Conflictoflaws

In its session in The Hague on 31 August 2019, the Institut de Droit International/Institute of International Law passed two highly relevant resolutions:

Firstly, the resolution on “Internet and the Infringement of Privacy” adopted by the 8th Commission (Rapporteurs: Erik Jayme and Symeon Symeonides) focuses on numerous yet unresolved issues of jurisdiction, applicable law and the enforcement of foreign judgments. For example, the Commission rejects a ‘mosaic’ approach for internet-related tortious claims. Instead, it proposes a “holistic principle” that would allow a person to seek redress for injuries in a single state even if the injuries have occurred or may occur in another state. Moreover, the resolution puts forward a rather sophisticated choice of law rule:

In the absence of a choice-of-law agreement valid under Article 8, the applicable law shall be determined as follows:

1. If the court’s jurisdiction is based on paragraph 1(a) of Article 5, the applicable law shall be the internal law of the forum State.

2. If the court’s jurisdiction is based on paragraph 1(b) of Article 5, the applicable law shall be the internal law of the forum State. However, if, at the time of the injury, the defendant’s home is located in another state, the applicable law shall be the internal law of the state that, considering all the circumstances, has the closest and most significant connection.

3. If the court’s jurisdiction is based on paragraph 1(c) of Article 5, the applicable law shall be the internal law of the forum State. However, if the aggrieved person proves that the critical conduct of the person claimed to be liable occurred in another State, the internal law of the latter State shall govern all substantive issues, provided that the aggrieved person formally requests the application of that law and, upon request by the court, establishes the content of that law.

4. If the court’s jurisdiction is based on paragraph 1(d) of Article 5, the applicable law shall be the internal law of the forum State. However, if the person claimed to be liable proves that the most extensive injurious effects occurred in another State, the internal law of the latter State shall govern all substantive issues, provided that that person formally requests the application of that law and, upon request by the court, establishes the content of that law.

5. If the court’s jurisdiction is based on a valid choice-of-court agreement and that court is located in a State referred to in Article 5, the applicable law is determined as provided in paragraphs 1–4 of Article 7, whichever is applicable. If the court is located in a State other than the States referred to in Article 5, the applicable law shall be the law of the State which, considering all circumstances, has the closest and most significant connection.

Finally, the recognition and enforcement of judgments in line with the resolution’s standards shall be subject to conditions identical to the ones introduced in the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.

Secondly, the 18th Commission’s (Rapporteur: Campbell McLachlan) resolution on “Equality of Parties before International Investment Tribunals” deals with one of the most fundamental elements of the rule of law that ensures a fair system of adjudication. The first part of the resolution tackles issues of party equality at the stage of the establishment of the arbitral tribunal (such as access to a tribunal, the indispensable requirement of impartiality, and the tribunal’s composition), the second part is devoted to equality during the proceedings (e.g., the treatment of multiple claims and counterclaims, rules on pleading and evidence, and costs).

The resolutions can be accessed here.

Arthur Eyffinger, legal historian and former Head Librarian of the International Court of Justice, recently published T.M.C. Asser (1838–1913): In Quest of Liberty, Justice, and Peace (Brill 2019). As the name suggests, the two-volume biography retraces the life of Tobias Asser, who famously won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911 for his contributions to the field of private international law, including the establishment of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the initiative to found the Institut de Droit International, and his role in the subsequent creation of the Hague Academy of International Law.

A copy of the book was presented to the great-grandson of Tobias Asser, Professor Daan Asser, yesterday in the context of a mini-symposium co-hosted by the Royal Netherlands Society of International Law (KNVIR) and the Institut de Droit International, which is currently holding its 79th session in the Peace Palace in the Hague. The symposium featured contributions by Marta Pertegás Sender, Janne Nijman, Jean Salmon, Hans van Loon, and the author, Arthur Eyffinger, himself.

Given that the UK Supreme Court has given permission to hear a third appeal concerning collective actions – two of which have direct cross-border relevance (Merricks v MasterCard Inc [2019] EWCA Civ 674; Okpabi and others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 191; and Wm Morrisons Supermarkets Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 2339) – it may be timely to also reflect on the development of border-crossing collective actions considered in a European context.

To this end, Csongor István Nagy (of University of Szeged’s Faculty of Law) has just published an interesting open access monograph with Springer on collective actions in Europe. It is called Collective Actions in Europe – A Comparative, Economic and Transsystemic Analysis and is available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440551 .

For those of you who are interested in the case Monasky v. Taglieri currently before the US Supreme Court, please note that an extremely useful amicus curiae brief was filed this week by Reunite International Child Abduction Centre (as stated on its website Reunite is the “leading UK charity specialising in parental child abduction and the movement of children across international borders”).  This brief will certainly help put things into perspective with regard to the weight that should be given to parental intent when determining the habitual residence of the child under the Hague Child Abduction Convention (but it only answers the second question presented).

Other amicus curiae briefs have also been filed this week (incl. the one for the United States, which addresses accurately, in my view, the first question presented with regard to the standard of review of the district court’s determination of habitual residence; such determinations should be reviewed on appeal for clear error – and not de novo, which is more burdensome-). This reasoning is in line with the Balev case of the Canadian Supreme Court (2018 SCC 16, 20 April 2018).

For more information on this case, see my previous post here.

I include some excerpts of the brief of Reunite below (p. 18):

“It can therefore be seen that, while still important, parental intention is not necessarily given greater weight in English and Welsh law than any other factor when determining a child’s habitual residence. Further, the court evaluates parental intention in relation to the nature of the child’s stay in the country in question (by way of example, whether it was for a holiday, or some other temporary purpose, or whether it was intended to be for a longer duration).

“In that way, parental intention is treated as one factor within a broad factual enquiry, rather than as separate and, perhaps, determinative enquiry that precedes or is separate from an evaluation of the child’s circumstances. Within such an enquiry, the factors that are relevant to the habitual residence determination will vary in terms of the weight that they are given depending on the circumstances of the case. Lord Wilson’s judgment in Re B provides an example of how those facts might be weighed up against each other.”

