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On Thursday, 15 July from 15.30-17.30 CET the seminar European Civil Justice in Transition: Past, Present & Future will take place, organized by Erasmus School of Law in the context of the ERC project Building EU Civil Justice. You can register here.

In this last seminar of a series of six, key experts on European civil justice will share their views on current and future issues, including digitisation, collective redress, the Brussels I-bis reform, private and public justice, the funding of civil justice and the role of civil justice in today’s society.

Thursday, 15 July (15.30-17.30 CET) – Program

15.15 Waiting room opens

15.30 Opening

15.35-15.45 Xandra Kramer (Erasmus University Rotterdam/Utrecht University)

Introduction – Past, present and future: Highlights of European civil justice

15.45-16.00 Burkhard Hess (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg )

Reforming the Brussels Ibis Regulation in January 2022 – taking up the next reform step

16.00-16.15 John Sorabji (University College London; Barrister, 9 St John Street)

Digitisation and the development of Integrated Dispute Resolution

16.15-16.30 Eva Storskrubb (Uppsala University/Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Trust and Quality in Civil Justice

16.30-16.45 Alan Uzelac (University of Zagreb)

It’s better to burn out than to fade away: is civil justice here to stay?

16.45-17.30 Comments & discussion (moderated by Xandra Kramer and Alexandre Biard, Erasmus University Rotterdam)

 

Nike European Operations Netherlands et Converse Netherlands / Commission
Aide d'État
Tax rulings émis par l’administration fiscale néerlandaise au bénéfice de Nike et de Converse : le Tribunal rejette le recours contre la décision de la Commission d’ouvrir la procédure formelle d’examen

Commission / Pologne
La Pologne doit suspendre immédiatement l’application des dispositions nationales relatives notamment aux compétences de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême

NB / Cour de justice de l'Union européenne
Statut des fonctionnaires
Tax rulings émis par l’administration fiscale néerlandaise au bénéfice de Nike et de Converse : le Tribunal rejette le recours contre la décision de la Commission d’ouvrir la procédure formelle d’examen

Ryanair et Laudamotion / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal confirme que l’aide accordée par l’Autriche à Austrian Airlines afin de l’indemniser pour les dommages résultant de l’annulation ou de la reprogrammation de ses vols en raison de la pandémie de Covid-19 est compatible avec le marché intérieur

Guerlain / EUIPO (Forme d'un rouge à lèvres oblongue, conique et cylindrique)
Propriété intellectuelle et industrielle
Marque de l’Union européenne : la marque tridimensionnelle de la forme d’un rouge à lèvres de Guerlain peut être enregistrée

On 20 July 2021, the University of Milan will host the (on-line) Annual Conference of the EU-funded project Jean Monnet Module on Multilevel, Multiparty and Multisector Cross-Border Litigation in Europe.

This year’s topic, Incentives and Challenges to Transnational Access to Justice, will be discussed in the framework of two roundtables concerning, respectively, Third-party Funding in International Dispute Resolution and E-Justice in International Dispute Resolution.

The complete programme is available here. Registrations are open until 15 July 2021, through this form.

Eastern Pacific Chartering Inc v Pola Maritime Ltd [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm) is a highly unusual case which shows that dormant Conventions can be awoken from their slumber.  I merely dabble in EU external relations law, I am no expert in it. The application of that law in the context of private international law is an issue I have tasked one or two students with – let’s just say they find it challenging.

On the specific issue at hand, parties agree that consequential to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Gibraltar) Order 1997, matters of jurisdiction between the E&W Courts and the Supreme Court of Gibraltar are governed by the Brussels Convention 1968 and that this remains the case notwithstanding Brexit. That core issue of external relations law pre and post Brexit is therefore not sub judice. One imagines that had it been, it could have led to extensive to and fro, among others within the context of the UK having revoked the 1968 Convention per the jurisdiction and Judgments Exit Regulations SI 2019/479, and of the Withdrawal Agreement.

In July 2020, claimant had a ship arrested in Gibraltar, with the purpose to serve as security for claims under a charterparty between both, claims that were to be brought in London, consistently with an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the charterparty. Roberston DJ classifies that action as one for provisional measures under Article 24 Convention (35 of the Brussels Ia Regulation).  The legality of that arrest (which ended upon claimant releasing it) continues to be disputed (ia viz the actual ownership of the ship).

Claimant (not domiciled in a 1968 Convention Contracting State) now sues  in E&W (pursuant to the choice of court) Defendant (domiciled at Cyprus) for outstanding monies. In current proceedings it applies to dismiss and strike out that part of the Defendant’s counterclaim at the E&W courts which seeks to advance claims in tort based on the alleged wrongful Gibraltar arrest.  In essence claimant submits that the High Court court has no jurisdiction to try the Defendant’s tort claims and should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Supreme Court of Gibraltar.

