Do actions for recovery of sums unduly paid by way of unjust enrichment fall within exclusive jurisdiction under Article 22(5) of the Brussels I Regulation and, if not, do they fall within alternative jurisdiction set out in Article 5(3) in respect of “quasi-delicts”?
This is the twofold question that a Croatian court addressed to the Court of Justice in the case HRVATSKE ŠUME, C-242/20.
Last week, on 9th December, the Court handed down its judgment in this case.
Gilles Cuniberti and Geert van Calster reported and commented on the judgment. I am happy to refer to their contributions. As the judgment has already made object of their interesting analysis, the present post aims solely to complement the initial post about the Opinion presented by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in the case at hand and the observations made there.
A brief reminder of the Opinion and its findings
Back in September, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe presented his Opinion in this case. At the request of the Court, he did only elaborate on the second part of the question presented above – and, technically speaking, the first preliminary question – pertaining to the interpretation of Article 3(5) of the Brussels I Regulation (point 20 of the Opinion).
In essence, he argued that an action for unjust enrichment is not a “matter relating to a contract” in the sense of Article 5(1), save where it is closely connected with a preexisting (or alleged to exist) contractual relationship (points 44-52). Nor it is a “matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Regulation (point 79).
The judgment of the Court On the exclusive jurisdiction
The Court starts its analysis with first part of the question presented in the introduction of the this post – and again, technically speaking, the second preliminary question – on the interpretation of Article 22(5) on the exclusive jurisdiction.
The Court reads this question in the context of a particularity of the case that is brought up by the referring court in its request for a preliminary ruling: an action for recovery of sums unduly paid by way of unjust enrichment falls within the scope of exclusive jurisdiction set out in Article 22(5) where that action concerns an amount levied in the enforcement proceedings and is brought before a court because it is not possible anymore, given the lapse of time (since the date of enforcement), to seek recovery of the levied amount in the same enforcement proceedings? (paragraph 26).
The reasoning of the Court relies heavily on the autonomous character of the action in question with regards to the enforcement proceedings (paragraph 31) and on the predictability argument (paragraphs 30 and 34).
This reasoning leads the Court to conclude that, despite the aforementioned particularity of the case, the action for recovery of sums unduly paid does not fall within the scope of Article 22(5) of the Brussels I Regulation (paragraph 37).
On the alternative jurisdiction for contracts/torts
After that, the Court, logically, proceeds to the interpretation of Article 5(3) in order to clarify whether the action in question falls within the scope of that provision.
In short, it considers that due to the lack of the “harmful event” in the meaning of Article 5(3) , an action for recovery of sums unduly paid by way of unjust enrichment cannot fall within the scope of that provision (paragraph 55).
It also clarifies that the unjust enrichment does not, generally speaking, result from the act voluntarily undertaken by the party enriched at the expense of another. Thus, in principle it does not fall within the scope of Article 5(1), as a “matter relating to a contract” (paragraph 45). However, echoing the Opinion delivered by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, the Cour considers that action “closely linked” to a contract would fall within the ambit of that provision (paragraphs 47 and 48).
Already second time’s a charm ?
In the initial post on the Opinion, I speculated that the solution proposed by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe may have brought to mind the proposal made by AG Bobek in the context of actio pauliana in his Opinion delivered in the case Feniks, C-337/17. As a reminder, in the latter Opinion, AG Bobek proposed to consider, in essence, that an actio pauliana cannot be seen as a “matter relating to a contract”, nor it is a “matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict”. It has to be brought before the court having jurisdiction under the general rule of jurisdiction, according to the principle actor sequitur forum rei.
Let us speculate and take that proposal one step further: while in order to identify the law governing action pauliana it might be necessary to decide whether this action is contractual or non-contractual in nature and thus falls within the scope of the Rome I Regulation or within the scope of the Rome II Regulation, it is not the case for the contract/tort distinction under the rules of jurisdiction set out in Article 5(1) and 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.
In the judgment in the case Feniks, C-337/17, the Court did not follow the proposal advanced by AG Bobek (see paragraph 44 of that judgment). Thus, it did not have to face or even to consider the one-step-forward speculative consequence mentioned above.
By contrast, it decided to do exactly that in the present case.
The Court acknowledges that a non-contractual characterization of the unjust enrichment is mandated by the Rome II Regulation (even though it falls within a scope of a special choice-of-law rule of Article 10), but it does not automatically translate to a similar characterization under the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I Regulation (paragraph 46).
The judgment can be consulted here.
Ilaria Queirolo (University of Genova), Salvatore Patti (University of Rome La Sapienza), Carlos Esplugues Mota (University of Valencia), Boriana Musseva (Sofia University), Dana Rone (Turiba University, Riga), Laura Carpaneto (University of Genova) and Francesca Maoli (University of Genova) have edited Children’s Right to Information in EU Civil Actions, published by the Italian publisher Pacini.
The volume collects the results of the EU co-funded Project Minor’s Right to Information in EU civil actions – Improving children’s right to information in cross-border civil cases – MiRI, European Union Justice Programme 2014-2020, JUST-JCOO-AG-2018-831608. It critically addresses the fundamental right of the child to receive information during the course of civil proceedings affecting him or her, with particular reference to the peculiarities characterizing cross-border proceedings in family matters. In this context, the right to information is coinceived not only as a corollary of the right of the child to be heard during the course of the proceedings, but also in the light of the possible developments as an autonomous procedural right. The volume rationalizes the main criticalities emerging from the current practice in several EU Member States and offers a set of Guidelines, aimed at improving the situation of children involved in cross-border family proceedings, in order to enhance and protect their fundamental rights.
The contributors include Roberta Bendinelli, Leontine Bruijnen, Laura Carpaneto, Carlos Esplugues Mota, Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, Maria González Marimón, Sara Lembrechts, Francesca Maoli, Boriana Musseva, Vasil Pandov, Francesco Pesce, Ilaria Queirolo, Pablo Quinzá Redondo, Geraldo Rocha Ribeiro, Dana Rone, Tine Van Hof, Daja Wenke.
The book is fully accessible here.
In its Judgment BT v Seguros Catalana Occidente, EB, Case C-708/20, rendered on 9 December 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 13 Brussels Ibis Regulation. Amongst other things, the provision at hand takes into consideration direct actions of the injured party against the insurer domiciled in a Member State. Two main scenarios are taken into account. Either the injured party starts proceedings against the insured, and the insurer joins proceedings at a second moment, or the damaged party brings a direct action against the insurer. In this last case, the court having jurisdiction over the insurer shall have jurisdiction over the insured as well (that is, the contractually weaker party).
In Seguros Catalana Occidente, the damaged party, domiciled in the UK, spent some time at a holiday accommodation in Spain, and was there injured due to a fall on the patio. The insurance company of the immovable property was Spanish, and the insured/owner of the premises where the accident occurred, and who previously entered into an accommodation contract allowing the stay of the injured party, was domiciled in Ireland. By making use of its own forum actoris under Article 13(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation, the injured party started proceedings against the insurance company before British courts. British courts were also seised by the injured party for an action in damages against the insured party/owner of the property, who contested jurisdiction arguing that Article 13(3) Brussels Ibis was not applicable as a claim for damages arising from alleged negligence in the provision of a holiday accommodation would not constitute an ‘insurance claim’ (para. 18).
Whereas the nature of the injured person’s direct action against the insurer under national law is irrelevant for the purposes of qualifying an action as falling within the notion of ‘insurance matters’ (as already noted in C-463/06), the CJEU accedes to the interpretation that a claim against an insured for damages arising from alleged negligence in the provision of holiday accommodation does not fall within the scope of Article 13(3) Brussels Ibis Regulation, rather it being a matter of tort. For the section on insurance matters to be applicable, ‘the action before the court must necessarily raise a question relating to rights and obligations arising out of an insurance relationship between the parties to that action’ (para. 30). In other words, ‘a claim brought by the injured person against the policyholder … cannot be considered to be an insurance claim merely because that claim and the claim made directly against the insurer have their origin in the same facts or there is a dispute between the insurer and the injured person relating to the validity or effect of the insurance policy’ (para. 31).
