New civil procedure rules in Singapore
New civil procedure rules (Rules of Court 2021) for the General Division of the High Court (excluding the Singapore International Commercial Court (‘SICC’)) have been gazetted and will be implemented on 1 April 2022. The reform is intended to modernise the litigation process and improve efficiency.[1] New rules for the SICC have also been gazetted and will similarly come into operation on 1 April 2022.
This update focuses on the rules which apply to the General Division of the High Court (excluding the SICC). New rules which are of particular interest from a conflict of laws point of view include changes to the rules on service out. The new Order 8 rule 1 provides that:
‘(1) An originating process or other court document may be served out of Singapore with the Court’s approval if it can be shown that the Court has the jurisdiction or is the appropriate court to hear the action.
…
(3) The Court’s approval is not required if service out of Singapore is allowed under a contract between the parties.
…’
The current rules on service out is to be found in Order 11 of the Rules of Court. This requires that the plaintiff (‘claimant’ under the new Rules) establish that (1) there is a good arguable case that the action fits within one of the heads of Order 11; (2) there is a serious issue to be tried on the merits; and (3) Singapore is forum conveniens.[2] The heads of Order 11 generally require a nexus to be shown between the parties or subject-matter of the action to Singapore and are based on the predecessor to the UK Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 6B paragraph 3.1. The wording of the new Order 8 rule 1(1) suggests a drastic departure from the current Order 11 framework; however, this is not the case.
There will be two alternative grounds of service out: either the Singapore court ‘has the jurisdiction’ to hear the action or ‘is the appropriate court’ to hear the action. The first ground of service out presumably covers situations such as where the Singapore court is the chosen court in accordance with the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016,[3] which enacts the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements into Singapore law. The second ground of service out i.e. that the Singapore court is the ‘appropriate court’ to hear the action could, on one view, be read to refer only to the requirement under the current framework that Singapore is forum conveniens. However, the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021, which are to be read with the new Rules of Court, make it clear that the claimant still has to show:[4]
‘(a) there is a good arguable case that there is sufficient nexus to Singapore;
(b) Singapore is the forum conveniens; and
(c) there is a serious question to be tried on the merits of the claim.’
The Practice Directions go on to give as examples of a sufficient nexus to Singapore factors which are substantively identical to the current Order 11 heads.[5] As these are non-exhaustive examples, the difference between the current rules and this new ground of service out is that the claimant may still succeed in obtaining leave to serve out even though the action does not fit within one of the heads of the current Order 11. This is helpful insofar as the scope of some of the heads are uncertain; for example, it is unclear whether an action for a declaration that a contract does not exist falls within the current contractual head of service out[6] as there is no equivalent to the UK CPR PD 6B paragraph 3.1(8).[7] Yet at the same time, the Court of Appeal had previously taken a wide interpretation of Order 11 rule 1(n), which reads: ‘the claim is made under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap. 65A), the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing Act (Cap. 325) or any other written law’.[8] The phrase ‘any written law’ was held not to be read ejusdem generis[9] and would include the court’s powers, conferred by s 18 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act read together with paragraph 14 of the First Schedule, to ‘grant all reliefs and remedies at law and in equity, including damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific performance.’[10] This interpretation of Order 11 rule 1(n) arguably achieves much the same effect as the new ‘appropriate court’ ground of service out.
The new Order 8 rule 1(3) is to be welcomed. However, it is important to note that a choice of court agreement for the Singapore court which is unaccompanied by an agreement to permit service out of Singapore will still require an application for leave to serve out under the ‘has jurisdiction’ ground (if the Choice of Court Agreements Act is applicable) or the ‘appropriate court’ ground (if the Choice of Court Agreements Act is not applicable).
Other provisions in the new Rules of Court 2021 which are of interest deal with a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court. A defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the action or the court should not exercise jurisdiction to hear the action. A challenge on either ground ‘is not treated as a submission to jurisdiction’.[11] This seemingly obviates the established common law understanding that a jurisdictional challenge which attacks the existence of the court’s jurisdiction (a setting aside application) does not amount to a submission to the court’s jurisdiction, whereas a jurisdictional challenge which requests the court not to exercise the jurisdiction which it has (a stay application) amounts to a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.[12] Further to that, the provisions which deal with challenges to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction are worded slightly differently depending on whether the action is commenced by way of an originating claim or an originating application. For the former, Order 6 rule 7(5) provides that ‘The challenge to jurisdiction may be for the reason that – … (b) the Court should not exercise jurisdiction to hear the action.’ For the latter, Order 6 rule 12(4) elaborates that ‘The challenge to jurisdiction may be for the reason that – … (b) the Court should not exercise jurisdiction because it is not the appropriate Court to hear the action.’ The difference in wording is puzzling because one assumes that the same types of challenges are possible regardless of whether the action is commenced by way of an originating claim or originating application – eg, challenges based on forum non conveniens, abuse of process or case management reasons. Given use of the word ‘may’ in both provisions though, it ought to be the case that the different wording does not lead to any substantive difference on the types of challenges which are permissible.
[2] Zoom Communications v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 (CA).
[3] Cap 39A.
[4] Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (To be read with Rules of Court 2021), p 72.
[5] Ibid, pp 72-73.
[6] Rules of Court, Order 11 rule 1(d).
[7] ‘A claim is made for a declaration that no contract exists …’.
[8] Li Shengwu v Attorney-General [2019] 1 SLR 1081 (CA).
[9] Ibid, [168]-[170].
[10] Ibid, [161].
[11] Rules of Court 2021, Order 6 rule 7(6) (originating claim); Order 6 rule 12(5) (originating application.
[12] Zoom Communications v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 (CA).
This post was contributed by Dr. Vito Bumbaca, who is Assistant Lecturer at the University of Geneva
In a ruling of 2 August 2021 (A v. B, C-262/21 PPU), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified that a child who is allegedly wrongfully removed, meaning without consent of the other parent, should not return to his/ her habitual residence if such a removal took place as a consequence of the ordered transfer determining international responsibility based on the Dublin III Regulation. The judgment is not available in English and is the first ever emanating from this Court concerning the Brussels IIA-Dublin III interplay.
The Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (Brussels IIA Regulation) complements the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and is applicable to 26 EU Member States, including Finland and Sweden. The Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) (Dublin III), is pertinent for asylum seekers’ applications commenced at least in one of the 31 Dublin Member States (EU/EFTA), comprising Finland and Sweden, bound by this Regulation.
Questions for a CJEU urgent preliminary ruling:
The CJEU was referred five questions, but only addressed the first two.
‘(1) Must Article 2(11) of [Regulation No 2201/2003], relating to the wrongful removal of a child, be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which one of the parents, without the other parent’s consent, removes the child from his or her place of residence to another Member State, which is the Member State responsible under a transfer decision taken by an authority in application of Regulation [No 604/2013], must be classified as wrongful removal?
(2) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, must Article 2(11) [of Regulation No 2201/2003], relating to wrongful retention, be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which a court of the child’s State of residence has annulled the decision taken by an authority to transfer examination of the file, and to take no further action since the mother and child have left the State of residence, but in which the child whose return is ordered, no longer has a currently valid residence document in his or her State of residence, or the right to enter or to remain in the State in question, must be classified as wrongful retention?’
Contents of the CJEU judgment:
In 2019, a married couple, third-State nationals (Iran), both with regard to Brussels IIA and Dublin III respective Member States, moved from Finland to settle in Sweden. Since 2016, the couple had lived in Finland for around three years. In 2019, a child was born in Sweden. The couple was exercising joint custody over the child in conformity with Swedish law. The mother was holding a family residency permit, in both Finland and Sweden, through the father’s employment rights. The approved duration of the mother’s residency right in Finland was around one year longer than in Sweden.
Two months after the child’s birth, the latter and the mother were placed under Swedish residential care (hostel). Essentially, the Swedish administrative decision to uphold this care protective measure was the result of the father’s violence against the mother, so to protect the child from the risks against his development and health, as well as to prevent his wrongful removal to Iran possibly envisaged by his father. Limited contact rights were granted to the father. A residency permit was requested, individually, by the father and the mother based on the family lien – request respectively filed on 21 November and 4 December 2019.
In August 2020, the mother submitted an asylum request, for the child and herself, before the Swedish authorities. The same month, the Finnish authorities declared themselves internationally responsible over the mother’s and child’s asylum request by virtue of article 12(3) of Dublin III – based on the longer duration of the residency permit previously delivered according to Finnish law. In October 2020, the Swedish authorities dismissed the father’s and rejected the mother’s respective residency and asylum requests, and ordered the transfer of the child and his mother to Finland. Taking into account the father’s presence as a threat against the child, the limited contacts established between them, and the father’s residency right in Finland, the Swedish authorities concluded that the child’s separation from his father was not against his best interests and that the transfer was not an obstacle to the exercise of the father’s visitation right in Finland. In November 2020, the mother and the child moved to Finland pursuant to article 29(1) of Dublin III. In December 2020, the father filed an appeal against the Swedish court’s decisions, which was upheld by the Swedish Immigration Tribunal (‘Migrationsdomstolen i Stockholm’), although it resulted later to be dismissed by the Swedish Immigration Authorities, and then rejected by the Immigration Tribunal, due to the child’s relocation to Finland (CJEU ruling, § 23-24).
In January 2021, the father filed a new request before the Swedish authorities for family residency permit on behalf of the child, which was still ongoing at the time of this judgment (CJEU ruling, § 25). During the same month, the mother deposited an asylum application before the Finnish authorities, which was still ongoing at the time of this judgment – the mother’s and child’s residency permits were withdrawn by the Finnish authorities (CJEU ruling, § 26). In April 2021, the Swedish Court (‘Västmanlands tingsrätt’), notwithstanding the mother’s objection to their jurisdiction, granted divorce, sole custody to the mother and refused visitation right to the father – upheld in appeal (‘Svea hovrätt’). Prior to it, the father filed an application for child return before the Helsinki Court of Appeal (‘Helsingin hovioikeus’), arguing that the mother had wrongfully removed the child to Finland, on the grounds of the 1980 Hague Convention. The return application was rejected. On the father’s appeal, the Finnish authorities stayed proceedings and requested an urgent preliminary ruling from the CJEU, in line with article 107 of the Luxembourg Court’s rules of procedure.
CJEU reasoning:
The Court reiterated that a removal or retention shall be wrongful when a child holds his habitual residence in the requesting State and that a custody right is attributed to, and effectively exercised by, the left-behind parent consistently with the law of that State (§ 45). The primary objectives of the Brussels IIA Regulation, particularly within its common judicial space aimed to ensure mutual recognition of judgments, and the 1980 Hague Convention are strictly related for abduction prevention and immediate obtainment of effective child return orders (§ 46).