After a swipe [18 ff] at both parties having engaged, without court approval, experts on Gibraltarian law (which, she holds, bear no relevance for the jurisdictional issues anyways), Roberston DJ proceeds to discuss the lis pendens issue.

Defendant’s primary case is that, on the facts of this case, Article 17 Convention (A25 BIa) applies to confer jurisdiction, because the exclusive jurisdiction clause is broad enough to cover the tort claims. The Defendant’s fallback position is that, if that is wrong, the Court nevertheless has jurisdiction in respect of its counterclaims, not on the basis of A5(3) Convention (the Claimant (defendant on the counterclaim) not being domiciled in a Convention State) either because that necessarily follows from the Claimant’s decision to litigate its own claims here, or because Claimant has taken steps since service of the Defence and Counterclaim which waived any right to object to jurisdiction in respect of the counterclaims.

The discussion revolves around the contractual and statutory interpretation of the action radius of choice of court. This also involves the classic issue of tort claims between contractual parties (compare Wikingerhof) with the judge opting for the one stop shop approach (distinguishing ia Ryanair Ltd v Esso Italiana Srl [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 152): 42: ‘there is a clear causal connection [between the contractual and tort claims, GAVC], which seems to be sufficient for the purposes of a clause worded “in connection with“.’ In conclusion: [52]: ‘whether damages are recoverable for an allegedly wrongful arrest made in seeking security for claims under the charter, ..is a claim “in connection with” the charter’ hence the E&W courts have jurisdiction. [39]: this ‘allows a single accounting, as regards the overall financial position of the parties as a result of the legal relationship created between them by the charter, and their dispute about what rights and obligations properly flow from that legal relationship.’

Obiter jurisdiction on the alternative grounds, under English residual rules, is also accepted (with the interesting note of the absence, in the Convention, of a gateway for counterclaims, in contrast with Brussels I and Brussels Ia).

Coming then to lis pendens under Article 21 Convention, this is dismissed. [70] The arrest claim plainly does not involve either the same cause of action or the same object as the Defendant’s tort claims seeking to recover damages for wrongful arrest, which are advanced solely by way of counterclaim in E&W. The factual and legal foundation for that counterclaim needs, on any view, to travel substantially beyond the matters the Claimant relies on for its own cause of action and the object of the counterclaim is to recover damages.

Neither [73] is an acknowledgment of service in the Gibraltar arrest proceedings does not amount to a submission to that jurisdiction which would preclude the Defendant from raising its distinct tort claims in E&W.

A stay on ‘related proceedings’ (Article 22 Convention) is also rejected for the reasons listed at [83]. Core reference here is Research in Motion v Visto [2007] EWHC 900 (Ch).

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Chapter 1 Heading 1.7, Chapter 2 para 2.375, 2.469.

Eastern Pacific Chartering v Pola Maritime [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm)
Interesting and unusual case involving the UK and Gibraltar and applying the 1968 Brussels Convention (!)
Lis pendens, choice of court (charterparty), whether issues arises out of samehttps://t.co/eNp2jpl4Zw

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 28, 2021

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) can be defined as lawsuits intended to intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense, until they abandon their criticism or opposition.

Some jurisdictions have already passed anti-SLAPP laws. In its Action plan for democracy, of 2020, the Commission had already announced its intention to present an initiative to protect journalists and civil society against SLAPPs in 2021. An Expert group was created in December 2020.

The topic is of course not new. It has gained momentum again – possibly following the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia in October 2017- also at the Council of Europe, and within the civil society (see, for instance on the need for a EU legislative proposal to protect public watchdogs from legal harassment  here and here.)

On 5 July 2020, a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee on SLAPP and PIL instruments was published, authored by J. Borg-Barthet (who is one of the members of the Expert Group mentioned above), Benedetta Lobina and Magdalena Zabrocka.

The document analyses legal definitions of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), assesses the compatibility of anti-SLAPP legislation with EU law, and recommends that an anti-SLAPP Directive be adopted.

Of special interest for PIL is that it also recommends that the Brussels I bis Regulation and Rome II Regulation be recast to limit the incidence of SLAPPs. The final conclusion in this regard reads as follows:

In addition to the adoption of an anti-SLAPP Directive, it is recommended that the Brussels Ia Regulation be recast with a view to adopting a bespoke rule concerning defamation claims and thereby to distinguish jurisdiction in defamation cases from ordinary torts. To this end, it is recommended that jurisdiction should be grounded in the forum of the defendant’s domicile unless the parties agree otherwise. This would enable public interest speakers to foresee where they will be expected to defend themselves, and would be in keeping with the core values of the Brussels Ia Regulation, namely predictability and the limitation of forum shopping.
Greater predictability as to the outcomes of choice of law processes is also needed to dissuade meritless litigation intended to suppress public participation. Accordingly, it is recommended that a new rule be included in the Rome II Regulation which would harmonise national choice of law rules in defamation cases. It is recommended that this rule should focus on the closest connection with the publication and its audience, namely the law of the place to which the publication is directed.

