Droit international général

Claudio Biscaretti di Ruffìa, Alberto Santa Maria, Le società estere, in Trattato Cicu-Messineo, Giuffrè, 2015, pp. XIV – 340, ISBN: 9788814209703, Euro 42.

Ulteriori informazioni sul volume sono reperibili al sito dell’editore. L’indice dell’opera è disponibile qui.

I have referred repeatedly in the past to an inevitable attraction which some find in harmonising private, incuding contract law, in the Member States. The Common European Sales Law (CESL) proposal is dead, and for good reason. Its demise however has not led to the European Commission leaving the path of harmonisation in contract law. The EC has now selected bits and pieces of the CESL approach which it reckons might pass Member States objections. The proposed ‘fully harmonised’ rules on e-commerce formally do not close the door on party autonomy in the contracts under their scope of application. Yet in forcing regulatory convergence top-down, the aim is to make choice of law for these contracts effectively nugatory.

The EC itself formulates it as follows (COM(2015)634, p.1:

“This initiative is composed of (i) a proposal on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content (COM(2015)634 final), and (ii) a proposal on certain aspects concerning contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods (COM(2015)635 final). These two proposals draw on the experience acquired during the negotiations for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law. In particular, they no longer follow the approach of an optional regime and a comprehensive set of rules. Instead, the proposals contain a targeted and focused set of fully harmonised rules.”

Consequently the same proposal reads in recital 49 ‘Nothing in this Directive should prejudice the application of the rules of private international law, in particular Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council‘: that is, respectively, Rome I and Brussels I Recast’.

Consequently and gradually, choice of law for digital B2C contracts becomes redundant, for the content of national law converges. Support for this in my view is not rooted in fact (the EC’s data on the need for regulation have not fundamentally changed since its doomed CESL proposal), neither is it a good development even for the consumer. National consumer law is able to adapt, often precisely to the benefit of the consumer, through national Statute and case-law. Turning the EU regulatory tanker is much more cumbersome. The circular economy, recently often debated, is a case in point. Many national authorities point to limitations in contract law (incuding warranty periods and design requirements) as an obstacle to forcing manufacturers, including for consumer goods, to adopt more sustainable manufacturing and distribution models. The EC’s current proposals do no meet those challenges, rather, they obstruct them.

Geert.

On 4 February 2016, the University Jean Moulin Lyon 3 will host a workshop on Global Phenomena and Social Sciences.

The event will feature five panels, which will address the topic, respectively, from the point of view of politics, business, economics, anthropology and law.

Among the speakers of the latter panel, Jean-Sylvestre Bergé (Univ. Jean Moulin Lyon 3) will talk of Border Crossing Phenomenon and the Law.

Further information in the flier of the initiative.

On 6 June 2016, the 3rd Yale-Humboldt Consumer Law Lecture will take place at Humboldt-University Berlin. This year’s speaker will be Professor Richard Brooks (Yale Law School/Columbia Law School), Professor Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School) and Professor Roberta Romano (Yale Law School).

The program reads as follows:

• 2.00 p.m. Welcome by Professor Susanne Augenhofer and the Vice President for Research of Humboldt University, Professor Dr. Peter A. Frensch
• 2.15 p.m. Professor Richard Brooks, Columbia Law School
• 3.15 p.m. Coffee break
• 3.45 p.m. Professor Henry B. Hansmann, Yale Law School
• 4.45 p.m. Break
• 5.00 p.m. Professor Roberta Romano, Yale Law School
• 6.00 p.m. Panel Discussion
• 7.00 p.m. Reception

Further information regarding the event is available here. Participation is free of charge but registration is required. Please register online before 27 May 2016.

The annual Yale-Humboldt Consumer Law Lecture brings faculty members from Yale Law School and other leading US law Schools to Berlin where they spend time at Humboldt Law School. During their stay, and as part of a variety of activities, the three visitors will interact with colleagues as well as with doctoral candidates and students. Highlight of their stay is the Yale-Humboldt Consumer Law Lecture, which is open to all interested lawyers. The speakers’ remarks will be followed by discussion.

The Yale-Humboldt Consumer Law Lecture aims at encouraging an exchange between American and European lawyers in the field of consumer law, understood as an interdisciplinary field that affects many branches of law. Special emphasis will therefore be placed on aspects and questions which have as of yet received little or no attention in the European discourse.

This seventh volume in the Swedish Studies in European Law series (Hart Publishing, Oxford) brings together some of the most prominent scholars working within the fast-evolving field of EU civil justice. Civil justice has an impact on matters involving, inter alia, family relationships, consumers, entrepreneurs, employees, small and medium-sized businesses and large multinational corporations. It therefore has great power and potential. Over the past 15 years a wealth of EU measures have been enacted in this field. Issues arising from the implementation thereof and practice in relation to these measures are now emerging. Hence this volume will explore the benefits as well as the challenges of these measures. The particular themes covered include forum shopping, alternative dispute resolution, simplified procedures and debt collection, family matters and collective redress. In addition, the deepening of the field that continues post-Lisbon has occasioned a new level of regulatory and policy challenges. These are discussed in the final part of the volume which focuses on mutual recognition also in the broader European law context of integration in the area of freedom, security and justice.

The editors

 Burkhard Hess is Director at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and RegulatoryProcedural Law.

Maria Bergström is Senior Lecturer in EU law at the Faculty of Law, Uppsala University.

Eva Storskrubb is Marie Curie Research Fellow at Uppsala University

The Academy of European Law (ERA) will host a conference on the new proposals for Directives on contracts for the supply of digital content (COM(2015) 634 final) and contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods (COM(2015) 635 final), which were published by the European Commission on 9 December 2015 and contain a set of fully harmonized rules on e-commerce. The conference is organized by Dr Angelika Fuchs (ERA) and will take place on 18 February 2016 in Brussels. The event will offer a platform to discuss the new legislative package, which has already become the subject of highly controversial debate, at an early stage in the legislative process by bringing together representatives of the European Commission and the European Parliament as well as legal practitioners, stakeholders and academics.

Key topics will be:

• Scope of the proposed Directives
• How to define conformity?
• Remedies and exercise of remedies
• Specifics for the supply of digital content
• Looking ahead: High standards or low costs for online trade?

The full conference programme is available here.