In the CJEU’s eye, allowing the injured party to bring an action unrelated to insurance matters against the insured on the basis of Article 13(3) Brussels Ibis would circumvent the rules of that regulation concerning jurisdiction in matters of tort and lead to the effect that damaged parties could start proceedings against insurers before their own forum actoris under Article 13(2) ‘in order, subsequently, to bring an action against the insured, as a third party to those proceedings, on the basis of Article 13(3)’ (para. 36).
On 25 November 2021, the Court of Justice handed out its judgement in IB (C-289/20), in which it followed the earlier Opinion of AG Sánchez-Bordona. The preliminary question referred to the Court in this case concerned the jurisdictional rules of Article 3(1)(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation and was aimed at clarifying whether a spouse might have his or her ‘habitual residence’ in more than one country, which could result in courts of both Member States having jurisdiction in proceedings relating to matrimonial matters. This post was published previously on EU Law Live.
BackgroundThe background to the case concerns the applicant IB, who wanted to institute divorce proceedings at forum actoris pursuant to the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, having strong ties to two countries, Ireland due to family and social interests and France due to professional and patrimonial interests.
CJEU’s AnalysisReferring to Mikołajczyk (C-294/15), the Court of Justice recalled that Article 3 of the Brussels II bis Regulation provides for very generous grounds of jurisdiction, which are alternative, but exclusive. The rules of the fifth and sixth indents of Article 3(1)(a) were designed considering interests of the spouse who, after the breakdown of the marriage, decides to move back to his or her home country nad wants to institute proceeding there (paragraph 35). The concept of ‘habitual residence’ is not defined in the Brussels II bis Regulation; however, it is consistently used in a singular form. The use of the adjective ‘habitual’ suggests that on the one hand the residence should have a stable and regular character and on the other the transfer of habitual residence to another country should reflect the willingness of remaining there with the intention of establishing there the stable center of one’s life interests. The assimilation of the habitual residence of a person, in this case a spouse, to the permanent or habitual centre of his or her interests does not militate in favour of accepting that a number of residences may simultaneously have such a character (paragraphs 40-44).
The objective of Article (3)(1)(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation is to reconcile legal certainty with the reality of the mobility of persons within the EU. Assuming that one might have multiple habitual residences would definitely undermine this legal certainty and predictability as to which court might hear the case. It would also create a risk that the concept of ‘habitual residence’ would be equated with simple residence. Additionally, such interpretation of the concept of habitual residence under the Brussels II bis Regulation would have repercussions for other EU instruments, namely the Maintenance Regulation and the Matrimonial Property Regulation, which provide for jurisdictional basis dependent on the jurisdiction in matrimonial matters (paragraph 48).
CJEU’s ConclusionAs a result, a person might have only one habitual residence within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation (paragraph 51). Having concluded the above, the Court of Justice clarified the meaning of the concept of ‘habitual residence’. Its judgements concerning habitual residence of a child, in HR (C-512/17) for example, were used as a starting point. Then the Court underlined the specificities of the situation of an adult, namely the will of returning to the home country after the marriage breakdown, as well as the more diverse nature of the environment, which is composed of different activities and diversified interests – professional, sociocultural, patrimonial, and familial (paragraph 56). Habitual residence is characterized by two elements, namely the willingness of fixing one’s center of interests in a given place and the presence of sufficiently stable character (paragraph 57). The Court of Justice thus seemed to suggest that IB might have indeed changed his place of habitual residence (paragraphs 59-61) but noted that it is for the referring court to ascertain.
Overall, the judgement is not a surprising one, as it stands in line with previous jurisprudence of Court of Justice, for example in EE (C-80/19), when it states that the habitual residence of the deceased must be established in a single Member State (paragraph 40).
The Journal of Private International Law and the Singapore Management University will hold a virtual conference on 23 to 24 June 2022. The theme of the conference is Conflicts of Jurisdiction. The conference is designed to assist with the ongoing work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) on Jurisdiction. The speakers are leading private international law scholars and experts, many of whom are directly involved in the ongoing negotiations at the HCCH. Registration to attend the conference will open nearer the time.
The biennial Journal of Private International Law Conference has been delayed until 2023 in order to enable it to take place in person at the Singapore Management University. This conference will be based on a call for papers. We will announce further details in due course.
Conference on Conflicts of Jurisdiction
23-24 June 2022
Organised by the Journal of Private International Law and the Singapore Management University
(SGT=Singapore Time; BST=British Summer Time)
Day 1
Session 1 Thursday 23 June 2022 – The Common Law Approaches to Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Chair: Professor Jonathan Harris (QC) (King’s College London)
Time Speaker Topic 18.00-18.05 SGT11.00-11.05 BST Professor Jonathan Harris (QC) (King’s College London) Welcome by Chair 18.05-18.10 SGT
11.05-11.10 BST Dean of Yong Pung How School of Law, Singapore Management University Opening comments 18.10-18.35 SGT
11.10-11.35 BST Professor Campbell McLachlan QC (Victoria University, New Zealand) Overview of some key issues in relation to conflicts of jurisdiction 18.35-19.00 SGT
11.35-12.00 BST Dr Ardavan Arzandeh (National University of Singapore) The Scottish, English and Singapore approach of forum non conveniens in conflicts of jurisdiction cases 19.00-19.25 SGT
12.00-12.25 BST Professor Ronald Brand (University of Pittsburgh) The US approach to forum non conveniens in conflicts of jurisdiction cases 19.25-19.50 SGT
12.25-12.50 BST Professor Mary Keyes (Griffith University) The Australian approach to forum non conveniens in conflicts of jurisdiction cases 19.50-20.05 SGT
12.50-13.05 BST Q&A 20.05-20.20 SGT
13.05-13.20 BST Break
Session 2 Thursday 23 June 2022 – Civilian Approaches to Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Chair: Professor Kei Takeshita (Hitotsubashi University and Chair of the HCCH Working Group on Jurisdiction)
Time Speaker Topic 20.20-20.25 SGT13.20-13.25 BST Professor Kei Takeshita (Hitotsubashi University and Chair of the HCCH Working Group on Jurisdiction) Welcome by Chair 20.25-20.50 SGT
13.25-13.50 BST Professor Tanja Domej (University of Zurich) The EU and Lugano Convention approaches to conflicts of jurisdiction for internal cases (ie within the EU or between Contracting States to the Lugano Convention) 20.50-21.15 SGT
13.50-14.15 BST Professor Geert Van Calster (KU Leuven) The EU approach to conflicts of jurisdiction with non-EU and Lugano States (Articles 33 and 34 of Brussels Ia Regulation)
21.15-21.40 SGT
14.15-14.40 BST Professors Nadia De Araujo and Marcelo De Nardi (Brazil) Latin American approaches to conflicts of jurisdiction in international cases
21.40-22.05 SGT
14.40-15.05 BST Professor Zheng (Sophia) Tang (University of Wuhan and Newcastle University) Chinese and some other civilian approaches in Asia to conflicts of jurisdiction
22.05-22.20 SGT
15.05-15.20 BST Q&A
Day 2
Session 3 Friday 24 June 2022 – Work at the Hague Conference on Private International Law on Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Chair: Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling)
Time Speaker Topic 18.00-18.05 SGT11.00-11.05 BST Professor Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling) Welcome by Chair 18.05-18.30 SGT
11.05-11.30 BST Professor Fausto Pocar (University of Milan) The work on the Judgments Project in the Hague in the 1990s culminating in the interim text of 2001 18.30-18.55 SGT
11.30-11.55 BST Professor David McClean (University of Sheffield) Lessons from family law notably the provisions on conflicts of jurisdiction including transfers of jurisdiction in the Child Protection Convention 1996 18.55-19.20 SGT
11.55-12.20 BST Dr João Ribeiro-Bidaoui (First Secretary, HCCH) The revived Jurisdiction Project in the Hague – from Experts’ Group to Working Group – possible solutions on conflicts of jurisdiction 19.20-19.45 SGT
12.20-12.45 BST Professor Matthias Lehmann (University of Vienna) Challenges and opportunities for a new binding global instrument on conflicts of jurisdiction 19.45-20.00 SGT
12.45-13.00 BST Q&A 20.00-20.15 SGT
13.00-13.15 BST Break
Session 4 Friday 24 June 2022 – Work at the Hague Conference on Private International Law on Conflicts of Jurisdiction (continued)
Chair: Dr Adeline Chong (Singapore Management University)
Time Speaker Topic 20.15-20.20 SGT13.15-13.20 BST Dr Adeline Chong (Singapore Management University) Welcome by Chair 20.20-20.45 SGT
13.20-13.45 BST Professor Trevor Hartley (London School of Economics) Balancing forum non conveniens and lis pendens (same parties and same subject matter) in a new global instrument on conflicts of jurisdiction 20.45-21.10 SGT
13.45-14.10 BST Professor Yeo Tiong Min (Singapore Management University) Dealing with related actions in a new global instrument on conflicts of jurisdiction 21.10-21.35 SGT
14.10-14.35 BST Professor Franco Ferrari (NYU) Conflicts between courts and arbitration in international cases and how to resolve them in a new global instrument on conflicts of jurisdiction 21.35-22.00 SGT
14.35-15.00 BST Justice Anselmo Reyes (Singapore International Commercial Court and Doshisha University) International commercial courts’ approaches to conflicts of jurisdiction and how they fit with a new global instrument on conflicts of jurisdiction 22.00-22.15 SGT
15.00-15.15 BST Q&A 22.15-22.20 SGT
15.15-15.20 BST Professor Jonathan Harris, Professor Paul Beaumont, Dr Adeline Chong Closing remarks
Guest post by Willem Theus, PhD Researcher (KULeuven, cotutelle with UCLouvain)
The history of private international law (or ‘conflict of laws’) is incomplete. Private international law textbooks have always referred to the essentials of the history of our discipline.[1] However, these essentials are often solely based on the history of conflict of laws in the West and on the works of western authors such as Huber, Von Savigny and Story. It is undoubtedly true that these authors played an important role and that the “modern” conflict of laws finds it origin in 19thcentury Europe, when the split between private and public international law occurred.[2] This is however only one part of history.
