and the purpose of the law against child marriage allow. The article focuses on the intertemporal problem. In addition, it is discussed whether the legal norm is to be applied universally or only if there is a sufficient domestic reference. The article follows the restrictive interpretation of the BGH of Section 1314 (1) No. 1 BGB, insofar as it concerns marriages that are covered by Art. 13 (3) No. 2 EGBGB. According to this, the court can reject the annulment of the marriage in individual cases, if all aspects of the protection of minors speak against it.

 

D. Looschelders: Cross-border enforcement of agreements on the Islamic dower (mahr) and recognition of family court rulings in German-Iranian legal relations

The cross-border enforcement of agreements on the Islamic dower (mahr) can present significant difficulties in German-Iranian legal relations. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that mutual recognition of family court rulings is not readily guaranteed. Against this background, the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Celle deals with the recognition of an Iranian family court ruling concerning a claim for recovery of the Islamic dower. The Higher Regional Court of Hamburg on the other hand discusses in its decision whether a husband can sue his wife for participation in a divorce under Iranian religious law as contained in their divorce settlement agreement on the occasion of a divorce by a German court. The recognition of a judicial divorce is not per se excluded in Iran; however, the husband required his wife’s participation due to Iranian religious laws in order for her waiver on the Islamic dower to gain legal effectiveness under Iranian law. The court rejected the claim as it drew upon the state divorce monopoly contained in Art. 17 (3) EGBGB (Introductory Act to the German Civil Code) and § 1564 BGB (German Civil Code). Consequently, despite the waiver declared in Germany, the respondent is free to assert her claim for recovery of the Islamic dower in Iran.

 

M. Andrae: HMP: Maintenance Obligations between ex-spouses if the parties lived together as an unmarried couple for a long time before the marriage

The main focus is on the relationship between Art. 3 (general rule on applicable law) and Art. 5. (special rule with respect to spouses and ex-spouses) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol. The following legal issues are discussed: Are maintenance obligations arising out of unmarried relationships included within scope of the HMP? Is Art. 5 HMP to be interpreted as an exception in relation to Art. 3 HMP? How is the phrase “closer connection with the marriage” in the Art. 5 HMP to be interpreted? Should a period of time in an unmarried relationship before a marriage be taken into account in relation to Art. 5 HUP? What is the significance of the last common habitual residence during the marriage with regard to the escape clause if the parties previously lived in different countries for professional reasons?

 

C. von Bary: Recognition of a Foreign Adoption of an Adult

In its decision on the recognition of a foreign adoption of an adult, the German Federal Court of Justice addresses questions concerning procedure and public policy. The special provisions for proceedings in adoption matters do not apply in recognition proceedings, which has consequences for the remedies available. Considering the effect on the ground for refusal of recognition due to a lack of participation (§ 109(1) No. 2 FamFG), courts only have to hear the other children of the adopting person rather than them being a party to the proceedings. The Court also sets strict criteria for a violation of public policy in the case of a foreign adoption of an adult. It only amounts to a violation of public policy when the parties deliberately seek to evade the prerequisites under German law by going abroad, which seems to imply that there are no fundamental principles specific to the adoption of an adult.

 

H. Roth: Enforcement issues due to a decision repealed in the State of origin

The decision of the German Federal Court of Justice was handed down pursuant to intertemporal civil procedure law and also to the Brussels I Regulation, which requires a declaration of enforceability for enforcement in another Member State. The court rightly upheld its settled case-law that a decision subsequently repealed in the State of origin cannot be authorized for enforcement. The ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice has significance for future cases examined on the basis of the new Brussels Ia Regulation, which states that enforcement can occur in another Member State without a declaration of enforceability. If the decision in the State of origin is subsequently repealed, a debtor in the executing State can choose for this fact to be taken into account either in the refusal of enforcement proceedings pursuant to Articles 46 et seq. Brussels Ia Regulation or in the execution itself by the competent executing body pursuant to Section 1116 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO).

 

O. Remien: Étroitement liée? – On jurisdiction for a damages action against an arbitrator after setting-aside of the award and artt. 1 (2) (d) and 7 (1) (b) Brussels Ibis-Regulation

In Saad Buzwair Automotive Co, Cour d’appel and Tribunal Judiciaire de Paris were of opposite opinions on the question which courts are competent to decide on a damages action against an arbitrator after setting-aside of the award. In an ICC arbitration with seat in Paris but hearings and domicile of the three arbitrators in Germany, the Qatari claimant had been unsuccessful against the Emirati respondent, but later the award had been set aside by the Cour d’appel de Paris and this setting-aside been confirmed by the Cour de cassation. The Qatari company sued one of the German arbitrators for damages before the Paris courts. The first instance Tribunal Judiciaire found that the arbitration exception of art. 1 (2) (d) Brussels Ibis did not apply to the action for damages based on an alleged breach of the arbitrator’s contract; further, it held that the place of performance under art. 7 (1) (b) Brussels Ibis was in Germany where the arbitrators lived and had acted. The Cour d’appel disagreed, the leitmotiv being that the damages action is closely connected (étroitement liée) to the arbitration. It found that the arbitration exception applied, so that the Brussels Ibis Regulation was inapplicable, and that under the autonomous French place of performance rule the place of performance was in Paris. After recalling the importance of the arbitrator’s contract this note distinguishes the damages action against the arbitrator from the arbitration between the original parties, points out that the courts of the seat of the arbitration are not necessarily competent for damages actions against an arbitrator and stresses the negative consequence of the ruling of the Cour d’appel – an eventual judgment awarding damages would not fall under the Brussels Ibis Regulation and thus not necessarily be enforceable in other Member States! Further, it is unclear whether the arbitration exception would also apply to an action for payment of the arbitrator’s fees. Finally, the situation where an arbitral award is not set-aside, perhaps even cannot be set aside, by the courts of the seat but where its enforcement is denied in another state is taken account of and can in case of a damages action lead to the competence of a court other than that of the seat of the arbitration. As to the place of performance, the two courts apply similar autonomous French respectively EU-rules, but with diverging results: the Cour d’appel stressing again the close connection, the Tribunal Judiciaire applying a more concrete fact-based approach. In sum, there are good arguments in favour of the decision of the Tribunal Judiciaire and a judgment of the ECJ on these questions would be welcome.

 

 

The third issue of 2021 of the Dutch journal on private international law (NIPR) is available. A number of papers are dedicated to Brexit and private international law.

 

Brexit en ipr/brexit and pilSumner, Eerst de echtscheiding, dan de afwikkeling! Brexit en het internationaal privaatrecht / p. 433-453

Abstract

Brexit has changed a lot in the legal landscape. There are few areas of the law that have been unaffected, and international family law is no exception. In this article, attention will be paid to the various areas of international family law that have been affected by the Brexit, drawing attention to the new legal regimes that are applicable with respect to these areas of the law (for example divorce, child protection and maintenance). Each section will further discuss how the new regime differs from the old regime, drawing attention to particular difficulties that may occur in the application of these new rules to the specific situation of the United Kingdom.

Berends, Internationaal insolventierecht tussen het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Nederland na de Brexit / p. 454-470

Abstract

What are the legal consequences in the Netherlands of a British insolvency proceeding since Brexit? In the Netherlands, there is no Act on this matter, and the answers must be found in case law. A foreign representative does not need to apply for recognition. He can exercise his rights unless an interested party prevents him from doing so in a legal procedure, for instance on the ground that the recognition of the insolvency proceeding would be contrary to public policy. A foreign proceeding has the applicable legal consequences according to the law of the State where the insolvency proceeding was opened, with some exceptions. Execution against the debtor’s assets in the Netherlands remains possible.

What are the legal consequences in the United Kingdom of a Dutch insolvency proceeding since Brexit? The United Kingdom has enacted the Model Law of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. A foreign representative must apply for recognition. Upon recognition, individual actions concerning the debtor’s assets and execution are stayed, unless such actions and execution are necessary to preserve a claim against the debtor. The consequences of recognition can be modified or terminated if the Court is not satisfied that the interests of interested parties are adequately protected. The so-called Gibbs Rule applies: a party to a contract made and to be performed in England is not discharged from liability under such contract by a discharge in bankruptcy or liquidation under the law of a foreign country in which he is domiciled.

Bens, Brussel na de Brexit: nieuwe regels in burgerlijke en handelszaken? / p. 471-492

Abstract

The UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020, although the Brussels Ibis Regulation remained applicable in and for the UK until the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020. This article analyses the changes in the framework for international jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in cross-border civil and commercial matters between the Netherlands and the UK after 1 January 2021. After setting the historical context, the transitional provisions provided for the Brussels regime in the Withdrawal Agreement are scrutinised. It is argued that, considering these arrangements and the current EU framework for judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters, the Brussels Convention and the NL-UK Enforcement Treaty of 1967 are not applicable to proceedings instituted after 1 January 2021. Consequently, the rules governing international jurisdiction and the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgements applicable to ‘new’ cases and judgements are outlined and salient problems are highlighted. It is argued that most of these rules are not new, but are rather cast in a different perspective through Brexit, thereby raising some ‘old’ problems that require careful (re-)consideration of the post-Brexit legal framework.

