Droit international général

Federica Falconi, La legge applicabile ai contratti di assicurazione nel regolamento Roma I, Cedam, 2016, pp. 272, ISBN 9788813358297, Euro 24,50.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Il volume si propone di condurre un’analisi critica della disciplina di conflitto dettata dal regolamento Roma I in relazione ai contratti di assicurazione, alla luce delle modifiche di carattere sostanziale, oltre che sistematico, apportate da tale strumento rispetto alla normativa previgente. L’esegesi delle norme del regolamento è perciò svolta mettendo in evidenza i nodi interpretativi che tuttora permangono, per poi cercare di suggerire alcune possibili soluzioni nella prospettiva di un’ulteriore, più radicale riforma.

L’indice dell’opera e ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

On 24 and 25 March 2017 the Observatory on the European area of freedom, security and justice, based at the Department of Legal Sciences of the University of Salerno, will host an international conference titled 60 years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome: developments and perspectives on the construction of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The Observatory is launching a call for contributions of scholars and experts in EU Law of any nationality. Abstracts, written either in English or in Italian, and relating to aspects of the European area of freedom, security and justice, including judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, should be sent to slsg@unisa.it by 30 June 2016.

Selected papers will be published in the first issue of the review The European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; the authors of particularly innovative contributions will be invited to attend the conference as speakers.

The call is available here.

Il Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Verona, unitamente all’Ordine degli Avvocati e alla Camera Minorile di Verona, organizza per il giorno 11 febbraio 2016 un incontro formativo dal titolo Il minore nel contesto giuridico internazionale: responsabilità genitoriale, giurisdizione e legge applicabile, riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni.

L’incontro, che si terrà presso la sede del Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, sarà coordinato da Ernesto D’Amico (Trib. Verona) e vedrà susseguirsi le relazioni di Maria Caterina Baruffi e di Francesca Ragno (entrambe Univ. Verona).

Per maggiori informazioni si veda qui.

Con sentenza 1° febbraio 2016, n. 1863, la Corte di cassazione si è pronunciata sul ricorso di un uomo contro la decisione con cui la Corte di appello di Firenze aveva accordato all’ex moglie un assegno di mantenimento, all’esito di un autonomo procedimento,  successivo a quello di scioglimento del matrimonio svoltosi nella Repubblica Ceca.

Con il primo motivo di ricorso l’uomo lamentava la falsa applicazione degli articoli 5 e 9 della legge 1° dicembre 1970 n. 898 sulla disciplina dei casi di scioglimento del matrimonio. L’art. 5, comma 6, di tale legge, stabilisce che con la sentenza che pronuncia lo scioglimento, il tribunale – tenuto conto delle condizioni dei coniugi – “dispone l’obbligo per un coniuge di somministrare periodicamente a favore dell’altro un assegno quando quest’ultimo non ha mezzi adeguati o comunque non può procurarseli per ragioni oggettive”. L’art. 9 disciplina invece i casi di revisione (successivi, dunque, al divorzio) delle disposizioni concernenti l’affidamento dei figli e di quelle relative alla misura e alla modalità dei contributi economici.

Sulla base di tale disciplina, l’uomo riteneva che la donna non potesse avviare in Italia un procedimento autonomo rispetto a quello di divorzio, avente ad oggetto l’assegno (tra l’altro, ella aveva già presentato una richiesta di assegno in sede di procedimento di divorzio dinanzi a un giudice ceco, ma tale domanda non era stata ritenuta proponibile in quella sede, prevedendo la legislazione ceca la possibilità di proporre un separato giudizio per le questioni di carattere economico).

Con il secondo motivo di ricorso, l’ex marito rilevava inoltre che, poiché ai sensi dell’art. 21 del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza, al riconoscimento e all’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), la sentenza di divorzio pronunciata nella Repubblica Ceca doveva essere riconosciuta automaticamente in Italia, questa dovesse essere equiparata ad una decisione italiana e, pertanto, assoggettata alle medesime preclusioni processuali che impediscono l’accertamento del diritto all’assegno divorzile.

La Corte ha sottolineato come la pronuncia contestuale dello scioglimento del matrimonio (o della cessazione degli effetti civili del matrimonio) e delle statuizioni relative ai figli e alle condizioni economiche “non risponde a un principio costituzionale che imponga la regolamentazione contestuale dei diritti e dei doveri scaturenti da un determinato status”, portando ad esempio la sentenza non definitiva di divorzio che si pronuncia sullo status e rinvia al successivo corso del giudizio per l’adozione dei provvedimenti conseguenti.

La Corte ha inoltre stabilito che la richiesta di corresponsione dell’assegno divorzile di cui all’art. 5 della l. 898/1970 si configura “come domanda (connessa ma) autonoma rispetto a quella di scioglimento del matrimonio”: pertanto, la parte che non l’abbia avanzata nel corso del procedimento di divorzio, ben può proporla successivamente senza che a ciò sia ostacolo la sopravvenuta pronuncia di scioglimento del vincolo di coniugio.