Conflict of laws systems have been around much longer and are definitely not uniquely western. They were already present in the very first civilizations, with some rules of that ancient history still resembling our present-day rules.[3]Conflict of laws is “the body of law that aims to resolve claims involving foreign elements”.[4] A state or international border is therefore not required to have a conflict of laws system,[5] only different jurisdictions and laws (i.e. legal pluralism[6]) are. A distinction could therefore be made between “external” (i.e. crossing an international State border) conflict of laws or private international law and “internal” conflict of laws (i.e. within one State).[7] Both the historical research and the contemporary study of our field should arguably reflect much more on precolonial and/or non-western conflict of laws systems and on the unique linkage between the national (or “internal”) and international (or “external”) spheres. This is especially so given that “external” conflict of laws rules seem to sometimes guide “internal” conflict of laws cases.[8] I offer one historical example to highlight the new perspectives that such a widening of scope could offer.
In a not so distant and colonial past, there were multiple “internationalized” or mixed courts in various regions and nations. The last such mixed court only closed its doors in 1980.[9] In general, mixed courts were local courts that employed a mixed (read mostly Western) bench, bar and legal system to deal with legal conflicts that had a mixed or “foreign” element, i.e. conflicts not exclusively related to one local or foreign resident population.[10] Those exclusively local or intra-foreigner -of the same nationality- legal conflicts were often dealt with by various local or consular courts. The mixed or “foreign” element was however often widely interpreted and therefore quickly kicked in, leading to overlapping jurisdictions in many instances and therefore to a conflict of laws system.
An example of such a set-up is the Tangier International Zone (1923-1956), a treaty-based multinational run zone, which remained under the Sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco. It had various multinational institutions with local involvement. In the Zone, five different legal systems co-existed, each with their own courts. These were the American Consular Court, the Special Tribunal of the State Bank of Morocco, the Moroccan Sharia courts, the Moroccan Rabbinical courts and the Mixed Court. The latter dealt with all cases that had a “foreign” element (except American as they went to the aforementioned American Consular Court).[11] Both “internal” and “external” conflict of law systems in fact overlap here. Indeed the Mixed Court and the two Moroccan courts were “local” courts with the judges being formally appointed by the Sultan, whereas the American Consular Court was in essence an ad hoc American court in Tangier. The Special Tribunal was some sort of early investment protection court with very limited jurisdiction.
Naturally, in such a set-up conflict of laws cases were frequent, as illustrated by the Toledano-case which came before the Mixed Court. In 1949 a dispute between the heirs of the large inheritance of a Tangerine Jew, Isaac Toledano, broke out. The key question concerned the nationality of Isaac – and as such the questions of jurisdiction and applicable law. During his lifetime Isaac had become a Spanish citizen by naturalization, yet he had seemingly always lived in Morocco. Had he somehow lost his Moroccan citizenship? If so, the mixed courts would have jurisdiction and Spanish law would apply, leading his inheritance to be divided under all his children, including his married daughters. If not, the rabbinical courts of Tangier and rabbinical law would apply, leading to his inheritance to only go to his sons and unmarried daughters. On appeal the court overturned the judgment of first instance that held that he had retained his Moroccan nationality. He was deemed to be Spanish and therefore Spanish law was to be applied.[12]
Such jurisdictional caselaw is only a part of this conflict of laws treasure trove. The caselaw of the mixed courts seemingly encompasses all types of conflict of laws questions and many other legal questions. I have to say seemingly, as the caselaw of the mixed courts has in recent times barely been studied and their archives (if known at all) are scattered throughout the globe. A closer look could undoubtedly open up new perspectives to conflict of laws, and some of these mixed courts’ experiences and case-law could perhaps help to guide ever-recurring questions of personal status matters regarding foreigners. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi has for example reintroduced special personal status provisions for non-Muslim foreigners as reported on conflictoflaws recently. The courts also offer new perspectives for public international law as certain mixed courts acted as “true” international courts when interpreting their treaties. An example is the Court of Appeal of Mixed Court of Tangier going against the International Court of Justice in 1954 when it held that it alone had the authority to provide authoritative interpretations of the Zone’s constitutive treaties.[13] The Mixed Courts could even open new perspectives to EU-law as many early key EU lawyers and judges have ties to certain Mixed Courts.[14] Much work is therefore still to be done. This piece is a call to arms for just that.
[1] Hatzimihail, N.E. (2021) Preclassical Conflict of Laws. Cambridge University Press 51-52.
[2] For an overview of this period see: Banu, R. (2018). Nineteenth Century Perspectives on Private International Law. Oxford University Press
[3] Yntema, Hessel E. (1953). The Historic Bases of Private International Law. The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 2, no. 3, 301. Yntema refers to the following text found in a Fayoum Papyri: “Contracts between Greeks-who had established colonies in Egypt (red.)-and Egyptians, if in Greek form, should be tried before the chrematists, the Greek courts; if in Egyptian form, before the laocrites, the native courts, in accordance with the laws of the country.”
[4] Okoli, C.S.A. (2020). Private International Law in Nigeria. Hart, 3.
[5] Okoli, Op.cit., 3-7; Yntema. Op.cit., 299
[6] For a good overview of the different meanings of this term see: Benda-Beckmann, B. & Turner, B. (2018). Legal Pluralism, Social Theory, and the State. Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 50(3), 255–274
[7] This distinction is not new and is used in legislation. See for example: Non-application of This Regulation to Internal Conflicts of Laws. (2016). In A. Calvo Caravaca, A. Davì, & H. Mansel (Eds.), The EU Succession Regulation: A Commentary (pp. 521-529). Cambridge University Press.