The speakers are

• Razvan Antemir, Director Government Affairs, EMOTA, Brussels
• Professor Hugh Beale QC, University of Warwick, Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford
• Samuel Laurinkari, Senior Manager, EU Government Relations, eBay Inc., Brussels
• Professor Marco B.M. Loos, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law, University of Amsterdam
• Pedro Oliveira, Senior Adviser, Legal Affairs Department, BUSINESSEUROPE, Brussels
• Ursula Pachl, Deputy Director General, BEUC – The European Consumer Organisation, Brussels
• Professor Dirk Staudenmayer, Head of Unit – Contract Law, DG Justice, European Commission, Brussels
• Professor Matthias E. Storme, Institute for Commercial and Insolvency Law, KU Leuven
• Axel Voss MEP, Rapporteur, JURI Committee, European Parliament, Brussels / Strasbourg
• Diana Wallis, President of the European Law Institute, Vienna
• Professor Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Rechtsanwalt, Friedrich Graf von Westphalen & Partner, Cologne

The conference language will be English. For further information and registration, please see here.

In Florin Lazar, a judgment rendered on 10 December 2015 (C-350/14), the ECJ clarified the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).

Pursuant to this provision, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is “the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.

The case concerned a traffic accident occurred in Italy, which resulted in the death of a woman. Some close relatives of the victim, not directly involved in the crash, had brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.

In these circumstances, the issue arose of whether, in order to determine the applicable law under the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence” of the event, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.

In its judgment, the Court held that the damage related to the death of a person in an accident which took place in the Member State of the court seised and sustained by the close relatives of that person who reside in another Member State must be classified as “indirect consequences” of that accident, within the meaning of Article 4(1).

To reach this conclusion, the ECJ began by observing that, according to Article 2 of the Rome II Regulation, “damage shall cover any consequence arising out of tort/delict”. The Court added that, as stated in Recital 16, the uniform conflict-of-laws provisions laid down in the Regulation purport to “enhance the foreseeability of court decisions” and to “ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage”, and that “a connection with the country where the direct damage occurred … strikes a fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage”.

The Court also noted that Recital 17 of the Regulation makes clear that “in cases of personal injury or damage to property, the country in which the damage occurs should be the country where the injury was sustained or the property was damaged respectively”.

It follows that, where it is possible to identify the occurrence of direct damage, the place where the direct damage occurred is the relevant connecting factor for the determination of the applicable law, regardless of the indirect consequences of the tort. In the case of a road traffic accident, the damage is constituted by the injuries suffered by the direct victim, while the damage sustained by the close relatives of the latter must be regarded as indirect consequences of the accident.

In the Court’s view, this interpretation is confirmed by Article 15(f) of the Regulation which confers on the applicable law the task of determining which are the persons entitled to claim damages, including, as the case may be, the close relatives of the victim.

Having regard to the travaux préparatoires of the Regulation, the ECJ asserted that the law specified by the provisions of the Regulation also determines the persons entitled to compensation for damage they have sustained personally. That concept covers, in particular, whether a person other than the direct victim may obtain compensation “by ricochet”, following damage sustained by the victim. That damage may be psychological, for example, the suffering caused by the death of a close relative, or financial, sustained for example by the children or spouse of a deceased person.

This reading, the Court added, contributes to the objective set out in Recital 16 to ensure the foreseeability of the applicable law, while avoiding the risk that the tort or delict is broken up in to several elements, each subject to a different law according to the places where the persons other than the direct victim have sustained a damage.

In Florin Lazar, a judgment rendered on 10 December 2015 (C-350/14), the ECJ clarified the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).

Pursuant to this provision, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is “the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.

The case concerned a traffic accident occurred in Italy, which resulted in the death of a woman. Some close relatives of the victim, not directly involved in the crash, had brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.

In these circumstances, the issue arose of whether, in order to determine the applicable law under the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence” of the event, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.

In its judgment, the Court held that the damage related to the death of a person in an accident which took place in the Member State of the court seised and sustained by the close relatives of that person who reside in another Member State must be classified as “indirect consequences” of that accident, within the meaning of Article 4(1).

To reach this conclusion, the ECJ began by observing that, according to Article 2 of the Rome II Regulation, “damage shall cover any consequence arising out of tort/delict”. The Court added that, as stated in Recital 16, the uniform conflict-of-laws provisions laid down in the Regulation purport to “enhance the foreseeability of court decisions” and to “ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage”, and that “a connection with the country where the direct damage occurred … strikes a fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage”.

The Court also noted that Recital 17 of the Regulation makes clear that “in cases of personal injury or damage to property, the country in which the damage occurs should be the country where the injury was sustained or the property was damaged respectively”.

It follows that, where it is possible to identify the occurrence of direct damage, the place where the direct damage occurred is the relevant connecting factor for the determination of the applicable law, regardless of the indirect consequences of the tort. In the case of a road traffic accident, the damage is constituted by the injuries suffered by the direct victim, while the damage sustained by the close relatives of the latter must be regarded as indirect consequences of the accident.

In the Court’s view, this interpretation is confirmed by Article 15(f) of the Regulation which confers on the applicable law the task of determining which are the persons entitled to claim damages, including, as the case may be, the close relatives of the victim.

Having regard to the travaux préparatoires of the Regulation, the ECJ asserted that the law specified by the provisions of the Regulation also determines the persons entitled to compensation for damage they have sustained personally. That concept covers, in particular, whether a person other than the direct victim may obtain compensation “by ricochet”, following damage sustained by the victim. That damage may be psychological, for example, the suffering caused by the death of a close relative, or financial, sustained for example by the children or spouse of a deceased person.

This reading, the Court added, contributes to the objective set out in Recital 16 to ensure the foreseeability of the applicable law, while avoiding the risk that the tort or delict is broken up in to several elements, each subject to a different law according to the places where the persons other than the direct victim have sustained a damage.

On 9 December 2015, the European Commission presented two proposals aimed at the adoption of harmonised rules governing digital contracts, namely a proposal for a directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content (COM (2016) 634 final), and a proposal for a directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods (COM (2016) 635 final)

The proposed measures are meant to pursue one of the basic goals of the Commission’s Digital Market Strategy, ie to ensure better access for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across Europe.