 

Other articles

 

L.M. van Bochove, De voorzienbaarheid herzien? De fluctuerende invulling van het vereiste dat bevoegdheid ex artikel 7(2) Brussel Ibis redelijkerwijs voorzienbaar is / p. 493-506

Abstract

This article discusses the requirement that the jurisdiction over matters in tort, based on Article 7(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation, is reasonably foreseeable for the defendant. An analysis of CJEU case law shows that the interpretation of what is ‘reasonably foreseeable’ fluctuates. Often, the threshold is set rather low, but in two recent cases the CJEU seems to have adopted a stricter interpretation. In VEB/BP and Mittelbayerischer Verlag, the foreseeability requirement actually precludes the attribution of jurisdiction on the basis of established (sub-)criteria, including the place of damage and the centre of main interest. This article attempts to identify the rationale for the use of different yardsticks of reasonable foreseeability. It offers two possible explanations: the degree of the culpability of the defendant and the desired outcome in terms of jurisdiction, in particular the opportunity to use jurisdiction rules as a means to promote the enforcement of EU law. However, both explanations are problematic, in view of the Regulation’s scheme and objectives. This paper argues in favour of a uniform, rather strict interpretation, which ensures that the defendant can reasonably foresee the jurisdiction of the court and avoids a multitude of competent courts. Current law offers no legal basis to consider the enforcement of (EU) law as a factor to establish a reasonably foreseeable jurisdiction; this would require intervention by the European legislator.

 

Schmitz, Rechtskeuze in consumentenovereenkomsten: artikel 6 lid 2 Rome I-Verordening en de Nederlandse rechter / p. 507-331

Abstract

Party autonomy has been a widely accepted principle of private international law ever since the Rome Convention. Yet, the right to choose the applicable law is often restricted when weaker parties are involved. According to Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation, the parties to a consumer contract may choose the applicable law provided that this choice does not deprive ‘the consumer of the protection afforded to him’ by the objectively applicable law (the law of his habitual place of residence). In the Netherlands, academic opinion is still divided on the issue of how ‘deprived of protection’ should be interpreted. Some argue that the objectively applicable law trumps the chosen law, even if the latter is more beneficial for the consumer. Others want to apply the law that better protects the consumer – regardless of whether it is the chosen or the objectively applicable law. This question goes hand in hand with a (possibly complex) legal comparison between both systems of law. How this comparison needs to be exercised is unclear. Delving deeply into Dutch case law shows that Dutch judges do not have a ‘joined approach’. This paper uses a case study to illustrate that following a certain approach when applying Article 6(2) Rome I can alter the level of protection that the consumer enjoys. A lack of guidance from the European Court of Justice could be at fault here; and national courts should refer a question as to the ‘right way’ of applying Article 6(2) Rome I to the Court.

te Winkel, X.P.A. van Heesch, The Shell judgment – a bombShell in private international law? / p. 532-542

Abstract

This article discusses the recent judgment of the District Court of The Hague in Milieudefensie et al. v. RDS (May 26, 2021, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:5337). It reviews the most important substantive rulings of the Court and then focusses on the private international law aspects of the case. Milieudefensie et al. argued that the adoption of the concern policy for the Shell Group by RDS qualifies as the Handlungsort and that Dutch law is therefore applicable to their claims based on Article 7 Rome II Regulation. RDS disagreed with this line of reasoning for multiple reasons. Since there is (as yet) no legal precedent regarding this discussion, both Milieudefensie and RDS relied on the analogous application of case law that concerned the interpretation of the Handlungsort under the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The legal debate between the parties regarding this aspect and the conclusion of the Court are set out in this article. The authors conclude with an analysis of the assessment of the Court and suggest that, given the impact of this ruling and the fact that there is no legal precedent, the Court ex officio should have requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice.

Case note

Arons, HvJ EU 12 mei 2021, zaak C-709/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:377, NIPR 2021, 267 (VEB/BP) / p. 543-550

Abstract

In this judgment the CJEU has ruled on localising purely financial losses in order to determine jurisdiction in tort claims. A claimant may sue a defendant on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in the court of another Member State at the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur. The CJEU has reiterated that the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ may not be construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the adverse consequences of an event caused damage to the claimant.

For jurisdiction on this basis a close connection has to be established between the place where the damage occurred and the court addressed by the claimant. This ensures certainty for the defendant: the defendant has to be able to reasonably foresee the court(s) where he may be sued.

The mere location of an investment account is not sufficient to establish the required close connection; additional circumstances are required (paras. 34 and 35). In the Kolassa case (C-375/13) information was published and notified by the defendant in a prospectus aimed at investors in Austria. The CJEU ruled that foreseeability is not ensured if the claim is brought before the courts in the Member State where the investment account used for the purchase of securities listed on the stock exchange of another State is situated, and the issuer of those securities is not subject to statutory reporting obligations in the Member State where the investment account is held by the purchaser (para. 34). A claim can only be brought on the basis of Article 7(2) against a listed company for publishing misleading information to investors in the jurisdiction where that company had to comply, for the purposes of its listing, with statutory reporting obligations. It is only in that Member State that a listed company can reasonably foresee the existence of an investment market and incur liability (para. 35).

 

This post is written by Joshua Folkard, Barrister at Twenty Essex.

 

In FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC v Lady Brownlie [2021] UKSC 45 (“Brownlie II”), the Supreme Court held as a matter of ratio by a 4:1 majority that consequential loss satisfies the ‘tort gateway’ in Practice Direction (“PD”) 6B, para. 3.1(9)(a).

 

Background

 

PD 6B, para. 3.1(9)(a) provides that tort claims can be served out of the jurisdiction of England & Wales where “damage was sustained, or will be sustained, within the jurisdiction”. Brownlie concerned a car accident during a family holiday to Egypt, which tragically claimed the lives of Sir Ian Brownlie (Chichele Professor of Public International Law at the University of Oxford) and his daughter Rebecca: at [1], [10] & [91]. On her return to England, however, Lady Brownlie suffered consequential losses including bereavement and loss of dependency in this jurisdiction: at [83].

 

The question whether mere consequential loss satisfies the tort gateway had been considered before by the Supreme Court in the very same case: Brownlie v Four Seasons [2017] UKSC 80; [2018] 2 All ER 91 (“Brownlie I”). By a 3:2 majority expressed “entirely obiter” (Brownlie II, at [45]) the Court had answered affirmatively: [48]-[55] (Baroness Hale), [56] (Lord Wilson) & [68]-[69] (Lord Clarke). However, the obiter nature of that holding combined with a forceful dissent from Lord Sumption (see [23]-[31]) had served to prolong uncertainty on this point.

 

Majority’s reasoning

 

When asked the same question again, however, a differently-constituted majority of the same Court gave the same answer. Lord Lloyd-Jones (with whom Lords Reed, Briggs, and Burrows agreed: see [5] & [7])) concluded that there was “no justification in principle or in practice, for limiting ‘damage’ in paragraph 3.1(9)(a) to damage which is necessary to complete a cause of action in tort or, indeed, for according any special significance to a place simply because it was where the cause of action was completed”: at [49]. The ‘consequential’ losses suffered in England were accordingly sufficient to ground English jurisdiction for the tort claims.

 

Three main reasons were given. First, Lord Lloyd-Jones held that there had been no “assimilation” of the tests at common law and under the Brussels Convention/Regulation, which would have been “totally inappropriate” given the “fundamental differences between the two systems”: at [54]-[55]. Second, his Lordship pointed to what he described as an “impressive and coherent line” of (mostly first-instance) authority to the same effect: at [64]. Third, it was said that the “safety valve” of forum conveniens meant that there was “no need to adopt an unnaturally restrictive reading of the domestic gateways”: at [77].

 

Economic torts?

 

What is now the position as regards pure economic loss cases? Although Lord Lloyd-Jones concluded that the term “damage” in PD 6B, para. 3.1(9)(a) “simply refers to actionable harm, direct or indirect, caused by the wrongful act alleged” (at [81]), his Lordship expressly stated that:

 

• “I would certainly not disagree with the proposition, supported by the economic loss cases, that to hold that the mere fact of any economic loss, however remote, felt by a claimant where he or she lives or, if a corporation, where it has its business seat would be an unsatisfactory basis for the exercise of jurisdiction”: at [76].

 

• “The nature of pure economic loss creates a need for constraints on the legal consequences of remote effects and can give rise to complex and difficult issues as to where the damage was suffered, calling for a careful analysis of transactions. As a result, the more remote economic repercussions of the causative event will not found jurisdiction”: at [75].

 

The status of previous decisions on the meaning of PD 6B, para. 3.1(9)(a) in economic tort cases appears to have been called into doubt by Brownlie II because (as noted by Lord Leggatt, dissenting: at [189]) those decisions had relied upon an “inference” that PD 6B, para. 3.1(9)(a) should be interpreted consistently with the Brussels Convention/Regulation. That approach was, however, rejected by both the majority and minority of the Supreme Court: at [74] & [189]. It therefore appears likely that the application of Brownlie II to economic torts will be the subject of significant future litigation.