[8] Okoli Op.cit, 3.
[9] Pacific Manuscripts Bureau, Collection MS 1145: Judgements of the Joint Court of the New Hebrides. Retrieved from <https://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/pambu/catalogue/index.php/judgements-of-joint-court-of-new-hebrides> accessed 13 December 2021. It was known as a ‘Joint’ Court and not ‘Mixed’ as there were only two powers involved: France and the UK. Although in French it was still referred to as a Tribunal Mixte. Mixed Courts mostly existed in countries that were not-directly colonized, yet still under heavy Western influence such as Siam, China and Egypt. They were mostly founded due to western distrust for the local legal systems and build forth on the principle of personal jurisdiction (and the connected later principle of extraterritoriality and the connected Capitulations and Unequal Treaties).
[10] Erpelding, M. (2020). Mixed Courts of the Colonial Era. In Hélène Ruiz Fabri (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law. Oxford University Press.
[11] Erpelding, M & Rherrousse, F. (2019) The Mixed Court of Tangier. In Héne Ruiz Fabri (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law. Oxford University Press, paras 22-24.
[12] de Radigues de Chenneviere, C. (5 April 1949). ‘Procès Toledano’. Tangier, P 452/717, AF-12-A-3 (Diplomatic Archives of the Kingdom of Belgium)
[13] Grawitz, M. (1955). Arrêt du 13 août 1954. Annuaire français de droit international, 1(1), 324–328
[14] Erpelding, M. (2020). International law and the European Court of Justice: the Politics of Avoiding History, Journal of the History of International Law, 22(2-3), 446-471.
The European Commission (EC) set out an initiative Recognition of parenthood between Member States. As underlined by the EC, the initiative aims to ensure that parenthood, as established in one EU country, is recognised across the EU, so that children maintain their rights in cross-border situations, in particular when their families travel or move within the EU. Currently, in certain circumstances they might see the parenthood not recognised, which in turn might result in adverse consequences for the child (for example, obstacles in obtaining a passport or an identity card).
These problems might be easily illustrated by the background of the case, which resulted in a very recent judgement of the Court of Justice in Stolichna obshtina, rayon “Pancharevo” (C-490/20). See posts on this blog on the attitude of administrative authorities of some Member States, on the example of Bulgaria and AG Kokott’s opinion as to its implications in EU law, especially the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU – respectively – here and here.
As reminded in the inception impact assessment published in Spring 2021, there is currently no instrument on the recognition of parenthood at the international level. The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) is engaged in exploring the possibilities of tackling this issue (information about these works might be found at HCCH website here). In the EU, each Member State applies its own law on the recognition of civil status records/judgements on parenthood handed down in another Member State. On the one hand, under EU treaties, substantive family law falls within the competence of Member States. Their substantive rules on the establishment and recognition of parenthood differ. On the other hand, the EU has competence to adopt measures concerning family law with cross-border implications pursuant to Article 81(3) TFEU. These measures can include the adoption of common conflict rules and the adoption of common procedures for the recognition of judgments issued in other Member States. The EC plans to present a proposal of the regulation by the third quarter of 2022.
Public ConsultationThe EC has also lunched a public consultation. The outcome of the consultation was recently published (and is available here). Although collected answers are not necessary representative for the whole EU (interestingly, out of 389 answers 112 come from Slovakia), they indicate that indeed there are instances where parenthood was not recognised as between Member State.
(…) the cases mainly involved a child born out of surrogacy (37% or 116 responses), followed by a child born out of assisted reproductive technology (ART) (23% or 73 responses) and second parent adoption by the partner of the biological parent (21% or 65 responses). Other cases in which parenthood was not recognised included parenthood established by operation of law (14% or 45 responses) and adoption by two parents (10% or 30 responses). Adoption by one single parent and establishment of parenthood over an adult were not recognised according to 6% (or 18 responses) and 3% (or 8 responses) respectively.
As specified by respondents, the primary reason for not recognising parenthoods established in another Member State is that the recognition of parenthood is contrary to the national law of the Member State [or rather a public policy of that Member State? – AWB] where recognition is sought (72% or 184 responses) (…)
Expert GroupThe Expert Group was set up to advise EC on the preparation of this new legislative initiative. The Group has met already on several occasions. As minutes of these meeting reveal (see here for details), the Group was discussing, inter alia, the very notion of “recognition” with respect to parenthood, which often is confirmed by an administrative document, for example the birth certificate.
(…) existing Union instruments address the circulation of authentic instruments under three possible forms: acceptance, only enforcement and recognition and enforcement, and that by definition enforcement is not applicable to the status of persons. The group considered that acceptance may refer only to the evidentiary effects of the facts recorded in the document but not to the existence of a legal relationship, such that only recognition would be relevant for the purposes of the planned regulation on parenthood.
It was thus agreed that the term ‘recognition’ should be used in the proposal as it refers not only to the factual elements but also to the legal effects of the authentic instrument.
Enhanced Cooperation?It might be added that adoption of a regulation under Article 81(3) TFEU requires unanimity. As a result, so far regulations aimed at unifying international family law were adopted within enhanced cooperation, due to lack of such unanimity (for example, the Divorce Regulation). The side effect is that these regulations are applied only in participating Member States, which undermines the unification efforts of the EU. Hence, there is a risk that non-participating Member States could be the ones, in which the problem of non-recognition of parenthood established in another Member State is more pressing than in other ones.
On 17 December 2021, the UNCITRAL RCAPUM Joint Conference, an event celebrating the 2021 UNCITRAL Asia Pacific Day, is scheduled in the University of Macau (Macau SAR) under the title “Conquering the COVID: Enhancing Economic Recovery through Harmonization of Law Governing MSMEs”. This is the annual conference rising from the successful cooperation between the UNCITRAL Regional Centre for Asia and the Pacific (RCAP) and the University of Macau since 2014. The UNCITRAL RCAP-UM Joint Conference 2021 intends to bring together a group of distinguished experts and scholars to analyze contemporary issues related to the current agenda of UNCITRAL impacting MSMEs and the legal instruments resulting from its previous works. The conference will focus on the following tracks: 1. MSMEs formation: simplification of practices in business registration and transformation of business establishment procedures. 2. Creating congenial legal environment for MSMEs in special economic zones through legal harmonization: regional developments including the Guangdong-Macao in-depth Cooperation Zone. 3. MSME Financing: Financial support, access to credit, and sustainable finance for MSMEs & MSE insolvency, further efforts of UNCITRAL to simplify insolvency procedures, and unify insolvency law. 4. Promotion of viable dispute resolution mechanisms for MSMEs through adaptation of arbitration and mediation. 5. Contemporary legal developments facilitating the establishment and the successful operation of the MSMEs.
As the core legal body of the United Nations system in the field of international trade law, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) seeks to progressively harmonize and modernize trade laws by preparing and promoting the adoption and use of legislative and nonlegislative instruments in several key areas of commercial law. UNCITRAL RCAP (Incheon, Republic of Korea) was inaugurated in 2012 to promote the work of UNCITRAL in the Asia-Pacific region and provide technical assistance to the states concerning the implementation and uniform interpretation of UNCITRAL texts, thereby diminishing legal obstacles to global commercial transactions. University of Macau, founded in 1981, is the leading comprehensive public university in Macau. It is a resourceful and ambitious educational institution with unique Sino-European heritage and global connections. In 2017, it was ranked within the top-50 universities in Asia by the Times Higher Education Asia University Rankings. It has also been ranked within the top-100 Asian University Rankings in QS World University Rankings. The Faculty of Law of the University of Macau, responsible for organizing the conference, is the oldest law school in Macau. With its diversemultilingual programs and teaching staff of international background, the Faculty has been playing a vital role in promoting legal education and research in Macau and contributing to the build-up of the local legal system. In addition, the Faculty of Law has also successfully held many high-level international conferences and meetings on a range of legal topics.
