Agrégateur de flux

At its fifty-second session, in 2019, UNCITRAL considered a proposal from the European Union on applicable law in insolvency proceedings (A_CN.9_995_E).

UNCITRAL agreed on the importance of the topic, which complemented the significant work already done by UNCITRAL in the area of insolvency law, in particular cross-border insolvency.

However, UNCITRAL also observed that the subject matter was potentially complex and required a high level of expertise in various subjects of private international law, as well as on choice of law in areas such as contract law, property law, corporate law, securities and banking and other areas on which it had not worked recently. Therefore, UNCITRAL agreed that it was essential to delineate carefully the scope and nature of the work that it could undertake.

UNCITRAL requested the Secretariat to organize a colloquium, in cooperation with other relevant international organizations, with a view to submitting concrete proposals for UNCITRAL’s possible future work on such topic, for consideration by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2020. The Colloquium is to be conducted on an informal basis, that is, not as an intergovernmental group.

The Colloquium was to be held in New York on 15 May 2020 (see the draft programme here), in cooperation with the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

Due to the postponement of the Working Group V session originally scheduled for 11-14 May 2020, the Colloquium on Applicable Law in Insolvency Proceedings is also postponed. Information on the new date will be communicated by the UNCITRAL Secretariat when possible.

AG Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered today his opinion in case C‑620/18 (Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union), which is about the relationship between Rome I and Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. The opinion is available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version :

“VIII. Cinquième moyen : violation du principe de sécurité juridique en conséquence de l’incompatibilité de la directive 2018/957 avec le règlement Rome I

A. Position des parties

189. Le cinquième moyen comporte en réalité deux branches distinctes, sans grand rapport entre elles.

‐      D’une part, le gouvernement hongrois soutient que la directive 2018/957 est contraire au règlement Rome I ainsi qu’aux principes de sécurité juridique et de clarté normative, en ce qu’elle modifie l’application de ce règlement sans en altérer le libellé, ce qui engendre une incertitude juridique considérable quant à sa bonne application.

[…]

190. La Commission, le Conseil, le Parlement européen et les gouvernements des États membres intervenus à la procédure estiment que ce cinquième moyen n’est pas fondé.

B. Appréciation de la première branche du cinquième moyen : relation entre la directive 2018/957 et le règlement Rome I

191. L’article 8, paragraphe 1, du règlement Rome I, établit la règle générale de conflit de lois applicable aux contrats individuels de travail, qui désigne la loi choisie par les parties (conformément aux conditions que ledit règlement précise par ailleurs). À défaut d’un tel choix, « le contrat individuel de travail est régi par la loi du pays dans lequel ou, à défaut, à partir duquel le travailleur, en exécution du contrat, accomplit habituellement son travail. Le pays dans lequel le travail est habituellement accompli n’est pas réputé changer lorsque le travailleur accomplit son travail de façon temporaire dans un autre pays » (article 8, paragraphe 2).

192. L’article 23 du règlement Rome I prévoit une exception à l’applicabilité des règles de conflit de lois établies par ce dernier : si les dispositions du droit de l’Union fixent des règles relatives à la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles dans certaines matières, ces règles ont priorité (115)

193. Les règles générales du règlement Rome I relatives au choix de la loi applicable cèdent donc le pas aux règles spéciales prévues à cet égard dans des dispositions spécifiques du droit de l’Union (116).

194. Contrairement à ce qu’avance le gouvernement hongrois, je suis d’avis que l’article 3, paragraphe 1, (pour les travailleurs détachés ordinaires) et le nouvel article 3, paragraphe 1 bis (pour les travailleurs détachés pour une longue durée) de la directive 96/71 constituent des règles spéciales de conflit de lois (117), dont l’application doit être combinée avec celle du règlement Rome I (118).

195. Ces deux dispositions de la directive 96/71, qui s’ajoutent à la loi applicable en vertu des règles ordinaires de conflit de lois, imposent les dispositions suivantes du droit de l’État d’accueil :

‐      Les travailleurs détachés ordinaires se voient imposer les dispositions relatives aux conditions (de travail et de protection de la sécurité et de la santé des travailleurs) détaillées dans la liste exhaustive établie à l’article 3, paragraphe 1 ;

‐      Les travailleurs détachés de longue durée se voient imposer, outre les conditions susmentionnées, toutes les autres règles de l’État d’accueil, comme indiqué ci‑dessus (article 3, paragraphe 1 bis).

196. Comme l’indique le Conseil dans ses observations, le processus d’élaboration du règlement Rome I prouve que son article 23 couvre l’exception prévue par la directive 96/71, car la proposition de la Commission contenait en annexe une liste de règles spéciales établies dans d’autres dispositions du droit de l’Union, parmi lesquelles figuraient celles de la directive 96/71 (119).