Ms Ana Koprivica Harvey (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law) recently posted a new paper in the MPILux Research Paper Series, titled Non-Party Access to Court Documents and the Open Justice Principle: The UK Supreme Court Judgment in Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring.

Below is an overview provided by the Author:

This article analyses the eagerly awaited the UK Supreme Court judgment in Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring, unanimously delivered on 29th July 2019. Broadly speaking, the case concerned the scope and operation of the constitutional principle of open justice. More precisely, the questions before the Supreme Court were how much of the written material placed before a court in a civil action should be accessible to persons other than the parties to the proceedings, and how such access should be facilitated.

Case Background

The documents to which access was sought related to a lengthy trial in product liability proceedings against Cape Intermediate Holdings, a company involved in the manufacture and supply of asbestos. Following the settlement of the proceedings, the Asbestos Victims Support Groups Forum UK (the Forum), which was not a party to the dispute, applied to the court under Rule 5.4C of Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) for access to all documents used at or disclosed for the trial, including trial bundles and transcripts. The relevant Rule 5.4C CPR provides that a person who is not a party to proceedings may obtain from the court records copies of a statement of case and judgment or orders made in public, and, if the court gives permission, ‘obtain from the records of the court a copy of any other document filed by a party, or communication between the court and a party or another person’. In first instance, it was held that jurisdiction to grant the order sought existed either under Rule 5.4C or at common law. Following the appeal by Cape, the Court of Appeal limited the originally broad disclosure to the Forum to (i) statements of case held by the court pursuant to Rule 5.4C; (ii) provision by Cape of witness statements, expert reports and written submissions, and (iii) an order that the application for further disclosure be listed before the trial judge or another High Court judge to decide whether any other documents had lost confidentiality and had been read out in court or by the judge, or where inspection by the Forum was necessary to meet the principle of open justice. Neither Cape nor the Forum were satisfied with this decision and decided to bring their appeal and cross-appeal, respectively, before the Supreme Court. In essence, the appeal considered the powers of the court pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules or its inherent jurisdiction to permit access to documents used in litigation to which the applicant was not a party, and contested the scope of such powers. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal.

Supreme Court Judgment

Notably, the Supreme Court clarified that the scope of the court’s power to order access to materials to non-parties is not informed by “the practical requirements of running a justice system” (referring thereby to the keeping of records of the court, as laid down in Rule 5.4C), but the principle of open justice. In other words, according to the Court, the CPR are not exhaustive of the circumstances in which non-parties could be given access to court documents. On the contrary, they are considered a “minimum in addition to which the court had to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under the constitutional principle of open justice”.

Furthermore, the Court held that pursuant to the open justice principle, the default position – as previously established in Guardian News and Media Ltd – was that the public should be allowed access not only to the parties’ written submissions and arguments, but also to the documents which had been placed before the court and referred to during the hearing.

As there seems no realistic possibility of the judge making a more limited order than the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the orders for access already made by the Court of Appeal, with one change. It ordered that the balance of the application be listed before the judge in the original proceedings to determine whether the court should require Cape to provide a copy of any other document placed before the judge and referred to in the course of the trial to the Forum, at the Forum’s expense, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Supreme Court’s judgment.

Assessment

This judgment is significant for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it provides an extensive analysis of the court’s power to allow third parties access to court documents under the constitutional principle of open justice. In so doing, the judgment revisits the contents of the open justice principle and its application in the context of modern, predominantly written-based, civil proceedings. On the other, the judgment provides certain guidance on the circumstances in which a third party may obtain access to court documents and, to some extent, clarifies the type of documents that may in principle be obtained. As a result, the judgment provides broad third party access to the court files that have previously been under the exclusive purview of the court and the parties.

The present article provides an assessment of the Court’s findings, focusing on the interpretation of the open justice principle in relation to non-party access to court documents. In doing so, the article analyses the judgment in both comparative and the internal, UK legal context.

Seen from a comparative law perspective, the present judgment is a reminder of just how drastically different the approaches to the application of the open justice principle may be. In the context of third-party access to documents before courts this is particularly visible. These differences may be explained by the recent practice of exclusive reliance of the UK Supreme Court on the common law principle of open justice where non-party access to court documents is concerned. In other words, it is argued that, by employing the “common law exclusivity” approach, the Supreme Court has over time further developed the principle of open justice which has come to encompass a broader non-party access to court documents.

Observed within a broader context of the developments within the UK judicial system, the Supreme Court judgment may be understood as a reaction to the increasingly expressed concerns regarding the privatisation of civil justice. This is all the relevant so given the fact that the case at hand was settled out of court before the open judgment could be rendered. From a practitioner’s point of view, the judgment may potentially influence the parties and their counsels’ decision as to the type and number of documents they wish to file in a given case.

It is concluded that the Supreme Court judgment represents a point of departure for future applications for access to court documents. The judgment is not the end of the road, neither for the parties to the present dispute, nor with regard to future applications for access to documents. For the purposes of Cape Intermediate Holdings v Dring, the judgment requires the High Court to now consider whether further access should be granted pursuant to the open justice principle as interpreted by the Supreme Court. It remains to be seen how the High Court will now decide this case.

The upcoming issue of the Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (German Journal of Comparative Law; Vol. 118 [2019], No. 3) features the following contributions:

40 Years Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) – Even More Important Today than 40 Years Ago to Encourage Trade?

Petra Butler[1]

ZVglRWiss 118 (2019) 231–256

Taking note of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Good’s (CISG) upcoming 40-year anniversary the article discusses its success in light of empirical research into the contractual behaviour of small and medium-sized enterprises. The article argues that given the way small and medium-sized businesses manage their dispute resolution risk when contracting cross-border, the CISG is needed today more than ever before.

