Conflictoflaws

Written by Stephen Armstrong, lawyer practicing in Toronto, Ontario, Canada with an interest in international arbitration. [Linkedin]

On Friday, October 9, 2020, the United Kingdom Supreme Court released an interesting decision concerning the applicable law governing arbitration agreements in international contracts and the jurisdiction of the courts of the seat of the arbitration to grant anti-suit injunctions. The case is Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v 000 Insurance Company Chubb, [2020] UKSC 38.

The full text of the Supreme Court’s decision is available here.

A digestible summary of the case, including the facts, the breakdown of votes, and the reasons, is available here.

Interestingly, the Supreme Court fundamentally disagreed with the Court of Appeal on the role of the seat of the arbitration for determining the law of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court held that an express choice of law in the main contract should be presumptively taken as an implied choice of law governing the arbitration agreement. By contrast, the Court of Appeal had held that the law of the seat was the parties’ presumptive implied choice of law for the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court did, however, affirm the Court of Appeal’s holding that the courts of the seat are always an appropriate forum to grant an anti-suit injunction, regardless of the applicable law.

Unlike other choice of law issues in the UK, this issue is governed by the common law, rather than the EU’s Rome I regulation. This makes the Supreme Court’s decision a common law authority, rather than an EU law authority. I therefore expect that this decision will find purchase throughout the Commonwealth, including my home jurisdiction of Ontario, Canada.

The German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in August finally decided the case “Sahyouni” that made it twice to the ECJ (Sahyouni I  and Sahyouni II). The BGH decision (German text here) applied the new German rules on private divorces. The German legislator had enacted these rules after the ECJ declared the Rome III Regulation as only applicable on divorces by a court. Additionally, the court took the opportunity to comment on several other private international law issues. The probably most interesting issues of the case are (1) the new German rules, (2) the treatment of parties with more than one nationality if the connecting factor is nationality and (3) the question whether the unilateral private divorce finally was recognized.

1. German law regarding “private divorces”

Following the second “Sahyouni” decision, new private international law rules were enacted. German private international law follows the principle of “recognition via conflict of laws”, meaning that a divorce not issued by a court decision will only be recognized if it complies with the rules applicable according to German private international law. The new rules basically declared the Rome III Regulation applicable to private divorces mutatis mutandis except for those rules that could not be applied on a private divorce (e.g. the application of lex fori as there is not forum). Furthermore, Article 10 Rome III, the rule that initially triggered the request for the preliminary ruling, is not applicable. Thus, only the “usual” public policy exception can prevent the application of the lex causae.

1. Treatment of double-nationality

The court came to the conclusion that the spouses did not have a common habitual residence as required by Article 8 lit a, b Rome III (mutatis mutandis). So, the question occurred whether the spouses had a common nationality (Article 8 lit. c). In this special case, both spouses did not only have one common nationality but two: German and Syrian. As the Rome III regulation is silent to the treatment of double-nationals (and, furthermore, Rome III only applied mutatis mutandis), the court applied Article 5 para. 1 EGBGB (English non-official translation here). This rule provides in case of double-nationality (1) a prevalence of the German nationality and (2), if no German nationality is in play, a prevalence of the “effective” nationality, ie the nationality that is closer connected to the person, usually the one of habitual residence. In the context of EU private international law, there was a discussion whether these two rules can hold – given that in Garcia Avello and Haddadi similar rules had been regarded as violating EU primarily law, esp. the principle of non-discrimination.

In “Sahyouni” the BGH concluded that both cases were not relevant. The second (and probably non-effective) nationality of both spouses was the Syrian, a non-EU nationality. Thus, the principle of non-discrimination did not apply. Therefore, German law applied on the case. German law does not allow a “private divorce”. For that reason, the divorce was regarded as invalid in Germany.

1. Unilateral divorces and public policy

Finally, the court took the opportunity to mention that the poblic policy exception also would have made the divorce invalid: Article 10 Rome III was not applicable, thus, Article 6 EGBGB (English) would have applied. Contrary to Article 10, Article 6 requires an analysis of the concrete result of the application of the lex causae to determine whether this result violates fundamental principles/values of the German legal system. In Germany, divorces by unilateral declarations (such as talaq or ghet) can be regarded as not violating the German ordre public, especially if both spouses agree on the divorce. From the facts of the case the BGH concluded that in “Sahyouni” the wife did not wish for divorce. For that reason, the recognition of the unilateral declaration would violate the German public policy (“would” as this argument was not decisive for the case – as aforementioned, German law applied).

Written by Giesela Rühl, Humboldt-University of Berlin

 

The protection of human rights in global supply chains has been high on the agenda of national legislatures for a number of years. Most recently, also the European Union has joined the bandwagon. After Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders announced plans to prepare a European human rights to due diligence instrument in April 2020, the JURI Committee of the European Parliament has now published a Draft Report on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability. The Report contains a motion for a European Parliament Resolution and a Proposal for a Directive which will, if adopted, require European companies – and companies operating in Europe – to undertake broad mandatory human rights due diligence along the entire supply chain. Violations will result, among others, in a right of victims to claim damages.

The proposed Directive is remarkable because it amounts to the first attempt of the European legislature to establish cross-sectoral mandatory human rights due diligence obligations coupled with a mandatory civil liability regime. However, from a private international law perspective the Draft Report attracts attention because it also contains proposals to change the Brussels Ia Regulation and the Rome II Regulation. In this post I will briefly discuss – and criticize – the proposed changes to the Rome II Regulation. For a discussion of the changes to the Brussels Ia Regulation I refer to Geert Van Calster’s thoughts on GAVC.

Victims’ unilateral right to choose the applicable law

The proposed change to the Rome II Regulation envisions the introduction of a new Article 6a entitled “Business-related human rights claims”. Clearly modelled on Article 7 Rome II Regulation relating to environmental damage the proposal allows victims of human rights violations to choose the applicable law. However, unlike Article 7 Rome II Regulation, which limits the choice to the law of the place of injury and the law of the place of action, the proposed Article 6a allows victims of human rights violations to choose between potentially four different laws, namely

1) the law of the country in which the damage occurred, i.e. the law of the place of injury,

2) the law of the country in which the event giving rise to damage occurred, i.e. the law of the place of action,

3) the law of the country in which the parent company has its domicile or, where the parent company does not have a domicile in a Member State,

4) the law of the country where the parent company operates.

The rationale behind the proposed Article 6a Rome II Regulation is clear: The JURI Committee tries to make sure that the substantive provisions of the proposed Directive will actually apply – and not fall prey to Article 4(1) Rome II Regulation which, in typical supply chain cases, leads to application of the law of the host state in the Global South and, hence, non-EU law. By allowing victims to choose the applicable law, notably the law  of the (European) parent company, the JURI Committee takes up recommendations that have been made in the literature over the past years.

However, a right to choose the applicable law ex post – while certainly good for victims – is conceptually ill-conceived because it results in legal uncertainty for all companies that try to find out ex ante what their obligations are. Provisions like the proposed Article 6a Rome II Regulation, therefore, fundamentally impair the deterrence function of tort law and increase compliance costs for companies because they have to adjust their behaviour to four – potentially – different laws to avoid liability. It is for this reason that choice of law rules that allow one party to unilaterally choose the applicable law ex post have largely (even though not completely) fallen out of favour.