La Corte ha osservato infine come il riferimento al regime del riconoscimento automatico di cui al regolamento n. 2201/2003 corrobori questa interpretazione: esso comporta la ricezione nel nostro ordinamento del contenuto specifico della decisione ceca, che si è limitata ad accertare le condizioni per lo scioglimento del matrimonio ed a pronunciarlo, lasciando aperta la possibilità di far valere le pretese economiche in un separato procedimento.

Alla decisione ceca, infatti, per il Supremo Collegio, non può attribuirsi “il contenuto di un accertamento implicito sulla insussistenza delle condizioni per il riconoscimento di un assegno divorzile e neanche quello di un giudicato costituente una preclusione processuale alla proposizione di una successiva domanda di assegno divorzile basata sulle condizioni economiche degli ex coniugi anche se coincidenti con quelle esistenti al momento della pronuncia di divorzio”.

In Ranza v Nike, the Court of Appeal for the ninth circuit confirmed the high hurdle to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the US, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kiobel and Bauman /Daimler. Trey Childress has good summary here and I am happy largely to refer.

Loredana Ranza is a US citisen, resident in the EU (first The Netherlands; Germany at the time of the court’s decision). She seeks to sue against her Dutch employer, Nike BV, and its parent corporation, Nike inc. for alleged violation of federal laws prohibiting sex and age discrimination. The Dutch equality Commission had earlier found the allegations unfounded under Dutch law.

Of particular interest are the Court’s views on the attributability test /piercing the corporate veil following Daimler and Kiobel. The Court held (p.15 ff) that prior to Daimler, personal jurisdiction over the mother company could be established using either the agency or the alter ego test, with the former now no longer available following Daimler. Under the Agency test, effectively a type of abus de droit /fraus /fraud, plaintiff needed to show that the subsidiary performed services which were sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services. Daimler, the Court suggested in Ranza, held that the agency test leads to too broad a jurisdictional sweep. That leaves the alter ego test: effectively, whether the actions prima facie carried out by the subsidiary, are in fact carried out by the mother company for it exercises a degree of control over the daughter which renders that daughter the mother’s alter ego. Not so here, on the facts of the case: Nike Inc, established in Oregon, is heavily involved in Nike BV’s macromanagement, but not so ‘enmeshed’ in its routine management of day-to-day operation, that the two companies should be treated as a single enterprise for the purposes of jurisdiction.

For good measure, the Court also confirmed application of dismissal of jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.

Geert.

Barclays v ENPAM has been travelling in my briefcase for some time – apologies. Reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Alexandros, and the High Court in Nomura , Blair J in October 2015 employed national courts’ room under Article 27/28 of the Brussels I Regulation (the lis alibi pendens and related actions rules) to refuse a stay of English proceedings in favour of proceedings in (of course) Italy. Litigation like this will be somewhat less likely now that the Brussels I Recast applies. As readers will be aware, the current version of the Regulation has means to protect choice of court agreements against unwilling partners (see however below).

Claimant, Barclays Bank PLC, is an English bank. The defendant, Ente Nazionale di Previdenza ed Assistenza dei Medici e Degli Odontoiatri (“ENPAM”) is an Italian pension fund. A dispute has arisen between them as to a transaction entered into by way of a Conditional Asset Exchange Letter from ENPAM to Barclays dated 21 September 2007 by which ENPAM exchanged fund assets for securities which were in the form of credit-linked notes called the “Ferras CDO securities”. ENPAM’s claim is that it incurred a major loss in the transaction, and that it is entitled in law to look to Barclays to make that loss good.

On 18 May 2015, Barclays issued a summary judgment application on the basis that there is no defence to its claim that the Milan proceedings fall within contractual provisions giving exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts. ENPAM began proceedings against Barclays and others in Milan on 23 June 2014. Barclays says that this was in breach of provisions in the contractual documentation giving exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts. It issued the proceedings reviewed here seeking a declaration to that effect and other relief on 15 September 2014. On 20 April 2015, ENPAM applied pursuant to Article 27 or Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation for an order that the English court should not exercise its jurisdiction in these proceedings on the basis that Milan court was first seised.

The High Court refused. Reference is best made to the judgment itself, for it is very well drafted. Read together with e.g. the aforementioned Alexandros and Nomura judgments, it gives one a complete view of the approach of the English courts viz lis pendens under the Regulation. (E.g. Blair J has excellent overview of the principles of Article 27 (Article 29 in the Recast) under para 68).

Discussion of what exactly Barclays could recover from the English cq Italian proceedings, was an important consideration of whether these two proceedings were each other’s mirror image. (see e.g. para 82 ff). This is quite an important consideration for litigators. Statements of claims are an important input in the lis pendens analysis. Be careful therefore what you ask for. Restraint in the statement of claims might well serve you very well when opposed with recalcitrant opposing parties, wishing to torpedo your proceedings. (Let’s face it: the likelihood of such opposition is quite high in a litigious context).

