Droit international général

It has already been announced on this blog that the 77th Biennial Conference of the International Law Association will take place from 7 to 11 August 2016 in Johannesburg, South Africa.

This year’s main topic will be ‘International Law and State Practice: Is there a North/South Divide?’ 

Further information and programme details are available at the official conference website.

This post is meant to remind our readers that early-bird registration ends on 29 February 2016. We are looking forward to seeing many of you in Johannesburg, so don‘t forget to register!

In Case C-605/14, Komu v Komu, the CJEU stuck to its classic application of the rule of Article 22(1) Brussels I (now Article 24(1) Brussels Recast). This Article prescribes exclusive jurisdiction for (among others) proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property. Article 25 adds that where a court of a Member State is seised of a claim which is principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction. (emphasis added).

Mr Pekka Komu, Ms Jelena Komu, Ms Ritva Komu, Ms Virpi Komu and Ms Hanna Ruotsalainen are domiciled in Finland and are co-owners of a house situated in Torrevieja (Spain), the first three each with a 25% share and the other two each with a 12.5% share. In addition, Ms Ritva Komu has a right of use, registered in the Spanish Land Register, over the shares held by Ms Virpi Komu and Ms Hanna Ruotsalainen.Wishing to realise the interests that they hold in both properties, and in the absence of agreement on the termination of the relationship of co-ownership, Ms Ritva Komu, Ms Virpi Komu and Ms Ruotsalainen brought an action before the District Court, South Savo, Finland for an order appointing a lawyer to sell the properties and fixing a minimum price for each of the properties. The courts obliged in first instance and queried the extent of Article 22’s rule in appeal.

Co-ownership and rights of use, one assumes, result from an inheritance.

The CJEU calls upon classic case-law, including most recently Weber. At 30 ff it recalls the ‘considerations of sound administration of justice which underlie the first paragraph of Article 22(1) …’ and ‘also support such exclusive jurisdiction in the case of an action intended to terminate the co-ownership of immovable property, as that in the main proceedings.’:

The transfer of the right of ownership in the properties at issue in the main proceedings will entail the taking into account of situations of fact and law relating to the linking factor as laid down in the first paragraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, namely the place where those properties are situated. The same applies, in particular, to the fact that the rights of ownership in the properties and the rights of use encumbering those rights are the subject of entries in the Spanish Land Register in accordance with Spanish law, the fact that rules governing the sale, by auction where appropriate, of those properties are those of the Member State in which they are situated, and the fact that, in the case of disagreement, the obtaining of evidence will be facilitated by proximity to the locus rei sitae. The Court has already held that disputes concerning rights in rem in immovable property, in particular, must generally be decided by applying the rules of the State in which the property is situated, and the disputes which frequently arise require checks, inquiries and expert assessments which have to be carried out there.

A sound finding given precedent. However I continue to think it questionable whether these reasons, solid as they may have been in 1968, make much sense in current society. It may be more comfortable to have the case heard in Spain for the reasons set out by the Court. But essential? Humankind can perform transcontinental robot-assisted remote telesurgery. But it cannot, it seems, consult the Spanish land registry from a court in Finland. I would suggest it is time to adapt Article 24 in a future amendment of the Regulation.

Geert.

Il principio dell’armonia delle decisioni civili e commerciali nello spazio giudiziario europeo, a cura di Giacomo Biagioni, Giappichelli, 2015, pp. XII+196, ISBN 9788892100282, Euro 24.