Alternative roads to European law

The proposed Article 6a Rome II Regulation, however, does not only fail to convince conceptually. It also fails to convince as regards to the purpose that it seeks to achieve. In fact, there are much better ways to ensure that European standards apply in supply chain cases. The most obvious way is to simply adopt the envisioned European instrument in the form of a Regulation. Its provisions would then have to be applied as international uniform law by all Member State courts – irrespective of the provisions of the Rome II Regulation. However, even if the European legislature prefers to adopt a European instrument in the form of a Directive – for political or competence reasons –, no change of the Rome II Regulation is necessary to ensure that it is applied throughout Europe. In fact, its provisions can simply be classified as overriding mandatory provisions in the meaning of Article 16 Rome II Regulation. The national provisions implementing the Directive will then apply irrespective of the otherwise applicable law.

In the light of the above, application of European human rights due diligence standards can be ensured without amending the Rome II Regulation. It is, therefore, recommended that the JURI Committee rethinks – and then abandons – the proposed Article 6a Rome II Regulation.

 

Note: This post is also available via the blog of the European Association of Private International Law.

A foreign judgment is generally not to be reviewed on the merits at the recognition and enforcement stage. Yet, an exception has always been carved out for fraud under the common law rules on the basis that ‘fraud unravels everything’ (Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702, 712 per Lord Denning). Thus, English courts allow a judgment debtor to raise fraud at the recognition and enforcement stage even if no new evidence is adduced and fraud had been considered and dismissed by the court of origin (Abouloff v Oppenheimer & Co (1882) 10 QBD 295). This seeming anomaly with the prohibition against a review of the merits of a foreign judgment has been justified on the basis that where fraud is concerned, the court of origin is misled, not mistaken (Abouloff). The Abouloff rule has been much criticized, but successive courts have refused to depart from it (see also Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7, [2012] 1 WLR 1804, [116] (Privy Council)). Further, in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd ([2019] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 450) which is a case on fraud and domestic judgments, the Supreme Court held that, generally, no requirement that the fraud could not have been uncovered with reasonable diligence in advance of obtaining the judgment would be imposed on the party seeking to set aside the judgment on the basis of fraud. As one of the oft-cited criticisms for the Abouloff rule is that it is out of step with how English courts deal with domestic judgments, Takhar may have the effect of further embedding the Abouloff rule.

In Hong Pian Tee v Les Placements Germain Gauthier ([2002] SGCA 17, [2002] 1 SLR(R) 515), the Singapore Court of Appeal criticized the Abouloff rule on the basis that it would encourage ‘endless litigation’ and ‘judicial chauvinism’ (at [27]-[28]). Drawing on Canadian and Australian authorities on fraud and foreign judgments, the Court held that insofar as intrinsic fraud (ie, fraud which goes to the merits of the case) is concerned, the foreign judgment may only be impeached where ‘fresh evidence has come to light which reasonable diligence on the part of the defendant would not have uncovered and the fresh evidence would have been likely to make a difference in the eventual result of the case’ (at [30]).

The current position on fraud and domestic judgments under Singapore law is that the fresh evidence rule applies, albeit flexibly (see, eg, Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] SGCA 31, [2007] 3 SLR(R) 673). However, the Court of Appeal recently considered Takhar in a decision concerning a domestic adjudication determination (AD). Adjudication is available under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, Rev Ed 2006) and is a quick and inexpensive process to resolve payment disputes arising from building and construction contracts. In Facade Solution Pte Ltd v Mero Asia Pacific Pte Ltd ([2020] SGCA 88), the Court of Appeal held that an AD could be set aside on the ground of fraud. The party raising fraud would have to establish that the facts which were relied on by the adjudicator were false; that the other party either knew or ought reasonably to have known them to be false; and that the innocent party did not in fact, subjectively know or have actual knowledge of the true position throughout the adjudication proceedings (at [30]). The Court emphasised that ‘there is no requirement on the innocent party to show that the evidence of fraud could not have been obtained or discovered with reasonable diligence during the adjudication proceeding’ (at [31]). It cited Takhar and the High Court of Australia decision of Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2018] HCA 12 with approval, the High Court of Australia having also rejected the reasonable diligence requirement in the context of a fraudulently obtained domestic judgment in the latter case.

The Court held (at [33]; emphasis added):

‘Where it is established that an AD is infected by fraud, it is neither material nor relevant to inquire as to whether the innocent party could have discovered the truth by the exercise of reasonable diligence. A fraudulent party cannot be allowed to claim that he could have been caught had reasonable diligence been exercised, but because he was not caught, he should be allowed to get away with it. Such a view would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and it would be unprincipled to hold in effect that there is no sanction on the fraudulent party because he could have been found out earlier. Parties dealing with the court, and in the same vein, with the adjudicator in the adjudication of their disputes under the Act are expected to act with utmost probity.’

This passage suggests that the position on fraud and domestic judgments would change in the near future. It also raises the question whether the requirement of reasonable diligence in respect of intrinsic fraud and foreign judgments would survive for long. On the one hand, the Court in Hong Pian Tee had said that: ‘There is no logical reason why a different rule should apply in relation to a foreign judgment’ (at [27]) (ie, vis-à-vis a domestic judgment). The requirement of reasonable diligence has also been criticized on the basis that the court would be ‘taking the side of the fraudster against his negligent opponent’ (Briggs, ‘Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones; Rethinking the Law on Foreign Judgments’ (2005) 8 SYBIL 1, 21). On the other hand, there was a heavy emphasis on judicial comity in Hong Pian Tee. The Court observed that: ‘It is … vitally important that no court of one jurisdiction should pass judgment on an issue already decided upon by a competent court of another jurisdiction …. It must be borne in mind that the enforcement forum is not an appellate tribunal vis-à-vis the foreign judgment’ (at [28]).

It remains to be seen whether the Singapore Court of Appeal would in future resile from Hong Pian Tee. At least, the recent developments in the domestic context intimate that the point is arguable.

5 pm Argentinian time.
Registration here.

The US Supreme Court will hear oral arguments today (7-Oct-2020) concerning two consolidated cases: Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court and Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer. The consolidated cases deal with the difficult issue of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, where there is a split in federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort. These cases are significant because they will have a direct impact on the ease with which plaintiffs can lodge a complaint in product liability cases against big automobile companies (and others) before the courts of their own state. In a nutshell, it can be argued that besides jurisdictional matters relating to the defendant, these cases deal with fundamental notions of access to justice for consumers.

The oral argument was originally scheduled for April 2020 but given the Covid-19 pandemic was rescheduled for the October 2020 term. Please note that the Supreme Court can hear oral arguments even though they are currently only 8 justices. According to Rule 4 of the Supreme Court of the United States, six Members of the Court constitute a quorum. Nevertheless, complications may arise if there is a 4-4 split during the deliberations. Given the great experience and expertise of Justice Ginsburg in this area (see our previous post here), it is a pity that she could not partake in this oral argument and decision, and she will be greatly missed.

Below I include the question presented. More information will follow soon, stay tuned!

Petition for a writ of certiorari on behalf of Ford Motor Company

“The Due Process Clause permits a state court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only when the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum activities. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).”

The question presented is:

“Whether the “arise out of or relate to” requirement is met when none of the defendant’s forum contacts caused the plaintiff’s claims, such that the plaintiff’s claims would be the same even if the defendant had no forum contacts.”

The German Working Group of Young Scholars in Public International Law (Arbeitskreis junger Völkerrechtswissenschaftler*innen – AjV) asked me to forward the following call for papers. This conference intends to bridge the gap between international public and private international law, thus, contributions from private international law are more than welcome. The official call is on this website or here as pdf: 2020_30_09 – CfP [ENG] .

 

The Working Group of Young Scholars in Public International Law (Arbeitskreis junger Völkerrechtswissenschaftler*innen – AjV) and the German Society of International Law (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationales Recht – DGIR) invite contributions to their joint conference titled

Jurisdiction

Who speaks international law?