To this end, the proposed directive on the supply of digital content lays down certain requirements “concerning contracts for the supply of digital content to consumers, in particular rules on conformity of digital content with the contract, remedies in case of the lack of such conformity and the modalities for the exercise of those remedies as well as on modification and termination of such contracts”, whereas the proposed directive on online sales of goods provides for rules “concerning distance sales contracts concluded between the seller and the consumer, in particular rules on conformity of goods, remedies in case of non-conformity and the modalities for the exercise of these remedies”.

The legal basis for both directives is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, concerning the “approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market”.

As regards the coordination of the envisaged new directives with the existing rules of private international law that deal with digital contracts, the following remarks may be found in the Commission’s proposals and related texts.

In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the directive on the supply of digital content, the Commission observes that, “[t]ogether with the proposed new contract rules for the purchase of digital content as set out in this proposal, the existing rules on private international law establish a clear legal framework for buying and selling in a European digital market, which takes into account both consumers’ and businesses’ interests”.

As a consequence, “the proposal does not require any changes to the current framework of EU private international law, including to the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (Rome I)”. Recital 49 of the preamble reflects this assumption by stating that “[n]othing in this Directive should prejudice the application of the rules of private international law, in particular Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council”, ie the Brussels Ia Regulation.

A more detailed analysis of the private international law implications of the proposed new rules is provided in the memorandum relating to the directive on online sales of goods.

The Commission begins by noting that the proposal “is compatible with the existing EU rules on applicable law and jurisdiction in the Digital Single Market”. The Brussels Ia and Rome I Regulations “apply also in the digital environment”, “have been adopted quite recently and the implications of the internet were considered closely in the legislative process”.

As a matter of fact, “[s]ome rules take specific account of internet transactions, in particular those on consumer contracts”, and “aim at protecting consumers inter alia in the Digital Single Market by giving them the benefit of the non-derogable rules of the Member State in which they are habitually resident”. Since the proposal on online sales of goods “aims at harmonising the key mandatory provisions for the consumer protection, traders will no longer face such wide disparities across the 28 different legal regimes”.

As stated in the preamble of the proposed directive, “[e]xisting disparities may adversely affect businesses and consumers”, since, pursuant to the Rome I Regulation, “businesses directing activities to consumers in other Member States need to take account of the mandatory consumer contract law rules of the consumer’s country of habitual residence” and may thus “be faced with additional costs”. In these circumstances, “many businesses may prefer to continue trading domestically or only export to one or two Member States”. In addition, while consumers enjoy a high level of protection when they purchase online from abroad as a result of the application of the Rome I Regulation, “fragmentation also impacts negatively on consumers’ levels of confidence in e-commerce”.

In order to remedy those problems, “businesses and consumers should be able to rely on a set of fully harmonised, targeted rules for the online and other distance sales of goods”: uniform rules, the preamble goes on, “are necessary in relation to several essential elements of consumer contract law which under the current minimum harmonisation approach led to disparities and trade barriers across the Union”.

Here, too, in the Commission’s view, the existing rules on private international law establish a clear legal framework for buying and selling in a European digital market, and the legislative proposal does not require any changes to the Brussels Ia and Rome I Regulations. Accordingly, as indicated in Recital 37, nothing in the future directive should prejudice the application of the latter instruments.

As already announced in its Digital Single Market Strategy adopted on 6 May 2015, the Commission has, on 9 December 2015, finally presented a legislative initiative on harmonised rules for the supply of digital content and online sales of goods. The Commission explains: “This initiative is composed of (i) a proposal on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content (COM(2015)634 final), and (ii) a proposal on certain aspects concerning contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods (COM(2015)635 final). These two proposals draw on the experience acquired during the negotiations for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law. In particular, they no longer follow the approach of an optional regime and a comprehensive set of rules. Instead, the proposals contain a targeted and focused set of fully harmonised rules” (COM(2015)634, p. 1). From the perspective of legal policy, this change of approach can only be applauded (see already in this sense von Hein, Festschrift Martiny [2014], p. 365, 389: “Die beste Lösung dürfte aber eine effektive Harmonisierung des europäischen Verbraucherrechts auf einem verbindlichen Niveau darstellen, das optionale Sonderregelungen für den internationalen Handel überflüssig machen würde.”) According to the Commission, “[t]he proposals also build on a number of amendments adopted by the European Parliament in first reading concerning the proposal for a Regulation on the Common European Sales Law, in particular the restriction of the scope to online and other distance sales of goods and the extension of the scope to certain digital content which is provided against another counter-performance than money” (COM(2015)634, p. 1).

On the relationship between the new directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the online and other distance sales of goods and the existing Brussels Ibis and Rome I Regulations, the Commission elaborates (COM(2015)635, p. 4):

“The proposal is compatible with the existing EU rules on applicable law and jurisdiction in the Digital Single Market. Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), which provide rules to determine the competent jurisdiction and applicable law, apply also in the digital environment. These instruments have been adopted quite recently and the implications of the internet were considered closely in the legislative process. Some rules take specific account of internet transactions, in particular those on consumer contracts. These rules aim at protecting consumers inter alia in the Digital Single Market by giving them the benefit of the non-derogable rules of the Member State in which they are habitually resident. Since the current proposal on the online and other distance sales of goods aims at harmonising the key mandatory provisions for the consumer protection, traders will no longer face such wide disparities across the 28 different legal regimes. Together with the proposed new contract rules for online and other distance sales of goods as set out in this proposal, the existing rules on private international law establish a clear legal framework for buying and selling in a European digital market, which takes into account both consumers’ and businesses’ interests. Therefore, this legislative proposal does not require any changes to the current framework of EU private international law, including to Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (Rome I).”

Aldricus is glad to host the following announcement, provided by Susanne Gössl (Univ. Bonn).

As a group of doctoral and post-doctoral students with a keen interest in private international law (PIL), we are trying to improve the exchange between young scholars in this field. To further this aim, we have undertaken to organize a conference for all German-speaking young scholars (ie doctoral and post-doctoral students) with an interest in private international law.

PIL is understood broadly, including international jurisdiction and procedure, ADR, uniform and comparative law, as long as there is a connection to cross-border relationships.

The conference – which we hope to develop into a recurring event – will take place at the University of Bonn on 6 and 7 April 2017. It will be dedicated to the topic Politics and Private International Law (?) [Politik und Internationales Privatrecht (?)]. 