[Abstract] Muovendo dalla premessa che il riconoscimento reciproco e la libera circolazione dei provvedimenti giurisdizionali costituiscono obiettivi generali degli strumenti di cooperazione giudiziaria civile che possono essere adottati sulla base dell’art. 81 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea, il volume mira ad esaminare in quale misura e sotto quali profili la necessità di garantire il valore dell’armonia tra le decisioni in materia civile e commerciale venga in rilievo nell’interpretazione e nell’applicazione delle norme dell’Unione relative alla competenza giurisdizionale, al coordinamento delle azioni civili nello spazio e all’efficacia delle decisioni. L’indagine è condotta su due piani distinti: per un verso, essa attiene a profili di carattere più generale immanenti all’intero àmbito della cooperazione giudiziaria civile dell’Unione europea; per altro verso, essa si concentra sul sistema c.d. “Bruxelles I”, che ha costituito in passato e continua a costituire un laboratorio entro il quale vengono elaborate soluzioni, normative e giurisprudenziali, spesso destinate ad essere poi estese ad altri strumenti UE in materia di cooperazione giudiziaria civile. Questo metodo di indagine impone sia di tener conto delle molteplici innovazioni conseguenti all’adozione e all’entrata in vigore del regolamento UE n. 1215/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio; sia dei progressivi sviluppi della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea, nella quale nel corso degli anni il principio di armonia delle decisioni, pur con talune inevitabili oscillazioni, si è venuto enucleando nelle sue caratteristiche di principio generale della cooperazione giudiziaria civile tra gli Stati membri.

Il volume raccoglie, fra gli altri, contributi di Giacomo Biagioni, Elena D’alessandro, Antonio Leandro, Paola Piroddi, Francesco Salerno e Chiara Tuo. Il sommario dell’opera può leggersi qui.

Altre informazioni a questo indirizzo.

È da poco uscito il fascicolo invernale dell’annata 2015 di Int’l Lis – Corriere trimestrale della litigation internazionale, diretto da Claudio Consolo.

Il fascicolo contiene una nota di Annalisa Ciampi alla sentenza Taricco della Corte di giustizia (8 settembre 2015, causa C-105/14), dal titolo Il caso Taricco impone la disapplicazione delle garanzie della prescrizione: un problema di rapporti fra diritto dell’UE e diritto nazionale e di tutela dei diritti fondamentali, non solo di diritto processuale internazionale.

Viene poi proposto un commento di Marco De Cristofaro a Cassazione, sez. I, 4 giugno 2015, n. 11564, intitolato Il private enforcement antitrust ed il ruolo centrale della disciplina processuale, di nuovo conio legislativo o di nuova concezione giurisprudenziale.

La sezione Antologia ospita la seconda parte di uno scritto di Neil Andrews sulle più recenti innovazioni del contract law inglese.

Chiudono il fascicolo il caso del trimestre di Luca Penasa, relativo al caso Gazprom, deciso dalla Corte di giustizia (13 maggio 2015, causa C-536/13), e la recensione di Albert Henke della seconda edizione del libro di Richard Fentiman dedicato alla International Commercial Litigation.

Maggiori informazioni disponibili a questo indirizzo.

A great example of internal forum shopping and the application of forum non conveniens in the Court of Appeal. (Just before Christmas. I am still hacking away at my end-of-year queue).

Claimants claim damages for personal injuries they alleged they sustained in accidents in Scotland as a result of the negligence and/or breach of statutory duty of the defendants. The claims were issued in the Northampton County Court. The registered offices of the defendants are situated in England and Wales. Both claimants are domiciled in Scotland. Liability has been admitted in the case of Cook, but denied in the case of McNeil.  Since the claims related to accidents in Scotland, the claims were allocated to Carlisle County Court, which is the court geographically closest to Scotland. The claims were struck out on forum non conveniens grounds, with Scotland being the appropriate forum.

The most important issue that arises on these appeals (and the reason why Tomlinson LJ gave permission for a second appeal) is whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens can apply in a purely domestic context where the competing jurisdictions are England and Scotland. Put simply, the question is: does the English court have the power in such a case to stay or strike out a claim on the ground that the natural and more appropriate forum is Scotland?

As Floyd MR notes (at 7) it is surprising that there was no authority on this point.

He correctly holds that the ‘international element’ required for the Brussels I regime to apply, as it did in Owusu and Maletic  (but also Lindner) is absent in the case at issue. There is nothing in the facts which renders the case international in the Brussels I (Recast) sense.  Relevant precedent which did have some calling was Kleinwort Benson, Case C-346/93, in which the CJEU refused to interpret the (then) Brussels Convention in a purely domestic UK situation, even if the internal UK rules were modelled on the Brussels regime.

Forum non conveniens could be applied. Though not under appeal, Floyd MR does suggest that in his view the claim in which liability was admitted (Cook), should not have been struck out but rather stayed under the relevant rules.

Geert.