3-4 September 2021

University of Bonn

 

The topic: Jurisdiction endows an actor with the authority to provide binding answers to legal questions. Etymological observations reveal that an analysis of legal validity necessarily requires grasping the notion of jurisdiction. After all, the Latin roots of the term ‘jurisdiction’ – juris dicere – can be translated as ‘speaking the law’. In international law, the notion of jurisdiction serves to delimit international and domestic spheres of competence. Traditionally tied to territorial sovereignty, jurisdiction refers to the legislative, judicial, and executive power of the state bindingly to determine who speaks in the name of the law – and about whom is (merely) spoken. Against this backdrop, the link between jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty needs to be re-examined.

Several questions arise regarding the theoretical and historical underpinnings of the notion of jurisdiction: Who is given the power to speak in international law and who is not? How can rules that are generally considered to be ‘non-binding’ exert their influence on jurisdiction? How do actors located in the Global South approach the notion of jurisdiction? What is the role of jurisdiction in shaping the idea and self-description of International Law as a discipline? Do we have to rethink or abandon the conceptual link between sovereignty and jurisdiction? Is there an essential and unifying element that links the different conceptions of jurisdiction?

Interdisciplinary engagements can provide a more nuanced understanding of jurisdiction: How can accounts not linked to the state help us understand contemporary conflicts of jurisdiction? Which historical circumstances have shaped the notion of jurisdiction? Which (dis)continuities does the history of the idea of jurisdiction reveal? Are questions of jurisdiction always questions of power? How do socio-cultural circumstances inform diverging notions of jurisdiction? How can critical approaches sharpen our understanding of the notion of jurisdiction?

The aim is to shed light on these and other aspects of jurisdiction from different perspectives, taking into account specialized areas of international law: How has private international law dealt with conflicts of jurisdiction and ‘forum-shopping’? What is the relationship between sovereignty and state or diplomatic immunity? How do digital spaces challenge existing notions of jurisdiction? Do we need a new concept of jurisdiction for cyber warfare and for space law? What is the role of the notion of jurisdiction in shaping the relationship between humans and their natural environment? How do rival notions of jurisdiction affect the access to justice regarding human rights violations at the borders of Europe? How can the conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice be analysed through the lens of jurisdiction? What are the causes of the criticism levelled against the International Criminal Court’s interpretation and exercise of its jurisdiction?

We invite submissions contemplating these and other questions and hope to cover a broad range of international law topics, including public international law, private international law, and European law. We welcome all theoretical approaches and methods and explicitly invite doctrinal work as well as interdisciplinary, discourse theoretical, historical, philosophical, and critical approaches.

Formal requirements: The main purpose of the conference is to create an opportunity for PhD students and early career researchers to present their work. Established scholars will comment on the young scholars’ contributions. Anonymised abstracts in German or English (max. 500 words) must be submitted by 8 January 2021 only via the application form on the conference website. Selected candidates will be notified by 31 January 2021. Paper drafts (max. 7000 words, including footnotes) must be submitted by 1 June 2021. We envisage to publish the contributions.

On Monday, October 26, 2020 at 15.00 CET, the European Center for Arbitration and Mediation and The International School of Arbitration and Mediation for Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East organise their Annual International Conference Med-Mid XIV on “The Burden of Proof in International Arbitration/La charge de la preuve dans l’arbitrage international”.

The conference addresses four key issues of any international arbitration, which require a focussed and renewed reflection: 1) Oral Evidence: Fact Witnesses, Expert Witnesses, Parties and Witness Statement (Civil Law and Common Law approaches); 2) The applicable Law on matters such as the effects of the procedural law (Civil Law and Common Law approaches) on the taking of evidence; 3) Disclosure of documents: effects of only voluntary production of documents v. forced discovery; 4) The Arbitrator’s authority as to evidence (Role as Umpire; wider ex officio authority as to evidence) as well as limits and support from State Courts.

Some worldwide renowned speakers will give their views. On panel one: Sir Michael Burton (London, U.K.) and Prof. Fabrizio Marrella (Venice, Italy); on panel two: Elie Kleiman (Jones Day, Paris, France) and Prof. George Bermann (Columbia Law, New York, USA); on panel three: Melanie Willems (Haynes Boone, London, U.K.) and Prof. Ercument Erdem (Istanbul, Turkey); on panel four: Prof. José Carlos Fernandez Rozas (Complutense Madrid, Spain) and John Fellas (Hughes Hubbard & Reed, New York, USA).

Here is the complete program: https://cour-europe-arbitrage.org/med-mid-xiv/

Participation is free, but registration is necessary.

Registration for the 2021 Online Winter Courses will open on October 8th, 2020 at 0:00 hrs. The Hague Time (GMT +1).

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and for the first time in the Academy’s almost century-old history, a session of courses will be held exclusively online, that of winter 2021. The programme of the Winter Courses will take place as originally scheduled, from 11 to 29 January 2021. The Academy will offer registered attendees the opportunity to follow the courses in webinar format through the Zoom software application.

Programme:

Inaugural Lecture: A House of Many Rooms: The Rise, Fall and Rise Again of Territorial Sovereignty? Malcolm N. SHAW QC, Emeritus Sir Robert Jennings Professor at the University of Leicester

General Course (delivered French, simultaneously interpreted into English): International Law and Normative Polycentrism, Maurice KAMTO, Honorary Professor at the University of Yaoundé II

International Law-Making for the Environment, Alan BOYLE Emeritus Professor at the University of Edinburgh

Evidence in International Adjudication, Chester BROWN, Professor at the University of Sydney Law School

The Emergence of Food Sovereignty in International Law (delivered French, simultaneously interpreted into English), Olivier DE SCHUTTER, Professor at the Université catholique de Louvain and Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food

The Protection of Religious Cultural Property in Public and Private International Law (delivered French, simultaneously interpreted into English), José Angelo ESTRELLA FARIA, Principal Legal Officer and Head of the Legislative Branch, in the International Trade Law Division, UN Office of Legal Affairs

Civil War and the Transformation of International Law, Anne ORFORD, Professor at the University of Melbourne

The Regulation of the Internet, Inger ÖSTERDAHL, Professor at the University of Uppsala

Relationships Between International Criminal Law and Other Branches of International Law, William SCHABAS, Professor at Middlesex University London and at Leiden University

The programme can be downloaded here.

Further information on registration is here.

Highly recommended!

Professor Sophia Tang, Wuhan University (China) and Newcastle University (UK) will give a virtual seminar in the Durham University China Law Centre. The topic is “extraterritorial effects of the Hong Kong National Security Law”.

Webinar: Extraterritorial Effects of the Hong Kong National Security Law  Speaker:Prof Zheng TANG (Newcastle Law School)  Time:13:00 p.m. Tuesday, October 13    Zoom: https://durhamuniversity.zoom.us/j/96430562639?pwd=NS9lTGlxN3U2T2dzWWIwckJodGFRQT09 Meeting ID?964 3056 2639 Passcode:131767

Abstract:

The very controversial Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HK National Security Law” hereafter) was promulgated in the 20thsession of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) of China on 30 June 2020 and entered into effect in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) at 23:00 on the same day. This law defines four categories of offences and penalties, namely secession, subversion, terrorist activities and collusion with foreign or external elements to endanger national security. Article 38 provides: “This Law shall apply to offences under this Law committed against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from outside the Region by a person who is not a permanent resident of the Region.” This article extends jurisdiction of the HK National Security Law to the action of any individuals or organisations in any country, irrespective of their nationality, residence and the law of the countries where the action has taken place. The extraterritorial effect can be summarised as: no nexus or proximity, no double criminality, and no identity requirements. The legal basis for this jurisdiction is the protective principle, which allows a state to regulate extraterritorial conduct by foreigners or non-residents that may jeopardise its vital interests.  