Conventions & Instruments

On 5 October 2021, Indonesia deposited its instrument of accession to the HCCH 1961 Apostille Convention, in a ceremony held during the meeting of the Special Commission on the practical operation of the Apostille Convention. With the accession of Indonesia, the Apostille Convention now has 121 Contracting Parties. It will enter into force for Indonesia on 4 June 2022. With this accession, Indonesia becomes the 156th HCCH Connected Party. More information is available here.

Meetings & Events

On 4 October 2021, the HCCH hosted the 12th International Forum on the electronic Apostille programme (e-APP). Throughout the day, experts from around the globe shared their experiences with the development and implementation of the e-APP, its role in the context of e-Government initiatives, and the future of document authentication. More information is available here.

From 5 to 8 October 2021, the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission on the practical operation of the Apostille Convention was held via videoconference. The meeting coincided with the 60th anniversary of the Apostille Convention. The Special Commission considered the scope and operation of the Convention, including the electronic Apostille Programme (e-APP). Delegates discussed matters relating to the COVID?19 pandemic, plans for the second edition of the Apostille Handbook, and the outcomes of the Experts Group on the e-APP and New Technologies. More information is available here.

On 7 October 2021, the HCCH hosted a virtual seminar on the HCCH 1965 Service Convention and the HCCH 1970 Evidence Convention for the Supreme Court of Ukraine. This will be the first of a series of seminars, organised through the generous support of the EU Project Pravo-Justice, aimed at facilitating the proper and effective implementation of the HCCH Conventions and instruments in Ukraine. More information is available here.

On 8 October 2021, the HCCH hosted a virtual seminar on the negotiation and adoption of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. More information on the 2019 Judgments Convention is available here.

From 11 to 15 October 2021, the Working Group on Matters Related to Jurisdiction in Transnational Civil or Commercial Litigation met for the first time, via videoconference. The Group commenced work on the development of draft provisions on parallel proceedings, to further inform policy considerations and decisions in relation to the scope and type of any new instrument. More information is available here.

On 19 October 2021, the HCCH hosted the HCCH|Approach Global Event. Held online in celebration of the 25th anniversary of the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention, the event featured a series of lectures and a live panel discussion by global experts. The winners of the HCCH|Approach Essay Competition and the HCCH|Approach Media and Design Competition were announced during the event. More information is available here.

On 28 October 2021, the HCCH Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean hosted an online event for Central Authorities of the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention from the region, as part of the HCCH|Approach Initiative.

Other

Save the Date: HCCH a|Bridged Edition 2021 will be held online on Wednesday, 1 December 2021. This year’s edition will discuss contemporary issues relating to the application of the?HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention,?including the establishment of?international commercial courts around the globe and how it enables party autonomy. Registration will open on Monday, 1 November. More information is available here.

Vacancy: Applications are now open for the position of Library Assistant (8 to 16 hours per week). The deadline for the submission of applications is this Sunday, 31 October 2021 (12:00 a.m. CET). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

Guest post by Dr Sagi Peari, Senior Lecturer/Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia

When it comes to the question of the applicable law that governs disputes involving corporations: one must make a sharp distinction between two principal matters: (1) matters relating to external interactions of corporation (such as disputes between a corporation and other external actors, such as other business entities or individuals); and (2) matters relating to the internal interactions of a corporation (such as disputes within the corporate structure or  litigation between a corporation and its directors). A claim of a corporation against another in relation to a breach of contract between the two is an example of a dispute related to external affairs of a corporation. A claim of a corporate shareholder against a director in the firm is an example of a dispute concerning corporate internal affairs.

The division between external and internal affairs of corporation is an important one for the question of applicable law. A review of the case law suggests a strong tendency of the courts to apply the same choice-of-law rules applicable to private individuals. Thus, the general rule of the place of tort applies equally to corporations and private individuals.[1] In similar, the advancing principle of party autonomy[2] does not distinguish between corporations and other litigants on its operational level. The very fact that litigation involves a corporation does not seem prima facie to affect the identity of the applicable law rules.

The situation becomes dramatically different in cases concerning the internal affairs of a corporation. These are the situations involving claims between the corporate actors (i.e. executives, shareholders and directors) and claims between those actors and the corporation itself. Here, different considerations seem to apply. First, internal affairs of corporations tend to be excluded by the various international statutes aiming to harmonise the applicable law rules.[3] Second, there is a clear tendency of the rules to adhere to a single connecting factor (such as the place of incorporation or corporate headquarters with some further constitutional implications[4]) to determine the question of the applicable law. Thirdly, there is a clear tendency of rejecting the party autonomy principle in this sphere according to which  corporate actors are not free to determine the applicable law to govern their dispute.[5]

One of the neglected frameworks for addressing the external/internal affairs distinction relates to the classical corporate law theory on the nature of corporations and the relationships within the corporate structure. Thus, the classical vision of corporations perceives a corporation as an artificial entity that places the state at the very centre of the corporate creation, existence and activity.[6] Another, perhaps contradictory vision, challenges the artificial nature of corporation. It views corporation as an independent moral actor what dissects its existence from the originating act of incorporation.[7] Lastly, the third vision of corporation evaluates the corporate existence from the internal point of view by focusing on the bundle/nexus of contracts within the corporate structure.[8]

One could argue that an exercise of tackling the various theories of corporations could provide an invaluable tool for a better understanding of the internal/external division and subsequently shed light on the question of applicable law rules. Thus, for example, the traditional insistence of choice-of-law to equalise between corporations and private individuals seems to correlate with the ‘personality’ vision of corporation. On a related note, the insistence of the choice-of-law doctrine on a single connecting factor that denies party autonomy seems to be at odds with the nexus-contract theory and aligns with the traditional artificial entity theory of the corporation.

From this perspective, placing this question within the conceptual framework of corporate law could enable us to grasp the paradigmatic nature of the division and contemplate on whether the various suggestions for reform in the area of choice-of-law rules applicable to corporations do not just correlate with the underlying concerns and rationales of private international law/conflict of laws, but also those of corporate law.

I have tackled these (and other) matters in my recent article published in the 45 (3) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 469-530 (2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3905751.

 

[1] See eg Regulation 864/2007, on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC), art 4 (1).

[2] See eg Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, 2015.

[3] See eg Regulation 864/2007, on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC), art 1 (2) (f).

[4] See eg Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999).

[5] See eg Hague Principles, Commentaries, 1.27-1.29.

[6] See eg Dartmauth College v Woodward 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)

[7] See eg Peter A French, ‘Responsibility and the Moral Role of Corporate Entities’, in Business as Humanity (Thomas J Donaldson and RE Freeman eds, 1994) 90.

[8] Of course, the distinction between the above-mentioned three theories is not sharp and variations and overlaps have been suggested over the years in the corporate law literature.

 

The Research Center on Private International Law of the University Jean Moulin Lyon III (EDIEC – EA 4185) is organizing a 3-day conference (dir. sc. Ludovic Pailler et Cyril Nourissat). The ambitious program proposed by the organizers does not only aim to take stock of a vicennial construction of the law of judicial cooperation in civil matters. It should also allow the speakers to assess whether this field of Union law is merely a pile of autonomous texts (at most likely to constitute a few large blocks – family, obligations, etc.) or whether, beyond that, a comprehensive work is taking shape, a true “system” of private international law, in particular thanks to the many judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This event will also be an opportunity to question the necessity of a system of private international law in order to constitute the area of civil justice called for by the European Commission.

In order to take up this major scientific challenge, the colloquium brings together eminent European authors, specialists in Private international law and Union law. Their analysis will be usefully completed by a comparative approach from points of view from outside the Union (China, Maghreb, USA) and by the intervention of practitioners (lawyers, bailiffs, notaries), better able to evaluate the usefulness of a system for their daily work.

by Paul Patreider

The European Project “DXB – Identities on the move – Documents cross borders” aims at facilitating the dissemination and implementation of Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 in the everyday practice of several EU Member States, improve the knowledge of the links between circulation of public documents, fundamental rights and freedom of movement, ensure a sound implementation of the Regulation for “hard cases” and raise awareness among registrars and legal practitioners. The partnership is supported by a consortium of academic institutions and associations of registrars. More information on the Project and its partners on the official website.

DxB’s Final Conference takes place on 23–24 June 2022 at the premises of A.N.U.S.C.A.’s Academy in Castel San Pietro Terme, Bologna (Italy). The conference will offer a unique opportunity to take stock of the implementation status of Regulation (EU) 2016/1191. The event will also launch the Commentary and the EU-wide comparative survey placing the Regulation in the context of daily national practice.

The Conference will be a truly international event, gathering scholars, registrars, public administrators, political scientists, judges, PhD students and practitioners from all over Europe. Translation services are offered in English, Italian and German. To ensure wide participation as well as the variety of topics and viewpoints, we are pleased to announce a Call for Papers & Panels.

 

CONFERENCE TOPICS

Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 on promoting the free movement of citizens by simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public documents has so far gone largely unnoticed in scholarly debates and practitioners’ discussions. As issues related to the circulation and mutual recognition of authentic instruments in civil status and criminal matters are becoming more and more pressing, the Regulation represents a great opportunity to strengthen the principles and values of the European Union.