Choice-of-law rules established in continental Europe have since Savigny traditionally been regarded as ‘neutral’ as they only coordinate the law applicable in substance. However, the second half of the last century was marked by a realisation that choice-of-law rules may themselves promote or prevent certain substantial results. In the US, this has led to a partial abolishment of the classic understanding of the conflict of laws, and to its replacement by an analysis of the particular governmental interests concerned. Other legal systems have also seen traditional choice-of-law rules changed or limited by governmental or other political interests. The conference is dedicated to discussing the different aspects of this interplay between private international law and politics as well as their merits and demerits.

We welcome contributions which focus on classic political elements of private international law, such as lois de police, ordre public or substantial provisions within choice-of-law systems, but also comparisons to methodical alternatives to PIL or contributions discussing more subtle political influences on seemingly neutral choice-of-law rules. Examples range from the ever increasing influence of the European Union over national or international political agendas to questions of ‘regulatory competition’ (which may be relevant in establishing a national forum for litigation or arbitration) or other regulatory issues (such as the regulation of the allegedly international internet). By the same token, international family law and questions of succession are constantly increasing in relevance, the current growth of international migration making it a particularly important field for governmental regulation.

We are glad to announce that Professor Dagmar Coester-Waltjen (University of Göttingen) has accepted our invitation to inaugurate our conference on 6 April 2017. The afternoon will be dedicated to academic discourse and discussion and conclude with a dinner. The conference will continue on 7 April. We plan to publish all papers presented in a conference volume.

We intend to accommodate 6 to 10 papers in the conference programme, each of which will be presented for half an hour, with some additional room for discussion. We will publish a Call for Papers in early 2016 but invite everyone interested to note down the conference date already and consider their potential contributions to the conference topic (in German language).

Questions may be directed at Dr. Susanne L. Gössl, LL.M (sgoessl(at)uni-bonn.de).

For further information please see here.

In a recent article, Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg and a PhD candidate in Private International Family Law at the Paris II – Panthéon-Assas University, examined the private international law aspects of the PIP breast implants scandal.

The article, in French, appeared under the title Affaire PIP: quelques réflexions sur les aspects de droit international privé in the first issue for 2015 of the Revue internationale de droit économique, together with other papers concerning the PIP case.

Here’s an abstract of the article, provided by the author.

It is now common knowledge that the PIP company, domiciled in France, fraudulently mixed industrial-grade and medical-grade silicone gels to make its breast implants. The victims, women who have received the defective implants and have subsequently developed medical conditions, or who wish to have the implants removed or replaced as a precaution, can claim damages from a variety of actors. Because the victims, the clinics where the operations were performed, and the companies that were part of the supply chain, as well as their insurers, are domiciled in states spread all over the world, this case raises innumerable private international law issues.

This paper focuses on some of these issues, specifically those related to the tort actions which the victims can bring against the manufacturer, its executives, its insurer, and the notified body, which is the entity that was tasked with ensuring that PIP complied with its obligations under the European Union legal framework for medical products. In each case, both international jurisdiction and applicable law will be addressed.

To that end, some technical questions have to be answered first, for instance determining the place where the damage is sustained following the insertion of a potentially defective implant, or to what extent criminal courts can be expected to apply private international rules.

But on a more fundamental level, the PIP case highlights some of the shortcomings of the product liability regime in the single market. To take just one striking example, a French judge ruling on a claim against the manufacturer would apply the rules of the 1973 Hague Convention on the law applicable to products liability, while a German judge would apply the specific provision for product liability of the Rome II Regulation, a discrepancy which might ultimately result in the two claims being subject to different laws. Even though this particular field of the law has been harmonized by the 1985 Product Liability Directive, significant differences remain between the legislations of Member States, and these could have a decisive influence on the outcome of the cases.

This is just one factor that parties should take into account when deciding before which court to start proceedings, and it is likely that the significant forum shopping opportunities afforded to the victims by the Brussels I Regulation will be put to good use by the best-informed among them.

This state of affairs might legitimately be regarded as a lesser evil, since what is ultimately at stake is the compensation of victims of actual or possible bodily harm brought about by the fraudulent behaviour of a manufacturer. But the unequal treatment of victims, particularly depending on their domicile, cannot be regarded as satisfactory, any more than the considerable risk that contradictory or incoherent decisions will be rendered by the courts of different Member States, as some lower courts in Germany and France have already done.

The development of class actions, as introduced recently in French law, albeit in a very limited way, could help suppress or mitigate these difficulties, but accommodating these mechanisms within the framework of European private international law will create additional challenges.

Chris Thomale, Mietmutterschaft – Eine international-privatrechtliche Kritik, Mohr Siebeck, 2015, ISBN 9783161542398, pp. 154, Euro 34.

[Dal sito dell’editore] Die rechtliche Behandlung der Leihmutterschaft beschäftigt in wachsendem Maße Gerichte und Normsetzer auf allen Ebenen. Dabei berühren sich familienrechtliche mit international-privatrechtlichen, kollisionsrechtliche mit prozessrechtlichen sowie einfachrechtliche mit grundrechtlichen und unionsrechtlichen Anwendungsproblemen. Dieser Oberfläche der rechtspositiven Debatte liegen jedoch rechtsethische, rechtstheoretische und vor allem rechtspolitische Fragestellungen zugrunde, die sich erst aus der Regulierungsperspektive eines äußeren Betrachters und hypothetischen Rechtsetzers beurteilen lassen. Chris Thomale bemüht sich darum, beide Herangehensweisen zusammenzuführen, um die internationale Leihmutterschaft einer umfassenden Fundamentalkritik zu unterziehen.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Catania organizza il 9 dicembre 2015 un incontro di studio sul tema Genitorialità, problematiche acquisite all’estero.

L’incontro, presieduto da Tommaso Auletta (Univ. Catania) ed introdotto da Pasquale Pirrone (Univ. Catania), ospiterà le relazioni di Roberto Baratta (Univ. Macerata) su Diritti fondamentali e riconoscimento dello status filii in casi di maternità surrogata, e Giulia Rossolillo (Univ. Pavia) in tema di Riconoscimento di adozioni sconosciute all’ordinamento nazionale. Interverranno, tra gli altri, Adriana Di Stefano e Rosario Sapienza (entrambi Univ. Catania).