In this seminar, we are going to discuss what is protective jurisdiction, whether the extraterritorial effect of the HK National Security Law is justifiable in international law, what the overseas impact of the HK National Security Law would be, especially on the freedom of speech, and how this law could be enforced in practice.  

 

Brentwood Industries v. Guangdong Fa Anlong Machinery Equipment Co., Ltd?–A third way to enforce China-seated arbitral awards made by foreign arbitration institution

by Jingru Wang

Wuhan University Institute of International Law

Background

Nationality of an arbitral award marks the source of the legal validity of the award. Most countries generally divide the awards into domestic awards and foreign awards, and provide different requirements for their recognition and enforcement. It is a common practice to determine the nationality of the arbitral award by the seat of arbitration, which is the so-called “territorial theory”. However, Chinese law adopts the “institutional theory”, which raises controversy concerning the nationality of the arbitral award made by foreign arbitration institutions located in mainland. After long-term debate in practice, the Brentwood Case[1] finally confirmed that China-seated arbitral awards made by a foreign arbitration institution shall be regarded as Chinese foreign-related awards.

 

Fact and decision

Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court (hereinafter, “the court”) delivered the judgment on Brentwood Industries v. Guangdong Fa Anlong Machinery Equipment Co., Ltd. on 6 Aug 2020[2]. After DUFERCOS Case[3], it is another landmark case that granted the enforcement of arbitral award made by a foreign arbitration institution in mainland China.

Brentwood Industries (hereinafter, “plaintiff”) concluded a sales contract with three Chinese companies (hereinafter, “defendants”) and agreed that “any dispute arising out of or in relation to the agreement shall be settled by amiable negotiation. If no agreement can be reached, each party shall refer their dispute to the International Commercial Chamber (hereinafter, “ICC”) for arbitration at the site of the project in accordance with international practice.” Due to the defendants’ delay in payment, theplaintiff submitted their disputes to the ICC for arbitration. Since the “project” mentioned in the arbitration clause was the “Guangzhou Liede Sewage Treatment Plant Phase IV Project” listed in Article 3 of the “Supplementary Agreement”, located in Guangzhou, China, the seat of arbitration shall be Guangzhou, China. After defendants refused to perform the award, which was in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff resorted to the court for recognition and enforcement.

Under current Chinese law, there are two possible ways to enforce the arbitral award made by a foreign arbitration institution in mainland China: (1) Classify such an award as a foreign award by the location of the arbitration institution under Art. 283 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter, “Civil Procedure Law”), which provides that an award made by a foreign arbitration institution must be recognised and enforced by a people’s court pursuant to international treaties or the principle of reciprocity. (2) Classify such award as non-domestic award provided by the last sentence of Art. 1(1) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter, “New York Convention”), which provides that the convention shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.

Besides the aforementioned choices, the court provided a third way. It ruled that the arbitral award made by a foreign arbitration institution in mainland China shall be regarded as Chinese foreign-related arbitral award. If a party fails to perform the arbitral award, the other party may refer to Art. 273 of the Civil Procedure Law for recognition and enforcement. Under Art. 273 of the Civil Procedure Law, after an award has been made by an arbitration institution of the People’s Republic of China for foreign-related disputes, no party may file a lawsuit in a people’s court. If a party fails to perform the arbitral award, the other party may apply for enforcement to the intermediate people’s court of the place where the domicile of the person against whom an application is made is located or where the property is located.

 

Comment

Since Long Lide Case[4], Chinese court had affirmed the validity of arbitration agreements providing arbitration proceedings conducted by a foreign arbitration institution in mainland China. But in practice, arbitral awards based on these agreements still face the dilemma in recognition and enforcement. Because in China, different from international practice, the nationality of an arbitral award is determined by the location of the arbitration institution instead of the seat of arbitration, which is referred to as the “institutional theory”. Under Art. 283 Civil Procedure Law, to recognise and enforce an award made by a foreign arbitration institution by a people’s court, the people’s court shall handle the matter pursuant to international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. It impliedly refers to the New York Convention. However, concerning the determination of the nationality of the arbitral award, the New York Convention adopts the “territorial theory”, which provides: “this Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought”. The “territorial theory” adopted by the New York Convention collides with the provision of the Civil Procedure Law. The confusion on application of law has not yet been dispelled.

In response to the conflict between domestic legislation and international convention, judicial practice has shown inclination to convert towards the “territorial theory”. For example, in DMT case[5], the nationality of an arbitral award made by ICC in Singapore was deemed Singapore rather than France. But in line with the “territorial theory”, arbitral awards made in mainland China shall therefore be deemed as Chinese awards. Under the “reciprocity reservation” filed by China, the New York convention shall only be applied to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another contracting state. Hence, the New York Convention shall not be applied to China-seated arbitral awards.

As early as DUFERCOS Case, the court defined the arbitral award made by the ICC in Beijing as non-domestic and therefore enforced it under the New York Convention. However, it failed to clarify what exactly constitutes a non-domestic award and how to interpret the reciprocity reservation. Originally, both non-domestic awards and reciprocity reservation were methods to encourage the acceptance and enlarge the application of the New York Convention. Conversely, their coexistence has impaired the effect of the New York Convention.

From this perspective, the Guangzhou Intermediate Court did find another way out by completely avoiding such conflict. The current Chinese law divides arbitral awards into: (1)domestic awards; (2)Chinese foreign-related awards; (3)foreign awards. Compared with domestic awards, Chinese foreign-related awards take into account the particularity of foreign-related factors, and the review standards for recognition and enforcement are less strict, subject to procedural review only. Compared with foreign awards, Chinese foreign-related awards can be set aside by Chinese court, which makes them under more restrictive supervision. That is reason why some argued that China-seated arbitral awards will be subject to stricter supervision by Chinese court because there are more diversified judicial review channels.[6] Indeed, arbitral awards made by Chinese foreign-related arbitration institution are under triple supervision carried out by the seat of arbitration, the place of recognition and enforcement, and China. But it should be noted that when it comes to China-seated arbitral awards made by foreign arbitration institution, China, as the seat of arbitration, has the inherent power to review the arbitral award and set it aside. Moreover, according to Art. 70 and Art. 71 of the Chinese Arbitration Law, reasons for setting Chinese foreign-related arbitral awards aside do not exceed the scope of reasons for refusing recognition and enforcement of these awards. Therefore, they are not imposed with any additional burden by being regarded as Chinese foreign-related arbitral awards. Concerning the recognition and enforcement of Chinese foreign-related award, Art. 274 of the Civil Procedure Law provided a more tolerant standard than the New York Convention. Compared with Art. 5 of the New York Convention, the legal capacity of the parties to the agreement and the final effect of the award are no longer obstacles to recognition and enforcement. Since arbitral awards made by foreign arbitration institutions are regarded as Chinese foreign-related award, they are treated more favorably than foreign awards concerning recognition and enforcement. Left the legal problems behind, it showed China’s effort to support the arbitration within the current legislative framework.