197. Le considérant 11 de la directive 96/71 confirme cette affirmation, en ce qu’il expose que la convention de Rome, du 19 juin 1980, sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles (remplacée par le règlement Rome I) « ne préjuge pas l’application des dispositions qui, dans des matières particulières, règlent les conflits de lois en matière d’obligations contractuelles et qui sont ou seront contenues dans les actes émanant des institutions des Communautés européennes ou dans des législations nationales harmonisées en exécution de ces actes ».

198. Le considérant 40 du règlement Rome I, qui expose que « [t]outefois, le présent règlement n’exclut pas la possibilité d’insérer des règles de conflit de lois en matière d’obligations contractuelles dans les dispositions de droit communautaire concernant des matières particulières », conduit à la même conclusion.

199. Contrairement à la thèse de la Hongrie, le principe de sécurité juridique n’exige donc pas que la modification de la directive 96/71 opérée par la directive 2018/957 soit accompagnée d’une modification du règlement Rome I.

200. L’article 23 de ce règlement permet aux règles spéciales de la directive 96/71 de coexister avec les règles générales de son article 8 en ce qui concerne les contrats des travailleurs détachés. La relation entre les deux types de règles est suffisamment claire, prévisible et précise et, par conséquent, respecte à suffisance le principe de sécurité juridique (120).

201. Cette conclusion n’est pas contredite, comme le prétend la Hongrie, par le fait que le nouvel article 3, paragraphe 1 bis, troisième alinéa, de la directive 96/71, prévoie une règle anti-fraude pour les cas de détachement de remplacement que j’ai précédemment évoqués (121). Dans ce cas, le contrat de chaque travailleur concerné par le remplacement peut être soumis à la loi d’un pays différent et cette disposition ne fait qu’ajouter une condition visant à prévenir une utilisation frauduleuse de la relation entre la directive 96/71 et le règlement Rome I”.

Source : here

In another opinion delivered on the same day (case C‑626/18, Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, available here), the same AG makes a renvoi to the above paragraphs 191 to 200 in fn. 33 in the following:

“83. Je ne partage pas non plus l’avis du gouvernement polonais lorsqu’il juge le nouveau régime des travailleurs détachés pour une longue durée incompatible avec l’article 9 du règlement Rome I.

84. Cet article fait référence à « l’application des lois de police du juge saisi », mais le nouvel article 3, paragraphe 1 bis, de la directive 96/71 n’est pas une loi de ce type.

85. La relation entre cette directive et le règlement Rome I est définie par l’article 8 (« Contrats individuels de travail ») et l’article 23 (« Relation avec d’autres dispositions du droit communautaire ») de ce dernier (33) ».

The Pax Moot went totally online this year (OK, no surprises there). The case concerns an employment dispute and environmental damage due to mining in an unidentified African country (see the paxmoot website). It raises various issues of jurisdiction, applicable law, freezing orders, parallel proceedings and company structures.

Over the past two days the preliminary rounds took place on an online platform hosted by the University of Antwerp. The Universities of Cologne, Erasmus Rotterdam, Maastricht and Singapore Management University secured places in the semi-finals.

Please join us on 29 May at the links below for the semi-finals and finals. All welcome!

Semi-finals 1, 10.00 – 11.30 CEST: https://eu.bbcollab.com/guest/4a86f539e78642859e773e301ddbb8dd

University of Cologne v. Erasmus University Rotterdam

Judges: Ilse COUWENBERG, Daniel GIRSBERGER and Matthias WELLER

Semi-finals 2, 10.00 – 11.30 CEST: https://eu.bbcollab.com/guest/2d4c41243bf44fdbb3c175b15d0f30cf

Singapore Management University v. Maastricht University

Judges: Hans VAN HOUTTE, María ALVÁREZ TORNÉ and Michael WILDERSPIN

Finals, 13:30-15:00: https://eu.bbcollab.com/guest/b85996765dce4a4db29ad03e4a9b235f

13:30 Welcome words, by Frederik SWENNEN, Dean of the Law Faculty, University of Antwerp

Pleadings

Judges: Horatia MUIR WATT, Alex LAYTON, Hans VAN LOON

Approx. 15:30 Awards and Closing Ceremony

• A few words about the Case, by Alexander LAYTON QC
• A few words on behalf of the European Commission, DG Justice, Civil Unit, by Pia LINDHOLM
• Official results of the 2020 Rounds:
  • Best written submissions, by Horatia MUIR WATT, Competition Initiator and Member of the PAX Team
  • Best oralist, by Daniel CHAN, Executive Secretary of the PAX Team
  • Winner of the 2020 Asser Round, PAX Competition, by Horatia MUIR WATT
• Farewell words, by Hans van LOON

The Moot Court Competition is organised by the University of Antwerp and the T.M.C. Asser Instituut, as part of the research project on ‘Regulation BIa: a standard for free circulation of judgments and mutual trust in the EU (JUDGTRUST)’, funded by the European Union, DG Justice (JUST-JCOO-AG-2017), in cooperation with Sciences Po Law School.