The Court stated that, pursuant to articles 2 § 11 and 11 of the Brussels IIA Regulation, the child removal to a Member State other than the child’s habitual residence, essentially performed by virtue of the mother’s right of custody and effective care while executing a transfer decision based on article 29 § 1 of the Dublin III Regulation, should not be contemplated as wrongful (§ 48). In addition, the absence of ‘take charge’ request following the annulment of a transfer decision, namely for the purposes of article 29 § 3 of Dublin III, which was not implemented by the Swedish authorities, would lead the retention not to being regarded as unlawful (§ 50). Consequently, as maintained by the Court, the child’s relocation was just a consequence of his administrative situation in Sweden (§ 51). A conclusion opposing the Court reasoning would be to the detriment of the Dublin III Regulation objectives.
Some insights from national precedents:
In the case ATF 5A_121/2018, involving a similar scenario (cf. FamPra.ch 1/2019), the Swiss Federal Court maintained that a child born in Greece, who had lived for more than a year with his mother in Switzerland, had to be returned to Greece (place of the left-behind parent’s residence) based on the established child’s habitual residence prior to the wrongful removal to Switzerland, notwithstanding his pending asylum application in the latter State. Indeed, the Greek authorities had been internationally responsible over the child’s asylum request on the basis of his father’s residence document. However also in that case it was alleged that the father had been violent against the mother and that a judgment ordering the child’s return to Greece, alone or without his mother (§ 5.3), would not have caused harm to the child under the 1980 Hague Convention, art. 13.
In the case G v. G [2021] UKSC 9, involving a slightly different scenario in that no multiple asylum requests were submitted, the UKSC judged that a child, of eight years old born in South Africa, should not be returned – stay of proceedings – until an asylum decision, based on an asylum application filed in England, had been taken by the UK authorities. The UKSC considered that, although an asylum claim might be tactically submitted to frustrate child return to his/ her country of habitual residence prior to wrongful removal or retention, it is vital that an asylum claim over an applicant child, accompanied or not by his/ her primary carer, is brought forward while awaiting a final decision – in conformity with the ‘non-refoulement’ principle pursuant to article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
Comment:
The CJEU ruling is momentous dictum in that it holds the not any longer uncommon intersection of private international law and vulnerable migration, especially with regard to children in need of international protection in accordance with both Brussels IIA and Dublin III Regulations (cf. Brussels IIA, § 9, and Dublin III, article 2 lit. b). The Luxembourg Court clarifies that a child who is allegedly wrongfully removed, meaning without consent of the other parent, should not return to his/ her habitual residence if such a removal took place as a consequence of the ordered transfer determining international responsibility based on the Dublin III Regulation. It is emphasised that, contrary to the Swiss judgment, the child in the instant case did not have any personal attachments with Finland at the time of the relocation – neither by birth nor by entourage – country of destination for the purposes of the Dublin III transfer. Moreover, the ‘transfer of responsibility’ for the purposes of Dublin III should be contemplated as an administrative decision only, regardless of the child’s habitual residence.
It is observed as a preamble that, according to a well-known CJEU practice, a child should not be regarded as to establish a habitual residence in a Member State in which he or she has never been physically present (CJEU, OL v. PQ, 8 June 2017, C-111/17 PPU; CJEU, UD v. XB, 17 October 2018, C-393/18 PPU). Hence, it appears procedurally just that the Swedish courts retained international jurisdiction over custody, perhaps with the aim of Brussels IIA, article 8 – the child’s habitual residence at the time of the seisin, which occurred prior to the transfer to Finland. On that procedural departure, the Swedish courts custody judgment is substantially fair in that the father’s abuse against the mother is indeed an element that should be retained for parental responsibility, including abduction, merits (CJEU ruling, § 48; UKSC judgment, § 62).
However, it is argued here that, particularly given that at the relevant time Sweden was the child’s place of birth where he lived for around 14 months with his primary carer, the Swedish and the Finnish authorities might have ‘concentrated’ jurisdiction and responsibility in one Member State, namely Sweden, ultimately to avoid further length and costs related to the asylum procedures in line with the same Dublin III objectives evoked by the CJEU – namely “guarantee effective access to the procedures for granting international protection and not to compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications for international protection” (§ 5, Dublin III). Conversely, provided that the child’s relocation was not wrongful as indicated by the Finnish authorities, and confirmed by the CJEU ruling, the Swedish authorities may have opted for the ‘transfer of jurisdiction’ towards the Finnish authorities on the basis of Brussels IIA, article 15(1) lit. b, indicating the child’s new habitual residence (cf. Advocate General’s opinion, § 41) following the lawful relocation (cf. article 15.3., lit. a).
Importantly, concentration of jurisdiction-responsibility over a child seeking international protection in one Member State, in light of the Brussels IIA-Dublin III interplay, would essentially determine a coordinated interpretation of the child’s best interests (cf. Brussels II, § 12, and Dublin III, § 13), avoiding two parallel administrative-judicial proceedings in two Member States whose authorities may not always come to similar views, as opposed to the present case, over such interests (AG’s opinion, § 48). This is particularly true, if the child (non-)return to his/ her habitual residence might likely be influenced, as stated in the CJEU ruling, by his/ her administrative situation, which would potentially have an impact on the international custody jurisdiction determination. An example of controversial outcome, dealing with child abduction-asylum proceedings, is the profoundly divergent opinion arising from the UK and Swiss respective rulings, to the extent of child return in a situation where the mother, primary carer, is or could be subject to domestic violence in the requesting State.
Similarly, the UKSC guidance, in ‘G v. G’, affirmed: “Due to the time taken by the in-country appeal process this bar is likely to have a devastating impact on 1980 Hague Convention proceedings. I would suggest that this impact should urgently be addressed by consideration being given as to a legislative solution […] However, whilst the court does not determine the request for international protection it does determine the 1980 Hague Convention proceedings so that where issues overlap the court can come to factual conclusions on the overlapping issues so long as the prohibition on determining the claim for international protection is not infringed […] First, as soon as it is appreciated that there are related 1980 Hague Convention proceedings and asylum proceedings it will generally be desirable that the Secretary of State be requested to intervene in the 1980 Hague Convention proceedings” (UKSC judgment, § 152-157). Clearly, the legislative solution on a more efficient coordination of child abduction-asylum proceedings, invoked by the UK courts, may also be raised with the EU [and Swiss] legislator, considering their effects on related custody orders.
– Cross posted at the EAPIL blog.
Thanks to Ilaria Pretelli for the tip-off.
The XXIInd volume of the Yearbook of Private International Law (2020/2021) has been released. It contains articles on the most important innovations in multilateral and national private international law by authors from all over the world. The readers will find an analysis on cross-border mobility of union citizens and continuity of civil status by Johan Meeusen as well as how to cope with the obstacles to mobility due to the pandemics (Bernard Haftel) and Brexit (Katarina Trimmings and Konstantina Kalaitsoglou). Two inspiring sections nourish the core of the volume: the editors present the most challenging innovations of Regulation Brussels II ter (EU Regulation 2019/1111), and the consequences of the global reach of the internet for private international law. The National reports section hosts articles on the new Croatian and Uruguayan Private International law Statutes.
The most recent innovations on classical themes of private international law (torts, muslim divorces, the degree of deference by state courts to international commercial arbitral awards, etc.) add to this already rich volume.
Readers are invited to view the table of contents and the foreword by the editors.
Comparative Procedural Law and Justice (CPLJ) is a global project of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, with the support of the Luxembourg National Research Fund (019/13946847), involving more than one hundred scholars from all over the world.
CPLJ is envisioned as a comprehensive study of comparative civil procedural law and civil dispute resolution schemes in the contemporary world. It aims at understanding procedural rules in their cultural context, as well as at highlighting workable approaches to the resolution of civil disputes.
In this framework, the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law will host its 8th CPLJ Webinar on 28 January 2022, 3:00 – 5:45 pm (CET).
The programme reads as follows:
Chair: Loïc Cadiet (University of Paris 1)
3:00 pm John Dashaco (University of Yaoundé II)
Harmonization and Practice of Civil Procedure within the OHADA Sub-Region: Reflection on the Uniform Act on Simplified Recovery Procedure and Measures of Execution
3:30 pm Discussion
4:00 pm Intermission
4:15 pm Sami Bostanji (University of Tunis El Manar)
Droit Processuel Comparé: Regard Général sur les Droits des Pays Arabes (*)
5:00 pm Discussion
5:45 pm Closing of the event
The full programme is available here.
(Image credits: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam)
(*) Presentation in French. Consecutive interpretation in English will be provided.
The RIDOC 2021: Rijeka Doctoral Conference will be held on Friday 10 December 2021, from 8:30 to 17:30, in 10 sessions (some running parallel), at the University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law and online. The record number of doctoral students and outstanding three-member panels will provide an internationally diverse environment for discussion of various legal topics. Among the topics many of our readers will find something along their interests in conflict of laws, arbitration law, and of course public international law, as the same day we celebrate the international day of human rights.
The special treat is the plenary lecture to be given by the First Advocate General of the CJEU Maciej Szpunar on “The Court of Justice of the European Union and Effects of Research upon its Functioning” which starts at 12:30 at this link.
The programme is available here, and next to each session there is a corresponding link.
Written by Zhen Chen, doctoral candidate at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands
The article titled ‘The Tango Between Art.17(3) Brussels Ibis and Art.6(4)(b) Rome I under the Beat of Package Travel Directive’ is published on Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law with open access, available at https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1023263X211048595
In the field of European private international law, Brussels Ibis Regulation and Rome I Regulation are dancing partners that work closely with different roles. When it comes to consumer protection, Brussels Ibis Regulation is the leader and Rome I Regulation is the follower, since special protective rules over consumer contracts were first introduced in Articles 13–15 Brussels Convention[1] and then followed by Article 5 Rome Convention.[2]
Package travel tourists are explicitly protected as consumers under Article 6(4)(b) Rome I, but not under Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis since it does not expressly mention the term ‘package travel’. Instead, the term used in Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis is the same as that in Article 5(5) Rome Convention, which has been abandoned by its successor Article 6(4)(b) Rome I. Such discrepancy is widened with the replacement of Directive 90/314 by Directive 2015/2302 with the enlarged notion of package travel. This means that when Article 6(4)(b) Rome I Regulation is dancing under the beat of Directive 2015/2302, Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis Regulation is still dancing under the beat of Article 5(5) 1980 Rome Convention.