Given the strict connection between the scientific and practical dimension of Regulation 2016/1191, authors are invited to examine how this act is currently implemented in the context of national civil status systems and fundamental rights. They should explore the potential positive impact on the freedom of movement of European citizens and on the enjoyment of their fundamental rights as well as focus on critical aspects and deficiencies of the current legal framework.

We encourage applicants to submit proposals for papers and panels related to the Regulation and its context. Possible topics include:

• The creation of a common European civil status framework;
• The notion of “public document” under the Regulation and similar instruments (e.g. formal and substantial requirements) and under domestic law;
• The circulation of criminal records;
• Problems arising from the lack of standardized definitions shared by all Member States (e.g. “crime”, “sex”, “intended parent”, “intersex” );
• The impact of the Regulation on the effective exercise of the freedom of movement;
• Connections between EU citizenship, national citizenship status, and circulation of public documents;
• Case-law of the Court of Justice influencing the interpretation and implementation of the Regulation, with special regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR;
• Exercise of electoral rights and the circulation of public documents under Article 2.2. of the Regulation;
• Analysis of “hard cases” when applying the Regulation (e.g. marriages celebrated by religious authorities as third-country public documents etc.);
• The Regulation in comparison to the ICCS Conventions and other relevant international conventions (e.g. the Hague Apostille Convention (1961));
• E-Justice Portal tools (e.g. the multilingual form-filling system) and the efficiency of the Internal Market Information System (IMI) in the event of doubts as to the veracity of the documents, or the authenticity of the authority that signed them;
• The digitalization of documents and their circulation; how to ensure the authenticity of digital documents (both native digital size or digital copies of a paper original); forms of electronic signature or seals, with special regard to electronic signatures governed by the eIDAS Regulation and country-specific standards;
• Extension of the scope of the Regulation to public documents relating to, among others, the legal status and representation of a company or other undertakings, diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications, officially recognised disabilities, etc. (see article 23 of the Regulation);
• Critical issues related to multilingual standard forms (regional/local linguistic minorities; public documents for which multilingual standard forms are not yet established by the Regulation etc.).

 

WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE

Participation is not restricted to lawyers or to established scholars. We welcome registrars, public administrators, professionals, practitioners, doctoral students. We welcome proposals that offer multi-disciplinary perspectives from various areas of law (including European, civil, administrative, comparative, international, criminal, and labour law), as well as from scholars in the humanities and the social sciences (e.g. history, economics, political science, sociology) with an interest in the Conference’s themes. We also welcome submissions from both senior and junior scholars (including doctoral students) as well as interested practitioners.

 

PAPER AND PANEL SUBMISSIONS

• Submit your PAPER proposal with an abstract of a maximum of 500 words and 5 keywords. The abstract must also contain Title, Name, Affiliation (e.g. university, institution, professional association), Country and E-mail address.
• Submit your PANEL proposal with an abstract of a maximum of 800 words and 5 keywords. We welcome a state-of-the art symposium or a round-table providing on key issues. Fully formed panel proposals should include at least three and no more than five presentations by scholars or practitioners who have agreed in advance to participate. Panel proposals should also identify one panel chair/moderator. Include: title of the panel, names of speakers and of the chair/moderator and their affiliation (e.g. university, institution, professional association), title of each presentation (if applicable), e-mail address of panel participants, language(s) to be used.

We encourage submissions in English. However, as part of the vision of a truly European conference, paper and panel proposals will also be accepted in Italian and German.

Selected paper authors will receive further information on the publication of the proceedings.

Submission templates for paper & panel proposal are available on the DXB website.

 

HOW AND WHEN TO SUBMIT

Send proposals to: info@identitiesonthemove.eu. Indicate in the e-mail subject line: “Conference call – name of the (lead) author (or moderator) – Title of the paper or panel proposal”.

The deadline for submitting the paper or panel abstract proposal is 22 December 2021.

Applicants will be informed about the outcome of the abstract selection process no later than 15 January 2022. If successfully selected, full papers must be submitted by 15 April 2022.

 

PROGRAMME AND REGISTRATION

The draft of the Conference Programme will be published on 1st March 2022. The final Conference Programme with all panel sessions will become available on 25 April 2022.

Registration for the Conference opens on the DXB website on 15 January and closes on 20 May 2022.

The event will be held in person, in compliance with the current health safety regulations, and will also be broadcast online via live streaming with free access.

Onsite participants will need a Covid-19 digital certificate (Green Pass), or equivalent certificate recognized under Italian law, if still so required by the Authorities at the time of the conference.

N.B. All speakers and moderators, including those invited under the call, are required to attend the event in person.

Registration fee: it includes conference materials, shuttle service (see website for details), tea/coffee and lunch refreshments as well as the certificate of attendance.

Ordinary fee: 80 Euros

Reduced student fee (including Ph.D. students): 40 Euros

Check the Project website for updates.

This project was funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014–2020). Project number: 101007502. The content of this Call represents the views of the partners only and is their sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.

Mag. Paul Patreider, Institut für Italienisches Recht, Fachbereich Privatrecht, Universität Innsbruck

On October 18, 2021 Professor Monika Pauknerová, professor for private international law and international trade law at Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic, celebrated a significant jubilee. Colleagues and friends from many countries contributed to a liber amicorum to her honour:

Magdalena Pfeiffer, Jan Brodec, Petr Bríza and Marta Zavadilová (eds.). Liber Amicorum Monika Pauknerová. Praha: Wolters Kluwer ?R, 2021, 552 p. ISBN 978-80-7676-186-5.  The publication contains 47 contributions in English, Czech and Slovak, most of them on private international law.

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENT

Nadia de Araujo and Marcelo De Nardi
International Jurisdiction in Civil or Commercial Matters: HCCH´s New Challenge

Jürgen Basedow
International Transport Conventions and the European Union

Paul Beaumont and Jayne Holliday
Habitual Residence in Child Abduction Cases: The Hybrid Approach Is Now the Norm bur How Much Weight Should Be Given to Parental Intention?

Alexander J. Belohlávek
Conflicting Interpretations of International Treaties

Karel Beran
Cím se liší „právní entita“ od právnické osoby (úvaha nad „jinou než fyzickou
osobou“ podle § 30 odst. 1 z. m. p. s.)

Michael Bogdan
Article 36 of the EU Insolvency Regulation and the Treatment of General
Priority Rights

Jan Brodec
Vliv lex loci arbitri na prubeh mezinárodní obchodní arbitráže

Petr Bríza
Determination of the Law Applicable to a Share Transfer Agreement: Are All
Doubts Dispelled after the TVP Case?

Giuditta Cordero-Moss
Private International Law in Arbitration

Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers
The Incurious Curia

Stanislava Cerná
Stát jako ovládající osoba

Lucie Dolanská Bányaiová
Jak moc musí být cizí rozsudek vykonatelný?

Katerina Eichlerová
EMCA – inspirace (nejen) pri vymezení požadavk? na oznacení pobocky

Richard Fentiman
Foreign Law as Local Law: a Case of Mistaken Identity?

Zuzana Fišerová
Zamyšlení nad kolizní úpravou pro rozvod manželství s mezinárodním prvkem
aneb nastal cas, aby CR pristoupila k narízení ?ím III?

Cristina González Beilfuss
Prorogation of Jurisdiction in Parental Responsibility Matters under Regulation
(EU) No. 2019/1111

Trevor Hartley
The Concept of a Consumer under Brussels I: the Petruchová Case

Elena Júdová
Špeciálne režimy v európskom medzinárodnom práve súkromnom

Zdenek Kapitán
Mezinárodní pravomoc ceských soudu ve vecech péce o deti založená na
státním obcanství

Catherine Kessedjian
Mediation for Disputes in Investment Matters

Zdenek Kühn
Vztah ceské Ústavy k mezinárodnímu právu

Ivana Kunda
Overriding Mandatory Provisions before the CJEU: Takaways or Getaways?

Tuula Linna
Sustainability and Insolvency Proceedings

Alena Macková a Filip Crncevic
Systém mimosoudního rešení sporu spotrebitel? v CR perspektivou ADR

Peter Mankowski
Presumptions, Escape Clauses and Protective Regimes under the Rome
I Regulation

Milan Müller
Mezinárodní postoupení pohledávek a jeho úcinky na tretí strany ve svetle
pripravované nové evropské právní úpravy

Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira
“Latent” Citizens. What Do They Tell Us about the Concept of Citizenship?

Jan Ondrej
Smlouvy o mezinárodní preprave se zamerením na Úmluvu o prepravní
smlouve v mezinárodní silnicní nákladní doprav? a její provádení v právu CR

Daniel Patek
Úcinky (nekalé) souteže

Marta Pertegás Sender
Cross-Border Liability Cases in the European Union: No Good Match with the
Special Jurisdiction Rules of the Brussels I Regulation?

Magdalena Pfeiffer
The Cinderella Treatment of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the Czech
Enforcement Procedure

Fausto Pocar
Brief Remarks on the Relationship between the Hague Judgments and Choice
of Court Conventions

Helena Prášková
Konsenzuální a smírná rešení rozporu ve verejné správe

Ilaria Pretelli
Three Patterns, One Law: Plea for a Reinterpretation of The Hague Child
Abduction Convention To Protect Children from Exposure to Sexism,
Misogyny and Violence Against Women

Elena Rodríguez Pineau
Parallel Litigation in Proceedings Relating to Data Protection

Nadežda Rozehnalová
Cesta k soucasnému uchopení imperativních predpis?