Anbahnung, Abschluss und Durchführung von Smart Contracts im Rechtsvergleich

Francesco A. Schurr

ZVglRWiss 118 (2019) 257–284

In Germany and worldwide the Smart Contract is a legitimate form that can be used to conclude and to exercise contracts. Due to the enormous relevance in all the world, it seems to be essential to use the method of legal comparison in this field. This seems to be important in order to distinguish the Smart Contract from the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) in general and more specifically the Blockchain. The comparative analysis of the paper shows, that the fundamental aspects of the Smart Contract, therefore the immutability, the self-enforcement and the unlimitedness, are understood differently in the various legal cultures. Still there seem to be good reasons to assume, that software algorithms will change the contractual landscape in the future: maybe one day a contractual link will be feasible without law and this link will be allocated in a global space without national boundaries. The paper shows that the national law of the respective applicable jurisdiction, that is expressed in a natural language and not in a Code, is still essential. Without that, the features of a contractual relationship and the resulting rights cannot be determined. The most recent legislative initiatives in Italy and Liechtenstein can serve as examples for the future legal development in Europe.

Is the Law Ready to Face the Progressing Digital Revolution? – General Policy Issues and Selected Aspects in the Realm of Financial Markets from the International, European Union and German Perspective

Gudula Deipenbrock[2]

ZVglRWiss 118 (2019) 285–313

The progressing digital revolution is in full swing. It dramatically transforms economies, societies and law. To financial markets, cross-border business, opaque interconnections and rapid transformation are nothing new. It is however the accelerated high-speed growth of technical complexity and advanced levels of digitalisation that force financial markets actors in an unprecedented way to adjust to it. But is the law or – more specifically – are policy makers, legislators, and particularly regulators and supervisors ready to face the manifestations of the progressing digital revolution particularly in financial markets? Such readiness to respond entails at the outset to generally define and critically assess which policies are suitable and shall be pursued in finding adequate legal answers. This paper aims to contribute to this discussion. The paper concludes that the law plays a core part in framing, channelling, structuring and monitoring the progressing digital revolution in financial markets.

Grenzüberschreitende Musterfeststellungsklagen

Simon Horn

ZVglRWiss 118 (2019) 314–340

The paper discusses under which conditions the German Model Declaratory Action allows international participation. The interaction of Sec. 606 et seqq. of the German Code of Civil Procedure and the Brussels Ibis Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 1215/ 2012) provides various possibilities for cross-border Model Declaratory Actions and generally allows international participation in all roles. However, as the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not suited for collective redress mechanisms and the Model Declaratory Action has been drafted from a strictly national perspective without sufficiently considering the problems arising from international participation, cross-border Model Declaratory Actions are a challenge for both German civil procedure and European conflict of jurisdiction rules.

[1] Professor Dr. Petra Butler, Victoria University of Wellington and Director Institute of Small and Micro States. – I am indebted to Chris Nixon, senior analyst (NZIER), Hanneke van Oeveren and Georgia Whelan (both former students at Victoria University Faculty of Law) for the vital empirical research they have done underlying this paper and my enthusiastic colleagues and fellow MSME researchers in Spain, Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong, Belgium, Australia, and the UK (see www.msmejustice.com). I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Max-Planck-Institute for International, European, and Regulatory Procedural Law for providing me with a stimulating and supportive research environment. The article is partly based on a paper delivered at the “The CISG as Middle Age” conference at the University of Pittsburgh in March 2019.

[2] Prof. Dr. iur. Gudula Deipenbrock, Professorin für Wirtschaftsrecht, HTW Berlin, University of Applied Sciences, Germany, and Associate Research Fellow 2018/2019 at Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (IALS), University of London, UK. The author gave talks on selected aspects of preliminary versions of this paper at HTW Berlin, University of Applied Sciences, Germany, on 16 November 2018, and at Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (IALS), University of London, UK, on 26 February 2019.

The Permanent Bureau of the HCCH has just announced that the programme for the first global conference on the newly adopted HCCH Judgments Convention is now available via: <http://www.hcchjudgmentshk.org/programme.php> with registrations are now also open.

As previously posted, the conference will take place on 9 September 2019 in Hong Kong SAR, People’s Republic of China. It is open to interested experts with participation free of charge. However, advance registration is required as the number of participants is limited. Registrations are handled on a first come, first served basis.

The deadline for registration is Saturday 31 August 2019.

Additional information relating to the Conference (incl. venue, accommodation, transportation, visa requirements, and other practical information) is also now available on the Conference website. Interested experts may consult this site regularly for more updates as they become available.

Dr Burcu Yüksel (University of Aberdeen, Scotland) and Dr Florian Heindler (Sigmund Freud University, Austria) have written a post for the Aberdeen Law School’s blog exploring what blockchain/distributed ledger technology can offer to enhance cross-border legal cooperation, particularly in the context of the Hague conventions. The full text is available here.

Benedikt Windau, Judge at the Oldenburg District Court (Landgericht Oldenburg), runs a very interesting blog (in German), focusing on German Civil Procedure. In one of his recent postings, he presented a very interesting judgment of the Frankfurt CoA, related to the Service Regulation. Upon my request, he prepared an English version of his post for our blog.

Benedikt Windau, Judge at the Oldenburg District Court (Landgericht Oldenburg),

author of the German zpoblog

A recent ruling of the Frankfurt Court of Appeals (Docket No. 13 U 210/17) will potentially shake up the (German) law of cross-border service quite a bit, as it imposes new, hence unknown obligations on the plaintiff – and its legal counsel accordingly.

THE FACTS

The plaintiff, a German insolvency administrator, sued the defendant, who is located in France, before the Darmstadt district court (Landgericht). The statement of claim arrived at the court on December 15, 2015; the period of limitation ended on December 31, 2015 (at least that is what the district court and the court of appeals assumed).

In the statement of claim he asked for it to be translated by the court on his costs into French before being served upon the defendant. Yet the court could not find a translator for quite a period of time (yes, that French quite frequently spoken in the EU…) and thus the statement of claim was not translated before October 24, 2016. It was finally served on December 9, 2016.