The registration for the conference is free of charge. Participants should complete registration in advance and obtain confirmation to secure a place at the conference. The deadline for registration is 15 December 2021. The conference will be held on 17 December 2021 in a mixed format (online and offline). The speakers and participants from outside Macau are invited to take part in the conference via Zoom. The conference will start at 9:30 a.m. (Macau time) and may end late in the evening to accommodate speakers and participants from different time zones.
FOR MORE INFORMATION AND ENQUIRIES, PLEASE CONTACT US AT LAW.UMUNCITRAL@UM.EDU.MO
La rédaction de Dalloz actualité prend ses quartiers d’hiver, le temps de fêtes de fin d’année bien méritées !
Nous serons de retour dès le lundi 3 janvier 2022.
Merci de votre fidélité et joyeuses fêtes!
New civil procedure rules in Singapore
New civil procedure rules (Rules of Court 2021) for the General Division of the High Court (excluding the Singapore International Commercial Court (‘SICC’)) have been gazetted and will be implemented on 1 April 2022. The reform is intended to modernise the litigation process and improve efficiency.[1] New rules for the SICC have also been gazetted and will similarly come into operation on 1 April 2022.
This update focuses on the rules which apply to the General Division of the High Court (excluding the SICC). New rules which are of particular interest from a conflict of laws point of view include changes to the rules on service out. The new Order 8 rule 1 provides that:
‘(1) An originating process or other court document may be served out of Singapore with the Court’s approval if it can be shown that the Court has the jurisdiction or is the appropriate court to hear the action.
…
(3) The Court’s approval is not required if service out of Singapore is allowed under a contract between the parties.
…’
The current rules on service out is to be found in Order 11 of the Rules of Court. This requires that the plaintiff (‘claimant’ under the new Rules) establish that (1) there is a good arguable case that the action fits within one of the heads of Order 11; (2) there is a serious issue to be tried on the merits; and (3) Singapore is forum conveniens.[2] The heads of Order 11 generally require a nexus to be shown between the parties or subject-matter of the action to Singapore and are based on the predecessor to the UK Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 6B paragraph 3.1. The wording of the new Order 8 rule 1(1) suggests a drastic departure from the current Order 11 framework; however, this is not the case.
There will be two alternative grounds of service out: either the Singapore court ‘has the jurisdiction’ to hear the action or ‘is the appropriate court’ to hear the action. The first ground of service out presumably covers situations such as where the Singapore court is the chosen court in accordance with the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016,[3] which enacts the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements into Singapore law. The second ground of service out i.e. that the Singapore court is the ‘appropriate court’ to hear the action could, on one view, be read to refer only to the requirement under the current framework that Singapore is forum conveniens. However, the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021, which are to be read with the new Rules of Court, make it clear that the claimant still has to show:[4]
‘(a) there is a good arguable case that there is sufficient nexus to Singapore;
(b) Singapore is the forum conveniens; and
(c) there is a serious question to be tried on the merits of the claim.’
The Practice Directions go on to give as examples of a sufficient nexus to Singapore factors which are substantively identical to the current Order 11 heads.[5] As these are non-exhaustive examples, the difference between the current rules and this new ground of service out is that the claimant may still succeed in obtaining leave to serve out even though the action does not fit within one of the heads of the current Order 11. This is helpful insofar as the scope of some of the heads are uncertain; for example, it is unclear whether an action for a declaration that a contract does not exist falls within the current contractual head of service out[6] as there is no equivalent to the UK CPR PD 6B paragraph 3.1(8).[7] Yet at the same time, the Court of Appeal had previously taken a wide interpretation of Order 11 rule 1(n), which reads: ‘the claim is made under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap. 65A), the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing Act (Cap. 325) or any other written law’.[8] The phrase ‘any written law’ was held not to be read ejusdem generis[9] and would include the court’s powers, conferred by s 18 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act read together with paragraph 14 of the First Schedule, to ‘grant all reliefs and remedies at law and in equity, including damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific performance.’[10] This interpretation of Order 11 rule 1(n) arguably achieves much the same effect as the new ‘appropriate court’ ground of service out.
The new Order 8 rule 1(3) is to be welcomed. However, it is important to note that a choice of court agreement for the Singapore court which is unaccompanied by an agreement to permit service out of Singapore will still require an application for leave to serve out under the ‘has jurisdiction’ ground (if the Choice of Court Agreements Act is applicable) or the ‘appropriate court’ ground (if the Choice of Court Agreements Act is not applicable).
Other provisions in the new Rules of Court 2021 which are of interest deal with a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court. A defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the action or the court should not exercise jurisdiction to hear the action. A challenge on either ground ‘is not treated as a submission to jurisdiction’.[11] This seemingly obviates the established common law understanding that a jurisdictional challenge which attacks the existence of the court’s jurisdiction (a setting aside application) does not amount to a submission to the court’s jurisdiction, whereas a jurisdictional challenge which requests the court not to exercise the jurisdiction which it has (a stay application) amounts to a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.[12] Further to that, the provisions which deal with challenges to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction are worded slightly differently depending on whether the action is commenced by way of an originating claim or an originating application. For the former, Order 6 rule 7(5) provides that ‘The challenge to jurisdiction may be for the reason that – … (b) the Court should not exercise jurisdiction to hear the action.’ For the latter, Order 6 rule 12(4) elaborates that ‘The challenge to jurisdiction may be for the reason that – … (b) the Court should not exercise jurisdiction because it is not the appropriate Court to hear the action.’ The difference in wording is puzzling because one assumes that the same types of challenges are possible regardless of whether the action is commenced by way of an originating claim or originating application – eg, challenges based on forum non conveniens, abuse of process or case management reasons. Given use of the word ‘may’ in both provisions though, it ought to be the case that the different wording does not lead to any substantive difference on the types of challenges which are permissible.
[2] Zoom Communications v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 (CA).
[3] Cap 39A.
[4] Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (To be read with Rules of Court 2021), p 72.
[5] Ibid, pp 72-73.
[6] Rules of Court, Order 11 rule 1(d).
[7] ‘A claim is made for a declaration that no contract exists …’.
[8] Li Shengwu v Attorney-General [2019] 1 SLR 1081 (CA).
[9] Ibid, [168]-[170].
[10] Ibid, [161].
[11] Rules of Court 2021, Order 6 rule 7(6) (originating claim); Order 6 rule 12(5) (originating application.
[12] Zoom Communications v Broadcast Solutions Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 (CA).
This post was contributed by Dr. Vito Bumbaca, who is Assistant Lecturer at the University of Geneva
In a ruling of 2 August 2021 (A v. B, C-262/21 PPU), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified that a child who is allegedly wrongfully removed, meaning without consent of the other parent, should not return to his/ her habitual residence if such a removal took place as a consequence of the ordered transfer determining international responsibility based on the Dublin III Regulation. The judgment is not available in English and is the first ever emanating from this Court concerning the Brussels IIA-Dublin III interplay.
The Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (Brussels IIA Regulation) complements the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and is applicable to 26 EU Member States, including Finland and Sweden. The Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) (Dublin III), is pertinent for asylum seekers’ applications commenced at least in one of the 31 Dublin Member States (EU/EFTA), comprising Finland and Sweden, bound by this Regulation.
Questions for a CJEU urgent preliminary ruling:
The CJEU was referred five questions, but only addressed the first two.
‘(1) Must Article 2(11) of [Regulation No 2201/2003], relating to the wrongful removal of a child, be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which one of the parents, without the other parent’s consent, removes the child from his or her place of residence to another Member State, which is the Member State responsible under a transfer decision taken by an authority in application of Regulation [No 604/2013], must be classified as wrongful removal?
(2) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, must Article 2(11) [of Regulation No 2201/2003], relating to wrongful retention, be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which a court of the child’s State of residence has annulled the decision taken by an authority to transfer examination of the file, and to take no further action since the mother and child have left the State of residence, but in which the child whose return is ordered, no longer has a currently valid residence document in his or her State of residence, or the right to enter or to remain in the State in question, must be classified as wrongful retention?’