Finally, it is often assumed that precedent value of the case discussed here and other cases with it, has diminished drastically following the Brussels I Recast. It instructs all courts not named in a choice of court agreement, to step back from jurisdiction in favour of the court named (Article 31(2)). Yet what is and what is not caught by a choice of court agreement (starting with the issue of non-contractual liability between the parties) depends very much on its wording and interpretation. Article 31(2) is not the be all and end all of litigation between contracting parties.

Geert.

The latest issue of “Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht  – The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law” (RabelsZ) has just been released. It contains the following articles:

Armin Steinbach, Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren und Verfassungsrecht (Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Constitutional Law)

Investment treaties allow foreign investors to claim damages against states before tribunals of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). More frequently, such dispute settlement procedures tend to replace proceedings before national courts. This has given rise to the heated debate surrounding the ongoing negotiation about the free trade agreements between the European Union and the United States of America. This article identifies and discusses the constitutional law implications of such tribunals. The composition of the tribunals of private persons, the lack of a legal ground for public policy reasons to override investors’ rights, the dynamic development of the adjudication based on vague legal terms and the lack of publicity and transparency in the proceedings – all this raises questions from the perspective of democratic principle and rule of law. Based on democratic principle doctrine, this article classifies rulings of tribunals as acts of public authority and highlights the lack of material and personal legitimacy and examines whether a state monopoly of adjudication can be derived from the separation of powers principle. It discusses the publicity and control of ISDS tribunals as an obligation enshrined in the democratic principles and highlights the missing legal reviewability of ISDS rulings compared to tribunals established under German administrative law. Finally, the article explores possible compensatory instruments addressing the identified deficits based on an application of investments treaties in line with constitutional law principles.

Reinhard Zimmermann, Das Ehegattenerbrecht in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive (The Intestate Succession Rights of the Deceased’s Spouse in Historical and Comparative Perspective)

The coordination of the position of the surviving spouse with that of the deceased’s (blood-) relatives is one of central problems faced by the intestate succession systems of the Western world. While the succession of the relatives essentially follows one of three different systems (the “French” system, the three-line system, and the parentelic system) which have remained relatively stable, the position of the surviving spouse has, over the centuries, become ever more prominent. Roman law, at the time of Justinian, took account of the surviving spouse only in exceptional situations, medieval customary law often not at all. Today, on the other hand, she (much more often than he) has worked her way up, in most countries, to the position of main beneficiary under the rules of intestate succession, for small and medium-sized estates sometimes even to the position of exclusive beneficiary.

The present essay (based on the author’s Rudolf von Jhering lecture at the University of Gießen) traces this development. In doing so it attempts, in the spirit of Jhering, not to line up the laws in the various epochs of our legal history “like pearls on a pearl string” but to look at them as part of a development and to trace their interconnections. The same idea can also be applied to comparative law in view of the fact that the modern national legal systems do not coexist in isolation but in a “system of mutual contact and influence” and, as may be added, on the fertile soil of a common legal culture. Today we find a wide-spread desire to allow the surviving spouse to remain in her familiar environment and to continue to enjoy the standard of living she has become accustomed to. Legal systems still differ as to the way in which best to achieve this aim, i.e. as to the details of the surviving spouse’s intestate succession right. An important guideline for assessing the various solutions to be found in the national legal systems is what the average deceased typically regards as reasonable, as far as the distribution of his estate is concerned. This can sometimes be gauged from the way in which wills are commonly drafted, and it has indeed guided the reforms in a number of countries. In Germany, the so-called “Berlin will” is particularly popular. Nonetheless, it does not appear to offer a satisfactory cue for the regulation of the law of intestate succession. In spite of a certain degree of arbitrariness inherent in this way of proceeding, the surviving spouse will have to be given a share (e.g. one half ) of the estate. In addition, she should be granted the right to retain the right to continue to live in the family home.

Talia Einhorn, The Common Law Foundations of the Israeli Draft Civil Code – A Critical Review of a Paradigm-Shifting Endeavor

(no English abstract available)

Diegeo P. Fernández Arroyo, Main Characteristics of the New Private International Law of the Argentinian Republic

(no English abstract available)

On 11 February 2016, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) will host an event titled International Protection of Adults – the Current Legal Framework Under Scrutiny.

[From the website of the Institute] – Despite the 2000 Hague Convention, practical problems arise in cross-border scenarios, involving public policy and human rights considerations. On a practical level, private mandates are not accepted by financial institutions and there is no mechanism for enforcement. Speakers will discuss strengths and weaknesses of the current legal framework, prospects for future ratification of the 2000 Hague Convention, and initiatives of the European Parliament and Council of Europe to improve matters for European citizens.

Speakers include Philippe Lortie, Adrian Ward, Claire Van Overdijk, Richard Frimston and Alex Ruck Keene.

More information available here.

The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has just published two Practical Handbooks:
* Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention (4th edition);
* Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Evidence Convention (3rd edition).

Both publications are for sale in e-Book format on the Hague Conference website here.