As announced earlier on this blog, on 25 and 26 February 2016 a conference will be held at Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands) on the theme From common rules to best practices in European Civil Procedure, jointly organized by Erasmus School of Law and the Max Planck Institute in Luxembourg.

The conference brings together many distinguished academics, practitioners, EU and national legislators and policy makers, discussing in panels the need for common rules to facilitate judicial cooperation and mutual trust, procedural innovation and e-justice in the EU, alternative dispute resolution, and best practices on the operationalization of judicial cooperation in civil matters.

The updated program and more information is available here. Please register as soon as possible if you intend to come!

Edited by Professors Jürgen Basedow, John Birds, Malcolm A. Clarke, Herman Cousy, Helmut Heiss and Dr. Leander D. Loacker, the second expanded edition of “Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)” has just been released. The updated volume is based on no less than 15 years of cooperative research in the field of cross-border insurance law, which was initiated at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law (Hamburg) under the guidance of Director Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Jürgen Basedow, LL.M. (Harvard), and involved legal scholars from 14 Member States of the European Union as well as Switzerland. In 2009, the Project Group “Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law” first published the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL), which provided model rules for a common European insurance contract law in the form of an optional instrument.

While the first edition set out provisions regarding general insurance law, the new expanded volume also covers rules on liability insurance, life insurance and group insurance. In addition, the book contains translated versions of the PEICL rules in Chinese, Czech, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Serbian, Slovak, Spanish, Swedish and Turkish.

For further information, please see the publisher’s website here.

La Corte di Giustizia è stata recentemente investita di un rinvio pregiudiziale volto a chiarire l’incidenza del diritto primario dell’Unione europea sulle norme che disciplinano, a livello nazionale, il riconoscimento della modifica di un cognome intervenuta sulla base delle regole di un diverso Stato membro (Causa C-541/15, Mircea Florian Freitag).

Il dubbio del giudice remittente concerne l’interpretazione degli articoli 18 e 21 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione. La prima di tali norme vieta, nel campo di applicazione dei trattati, “ogni discriminazione effettuata in base alla nazionalità”, mentre la seconda garantisce ad ogni cittadino dell’Unione “il diritto di circolare e di soggiornare liberamente nel territorio degli Stati membri”.

Il quesito — che dovrebbe consentire alla Corte di sviluppare gli orientamenti delineati (in un contesto non identico) nella sentenza Grunkin e Paul  del 2008 (C-353/06) — punta a sapere se le norme testé richiamate impongano alle autorità di uno Stato membro di “riconoscere la modifica del cognome di un cittadino di tale Stato se questi è nel contempo cittadino di un altro Stato membro e in tale Stato ha (ri-)acquisito, a seguito di una modifica del cognome non legata a una variazione dello stato di famiglia, il proprio cognome originario ricevuto alla nascita, benché l’acquisizione di tale cognome non sia avvenuta quando il cittadino aveva la residenza abituale nell’altro Stato membro e sia avvenuta dietro sua richiesta”.

The University of Milan will host on 4 March 2016 the final conference of a project co-funded by the Civil Justice Programme of the EU: “Towards the Entry into Force of the Succession Regulation: Building Future Uniformity upon Past Divergencies“.

The project, lasting from April 2014 to March 2016, focuses on the impact of Regulation 650/2012 on national legal systems and the related national and European case law with the aim of assessing the changes that it introduces to legal practice, arising awareness within the legal professionals (notaries, lawyers and court judges), providing training and disseminating information in order to promote future uniformity in the application of its provisions. Video footage of the conferences and seminars organized in the frame of the project are available on its website, as well as a database of caselaw and legislation related to succession matters.