Contents of the CJEU judgment:
In 2019, a married couple, third-State nationals (Iran), both with regard to Brussels IIA and Dublin III respective Member States, moved from Finland to settle in Sweden. Since 2016, the couple had lived in Finland for around three years. In 2019, a child was born in Sweden. The couple was exercising joint custody over the child in conformity with Swedish law. The mother was holding a family residency permit, in both Finland and Sweden, through the father’s employment rights. The approved duration of the mother’s residency right in Finland was around one year longer than in Sweden.
Two months after the child’s birth, the latter and the mother were placed under Swedish residential care (hostel). Essentially, the Swedish administrative decision to uphold this care protective measure was the result of the father’s violence against the mother, so to protect the child from the risks against his development and health, as well as to prevent his wrongful removal to Iran possibly envisaged by his father. Limited contact rights were granted to the father. A residency permit was requested, individually, by the father and the mother based on the family lien – request respectively filed on 21 November and 4 December 2019.
In August 2020, the mother submitted an asylum request, for the child and herself, before the Swedish authorities. The same month, the Finnish authorities declared themselves internationally responsible over the mother’s and child’s asylum request by virtue of article 12(3) of Dublin III – based on the longer duration of the residency permit previously delivered according to Finnish law. In October 2020, the Swedish authorities dismissed the father’s and rejected the mother’s respective residency and asylum requests, and ordered the transfer of the child and his mother to Finland. Taking into account the father’s presence as a threat against the child, the limited contacts established between them, and the father’s residency right in Finland, the Swedish authorities concluded that the child’s separation from his father was not against his best interests and that the transfer was not an obstacle to the exercise of the father’s visitation right in Finland. In November 2020, the mother and the child moved to Finland pursuant to article 29(1) of Dublin III. In December 2020, the father filed an appeal against the Swedish court’s decisions, which was upheld by the Swedish Immigration Tribunal (‘Migrationsdomstolen i Stockholm’), although it resulted later to be dismissed by the Swedish Immigration Authorities, and then rejected by the Immigration Tribunal, due to the child’s relocation to Finland (CJEU ruling, § 23-24).
In January 2021, the father filed a new request before the Swedish authorities for family residency permit on behalf of the child, which was still ongoing at the time of this judgment (CJEU ruling, § 25). During the same month, the mother deposited an asylum application before the Finnish authorities, which was still ongoing at the time of this judgment – the mother’s and child’s residency permits were withdrawn by the Finnish authorities (CJEU ruling, § 26). In April 2021, the Swedish Court (‘Västmanlands tingsrätt’), notwithstanding the mother’s objection to their jurisdiction, granted divorce, sole custody to the mother and refused visitation right to the father – upheld in appeal (‘Svea hovrätt’). Prior to it, the father filed an application for child return before the Helsinki Court of Appeal (‘Helsingin hovioikeus’), arguing that the mother had wrongfully removed the child to Finland, on the grounds of the 1980 Hague Convention. The return application was rejected. On the father’s appeal, the Finnish authorities stayed proceedings and requested an urgent preliminary ruling from the CJEU, in line with article 107 of the Luxembourg Court’s rules of procedure.
CJEU reasoning:
The Court reiterated that a removal or retention shall be wrongful when a child holds his habitual residence in the requesting State and that a custody right is attributed to, and effectively exercised by, the left-behind parent consistently with the law of that State (§ 45). The primary objectives of the Brussels IIA Regulation, particularly within its common judicial space aimed to ensure mutual recognition of judgments, and the 1980 Hague Convention are strictly related for abduction prevention and immediate obtainment of effective child return orders (§ 46).
The Court stated that, pursuant to articles 2 § 11 and 11 of the Brussels IIA Regulation, the child removal to a Member State other than the child’s habitual residence, essentially performed by virtue of the mother’s right of custody and effective care while executing a transfer decision based on article 29 § 1 of the Dublin III Regulation, should not be contemplated as wrongful (§ 48). In addition, the absence of ‘take charge’ request following the annulment of a transfer decision, namely for the purposes of article 29 § 3 of Dublin III, which was not implemented by the Swedish authorities, would lead the retention not to being regarded as unlawful (§ 50). Consequently, as maintained by the Court, the child’s relocation was just a consequence of his administrative situation in Sweden (§ 51). A conclusion opposing the Court reasoning would be to the detriment of the Dublin III Regulation objectives.
Some insights from national precedents:
In the case ATF 5A_121/2018, involving a similar scenario (cf. FamPra.ch 1/2019), the Swiss Federal Court maintained that a child born in Greece, who had lived for more than a year with his mother in Switzerland, had to be returned to Greece (place of the left-behind parent’s residence) based on the established child’s habitual residence prior to the wrongful removal to Switzerland, notwithstanding his pending asylum application in the latter State. Indeed, the Greek authorities had been internationally responsible over the child’s asylum request on the basis of his father’s residence document. However also in that case it was alleged that the father had been violent against the mother and that a judgment ordering the child’s return to Greece, alone or without his mother (§ 5.3), would not have caused harm to the child under the 1980 Hague Convention, art. 13.
In the case G v. G [2021] UKSC 9, involving a slightly different scenario in that no multiple asylum requests were submitted, the UKSC judged that a child, of eight years old born in South Africa, should not be returned – stay of proceedings – until an asylum decision, based on an asylum application filed in England, had been taken by the UK authorities. The UKSC considered that, although an asylum claim might be tactically submitted to frustrate child return to his/ her country of habitual residence prior to wrongful removal or retention, it is vital that an asylum claim over an applicant child, accompanied or not by his/ her primary carer, is brought forward while awaiting a final decision – in conformity with the ‘non-refoulement’ principle pursuant to article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
Comment:
The CJEU ruling is momentous dictum in that it holds the not any longer uncommon intersection of private international law and vulnerable migration, especially with regard to children in need of international protection in accordance with both Brussels IIA and Dublin III Regulations (cf. Brussels IIA, § 9, and Dublin III, article 2 lit. b). The Luxembourg Court clarifies that a child who is allegedly wrongfully removed, meaning without consent of the other parent, should not return to his/ her habitual residence if such a removal took place as a consequence of the ordered transfer determining international responsibility based on the Dublin III Regulation. It is emphasised that, contrary to the Swiss judgment, the child in the instant case did not have any personal attachments with Finland at the time of the relocation – neither by birth nor by entourage – country of destination for the purposes of the Dublin III transfer. Moreover, the ‘transfer of responsibility’ for the purposes of Dublin III should be contemplated as an administrative decision only, regardless of the child’s habitual residence.
It is observed as a preamble that, according to a well-known CJEU practice, a child should not be regarded as to establish a habitual residence in a Member State in which he or she has never been physically present (CJEU, OL v. PQ, 8 June 2017, C-111/17 PPU; CJEU, UD v. XB, 17 October 2018, C-393/18 PPU). Hence, it appears procedurally just that the Swedish courts retained international jurisdiction over custody, perhaps with the aim of Brussels IIA, article 8 – the child’s habitual residence at the time of the seisin, which occurred prior to the transfer to Finland. On that procedural departure, the Swedish courts custody judgment is substantially fair in that the father’s abuse against the mother is indeed an element that should be retained for parental responsibility, including abduction, merits (CJEU ruling, § 48; UKSC judgment, § 62).
However, it is argued here that, particularly given that at the relevant time Sweden was the child’s place of birth where he lived for around 14 months with his primary carer, the Swedish and the Finnish authorities might have ‘concentrated’ jurisdiction and responsibility in one Member State, namely Sweden, ultimately to avoid further length and costs related to the asylum procedures in line with the same Dublin III objectives evoked by the CJEU – namely “guarantee effective access to the procedures for granting international protection and not to compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications for international protection” (§ 5, Dublin III). Conversely, provided that the child’s relocation was not wrongful as indicated by the Finnish authorities, and confirmed by the CJEU ruling, the Swedish authorities may have opted for the ‘transfer of jurisdiction’ towards the Finnish authorities on the basis of Brussels IIA, article 15(1) lit. b, indicating the child’s new habitual residence (cf. Advocate General’s opinion, § 41) following the lawful relocation (cf. article 15.3., lit. a).