However, Chinese foreign-related arbitral award itself is a distorting product of the conflicts between “institutional theory” and “territorial theory”. Application of Art. 273 of the Civil Procedure Law can only temporarily ease the tension. “Institutional theory” stipulated by Chinese law is an issue left over from history. “Foreign-related arbitration institutions” historically referred to the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (hereinafter referred to as CIETAC) and China Maritime Arbitration Commission (hereinafter referred to as CMAC). They were established respectively in 1954[7] and 1958[8]. At that time, only CIETAC and CMAC can accept foreign-related arbitration cases, while domestic arbitration institutions can only accept domestic arbitration cases. Accordingly, arbitral awards made by different arbitration institutions were divided into Chinese foreign-related arbitral awards and domestic arbitral awards. However, nowadays, such restrictions are extinct in practice. In 1996, the State Council of People’s Republic of China issued a document stating that: “The main responsibility of the newly established arbitration institution is to accept domestic arbitration cases; if the parties to a foreign-related arbitration case voluntarily choose the newly established arbitration institution for arbitration, the newly established arbitration commission can accept the case.”[9] In fact, there is no longer division of foreign-related arbitration institution and domestic arbitration institution. Hence, the “institutional theory” can no longer meet the needs of practice. Under the “territorial theory”, the arbitral awards are divided into domestic awards, non-domestic awards and foreign awards. We may wonder whether China would revoke the reciprocity reservation, the obstacle in recognition and enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards, in the future. Would China-seated arbitral awards made by foreign arbitration institution be defined as non-domestic awards by then? To get out of the dilemma once for all, the responsibility remains on the shoulder of legislative body.

 

[1] https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/website/wenshu/181107ANFZ0BXSK4/index.html?docId=bded4e3c31b94ae8b42fac2500a68cc4

[2]  https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/website/wenshu/181107ANFZ0BXSK4/index.html?docId=bded4e3c31b94ae8b42fac2500a68cc4

[3] https://www.pkulaw.com/specialtopic/61ffaac8076694efc8cef2ae6914b056bdfb.html

[4] https://www.pkulaw.com/chl/233828.html

[5] http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx/pay/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=bd44ff4e02d033d0bdfb

[6]Good News or Bad News? Arbitral Awards Rendered in China by Foreign Arbitral Institutions Being Regarded as Chinese Awards available at: https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/a/good-news-or-bad-news-arbitral-awards-rendered-in-china-by-foreign-arbitral-institutions-being-regarded-as-chinese-awards?from=timeline

[7] http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=2

[8] http://www.cmac.org.cn/%E6%B5%B7%E4%BB%B2%E7%AE%80%E4%BB%8B

[9] http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/218/62/83/440.html

 

 

 

As announced in a previous post, the UK has (again) joined the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the 2007 Child Support Convention. On 2 October 2020, the Depositary has officially notified of the new UK instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and of the new UK instrument of ratification of the Child Support Convention, including the new UK declarations and reservations. And yes both Conventions have been extended to Gibraltar from the outset.

As you may remember, the previous UK instruments of accession to and ratification of the above-mentioned Conventions were withdrawn because the United Kingdom and the European Union signed, ratified and approved a Withdrawal Agreement. Such an agreement entered into force on 1 February 2020, and included a transition period that started on the date the Withdrawal Agreement entered into force and which will end on 31 December 2020. In accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement, during the transition period, European Union law, including the HCCH Conventions, will continue to be applicable to and in the United Kingdom.

While from a public international law standpoint the UK has joined the HCCH Conventions above-mentioned three times (by EU approval, by accession/ratification – instruments that were later withdrawn, and by accession/ratification in September 2020), the view of the UK is that the HCCH Conventions have applied seamlessly since October 2015 regarding the HCCH Choice of Court Convention and since August 2014 regarding the HCCH Child Support Convention. In this regard, the UK declares:

With respect to the Choice of Court Convention: “Whilst acknowledging that the Instrument of Accession takes effect at 00:00 CET on 1 January 2021, the United Kingdom considers that the 2005 Hague Convention entered into force for the United Kingdom on 1 October 2015 and that the United Kingdom is a Contracting State without interruption from that date.”

With regard to the Child Support Convention: “Whilst acknowledging that the Instrument of Ratification takes effect at 00:00 CET on 1 January 2021, the United Kingdom considers that the 2007 Hague Convention entered into force for the United Kingdom on 1 August 2014 and that the United Kingdom is a Contracting State without interruption from that date.”

Before referring to the UK declarations and reservations, perhaps our readers may find it interesting to get a recap of the unorthodox process by which the UK joined the two HCCH Conventions.

• On 1 October 2015, the UK was bound by the Choice of Court Convention by virtue of its membership of the European Union which approved the Convention on behalf of its Member States;
• On 1 August 2014, the UK was bound by the Child Support Convention by virtue of its membership of the European Union which approved the Convention on behalf of its Member States;
• On 28 December 2018, the UK deposited an instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and an instrument of ratification of the Child Support Convention in the event the Withdrawal Agreement would not be ratified and approved by the UK and the European Union
• On several occasions, the UK suspended the legal effect of the accession/ratification, stating that as the European Council agreed a further extension of the period for withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union. During the Extension Period, the United Kingdom remains a Member State of the European Union. As a Member State, European Union law, including the Agreement, will remain applicable to and in the United Kingdom. See our previous posts part I, part III;
• The UK extended its accession/ratification to Gibraltar in the event the Withdrawal Agreement would not be ratified and approved by the UK and the European Union. See our previous post here;
• The Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the European Union was signed and approved and entered into force on 1 February 2020:
• On 31 January 2020, the UK withdrew its instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and its instrument of ratification of the Child Support Convention (incl. declarations and reservations and extension to Gibraltar). See our previous post here;
• On 28 September 2020, the UK deposited a new instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and a new instrument of ratification of the Child Support Convention, incl. declarations and reservations

While this process may seem to be undesirable from a legal standpoint (or just a legal nightmare!), the UK has acted in this way out of an abundance of caution and because of the lack of legal certainty surrounding Brexit.

With regard to the UK declarations, and in addition to the extension to Gibraltar, they seem to be exactly the same as those submitted previously, perhaps with some minor improvements.

The Depositary’s notifications are available here for the Child Support Convention and here for the Choice of Court Convention.

Fortunately, the process of joining the above-mentioned Conventions by the UK has finally come to an end.

On Tuesday, October 6, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its fourth monthly virtual workshop in private international law at 11:00-12:30. Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilian University Munich) will speak in German family law and multicultural society, followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

This is the fourth such lecture in the series, after those by Mathias Lehmann in June, Eva-Maria Kieninger in July, and Giesela Rühl in September. The designated November speaker is Marc-Philippe Weller (Heidelberg). So far, all presentations have been in German, but in the future we plan to alternate between German and English, in order to enable more interested scholars to participate.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de

 

On 30 September Belgium ratified the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults. This means that the Convention will enter into force for Belgium on 1 January 2021. The Convention will then have 13 Contracting States. All of them are in Europe (EU or neigbouring States): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Monaco, Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (only Scotland). The Convention has additionally been signed by a number of other States (all EU): Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland.

The European Parliament has attempted to have the Commission adopt EU legislation on this topic (see its resolutions of 2008 and of 2017). The European Law Institute has conducted a study on which we reported earlier (here). Although the Commission has not initiated legislation, they are following up the signing and ratifying of the Convention by Member States. They seem to have success.

Belgium has been preparing the implementation legislation since 2019 and initially planned to ratify the convention a year earlier, but the process was delayed due to the setting up of an electronic central register of protected persons.

(On the same day Belgium’s new federal government was sworn in after 493 days, but that is unrelated!)

Membership

On 7 September 2020, Nicaragua and Thailand were issued with certificates confirming an affirmative vote in favour of their respective admissions as Members of the HCCH, following a six-month voting period which ended on 4 September 2020. Both Nicaragua and Thailand are now each invited to deposit an instrument of acceptance of the HCCH Statute to become a Member of the HCCH.