German law provides, that the limitation period is suspended by inter alia the bringing of an action for performance (Sec. 204 (1) No. 1 German Civil Code). It furthermore provides that if service is made in order to have the period of limitations suspended in this respect, the receipt of the corresponding application or declaration by the court shall already have this effect provided service is made “demnächst” (Sec. 167 Code of Civil Procedure). “Demnächst” (which means something like “soon” or “in the near future”), in this respect is roughly understood as “not with undue delay caused by the plaintiff”.

The district court considered the service to be “demnächst”, as the court, not the plaintiff was to be blamed for the delay. It thus held that the service in December 2016 suspended the period of limitations despite the fact that almost a year passed between the ending of the period of limitation and the service.

THE RULING

On the defendant’s appeal, the Frankfurt Court of Appeal held that the period of limitations was not suspended retroactively and thus dismissed the claim.

It first discusses whether there is an absolute time limit to “demnächst” that might have been exceeded in this case. But according to the court, this need not be decided, as there was undue delay caused by the plaintiff.

The court states, that under the Service Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 1393/2007) documents do not have to be translated before being served. Without translation the addressee is protected by its right to refuse acceptance of the document (Art. 5, 8 Service Regulation). Furthermore, a translation under the Service Regulation need not comply with any requirements regarding its form and thus could be provided by the parties.

It then argues that according to Art. 5 (1) Service Regulation it had been upon the plaintiff to decide whether the statement of claim would be translated prior to service. So, if the plaintiff here chose the statement of claim to be translated, it would have been upon him to provide a translation along with the statement of claim. Had he done so, the statement would probably have been served within six weeks, thus not later than February 2016. Under these circumstances, the service in December 2016 could not be seen as “demnächst”.

COMMENTS

1. The Court of Appeals is absolutely right in stating the obvious (but widely quite unknown), that  a) documents do not have to be translated under the Service Regulation, and  b) the translation can be provided by the plaintiff as there is no certain form required (just as under the Hague Service Convention).

The defendant is sufficiently protected by his right to refuse acceptance of service (Art. 8 Service Regulation) – and by Art. 45 (1) lit. (b) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, if the quality of the translation is insufficient.

2. Thus the plaintiff could (and maybe should) have chosen the statement of claims to be served without translation in the first place, which would have been faster and probably cheaper. Had the defendant then refused to accept the service, he could still have provided a translation (or asked the court to provide a translation) and this service would still have suspended the period of limitations (see Art. 8 (3) Service Regulation). Alternatively, he could have proven that the defendant does in fact understand the language of the document and therefore the refusal of acceptance was without justification. That would make the statement of claim deemed to be served under German Law (see Sec. 179 Code of Civil Procedure).

3. However I’m not convinced, that under German Law a plaintiff is obliged to provide a translation himself for purposes of cross-border-service, even more so without an explicit request by the court (cf. Sec. 139 Code of Civil Procedure). Such an obligation is neither provided for in the ZRHO (“Rechtshilfeordnung für Zivilsachen”, the German administrative regulation governing inter alia cross-border-service), nor can such an obligation be found in the Service Regulation, especially in light of the wording in Art. 5 (2).

4. Plaintiffs’ counsel will now often find themselves “lost in translation”: On the one hand the Frankfurt Court of Appeals‘ judgment requires the parties to provide translations themselves. On the other hand, the parties‘ right to provide translations themselves may be unkonwn to some courts and therefore require some discussions. A little help in these discussions may be an article by Dr. Philine Fabig (and myself) in the Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW 2017, 2502 et seq.).

OUTLOOK

The only good news is that the plaintiff appealed the judgement; the case is now pending before the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) under Docket-No. IX ZR 156/19. So maybe the Bundesgerichtshof will find some final and fog-lifting words on the subject.

A half-day Conference at the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg, jointly convened by Ralf Michaels (Max Planck) and Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (Edinburgh) will look at the (renewed) role of academia in Latin American Private International Law. Participants will come from several Latin American countries, as well as from the Institute.
More information and the program are here. The conference takes place on September 10, 13:00-17:30. Registrations by email at veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de

Carlos Santaló Goris, researcher at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law, and Ph.D. candidate at the University of Luxembourg, offers a summary and an analysis of AG Spuznar’s Opinion on the Case C-555/18, K.H.K. v. B.A.C., E.E.K.

I. Introduction

Less than three years after Regulation 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order (“the EAPO Regulation”) entered into force, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) released its first Opinion on this instrument. This regulation established a uniform provisional measure at the European level, which permits creditors the attachment of bank accounts in cross-border pecuniary claims. In many senses, the EAPO regulation represents a huge step forward, particularly in comparison to the ex-ante scenario regarding civil provisional measures in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  It is no accident that in the first line of the Opinion, AG Szpunar refers to the landmark case Denilauler.  Besides the concrete assessment of the preliminary reference, he found a chance in this case to broadly analyse the EAPO Regulation as such, contextualizing it within the general framework of the Brussels system.

II. Facts of case

The main facts of this case were substantiated before the First Instance Court of Sofia (Bulgaria). Upon the request of a creditor, this court granted a national order for payment against two debtors. The order for payment was sent to the debtors’ domicile as it appeared in the national population register. Since the notification was returned without an acknowledgment of receipt, the debtors were also informed by the posting of a public notice on the door of their “official” domicile. They did not respond to this notification either. In accordance with Bulgarian law, in such occasions, if the creditor does not initiate  declaratory proceedings on the substance of the case to ascertain the existence of a debt, any order for payment would be annulled o. In the present case, before proceeding in that manner, the creditor requested an European Account Preservation Order  (“EAPO“)  before the First Instance Court of Sofia, to freeze the debtors’ bank accounts in Sweden. This court informed the creditor that he must initiate declaratory proceedings in order to avoid the nullification of the payment order. In the court’s view, since the order for payment was not yet enforceable, it could not be considered an authentic instrument. Therefore, based on Article 5(1) of the EAPO, the creditor had to initiate the declaratory proceedings on which he would rely on when applying for the EAPO. Conversely, the President of Second Civil Section of the same court considered that the non-enforceable order for payment was an authentic instrument pursuant to Article 4(10), and thus there was no need for separate proceedings. These different understandings of the regulation led the First Instance Court of Sofia  to refer the following questions to the CJEU:

1. Is a payment order for a monetary claim under Article 410 of the Grazhdanski protsesualen kodeks (Bulgarian Civil Procedure Code; GPK) which has not yet acquired the force of res judicata an authentic instrument within the meaning of Article 4(10) of Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014?