Importantly, concentration of jurisdiction-responsibility over a child seeking international protection in one Member State, in light of the Brussels IIA-Dublin III interplay, would essentially determine a coordinated interpretation of the child’s best interests (cf. Brussels II, § 12, and Dublin III, § 13), avoiding two parallel administrative-judicial proceedings in two Member States whose authorities may not always come to similar views, as opposed to the present case, over such interests (AG’s opinion, § 48). This is particularly true, if the child (non-)return to his/ her habitual residence might likely be influenced, as stated in the CJEU ruling, by his/ her administrative situation, which would potentially have an impact on the international custody jurisdiction determination. An example of controversial outcome, dealing with child abduction-asylum proceedings, is the profoundly divergent opinion arising from the UK and Swiss respective rulings, to the extent of child return in a situation where the mother, primary carer, is or could be subject to domestic violence in the requesting State.
Similarly, the UKSC guidance, in ‘G v. G’, affirmed: “Due to the time taken by the in-country appeal process this bar is likely to have a devastating impact on 1980 Hague Convention proceedings. I would suggest that this impact should urgently be addressed by consideration being given as to a legislative solution […] However, whilst the court does not determine the request for international protection it does determine the 1980 Hague Convention proceedings so that where issues overlap the court can come to factual conclusions on the overlapping issues so long as the prohibition on determining the claim for international protection is not infringed […] First, as soon as it is appreciated that there are related 1980 Hague Convention proceedings and asylum proceedings it will generally be desirable that the Secretary of State be requested to intervene in the 1980 Hague Convention proceedings” (UKSC judgment, § 152-157). Clearly, the legislative solution on a more efficient coordination of child abduction-asylum proceedings, invoked by the UK courts, may also be raised with the EU [and Swiss] legislator, considering their effects on related custody orders.
– Cross posted at the EAPIL blog.
This post was contributed by Dr. Vito Bumbaca, who is Assistant Lecturer at the University of Geneva.
In a ruling of 2 August 2021 (A v. B, C-262/21 PPU), the CJEU clarified that a child who is allegedly wrongfully removed, meaning without consent of the other parent, should not return to his/ her habitual residence if such a removal took place as a consequence of the ordered transfer determining international responsibility based on the Dublin III Regulation. The judgment is not available in English and is the first ever emanating from this Court concerning the Brussels IIA-Dublin III interplay.
The Brussels IIA Regulation complements the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and is applicable to 26 EU Member States, including Finland and Sweden. The Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) (Dublin III), is pertinent for asylum seekers’ applications commenced at least in one of the 31 Member States (EU/EFTA), comprising Finland and Sweden, bound by this Regulation.
Questions for a CJEU Urgent Preliminary RulingThe CJEU was referred five questions, but only addressed the first two.
(1) Must Article 2(11) of [Regulation No 2201/2003], relating to the wrongful removal of a child, be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which one of the parents, without the other parent’s consent, removes the child from his or her place of residence to another Member State, which is the Member State responsible under a transfer decision taken by an authority in application of Regulation [No 604/2013], must be classified as wrongful removal?
(2) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, must Article 2(11) [of Regulation No 2201/2003], relating to wrongful retention, be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which a court of the child’s State of residence has annulled the decision taken by an authority to transfer examination of the file, and to take no further action since the mother and child have left the State of residence, but in which the child whose return is ordered, no longer has a currently valid residence document in his or her State of residence, or the right to enter or to remain in the State in question, must be classified as wrongful retention?
BackgroundIn 2019, a married couple, third-State nationals (Iran), both with regard to Brussels IIA and Dublin III respective Member States, moved from Finland to settle in Sweden. Since 2016, the couple had lived in Finland for around three years. In 2019, a child was born in Sweden. The couple was exercising joint custody over the child in conformity with Swedish law. The mother was holding a family residency permit, in both Finland and Sweden, through the father’s employment rights. The approved duration of the mother’s residency right in Finland was around one year longer than in Sweden.
Two months after the child’s birth, the latter and the mother were placed under Swedish residential care (hostel). Essentially, the Swedish administrative decision to uphold this care protective measure was the result of the father’s violence against the mother, so to protect the child from the risks against his development and health, as well as to prevent his wrongful removal to Iran possibly envisaged by his father. Limited contact rights were granted to the father. A residency permit was requested, individually, by the father and the mother based on the family lien – request respectively filed on 21 November and 4 December 2019.
In August 2020, the mother submitted an asylum request, for the child and herself, before the Swedish authorities. The same month, the Finnish authorities declared themselves internationally responsible over the mother’s and child’s asylum request by virtue of article 12(3) of Dublin III – based on the longer duration of the residency permit previously delivered according to Finnish law. In October 2020, the Swedish authorities dismissed the father’s and rejected the mother’s respective residency and asylum requests, and ordered the transfer of the child and his mother to Finland. Taking into account the father’s presence as a threat against the child, the limited contacts established between them, and the father’s residency right in Finland, the Swedish authorities concluded that the child’s separation from his father was not against his best interests and that the transfer was not an obstacle to the exercise of the father’s visitation right in Finland. In November 2020, the mother and the child moved to Finland pursuant to article 29(1) of Dublin III. In December 2020, the father filed an appeal against the Swedish court’s decisions, which was upheld by the Swedish Immigration Tribunal (‘Migrationsdomstolen i Stockholm’), although it resulted later to be dismissed by the Swedish Immigration Authorities, and then rejected by the Immigration Tribunal, due to the child’s relocation to Finland (CJEU ruling, § 23-24).
In January 2021, the father filed a new request before the Swedish authorities for family residency permit on behalf of the child, which was still ongoing at the time of this judgment (CJEU ruling, § 25). During the same month, the mother deposited an asylum application before the Finnish authorities, which was still ongoing at the time of this judgment – the mother’s and child’s residency permits were withdrawn by the Finnish authorities (CJEU ruling, § 26). In April 2021, the Swedish Court (‘Västmanlands tingsrätt’), notwithstanding the mother’s objection to their jurisdiction, granted divorce, sole custody to the mother and refused visitation right to the father – upheld in appeal (‘Svea hovrätt’). Prior to it, the father filed an application for child return before the Helsinki Court of Appeal (‘Helsingin hovioikeus’), arguing that the mother had wrongfully removed the child to Finland, on the grounds of the 1980 Hague Convention. The return application was rejected. On the father’s appeal, the Finnish authorities stayed proceedings and requested an urgent preliminary ruling from the CJEU, in line with article 107 of the Luxembourg Court’s rules of procedure.
JudgmentThe Court reiterated that a removal or retention shall be wrongful when a child holds his habitual residence in the requesting State and that a custody right is attributed to, and effectively exercised by, the left-behind parent consistently with the law of that State (§ 45). The primary objectives of the Brussels IIA Regulation, particularly within its common judicial space aimed to ensure mutual recognition of judgments, and the 1980 Hague Convention are strictly related for abduction prevention and immediate obtainment of effective child return orders (§ 46).
The Court stated that, pursuant to articles 2 § 11 and 11 of the Brussels IIA Regulation, the child removal to a Member State other than the child’s habitual residence, essentially performed by virtue of the mother’s right of custody and effective care while executing a transfer decision based on article 29 § 1 of the Dublin III Regulation, should not be contemplated as wrongful (§ 48). In addition, the absence of ‘take charge’ request following the annulment of a transfer decision, namely for the purposes of article 29 § 3 of Dublin III, which was not implemented by the Swedish authorities, would lead the retention not to being regarded as unlawful (§ 50). Consequently, as maintained by the Court, the child’s relocation was just a consequence of his administrative situation in Sweden (§ 51). A conclusion opposing the Court reasoning would be to the detriment of the Dublin III Regulation objectives.