Conventions & Instruments

On 12 September 2020, the HCCH 1965 Service Convention entered into force for Austria. It currently has 78 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.

On 16 September 2020, Serbia signed the HCCH 2007 Child Support Convention. The next step for it to enter into force is for Serbia to deposit its instrument of ratification. More information is available here.

On 28 September 2020, the United Kingdom deposited its instrument of accession to the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention and its instrument of ratification to the HCCH 2007 Child Support Convention. The United Kingdom is currently bound by both Conventions by virtue of the approval of the EU, and they will continue to be applicable until 31 December 2020. Both Conventions will then enter into force on 1 January 2021, ensuring a seamless continuity in operation. More information is available here.

Publications & Documentation

On 2 September 2020, the Proceedings of the Twenty-First Session were published online. The series contains all the minutes and working documents of the Twenty-First Session of the HCCH, during which the HCCH 2007 Child Support Convention was concluded. It also includes relevant documents from the preparatory Special Commissions and the preliminary studies carried out by the Permanent Bureau. It is published in bilingual form, with English and French texts appearing side by side. It is available for download here.

On 22 September 2020, the Explanatory Report on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention was approved following a two-month silent approval procedure during which no Member of the HCCH raised an objection. This report, prepared in both English and French, reflects the discussions and consensus-based negotiations leading to the adoption of the Convention, and, although non-binding in nature, will serve as an important and authoritative resource in the implementation, operation and interpretation of the HCCH Judgments Convention. More information is available here.

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

On 28 September 2020, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland deposited its instrument of accession to the HCCH Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (2005 Choice of Court Convention) and its instrument of ratification to the HCCH Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (2007 Child Support Convention). The full text of the HCCH’s announcement is here.

Celebrating the 40th birthday of the Austrian Private International Law Act, scholars from numerous European countries have contributed to a festschrift of more than 400 pages edited by Florian Heindler (Sigmund Freud University Vienna). The essays focus on the possible reform of the Austrian PIL Act, its value, and its role as a national PIL Codification influenced and partly derogated by EU legislation. The contributions from Andrea Bonomi (in English), Axel Flessner, Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Thomas John, Caroline Sophie Rupp, Thomas Bachner, Ena-Marlis Bajons Wolfgang Faber, Edwin Gitschthaler, Florian Heindler, Helmut Heiss, Brigitta Lurger, Martina Melcher, Andreas Schwartze, and Bea Verschraegen deal with the general part of the PIL act and specific issues such as conflict of laws in family, property, succession, and company law matters.

The table of contents can be accessed here.

By Zheng (Sophia) Tang

1 Anti-suit Injunctions issued in Huawei v Conversant and Xiaomi v Intel Digital

Chinese courts have issued two anti-suit injunctions recently in cross-border patent cases. The first is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Huawei v Conversant, (2019) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong 732, 733 and 734 No 1. (here) Huawei, a Chinese telecom giant brought an action on 25 Jan 2018 in Jiangsu Nanjing Intermediate Court requiring determination of FRAND royalty for all Chinese patents held by Conversant that is essential to 2G, 3G and 4G standard (standard essential patent or ‘SEP’). Conversant brought another action in Düsseldorf, Germany on 20 April 2018 claiming Huawei infringed its German patents of the same patent family. On 16 Sept 2019, the Chinese court ordered a relatively low rate pursuant to Chinese standard and Conversant appealed to the Supreme Court on 18 Nov 2019. On 27 Aug 2020, the German Court held Huawei liable and approved the FRAND fee proposed by Conversant, which is 18.3 times of the rate determined by the Chinese court. Pursuant to Huawei’s application, the Chinese Supreme Court restrained Conversant from applying the German court to enforce the German judgment. The reasons include: the enforcement of the Düsseldorf judgment would have a negative impact on the case pending in Chinese court; an injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Huawei; the damage to Conversant by granting the injunction is significantly smaller than the damage to Huawei if not granting injunction; injunction will not harm public interest or international comity.

On 9 June 2020, Chinese company Xiaomi brought the proceedings in the Wuhan Intermediate Court requesting the determination of the global FRAND rate for SEPs held by the US company, Inter Digital. On 29 July, Intel Digital sued Xiaomi in Delhi High Court in India for infringement of Indian patents of the same patent family and asking for injunction. The Wuhan Intermediate Court ordered Inter Digital to stop the injunction application in India and prohibited Intel Digital from applying injunctions, applying for the determination of FRAND rate or enforcing junctions already received in any countries. (Xiaomi v Intel Digital (2020) E 01 Zhi Min Chu 169 No 1) The court provides reasons as follows: Inter Digital intentionally brought a conflicting action in India to hamper the Chinese proceedings; the Indian proceedings may lead to judgments irreconcilable to the Chinese one; an anti-suit injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Xiaomi’s interests; an anti-suit injunction will not harm Intel Digital’s legitimate interests or public interests.

2 Innovative Judicial ‘Law Making’ to Transplant Foreign Law

These two cases are interesting in that they open the door for the courts to ‘make law’ by providing Chinese legislation innovative interpretation. Chinese law does not explicitly permit the courts to issue anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunctions. Article 100 of the Civil Procedure Law of China permits Chinese courts to order or prohibit the respondent to do, or from doing, certain actions, if the respondent’s behaviour may lead to the difficulty to enforce the judgment or cause other damages to the other party. But this act preservation provision was generally used only in the preservation of property, injunction of infringing actions, or other circumstances where the respondent’s action may directly cause substantive harm to the applicant’s personal or proprietary rights. It has never been applied as the equivalent to anti-suit injunctions. The ‘Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in Cases Involving the Review of Act Preservation in Intellectual Property Disputes’ (No. 21 [2018] of the Supreme People’s Court) enforced from 1 Jan 2019 did not mention the court’s competence to issue anti-suit injunction. These two judgments provide innovative interpretation to Art 100 by extending act preservation measures to cover anti-suit injunction.

It is important to note that anti-suit injunction is a controversial instrument used to combat the conflict of jurisdiction and forum shopping. It is not issued frequently or lightly. Instead, there is a high threshold to cross. In England, for example, an anti-suit injunction can be ordered only if the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive and England is the natural forum, (Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] AC 119) or the foreign proceedings would breach a valid exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration clause between the parties. (The “Angelic Grace”, [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 87) In both cases, neither courts justify China is a natural forum. Such justification may be more difficult in disputes concerning foreign patent due to the territoriality of patent.  Furthermore, foreign proceedings are not oppressive just because they award higher rate to the parent holder, which is not properly handled either by the Chinese judgments. In the US, anti-suit injunction requires the parties and issues in foreign proceedings are ‘the same’ as the local ones. (E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores SA, 446 F. 3d 984 (Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2006)) This barrier is difficult to lift in disputes concerning infringement of national patents in the same family. In FRAND cases, the court usually relies on the ‘contractual umbrella over the patent’ to avoid the difficulty brought by the territoriality of patent. (Huawei v Samsung, Case No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO) Even if a contractual approach is adopted, the court still needs to ascertain the foreign litigation may frustrate a local policy, would be vexatious or oppressive, would threaten the U.S. court’s in rem jurisdiction, or would prejudice other equitable considerations. (Zapata Off-Shore Company v. Unterweser Reederei GMBH, 428 F.2d 888 (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1970))

The Chinese judgments show clear sign of borrowing the common law tests. In particular, the Huawei v Conversant judgment has high similarity with Huawei v Samsung judgment rendered by the California Northern District Court. The problem is the enjoined Düsseldorf judgment awarded FRAND rate instead of an unconditional injunction like the Shenzhen judgment. While enforcing a permanent injunction in the biggest market of Samsung may lead to a forced settlement which would make the US proceedings unnecessary or redundant, enforcing the court determined FRAND rate covering only one state may not have the same effect on the Chinese proceedings. In particular, due to different standards to calculate the FRAND rate, a higher rate covering the German market is not oppressive and would not result in a forced settlement for Chinese FRAND rate. The Wuhan judgment focuses on the vexatious foreign proceedings brought in bad faith and abuse of process. The Wuhan court considers the Indian proceedings was brought to frustrate the pending proceedings before the Wuhan court. The judgment seems to follow the English trait. However, the court did not fully explain how an action purely covering Indian patents and concerning Indian market would affect the Chinese proceedings based on contract. It is also unclear whether Chinese court could award a global FRAND rate as the English court will do. Although in contrast to many other judgments, these two judgments show reasonable quality and laudable efforts of reasoning, reading in details may suggest the courts have learnt more in form instead of substance. The judicial transplant of very unfamiliar common law instruments into Chinese practice seems a little awkward and immature.