Here is the announcement by the Permanent Bureau, as published in the news section of the Conference’s website:
“The new editions of these Handbooks bring together and synthesise the wealth of case law and commentary on the Convention on the one hand, as well as the work of the Special Commission and practice communicated by Contracting States on the other. Furthermore, in recent years, new issues have arisen with respect to the operation of the Conventions, many of which are the result of unprecedented technological developments. Thus, these new editions also include comprehensive research and analysis relating to the use of information technology in the operation of the Conventions, an area that continues to evolve.

Before their official release, both Handbooks were formally approved by the Council on General Affairs and Policy, the highest organ of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. This of course only increases the authoritative value of these Handbooks as a secondary source of information on the operation of these important Conventions.
For more information, please see the Service and Evidence Sections of the Hague Conference website.”

I have reported before on the narrow possibility, within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, for refusal of recognition of judgments from fellow national courts in the EU (Diageo; Trade Agency). The High Court confirmed the exceptional character of the exercise in Smith v Huertas. Following conviction in a criminal court, Dr Smith had been instructed by the French courts to pay Huertas a considerable sum following fraudulent payments made by a new insolvent company, of which Dr Smith was a director. The argument on ordre public grounds was made viz alleged bias and hostility in one particular court hearing; the long duration of the trial; and one or two alleged procedural inadequacies (in particular, the refusal to interview Dr Smith on a number of occasions).

Most if not all of the complaints were taken by Dr Smith to the ECtHR, which decided not to proceed with the case (such decisions are made in summary manner and one therefore has to guess whether either the claims were found to be manifestly unfounded, or not of a nature as having actually put the applicant at a disadvantage).

Importantly, Cooke J emphasises the responsibility of applicant (seeking refusal of recognition) to raise matters which might conceivably lead to a refusal of recognition, in the Member State of origin: at 21:

Where the factors relied on as being contrary to public policy in England are factors which the court has already considered in the foreign jurisdiction or are factors which could have been raised by way of objection in that jurisdiction, it appears to me self-evident that the foreign jurisdiction must be treated as the best place for those arguments to be raised and determined. To do otherwise would be contrary to the spirit of the Convention and, where issues of unfairness are raised which are capable of being the subject of appeal in the foreign jurisdiction, the court in the enforcing jurisdiction would be much less able to assess them than the original court which was familiar with its own forms of procedure. It is plain that an enforcing court will have much more difficulty in understanding the overall foreign system and its procedures for ensuring that justice is done than the appeal court of the original jurisdiction itself. There is moreover a highly unattractive element in a defendant not raising points which he could have raised in the original jurisdiction, by way of appeal against the judgment and only seeking to raise those matters when the judgment is exported to an enforcing jurisdiction under the Convention as matters of public policy for that court.

Dr Smith’ task therefore was to (at 26) not only … show an exceptional case of an infringement of a fundamental principle constituting a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order in this country or of a right recognised as being fundamental within it but that the system of legal remedies in France did not afford a sufficient guarantee of his rights. Dr Smith must overcome the strong presumption that the procedures of the courts of France, another Contracting State, are compliant with Article 6…

A task which in the end Dr Smith failed to accomplish and summary judgment for recognition and enforcement was issued. Review by Cooke J may seem lengthy to some however CJEU case-law emphasises the ad hoc nature of the ordre public exception: that requires some case-specific assessment, of course.

Geert.

Objective
This seminar will provide participants with a detailed understanding of the most recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) related to family law matters.

The spotlight is centred on Article 8 (respect for private and family life) in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 12 (right to marry). The case law of the ECtHR concentrates not only on the legal implications but also on social, emotional and biological factors.

Key topics
Notion of family life – current definition and interpretation by the ECtHR
International child abduction
Balancing children’s rights, parents’ rights and public order
Surrogacy parenthood
Home births and assistance rights
Abortion
Same-sex relationships and trans individuals’ gender recognition

Who should attend?
Lawyers specialised in family law, human rights lawyers, judges dealing with family law matters, ministry officials, representatives of NGOs and child’s rights organisations.

See the full programme here.

L’Istituto Ellenico di diritto internazionale e straniero ha comunicato attraverso il suo sito, il 28 gennaio 2016, la decisione di sospendere, per ragioni finanziarie, la pubblicazione della Revue hellénique de droit international.

Fondata nel 1948, la Revue hellénique ha rappresentato il principale veicolo di diffusione della dottrina greca nel campo del diritto internazionale pubblico e privato, oltre che nel campo del diritto dell’Unione europea, in lingua francese e inglese.

Rispetto alle tematiche internazionalprivatistiche, la rivista ha ospitato, oltre a numerose cronache della giurisprudenza greca, molti contributi scientifici importanti, di studiosi greci e non (le coordinate bibliografiche degli scritti apparsi sulla rivista sono reperibili a questo indirizzo).