The CJEU clarified in the Pammer judgment that the concept ‘a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation’ in Article 15(3) Brussels I should be interpreted in line with Article 6(4)(b) Rome I by reference to Directive 90/314.[3] The CJEU did not follow the opinion of the Advocate General, according to which the concept prescribed in Article 15(3) Brussels I has to be interpreted in exactly the same way as the term ‘package’ enshrined in Article 2(1) Directive 90/314.[4] The court stated that the concept in Article 15(3) Brussels I is ‘close to’[5] the notion package in Directive 90/314. The wording ‘close to’, instead of ‘identical’ or ‘the same as’, indicates that the CJEU did not intend to interpret such two terms as having exactly the same meaning.
Since Article 15(3) Brussels I remains unchanged in its successor Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis, this article argues that Art.17(3) Brussels Ibis Regulation has been two steps behind Art.6(4)(b) Rome I when it comes to the protection of consumers in package travel contracts. In order to close the gap, a uniform concept of package travel should be given. It is suggested that Art.17(3) Brussels Ibis should adopt the concept of package travel provided in Directive 2015/2302.
Despite the adoption of a uniform concept, Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis and Article 6 Rome I only cover packages containing transport, as an exception of transport contracts. Packages not including transport do not fall under the exception of transport contracts. Since all package travel contracts should be protected as consumer contracts, regardless of containing transport or not, it is more logical to delete package travel contracts from the exception of transport contracts in Art.6(4)(b) Rome I as well as Art.17(3) Brussels Ibis and establish a separate provision to regulate package travel contracts.
To this end, Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis and Article 6(4)(b) Rome I can be simplified as ‘This Section/article shall not apply to a contract of transport/carriage’, whereas package travel contracts are expressly regulated as consumer contracts in a separate provision. In this regard, the framework in Article 5 Rome Convention is a better solution, according to which package travel contracts can be expressly included in Article 17 Brussels Ibis/Article 6 Rome I as follows:
Notwithstanding Article 17(3) Brussels Ibis/Article 6(4)(b) Rome I, this Section/article shall apply to a contract relating to package travel within the meaning of Council Directive 2015/2302/EU of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements.
[1] The predecessor of Articles 17-19 Brussels Ibis Regulation.
[2] The predecessor of Article 6 Rome I Regulation.
[3] Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, ECLI:EU:C:2010:740, para. 43
[4] Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, ECLI:EU:C:2010:273, opinion of advocate general, para. 49.
[5] Case C-585/08 Pammer, ECLI:EU:C:2010:740, para. 36.
Rescheduled: “The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Prospects for Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters between the EU and Third Countries” – Conference on 9 and 10 September 2022, University of Bonn, Germany
In preparation of the Conference on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention on 9/10 September 2022, planned to be taking place on campus of the University of Bonn, Germany, we are offering here a Repository of contributions to the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. Please email us if you miss something in it, we will update immediately…
Update of 7 December 2021: New entries are printed bold.
Please also check the “official” Bibliography of the HCCH for the instrument.
I. Explanatory Reports
Garcimartín Alférez, Francisco;
II. Bibliography
Badr, Yehya Ibrahim “The Hague 2019 Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judicial Decisions: A Comparative Study”, International Journal of Doctrine, Judiciary, and Legislation (IJDJL) 3 (2022), forthcoming (soon available here) Balbi, Francesca “La circolazione delle decisioni a livello globale: il rogetto di convenzione della Conferenza dell’Aia per il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle sentenze straniere” (Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2019; available: here) Beaumont, Paul “Forum non Conveniens and the EU rules on Conflicts of Jurisdiction: A Possible Global Solution”, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 2018, pp 433-447 Beaumont, Paul R. “Judgments Convention: Application to Governments”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 121-137 Beaumont, Paul;(Cooperative Constitutional State and the Codification of Private International Law: Notes on the “Judgment Project” of the Hague Conference on Private International Law)
Brand, Ronald A.
“The Circulation of Judgments Under the Draft Hague Judgments Convention”, University of Pittsburgh School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2019-02, pp 1-35
Brand, Ronald A.
“Jurisdictional Developments and the New Hague Judgments Project”, in HCCH (ed.), A Commitment to Private International Law – Essays in honour of Hans van Loon, Cambridge 2013, pp 89-99
Brand, Ronald A.
“New Challenges in Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments”, in Franco Ferrari, Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law – Contemporary Challenges and Continuing Relevance, Cheltenham/Northampton 2019, pp 360-389
Brand, Ronald A.
“Jurisdiction and Judgments Recognition at the Hague Conference: Choices Made, Treaties Completed, and the Path Ahead”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 3-17
Brand, Ronald A.
“The Hague Judgments Convention in the United States: A ‘Game Changer’ or a New Path to the Old Game?“, University of Pittsburgh Law Review 82 (2021), pp. 847-880 (available here)
Çaliskan, Yusuf;
Çaliskan, Zeynep
“2 Temmuz 2019 Tarihli Yabanci Mahkeme Kararlarinin Taninmasi ve Tenfizine Iliskin Lahey Anlasmasinin Degerlendirilmesi”, Public and Private International Law Bulletin 40 (2020), pp 231-245 (available here)
(An Evaluation of 2 July 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters)
Celis Aguilar, María Mayela
“El convenio de la haya de 30 de junio de 2005 sobre acuerdos de elección de foro y su vinculación con el ‘proyecto sobre Sentencias’ (y viceversa)”, Revista mexicana de Derecho internacional privado y comprado N°40 (octubre de 2018), pp. 29-51 (available here)
Chai, Yuhong; Qu, Zichao
“The Development and Future of the Hague Jurisdiction Project”, Wuhan University International Law Review 2021-05, pp. 27-52 (online first)
Chen, Wendy
“Indirect Jurisdiction over the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments of Foreign Courts in Compulsory Counterclaims”, Journal of Xingtai University 2019-04, pp. 106-110
Cheng, Xian-ping; Liu, Xian-chao
“On the Application of the Severable Clause in The Hague Judgments Convention”, Harbin Normal University Social Science Journal 2021-05, pp. 30-34
Choi, Sung-Soo
“Review of the several issues of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, Gachon Law Review 14 (2021), pp. 37-68 (available here)
Clavel, Sandrine ; Jault-Seseke, Fabienne
“La convention de La Haye du 2 juillet 2019 sur la reconnaissance et l’exécution des jugements étrangers en matière civile ou commerciale : Que peut-on en attendre ?”, Travaux du comité français de Droit international privé, Vol. 2018-2020, Paris 2021 (Version provisoire de la communication présentée le 4 octobre 2019, available here)
Clover Alcolea, Lucas
“The 2005 Hague Choice of Court and the 2019 Hague Judgments Conventions versus the New York Convention – Rivals, Alternatives or Something Else?”, Mc Gill Journal of Dispute Resolution 6 (2019-2020), pp. 187-214
Coco, Sarah E.
“The Value of a New Judgments Convention for U.S. Litigants”, New York University Law Review 94 (2019), pp 1210-1243
Cong, Junqi
“Reinventing China’s Indirect Jurisdiction over Civil and Commercial Matters concerning Foreign Affairs – Starting from the Hague Judgment Convention” (Master’s Thesis, National 211/985 Project Jilin University; DOI: 10.27162/d.cnki.gjlin.2020.001343)
Contreras Vaca, Francisco José
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„The Judgments Convention – The Current State of Play”, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 29 (2019), pp 473-490
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“A Conflict of Laws Study in Hong Kong-China Judgment Regionalism: Legal Challenges and renewed Momentum”, Cornell International Law Journal 52 (2020), pp. 591-642
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“Latest Development of the Hague Jurisdiction Project”, Wuhan University International Law Review 2020-04, pp. 1-16
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“The Recognition and Enforcement of Commercial Judgments Between China and South Africa: Comparison and Convergence”, China Legal Science 2019-06, pp 33-57 (available here)
Weller, Matthias
“The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: New Trends in Trust Management?”, in Christoph Benicke, Stefan Huber (eds.), Festschrift für Herbert Kronke zum 70. Geburtstag, Bielefeld 2020, pp 621-632
Weller, Matthias
“The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention – The Jurisdictional Filters of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, Yearbook of Private International Law 21 (2019/2020), pp 279-308
Weller, Matthias
“Das Haager Übereinkommen zur Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausländischer Urteile”, in Thomas Rauscher (ed.), Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht, Munich, 5th ed., forthcoming
Weller, Matthias
„Die Kontrolle der internationalen Zuständigkeit im Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen 2019“, in Christoph Althammer/Christoph Schärtl (eds.), Festschrift für Herbert Roth, Tübingen 2021, pp. 835-855
Wilderspin, Michael;
Vysoka, Lenka
“The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention through European lenses”, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR) 2020, pp 34-49
Wu, Qiong
“The Overview of the 22nd Diplomatic Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law”, Chinese Yearbook of International Law 2019, pp. 337-338
Xie, Yili
“Research on the Intellectual Property Infringment System of the Hague Judgments Convention”, China-Arab States Science and Technology Forum 2021-09, pp. 190-194
Xu, Guojian
“Comment on Key Issues Concerning Hague Judgment Convention in 2019 “, Journal of Shanghai University of Political Science and Law 35 (2020), pp 1-29
Xu, Guojian
“To Establish an International Legal System for Global Circulation of Court Judgments”, Wuhan University International Law Review 2017-05, pp 100-130
Xu, Guojian
“Overview of the Mechanism of Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements Established by HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, China Journal of Applied Jurisprudence No. 2020-02, pp 65-77
Xu, Guojian
“On the Scope and Limitation of the Global Circulation of Court Judgments: An Analysis on the Application Scope of the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters”, Chinese Yearbook of Private International Law and Comparative Law 2019-01, pp. 269-299
Yekini, Abubakri
“The Hague Judgments Convention and Commonwealth Model Law – A Pragmatic Perspective”, Oxford 2021.
Yeo, Terence
“The Hague Judgments Convention – A View from Singapore”, Singapore Academy of Law Journal (e-First) 3rd August 2020 (available here)
Zasemkova, Olesya F.