The sessions of the final conference will be held in English and Italian (with simultaneous interpreting). Here’s the programme (available as a .pdf file):

Welcome addresses – Presentation of the Project

• Stefania Bariatti (Univ. of Milan)
• Domenico Cambareri (Notary in Milan)
• Petra Jeney (EIPA, Luxembourg)

SESSION 1: Scope and definitions. Chair: Alegría Borrás (Univ. of Barcelona)

• Introduction to the Regulation and to Its Scope, Domenico Damascelli (Notary in Turi and Univ. of Salento)
• The Definition of “Succession” and Habitual Residence Within the Meaning of the Regulation (EU) 650/2012, Peter Kindler (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

SESSION 2: Applicable law. Chair: Roberta Clerici (Univ. of Milan)

• Applicable Law: Choice of Law, Ilaria Viarengo (Univ. of Milan)
• Agreements as to Successions, Jacopo Re (Univ. of Milan)
• Public Policy and Overriding Mandatory Rules, Francesca C. Villata (Univ. of Milan)
• Renvoi, Luigi Fumagalli (Univ. of Milan)
• Practice Paper, Daniele Muritano (Notary in Empoli)

SESSION 3: Jurisdiction and recognition. Chair: Alexandra Irina Danila (Notary in Romania)

• Jurisdiction: General Rules and Choice of Court, Ilaria Queirolo (Univ. of Genoa)
• Jurisdiction: Other Grounds, Stefania Bariatti (Univ. of Milan)
• Recognition of Judgments, Stefano Dominelli / Francesco Pesce (Univ. of Genoa)
• European Certificate of Succession: First Remarks concerning its Application, Carlo Alberto Marcoz (Notary in Turin)

SESSION 4: Round Table: The Impact on Member States and Third Countries. Chair: Stefania Bariatti (Univ. of Milan)

• Isidoro Calvo Vidal (Notary in Coruña)
• Cyril Nourissat (Univ. Jean Moulin Lyon 3)
• Peter Kindler (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
• Andrew Godfrey (Russell-Cooke, London)
• Paul Beaumont/Jayne Holliday (Univ. of Aberdeen)

Further information and the registration form are available on the conference’s webpage.

L’Università di Milano, assieme alla Fondazione Italiana del Notariato ed altri enti, organizza per il 4 marzo 2016 un convegno dal titolo Il diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni. Si tratta dell’evento conclusivo di una ricerca dedicata al regolamento n. 650/2012 sulle successioni mortis causa, co-finanziata dalla Commissione europea.

Il convegno si articolerà in quattro sessioni, dedicate rispettivamente all’ambito di applicazione del regolamento e alle nozioni di cui esso si serve, alle norme sui conflitti di leggi, a quelle sulla giurisdizione e il riconoscimento delle decisioni e all’impatto della disciplina uniforme sugli ordinamenti statali.

Interverranno, fra gli altri, Stefania Bariatti (Univ. Milano), Paul Beaumont (Univ. Aberdeen), Alegría Borrás (Univ. Barcellona), Roberta Clerici (Univ. Milano), Peter Kindler (Univ. Monaco), Luigi Fumagalli (Univ. Milano), Cyril Nourissat (Univ. Lyon), Ilaria Queirolo (Univ. Genova), Francesca Villata (Univ. Milano) e Ilaria Viarengo (Univ. Milano).

Il programma può leggersi qui.

La partecipazione – gratuita – richiede la registrazione al sito www.suxreg.eu.

At the Institute for Foreign and Private International Law of the Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg im Breisgau (Germany), a vacancy has to be filled at the chair for private law, private international law and comparative law (chairholder: Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein), from 1 April, 2016 with

a legal research assistant (salary scale E 13 TV-L, personnel quota 50%)
limited for 2 years.

The assistant is supposed to support the organizational and educational work of the chairholder, to participate in research projects of the chair as well as to teach his or her own courses (students’ exercise). Applicants are offered the opportunity to obtain a doctorate.

Applicants are expected to be interested in the chair’s main areas of research. They should possess an above-average German First State Examination (at least “vollbefriedigend”) or a foreign equivalent degree and be fluent in German. In addition, a thorough knowledge of German civil law as well as conflict of laws, comparative law and/or international procedural law is a necessity. Severely handicapped persons will be preferred provided that their qualification is equal.

Please send your application (curriculum vitae, certificates and, if available, further proofs of talent) to Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein, Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Abt. III, Peterhof, Niemensstr. 10, D-79098 Freiburg (Germany) no later than 1 March, 2016.

As the application documents will not be returned, applicants are kindly requested to submit only unauthenticated copies. Alternatively, the documents may be sent as a pdf-file via e-mail to ipr3@jura.uni-freiburg.de.