La sospensione delle pubblicazioni della Revue hellénique, se non dovesse essere solo temporanea, costituirebbe una perdita significativa per la comunità scientifica degli internazionalisti europei. Essa in ogni caso riflette le condizioni di straordinaria difficoltà in cui sono costretti a lavorare gli studiosi greci, dopo la drammatica crisi che ha colpito il loro paese.

Dorota Leczykiewicz, Human Rights and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Immigration, Criminal Justice and Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters, available here through on SSRN.

[Abstract] – The chapter considers the rich acquis of the EU falling within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice from the perspective of human rights. It starts by looking at human rights issues arising from EU asylum and migration law and moves on to the EU’s prevention of crime measures, where it focuses on the judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It finishes by considering the human rights issues arising in the context of judicial cooperation in civil matters. The chapter explains the double role of human rights in the AFSJ – as a policy objective realised through legislative measures and a standard of review of acts adopted as part of this EU activity. It also explains why so many human rights issues arise in the AFSJ and investigates the way in which they have been addressed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The chapter argues that the Court’s case law exhibits an extreme version of utilitarianism, which is incompatible with a corrective justice conception of human rights, underlying the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It concludes that the Court of Justice is far from usurping a human rights jurisdiction for itself and that the full potential of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights to infuse EU law in the AFSJ with content inspired by human rights has not yet been realised. Instead, the chapter observes, the Court is often using the argument of effectiveness to resist arguments of human rights, which, as a result, are protected in the AFSJ only in so far as they are recognised and codified in secondary law.

The CJEU has held in Case C-521/14 Sovag that Article 6(2) Brussels I (Article 8(2) in the Recast) applies regardless of whether the proceedings are brought against (which is what inter alia the English language version suggests) or by a third party.

A, the victim of a traffic accident that took place in Germany, brought an action in Finland against SOVAG, with which the vehicle responsible for the damage was insured. That traffic accident also constituting a work accident under the Law on accident insurance, If, which is established in Finland, paid A compensation for the accident in accordance with that law. After A had brought the action against SOVAG, If itself sued SOVAG before the same court of first instance.

The national court in first instance held that, in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation 44/2001, in matters relating to insurance jurisdiction may be determined by the provisions of Section 3 of Chapter II of that Regulation alone. According to SOVAG, Article 6(2) of Regulation 44/2001 is indeed not applicable because Section 3 of Chapter II of the same Regulation establishes an autonomous system for the conferring of jurisdiction in matters of insurance. On this issue, the CJEU (at 30) reminded the national court of earlier case-law that where the action at issue in the main proceedings concerns relations between professionals in the insurance sector, and will not affect the procedural situation of a party deemed to be weaker, the insurance title does not apply. The objective of protecting a party deemed to be weaker being fulfilled once jurisdiction is established on the basis of Section 3 of Chapter II of Regulation 44/2001, subsequent procedural developments concerning only relations between professionals cannot fall within the ambit of that section.

Next, the wording of several of the language versions of Article 6(2), in particular the German, French, Finnish and Swedish versions, does not prevent the court before which the original proceedings are pending from having jurisdiction to hear and determine an action brought by a third party against one of the parties to the original proceedings.  However, other language versions of that provision, particularly the English language version, appear to restrict its scope to actions brought against third parties (‘a person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: … as a third party’).

While the CJEU acknowledged that the special jurisdictional rules need to be applied restrictively, ie not going beyond their purpose, here the purpose of Article 6(2) is the harmonious administration of justice, namely minimising the possibility of concurrent proceedings and ensuring that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member States. Therefore Article 6(2) must also apply where the third party brings the proceedings, not just where it is drawn into those proceedings by others.

However, the Court also sanctioned the Finnish rule of civil procedure that the right of a third party to bring an action in connection with pending judicial proceedings, is contingent on that action being linked to the original proceedings. Given that Article 6(2) does not apply where the proceedings were brought ‘solely with the object of removing’ the party concerned from the jurisdiction of the court which would ordinarily have jurisdiction to hear the case,  the CJEU OK-ed the Finnish rule as being one that assist in helping to avoid abuse of the rule on joinders.

I would have thought the Court would have made that rule one of EU law, given its insistence on autonomous interpretation. (Rather than simply OK-ing a national rule). Whether there is such a European rule therefore must stay into the open a little longer.

Geert.

It has already been mentioned on this blog that the European Commission is funding an international research project on “European Private International Law – Legal Application in Reality” (EUPILLAR). The project, which is led by Prof. Paul Beaumont and Dr. Katarina Trimmings from the University of Aberdeen (UK), will last for two years and involves six research partners from the Universities of Freiburg (Germany), Antwerp (Belgium), Wroclaw (Poland), Leeds (UK), Milan (Italy) and Complutense (Madrid, Spain), examining the case law and legal practice on the main EU private international law instruments in the Court of Justice of the European Union and in the participating Member States. The key objectives of the project are to consider whether the selected Member States’ courts and the CJEU can appropriately deal with the relevant cross-border issues arising in the European Union context and to propose ways to improve the effectiveness of the European PIL framework.