3 Comity, Pragmatism and Rule of Law

Anti-suit injunction is a controversial instrument in that it may infringe foreign judicial sovereignty and comity. Even if it is technically directed to the respondent not a foreign court, it makes judgment on the appropriateness of foreign proceedings, which, in normal circumstances, should be judged by the foreign court. No matter how indirect the interference is, an interference is there. Such an approach is fundamentally incompatible with Chinese jurisprudence and diplomatic policy, which emphasise on the principle of sovereign equality and non-interference. China usually considers parallel proceedings tolerable which concern the judicial sovereignty of two countries and each could continue jurisdiction pursuant to their domestic law. (Art 533 of Civil Procedural Law Judicial Interpretation by SPC) Adopting anti-suit injunction to tackle foreign parallel proceedings or related proceedings directly contradicts this provision.

Since Chinese courts would not deviate from the central government’s policy, the two judgments may be a sign to show China is gradually adjusting its international policy from self-restraint to zealous competition, at least in the high-tech area. This is consistent with China’s strategic plan to develop its high-tech industry and a series of reform is adopted to improve IP adjudication. It may imply consideration of diffused reciprocity, i.e. since some foreign courts may issue anti-suit injunction to obstruct Chinese proceedings, Chinese courts should have the same power. It may also reflects China’s increased confidence on its institutions led by its economic power. The transplant of anti-suit injunction cannot be deemed as admiring foreign law, but a pragmatic approach to use any tools available to achieve their aims. Since anti-suit injunctions may interfere a state’s sovereignty, a foreign state may issue ‘anti-anti-suit injunction’ to block it. While injunction wars occur in high-tech cases, the final trump card should be a country’s economic power. Since China is the biggest market for many telecom products, it would be the last market that most companies would give up, which would provide Chinese courts a privilege.

Finally, since anti-suit injunction is not included explicitly in Chinese law, there is no consistent test applying to it. The two judgments have applied different tests following the practice from different common law countries. It is also noted that the lack of relevant training in exercise discretion in issuing anti-suit injunctions or applying precedents leads to uncertainty and some discrepancy. Issuing anti-suit injunction is serious in that it may affect comity and international relation. It is thus cannot be adopted randomly or flexibly by mirroring one or two foreign judgments. If China indeed wants to adopt anti-suit injunction, a test guidance should be provided. Anti-suit injunction needs to be issued under the rule of law.

 

 

 

 

In preparation of the Video Roundtable by the University of Bonn and the HCCH on 29 October 2020, we are offering here a Repository of contributions to the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. Please email us if you miss something in it, we will update immediately…

Update of 27 June 2020: New entries are printed bold.

Please also check the “official” Bibliograghy of the HCCH for the instrument.

1. Explanatory Reports

Garcimartín Alférez, Francisco;
Saumier, Geneviève „Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters: Explanatory Report“, as approved by the HCCH on 22 September 2020, Pre-Publication available here Garcimartín Alférez, Francisco;
Saumier, Geneviève “Judgments Convention: Revised Draft Explanatory Report”, HCCH Prel.-Doc. No. 1 of December 2018 (available here) Nygh, Peter;
Pocar, Fausto “Report of the Special Commission”, HCCH Prel.-Doc. No. 11 of August 2000 (available here), pp 19-128

2. Bibliography

Beaumont, Paul “Forum non Conveniens and the EU rules on Conflicts of Jurisdiction: A Possible Global Solution”, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé 2018, pp 433-447 Beaumont, Paul “Judgments Convention: Application to Governments”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 121-137 Blom, Joost “The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act and the Hague Judgments and Jurisdictions Projects”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal 55 (2018), pp 257-304 Bonomi, Andrea “European Private International Law and Third States”, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2017, pp 184-193 Bonomi, Andrea “Courage or Caution? – A Critical Overview of the Hague Preliminary Draft on Judgments”, Yearbook of Private International Law 17 (2015/2016), pp 1-31 Bonomi, Andrea;
Mariottini, Cristina M. “(Breaking) News From The Hague: A Game Changer in International Litigation? – Roadmap to the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention”, Yearbook of Private International Law 20 (2018/2019), pp 537-567 Borges Moschen, Valesca Raizer;
Marcelino, Helder “Estado Constitutional Cooperativo e a conficaçao do direito internacional privado apontamentos sobre o ’Judgement Project’ da Conferência de Haia de Direito Internacional Privado”, Revista Argumentum 18 (2017), pp 291-319

(Cooperative Constitutional State and the Codification of Private International Law: Notes on the “Judgment Project” of the Hague Conference on Private International Law) Brand, Ronald A. “The Circulation of Judgments Under the Draft Hague Judgments Convention”, University of Pittsburgh School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2019-02, pp 1-35 Brand, Ronald A. “Jurisdictional Developments and the New Hague Judgments Project”, “in HCCH (ed.), A Commitment to Private International Law – Essays in honour of Hans van Loon”, Cambridge 2013, pp 89-99 Brand, Ronald A. “New Challenges in Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments”, in Franco Ferrari, Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law – Contemporary Challenges and Continuing Relevance, Cheltenham/Northampton 2019, pp 360-389 Brand, Ronald A. “Jurisdiction and Judgments Recognition at the Hague Conference: Choices Made, Treaties Completed, and the Path Ahead”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 3-17 Çaliskan, Yusuf;
Çaliskan, Zeynep “2 Temmuz 2019 Tarihli Yabanci Mahkeme Kararlarinin Taninmasi ve Tenfizine Iliskin Lahey Anlasmasinin Degerlendirilmesi”, Public and Private International Law Bulletin 40 (2020), pp 231-245

(An Evaluation of 2 July 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters) Clavel, Sandrine; Jault-Seseke, Fabienne “La convention de La Haye du 2 juillet 2019 sur la reconnaissance et l’exécution des jugements étrangers en matière civile ou commerciale: Que peut-on en attendre?”, Travaux du comité français de Droit international privé, Vol. 2018-2020, forthcoming (Version provisoire de la communication présentée le 4 octobre 2019 available here) Coco, Sarah E. “The Value of a New Judgments Convention for U.S. Litigants”, New York University Law Review 94 (2019), pp 1210-1243 Cuniberti, Gilles “Signalling the Enforceability of the Forum’s Judgments Abroad”, Rivista di diritto internazionale private e processuale (RDIPP) 56 (2020), pp 33-54 de Araujo, Nadia; De Nardi, Marcelo;
Spitz, Lidia “A nova era dos litígios internacionais”, Valor Economico 2019 de Araujo, Nadia;
De Nardi, Marcelo;
Lopes Inez;
Polido, Fabricio „Private International Law Chronicles“, Brazilian Journal of International Law 16 (2019), pp 19-34

  de Araujo, Nadia;
De Nardi, Marcelo „Consumer Protection Under the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 67-79 de Araujo, Nadia;
De Nardi, Marcelo „22ª Sessão Diplomática da Conferência da Haia e a Convenção sobre sentenças estrangeiras: Primeiras reflexões sobre as vantagens para o Brasil da sua adoção“, Revista de la Secretaría del Tribunal Permanente de Revisión 7 No. 14 (2019), páginas 198-221