“ ‘Judicial Convention’ as a New Stage in the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, Lex Russica 2019-10, pp. 84-103 (available here)
Zhang, Chunliang;
Huang, Shan
“On the Common Courts Rules in Hague Judgments Convention – China’s way for the Judicial Assistance under Belt and Road Initiative”, Journal of Henan University of Economics and Law 2020-05, pp. 103-113
Zhang, Lizhen
“On the Defamation Problem in the Hague Judgments Project: Ever In and Now out of the Scope”, Wuhan University International Law Review 2019-01, pp. 41-58 (available here)
Zhang, Wenliang
“The Finality Requirement of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, Wuhan University Law Review 2020-02, pp. 19-38
Zhang, Wenliang; Tu, Guangjian
“The Hague Judgments Convention and Mainland China-Hong Kong SAR Judgments Arrangement: Comparison and Prospects for Implementation”, Chinese Journal of International Law 20 (2021), pp. 101-135
Zhang, Wenliang;
Tu, Guangjian
“The 1971 and 2019 Hague Judgments Conventions: Compared and Whether China Would Change Its Attitude Towards The Hague”, Journal of International Dispute Settlement (JIDS), 2020, 00, pp. 1-24
Zhang, Zhengyi;
Zhang, Zhen
“Development of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters and Its Implication to China”, International and Comparative Law Review 2020, pp. 112-131
Zhao, Ning
“Completing a long-awaited puzzle in the landscape of cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments: An overview of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, Swiss Review of International and European Law (SRIEL) 30 (2020), pp 345-368
Zirat, Gennadii
“Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters: A new Contribution of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to the Unification of International Civil Procedure” Ukrainian Journal of International Law 2020-03, pp. 105-112 (available here)
III. Recordings of Events Related to the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention
HCCH “HCCH a|Bridged: Innovation in Transnational Litigation – Edition 2021: Enabling Party Autonomy with the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention”, 1 December 2021 (full recording available here) UIHJ; HCCH “3rd training webinar on the Hague Conventions on service of documents (1965) and recognition and enforcement of judgements (2019)”, 15/18 March 2021 (full recording available here in French and here in English) ASADIP; HCCH “Conferencia Internacional: Convención HCCH 2019 sobre Reconocimiento y Ejecución de Sentencias Extranjeras”, 3 December 2020 (full recording available here and here) ASIL “The Promise and Prospects of the 2019 Hague Convention”, 25-26 June 2020 (full recording available here and here) JPRI; HCCH; UNIDROIT; UNCITRAL “2020 Judicial Policy Research Institute International Conference – International Commercial Litigation: Recent Developments and Future Challenges, Session 3: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, 12 November 2020 (recording available here) University of Bonn; HCCH “Pre-Conference Video Roundtable on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Prospects for Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters between the EU and Third Countries”, 29 October 2020 (full recording available here) Department of Justice Hong Kong; HCCH “Inaugural Global Conference – 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention: Global Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments”, 9 September 2019 (recording available here) HCCH “22nd Diplomatic Session of the HCCH: The Adoption of the 2019 Judgments Convention”, 2 July 2020 (short documentary video available here)
You are kindly invited for the online conference on “Human Mobility Becomes ‘Unwanted’ Migration When Meeting Borders: Tactics and Technologies of Migration Management” by Prof. Dr. Helga RITTESBERGER-TILIÇ (Middle East Technical University, Department of Sociology, Ankara, Turkey) on December 8, 2021, Wednesday between 12.30-13.30 (GMT+3). The conference is organised by Bilkent University as a part of the Talks on Migration Series within the Jean Monnet Module on European and International Migration Law. It will be held via zoom, free of charge. Please contact us (Jmmigration@bilkent.edu.tr) for participation.
Biography:
Prof. Dr. Helga RITTESBERGER-TILIÇ is a member of the Department of Sociology at Middle East Technical University (Ankara, Turkey) since 1985. She received her doctorate degree from Essen University, Germany.
She has extensively worked on different aspects of international as well as national migration. She covered a wide field of subthemes such as return migration from Germany, migration to Europe, human trafficking, unacompanied migrant children, foreign domestic women labor in the informal economy in Turkey, integration of Syrian migrants into the Turkish labor market, ‘legal’ foreigners in Turkey as well as rural-to-urban migration processes and urban poverty in the national Turkish context.
Abstract:
Human Mobility becomes ‘unwanted’ Migration When Meeting Borders: Tactics and Technologies of Migration Management
Some researchers might stress a quantitative analysis of numbers of ‘forced’ migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, deportations etc. or we may say the quantification of state categorizations of different types of wanted and unwanted migrants. Others might be more interested in the study of how social relations produce discriminatory practices such as the subjectification of deportees, the role of criminalization and securitization discourses, etc.
The categorization into ‘those migrants, who deserve’ and ‘those, who do not deserve’ to stay, live, and work in a country is part of multiple processes in which a variety of tactics, tools and strategies are employed by different actors on local, regional and global levels. There is a wide range of actors: politicians, civil society organizations, academia, media, migrant solidarity organizations, local people and the migrants themselves. But the underlying assumption that migrants are part of a subordinate inclusion into local and global labor regimes remains.
Among the strategies of migration management changing of border regimes and control mechanisms, closing of borders, policing and an increase in deportation measures can be listed. Migrants were forced to return, stay in hotspot detention camps, find ‘alternative’ routes, or built their self-made camps like in Calais. The migrants trying to pass border crossings and fighting police, pushbacks of crowded boats and death statistics are presented to us, the audience, as a mediatic spectacle. The manifestation of the COVID 19 pandemic can be stressed, referring to changing tactics of ‘re-bordering’ the national borders as purposeful activities in the name of public health emergency on a global scale.
Thus, the process of building borders and the externalization of border regimes should be part of a discussion on ’forced’ migration without forgetting that migrants are disposable labor but also subjective beings.
On 25th November 2021, the English Law Commission published its Advice to Government on smart legal contracts. While the English Law Commission is anticipating launching in mid-2022 a project to review conflict of law rules to emerging technology, in Chapter 7 of this Advice, it discusses issues relevant to the jurisdiction of English courts concerning smart legal contracts. The term ‘smart legal contracts’ is explained at paragraph 2.11 of the Advice as: “legally binding contracts in which some or all of the contractual obligations are defined in and/or performed automatically by a computer program”.
In England, whether a court will have jurisdiction over a contractual dispute depends on either a party’s presence or domicile or by how or where a contract is formed. The English Law Commission found that identifying a party’s identity, presence, or domicile in the context of smart legal contracts can be problematic because parties can use pseudonyms in transactions on a distributed ledger. Concerning the place where the contract is formed, this depends upon the type of smart legal contracts in question. For smart legal contracts agreed upon in natural language but with automated performance, the place of formation can be determined by the normal rules of contract formation with reference to the natural language negotiations. For solely code smart legal contracts, a further distinction needs to be made between a unilateral one (whereby a party uses code on a distributed ledger and the other party acts upon) and a bilateral one (whereby a party uses a computer program on a distributed ledger to make an offer which is then accepts by a computer program deployed by the counter party). In case of a unilateral one, uncertainty exists because the place can be either a place where the other party performs the act pursuant to the deployed code or a place where acceptance is communicated to the offeror or there may be other potential places. For a bilateral one, the place can be either the place where the offeree is when his computer program accepts the offer, or it might be where the offeree is when the acceptance is communicated to the offeror. Or such place may be where the offeror is when the acceptance takes place or where the offeror is when the acceptance is communicated. Alternatively, the place of formation may be determined by the location of certain numbers of participating nodes. For hybrid smart legal contracts where terms are defined in natural language as well as defined in code, if such contracts are taken to be formed when the parties sign natural language terms, then there is no new complexity. On the other hand, if they are taken to be formed when coded terms are deployed, then same complexity in the context of solely code smart legal contracts arises. On either form, there will be more complexity due to multi-party arrangements as well as due to the nature of the distributed ledger technology itself. The English Law Commission ultimately was of the view that a bespoke principle to identify the place of formation of smart legal contracts should be developed. Parties are also encouraged to embed a jurisdiction clause in their smart legal contract. A possibility that the jurisdiction may be based upon the location of an agent was also considered. On this, a computer coder engaged to produce coded terms for a smart legal contract is taken to be an agent.
At times, an applicable law to contract may constitute a basis for establishing the court’s jurisdiction. On this, the English Law Commission pointed out that parties cannot choose a platform protocol as a governing law since this is not a “law” of a particular country as in Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation, which the English choice of law rules are still based upon. Nevertheless, the parties can incorporate the platform protocol as terms in their contract. While it will be difficult for parties to include a coded choice of law clause in their contract, the parties are advised to include a comment or other natural language provision so to stipulate the choice of law. In the absence of the express choice, Article 4(1) of the Rome I Regulation set out rules to determine the applicable law in certain types of contracts. The English Law Commission did not view these connecting factors to create any novel problem. Yet, the difficulty lies in identifying counter parties. In the absence of specific rules in Article 4(1), in Article 4(2), the applicable law is determined by the place of characteristic performance. In this context the characteristic performer is “the person that, but for the automation, would have performed the obligation that is characteristic of that type of contract, even if the actual performance of that duty is automated”. Failing this, the closest connection as per Article 4(3) and (4), this can be drawn from several connecting factors (no.7.92):
“(1) The identities, habitual residences, and domiciles of the parties (and/or of their agents).
(2) The place where any real-world performance takes place.
(3) The location of the nodes running the smart legal contract…
(4) The location of the party who instigates the creation of the smart legal contract.
(5) The place where the relevant smart legal contract platform is based.
(6) The domicile of the ledger’s gatekeeper/controller, if the relevant ledger is permissioned.
(7) The law governing any closely related contracts.
(8) The location of the private key…
(9) The location of any real-world assets to which the smart legal contract relates;
(10) The location of any cryptoasset to which the smart legal contract relates…”
Similar connecting factors are also applicable in the context of forum (non) conveniens consideration.
For full access of the Advice: https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2021/11/Smart-legal-contracts-accessible.pdf
Dr Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit is Lecturer in Maritime Law, Australian Maritime College, University of Tasmania and Senior Research Fellow, Research Centre for Private International Law in Emerging Countries, University of Johannesburg
Dr. Lenka Valkova, Researcher at the University of Milan, offers a description of the Proposal for a Regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and amending certain acts in the judicial cooperation, COM(2021) 759 final, issued on 1 December 2021.
Although a comprehensive set of instruments were designed to enhance judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal cases at EU level, most of them do not provide for engaging in communication between authorities and individuals or legal entities through digital means.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, in many instances national courts have been unable to maintain normal operations and were forced to switch to the use of digital technologies (e.g. email, videoconference, etc.). However, many of the technical solutions employed were developed in an ad hoc manner. Against this background, in December 2020 the Commission adopted a Communication on the digitalisation of justice in the EU proposing a set of measures to bring forward digitalisation at both the national and EU level in line with the ‘digital by default’ principle. Such principle should be understood as a way to improve the efficiency and resilience of communication, reduce costs and administrative burden, by making the digital channel of communication the preferred one to be used (on the Communication see here and Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication see here).
In this framework, and following the publication of The Roadmap and Public consultation, the Proposal for a Regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and amending certain acts in the judicial cooperation, was issued on 1 December 2021 (on the Proposal and also on the Impact Assessment see here). According to the Proposal, the Regulation shall apply to electronic communication between competent authorities and between natural or legal persons and competent authorities, and videoconferencing in proceedings falling under the scope of the legal acts listed in Annex I, and notably the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Regulation on European Order for Payment Procedure, the Regulation on European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims, the Regulation on European Small Claims Procedure, the Regulation on European Account Preservation Order, the Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, the Brussels IIter Regulation, the Maintenance Regulation, the Regulations on Matrimonial Property Regimes and on the Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships (on complete list of the legal instruments in Annex I see here).