After a practitioners‘ workshop has already been conducted in Freiburg last year, the German branch of the project (Prof. Jan von Hein) is now organizing an academic conference which focuses on the experience gathered in German court practice so far. The conference will take place on 14-15 April 2016 in Freiburg and features high-level academics dealing with pervasive issues such as European and domestic court organization, the methods of evaluating PIL instruments and the application of foreign law in practice. Moreover, court practice on PIL instruments such as Rome I and II, Brussels I(bis) and II(bis) will be analyzed and discussed. The conference language is German and the proceedings will be published in the „Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft“. Participation is free of charge, but requires a prior registration. For the full programme and further details, see here. For registration, please click here.

Sucesiones internacionales. Comentarios al Reglamento (UE) 650/2012, a cura di José Luis Iglesias Buigues e Guillermo Palao Moreno, Tirant lo Blanch, 2015, ISBN 9788490867891, pp. 276, € 89.

[Dal sito dell’editore] El 4 de julio de 2012 se aprobó el Reglamento N° 650/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, relativo a la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de las resoluciones, a la aceptación y la ejecución de los documentos públicos en materia de sucesiones mortis causa y a la creación de un certificado sucesorio europeo. La aplicación plena de este instrumento legislativo adoptado en el ámbito del Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia se producirá el 17 de agosto de 2015, momento a partir del cual nuestro modelo de Derecho internacional privado de sucesiones pasará a regirse por esta nueva norma, cuyo análisis pormenorizado, disposición a disposición, constituye el objeto de esta obra. El estudio que presentamos no es un trabajo exclusivamente académico, sino que se ha buscado ofrecer al profesional del Derecho un comentario de cada una de sus disposiciones en cuanto Derecho positivo, presidido por su confrontación con el Derecho español, con el fin de fundamentar la interpretación y aplicación en la práctica del Reglamento en España.

Maggiori informazioni, compreso l’indice del volume, sono disponibili qui.

The latest issue of the “Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)” features the following articles:

H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner, European conflict of laws 2015: Reappraisal
The article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from December 2014 until November 2015. It summarizes current projects and new instruments that are presently making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss both important decisions and pending cases before the ECJ as well as important decisions from German courts pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

K. Kroll-Ludwigs, Conflict between the Hague Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations (2007) and the Hague Maintenance Convention (1973): lex posterior derogat legi priori?
On 18.6.2011, the European Union set into force the Hague Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations of 23 November 2007 and established common rules for the entire European Union aiming to determine unanimously the applicable law where debtor and creditor are in different countries. The Protocol replaced the Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law applicable to maintenance obligations. Due to its universal application, its rules apply even if the applicable law is the law of a non-Contracting State. However, note that non-EU-States, as Turkey, Switzerland, Japan and Albania are not bound by the Protocol. As well as Germany they are Contracting States of the Hague Maintenance Convention. From the German perspective, in relation to these States the question raises whether the rules of the Hague Maintenance Convention still apply. Taking into account that the Protocol – unlike the Hague Maintenance Convention – enables the parties to choose the applicable law, determining the relevant legal instrument is of great practical importance.

F.M. Wilke, The subsequent completion of German judgments to be enforced abroad
Under certain conditions, a German court can pass a judgment without a statement of facts and even without reasons. This can lead to problems abroad if the decision is to be recognized and enforced there. This is why the implementing statute concerning recognition and enforcement (AVAG) contains provisions that cover the subsequent completion of such decisions in light of certain international conventions and, so far, the Brussels regime. After the reform of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) in light of the Brussels I Recast, however, the scope of application of the AVAG does not extend to the Brussels I Regulation anymore. At first sight, this may seem plausible because of the abolition of exequatur. Yet it might be necessary for a court of an EU member state to examine the facts of a case and/or the reasons behind a decision in order to determine if its recognition/enforcement should be refused (Articles 45, 46 Brussels I Recast). This short article analyses for which cases the legal basis for subsequent completion seems to have vanished and how to deal with them. Essentially, the solutions de lege lata are to bypass the scope of application of the AVAG or to proceed by analogy. In a potential future reform, the respective AVAG provisions simply should be integrated into the ZPO.

S. Kröll, The law applicable to the subjective reach of the arbitration agreement
Defining the parties to an arbitration agreement, in particular whether nonsignatories are bound by the agreement, is one of the pervasive problems in international arbitration. It generally involves a number of conflict of laws questions some of which have been addressed by the German Supreme Court in its decision of 8 May 2014. A party’s reliance on the „group of companies doctrine“ does not relieve the courts from a detailed analysis of the various relationships involved. In most cases, it is the law governing the arbitration agreement which also determines who are the true parties to the arbitration agreement.

M. Weller, No effect of foreign mandatory provisions on arbitration agreements under German law according to § 1030 ZPO
The material scope of arbitration agreements, in particular with regard to tort claims, is a constant point of controversy before state courts. The note on the judgment by the Upper Regional Court Munich identifies opposing trends in German and European case law. The judgment also decides on the (lack of) influence of foreign mandatory provisions, arbitrability according to foreign law and the foreign ordre public on arbitration agreements, subject to German law.