Kvetoslav Ružicka
Náklady stran v rozhodcím rízení

Pavel Simon
Potíže spojené s ur?ením místn? p?íslušného soudu ve sporech s mezinárodním
prvkem aneb o zbyte?nosti § 11 odst. 3 o. s. ?.

Michal Skrejpek
Commercium inter gentes

Josef Staša
Cel?eprávní procesní mix po cesku

Pavel Svoboda
Trnitá cesta ke kodexu unijního správního práva procesního

Pavel Šturma
Pojem due diligence v mezinárodním investicním právu

Zbynek Švarc
Odpovednost dopravce za škodu v mezinárodní silnicní preprave zboží

Michal Tomášek
Nejpríznivejší sudište japonských šógunu

Aukje A.H. van Hoek
The Declaratory Judgment—between Remedy and Procedural Technique

Spyridon Vrellis
Family Reunification in Greek Immigration Law

Marta Zavadilová
Kulhající manželství osob stejného pohlaví

 

For further information see here.

One Afghanistan-based company sues another in commercial court in Afghanistan. The plaintiff wins at trial. The Afghanistan Supreme Court reverses. It orders the parties to resolve their dispute in the United States. The plaintiff files suit in the United States. Chaos ensues.

This may sound like an unlikely scenario. It is, however, a concise description of the facts presented in Nawai Wardak Transportation Co. v. RMA Grp. Afghanistan Ltd, No. 350393 (Mich. Ct. App. 2021). This case is noteworthy for a number of reasons. It offers insights into best drafting practices for choice-of-court clauses. It illustrates how U.S. courts decide whether these clauses should be enforced. And it suggests that the Afghanistan Supreme Court takes the principle of party autonomy pretty seriously.

In July 2012, the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) contracted with Aircraft Charter Solutions (“ACS”) to perform aircraft flight operations out of Kabul International Airport in Afghanistan. ACS entered into a contract with RMA Afghanistan (“RMA”), an Afghanistan-based company, to supply fuel to locations throughout Afghanistan. RMA, in turn, entered into a contract with Nawai Wardak Transportation Company (“NWTC”), another Afghanistan-based company, to supply fuel in support of the contract between USAID and ACS. The contract between RMA and NWTC contained the following provision:

The parties irrevocably agree that the courts of the United States of America shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute or claim that arises out of or in connection with this Agreement or its subject matter or formation (including non-contractual disputes or claims).

Roughly a year after the RMA-NWTC contract was signed, a dispute arose. NWTC demanded payment. RMA refused. NWTC brought a suit against RMA in commercial court in Afghanistan and won a judgment. The Supreme Court of Afghanistan reversed the judgment of the lower court. It concluded that the case should have been dismissed because the parties had previously agreed in their choice-of-court clause to litigate all disputes in the United States.

Undeterred, NWTC filed suit against RMA in state court in Michigan. RMA immediately moved to dismiss the Michigan lawsuit on the grounds that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. It argued that it had only consented to suit in federal court via the choice-of-court clause. It pointed out that that clause referred to the courts “of” the United States of America. It then argued that this language necessarily excluded state courts because these courts were only “of” the State of Michigan. They were not courts of the United States as a whole.

NWTC responded to this argument by pointing out that the case could not be heard in federal court because those courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction on the facts presented. If the clause were interpreted the manner suggested by RMA, the plaintiff contended, then the choice-of-court clause would be rendered a nullity because no court in the United States could hear the claim and it would be deprived of a remedy altogether.

The state trial court in Michigan ruled in favor of RMA and dismissed the case. This decision was then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Michigan. That court acknowledged that “the dictionary definition of ‘of’ supports that, while Michigan courts may be in the United States, they are not of the United States.” The court then went on to conclude, however, that dictionary definitions are not conclusive:

We are not constrained to follow dictionary definitions when interpreting a contract, and the effect of interpreting the forum-selection clause to refer exclusively to federal courts is to deprive both parties of a forum in which to resolve their contract disputes. In other words, for either party to have had a legal remedy for the other party’s failure to perform under the subcontract, the parties must have intended “courts of the United States of America” as a geographical designation encompassing both federal and state courts. Any other reading of the forum-selection clause would render it nugatory, which is to be avoided when interpreting contracts.

The court of appeals then considered the defendant’s argument that if the clause was interpreted to refer to any state court in the United States, it would become so “overbroad and so lacking in specificity” that “enforcing it would be unreasonable and unjust.” The court held that this argument had not been fully developed in the proceedings below. Accordingly, it remanded the case for further consideration by the lower court.

This case presents a number of interesting issues relating to choice-of-court clauses. The first has to do with contract drafting. As a matter of best practice, it is better to name a specific U.S. state in which a suit must be brought rather than the United States as a whole. If the clause selects the nation as a whole, however, it is better to select the courts “in” in the United States rather than courts “of” the United States to make clear that the suit may be brought in either state or federal court.

The second issue relates to clause enforcement. U.S. courts routinely decline to give effect to choice-of-court clauses selecting courts that lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute. If the chosen forum lacks the power to resolve the case, these courts reason, the parties may sue wherever they want. The Court of Appeals of Michigan recognized this fact and rightly rejected the defendant’s arguments that would have produced a contrary result.

The third issue relates to the need for specificity in identifying the chosen forum. Under ordinary circumstances, a clause selecting the courts of “any” U.S. state would not be enforceable because it does not clearly identify where the suit may proceed. In the unique facts presented in the case described above, however, the lack-of-specificity argument is unlikely to carry the day because, if accepted, it would result in no court being able to hear the dispute.

Finally, it is important to note that the State of Michigan has adopted a statute that clearly spells out when its courts should and should not give effect to choice-of-court clauses. This is unusual. Only three other U.S. states—Nebraska, New Hampshire, and North Dakota—have adopted similar statutes based on the Model Choice of Forum Act. Judges in the remaining U.S. states apply judge-made common law to decide the issue of enforceability. The Michigan approach has a lot of recommend to it because it provides a clear, concise, and unchanging set of factors for the courts to consider when analyzing this issue.

The American Association of Private International Law (ASADIP) will be holding its annual XIV conference entitled “Private International Law and Modern Technologies” on 4-5 November 2021 for the first time online.

There is a full website dedicated to this conference, click here.

The Conference will be mostly in Spanish (with a few exceptions) but simultaneous English-Spanish interpretation will be provided on the first day of the conference, which has been made possible thanks to the Organization of American States (OAS).

The programme is available here. Many international organisations will take part of this conference, notably the OAS, UNCITRAL, HCCH, and UNIDROIT.

The Conference has many interesting panels but perhaps it is worth noting the one taking place on Thursday 4 November at 14:15 – 16:00 h (Argentinean time, 18:15 – 20:00 CET time) – PANEL II – “Blockchain, contratos inteligentes y Derecho internacional privado” (Blockchain, intelligent contracts and Private International Law), where Giesela Rühl, a conflictoflaws.net editor and former general editor, will be participating along with Matthias Lehmann, Luis Ernesto Rodríguez Carrera and Alfonso Ortega Giménez. As previously indicated, simultaneous English-Spanish interpretation will be provided on that day.

The Conference is free of charge and no previous registration is required. The platform that will be used is KUDO and there are four links that have been provided to join the conference, one for each session. Participants will be allowed as “spectators” and their cameras and microphones will be deactivated but it will nonetheless be possible to use the chat function with the moderator to ask questions.

To join each session, participants must click on the provided link (for the specific session) and enter their full name and their professional affiliation. For more information on how to join, click here and see below.

First session (morning) / Thursday 4 November
Hora: 9:45 am a 1:00 pm (Horario Argentina)
https://live.kudoway.com/br/110112440372
Meeting ID: 110112440372

Second session (afternoon) / Thursday 4 November
Hora: 2:15 pm a 5:30 pm (Horario Argentina)
https://live.kudoway.com/br/110111239295
Meeting ID: 110111239295

Third session (morning) / Friday 5 November
Hora: 9:45 am a 2:00 pm (Horario Argentina)
https://live.kudoway.com/br/110115267689
Meeting ID: 110115267689

Fourth Session (afternoon) / Friday 5 November
Hora: 3:00 pm a 5:30 pm (Horario Argentina)
https://live.kudoway.com/br/110115948325
Meeting ID: 110115948325

 

Written by Huiyin Zhang, PhD Candidate at the Wuhan University Institute of International Law

China enacted the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) at the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress on August 20, 2021. This is the first comprehensive national law in China concerning personal information protection and regulating the data processing activities of entities and individuals. PIPL, the Cyber Security Law (came into force on June 1, 2017) and Data Security Law (promulgated on September 1, 2021) constitute the three legal pillars of the digital economy era in China.

PIPL includes eight chapters and 74 articles, covering General Provisions, Rules for Processing Personal Information, Rules for Cross-border Provisions of Personal Information, Rights of Individuals in Activities of Processing Personal Information, Obligations of Personal Information Processors, Departments Performing Duties of Personal Information Protection, Legal Liability and Supplementary Provisions. This note focuses on its extraterritorial effect.