To guarantee a common approach towards the use of modern technologies in cross-border judicial cooperation and access to justice, this initiative aims to make using digital communication compulsory for communication between courts and competent authorities through a decentralised IT system, subject to justified exceptions in case of disruption of the system or in other specific circumstances. Moreover, the Regulation should provide a legal basis for the electronic communication between courts and natural and legal persons and for the use of videoconferencing or other distance communication technology for oral hearings in cross-border cases. To this end, the European electronic access point, located on the European e-Justice Portal, which may be used by natural and legal persons for electronic communication with the courts and competent authorities in civil and commercial matters with cross-border implications, will be established. While the courts and competent authorities will be required to accept electronic communication from natural and legal persons, the use of the digital channel will be voluntary for the natural and legal persons. In fact, to respect the needs of disadvantaged groups and vulnerable people and to ensure that citizens who lack digital skills, who live in remote areas or whose personal capacity does not allow them a seamless access to the digital tools, the paper-based communication will be maintained as an option.
This Proposal and other EU initiatives concerning cross-border civil, commercial and family law in the digital world will be discussed on 8 December 2021 during the event PhD Book Club – EU PIL in Digital World. The event is organized under the auspices of the Digital in Law project, co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union.
The quarterly “Polish Civil Procedure” (“Polski Proces Cywilny”) just published a special issue on international procedural law and private international law. The issue is entirely devoted to international family law. Under the common title “New efforts in judicial cooperation in European child abduction cases”, it gathers contributions drafted in English and coming from authors representing several jurisdictions.
A special attention is being given to the Regulation 2019/1111. In fact, as Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly, Karol Weitz, and his colleagues clarify in the Editorial, it is the upcoming entry intro application of the Regulation that has prompted them to “invite distinguished and well-known academics from all over Europe to share their ideas [in particular on] the practical problems of its application by national courts and predicted impacts of amendments introduced pursuant to the [Regulation] as well as the outlook for the future developments in the field of European private international and procedural law, with a particular emphasis on cross-border family law matters”.
In addition to the print, the contributions contained in this issue are available online. The texts themselves as well as the table of content with abstracts can be consulted here.
Single-click shortcut for our readers:
Dieter Martiny
New efforts in judicial cooperation in European child abduction cases
Burkhard Hess
Michele Angelo Lupoi
Maciej Szpunar, Krzysztof Pacula
Forum of necessity in family law matters within the framework of EU and international law
Olga Bobrzynska
Fernando Gascón Inchausti, Pilar Peiteado Mariscal
Zofia Kubicka-Grupa
A monthly (online) seminar series on Trends and Challenges in Costs and Funding of Civil Justice will be launched on 15 December 2021 and run till June 2022. The seminars aim to discuss developments in costs and funding of civil litigation in Europe and at the global level, including third-party litigation funding, crowdfunding, collective and public interest ligitation, legal mobilization, austerity policies and funding of ADR. The seminars are organized by the team of the five year Vici project ‘Affordable Access to Justice’, financed by the Dutch Research Council, at Erasmus School of Law in Rotterdam.
You can register for all or some of the seminars here.
The first seminar will address key issues in access to justice and costs and funding, including funding of international commercial litigation, third-party funding of collective redress and Law & Economics views on litigation funding. It is combined with the launch of the book New Pathways to Civil Justice in Europe (Springer, 2021) which resulted from a conference organized by the Rotterdam ERC team Building EU Civil Justice.
Access to Justice and Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation – 15 December 2021, 15.30-17.30 CET
PROGRAM
15.30-15.40 Xandra Kramer (Erasmus School of Law): Welcome, Introduction and book launch
15.40-16.10 Judith Resnik (Yale University): Constituting a Civil Legal System Called “Just”: Law, Money, Power, and Publicity (open access chapter) – including Q&A
16.15-16.35 Ianika Tzankova (Tilburg University): Access to Justice in the Global Village? Follow the Money!
16.35-16.55 John Sorabji (University College London): Developments in Costs and Funding of Civil Justice
16.55-17.15 Louis Visscher (Erasmus School of Law): Funding Litigation – a Law & Economics perspective
17.15-17.30 Discussion
OTHER UPCOMOMING SEMINARS:
19 January 2022: Legal Mobilization:?A European Perspective
16 February 2022: The impact of public interest litigation on access to justice: an empirical perspective
March 2022: Delving into Third-Party Litigation Funding in Europe (registration not open yet, date and details will follow)
20 April 2022: ‘Emotions recollected in tranquillity’: Austerity policies and litigation costs reforms in Southern Europe
25 May 2022: Funding and Costs of ADR in the Civil Justice System
June 2022: Regulating Third-Party Litigation Funding (registration not open yet, date and details will follow; may be combined with a live event in Rotterdam)
Where the habitual residence of the deceased at the time of death is not located in any of the Member States, the court of a Member State which finds that the deceased had the nationality of that State and held assets within its territory must, of its own motion, examine whether it has jurisdiction under Article 10 of the Succession Regulation?
This question lies at the heart of the request for a preliminary ruling lodged by French Cour de Cassation before the Court of Justice in the case V A and Z A, C-645/20. This is also the question that AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona thoroughly analyses in his Opinion presented this Thursday.
On the Opinion
As a reminder, under the general rule of jurisdiction set out in Article 4 of the Succession Regulation, the courts of the Member State in which the deceased had his habitual residence at the time of death have jurisdiction to rule on the succession as a whole.
In a subsidiary manner, under Article 10(1)(a) of the Regulation, where the habitual residence of the deceased at the time of death is not located in a Member State, the courts of a Member State in which assets of the estate are located shall nevertheless have jurisdiction to rule on the succession as a whole in so far as the deceased had the nationality of that Member State at the time of death.
These provisions are followed by Article 15. It states that where a court of a Member State is seised of a succession matter over which it has no jurisdiction under this Regulation, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.
According to AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona, the outcome of the clash between these provisions leads to an affirmative answer to the preliminary question:
Where the habitual residence of the deceased at the time of death is not located in any of the Member States, a court of a Member State seised of a succession matter must, of its own motion, declare that it has jurisdiction to rule on the succession as a whole when, in the light of the uncontested facts alleged by the parties (“au vu des faits allégués par les parties et non contestés”), the deceased had the nationality of that State and held assets in it (point 94, please keep in mind that this is not an official translation though).
… and on the sidenote
It seems noteworthy that the preliminary question refers to a situation where a court “finds” that the deceased had the nationality of its Member State and held assets in it. According to the Opinion, such findings must be made “in the light of the uncontested facts alleged by the parties” (see, however, the remark made above concerning the translation).
Why the nuance ?
It seems that Advocate General fine-tunes the scope of his analysis of the preliminary question to perfectly reflect the circumstances of the case pending before the French courts (points 37, 38 and 73). It might be a question of debate whether, simultaneously, his supplementary precision relating to “uncontested” and “alleged” facts may be used in order to delineate, in the abstract (what points 82-87 and 91 could maybe allow for), the (highly unclear and varied under national laws – see point 36) modalities of ex officio examination of jurisdiction under the Succession Regulation and as such be of relevance beyond the scope of the present case.
The Opinion can be consulted here (no English version yet).
By Zheng Sophia Tang, Wuhan University Institute of International Law and Academy of International Law and Global Governance
Chinese courts recognize and enforce foreign civil and commercial judgments under two circumstances: the existence of treaty obligations and the existence of reciprocity. In the past, Chinese courts relied solely on de facto reciprocity to enforce foreign judgments, which requires evidence to prove the courts in the foreign country enforced Chinese judgments in previous cases. Some courts have adopted an even tougher approach and rejected enforcing foreign judgments even though one positive precedent exists in the foreign country, arguing one case is not enough to prove reciprocity. The application of de facto reciprocity causes difficulty to enforce foreign judgments in Chinese courts. It makes enforcement impossible if no application was made to the foreign court to enforce Chinese judgment in the past, and if the other country also adopts the de facto reciprocity. It also makes proving reciprocity difficulty, especially if the foreign country has no comprehensive case report system.
After China commenced the One-Belt-One-Road initiative, efforts were made to relax the threshold to prove reciprocity. The Supreme Court has proposed, in two OBOR opinions, that China should adopt a presumed reciprocity approach, which presumes reciprocity exists if the other country demonstrates intention to establish judicial cooperation with China and no negative precedence exists.[1] However, since these opinions are not legally binding, they are not enough to reverse court practice. Although more Chinese courts enforce foreign judgments after 2013, they still need the proof of one positive case in the foreign country.
20 July, 2021, Shanghai No 1 Intermediate Court decided to recognize and enforce the Singaporean monetary judgment.[2] Although de facto reciprocity already exists between China and Singapore and Chinese courts enforced Singaporean judgments based on de facto reciprocity in the past,[3] this case justifies the decision based on de jure reciprocity. The judgment states: “The reciprocal relationship exists between China and Singapore, because Chinese judgments can be recognized and enforced in Singapore under the same conditions. On the other hand, Singaporean High Court recognized and enforced Chinese judgments in the past, and precedents to recognize and enforce Singaporean judgments also exist in Chinese courts. It shows de facto reciprocal relationship also exists between China and Singapore.”
It is clear that this judgment discusses both de facto and de jure reciprocity. The court considers whether Chinese judgments may be recognized and enforced in Singapore as a matter of law. However, proving de jure reciprocity is not easy. Unless the foreign law completely prohibits enforcing foreign judgments in the absence of treaty obligations, most law will provide conditions for foreign judgments enforcement. The conditions would allow foreign judgments enforced in certain circumstances and not others. In other words, no law would say foreign judgments can be recognized in all circumstances. How to assess if these conditions are enough to make enforcement possible in law? What if the foreign law provides different conditions to enforce foreign judgments from Chinese law? What if the foreign law require de facto reciprocity and China has not yet enforced judgments from this country, rendering enforcement of Chinese judgments practically impossible in the foreign court?
The Shanghai court adopts the equivalent condition test. It takes the seat of Singaporean court and imagine what may happen if this application is a Chinese judgment seeking Singaporean enforcement. It concludes that as far as Singaporean court can enforce Chinese judgments under the same condition, de jure reciprocity exists. In other words, it applies the Singaporean standard to assess enforceability of this judgment. The problem is it may lead to the result that between two countries de jure reciprocity exits in some cases but not others. As reciprocity refers to the relationship between two countries, it should be a systematic status, and not variable according to the different fact of a case.