A collection of papers from the 11th Regional Private International Law Conference held in Osijek, Croatia, on 11-12 June 2014 is out now. The book, edited by Professor Mirela Župan, contains scientiffic contributions by prominent authors on topics ranging from analysing the role and/or meaning of different connecting factors (habitual residence, nationality, party autonomy) to commenting on the effects which ECtHR case law may have on the interpretation of the Hague Abduction Convention. In addition, the book contains six national reports on the operation of the Hague Abduction Convention in the region.
The links to the books in .pdf and .epub formats are available here.

Readers of our blog might recall that Jan von Hein and I convened a conference on coherence in European private international law in Freiburg i.Br. (Germany) in October 2014 (see our previous post). Today, we are happy to report that the findings of the conference have just been published by the German publishing house Mohr Siebeck.

The  volume critically assesses the current state of European private international law including the law of international civil procedure. It sheds light on existing incoherences, describes the requirements for a more coherent regulation and discusses perspectives for a future European codification in the field of Private International Law. In addition, the volume contains English language summaries of each contribution as well as detailed discussion reports.

More information is available on the publisher’s website. The table of contents reads as follows:

Part 1: Grundlagen

• Jürgen Basedow, Kohärenz im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht der Europäischen Union: Eine einleitende Orientierung
• Anatol Dutta, Gemeinsame oder getrennte Kodifikation von IPR und IZVR auf europäischer Ebene: Die bisherigen und geplanten Verordnungen im Familien- und Erbrecht als Vorbilder für andere Rechtsgebiete?
• Thomas Kadner Graziano, Gemeinsame oder getrennte Kodifikation von IPR und IZVR: Das schweizerische IPR-Gesetz als Modell für eine europäische Gesamtkodifikation – Lehren für die EU?

Part 2: Der räumliche Anwendungsbereich des europäischen IPR/IZVR

• Burkhard Hess, Binnenverhältnisse im Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht: Grenzüberschreitende v. nationale Sachverhalte
• Tanja Domej, Das Verhältnis nach „außen“: Europäische v. Drittstaatensachverhalte
• Andrea Schulz, Die EU und die Haager Konferenz für Internationales Privatrecht

Part 3: Subjektive und personale Anknüpfungspunkte im europäischen IPR/IZVR

• Felix Maultzsch, Parteiautonomie im Internationalen Privat- und Zivilverfahrensrecht
• Frauke Wedemann, Die Verortung juristischer Personen im europäischen IPR und IZVR
• Brigitta Lurger, Die Verortung natürlicher Personen im europäischen IPR und IZVR: Wohnsitz, gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt, Staatsangehörigkeit

Part 4: Objektive Anknüpfungsmomente für Schuldverhältnisse im europäischen IPR/IZVR

• Michael Müller, Objektive Anknüpfungsmomente für Schuldverhältnisse im europäischen IPR und IZVR: Die Behandlung vertraglicher Sachverhalte
• Haimo Schack, Kohärenz im europäischen Internationalen Deliktsrecht

Part 4: Schutz schwächerer Parteien und von Allgemeininteressen im europäischen IPR/IZVR

• Eva-Maria Kieninger, Der Schutz schwächerer Personen im Schuldrecht
• Urs Peter Gruber, Der Schutz schwächerer Personen im Familien- und Erbrecht
• Moritz Renner, Ordre public und Eingriffsnormen: Konvergenzen und Divergenzen zwischen IPR und IZVR

The November 2015 draft ‘Judgments project’ of the Hague Conference on private international law, otherwise known as the draft convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to civil and commercial matters, is a very ambitious project which at the same time risks exposing some of the inherent weaknesses of the modus operandi of the Hague Conference. This is not the right forum for an exhaustive analysis. Rather, with input from other members (Elsemiek Apers in particular) at Leuven PIL institute, I would like to flag some areas of interest. Inevitably, an obvious point of reference is the European Union’s Brussels I (Recast) regime.

First, the text itself. The Working Group’s report, which accompanies the draft, explains the history and development of the text and the various options taken. No need to repeat it here. The approach of the Convention is the same ‘mission creep’ which the 1968 Brussels Convention had to resort to, to enhance the free movement of judgments between Member States. Given that the most widespread reason for refusal of recognition and enforcement (R&E), are accusations of excessive or inappropriate exercise of jurisdiction, one can only truly co-ordinate R&E if one also co-ordinates jurisdiction. The Hague Convention takes this route in Articles 5-6, (Exclusive) bases for recognition and enforcement. Following this co-ordination of jurisdictional rules, Article 7 then limits the ground upon which R&E may be refused.