Maggiori informazioni nella locandina reperibile qui.

Jurisdiction and the internet is a topic which has featured once or twice on this blog recently (and in a  paper which I have already referred to in those earlier postings). Belgian’s Supreme Court in ordinary (the Hof van Cassatie /Cour de Cassation) employed the objective territoriality principle in a case with roots going back to 2007 (the fraudulent purchase of and subsequent failure to pay for electronic equipment from a shop in Dendermonde, Belgium), Yahoo! was requested to hand over the IP addresses associated with e-mail accounts registered to Yahoo!’s e-mail service. Yahoo! Inc, domiciled in California, refused to comply, triggering fines under criminal law.

Responding to Yahoo!s claims that Belgium was imposing its criminal laws extraterritorially, the Court of Appeal had held that Yahoo! is territorially present in Belgium, hereby voluntarily submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the Belgian authorities: it takes an active part in economic life in Belgium, among others by use of the domain name http://www.yahoo.be, the use of the local language(s) on that website, pop-up of advertisements based on the location of the users, and accessibility in Belgium of Belgium-focussed customer services (among others: a ‘Belgian’ Q&A, FAQ, and post box). [Notice the similarity with the Pammer /Alpenhof criteria]. The Court of Appeal had suggested that the accusations of extraterritoriality could only be accepted had there been a request for the handover of data or objects which are located in the USA, with which there is no Belgian territorial link whatsoever, and if the holder of these objects or data is not accessible in Belgium (either physically or virtually).

The Supreme Court on 1 December (not yet published in relevant databases – I have a copy for interested readers) confirmed all of the Court of Appeal’s arguments, essentially linking them to the objective territoriality principle. Yahoo! actively directs its activities towards consumers present in Belgium.

Even though the case involves a criminal proceeding, the Court’s judgment inevitably (not necessarily justifiably) will be used as further support for the Belgian tussle with Facebook.

Geert.

The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has just published the most recent item in their series on international litigation. The text, entitled “Discovery in International Civil Litigation: A Guide for Judges,” was written by Timothy Harkness, Rahim Moloo, Patrick Oh and Charline Yim. The guide joins a variety of other titles, including those on mutual legal assistance treaties (T. Markus Funk), the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (David Stewart), international commercial arbitration (S.I. Strong), recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Ron Brand), and international extradition (Ronald Hedges).

The new text can be downloaded from the FJC website here. The other texts are also available for download at fjc.gov. If you would like a free copy of the new discovery guide or any of the judicial guides on international law, just contact the FJC.

Anche quest’anno, la Società Italiana di Diritto Internazionale e di Diritto dell’Unione europea (SIDI) ha indetto un bando di concorso per il conferimento del premio “Riccardo Monaco” – istituito dalla famiglia per onorare la memoria dell’insigne giurista, socio fondatore e primo Presidente della SIDI – per una tesi di dottorato su aspetti giuridici e dell’integrazione europea e una tesi di dottorato su aspetti giuridici delle organizzazioni internazionali.

Il termine per la presentazione della domanda scade il 4 marzo 2016.

Maggiori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

I have earlier referred to Shell’s arguments in appeal (in Dutch) on the specific issue of jurisdiction, which may be found here .  Judgment in fact, as I reported, generally was quite comforting for Shell (and other holding companies in similar situations) on the issue of substantive liability.

However on jurisdiction, the Dutch court’s approach of joinders under residual national jurisdictional rules, was less comforting. The rules on joinders, otherwise known as ‘anchor defendants’, in the Brussels regime (Brussels I as well as the Recast) do not apply to defendants domiciled outside of the EU. Consequently national rules of civil procedure decide whether an action against a daughter company, established outside of the EU, can be successfully anchored to an action against the mother company (against which jurisdiction is easily established per Article 4 of the Recast, Article 2 of the former Regulation). In first instance, the Court at The Hague ruled in favour of joining a non-EU defendant to a case against its mother company in The Netherlands.

In its submission, Shell (with reference to relevant national case-law) borrows heavily from CJEU case-law on what was Article 6(1) (now Article 8(1)), suggesting that Dutch residual law was meant to apply as a mirror the European regime, with one important difference: precisely the issue that under the Dutch regime, none of the parties need to be domiciled in The Netherlands. Any jurisdictional rule which leads the Dutch courts to accept jurisdiction against one defendant, even if that anchor defendant is not domiciled in the country, can lead to others being drawn into the procedure. This means, so Shell suggests, that the Dutch rule (Article 7(1) of the Dutch code of civil procedure) is more in need of precautions against abuse, than the equivalent European rule.

As part of the efforts to avoid abuse, the Dutch courts need to make a prima facie assessment of the claims against the anchor defendant: for if those claims are spurious, anchoring other claims to such loose ground would be abusive. On this point, the Court of Appeal will have to discuss the corporate veil, piercing it, Chandler v Cape etc. Shell’s submission does not in fact argue why piercing needs to be assessed by the lex causae (here: Nigerian law as the lex loci damni) and not, for instane, by the lex fori. I doubt the Court of appeal will raise it of its own accord. (See here for a consideration of the issues in an unrelated area and further pondering here).

A little bird tells me that judgment will be issued on 18 December. I may or may not be able to review that before the Christmas break. In the negative, it will have to be an Epiphany posting. (Potentially in more than one meaning of the word).

Geert.

Con due sentenze sostanzialmente gemelle depositate il 28 ottobre 2015 (n. 21946 e n. 21947) le Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione si sono pronunciate sulla riconoscibilità in Italia di due sentenze emesse dalla District Court della Columbia, che condannavano l’Iran, in solido con altri responsabili, al pagamento di ingenti somme di denaro a titolo di risarcimento dei danni (anche “punitivi”), cagionati ai parenti delle vittime di due attentati terroristici avvenuti in Israele nel 1995 e nel 1996.

Richiamando quanto affermato dalla Corte Costituzionale con la sentenza 238/2014, la Cassazione ha negato all’Iran l’immunità dalla giurisdizione nel procedimento volto all’accertamento delle condizioni del riconoscimento della decisione americana in Italia, instaurato secondo l’art. 67 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, non ritenendo tuttavia riconoscibili le sentenze per difetto della condizione di cui alla lettera a) dell’art. 64 della stessa legge n. 218/1995, concernente la c.d. competenza “internazionale” del giudice a quo.