 

1.Territorial Scope

Article 3 of the PIPL provides:

“This Law shall apply to activities conducted by organizations and individuals to control the personal information of natural persons within the territory of the People’s Republic of China.

This Law shall also apply to activities outside territory of the People”s Republic of China to handle the personal information of natural persons within the territory of the People’s Republic of China under any of the following circumstances:

a . personal information handling is to serve the purpose of providing products or services for natural persons within the territory of the People’s Republic of China;

1. personal information handling is to serve the purpose of analyzing and evaluating the behaviors of natural persons within the territory of the People’ s Republic of China; or
2. having other circumstances as stipulated by laws and administrative regulations.”

 

According to paragraph 1 of Art 3, PIPL applies to all data processing activities of personal information carried out in China. If foreign businesses processes or handles the personal information within the territory of China, in principle, they shall comply with the PIPL. It indicates that this clause focuses on the activities of processing or handling personal information in the territorial of China, especially the physical link between the data processing or handling activities and Chinese territory.

According to paragraph 2 of Art 3, the PIPL shall be applicable to activities outside the territory of China in processing or handling the personal information within China under some circumstances. As provided in Art 53, “personal information handlers outside the borders of the People’ s Republic of China shall establish a dedicated entity or appoint a representative within the borders of the People’ s Republic of China to be responsible for matters related to the personal information they handle”. Notably, this clause focuses on the physical location of the data processors or handlers rather than their nationality or habitual residence.

PIPL has extraterritorial jurisdiction to data processing or handling activities outside the territorial of China under 3 circumstances as provided in paragraph 2 of Art 3 of the PIPL. This is the embodiment of the effect principle, which derives from the objective territory jurisdiction and emphasizes the influence or effect of the behavior in the domain. If the purpose is to provide products or services to individuals located in China, or to analyze the behaviors of natural person in China, the PIPL shall be applicable. Crucially, the actual “effect” or “influence” of data processing or handling is emphasized here, i.e. when it is necessary to determine what extent or what requirements are met of the damage caused by the above-mentioned data processing or handling activities outside the territorial of China, Chinese courts may reasonably exercise the jurisdiction over the case. Obviously, it reflects the consideration of the element of “brunt of harm”. However, if the “effect” or “influence” is not specifically defined and limited, there will be a lot of problems. It is important to figure out exactly whether data processors or handlers outside the territorial of China are aware of the implications of their actions on natural person within China and whether the “effect” or “influence” of the data-processing behaviors are direct, intentional and predictable.

The PIPL explicitly states its purported extraterritorial jurisdiction for the first time and insists on the specific personal jurisdiction and the effect principle. It is mainly because the PIPL is formulated “in order to protect personal information rights and interests, standardize personal information handling activities, and promote the rational use of personal information”, but in the process of legal protection of personal information of natural person, there are a lot of challenges, such as the contradiction between the application of traditional jurisdiction, the virtual nature of personal information and so on. In this sense, all jurisdiction of the PIPL, whether territorial jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction or effect principle, are all further supplements for the existing personal information protection regime previously provided.

 

2.PIPL and GDPR: a Comparative Study

The provisions on jurisdiction of GDPR are mainly concentrated in Art 3 and Art 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 of preambular 2. In Art 3, paragraph 1 and 2 identified “establishment principle” and “targeting principle” and paragraph 3 provides “This regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law”.

A. Establishment Principle

Under paragraph 1 of Art 3, GDPR applies to “the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.” It set the “establishment criterion”, which has the dual characteristics of territorial jurisdiction and extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Compared with establishment criterion in GDPR, the PIPL indicates that personal information handlers outside the territorial of China shall establish a dedicated entity or appoint a representative within China as previously mentioned. It highlights the significance and necessity of establishing an entity when foreign data handlers process the personal information of national persons outside China under circumstance in paragraph 2 of Art3 of PIPL.

B. Targeting Principle

Compared with targeting criterion in GDPR, PIPL has many differences. Paragraph 2 of Art 3 of the GDPR clearly states that for data processors and controllers that do not have an establishment in the EU, GDPR will apply in two circumstances. Firstly, as stated in Art 3 of GDPR, the processing activities relate to “the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union” (Art 2 GDPR). It seems too abstract to give the definition and processing method of data processor and controller’ s behavior intention. Art 23 of the GDPR provides the clarification that “it should be ascertained whether it is apparent that the controller or processor envisages offering services to data subjects in one or more Member States in the Union.” The key factor to assess whether the processor or controller “targets” the EU is whether the behaviour of the offshore data processors or controllers indicates their apparent intention to provide goods or services to data subjects in the EU. This is an objective subjective test.

In contrast, Art 3 of the PIPL states that the law shall apply when the data processor processes personal information “to serve the purpose of providing products or services for natural persons within the territory of the People’ s Republic of China”. It indicates that the purpose of data processor or controller outside China is to provide a product or service to a domestic natural person in China. The key to the application is not only about whether it has purpose, but also about whether they have processed personal information of a natural person in China.

Secondly, the procession activities are in related to “the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union”. It requires both the data subject and the monitored activity be located within the EU. “Monitoring” shall be defined in accordance with Article 24 of the GDPR preamble. This provision does not require the data processors or controllers to have a corresponding subjective intent in the monitoring activity, but the European Data Protection Board ( Hereinafter referred to as EDPB) pointed out that the use of the term “monitoring” implied that the data controllers or processors had a specific purpose, namely to collect and process the data. Similarly, Art 3 of the PIPL also applies to activities outside China dealing with personal information of natural persons within China, if the activities are to analyse and evaluate the acts of natural persons within China. The meaning of “analysis and evaluation” here is very broad and seems to cover “monitoring” activities under the GDPR.

Furthermore, paragraph 3 of Art 3 of the GDPR provides: “This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law.” It suggests that the data processor or controller does not have an establishment in the territory of the EU and there is no circumstances under paragraph 2 of Art 3 of the GDPR. Due to that the international law applies EU member state law in the area where the numerical controller is located, this law shall apply. This condition is primarily aimed at resolving the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction over data processing or controlling that takes place in EU without an establishment. This condition is similar to Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. The similar condition is not included in the PIPL, which instead shall apply to other circumstances “as stipulated by laws and administrative regulations”.

C. Passive personality principle

Under the passive personality principle, a state has prescriptive jurisdiction over anyone anywhere who injures its nationals or residents. As previously mentioned, paragraph 2 of Art 3 of the GDPR states that although the personal data processors or controllers are not established in the EU, EU still applies the laws of member states in accordance with public international law. Art 25 of the preamble of GDPR provides examples of such situations which may include a Member State’s diplomatic mission or consular post.

To some extent, GDPR includes all the personal data processing activities involving natural persons situated in the EU area into its jurisdiction, which is a variation of the passive nationality principle. It is because EU treats the individual data right as a fundamental human right and aims to establish a digital market of the unified level of protection. PIPL adopts the similar practice by adopting the passive nationality principle to protect Chinese citizens and residents.

3.Conclusion

The promulgation of PIPL shows that China recognizes the extraterritorial effect of data protection law. The exploration of legislation not only has the meaning of localization, but also contributes to the formulation of data rules for the international community. It marks an important step towards China’ s long-term goal of balancing the preservation of national sovereignty, the protection of individual rights and the free flow of data across borders.

This is a case note on the very recent Nigerian Court of Appeal’s decision that recognised the immunity of the President of the Commission of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) from being impleaded in Nigerian courts.[1]

In Nigeria, the applicable law in respect of diplomatic immunities and privileges is the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, which implements aspects of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (the “Vienna Convention”). Under the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, foreign envoys, consular officers, members of their families, and members of their official and domestic staff are generally entitled to immunity from suit and legal process.[2] Such immunities may also apply to organisations declared by the Minister of External Affairs to be organisations, the members of which are sovereign powers (whether foreign powers or Commonwealth countries or the Governments thereof).[3]

Where a dispute arises as to whether any organisation or any person is entitled to immunity from suit and legal process, a certificate issued by the Minister stating any fact relevant to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.[4]

In a very recent case the claimant/respondent who was a staff of the Commission of ECOWAS sued the defendant/appellant in the National Industrial Court in Nigeria for orders declaring his suspension from office by the Commission unlawful and a violation of ECOWAS Regulations, and damages from the defendant/appellant for publishing what the claimant/respondent considered a “libelous” suspension letter. The defendant/appellant responded to the suit with a statement of defence and equally filed a motion of notice objecting to the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court on grounds of diplomatic immunity he enjoys from proceedings in municipal courts of Nigeria by virtue of the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of ECOWAS and the Headquarters Agreement between ECOWAS and the Government of the Republic of Nigeria. He also placed reliance on Principles of Staff Employment and ECOWAS staff Regulations. In addition he attached a certificate from Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs which acknowledged his diplomatic immunity.

The trial court (Haastrup J) held that it had jurisdiction and dismissed the preliminary objection of the defendant/appellant. It relied on Section 254C (2)[5] of the 1999 Constitution (as amended in 2011)  and Order 14A Rule 1 (1)[6] of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria(Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 to hold that the National Industrial Court had jurisdiction to resolve all employment matters in Nigeria, including cases that have an international element.