Of note is that Article 4(2)’s ban on merits review (when assessing the possibility of recognition and enforcement), probably does not extend to judgments issued by default. The Article is not clear on what is meant exactly: the first para of Article 4(2) rules out ‘review of the merits’. The second para suggests ‘The court addressed shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by default.’ Not being bound by findings of fact does not necessarily entail a possibility for merits review, and the text can probably do with clarification at this point.

Article 5(e)’s special jurisdictional rule for contracts, has been clarified compared with earlier versions, however the text remains subject to plenty of room for debate.

Article 8’s room for refusing R&E when the exclusive jurisdictional rules of the Convention were infringed, or where matters excluded from the Convention were at issue, could in our view do with tidying up. It currently mingles scope for refusal of R&E as such, in the case of infringement of the exclusive jurisdictional rules, with discussion of excluded matters as ‘preliminary issues’ only – a clear reference to the EU’s experience with arbitration. Without editorial perfection, however, this article, in combination with Article 2’s excluded matters, risks similar and protracted debate as was /is the case under Brussels I (and the Recast).

Further, the modus operandi, and institutional consequences of the Convention. As indicated, an exhaustive review of the Convention is not possible here. That is due in large part to the extensive comments which one could address vis-a-vis each individual entry of the text. Rather like in the case of each individual provision of the Brussels regime. In the case of the latter, the CJEU is exercised on a very regular basis with the determination of the precise meaning of the heads of jurisdiction. In the Hague process, there is no such institution. One has to rely on the application of the Convention by the signatory States. At some point, one has to assess whether it is tenable not to have some kind of review process at The Hague, lest one risks the Convention being applied quite differently in the various signatory States. Coupled with the additional lawyer of complication were the EU to accede (which it is bound to; however would it really be progress to create additional layers of differentiation?), the CJEU itself might have difficulty accepting a body of judicial review, where the text to be reviewed borders so closely unto the Brussels regime.

Geert.

Federica Falconi, La legge applicabile ai contratti di assicurazione nel regolamento Roma I, Cedam, 2016, pp. 272, ISBN 9788813358297, Euro 24,50.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Il volume si propone di condurre un’analisi critica della disciplina di conflitto dettata dal regolamento Roma I in relazione ai contratti di assicurazione, alla luce delle modifiche di carattere sostanziale, oltre che sistematico, apportate da tale strumento rispetto alla normativa previgente. L’esegesi delle norme del regolamento è perciò svolta mettendo in evidenza i nodi interpretativi che tuttora permangono, per poi cercare di suggerire alcune possibili soluzioni nella prospettiva di un’ulteriore, più radicale riforma.

L’indice dell’opera e ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

On 24 and 25 March 2017 the Observatory on the European area of freedom, security and justice, based at the Department of Legal Sciences of the University of Salerno, will host an international conference titled 60 years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome: developments and perspectives on the construction of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The Observatory is launching a call for contributions of scholars and experts in EU Law of any nationality. Abstracts, written either in English or in Italian, and relating to aspects of the European area of freedom, security and justice, including judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, should be sent to slsg@unisa.it by 30 June 2016.

Selected papers will be published in the first issue of the review The European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; the authors of particularly innovative contributions will be invited to attend the conference as speakers.

The call is available here.

Il Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Verona, unitamente all’Ordine degli Avvocati e alla Camera Minorile di Verona, organizza per il giorno 11 febbraio 2016 un incontro formativo dal titolo Il minore nel contesto giuridico internazionale: responsabilità genitoriale, giurisdizione e legge applicabile, riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni.

L’incontro, che si terrà presso la sede del Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, sarà coordinato da Ernesto D’Amico (Trib. Verona) e vedrà susseguirsi le relazioni di Maria Caterina Baruffi e di Francesca Ragno (entrambe Univ. Verona).

Per maggiori informazioni si veda qui.