 

The Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg is starting a new virtual workshop series in private international law. The first speaker, Mathias Lehmann from Bonn University, will present (in German) on Tuesday, June 2, at 11:00-12:30 via zoom. His topic: Covid-19 and Private International Law (see also here and here). Open to everyone, including doctoral and predoctoral students!

More information (in German) and the link for signing up are here.

Bail rural

Bail commercial

Sécurité sociale

Bail commercial

Propriété immobilière

Habitation à loyer modéré

One does not often see Nigeria sue Shell. Federal Republic of Nigeria v Royal Dutch Shell Plc & Anor [2020] EWHC 1315 (Comm) engages Article 29 Brussels Ia’s lis alibi pendens rule in a period in which (see other posts on the blog) the High Court intensely entertained that section of Brussels Ia. Royal Dutch Shell Plc (RDS) is the anchor defendant for the other EU-domiciled defendants. Quite a few of the defendants are not domiciled in the EU.

The case concerns Nigerian allegations that monies paid by it under an earlier settlement following alleged expropriation, which had led to bilateral investment treaty arbitration under ICSID rules, had been channeled to pay bribes. Nigeria is pursuing the case in the criminal courts in Italy, too.

Nigeria therefore are already pursuing claims in Italy to obtain financial relief against 4 of the defendants including the anchor defendant. Defendants contend that those claims are the same claims as the English ones and that the court should decline jurisdiction in respect of those claims pursuant to A29 BIa. Defendants then further contend that, if the court so declines jurisdiction over the claims against RDS and Eni SpA, the entire proceedings should be dismissed. This is because RDS is the ‘anchor defendant’ under A8(1) BIa in the case of three of the EU-domiciled defendants and under English CPR rules against the other defendants. In the alternative to the application under Article 29, Defendants seek a stay of the proceedings under A30 BIa (related cases) or, in the further alternative as a matter of case management, pending a final determination, including all appeals, of the claim that the FRN has brought in Italy.

Butcher J refers at 41 to the UKSC in The Alexandros, and to Rix J in Glencore International AG v Shell International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd, at 110: ‘broadly speaking, the triple requirement of same parties, same cause and same objet entails that it is only in relatively straightforward situations that art [29] bites, and, it may be said, is intended to bite. After all, art [30] is available, with its more flexible discretionary power to stay, in the case of ‘related proceedings’ which need not involve the triple requirement of art [29]. There is no need, therefore, as it seems to me, to strain to fit a case into art [29].’

Same parties. Per CJEU The Tatry A29 applies to the extent to which the parties before the courts second seised are parties to the action previously commenced. Butcher J correctly holds that the fact that there may be other parties to the second action does not prevent this. Nigeria nevertheless argue that the involvement of the Italian Public Prosecutor in the Italian case, and not in the English case, and its crucial role in the Italian proceedings, means that the proceedings nevertheless are not between the ‘same parties’. Defendants call upon CJEU C-523/14 Aertssen to counter this: there BE and NL proceedings were considered to be caught by A29 even though the BE proceedings concerned criminal proceedings and the Dutch did not.

At 47 Butcher J holds that the prosecutor is not a ‘party’ in the A29 sense and that even it were, it is nevertheless clear from The Tatry that there does not have to be complete identity of the parties to the two proceedings for Article 29 to be applicable. (Ditto Leech J in Awendale v Pixis).

Same cause of action. Nigeria accept that there is no material difference in the facts at issue in the two proceedings, however contends that the legal basis of its claim in England is different.

Butcher J refers to Lord Clarke in The Alexandros, that in order to consider same cause of action, one must look ‘at the basic facts (whether in dispute or not) and the basic claimed rights and obligations of the parties to see if there is coincidence between them in the actions in different countries, making due allowance for the specific form that proceedings may take in one national court with different classifications of rights and obligations from those in a different national court’. Doing that, at 55 he holds that these basic claimed rights in the IT and EN proceedings, which he characterises as being the right not to be adversely affected by conduct of RDS which involves or facilitates the bribery and corruption of the FRN’s ministers and agents, and the right to redress if there is such bribery and corruption’, are the same.

That seems to me an approach which is overly reliant on the similarity of underlying facts. (At 70, obiter, Butcher J splits the claims and suggests he would have held on a narrower similarity of cause of action for some claims and not the others, had he held otherwise on ‘same cause of action’; and at 80 that he would have ordered a stay under Article 30 or on case management grounds on the remainder of the action).