2. If a payment order under Article 410 GPK is not an authentic instrument, must separate proceedings in accordance with Article 5(a) of Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 be initiated by application outside the proceedings under Article 410 GPK?

3. If a payment order under Article 410 GPK is an authentic instrument, must the court issue its decision within the period laid down in Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 if a provision of national law states that periods are suspended during judicial vacations?

III. “Fitting in” in the autonomous concept of authentic instrument

Firstly, AG Szpunar examined if the payment order fell within the autonomous concept of ‘authentic instrument’. Article 4(10) of the EAPO Regulation establish three prerequisites that a document has to satisfy in order to be considered an authentic instrument: (1) it has to be an authentic instrument in a Member State; (2) the authenticity relates to the signature and the content of the instrument; (3) the authenticity has been established by a public authority or other authority empowered for that purpose.

The AG stated that, whereas the first and the third prerequisites were duly satisfied, the second condition, concerning the authenticity of the content, was not fulfilled. Under Bulgarian law, when creditors apply for a payment order, they do not have to provide the court with any documentary evidence, they simply indicate the basis of their claim and the amount  due. Therefore, the judge who grants a  preservation order is merely confirming the obligation to pay a debt, but without “authenticating” the content of that obligation. Consequently, in the  AG’s view, the order for payment would not be an authentic instrument under the regulation. Obiter dictum, he considered the payment order to be a judgment under the EAPO Regulation (at para. 46).

IV. Enforceable or not enforceable, that is the question

Retaking and reformulating the original question, AG Szpunar proceeded to analyse if  titles other than authentic instruments (e.g. judgments and court settlements), are enforceable for the purposes of the EAPO Regulation (at para. 59). This question is not superfluous. As AG Szpunar remarked, the EAPO Regulation establishes two different regimes: one for creditors without a title, and one for creditors with a title. Creditors who lack a title are subject to stricter conditions when they apply for an EAPO (at para. 53). They have to prove their likelihood of success on the substance of the claim (art. 7.2), and the provision of a security becomes mandatory, unless the court decides to dispense of this requirement if it finds it inappropriate in the particular circumstances of the case (art. 12.1).  Furthermore, the court has ten days to render the decision on the EAPO application (art. 18.1), instead of the five working days when the creditor has a title (art. 18.2).

Regarding  this question, the European Commission suggested examining whether “enforceability” as a prerequisite for other titles is present under different European civil procedural instruments, particularly in regards to the European Enforcement Order Regulation (“EEO Regulation”), the Maintenance Regulation, and the Brussels I bis Regulation (at para. 51).  AG Szpunar declined  drawing any comparisons with  other regulations due to the “provisional” nature of the EAPO Regulation. These other instruments are mainly focus on facilitating the enforcement of final decisions on the substance of a  claim, thus, the concept of title would have a different understanding (at para.  51). On this basis, AG Szpunar considered  it  more appropriate to elaborate an “individualized” analysis of the EAPO Regulation and proceeded with a literal, systemic,  historical and teleological interpretation of this instrument:

• In the literal and systemic analysis, AG Szpunar found several provisions referring to the different types of title. In particular, he referred to Article 6 (jurisdiction); Article 7 (material prerequisites); Article 12 (security); Article 14 (information mechanism); and Article 18 (time-limits to render the decision on the EAPO application) (at paras. 55 – 59).  None of these provisions, except Article 14(1),  specify whether the title has to be enforceable or not. Article 14(1) is the sole provision which distinguishes between enforceable and non-enforceable titles. This provision contains the prerequisites that creditors have to satisfy if they want to request information on debtors’ bank accounts. Creditors with a non-enforceable title can apply for bank account information, but under a stricter regime than those who have an enforceable title (at para. 64). AG Szpunar considered that this is an exception, in which creditors without an enforceable title are recognized. For the other cases, these creditors would be placed under the same status as creditors without any kind of title (at para. 66).
• The historical interpretation was based on the Commission Proposal of the EAPO Regulation (at paras. 74 -79). This text still operated under an exequatur Unlike the current version of the EAPO Regulation, it systematically distinguished between two different regimes, one applied to creditors without an enforceable title or a title enforceable in the Member State of origin; another applied to creditors whose titles were already declared enforceable in the Member State of enforcement. Within the first regime, there were also differences between creditors with an enforceable title and creditors without. Creditors with an enforceable title did not have to prove the boni fumus iuris. After the Council reviewed the Commission Proposal, the exequatur was removed along with the distinction between enforceable title in the Member State of origin and in the Member State of enforcement. In AG Szpunar’s view, both “enforceable” titles would then have been subsumed into the more generic term of “title”, which did not expressly refer to the enforceability (at para. 79).
• Perhaps the strongest point of the AG’s Opinion was the teleological argument. In AG Szpunar’s view, including non-enforceable titles within the concept of title would impair the balance between the claimants’ and defendants’ rights (at para. 68). As  stated above, creditors with a title do not have to prove the existence of the boni fumus iuri. This barrier is also a prevention against fraudulent requests of an EAPO. An enlargement of the concept of title would facilitate access to the EAPO, undermining one of the protections against abusive behaviour.

Based on the above reasoning, AG Szpunar concluded that any title for the purposes of the EAPO has to be enforceable.