Con sentenza 1° febbraio 2016, n. 1863, la Corte di cassazione si è pronunciata sul ricorso di un uomo contro la decisione con cui la Corte di appello di Firenze aveva accordato all’ex moglie un assegno di mantenimento, all’esito di un autonomo procedimento,  successivo a quello di scioglimento del matrimonio svoltosi nella Repubblica Ceca.

Con il primo motivo di ricorso l’uomo lamentava la falsa applicazione degli articoli 5 e 9 della legge 1° dicembre 1970 n. 898 sulla disciplina dei casi di scioglimento del matrimonio. L’art. 5, comma 6, di tale legge, stabilisce che con la sentenza che pronuncia lo scioglimento, il tribunale – tenuto conto delle condizioni dei coniugi – “dispone l’obbligo per un coniuge di somministrare periodicamente a favore dell’altro un assegno quando quest’ultimo non ha mezzi adeguati o comunque non può procurarseli per ragioni oggettive”. L’art. 9 disciplina invece i casi di revisione (successivi, dunque, al divorzio) delle disposizioni concernenti l’affidamento dei figli e di quelle relative alla misura e alla modalità dei contributi economici.

Sulla base di tale disciplina, l’uomo riteneva che la donna non potesse avviare in Italia un procedimento autonomo rispetto a quello di divorzio, avente ad oggetto l’assegno (tra l’altro, ella aveva già presentato una richiesta di assegno in sede di procedimento di divorzio dinanzi a un giudice ceco, ma tale domanda non era stata ritenuta proponibile in quella sede, prevedendo la legislazione ceca la possibilità di proporre un separato giudizio per le questioni di carattere economico).

Con il secondo motivo di ricorso, l’ex marito rilevava inoltre che, poiché ai sensi dell’art. 21 del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza, al riconoscimento e all’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), la sentenza di divorzio pronunciata nella Repubblica Ceca doveva essere riconosciuta automaticamente in Italia, questa dovesse essere equiparata ad una decisione italiana e, pertanto, assoggettata alle medesime preclusioni processuali che impediscono l’accertamento del diritto all’assegno divorzile.

La Corte ha sottolineato come la pronuncia contestuale dello scioglimento del matrimonio (o della cessazione degli effetti civili del matrimonio) e delle statuizioni relative ai figli e alle condizioni economiche “non risponde a un principio costituzionale che imponga la regolamentazione contestuale dei diritti e dei doveri scaturenti da un determinato status”, portando ad esempio la sentenza non definitiva di divorzio che si pronuncia sullo status e rinvia al successivo corso del giudizio per l’adozione dei provvedimenti conseguenti.

La Corte ha inoltre stabilito che la richiesta di corresponsione dell’assegno divorzile di cui all’art. 5 della l. 898/1970 si configura “come domanda (connessa ma) autonoma rispetto a quella di scioglimento del matrimonio”: pertanto, la parte che non l’abbia avanzata nel corso del procedimento di divorzio, ben può proporla successivamente senza che a ciò sia ostacolo la sopravvenuta pronuncia di scioglimento del vincolo di coniugio.

La Corte ha osservato infine come il riferimento al regime del riconoscimento automatico di cui al regolamento n. 2201/2003 corrobori questa interpretazione: esso comporta la ricezione nel nostro ordinamento del contenuto specifico della decisione ceca, che si è limitata ad accertare le condizioni per lo scioglimento del matrimonio ed a pronunciarlo, lasciando aperta la possibilità di far valere le pretese economiche in un separato procedimento.

Alla decisione ceca, infatti, per il Supremo Collegio, non può attribuirsi “il contenuto di un accertamento implicito sulla insussistenza delle condizioni per il riconoscimento di un assegno divorzile e neanche quello di un giudicato costituente una preclusione processuale alla proposizione di una successiva domanda di assegno divorzile basata sulle condizioni economiche degli ex coniugi anche se coincidenti con quelle esistenti al momento della pronuncia di divorzio”.

In Ranza v Nike, the Court of Appeal for the ninth circuit confirmed the high hurdle to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the US, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kiobel and Bauman /Daimler. Trey Childress has good summary here and I am happy largely to refer.