(22nd Diplomatic Session of The Hague Conference and the Convention on Foreign Judgments: First Reflections on the Advantages for Brazil of their Adoption) Dotta Salgueiro, Marcos “Article 14 of the Judgments Convention: The Essential Reaffirmation of the Non-discrimination Principle in a Globalized Twenty-First Century”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 113-120 Douglas, Michael;
Keyes, Mary;
McKibbin, Sarah;
Mortensen, Reid “The HCCH Judgments Convention in Australian Law”, Federal Law Review 47 (2019), pp 420-443 Franzina, Pietro; Leandro, Antonio

  “La Convenzione dell’Aja del 2 luglio 2019 sul riconoscimento delle sentenze straniere: una prima lettura”, Quaderni di SIDIblog 6 (2019), pp 215-231, available at http://www.sidi-isil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Quaderni-di-SIDIBlog-6-2019.pdf

(The Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition of Foreign Judgments: A First Appraisal) Fuchs, Felix “Das Haager Übereinkommen vom 2. Juli 2019 über die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausländischer Urteile in Zivil- oder Handelssachen“, Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht (GWR) 2019, pp 395-399 Garcimartín, Francisco “The Judgments Convention: Some Open Questions”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 19-31 Goddard, David „The Judgments Convention – The Current State of Play”, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 29 (2019), pp 473-490 He, Qisheng “The HCCH Judgments Convention and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments pertaining to a State”, Global Law Review 3 (2020), pp 147-161 He, Qisheng “Unification and Division: Immovable Property Issues under the HCCH Judgement Convention”, Journal of International Law 1 (2020), pp 33-55 Jacobs, Holger “Der Zwischenstand zum geplanten Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen – Der vorläufige Konventionsentwurf 2016“, Zeitschrift für Internationales Privatrecht & Rechtsvergleichung (ZfRV) 2017, pp 24-30 Jang, Junhyok “The Public Policy Exception Under the New 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 97-111 Jovanovic, Marko Thou Shall (Not) Pass – Grounds for Refusal of Recognition and

Enforcement under the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention, YbPIL 21 (2019/2020), pp. 309 – 332 Juepter, Eva “The Hague Jurisdiction Project – what options for the Hague Conference?”, Journal of Private International Law 16 (2020), pp 247-274 Kessedjian, Catherine “Comment on the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters. Is the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 a useful tool for companies who are conducting international activities?“, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR) 2020, pp 19-33 Khanderia, Saloni „The Hague judgments project: assessing its plausible benefits for the development of the Indian private international law”, Commonwealth Law Bulletin 44 (2018), pp 452-475 Khanderia, Saloni “The Hague Conference on Private International Law’s Proposed Draft Text on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Should South Africa Endorse it?”, Journal of African Law 63 (2019), pp 413-433 Mariottini, Cristina „Establishment of Treaty Relations under The 2019 Hague Judgments

Convention“, YbPIL 21 (2019/2020), pp. 365-380 Mariottini, Cristina “The Exclusion of Defamation and Privacy from the Scope of the Hague Draft Convention on Judgments, YbPIL 19 (2017/2018), pp 475-486. Meier, Niklaus “Notification as a Ground for Refusal”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 81-95 Nielsen, Peter Arnt “The Hague 2019 Judgments Convention – from failure to success”, Journal of Private International Law 16 (2020), pp 205-246 North, Cara “The 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention: A Common Law Perspective”, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2020, pp 202-210 North, Cara “The Exclusion of Privacy Matters from the Judgments Convention”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 33-48 Oestreicher, Yoav „ ’We’re on a Road to Nowhere’ – Reasons for the Continuing Failure to Regulate Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, The International Lawyer 42 (2008), pp 59-86 Pertegás Sender, Marta “The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention: Its Conclusion and the road ahead”, in Asian Academy of International Law (publ.), Sinergy and Security: the Keys to Sustainable Global Investment: Proceedings of the 2019 Colloquium on International Law, 2019 Hong Kong, pp 181-190 Pertegás, Marta “Brussels I Recast and the Hague Judgments Project”, in Geert Van Calster (ed.), European Private International Law at 50: Celebrating and Contemplating the 1968 Brussels Convention and its Successors, Cambridge 2018, pp 67-82 Ribeiro-Bidaoui, João “The International Obligation of the Uniform and Autonomous Interpretation of Private Law Conventions: Consequences for Domestic Courts and International Organisations”, Netherlands International Law Review 67 (2020), pp 139 – 168 Rumenov, Ilija “Implications of the New 2019 Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments on the National Legal Systems of Countries in South Eastern Europe”, EU and Comparative Law Issues and Challenges Series (ECLIC) 3 (2019), pp 385-4040 Saumier, Geneviève “Submission as a Jurisdictional Basis and the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention”, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR) 67 (2020), pp 49-65 Schack, Haimo “Wiedergänger der Haager Konferenz für IPR: Neue Perspektiven eines weltweiten Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommens?“, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEUP) 2014, pp 824-842 Schack, Haimo „Das neue Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2020, pp 1-96 Silberman, Linda “Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention be Stalled?”, DePaul Law Review 52 (2002), pp 319-349 Spitz, Lidia „Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments on Public Policy Grounds in the Hague Judgments Convention – A Comparison with The 1958 New York Convention“, YbPIL 21 (2019/2020), pp 333-364 Stein, Andreas „Das Haager Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen 2019 – Was lange währt, wird endlich gut?“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2020, pp 197-202 Stewart, David P. „Current Developments: The Hague Conference adopts a New Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters”, American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 113 (2019), pp 772-783 Taquela, María Blanca Noodt; Abou-Nigm, Verónica Ruiz “News From The Hague: The Draft Judgments Convention and Its Relationship with Other International Instruments”, Yearbook of Private International Law 19 (2017/2018), pp 449-474 Teitz, Louise Ellen “Another Hague Judgments Convention? – Bucking the Past to Provide for the Future”, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 29 (2019), pp 491-511 van der Grinten, Paulien;
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As announced earlier on this blog, the Conference Frontiers in Civil Justice organized by the ERC team of Erasmus School of Law in Rotterdam, will take place on 16 and 17 November 2020.

The conference addresses four key issues in civil justice, which require a deeper and renewed reflection in light of their contribution of facilitating access to justice. Those concern the shaping of the interaction between formal and informal justice, the digitalization of consumer dispute resolution, the collectivizing and monetizing of civil litigation and justice innovation.

Renowned speakers and selected speakers following a call for papers will give their views. Keynotes will be given by Professor Dame Hazel Genn (UCL) and Hrvje Grubisic (European Commission).

View the programme and register for free online participation  here.

The conference is set up as a blended event, with speakers at the site and some presenting online. We will only be able to host a limited number of guests. If necessary, in the light of the COVID-19 situation, the conference will take place online entirely.
For more information, do not hesitate to contact us at kas@law.eur.nl (Betül).

This conference is organised by Erasmus School of Law of Rotterdam University and funded by an ERC consolidator grant from for the project ‘Building EU Civil Justice’.