Entrambe le pronunce originavano dalle domande volte ad ottenere la dichiarazione di esecutività (rectius l’accertamento dei requisiti del riconoscimento) di due sentenze  (n. 97-396 (RCL) dell’11 marzo 1998  e la n. 98-1945 (RCL) dell’11 luglio 2000) emesse dalla United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Entrambe le sentenze avevano ad oggetto la condanna della Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran e del Ministero per l’informazione e la sicurezza iraniano (in solido con altri responsabili), al pagamento di somme di denaro a titolo di risarcimento dei danni, anche punitivi, in favore dei congiunti delle vittime, cittadine americane, decedute in Israele a seguito di attentati terroristici  rivendicati dalla fazione Shaqaqi della Jihad Islamica Palestinese (nota con il nome di Hamas). Le sentenze hanno accertato che gli attentati erano stati portati a termine sotto la direzione della Repubblica Iraniana e dei suoi alti vertici.

In entrambi i casi un primo tentativo volto ad ottenere l’esecuzione in Italia di tali sentenze era già stato avviato nel 2004, quando la Corte d’appello di Roma con sentenze depositate il 14 giugno 2004 aveva dichiarato riconoscibili le sentenze della Corte statunitense e ne aveva dichiarato l’esecutività, sulla base della accertata sussistenza di tutti i requisiti previsti dall’art. 64 della legge n. 218/1995. Le pronunce della Corte d’Appello vennero però successivamente cassate, senza rinvio, dalla Corte di Cassazione con sentenze n. 14570 e n. 14571 del 22 giugno 2007, per vizi formali (essendo stato accertato un vizio di inesistenza della notificazione dell’atto di citazione introduttivo del giudizio di riconoscimento).

I ricorrenti promuovevano due nuovi giudizi ex art. 67 della legge n. 218/1995 davanti alla Corte d’Appello di Roma volti ad ottenere l’accertamento della sussistenza delle condizioni del riconoscimento al fine di poter porre in esecuzione le due decisioni. In entrambi i giudizi si costituivano la Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran e il Ministero dell’informazione e della sicurezza dell’Iran, eccependo la carenza di giurisdizione della Corte statunitense. Nei procedimenti intervenivano, per il Governo italiano, il Ministero degli affari esteri, che richiamava il principio dell’immunità giurisdizionale degli Stati e della impignorabilità dei beni siti nel territorio italiano appartenenti a Stato estero, chiedendo quindi il rigetto delle istanze.

La Corte d’appello di Roma, con sentenze depositate l’8 luglio 2013, ha rigettato le domande di riconoscimento delle sentenze, ritenendo non sussistenti i presupposti per il riconoscimento delle decisioni, in ragione del principio di immunità giurisdizionale applicabile allo Stato convenuto. A tale riguardo, la Corte d’appello ha rilevato che nel nostro ordinamento è applicabile, in virtù del rinvio operato dall’art. 10 della Costituzione, la norma di diritto internazionale consuetudinario che impone agli Stati l’obbligo di astenersi dall’esercitare il potere giurisdizionale sugli atti compiuti da uno Stato straniero. La Corte richiama a tal fine quanto affermato dalla Corte internazionale di giustizia nella sentenza del 3 febbraio 2012 nell’affare delle immunità giurisdizionali dello Stato (Germania c. Italia, Grecia interveniente) (pubblicata in Riv. dir. int., 2012, p. 475), nella quale la Corte internazionale di giustizia, in relazione alla questione dell’immunità dello Stato dalla giurisdizione di un alto Stato in un procedimento volto alla dichiarazione di esecutività di una decisione straniera, ha affermato, che il giudice deve chiedersi se, ove fosse stato investito del merito di una controversia identica a quella decisa con la sentenza straniera, esso avrebbe o meno dovuto accordare l’immunità allo Stato in base la diritto internazionale (cfr. par. 130 della sentenza). Applicando tale principio, la Corte d’appello concludeva nel senso della inesistenza nel diritto internazionale di una norma che limiti l’immunità degli Stati a fronte di una violazione grave dello ius cogens e rigettava le domande dei ricorrenti.

Gli stessi ricorrevano per la cassazione di tali sentenze davanti alla Corte di Cassazione, denunciando – ai sensi dell’art. 360, primo comma, n. 3, del codice di procedura civile – la violazione o falsa applicazione dell’art. 64, comma 1, lett. a), della legge n. 218/1995, e dei principi di diritto internazionale relativi all’immunità giurisdizionale degli Stati, nonché degli articoli 5 e 12 della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sulle immunità giurisdizionali degli Stati e dei loro beni (legge di autorizzazione all’adesione 14 gennaio 2013, n. 5), degli articoli 7 e 27 dello statuto istitutivo della Corte penale internazionale (legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica 12 luglio 1999, n. 232, ed entrato in vigore il 1° luglio 2002), degli articoli 10, primo comma, e 11 della Costituzione, nonché dei principi della “giurisdizione universale”.

Nelle due sentenze gemelle la Corte di Cassazione richiama la conclusione a cui è giunta la Corte d’Appello per effetto della citata sentenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia del 3 febbraio 2012 nel caso Germania c. Italia, stabilendo che tale ratio decidendi non sia “ulteriormente confermabile”. A giudizio della Corte vi osta “la sopravvenuta sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 238 del 2014, la quale ha affermato che l’immunità degli Stati esteri dalla giurisdizione civile per gli atti compiuti nell’esercizio dei poteri sovrani, riconosciuta dal diritto internazionale consuetudinario, non può valere ad escludere l’accesso alla giurisdizione di fronte ai giudici italiani, in relazione ad azioni derivanti da crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità, lesivi dei diritti della persona umana, trattandosi di un principio qualificante il nostro sistema costituzionale italiano, saldamente ancorato alla tutela della dignità umana e dei diritti inviolabili e ai principi di pace e giustizia nelle relazioni internazionali. Con la citata sentenza è stato sbarrato l’ingresso, nel nostro ordinamento, della norma consuetudinaria, limitatamente alla parte in cui estende l’immunità alle azioni di danni provocati da atti o comportamenti qualificabili come crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità, lesivi di diritti inviolabili della persona, in quanto tali estranei all’esercizio legittimo della potestà di governo.”