Loredana Ranza is a US citisen, resident in the EU (first The Netherlands; Germany at the time of the court’s decision). She seeks to sue against her Dutch employer, Nike BV, and its parent corporation, Nike inc. for alleged violation of federal laws prohibiting sex and age discrimination. The Dutch equality Commission had earlier found the allegations unfounded under Dutch law.

Of particular interest are the Court’s views on the attributability test /piercing the corporate veil following Daimler and Kiobel. The Court held (p.15 ff) that prior to Daimler, personal jurisdiction over the mother company could be established using either the agency or the alter ego test, with the former now no longer available following Daimler. Under the Agency test, effectively a type of abus de droit /fraus /fraud, plaintiff needed to show that the subsidiary performed services which were sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services. Daimler, the Court suggested in Ranza, held that the agency test leads to too broad a jurisdictional sweep. That leaves the alter ego test: effectively, whether the actions prima facie carried out by the subsidiary, are in fact carried out by the mother company for it exercises a degree of control over the daughter which renders that daughter the mother’s alter ego. Not so here, on the facts of the case: Nike Inc, established in Oregon, is heavily involved in Nike BV’s macromanagement, but not so ‘enmeshed’ in its routine management of day-to-day operation, that the two companies should be treated as a single enterprise for the purposes of jurisdiction.

For good measure, the Court also confirmed application of dismissal of jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.

Geert.

Barclays v ENPAM has been travelling in my briefcase for some time – apologies. Reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Alexandros, and the High Court in Nomura , Blair J in October 2015 employed national courts’ room under Article 27/28 of the Brussels I Regulation (the lis alibi pendens and related actions rules) to refuse a stay of English proceedings in favour of proceedings in (of course) Italy. Litigation like this will be somewhat less likely now that the Brussels I Recast applies. As readers will be aware, the current version of the Regulation has means to protect choice of court agreements against unwilling partners (see however below).

Claimant, Barclays Bank PLC, is an English bank. The defendant, Ente Nazionale di Previdenza ed Assistenza dei Medici e Degli Odontoiatri (“ENPAM”) is an Italian pension fund. A dispute has arisen between them as to a transaction entered into by way of a Conditional Asset Exchange Letter from ENPAM to Barclays dated 21 September 2007 by which ENPAM exchanged fund assets for securities which were in the form of credit-linked notes called the “Ferras CDO securities”. ENPAM’s claim is that it incurred a major loss in the transaction, and that it is entitled in law to look to Barclays to make that loss good.

On 18 May 2015, Barclays issued a summary judgment application on the basis that there is no defence to its claim that the Milan proceedings fall within contractual provisions giving exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts. ENPAM began proceedings against Barclays and others in Milan on 23 June 2014. Barclays says that this was in breach of provisions in the contractual documentation giving exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts. It issued the proceedings reviewed here seeking a declaration to that effect and other relief on 15 September 2014. On 20 April 2015, ENPAM applied pursuant to Article 27 or Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation for an order that the English court should not exercise its jurisdiction in these proceedings on the basis that Milan court was first seised.

The High Court refused. Reference is best made to the judgment itself, for it is very well drafted. Read together with e.g. the aforementioned Alexandros and Nomura judgments, it gives one a complete view of the approach of the English courts viz lis pendens under the Regulation. (E.g. Blair J has excellent overview of the principles of Article 27 (Article 29 in the Recast) under para 68).

Discussion of what exactly Barclays could recover from the English cq Italian proceedings, was an important consideration of whether these two proceedings were each other’s mirror image. (see e.g. para 82 ff). This is quite an important consideration for litigators. Statements of claims are an important input in the lis pendens analysis. Be careful therefore what you ask for. Restraint in the statement of claims might well serve you very well when opposed with recalcitrant opposing parties, wishing to torpedo your proceedings. (Let’s face it: the likelihood of such opposition is quite high in a litigious context).

Finally, it is often assumed that precedent value of the case discussed here and other cases with it, has diminished drastically following the Brussels I Recast. It instructs all courts not named in a choice of court agreement, to step back from jurisdiction in favour of the court named (Article 31(2)). Yet what is and what is not caught by a choice of court agreement (starting with the issue of non-contractual liability between the parties) depends very much on its wording and interpretation. Article 31(2) is not the be all and end all of litigation between contracting parties.

Geert.