The Nigerian Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal. Ugo JCA in his leading judgment held as follows:

“So this Certificate of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria attached to the affidavit of Chika Onyewuchi in support of appellant’s application/objection before the trial National Industrial Court for the striking out of the suit is sufficient and in fact conclusive evidence of the immunity claimed by appellant. That also includes the statement of the Minister in paragraph 2 of the same certificate that the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 was “ratified by the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 1st July, 1994,” thus, putting paid to the trial Judge’s contention that appellant needed to prove that the said treaty was ratified by Nigeria for him to properly claim immunity.
Even Section 254C(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which states that ‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, the National Industrial Court shall have the jurisdiction and power to deal with any matter connected with or pertaining to the application of any international convention, treaty or protocol of which Nigeria has ratified relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations or matters connected therewith,’ does not by any means have the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court over diplomats. In fact Section 254C(2) of the 1999 Constitution, as was correctly argued by Mr. Obi, only confers on the National Industrial Court power to apply international conventions, protocols and treaties ratified by Nigeria relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations and matters connected therewith while exercising its jurisdiction over persons subject to its jurisdiction. Diplomats who enjoy immunity from Court processes from municipal Courts in Nigeria like the Respondent are not such persons. Incidentally, the apex Court in African Reinsurance Corporation v. Abate Fantaye (1986) 3 NWLR (PT 32) 811 in very similar circumstances conclusively put to rest this issue of immunity from proceedings in municipal Courts enjoyed by persons like appellant. That case was cited to the trial Judge so it is surprising that she did not make even the slightest reference to it in expanding her jurisdiction to appellant who has always insisted, correctly, on his immunity. In truth, the lower Court did not simply expound its jurisdiction but attempted to expand it too. A Court is competent when, among others, the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction…
Appellant’s diplomatic status and his consequent immunity from proceedings in the Courts of this country was such a feature that prevented the National Industrial Court from exercising jurisdiction over him and Suit No. NICN/ABJ/230/2019 of respondent; it was therefore wrong in holding otherwise and dismissing his preliminary objection…”[7]

Adah JCA in his concurring judgment held as follows:

“The Appellant, being an international organization enjoys immunity from suit and legal process, both by virtue of Section 11 and 18 of the 1962 Act, and Certificate issued by the Minister of External Affairs. Where a sovereign or International Organization enjoys immunity from suit and legal process, waiver of such immunity is not to be presumed against it. Indeed, the presumption is that there is no waiver until the contrary is established. Thus, waiver of immunity by a Sovereign or International Organization must be expressly and positively done by that Sovereign or International Organization.

In the instant case, the appellant from the record before the Court is an international organization. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Nigeria had given a certificate to indicate the immunity of the appellant. Exhibit CA issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16th January, 2020 in paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof state as follows:

“2. The ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to reaffirm the status of the ECOWAS Commission as an international organization and the immunity and privileges of the Commission and its staff members with exception of Nigerians and holders of Nigeria permanent residency from Criminal, Civil and Administrative proceedings by virtue of ECOWAS Revised Treaty by of 1993, which was ratified by the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 1st July, 1994.
3. The Headquarters Agreement between the ECOWAS Commission and the Federal Republic of Nigeria also confers immunity on officials and other employees of ECOWAS by virtue of Article VII (3) (C) of the Agreement.”

It is very clear therefore, that the appellant is covered by the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act and is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts. The fact that their base is in Nigeria or that Nigeria is the Host Country of the appellant does not make the appellant subserviate to the jurisdiction of Nigerian Courts. It is therefore, the law as stated lucidly in the leading judgment of my learned brother that the lower Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim against the appellant…”[8]

This is not the first time Nigerian courts have dealt with the issue of impleading a diplomat or foreign sovereign before the Nigerian court.[9] The decision of the trial judge was surprising in view of the weight of authorities from the Nigerian Supreme Court and Court of Appeal on the concept of diplomatic immunities in Nigeria. The claimant/respondent may have argued that matters of employment qualify as waiver of diplomatic immunity, but this position has never been explicitly endorsed by Nigerian courts. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has only accepted the concept of waiver in situations where the person claiming immunity entered into commercial transactions with the claimant.[10]

Looking at the bigger picture how does an employee who has been unfairly dismissed by a diplomatic organisation gain access to justice in Nigerian and African courts? Should the law be reformed in Nigeria and African countries to take into account the interest of employees as weaker parties?

 

 

[1] President of the Commission of ECOWAS v Ndiaye (2021) LPELR-53523(CA).

[2]Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act, Cap D9 LFN 2004 ss 1, 3-6.

[3]ibid, ss 11 and 12.

[4]ibid, s 18.

[5] ‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, the National Industrial Court shall have the jurisdiction and power to deal with any matter connected with or pertaining to the application of any international convention, treaty or protocol of which Nigeria has ratified relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations or matters connected therewith.’

[6] It provides that:

1.—(1) Where an action involves a breach of or non-compliance with an international protocol, a convention or treaty on labour, employment and industrial relations, the Claimant shall in the complaint and witness statement on oath, include,

(a) the name, date and nomenclature of the protocol, convention or treaty ; and

(b) proof of ratification of such protocol, convention or treaty by Nigeria.

(2) In any claim relating to or connected with any matter, the party relying on the International Best Practice, shall plead and prove the existence of the same in line with the provisions relating to proof of custom in the extant Evidence Act.”

[7] President of the Commission of ECOWAS v Ndiaye (2021) LPELR-53523(CA) 19-20.

[8] Ibid 24-26.

[9] See generally RF Oppong and CSA Okoli, Private International Law in Commonwealth Africa (2nd edition) (chapter 7).

[10]African Reinsurance Corporation v JDP Construction (Nig) Ltd (2007) 11 NWLR 224, 234-5 (Akintan JSC)..

The University of Turin and ILO International Training Centre’s Master in International Trade Law are pleased to announce the 2021/2022 Programme’s inaugural keynote. The event will take place on 5 November 2021, from 3.00 to 5.00 P.M. CET, on Zoom (at the following link: https://itcilo-org.zoom.us/j/85085505961?pwd=U2dLRitJTzUzYzlJUHAyM0NzclNydz09#success). The keynote will deal with ‘Gender and Trade Law’ and it will be delivered by Amrita Bahri, Assistant Professor, ITAM; Co-Chair, WTO Chair Program; Trade and Gender Consultant, International Trade Centre.

Please see the event’s flyer below:

The Time is Ripe? Proposed Regulation of Third Party Litigation Funding in the European Union

Written by Adrian Cordina, PhD researcher at Erasmus School of Law, project member of the Vici project ‘Affordable Access to Justice’ which deals with costs and funding of civil litigation, financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO).

The question of how to fund litigation is an essential precondition for civil justice systems. While in some countries like Australia third party litigation funding (TPLF) has been developing for decades, in Europe too TPLF is now on the rise, particularly in international arbitration and collective actions. This has also caught the attention of the European legislator.

On the 17th of June 2021 the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs published a Draft Report with recommendations to the Commission on Responsible Private Funding of Litigation (TPLF). This follows the February 2021 European Parliament Research Service Study on the same matter. TPLF is the funding of litigation by an external third party in return for a share of the proceeds in case of success and is a growing commercial practice. The Draft highlights that TPLF in the EU is however currently operating in a ‘regulatory vacuum’, as it is not only present in consumer collective redress cases, in which case specific funding rules have already been enacted through the Directive (EU) 2020/1929 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers [Representative Actions Directive  (RAD)].

While recognising the role TPLF plays in facilitating access to justice where otherwise not available due to the costs and risks of litigation, the Draft attempts to provide proposals on how to tackle the risks and concerns TPLF gives rise to. It focuses especially on the conflicts of interest between the litigation funders and the claimants, more specifically on the economic interest of the funder, which could drive the funder to demand excessive shares of the proceeds and to control the litigation process.

Similarly to the RAD, the Draft contains recommendations that it should be ensured that decisions in the relevant legal proceedings, including decisions on settlement, are not influenced in any way by the litigation funders and that courts or administrative authorities be empowered to require disclosure of information on third-party litigation funding.

Amongst the main recommendations which go beyond the funding rules in the RAD is that of establishing a system of supervisory authorities in each Member State which permits TPLF. These would grant authorisations and require that litigation funders comply with minimum criteria of governance, transparency, capital adequacy and observance of a fiduciary duty to claimants. Article 5 also proposes that third-party funding agreements need to comply with the laws of the Member State of the litigation proceedings or of the claimant, which could create problems if claimants and/or intended beneficiaries are from different Member States, from outside the EU or if one Member State prohibits TPLF in cross-border litigation.

It also contains recommendations on funding agreements being worded transparently, clearly and in simple language, on capping the return rate to the litigation funder at 40%, and on, subject to exceptions, preventing litigation funders from withdrawing funding midway through proceedings.

The debate on TPLF in Europe has only in recent years started to take the limelight in civil justice academia (see e.g. Kramer & Tillema 2020; Tzankova & Kramer 2021). That this topic is garnering attention is also evidenced by the September 2021 survey commissioned by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform on Consumer Attitudes on TPLF and its regulation in the EU. While the complex matter of TPLF is in need of further research and reflection, considering developments in legal practice perhaps now indeed the time is also ripe for regulatory discussions.