Come ha chiarito infatti la Corte Costituzionale nella citata sentenza: “la norma internazionale alla quale il nostro ordinamento si è conformato in virtù dell’art. 10, primo comma, Cost. non comprende l’immunità degli Stati dalla giurisdizione civile in relazione ad azioni di danni derivanti da crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità, lesivi di diritti inviolabili della persona, i quali risultano per ciò stesso non privi della necessaria tutela giurisdizionale effettiva”.

Le Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione, ritengono di dover aderire a tale principio (ribadito dalla Corte costituzionale con l’ordinanza n. 30 del 2015) anche se contenuto in una pronuncia che, per questa parte, non è di incostituzionalità, ma “interpretativa di rigetto”. Ciò per due ragioni: “sia per il vincolo (negativo) che deriva, per tutti i giudici comuni, da una sentenza interpretativa di rigetto resa dalla Corte costituzionale, consistente nell’imperativo di non applicare la norma ritenuta non conforme al parametro costituzionale evocato e scrutinato dalla Corte costituzionale (Sez. Un., 16 dicembre 2013, n. 27986); sia perché la propugnata lettura adeguatrice – nello stimolare i giudici nazionali a contribuire all’emersione e al consolidamento di una diversa consuetudine internazionale basata su una operatività non illimitata o indiscriminata dell’immunità – trova rispondenza negli orientamenti della giurisprudenza di questa Corte, la quale più volte nel recente passato, proprio in tema di immunità dalla giurisdizione civile dello Stato estero, ha ritenuto prevalenti, sul dogma della sovranità, i principi e i diritti fondamentali che si riconnettono ai valori costitutivi della dignità umana (Sez. Un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044; Sez. Un., 29 maggio 2008, n. 14199, n. 14201 e n. 14202; Sez. I, 20 maggio 2011, n. 11163).”

Pertanto, ad avviso delle S.U., “allo Stato convenuto non è applicabile il principio di immunità giurisdizionale là dove il risarcimento del danno sia stato chiesto ed accordato a seguito di un fatto terroristico annoverabile tra i crimini internazionali commessi in violazione dei diritti inviolabili dell’uomo. L’immunità dello Stato estero, infatti, non è un diritto, ma una prerogativa che non può essere assicurata di fronte a delicta imperii, a crimini, cioè, compiuti in violazione di norme internazionali di ius cogens, in quanto tali lesivi di valori universali che trascendono gli interessi delle singole comunità statali.”

Sempre secondo la Corte, in entrambi i casi gli attentati terroristici che costarono la vita alle vittime sono riconducibili tra i “crimini contro l’umanità”, essendosi trattato di atti criminosi perpetrati “nell’ambito di un attacco sistematico e consapevole della inerme popolazione civile, ispirato da ragioni di odio razziale, etnico, politico e religioso e gravemente pericoloso per la sicurezza e l’ordine internazionali”.

Una volta esclusa l’applicabilità della regola in materia di immunità nei confronti dell’Iran nei giudizi di accertamento della riconoscibilità in Italia delle decisioni della corte distrettuale della Columbia, la Corte prosegue nella valutazione del “merito” della questione: ossia l’accertamento della sussistenza delle condizioni del riconoscimento.

In particolare, ai sensi dell’art. 64, comma 1, lett. a), della legge n. 218/1995, si richiede, come è noto, la presenza della competenza c.d. “internazionale” del giudice straniero che ha pronunciato la sentenza, da valutarsi in base ai principi sulla competenza giurisdizionale propri dell’ordinamento italiano. Ne consegue che “non può essere riconosciuta la sentenza straniera allorché essa sia stata emanata all’esito di un procedimento fondato su criteri di giurisdizione previsti dall’ordinamento straniero, ma esorbitanti rispetto ai principi sulla delimitazione della giurisdizione deducibili dalla legge n. 218/1995, recante la disciplina del sistema italiano diritto internazionale privato”.

La Corte richiama a tal fine l’art. 3, comma 1, della legge n. 218/1995, ai sensi del quale “La giurisdizione italiana sussiste quando il convenuto è domiciliato o residente in Italia o vi ha un rappresentante che sia autorizzato a stare in giudizio a norma dell’articolo 77 del codice di procedura civile e negli altri casi in cui è prevista dalla legge”. Il comma 2 della stessa disposizione prevede: “La giurisdizione sussiste inoltre in base ai criteri stabiliti dalle sezioni 2, 3 e 4 del titolo II della Convenzione concernente la competenza giurisdizionale e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale e protocollo, firmati a Bruxelles il 27 settembre 1968, resi esecutivi con la legge 21 giugno 1971, n. 804, e successive modificazioni in vigore per l’Italia, anche allorché il convenuto non sia domiciliato nel territorio di uno Stato contraente, quando si tratti di una delle materie comprese nel campo di applicazione della Convenzione. Rispetto alle altre materie la giurisdizione sussiste anche in base ai criteri stabiliti per la competenza territoriale”.

La Corte rileva come la fattispecie in esame esula dall’ambito applicativo della Convenzione di Bruxelles del 27 settembre 1968, perché atti come quelli che si trovano all’origine del danno lamentato dagli attori dinanzi ai giudici statunitensi, sebbene illeciti e lesivi di quei valori universali di rispetto della dignità umana che trascendono gli interessi delle singole comunità statali, derivano da una manifestazione di pubblico imperio da parte dello Stato interessato nel momento in cui tali atti sono stati perpetrati. A tal fine la Corte richiama il precedente della Corte di giustizia nel caso Lechouritou, in cui la Corte ha infatti chiarito che la Convenzione non è applicabile alle controversie relative ad attività che costituiscono espressione della sovranità dei singoli Stati (sentenza 15 febbraio 2007, causa C-292/05, Lechouritou e altri, concernente un’azione volta ad ottenere il risarcimento del danno subito dagli aventi diritto delle vittime di azioni delle forze armate di uno Stato contraente nell’ambito di operazioni di guerra sul territorio dello Stato adito).