C. Althammer/J. Wolber, Cross-border enforcement of coercive fine orders in Europe and limitation on enforcement
The European Court of Justice ruled in the case of Realchemie Nederland BV./. Bayer CropScience AG that decisions ordering a coercive fine fall within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. This ruling made the German Federal Court of Justice decide upon the effects of a limitation on the crossborder enforcement of such an order. The judgment of the German Federal Court of Justice reveals a traditional understanding of the international law of enforcement and provokes the question if this approach is still appropriate for cross-border enforcement in Europe, especially as the recast of the Brussels I Regulation abolished the exequatur proceeding. The article examines the effects of obstacles resulting from national law of enforcement on the conditions of cross-border enforceability under the Brussels I and Ia Regulation. In this way the article leads into an issue that has so far not been discussed to a sufficient extent: the relationship between the cross-border enforceability of judgments and the national laws of enforcement.

P. Mankowski, Inhibitions against arrest of ships abroad inside or outside an insolvency context?
Sometimes seemingly technical cases at first instance open up a plethora of questions touching upon basics and fundamentals of international procedural law. Whether a court can inhibit parties from pursuing enforcement or arresting ships abroad in- or outside an insolvency context is precisely such a case. It touches upon the permissibility of measures against enforcement abroad and upon the universality approach in modern international insolvency law. Furthermore, it is inexplicably linked with the question to which extent (registered) ships are to be treated like real estate.

D. Otto, Internationale Zuständigkeit indischer Gerichte bei Markenverletzungen
In its decision of 15.10.2014, the Delhi High Court had to resolve whether it had competence in the international sense for a lawsuit by a U.S.-based claimant without a presence in India against an Indian-based defendant, who had his business in a different state. Under Indian civil procedure rules, a court has jurisdiction in the international sense against a defendant residing within the jurisdiction of the court. As per such rule, claimant would have to litigate before the Bombay High Court, not the Delhi High Court. The Claimant invoked a new legal provision that gives jurisdiction in disputes involving copy right or trademark violations in India also to a court at the place where the claimant carries on business. Claimant argued that it did “carry on business” within the jurisdiction of the Delhi court because its website could be accessed in Delhi. The court accepted that. This Article questions such decision as previous jurisprudence by Indian courts required that an “essential” part of claimant’s business is carried out in India; access to a website alone was deemed insufficient.

F. Heindler, Austrian Supreme Court on Remuneration of Heir Locators
The Austrian Surpreme Court in Civil Matters (Oberster Gerichtshof) has changed its jurisdiction on claims by commercial heir locators. Under Austrian law, according to the Oberster Gerichtshof, commercial heir locators are still entitled to reimbursement for expenses in negotiorum gestio. However, the amount of remuneration is no longer calculated in relation to the heir’s inheritance right.

Is the relationship between two insurers, having covered liability for a towing vehicle cq a trailer, each subrogated in their insured’s rights and obligations, one of them currently exercising a claim against the other in partial recovery of the compensation due to the victim, non-contractual? I reviewed Sharpston AG’s Opinion here. I believe the Court has confirmed her Opinion. However I am not entirely certain for the judgment is awkwardly phrased.

Like its AG, the CJEU dismisses a suggestion that Directive 2009/103 (relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability) includes a conflict of laws (applicable law) rule which is lex specialis vis-a-vis the Rome I Regulation. Indeed the Directive’s provisions do not indicate whatsoever that they can be stretched.

Then comes the core of the issue, the nature of the relationship underlying the claim. The AG had suggested this is contractual, using as I noted in my earlier posting, ‘centre of gravity’ (‘the centre of gravity of the obligation to indemnify is in the contractual obligation’); ‘rooted in’ (‘the recourse action by one insurer against the other…is rooted in the contracts of insurance’); and ‘intimately bound up’ (‘[the action] is intimately bound up with the two insurers’ contractual obligation‘). (at 62).

The Court did not repeat any of this terminology. It first suggests that the national court where the case is pending, needs to determine using Article 4 of Rome II (lex locus damni) whether the law so determined ‘provides for apportionment of the obligation to compensate for the damage’. This the AG had not expressly pondered, rather it may be implicit in her use of the conditional ‘where two or more insurers are jointly and severally liable’ ((only) used at 71 of her Opinion). Next, the Court holds, if there is such apportionment, the law applicable to the action for indemnity between the insurers of the tractor cq the trailer, needs to be determined using Article 7 of Rome I (which applies to insurance contracts).

The referring courts were looking I believe for more straightforward advice. Instead I fear the many conditions precedent expressed in the judgment may well leave plenty of room for counsel to further confuse these national courts. This arguably may have a knock-on effect given the repeated insistence by the CJEU that the provisions of Brussels I (Recast) on contract and tort, need to be applied in parallel with those of Rome I and II (not something I necessarily agree with but have come to accept as standing CJEU precedent).