Some Insights from National PrecedentsIn the case ATF 5A_121/2018, involving a similar scenario (cf. FamPra.ch 1/2019), the Swiss Federal Court maintained that a child born in Greece, who had lived for more than a year with his mother in Switzerland, had to be returned to Greece (place of the left-behind parent’s residence) based on the established child’s habitual residence prior to the wrongful removal to Switzerland, notwithstanding his pending asylum application in the latter State. Indeed, the Greek authorities had been internationally responsible over the child’s asylum request on the basis of his father’s residence document. However also in that case it was alleged that the father had been violent against the mother and that a judgment ordering the child’s return to Greece, alone or without his mother (§ 5.3), would not have caused harm to the child under the 1980 Hague Convention, art. 13.
In the case G v. G [2021] UKSC 9, involving a slightly different scenario in that no multiple asylum requests were submitted, the UKSC judged that a child, of eight years old born in South Africa, should not be returned – stay of proceedings – until an asylum decision, based on an asylum application filed in England, had been taken by the UK authorities. The UKSC considered that, although an asylum claim might be tactically submitted to frustrate child return to his/ her country of habitual residence prior to wrongful removal or retention, it is vital that an asylum claim over an applicant child, accompanied or not by his/ her primary carer, is brought forward while awaiting a final decision – in conformity with the ‘non-refoulement’ principle pursuant to article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
CommentThe CJEU ruling is momentous dictum in that it holds the not any longer uncommon intersection of private international law and vulnerable migration, especially with regard to children in need of international protection in accordance with both Brussels IIA and Dublin III Regulations (cf. Brussels IIA, § 9, and Dublin III, article 2 lit. b). The Luxembourg Court clarifies that a child who is allegedly wrongfully removed, meaning without consent of the other parent, should not return to his/ her habitual residence if such a removal took place as a consequence of the ordered transfer determining international responsibility based on the Dublin III Regulation. It is emphasised that, contrary to the Swiss judgment, the child in the instant case did not have any personal attachments with Finland at the time of the relocation – neither by birth nor by entourage – country of destination for the purposes of the Dublin III transfer. Moreover, the ‘transfer of responsibility’ for the purposes of Dublin III should be contemplated as an administrative decision only, regardless of the child’s habitual residence.
It is observed as a preamble that, according to a well known CJEU practice, a child should not be regarded as to establish a habitual residence in a Member State in which he or she has never been physically present (CJEU, OL v. PQ, 8 June 2017, C-111/17 PPU; CJEU, UD v. XB, 17 October 2018, C-393/18 PPU). Hence, it appears procedurally just that the Swedish courts retained international jurisdiction over custody, perhaps with the aim of Brussels IIA, article 8 – the child’s habitual residence at the time of the seisin, which occurred prior to the transfer to Finland. On that procedural departure, the Swedish courts custody judgment is substantially fair in that the father’s abuse against the mother is indeed an element that should be retained for parental responsibility, including abduction, merits (CJEU ruling, § 48; UKSC judgment, § 62).
However, it is argued here that, particularly given that at the relevant time Sweden was the child’s place of birth where he lived for around 14 months with his primary carer, the Swedish and the Finnish authorities might have ‘concentrated’ jurisdiction and responsibility in one Member State, namely Sweden, ultimately to avoid further length and costs related to the asylum procedures in line with the same Dublin III objectives evoked by the CJEU – namely “guarantee effective access to the procedures for granting international protection and not to compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications for international protection” (§ 5, Dublin III). Conversely, provided that the child’s relocation was not wrongful as indicated by the Finnish authorities, and confirmed by the CJEU ruling, the Swedish authorities may have opted for the ‘transfer of jurisdiction’ towards the Finnish authorities on the basis of Brussels IIA, article 15(1) lit. b, indicating the child’s new habitual residence (cf. Advocate General’s opinion, § 41) following the lawful relocation (cf. article 15.3., lit. a).
Importantly, concentration of jurisdiction-responsibility over a child seeking international protection in one Member State, in light of the Brussels IIA-Dublin III interplay, would essentially determine a coordinated interpretation of the child’s best interests (cf. Brussels II, § 12, and Dublin III, § 13), avoiding two parallel administrative-judicial proceedings in two Member States whose authorities may not always come to similar views, as opposed to the present case, over such interests (AG’s opinion, § 48). This is particularly true, if the child (non-)return to his/ her habitual residence might likely be influenced, as stated in the CJEU ruling, by his/ her administrative situation, which would potentially have an impact on the international custody jurisdiction determination. An example of controversial outcome, dealing with child abduction-asylum proceedings, is the profoundly divergent opinion arising from the UK and Swiss respective rulings, to the extent of child return in a situation where the mother, primary carer, is or could be subject to domestic violence in the requesting State.
Similarly, the UKSC guidance, in ‘G v. G’, affirmed: “Due to the time taken by the in-country appeal process this bar is likely to have a devastating impact on 1980 Hague Convention proceedings. I would suggest that this impact should urgently be addressed by consideration being given as to a legislative solution […] However, whilst the court does not determine the request for international protection it does determine the 1980 Hague Convention proceedings so that where issues overlap the court can come to factual conclusions on the overlapping issues so long as the prohibition on determining the claim for international protection is not infringed […] First, as soon as it is appreciated that there are related 1980 Hague Convention proceedings and asylum proceedings it will generally be desirable that the Secretary of State be requested to intervene in the 1980 Hague Convention proceedings” (UKSC judgment, § 152-157). Clearly, the legislative solution on a more efficient coordination of child abduction-asylum proceedings, invoked by the UK courts, may also be raised with the EU [and Swiss] legislator, considering their effects on related custody orders.
— Cross posted at Conflictoflaws.net.
La CJUE précise la portée de l’obligation d’authentification des actes émanant d’organes communautaires prévue par l’article 297 du TFUE, dans le cas où les exposés des motifs correspondants sont notifiés aux intéressés dans un document séparé.
Thanks to Ilaria Pretelli for the tip-off.
The XXIInd volume of the Yearbook of Private International Law (2020/2021) has been released. It contains articles on the most important innovations in multilateral and national private international law by authors from all over the world. The readers will find an analysis on cross-border mobility of union citizens and continuity of civil status by Johan Meeusen as well as how to cope with the obstacles to mobility due to the pandemics (Bernard Haftel) and Brexit (Katarina Trimmings and Konstantina Kalaitsoglou). Two inspiring sections nourish the core of the volume: the editors present the most challenging innovations of Regulation Brussels II ter (EU Regulation 2019/1111), and the consequences of the global reach of the internet for private international law. The National reports section hosts articles on the new Croatian and Uruguayan Private International law Statutes.
The most recent innovations on classical themes of private international law (torts, muslim divorces, the degree of deference by state courts to international commercial arbitral awards, etc.) add to this already rich volume.
Readers are invited to view the table of contents and the foreword by the editors.
Comparative Procedural Law and Justice (CPLJ) is a global project of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, with the support of the Luxembourg National Research Fund (019/13946847), involving more than one hundred scholars from all over the world.
CPLJ is envisioned as a comprehensive study of comparative civil procedural law and civil dispute resolution schemes in the contemporary world. It aims at understanding procedural rules in their cultural context, as well as at highlighting workable approaches to the resolution of civil disputes.
In this framework, the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law will host its 8th CPLJ Webinar on 28 January 2022, 3:00 – 5:45 pm (CET).
The programme reads as follows:
Chair: Loïc Cadiet (University of Paris 1)
3:00 pm John Dashaco (University of Yaoundé II)
Harmonization and Practice of Civil Procedure within the OHADA Sub-Region: Reflection on the Uniform Act on Simplified Recovery Procedure and Measures of Execution
3:30 pm Discussion
4:00 pm Intermission
4:15 pm Sami Bostanji (University of Tunis El Manar)
Droit Processuel Comparé: Regard Général sur les Droits des Pays Arabes (*)
5:00 pm Discussion
5:45 pm Closing of the event
The full programme is available here.
(Image credits: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam)
(*) Presentation in French. Consecutive interpretation in English will be provided.
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