Another difficulty is that it is usually hard for Chinese courts to know exactly how judicial decision of a foreign court may be made, especially how judicial discretion is going to be exercised in a foreign country. The assessment of the potential enforceability of Chinese judgments in the foreign court in the same condition can only be based on black-letter law which may not be so precise to test de jure reciprocity. Of course, it is arguable that de jure reciprocity only needs a general possibility for a foreign court to enforce Chinese judgments, but not specific Chinese judgments are definitely enforceable in the foreign country. If so, the equivalent condition test is not appropriate to assess de jure reciprocity.
One may suggest the legal comparability test. It argues that de jure reciprocity depends on whether the foreign law provide legally comparable conditions for FJR as Chinese law. This suggestion is also problematic, because many countries’ law provide much lower threshold to enforce foreign law than Chinese law. For example, they do not require reciprocity as a pre-condition. These laws are not comparable to Chinese law, but it is hard to argue that Chinese judgments cannot be enforced in those countries as a matter of law.
The third suggestion is a lower threshold test. It suggests that if the foreign law does not make it more difficult to enforce Chinese judgments, de jure reciprocity exists. However, what if a foreign court also adopt de facto reciprocity, like the practice in most Chinese courts? If neither country was seized to enforce the other’s judgment, Chinese judgment cannot be enforced in the foreign country as a matter of law. Can we still argue de jure reciprocity exists?
Anyway, although the test for de jure reciprocity is not settled, the Shanghai judgment shows a laudable progress. This is the first case that de jure reciprocity has been applied in a Chinese court. Of course, since de facto reciprocity also exists between China and Singapore, this judgment does not bring significant difference in result. It is curious to see whether the Chinese court will apply de jure reciprocity alone to enforce foreign judgments in the future, and whether any new tests for de jure reciprocity may be proposed in the future judgments.
[1] Several Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Judicial Services and Protection Provided by People’s Courts for the Belt and Road Initiative], [2015] Fa Fa No. 9, para 6; The Opinions of the SPC Regarding the People’s Court’s Further Provision of Judicial Services and Guarantees for the Construction of the Belt and Road, Fa Fa [2019] 29, para 24.
[2] (2019) Hu 01 Xie Wai Ren No 22.
[3] Singaporean case, Giant Light Metal Technology (Kunshan) Co Ltd v Aksa Far East Pte ltd [2014] 2 SLR 545; Chinese case, Kolmar Group AG v. Jiangsu Textile Industry Import and Export Corporation, (2016) Su 01 Xie Wai Ren No 3.
Written by Greta Siegert, doctoral candidate at the University of Freiburg.
In a recent decision of 29 September 2021 – case XII ZB 309/21, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) once again confirmed the validity of proxy marriages concluded abroad under the condition that they met the formal requirements of the applicable foreign law.
The parties, a German woman and a male citizen of Syria, had concluded a proxy marriage in Baja California Sur (Mexico). At the time of the marriage, neither of them was present in Mexico nor had ever met their respective representatives. The declarations of proxy had been prepared by a German notary both in English and Spanish. When the couple applied for a marriage name declaration in Germany, the responsible registry office denied such an entry, invoking the marriage’s formal invalidity.
Reviewing this case, the German Federal Court ruled that there were no doubts regarding the marriage’s formal validity, hence holding it valid in absence of other issues of concern.
The judges followed the line of argument brought forward by the higher regional court of Jena (Oberlandesgericht Jena), stating that the formal aspects of the marriage in question were ruled by Art. 11(1) of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (EGBGB). Art. 11(1) EGBGB provides that a legal transaction is formally valid if it either complies with the formal requirements of the law governing the legal relationship forming the subject matter of the legal act (so-called lex actus) or with the legal formalities of the state where the transaction takes place (so-called lex loci).
The German Federal Court confirmed that, in this case, the proxy was merely a question of the marriage’s formal validity: since the parties had already – prior to the creation of their declaration of proxy – made their decision about the marriage and their respective spouse, the proxy solely served as a matter of representation in making the declarations of intention.
However, the judges acknowledged that, in other cases, proxies may also affect the substantive aspects of a marriage. This would be the case if the representation affected the substance of the partners’ decision, i.e. if the future spouses had not decided about the marriage or their spouse themselves but had instead transferred the decision to their respective agent.
Since Mexican law – as the relevant lex loci – allows proxy marriages, the German Federal Court concluded that the marriage in question was formally valid. The court added that this result was compatible with German public policy (Art. 6 EGBGB). When drafting Art. 11(1) EGBGB more than 30 years ago, the German legislature recognized and accepted the possibility of marriages concluded abroad according to the rules of the respective lex loci. Though there were repeated calls for a revision of this legislation afterwards, especially regarding proxies in the context of forced marriages, the legislature held on to the lex loci principle. Against this backdrop, the German Federal Court found no evidence that the marriage in dispute violated fundamental principles of the German legal system.
Conventions & Instruments
On 17 November 2021, the Russian Federation signed the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. Although the 2019 Judgments Convention is not yet in force, the Russian Federation is its fifth signatory. The Russian Federation has been a Member of the HCCH since 2001 and is a Contracting Party to six HCCH Conventions. More information is available here.
Meetings & Events
On 5 November 2021, the HCCH hosted a virtual seminar on the HCCH 1980 Child Abduction Convention and the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention for the Supreme Court of Ukraine. This was the second of a series of seminars, organised through the generous support of the EU Project Pravo-Justice, aimed at facilitating the proper and effective implementation of the HCCH Conventions and instruments in Ukraine. More information is available here.
On 8 November 2021, the HCCH Working Group on Preventing and Addressing Illicit Practices in Intercountry Adoption met via videoconference. The Group continued to work on the development of a Toolkit aimed at preventing and addressing illicit practices in intercountry adoptions made under the HCCH 1993 Adoption Convention. More information is available here.
From 15 to 19 November 2021, the HCCH Experts’ Group on Parentage / Surrogacy met via videoconference. The Group discussed the form, structure and focus of the final report that is to be presented to the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the HCCH at its 2023 meeting. More information is available here.
From 22 to 25 November 2021, the HCCH participated in the 24th International Congress of the International Union of Judicial Officers. Dr Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary General, participated in the panel discussion “Cyber Justice: New Opportunities for the Judicial Officer” and in the roundtable discussion “Cyber Justice – The future of our profession – Evolution or Revolution?”, while Dr Ning Zhao delivered a presentation on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. Dr Zhao’s accompanying article “The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention – adding essential components for an effective international legal framework on recognition and enforcement” will be published in the proceedings of the Congress. More information is available here.
Upcoming Events
HCCH a|Bridged Edition 2021 will be held online on Wednesday, 1 December 2021. This year’s edition will discuss contemporary issues relating to the application of the?HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention,?including the establishment of?international commercial courts around the globe and how it enables party autonomy. More information is available here.
These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.
This post is by Alberto Pomari, LLM Student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and JD Student at the University of Verona School of Law.
On November 25, 2021, the Italian Parliament passed the long-awaited Enabling Act for “the efficiency of the civil trial” as one of the conditions attached to the Next Generation EU funding. Among its provisions, this law amends part of the Italian arbitration law with a view toward making arbitration in the country more appealing to individuals and foreign investors. Worthy of particular attention are the amendments regarding (1) the independence and impartiality of arbitrators, and (2) the arbitral tribunal’s power to grant interim relief.
Up until now, the Italian Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) has not compelled arbitrators to disclose any fact or circumstance that would reasonably call into question their impartiality and independence. This is not to say, though, that Italian law neglects impartiality and independence on the part of arbitrators. To the contrary, Article 815 CPC enumerates several situations where arbitrators can be challenged for specific circumstances that are likely to give rise to justifiable doubts about their unbiased judgment. However, the Enabling Act aims at shoring up this reactive guarantee by introducing a proactive duty of disclosure, which directly burdens the arbitrators appointed. Specifically, Article 15(a) of the Act calls for an express mandate for arbitrators to disclose, upon acceptance of their appointment, any situation that may give grounds for a challenge under Article 815 CPC. Along those lines, Article 15(a) also introduces broad grounds to challenge an arbitrator for any “severe reason of suitability.” Through these amendments, the Government commits to enhance the guarantee of fairness of the parties’ fact- and law-finder at the very outset of proceedings, thus avoiding the costs associated with a challenge.
Arguably, the Enabling Act’s most important innovation is contained in Article 15(c) and relates to the arbitrators’ power to grant interim relief. To date, with the only exception of corporate law disputes, no arbitral tribunal whose seat is in Italy is vested with the power to provide provisional relief. Article 818 CPC leaves no room for doubt by proscribing any provisional remedies rendered by an arbitral tribunal. The magnitude of this provision is reflected, for instance, by Article 26 of the Milan Chamber of Arbitration’s (CAM) Rules, which point out that the arbitral tribunal may issue interim measures unless “barred by mandatory provisions applicable to the proceedings.” Article 15(c) enables the Government to empower arbitrators to grant interim relief as long as parties manifest the intent of achieving this end. Therefore, arbitrators will have the power to issue conservatory measures, subject to the Italian lex arbitri, if the arbitration agreement expressly provides so as well as references institutional rules that contemplate such a power (like the above-mentioned CAM’s Rules). Understandably, Article 15(c) specifies that a national court issues the interim measures if a party seeks them before the arbitral tribunal has been fully appointed. Of course, the enforceability of said interim relief remains a prerogative of national courts. Lastly, Article 15(c) directs the Government to create a new appeal as of right whereby a party may challenge the arbitral tribunal’s decision regarding the requested interim relief before a national judge. However, said appeal can be brought exclusively for errors of law enumerated in Article 829(1) CPC, which currently warrants an appeal designed to void the final award. It follows that a national judge will not be allowed to hear the appeal if the party avers errors of fact.
While awaiting the implementing regulations issued by the Government, these changes represent a desirable modernization of the Italian arbitration law and should therefore be hailed. However, while they bring Italy up to the speed of countries that are legally more appealing to foreign investors, it remains to be seen whether they will be sufficient to effectively attract foreign investors or prove to be too late or too timid.
“Japanese Private International Law” certainly contains the currently leading reference to Japanese private international law in English.
The blurb reads: “The chapters systematically cover the whole of Japanese private international law, not just questions likely to arise in commercial matters, but also in family, succession, cross-border insolvency, intellectual property, competition (antitrust), and environmental disputes. The chapters do not merely cover the traditional conflict of law areas of jurisdiction, applicable law (choice of law), and enforcement. The chapters also look into conflict of law questions arising in arbitration and assess Japanese involvement in the global harmonisation of private international law. In addition to summarising relevant principles and scholarly views, the authors discuss case law whenever possible and identify deficiencies and anticipate difficulties in the existing law. The book thus presents the Japanese conflict of laws through a combination of common and civil law analytical techniques and perspectives, providing readers worldwide with a more profound and comprehensive understanding of the subject.”