Geert.

Anche quest’anno, la Società Italiana di Diritto Internazionale e di Diritto dell’Unione Europea (SIDI) indice il Premio di Laurea “Daniele Padovani” per la migliore tesi di laurea in materia di diritto internazionale privato e processuale.

L’ammissione al concorso è riservata ai candidati che abbiano conseguito una laurea specialistica o magistrale in giurisprudenza successivamente al 30 maggio 2014, con votazione non inferiore a 105.

Il termine per la presentazione delle domande è fissato al 4 marzo 2016.

Maggiori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

The procedural context of C&F Green Energy v Bakker Magnetic BV is an attempt at making the courts preliminarily decide the isuse of applicable law to the contract between the parties. Gearóid Carey  explains the Irish civil procedure context here. In this posting I just want to flag one or two Rome I/II issues.

Plaintiffs (an Irish company), wind turbine manufacturers, seek declaratory relief and damages arising out of an alleged breach of contract and negligence on the part of the defendant in connection with the supply of magnets to the plaintiffs for use in the turbines. Defendant denies liability and has counterclaimed in respect of unpaid invoices and loss of profit.

The issue sought to be resolved at a preliminary hearing is whether it is Irish or Dutch law which governs the contract and should be applied by the court when the case comes on for full hearing. It was not for the High Court to determine the applicable law issue at this stage but rather to decide whether this crucial issue is to be decided at a preliminary hearing or whether it should be dealt with as one of the issues at the trial. Hedigan J decided it should be the latter. He dismissed i.a. the argument that much time will be saved because the parties will only have to prepare the case on the basis of one applicable law whatever the result of the preliminary issue, as ‘a little overblown’: expert opinion of one or two Dutch lawyers may be sought, however the facts of the case once the applicable law issue is settled, ought not to be overly complicated.

What interests me here is the ease with which, wrongly, the Court (however presumably just paraphrasing counsel at this point) applies the cascade or waterfall of Article 4 Rome I.  Parties’ views on applicable law are summarised in the judgment as follows: (at 5.2-5.3)

‘The defendant argues that the issue is a very discrete question of law relatively easily established. It argues that pursuant to Article 3.1 of the Rome I Regulation, a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. It argues that the defendant’s general conditions of sale were incorporated into the contract because of their attachment to a series of quotations delivered by email and their inclusion in their order confirmation forms. Thus, Dutch law was chosen by the parties to govern their contract. It argues that if they succeed on this point then little remains to be decided because certain clear time limits will apply and these, they claim, have clearly not been met….

The plaintiffs argue that it is not Article 3 but Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation that should apply. This Article provides that it is the law of the country most closely connected to the contract that shall apply. Although Article 4 provides for the applicable law only in the absence of a choice of law, the plaintiff argues that this Article will fall to be considered if they can establish that the orders for the goods were not, in fact, made subject to the condition importing Dutch law. In this regard, they characterised the emails relied upon by the defendant as merely pre-contract correspondence. They will rely upon the evidence of the parties to demonstrate that Dutch law was never accepted as the law of the contract. They will argue that the choice of law should be determined pursuant to Article 4(3) by an examination of all the numerous connections between the contract and Ireland. This, they argue, will involve a consideration of all the evidence of the negotiations that took place between the parties. In relation to their claim in tort, they argue that the general rule under Rome II Article 4(1)(i) should apply i.e. the law of the country where the damage occurred. They argue that Article 4(3) of Rome II further brings into play evidence as to manifest proximity. Both of these, they argue, will involve evidence of the parties.’

Which of these will prevail will now be settled at trial stage. Defendant will have to show that what it refers to as the pre-contractual quotations of its general conditions of sale, seemingly by e-mails and eventually in the confirmation forms, amounts to a choice of law clearly established, per Article 3(1) Rome I.  There is considerable case-law on the mirror issue of choice of Court under Brussels I, also in an e-mail context (see e.g. here) however  to what degree one can simply apply the same principles to choice of law, is not clearly established in case-law.

An interesting point is that the Court (and counsel with it, one presumes) jumps straight to Article 4(3) Rome I should choice of law per Article 3(1 not be clearly established. Article 4(3) however is the escape clause (referred to by Hedigan J as ‘manifest proximity’), which must only apply in exceptional circumstance. The correct next steps following failure to establish clearly established choice of law, are firstly the assumptions made under Article 4(1)  (Article 4(1) (a) would seem most obvious here); should that fail, Article 4(2)’s characteristic performance test; and failing that, Article 4(4)s ‘proper law of the contract’ consideration. Article 4(3) only corrects Article 4(1) or (2)s more mechanical (‘objective’ as it is also called) choice of law determination. The judgment mixes Article 4(3)’s ultimate and exceptional correction, with the proper law of the contract test.

My concerns here should likewise not be overblown. Actual determination of the applicable law was not the court’s task. However now that the issue goes back to trial, correct application of Rome I must be made.

Geert.