Same object. Nigeria contend that its present proceedings do not have the same objet as the civil claim in the Italian proceedings. It contends that the only claim made in the Italian proceedings is for monetary damages, while in the English action claims are also made of a declaration of entitlement to rescind the April 2011 Agreements, other declaratory relief, an account of profits and tracing remedies.

Butcher J disagrees. Per Lord Clarke in The Alexandros, he holds that to have the same object, the proceedings must have the ‘same end in view’, per CJEU Aertssen at 45 interpreted ‘broadly’. At 61; ‘that ‘end in view’ is to obtain redress for RDS’s alleged responsibility for bribery and corruption…. Further, it is apparent that a key part of the redress claimed in the English proceedings is monetary compensation, which is the (only) relief claimed in the Italian proceedings. On that basis I consider that the two sets of proceedings do have the same objet.’

That the English action also seeks to rescind the original 2011 agreements is immaterial, he finds, for RDS were not even part to those proceedings. Moreover, that aim included in the English action serves to support the argument that if the two sets of proceedings go ahead, (at 64) ‘there would be the possibility of the type of inconsistent decisions which Article 29 is aimed at avoiding’. ‘If the English proceedings were regarded as involving a significantly different claim, namely one relating to rescission, and could go ahead, that would give rise to the possibility of a judgment in one awarding damages on the basis of the validity of the April 2011 Agreements and the other finding that those Agreements were capable of rescission. That would appear to me to be a situation of where there is effectively a ‘mirror image’ of the case in one jurisdiction in the other,..’

At 66 ff Butcher J adopts the to my mind correct view on the application of A29 to proceedings with more than one ‘objet’: one does not look at all claims holistically, one has to adopt a claim by claim approach, in line with CJEU The Tatry. At 68: ‘Difficulties which might otherwise arise from the fragmentation of proceedings can usually be addressed by reference to Article 30..’

At 71 he then concludes that the stay must be granted, and that he has no discretion not to do so once he finds that the conditions of A29 are fulfilled. He also holds that with the case against the anchor defendant stayed, A8(1) falls away. He appreciates at 72 that this may expose Nigeria to limitation issues in the Italian proceedings, however those are of their own making for they were under no obligation to sue in Italy.

 

At 74 ff Article 30 is considered obiter, and Butcher J says he would have stayed under A29. At 77 he notes the continuing debate on the difference at the Court of Appeal between Privatbank and Euroeco. At 75(2) he summarises the distinction rather helpfully as

‘In the Kolomoisky case, it was decided that the word ‘expedient’ in the phrase ‘it is expedient to hear and determine them together’ which appears in Article 28.3 of the Lugano Convention (as it does in Article 30.3 of the Regulation), is more akin to ‘desirable’ that the actions ‘should’ be heard together, than to ‘practicable or possible’ that the actions ‘can’ be heard together: paras. [182]-[192]. In the Euroeco Fuels case, having referred to the Kolomoisky case, the Court of Appeal nevertheless appears to have proceeded on the basis that the court had no discretion to order a stay under Article 30 when there was no real possibility of the two claims being heard together in the same foreign court’

At 75(5) he then without much ado posits that

‘In any event, even if not under Article 30, there should be a stay under the Court’s case management powers, and in particular pursuant to s. 49(3) Senior Courts Act 1981 and CPR 3.1(2)(f). Such a stay would not, in my judgment, be inconsistent with the Regulation, and is required to further the Overriding Objective in the sense of saving expense, ensuring that cases are dealt with expeditiously and fairly, and allotting to any particular case an appropriate share of the Court’s resources. Given that the Italian proceedings are well advanced, and that after the determination of the Italian proceedings English proceedings may well either be unnecessary or curtailed in scope, there appear good grounds to consider that a stay of the English proceedings will result in savings in costs and time, including judicial time.’

Whether such case-management stay under CPR 3.1(2)(f) is at all compatible with the Regulation in claims involving EU domicileds, outside the context of Articles 29-34 is of course contested and, following Owusu, in my view improbable.

Most important lis alibi pendens considerations at the High Court these days.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law – 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5.

 

More lis alibi pendens.
Article 29/30 Brussels IA. All English claims stayed under Article 29, in favour of pending Italian proceedings. https://t.co/8EaGXfsLWP

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 22, 2020

CK Telecoms UK Investments / Commission
Concurrence
Le Tribunal de l’Union européenne annule la décision de la Commission refusant le projet de rachat de Telefónica UK par Hutchison 3G UK dans le secteur du marché de la téléphonie mobile

Conseil / K. Chrysostomides & Co. e.a.
Droit institutionnel
Selon l’avocat général Pitruzzella, les juridictions de l’Union ne sont pas compétentes pour connaître des recours en indemnité formés contre l’Eurogroupe