 

GD Goenka University, Gurugram is part of the GD Goenka Group. GD Goenka University was established in 2013 under the Haryana Private Universities (Amendment) Act, 2013. The GD Goenka University School of Law offers Law Degree Programs at Undergraduate, Post Graduate and Doctoral levels and strives to open new vistas in the arena of law through clinical legal studies and research. With an objective to raise the standards of clinical legal education in India, the GD Goenka University, School of Law regularly hosts Moot Court Competitions and encourages law students from various Law Schools and Universities from across India and world to learn the art and skills of advocacy.

In November 2020, School of law, GD Goenka University successfully organized an arbitration moot court competition “GD Goenka – CIArb (India) International Virtual Commercial Arbitration Competition 2020” in association with CIArb (India) Chapter. The University is now organising the Fifth edition of  “GD Goenka – CIArb (India) International Virtual Commercial Arbitration Competition 2021″ in association with CIArb (India) Chapter on 20th-21st November. The event is expected to have participation from various Law Schools and Universities from across India & abroad.

The Registration for the Competition is open. The registration fee is USD 11 /- only.

You would also be pleased to know the Prizes for winners in various categories-

Winners- Rs 70,000/- (USD 935/-)

Runners Up- Rs 40,000/- (USD 534/-)

Best Speaker Male & Female- Rs 10,000/- each. (USD 133/- each)

Best Memorial- Rs 10,000/- (USD 133/-)

The link to the registration form, posters and brochure is found below.

Registration Form- https://forms.gle/ZwJpZKmsPNDJiwMN6

With Warm Regards,

Prof. (Dr.) Tabrez Ahmad,

Vice Chancellor GD Goenka University &

Dean School of Law

The INSOL Europe Academic Forum (IEAF) is inviting submission for its 17th annual conference, taking place from 2-3 March 2022 in Dublin (Ireland). Expressions of interest are invited for the delivery of research papers within the overall academic conference’s theme: “The Emerging New Landscape of European Restructuring and Insolvency”

The theme is intended to focus on, inter alia, the following overall topics:

• Reflections on the 2019/1023 Directive as such, and on further harmonization of insolvency laws in the EU;
• Reports on national implementations of the 2019/1023 Directive in the EU Member States, including related changes to insolvency and company laws;
• Cross-border issues relating to the new restructuring frameworks;
• The longer-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on insolvency and restructuring laws in the EU and elsewhere;
• Digital assets and data in the context of insolvency proceedings and the new restructuring frameworks.

Conference methodology

In line with practice established in our past academic conferences, the intention for this year’s conference is to have research papers that challenge existing approaches, stimulate debate and ask, and attempt to answer, comparative and interdisciplinary questions about the above-mentioned topics. Accordingly, proposals are invited that do more than just outline a topic of interest in respect of any given jurisdiction, but seek to understand, analyse and critique the fundamentals of insolvency and restructuring systems in ways that are relevant across jurisdictions and across fields of academic inquiry. All contributions must be in English.

Presenting at the IEAF conference

Expressions of interest in delivering papers within the conference theme should be sent by email on or before 6 December 2021 to the INSOL Europe Academic Forum’s Secretary. Authors of papers selected for presentation will benefit from a waiver of the participation fee for the academic conference, however, they will be responsible for their own travel and accommodation costs. A limited number of travel grants will be available to junior scholars invited to present.

For further information, see: www.insol-europe.org/academic-forum-events

Tulane University School of Law and The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel’s Legal Education Committee are organizing the 9th academic symposium financially supported by The ACTEC Foundation. The symposium, Conflict of Laws in Trusts and Estates will be held at the Tulane University School of Law on Friday, October 21, 2022. The keynote address will be given by Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum of Vanderbilt University Law School.

Among the objectives of this symposium are the following:

• To bring together prominent and up-and-coming scholars for the discussion of important issues in conflict of laws;
• To spur leading-edge research on conflict of laws in trusts and estates;
• To encourage professors of trusts and estates to incorporate and consider issues of conflict of laws in their scholarship and teaching;
• To promote collaborations and exchanges between conflict-of-laws scholars and scholars of trusts and estates.

Papers presented at the symposium will consist of papers selected from this Call for Papers and papers from invited speakers. The papers will be published in the Tulane Law Review.

If you would like to be considered to present a paper, please submit an abstract of your paper to Ron Scalise by email (rscalise@tulane.edu) by November 1, 2021. Those chosen to participate  in the symposium will be notified no later than December 1, 2021. Symposium speakers will be required to submit a draft of their papers by August 15, 2022, so that the panel commentators will have sufficient time to prepare their commentary.

Symposium speakers will be reimbursed for their travel expenses (economy airfare, the cost of ground transportation, and up to two nights’ hotel stay). Speakers will be invited to dinner on the evenings of Thursday, October 20, 2022, and (for speakers staying Friday evening) Friday, October 21, 2022.

Breakfast and lunch will be provided to speakers and attendees on Friday, October 21, 2022, courtesy of The ACTEC Foundation.

Questions about the symposium or this call for papers should be directed to Ron Scalise at the email address above.

This symposium was made possible through the financial support of The ACTEC Foundation, https://actecfoundation.org.

 

 

Under the auspices of the project “Time to Become Digital in Law” (DIGInLaw), funded by the Erasmus+ Partnerships for Digital Education Readiness, the University of Aberdeen organizes in collaboration with the Universities of Osijek, Zagreb, and Milan, a PhD Book Club – European Private International Law in a Digital World.

The PhD Book Club will be held online on 8 December 2021. The goal of the book club is to raise awareness and expand knowledge through a discussion on contemporary private international law issues that stem from digitalization.

Participants can choose to join one or both of the following discussion panels:

10.00 – 11.30 UK time – Topic 1 – Jurisdiction in Digital World: Focus on the Extraterritorial Effects of the General Data Protection Regulation and the EU Commission’s Proposal AI Act 

12.30 – 14.00 UK time – Topic 2 – Cross-Border Family Law in Digital World: Judicial & Administrative Co-operation and the Use of High-Risk AI Tools in Cross-Border Family Litigation

The reading list will be distributed in advance to allow participants to prepare for discussion, which will be moderated by law professors and lecturers from the above-mentioned universities. All PhD researchers are eligible to apply. Please follow the registration link available on the event webpage here: https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/events/16837/

 

 

This is an update on my previous blog post here

Capacity to sue and be sued is an important aspect of conflict of laws. It connects very well with the issue of access to justice. For example if a foreign company that does business with a Nigerian company cannot sue in Nigeria it can result in injustice, and lead to loss of confidence in doing transactions with parties located in the Nigerian legal system.

Why is the above topic important? Having undertaken further research, it can be said that Nigerian court decisions are not consistent on the issue of capacity of a foreign company to sue and be sued in Nigeria. The latest reported authoritative source from the Nigerian Supreme Court is that by virtue of Section 54 and 55 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 Cap C20 (now Section 78 and 79 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020), a foreign company that carries on business in Nigeria without being registered as a Nigerian company carries out an illegal and void transaction, and thus such a contract cannot be enforced in Nigerian courts.[1] In effect, the provision of Section 60(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 Cap C20 (now Section 84(b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020) cannot avail the foreign company in granting it the capacity to sue in Nigeria to enforce a contract where it carries on business in Nigeria without registering as a foreign company.[2] It is only where the foreign company that is not registered in Nigeria enters into a contract with a Nigerian company, while not doing business in Nigeria, will such a contract be enforceable in Nigeria.[3] The key word is thus doing business in Nigeria in determining whether a foreign company that is not registered in Nigeria can sue or be sued in Nigeria. This decision has now been confirmed by a very recent Court of Appeal decision, though in the instant case it was held that the foreign company had a Nigerian subsidiary and it was not carrying out business in Nigeria (it was a single transaction), so the contract was enforceable in Nigeria.[4]

Yet this current position of Nigerian law is strange and appears to contrast with the law in other common law countries including common law African countries. The recent position of the Nigerian Supreme Court also appears to contrast with previous decisions of Nigerian appellate courts that held that foreign companies could sue and be sued in Nigeria irrespective of whether they are carrying on business in Nigeria.[5]

This aspect of law requires further reflection as it is now an important and controversial aspect of Nigerian law. Dr Abubakri Yekini and I plan to write a full blown article on this interesting subject. Please stay tuned!

[1] Citec Intl Estates Ltd. v. E. Intl Inc. and Associates (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 332, 357 – 364 (Eko JSC)

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Mocoh SA & Anor v. Shield Energy Ltd & Anor (2021) LPELR-54559(CA).

[5]INFAZ v COBEC (Nig) Ltd (2018) 12 NWLR Pt. 1632) 127; Bank of Baroda v Iyalabani Company Ltd (2002) 13 NWLR 551. See also Watanmal (Singapore) Pte Ltd v. Liz Olofin and Company Plc (1997) LPELR-6224(CA) 13 (Musdapher JCA as he then was); NU Metro Retail (Nig) Ltd v. Tradex S.R.L & Another (2017) LPELR-42329(CA) 41-2 (Garba JCA as he then was).