Escluso che la materia rientrasse nell’ambito di applicazione della Convenzione di Bruxelles, la Corte ritiene di dover ricavare i criteri di giurisdizione sulla base dei criteri di collegamento stabiliti dal codice di procedura civile per la competenza per territorio, richiamati dall’art. 3, comma 2, ultima parte, della legge n. 218/1995.

L’applicazione di questi criteri non permette, ad avviso della Corte, di dare rilievo al foro degli attori, secondo la previsione, invocata dai ricorrenti, dell’art. 18, secondo comma, del codice di procedura civile: secondo la Corte, infatti, “[i]l criterio del foro dell’attore riveste un carattere del tutto residuale rispetto a quelli indicati dagli articoli 18 e 19 cod. proc. civ. (cfr. Sez. III, 18 marzo 1994, n. 2596); e poiché nella specie ad essere convenuto è uno Stato estero, soggetto di diritto internazionale, i criteri soggettivi di radicamento della competenza per territorio operano a condizione che nello Stato del foro lo Stato estero abbia un rappresentante autorizzato a stare in giudizio.”

Ad avviso della Corte, nei casi di specie nessuno dei titoli di giurisdizione propri dell’ordinamento italiano secondo i principi sulla delimitazione della giurisdizione deducibili dall’art. 3, comma 2, ultima parte, della legge n. 218/1995 consentiva alla District Court della Columbia di decidere le controversie sottoposte alla sua cognizione.

In primo luogo, il titolo di giurisdizione alla base della decisione del giudice statunitense, fondato sulla nazionalità dell’attore secondo la disciplina interna del Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, non è coerente con i criteri sulla competenza giurisdizionale propri dell’ordinamento italiano.

In secondo luogo, i convenuti Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran e Ministero della sicurezza e dell’informazione dell’Iran non erano rappresentati negli Stati Uniti d’America, essendo le relazioni diplomatiche tra Iran e Stati Uniti venute meno dal 1979.

Infine, sia la condotta illecita (l’attentato terroristico) che l’evento dannoso (la morte delle vittime) si sono interamente verificati al di fuori del territorio degli Stati Uniti, in Israele, e rispetto ad essi non era mai stata esercitata un’azione penale innanzi ad un giudice statunitense.

In particolare, ad avviso della Corte: “non può darsi seguito alla tesi dei ricorrenti, secondo cui l’attribuzione della competenza ai giudici di uno Stato diverso da quello nel cui territorio sono localizzati sia il fatto generatore che la realizzazione dell’intero danno subito dalla vittima principale sarebbe giustificata dalla necessità di prendere in considerazione anche il danno consistente nella sofferenza patita dagli stressi congiunti della vittima, cittadini americani e residenti negli Stati Uniti nel momento in cui si è verificato l’attentato”. Una siffatta impostazione è preclusa, secondo la Corte, dall’art. 20 cod. proc. civ., ai sensi del il locus commissi delicti coincide con il luogo ove il fatto causale ha prodotto direttamente i suoi effetti nei confronti di colui che ne è la vittima immediata, non con il luogo in cui sono stati percepiti dalle vittime ulteriori gli effetti lesivi della condotta antigiuridica. E quanto al luogo di adempimento dell’obbligo di risarcimento del danno derivante da fatto illecito, esso è quello del domicilio del debitore (art. 1182, ultimo comma, cod. civ.), non già quello del domicilio del creditore, riguardando il terzo comma dell’art. 1182 cod. civ. esclusivamente le obbligazioni aventi originariamente ad oggetto una somma di denaro (Sez. I, 5 ottobre 1957, n. 3626; Sez. III, 7 aprile 1995, n. 4057).

Prosegue la Corte affermando che la necessità di ricercare un titolo di giurisdizione conforme a quello dell’ordinamento italiano “non può dirsi venuta meno per effetto della citata sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 238 del 2014.”

Ad avviso del Collegio, infatti, “da tale pronuncia – che non ha creato alcun criterio di collegamento giurisdizionale nuovo – deriva, non il riconoscimento di un principio di giurisdizione civile universale per le azioni risarcitorie da delicta imperii, ma l’inoperatività della norma consuetudinaria sull’immunità dalla giurisdizione civile in presenza di domande dirette ad ottenere il risarcimento dei danni derivati dalla commissione, nel territorio dello Stato del foro, di crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità.”

Prosegue la Corte: “Per effetto della sentenza della Corte costituzionale, il giudice – sempreché gli sia attribuita la competenza giurisdizionale secondo un titolo valido per il nostro ordinamento – non può negare la propria giurisdizione in riferimento ad atti di uno Stato straniero che consistano in crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità, lesivi di diritti inviolabili della persona.”

A tal fine la Corte valorizza anche il principio della territorialità dell’illecito e della giurisdizione civile, posto alla base dell’art. 12 della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sulle immunità giurisdizionali degli Stati e dei loro beni [n.d.r. non in vigore]: norma che prevede una deroga al principio dell’immunità, nelle controversie aventi ad oggetto fatti illeciti imputabili allo Stato straniero, ma a condizione che l’atto o l’omissione si siano «prodotti, interamente o in parte, sul territorio dell’altro Stato» ove venga instaurata la lite e sempre che il loro autore materiale fosse «presente su tale territorio nel momento in cui si è prodotto l’atto o l’omissione».

I ricorsi vengono pertanto rigettati, perché la Corte distrettuale statunitense che ha pronunciato le sentenze di cui è chiesto l’accertamento del riconoscimento ai fini dell’esecuzione in Italia non poteva conoscere delle cause secondo i principi sulla competenza giurisdizionale propri dell’ordinamento italiano, dovendosi correggere nei sensi esposti, ex art. 384, ultimo comma, cod. proc. civ., la motivazione delle impugnate sentenze della Corte d’appello di Roma.

As was announced earlier on this blog, on 25 and 26 February a conference will be held at Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands) on the theme From common rules to best practices in European Civil Procedure, jointly organized by Erasmus School of Law and the Max Planck Institute in Luxembourg.

The conference brings together distinguished academics, practitioners, legislators, and policy makers, discussing in panels the need for common rules to facilitate judicial cooperation and mutual trust, procedural innovation and e-justice in the EU, alternative dispute resolution, and best practices on the operationalization of judicial cooperation.

The program and more information is available here and you are cordially invited to register.