V. Beyond the preliminary reference: casting light on the EAPO Regulation

The preliminary reference made by the Bulgarian court is a good example of the problems that might arise out of the intersection between domestic procedural law and the uniform procedural rules of the EAPO Regulation. Indeed, observing the questions, they implicitly require a certain analysis (and interpretation) of the domestic procedural system, an inquiry that is not for the CJEU to carry out. This might also be  one the reasons why AG Szpunar opted for a more general interpretation of the EAPO Regulation, especially in the second part of the Opinion. It is in this more general overview where we can find the most interesting insights of his analysis. There are three relevant points that I would like to highlight:

• The first one is the distinction made between the EAPO Regulation and other civil procedural instruments based on its provisional nature. Indeed, this is the very first uniform provisional measure at European level, whereas the other instruments to which AG Szpunar referred are mainly focused on the recognition and enforcement decisions of the merits of a claim (with the exception of some jurisdictional rules on provisional measures). One might speculate that, eventually, the CJEU might adopt a different interpretation of the EAPO Regulation, taking into account elements that it shares with other civil procedural instruments.
• The second point is on the dividing line between the two regimes existing within the EAPO Regulation. The bulk of AG Szpunar’s analysis focused on the distinction between the two different regimes implicitly reflected in the EAPO Regulation. This question is fundamental, not only for creditors who might have to satisfy different prerequisites when they apply for an EAPO, but also for the debtors. Neither the systemic nor the literal interpretation of the regulation seem conclusive. Only in the Spanish version is it mentioned that the authentic instruments have to be enforceable (“documento público con fuerza ejecutiva”). Nonetheless, it seems to have been erroneously transposed from the EEO Regulation. The historical interpretation could lead to different conclusions. The suppression of an express reference to the “enforceability” of the title in the final version of the EAPO Regulation could also be understood as the willingness of the European legislator to include non-enforceable titles. Thus, it seems that the only decisive interpretative tool was the teleological one, which leads to the third and final point.
• The last point relates to a pro-defendant interpretation of the EAPO Regulation. By restricting the most lenient regime to those creditors with an enforceable title, the regulation indirectly protects the defendant’s position or at least, maintains the status quo between both parties. From the debtor’s perspective, the EAPO Regulation could be perceived as too “aggressive”. Some authors have labelled it as too “creditor-friendly” and this was one of the grounds raised by the United Kingdom when they refused to opt-in to the EAPO Regulation. Despite all the safeguards given to the debtor, this criticism does not come without reason. The regulation operates inaudita altera parte, so debtors can only contest the EAPO once it is already enforced. The fumus boni iuris discourages abusive and fraudulent behaviour. For that reason, a broad interpretation of “title”, encompassing those that are non-enforceable, would allow more creditors to circumvent this prerequisite. In this respect, the AG’s approach attempts to maintain the existing fragile equilibrium between both parties.

It is unlikely that in the final judgement the CJEU will reproduce AG Szpunar’s extensive analysis of the EAPO Regulation. Nevertheless, this is a good starting point for an instrument that provokes plenty of inquiries and, for the time being, has seen little application by domestic courts.  This will not be the last time that an Advocate General confronts a preliminary reference concerning the EAPO Regulation.

The Permanent Bureau is seeking a qualified person to fill a full-time position (40 hours) as Administrative Assistant (legal). For more information, see here.

As indicated in the announcement, “the successful applicant will provide administrative support in English and French, including drafting, formatting, and reviewing legal and other documents as well as day-to-day correspondence, assisting with the co-ordination and advancement of various HCCH projects, updating the HCCH’s databases, answering the telephone and door, and providing general assistance during international meetings held by the HCCH,” among other things.

The Permanent Bureau offers a two-year contract with the possibility of renewal.  This is a local recruitment.

The deadline for applications is 19 August 2019.

While this is not strictly a legal job, it may be of interest to some of our readers.

Forty-six countries have signed up to the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (“Singapore Convention on Mediation”) today. The signatory countries included Singapore, China, India, South Korea and the USA. The Convention, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2018, facilitates the cross-border enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements reached through mediation. It complements existing international dispute resolution enforcement frameworks in arbitration (the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) and litigation (the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the recently concluded Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters).  Article 1(3) of the Singapore Convention carves out settlement agreements which may fall within the scope of these other instruments to avoid an overlap. The Convention does not prescribe the mode of enforcement, but leaves it to each Contracting State to do so “in accordance with its rules of procedure and under the conditions laid down in this Convention” (Article 3(1)). Formal requirements to evidence the settlement agreement are specified although the competent authority in the state of enforcement is also granted flexibility to accept any other evidence acceptable to it (Article 4). The settlement agreement may only be refused enforcement under one of the grounds listed in Article 5. These grounds include the incapacity of a party to the settlement agreement, the settlement agreement is null and void under its applicable law and breaches of mediation standards. Only two reservations are permitted: one relating to settlement agreements to which a government entity is a party and the other relating to opt-in agreements whereby the Convention applies only to the extent that the parties to the settlement agreement have agreed to the application of the Convention (Article 8).

While mediation currently commands a much smaller slice of the international dispute resolution mode pie compared to arbitration or litigation, some countries are making concerted efforts to promote mediation. To that end, the Singapore Convention will assist to increase mediation’s popularity among litigants in international commercial disputes.

On 31 July 2019, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) extended the HCCH Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (Child Support Convention) and the HCCH Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (Choice of Court Convention) to Gibraltar in the event the Withdrawal Agreement is not ratified and approved.

As indicated in the UK Notes: “[t]he United Kingdom is responsible for the international relations of Gibraltar and wishes to ensure that Gibraltar continues to be covered by the Agreement[s] in the event that the Withdrawal Agreement is not approved.” If the Withdrawal Agreement is indeed signed, ratified and approved by the UK and the European Union, the UK will withdraw its instrument of ratification to the Child Support Convention and its instrument of accession to the Choice of Court Convention and its declarations of territorial extent (incl. reservations) to Gibraltar. The Depositary of the HCCH Conventions is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

The UK has made a number of declarations and reservations under these Conventions for Gibraltar. For more information, please click here (Child Support Convention) and here (Choice of Court Convention).