For those who are particularly interested in unified or harmonized global PIL Chapter 6, still rather short (pp. 258 – 262), is recommended, dealing with Japan’s role in the works of the HCCH, UNICTRAL and UNIDROIT. For all others who are interested in comparative private international law, this book is an indispensable tool and combines most valuable information with most thorough analysis. The text is precisely structured which helps a lot to find one’s way directly to the issue in question. It also covers international alternative dispute resolution, in particular arbitration and mediation. The book is an admirable cooperative effort between Dr Kazuaki Nishioka (full text draft) and Professor Yuko Nishitani (comments and revision), as is explained in the foreword.
Likewise, “Indian Private International Law” certainly contains the currently leading reference to Indian private international law in English.
The blurb reads: “This book provides an authoritative account of the evolution and application of private international law principles in India in civil commercial and family matters. Through a structured evaluation of the legislative and judicial decisions, the authors examine the private international law in the Republic and whether it conforms to international standards and best practices as adopted in major jurisdictions such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, India’s BRICS partners – Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa and other common law systems such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Nepal.
Divided into 13 chapters, the book provides a contextualised understanding of legal transformation on key aspects of the Indian conflict-of-law rules on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or arbitral awards. Particularly fascinating in this regard is the discussion and focus on both traditional and contemporary areas of private international law, including marriage, divorce, contractual concerns, the fourth industrial revolution, product liability, e-commerce, intellectual property, child custody, surrogacy and the complicated interface of ‘Sharia’ in the conflict-of-law framework.
The book deliberates the nuanced perspective of endorsing the Hague Conference on Private International Law instruments favouring enhanced uniformity and predictability in matters of choice of court, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
The book’s international and comparative focus makes it eminently resourceful for legislators, the judges of Indian courts and other interested parties such as lawyers and litigants when they are confronted with cross-border disputes that involve an examination of India’s private international law. The book also provides a comprehensive understanding of Indian private international law, which will be useful for academics and researchers looking for an in-depth discussion on the subject.” Saloni Khanderia is of course known to CoL readers as one of the blog’s editors.
“Japanese Private International Law” (Volume 5) and “Indian Private International Law” (Volume 6) continue Hart’s Series on Studies in Private International Law – Asia, run by Anselmo Reyes (editor) and Paul Beaumont (advisory editor), after equally eminent publications (Volumes 1 to 4) on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, edited by Anselmo Reyes, Indonesian Private International Law by Afifah Kusumadara, Chinese Private International Law, edited by Xiaohong Liu and Zhengyi Zhang, and, last not least, Direct Jurisdiction: Asian Perspectives, edited by Anselmo Reyes and Wilson Lui.
All highly recommended!
Written by Marie-Luisa Loheide, doctoral candidate at the University of Freiburg.
From a PIL-perspective, granting asylum to the family members of a recognised asylum-seeker or refugee is relevant regarding the determination of an individual’s personal status and, more specifically, concerning the question of the relation between the individual’s political status (status politicus) and his or her personal status (status privatus). Whereas the personal status of an individual is ususally determined according to her or his own protection status, it is disputed with regard to personae coniunctae – meaning relatives of a protected person who do not (yet) possess a protection status of their own –, whether their personal status may be derived from the status of the already protected family member or whether it has to be determined by the person’s individual status. This is decisive as to the applicability of Art. 12(1) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees signed in Geneva on 28th July 1951 (Geneva Convention), according to which all conflict rules leading to the law of the persecuting state are modified by substituting habitual residence for nationality.
In Germany, § 26 of the Asylum Act (Asylgesetz) – with only few exemptions made in its para. 4 – grants family asylum to people who themselves do not satisfy the conditions for receiving asylum (Art. 16a of the German Basic Law), but whose spouse or parent has been granted this status. According to § 26(5) Asylgesetz, this also comprises international protection within the meaning of the refugee status as defined by the Geneva Convention as well as the EU-specific subsidiary protection status (§ 4 Asylgesetz, implementing Art. 15 et seq of the EU-Directive No. 2004/83). The close relative’s protection is thus a derived right from the family member’s political status. However, by this – even though the opposite might be implied by the misleading terminology of “derived” – the spouse or child of the protected person acquire a protection status of their own. § 26 Asylgesetz is meant to support the unity of the family and aims to simplify the asylum process by liberating family members from the burdensome task of proving that they individually satisfy the conditions (e.g. individual religious or political persecution) for benefitting from international protection or asylum.
While the exemptions made in § 26(4), (5) and § 4(2) Asylgesetz correspond to Art. 1D of the Geneva Convention as well as to Art. 12(2) of the EU-Directive No. 2011/95 (Qualification Directive), the non-exemption of people with multiple nationalities, who could also be granted protection in one of the states of which they are nationals, goes further than the Geneva Convention and the Qualification Directive (see Art. 1A(no. 2) of the Geneva Convention and Art. 4(3)(e) of the Qualification Directive).
This discrepancy was the subject of a preliminary question asked by the German Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) and was decided upon by the CJEU on 9th November 2021 (Case C-91/20). The underlying question was whether the more favourable rule of § 26 Asylgesetz is compatible with EU law.
The CJEU in general affirmed this question. For doctrinal justification, it referred to Art. 3 of the Qualification Directive, which allows more favourable rules for granting international protection as long as they do “not undermine the general scheme or objectives of that directive” (at [40]). According to the CJEU, Art. 23(2) of the Qualification Directive leads to the conclusion that the line is to be drawn where the family member is “through his or her nationality or any other element characterising his or her personal legal status, entitled to better treatment in […] [the host] Member State than that resulting from the grant of refugee status” (at [54]). For example, this could be the case if the close relative is a national of their spouse’s or parent’s host country or one of their nationalities entitles them to a better treatment there (like a Union citizenship). This interpretation also corresponds to the UNHCR’s guidelines in respect to the Geneva Convention (see [56] et seq.).
The CJEU’s judgment strengthens the right to family life guaranteed by human rights, namely Art. 8 ECHR as well as Art. 7 and Art. 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (see [55]). Disrupting a family unit can have a negative impact on the individual integration process (see Corneloup et al., study PE 583.157, p. 11), which should be neither in the interest of the individual nor the host state. This right to family unity, according to the CJEU, exists irrespective of the fact that the concerned families could alternatively take residence in one of the family member’s home states, because otherwise the person who had already been granted a protection status in a different country could not make use of his or her own protection (see [59] et seq.). In so far, the judgment is to be welcomed. On the other hand, opening the doors to more favourable domestic laws on a derivative protection of family members will lead to more situations where the law applicable to a family relationship between a person applying for family asylum and the person who had already been granted international protection must be determined under prior consideration of domestic PIL rules. However, PIL rules in this regard are frequently inconsistent among the EU Member States.
In practice, the CJEU’s judgment discussed here is particularly relevant in the overall picture that is characterised by the CJEU’s recent judgment of 19th November 2020 (C-238/19), according to which – contrary to the previous German Federal Administrative Court’s practice – the refugee status according to the Geneva Convention may be granted to individuals who are eligible to be drafted for military service in Syria, which potentially means all Syrian men of a certain age. However, the precise implementation of this judgment in current German judicial and administrative practice remains controversial (see here). In cases where Syrian men actually are granted a protective status, their spouses and children are entitled to receive family asylum as well. In Germany, this is the case even if they possess multiple nationalities, but, according to the CJEU judgment discussed here, only as long as they are not entitled to a better treatment in the host Member State through a different legal status in this country, e.g. nationality or Union citizenship. As a matter of fact, there will be most probably very few people among those seeking protection in a Member State who have a Union citizenship, so that the CJEU’s restriction to the scope of § 26 Asylgesetz will only be practically relevant in very few cases.
The focus of this write-up is a case note on a very recent decision of the Nigerian Court of Appeal that declined to enforce an exclusive English choice of court agreement.[1] In this case the 1st claimant/respondent was an insured party while the defendant/appellant was the insurer of the claimant/respondent. The insurance agreement between the 1st claimant/respondent and defendant/appellant provided for both an exclusive choice of court and choice of law agreement in favour of England. The claimants/respondents issued a claim for significant compensation before the High Court of Cross Rivers State, Nigeria for breach of contract and negligence on the part of the defendant/appellant for failure to fully perform the terms of the insurance contract during the period the 1st claimant/respondent was sick in Nigeria. The defendant/appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court of Cross Rivers State, and asked for a stay of proceedings on the basis that there was an exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of England. The 1st claimant/respondent in a counter affidavit stated mainly at the trial court that he was critically ill, and the 2nd claimant/respondent (the employer of the 1st claimant/respondent) had serious financial difficulties in paying the 1st claimant/respondent’s salaries, so in the interest of justice a stay should not be granted.
Both opposing parties were in agreement throughout the case that it was the Brandon test,[2] as applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court[3] that was applicable in this case to determine if a stay should be granted in the enforcement of a foreign choice of court agreement. Now the Brandon test (named after an English judge called Brandon J, who formulated the test) as applied in the Nigerian context is as follows:
“1. Where plaintiffs sue in Nigeria in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the Nigerian court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the jurisdiction is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not. 2. The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing it is shown. 3. The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs. 4. In exercising its discretion the court should take account of all the circumstances of the particular case. 5. In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following matters where they arise, may be properly regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the Nigerian and foreign courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs from Nigerian law in any material respects. (c) With what country either party is connected and how closely (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiff s would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign country because they would (i) be deprived of security for that claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in Nigeria; or (iv) for political, racial, religious, or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial (v) the grant of a stay would amount to permanently denying the plaintiff any redress.”
The reported cases where the plaintiff(s) have successfully relied on the Brandon test to oppose the enforcement of a foreign jurisdiction clause are where their claim is statute barred in the forum chosen by the parties.[4] Indeed, the burden is on the plaintiff to show strong cause as to why Nigerian proceedings should be stayed in breach of a choice of court agreement; if not, Nigerian courts will give effect to the foreign choice of court agreement.[5]
The High Court (Ayade J) relying on the Nigerian Supreme Court’s decision on the application of the Brandon tests declined to uphold the exclusive choice of court agreement in the interest of justice. It is fair to say that the trial judge applied a very flexible approach on the issue of whether the exclusive English choice of court agreement should be enforced. Indeed, he was very focused on substantial justice (rather than the strong cause test), thereby stretching the criteria provided in the Brandon test.[6] Ayade J’s judgment is worth quoting thus:
“This Court is fully aware of the principles of party autonomy, freedom and sanctity of contract, the doctrine that parties should be held to their contract (pacta sunt servanda) and this puts the burden on the plaintiff to show why the proceedings should continue in Nigeria inspite of the foreign jurisdiction clause, which in the opinion of this Court, the plaintiff has rightly done.”[7]
He also interestingly remarked that:
“Let it be remarked that this Court is not unmindful, and there is no doubt that in an area of globalization, the issue of foreign jurisdiction clause and the subject of conflict of laws has a future and one of growing importance, see MORRIS: The conflict of laws, 7th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 2010 page 16. This is reflected in the expanded membership of the specialist international bodies such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law: Rome Convention on Contractual Obligations 1980, Convention on Choice of Court, 1965, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1971, Convention on International Access to Justice, The Brussel Convention and the Lugano Convention, Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligation, Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), and the various efforts at Harmonization and Unification of Law are still in the inchoate stage in this part of the world. We shall get there at a time when there shall be one law, one forum and one world.