The European Union, as a Regional Economic Integration Organisation, approved both the Child Support Convention and the Choice of Court Convention on 9 April 2014 and 11 June 2015, respectively.

The latest issue of the Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales (REEI), the on-line open-access journal of the Association of Spanish Professors of international law and international relations, is out (issue 37, 2019).

Some of the articles in this issue address topics in the area of private international law.

All articles are in Spanish but come with an abstract in English.

The latest issue of RabelsZ has just been released. It contains the following articles (English abstracts are available only for articles in German):

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, The Common Law in Private Dispute Resolution’s Shadow, pp. 487 et seq

Fleischer, Holger and Horn, Konstantin, Berühmte Gesellschaftsverträge unter dem Brennglas: Das Standard Oil Trust Agreement von 1882 (A Closer Look at Prominent Corporate Charters: The Standard Oil Trust Agreement of 1882), pp. 507 et seq

The charter shapes the life of the corporation. This crucial role notwithstanding, corporate contracts have received but scarce scholarly attention. Apart from a few exceptions, little is known about the charters of notable business entities. A new research program at the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg has set out to fill that void. The first test case, which is explored in this paper, is the Standard Oil Trust Agreement of 1882 – a seminal governance framework for corporate groups that spread quickly through different industries and became eponymous for the anti-trust legislation of the United States. The remarkable success of this agreement illustrates how innovative legal design can be just as vital to the survival and success of a company as managerial or technical innovation.

Hille, Christian Peter, Die Legitimation des Markenschutzes aus ökonomischer und juristischer Sicht- Ein Beitrag insbesondere zur Search Cost Theory des US-Markenrechts (Justifying Trademark Protection – An Economic and Legal Approach with Special Reference to the Search Cost Theory of US Trademark Law), pp. 544 et seq

Whereas trademark protection in the 19th century was justified by the theory of natural law, such concepts are generally considered to be outdated in secular law, even if the underlying values are still embedded in positive law. The law and economics approach, however, is focused solely on allocative efficiency as defined by Pareto optimality and the Coase theorem. US theory justifies trademark protection with the dual rationales of reducing consumer search costs and creating an incentive to improve the quality of products. While some authors criticize this view, they mostly do not propose a different approach, instead arguing that the search cost theory neglects certain social costs. Still, whereas the qualification of a trademark as a public good leads to completely different conclusions, it has been without significant influence on legal theory. Based on the search cost theory, the efficiency of German trademark law may be enhanced, e.g. by requiring a bona fide intention to use the trademark and by obliging the trademark owner to produce evidence of use. Requiring quality control in cases where a license is granted would also improve efficiency, and a mark should be invalidated if the sign becomes generic without this development being attributable to the owner. However, in order to evaluate the search costs as well as other social costs related to the trademark system, further research needs to be conducted with respect to the modes of action of trademarks (in particular in the context of famous trademarks and new technologies). The economic analysis of trademark law and the associated findings may be considered by judges in their interpretation of the law as long as their rulings do not serve to amend the statutory provisions establishing German trademark law (or the applicable European directives). Amendments of this nature would need to be carried out by lawmakers (see Art. 20 para. 3 of the German Constitution).

Makowsky, Mark, Die „Minderjährigenehe“ im deutschen IPR- Ein Beitrag zur Dogmatik des neuen Art. 13 Abs. 3 EGBGB (The “Marriage of Minors” in German Private International Law – The Legal Structure of the New Article 13 para. 3 EGBGB), pp. 577 et seq

The migration crisis has sparked a debate on how to deal with minor migrants who married in their home country or during their flight to Europe. In response to this problem, in 2017 the German legislature passed the Act Combatting Child Marriage. The paper analyses the new and highly controversial conflict-of-laws rules. Pursuant to the public policy clause of Art. 13 para. 3 EGBGB, a marriage is invalid under German law if a fiancé was under the age of 16 at the time of the marriage. If a fiancé had already turned 16 by the time of the marriage but was not yet 18, the marriage has to be annulled pursuant to German law. This strict approach allows for only few exceptions. The invalidity rule has a limited temporal scope and is not applicable when the minor fiancé had already turned 18 by the time of the law’s entry into force. Another exception to the invalidity rule exists if the marriage was “led” by the spouses up until the minor spouse’s reaching the age of majority and if no spouse had his or her habitual residence in Germany during the time between the marriage and the minor spouse’s attaining the age of majority. Due to the limited scope of these exception clauses, most child marriages are rendered void in Germany. This leads to the question whether the invalid marriage can nonetheless have some legal consequences, especially when the spouses relied on its validity. The exception clauses of the annulment rule are similarly very limited. An annulment is ruled out only if the minor spouse has turned 18 and wants to uphold the marriage or if the annulment would constitute an undue hardship for him or her. It is disputed whether this is in conformity with European law because the annulment rule also applies to marriages which were contracted and registered in another EU Member State. The paper argues that the law can be interpreted in accordance with Art. 21 TFEU.

Biemans, Jan, and Schreurs, Sits, Insolvent Cross-Border Estates of Deceased Persons – Concurrence of the Succession and Recast Insolvency Regulations, pp. 612 et seq

Infantino, Marta, and Zervogianni, Eleni, Unravelling Causation in European Tort Laws- Three Commonplaces through the Lens of Comparative Law, pp. 647 et seq

Many thanks to Gustavo Cerqueira for this post:

The Société de législation comparée and the International Commission on Civil Status organize in partnership with the universities of Strasbourg and Reims an international symposium dedicated to the establishment of the content of foreign law and the need to consider appropriate instruments for cooperation.
The importance of the subject is major. On the one hand, the place nowadays given to foreign law in the settlement of disputes is growing. On the other hand, the intensified role of the various legal professions in the application of foreign law is indisputable. While judges and civil registrars were more traditionally exposed to such an office, nowadays it is notaries and lawyers in their dual role of advising and drafting documents who are called upon to take into account or implement foreign law.
In this context, while European Union law is often at the root of the involvement of these various actors in the application of foreign law, another, more recent phenomenon further increases the occurrences of how the law is handled: the extensive jurisdictional competition between European States as a result of Brexit. Indeed, Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and other capitals establish courts and chambers specializing in international litigation and the application of foreign law.
The stakes are high. The search for appropriate cooperation instruments for a good knowledge of foreign law is necessary in the face of rapidly evolving national laws and case law. These changes, which are specific to each system, therefore reinforce the need for access to reliable foreign law content in order to guarantee legal certainty for litigants, as well as to avoid the civil liability of legal service providers and even fraud in the manipulation of foreign solutions.
The research envisaged takes place in an environment in which there are formal and informal cooperation mechanisms whose effectiveness is only partial in view of the complexity of the phenomena that covers the application of foreign law. Indeed, they were designed to deal with a foreign law that is supposed to be stable and not plural in its sources. These mechanisms, which are not very visible, are also unknown by the practitioners themselves. The current discussions at European (EU) and international level (Hague Conference) attest to the urgent need to consider responses in this area through one or more relevant and effective instruments.
This is the purpose of the symposium. After having established a large inventory, it will be necessary to discuss solutions adapted to the different requirements revealed by both the type of situation to be dealt with and the type of professional involved.
The symposium will be held on 28 November 2019 at the French Court of Cassation (Chambre Criminelle, 5, Quai de l’Horloge, 75001 – Paris).

Registration: emmanuelle.bouvier@legiscompare.com

Conference Directors:
Dr. Gustavo Cerqueira, Agrégé des Facultés de droit, University of Reims (France)
Dr. Nicolas Nord, Deputy Secretary General of the ICCS, Senior Lecturer at the University of Strasbourg (France)

The last issue of the Revue Critique de Droit International Privé will shortly be released. This is a special edition composed of four articles on Brexit. It also contains several case notes, inter alia, a commentary by Horatia Muir Watt on Vedanta v Lungowe, major decision on the parent company’s duty of care and private international law, rendered by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom on 10 April 2019 (see also here).

The first article is authored by Paul James Cardwell (“Naviguer en eaux inconnues. Les défis rencontrés par la recherche juridique au Royaume-Uni à l’heure du Brexit”). The abstract reads as follows: “The consequences of the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union (Brexit) remain uncertain still. For legal scholars, Brexit has posed a series of complex legal questions, some of which have not been considered for over 40 years, if at all. This article aims to consider some of the main questions that have arisen during the Brexit process, and some of the potential responses. The article also evaluates the challenges that Brexit represents for researchers and teachers in the various sub-disciplines within legal scholarship, including the fast-paced, ever changing legal landscape. Although only a small number of the questions and challenges can be considered here, it goes without say that Brexit will undoubtedly have significant consequences for the UK, the EU and its Member States as well as for the systems of global governance, in which private international lawyers are inherently linked”.

The second article (“Le Brexit et les conventions de La Haye”) is written by Hans van Loon. The abstract reads as follows: “There are two possible scenarios at present for the immediate future of private international law in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union of Twenty-seven in the event of Brexit. Under the first, the “Withdrawal Agreement” approved by the European Council on 25th November 2018 enters into force; under the second (the “no-deal” scenario) the status quo will end abruptly on 31st October 2019. Both of these hypotheses have important and complex implications. Under the Withdrawal agreement, a transition period is organised and when this period ends, specific transitory provisions take over. In such a regime, the law issuing from the conventions has a significant role to play. But in the event of a no-deal Brexit, all the treaties establishing, and concluded by, the European Union, and, as a result, European Union secondary law, including the regulations on private international law cease immediately to apply to the United Kingdom. The Hague conventions, including the new convention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters will fill this gap to a large extent. However, the consequences may nevertheless be brutal for citizens, and in order to mitigate these, the transitory provisions of the Withdrawal agreement should be applied here by analogy”.

The third article, written by Uglješa Grušic (“L’effet du Brexit sur le droit international privé du travail”), describes the likely effect of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on the private international law of employment. “More specifically, it deals with the likely effect of Brexit on employment law, the law of international jurisdiction in employment matters and the law on choice of law for employment matters in the United Kingdom and the European Union, with particular emphasis on private international law in England”.

The fourth article is authored by Louise Merrett (“La reconnaissance et l’exécution en Angleterre des jugements venant des États de l’Union européenne, post-Brexit”). It describes the likely effect of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on the recognition and enforcement of judgments from EU Members States: “If the UK leaves the European Union without any new agreement in place allowing for mutual recognition and enforcement, the recognition and enforcement of judgments from EU Members States will prima facie only be possible under the existing common law rules. This article will describe the common law rules and draw attention to the key differences between them and the rules which currently apply to the enforcement of judgments under the Brussels I Regulation recast”.

A full table of contents is available here.

On 24 July 2019 Nicaragua joined the HCCH Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Service Convention). For more information, click here.

In accordance with Article 28 of the Service Convention, there is a six-month objecting period which will end for Nicaragua on 25 January 2020. If a Contracting State objects, then the Convention will not enter into force at all for Nicaragua. However, an objection has never been made under this Article in practice.

In the absence of any objection, the Service Convention will enter into force for Nicaragua on 1 February 2020.

The latest State to join was Brazil (EIF: 1 June 2019), which signals a growing interest in this Convention in the Latin American region.

As we have reported earlier, the final conference for the EU-funded IC2BE project will take place in Antwerp on 21 and 22 November 2019.

We are happy to anounce that registration is now open. See here for the programme and free registration (only the dinner is to be paid by attendees). Antwerp is close to Brussels and Amsterdam and can easily be reached by train from either of those cities. There are many hotels providing affordable accommodation.

The conference will discuss the application of the European Enforcement Order (805/2004), European Payment Order (1896/2006), the European Small Claims Procedure (861/2007) and Account Preservation Order (655/2014) in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain, as well as by the Court of Justice of the EU.

The case law database of the IC2BE project is available here (not yet complete).

National seminars will also take place in the participating countries. See here for the dates.