It is for the above reasons that I am of the view that the current attitude of the Nigerian Courts to foreign jurisdiction clauses remains as stated in the Norwind. Thus, I am inclined to agree that Courts are not bound to stay its proceedings on account of a foreign jurisdiction clause in a Court.”[8]
In the final analysis, he held as follows:
“Applying the law as declared above to the instant case and after due consideration of all the circumstances of this case, and in the exercise of discretion as to whether or not to do so in this case and this Court, which endeavoured always to do substantial justice between the parties. The sole issue raised by the claimants/respondents is therefore resolved in their favour against the defendant/applicant. Accordingly, this application is hereby dismissed.”[9]
On appeal, the defendant/appellant argued that in reality the test the High Court (Ayade J) applied was one of balance of convenience, and did not properly follow the strong cause test as stipulated by the Nigerian Supreme Court in applying the Brandon test.
The claimant/respondent brilliantly filed a respondent’s notice to justify the High Court’s decision on other grounds. The core argument was that the action will be statute-barred in England if the action was stayed before the Nigerian Court. This argument was clearly supported by the Brandon test as applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court.[10]
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal. Shuaibu JCA in his leading judgment held that:
“In exercising its discretion to grant a stay of proceedings in a case filed in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign country, the Court would take into consideration a situation where the granting would spell injustice to the plaintiff as where the action is already time barred in the foreign country and the grant of stay would amount to permanently denying the plaintiff any redress.”[11]
In analysing the Brandon test, as applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court he held that:
“It is imperative to state here that the Brandon Test is basically a guideline to judges in exercising their discretionary power to order a stay of proceedings where as in the present case, there is a foreign jurisdiction clause in the contract. It is to be noted however that like every discretion, the judge must exercise it judicially and judiciously based on or guided by law and discretion according to sound and well considered reason. Perhaps, the most noticeable guideline which I consider more novel is that the Brandon Test enjoins Court to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant unless strong cause for not doing so is shown which places the burden of showing such strong cause for not granting the application on the respondent (claimant).”[12]
After referring to the counter-affidavit of the claimant/respondent where they mainly alleged at the trial court that the 1st claimant/respondent was sick and had financial difficulties, Shuaibu JCA adopted a similar flexible approach to the Brandon tests as Ayade J. He held that:
“What is discernible from the above is that the evidence on the issues of fact is situated and more readily available, in Nigeria and the lower Court, was therefore right in refusing to adhere to foreign jurisdiction clause on the basis that the case is more closely connected to Nigeria. In effect, the trial Court has taken into account the peculiar circumstances of the case vis-à-vis the guidelines in the Brandon Test and thus exercised its discretion judicially and judiciously in refusing to grant stay of proceedings.”[13]
Owoade JCA in his concurring judgment held that:
“In the instant case, more particularly by paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Respondents counter-affidavit in opposition to the Appellant’s motion for an order for stay, the Respondents have established that they would suffer injustice if the case is stayed. This is more so in the instant case where the Plaintiffs/1st Respondent action was statute barred in the foreign Court and the grant of stay would amount to permanently denying the Plaintiff/1st Respondent any redress.”[14]
It is difficult to fault the decision of the High Court and Court of Appeal in this case, except for Shuaibu JCA’s occasional confusion of choice of court with choice of law (a conceptual mistake some Nigerian judges make). An additional observation is that this procedural issue on foreign choice of court agreement took over 5 years to resolve so far. The issue of delay is something to look into in the Nigerian legal system – a topic for another day.
The standard test for determining if a stay should be granted in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause is the Brandon test as applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court.[15] I am in total agreement with Shuaibu JCA that the Brandon test is a guideline. In other words, it must not be followed slavishly by Nigerian courts or indeed courts of other common law countries in Africa. A judge should be able to consider the facts of the instant case and decide if there is a strong cause for not granting a stay in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause. In this case, the fact that the action will be statute-barred was a strong ground not to grant a stay in breach of the exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of England. The financial difficulties and sickness of the claimant/respondent were also factors that could be taken into account in the interest of justice, although they are not as strong as the claim that the action was statute-barred in a foreign forum. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the test of the interest of justice should not be excluded from the Brandon test analysis.[16] Of course, I agree this might create uncertainty and undermine party autonomy in some cases, but this problem can be curtailed if the burden is firmly placed at the door steps of the claimant as to why a foreign jurisdiction clause should not be enforced.
Nigeria is a growing economy, and its lawyers, arbitrators and judges should be able to benefit from international commercial litigation and arbitration business like developed countries such as England. Of course, the best way to do this is to make Nigeria attractive for litigation in matters of speed, procedural rules, content of applicable laws, honesty of judges, and competence of judges to handle cases etc. However, Nigerian courts should not blindly apply party autonomy in the enforcement of choice of court agreements despite the certainty and predictability it offers to international commercial actors.
This brings me to an even more important issue. This case involved an insurance contract. The insured party – the claimant/respondent – was obviously the weaker party in this case. The traditional common law in Nigeria has not created a clear exception for the protection of weaker parties in the enforcement of foreign choice of court agreements. The European Union has done that in the case of employees, consumers and insured persons.[17] Nigeria and the rest of common law Africa’s legal system is not an island of its own. We can learn from the EU experience and borrow some good things from them. Indeed, the Nigerian Supreme Court had held that there is nothing wrong with borrowing from another legal system.[18] I will add there should be good reasons for borrowing from another legal system especially former colonial powers.
In this connection, it is proposed that in the case of weaker parties such as insured, consumers and employees, a party domiciled or habitually resident in Nigeria should be able to sue in Nigerian courts in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause. In addition, the common law concept of undue influence could be applied so that cases where a party is presumably weak in the contractual relationship, such a party should not be bound by the foreign jurisdiction clause. Of course, there is a danger that this could create uncertainty. So I propose that in cases of business to business contracts, Nigerian and African courts should be more willing to enforce foreign choice of court agreements strictly.
Back to the case at hand, it is not unlikely that this case might come before the Nigerian Supreme Court on appeal. The Nigerian Court of Appeal has applied varied approaches to the enforcement of foreign choice of court agreements in Nigeria. Indeed, I noted three inconsistent decisions of the Nigerian Court of Appeal in this area of the law as recent as 2020.[19] On the one extreme hand, there is the contractual approach that strictly treats a choice of court agreement like any ordinary commercial contract.[20] This approach is good in that it promotes party autonomy, but the problem with this approach is that it ignores the procedural context of a choice of court agreement and might spell injustice due to its rigid approach. On the other extreme hand, there is the ouster clause approach that strictly refuses to enforce a foreign choice of court agreement.[21] Though this approach might favour litigation in Nigeria and other African countries, it dangerously undermines party autonomy, and international commercial actors are likely to lose confidence in a legal system that does not uphold party autonomy. The other approach is the middle ground of the Brandon test, which upholds a choice of court agreement except strong reason is demonstrated to the contrary. This is standard approach the Nigerian Supreme Court has applied.[22]
It is recommended that if this case goes to the Nigerian Supreme Court, it should continue its endorsement of the Brandon test. It should also consider the addition of the interest of justice approach as was utilised by some of the High Court and Court of Appeal judges in this case. What is missing in the Nigerian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is a common law test that protects weaker parties like insured, consumers, and employees, as can be utilised in this case to protect the insured party (the 1st claimant/respondent). The time to act is now.
[1]BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA).
[2] The Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ship or Vessel ‘ Elftheria ’ v ‘ The Elftheria ’ (Owners), ‘ The Elftheria ’ [1969] 1 Lloyd ’ s Rep 237 (Brandon J).
[3] Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520; Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509.
[4]Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520. See also Hull Blyth (Nig) Ltd v Jetmove Publishing Ltd (2018) LPELR-44115 (CA).
[5]Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509. See also Captain Tony Nso v Seacor Marine (Bahamas) Inc (2008) LPELR-8320 (CA); Beaumont Resources Ltd & Anor v DWC Drilling Ltd (2017) LPELR-42814 (CA).
[6]Compare Adesanya v Palm Lines Ltd (1967) NCLR 133, which is one of the earliest cases where the interest of justice test was applied in enforcing foreign choice of court agreements.
[7]Cited in BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 3.
[8]Cited in BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 3-4.
[9] Cited in BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 5.
[10] Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520.
[11]BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA).21.
[12]BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA).
[13] BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 28.
[14] BUPA Insurance v Chakraverti & Anor (2021) LPELR-55940 (CA) 30.
[15] Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520; Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509.
[16]CSA Okoli, “Analysis of Choice of Court Agreements in Nigeria in the Year 2020” (2021) 21 Dutch Journal of Private International Law 292, 305.
[17]See Article 10 – 23 of Brussels I Regulation Recast (Council Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 [2012] OJ L351/1.). See also recital 19 to Brussels I Regulation Recast.
[18]Caribbean Trading & Fidelity Corporation v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2002) 34 WRN 11 (Ayoola JSC, Mohammed JSC (as he then was), Ejiwunmi JSC).
[19]CSA Okoli, “Analysis of Choice of Court Agreements in Nigeria in the Year 2020” (2021) 21 Dutch Journal of Private International Law 292 – 305.
[20] Damac Star Properties LLC v Profitel Limited (2020) LPELR-50699(CA). See also Conoil Plc v Vitol SA (2018) 9 NWLR 463, 489 (Nweze JSC), 500-501 (Okoro JSC), 502 (Eko JSC).
[21]A.B.U. v VTLS (2020) LPELR-52142 (CA). See also Conoil Plc v Vitol SA (2018 ) 9 NWLR 463, 489 (Nweze JSC); Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Partenreedri MS Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520, 544-5 (Oputa JSC); LAC v AAN Ltd (2006) 2 NWLR 49, 81 (Ogunbiyi JCA as she then was); Ventujol v Compagnie Française De L’Afrique Occidentale (1949) 19 NLR 32; Allied Trading Company Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Line (1980) (1) ALR Comm 146.
[22]Sonnar (Nig) Ltd v Norwind (1987) 4 NWLR 520; Nika Fishing Company Ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR 509.
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