I  expect comments – here or elsewhere- to both proposals and their underlying rationale.

The first impression is a little bit disappointing. The proposal regarding the applicable law is a general one for defamation cases, i.e., it is not SLAPP-specific. On jurisdiction, I would be cautious to spouse the assertion on page 39:

(…), the Court of Justice has developed a body of case law whose net effect is to afford further opportunities for forum shopping and vexatious litigation strategies in defamation cases, particularly where the claimed defamatory content is posted online.

Moreover  a solution which entails giving up eDate and Martinez looks unrealistic to me (in this regard, though, C-800/19 is worth considering; the Opinion was available in February 2021). Vexatious claims have always existed. The lis pendens and related actions rules provide a solution at the jurisdictional level for a plurality of claims within the EU: a word on why they would (or not) be fit in an anti-SLAPP scenario is missing. In addition, and more important, the Brussels regime does not prevent reacting against vexatious claims with the procedural tools available at the national level, such as abuse of process. That is why I am not convinced either by the following sentence, on page 42:

‘In particular, judgments concerning the deployment of antisuit injunctions reveal a Court that is reluctant to replace the ex ante general analysis deployed by the legislator with its, or a national court’s, judgement of the merits of jurisdictional justice in individual cases‘

Even if the bottom line was correct, antisuit injunctions would not have provided the pertinent example.

Beyond the EU borders, with the exception of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, which have no parallel in the Lugano Convention, the situation is left to the Member States; simultaneous proceedings before the courts of the UK and the USA is simply a situation that cannot be solved by the European lawmaker.

There is indeed a need to balance the interests of the claimants and of the defendant (the target of the strategic lawsuit) also in relation to international jurisdiction and to the conflict of law rule.

In my opinion, achieving the goal requires a more grounded examination; also, and mainly, to acknowledge that the problem is to be addressed at a different level – something that the Study does in its 5th part devoted to an anti-SLAPP directive.

But, just like the authors say, the adoption and implementation of such a directive may take too long. The time to react is now, and it is not imperative (not even for reasons of distribution of competences) to wait for Brussels to take the lead.

(Photo: The use of SLAPPs © Image used under the license of Adobe Stock)

La commission européenne vient de diffuser son tableau de bord annuel de la justice dans l’Union européenne. Ces chiffres soulèvent la question des moyens de la justice française et de ses retards informatiques.

en lire plus

Prestations familiales - Contrôle

Non lieu à renvoi

1) L'article R 663-20 du code de commerce résultant du décret n° 85-1390 du 27 décembre 1985 modifié par le décret 2006-1709 du 23/12/2006 s'applique-t-il en cas de remplacement de liquidateurs successifs dans une même procédure ?
2) La majoration de 30% des émoluments des liquidateurs prévue à l'article R 663-35 du code de commerce résultant du décret n° 85-1390 du 27 décembre 1985 modifié par le décret 2006-1709 du 23/12/2006 s'applique-t-elle en cas de remplacement de liquidateurs successifs dans une même procédure ?
3) Les émoluments fixés par l'article R 663-29 du code de commerce issu du décret n° 85-1390 du 27 décembre 1985 modifié par le décret 2006-1709 du 23/12/2006 se calculent-t-ils par liquidateur successivement désignés ou pour la totalité des actifs réalisés au cours de la procédure, quel que soit le liquidateur désigné lors de la réalisation de l'actif ?
4) La demande de fixation définitive des émoluments formée par le liquidateur ayant été désigné en cours de procédure en remplacement du liquidateur initialement désigné doit-elle mentionner la totalité des émoluments déjà perçus par le premier liquidateur ou se limiter aux émoluments dont le dernier liquidateur demande la fixation ?
5) En cas de remplacement de l'un des mandataires de justice en cours de procédure, la demande de fixation définitive des émoluments doit-elle préciser le partage des émoluments entre les mandataires de justice successivement désignés pour la même mission ? Le cas échéant, l'accord du mandataire de justice initialement désigné doit-il être justifié dans la demande de fixation définitive des émoluments ?

This post was contributed by Alexia Pato, who is Postdoc Research Fellow at the University of McGill (Montreal, Canada).

The present post provides an overview of the legal initiatives on artificial intelligence (AI) recently launched at the EU level and the questions they generate from a private international law (PIL) perspective.

The analysis starts with the 2021 Proposal for a Regulation on harmonised rules on AI and continues with the EU Parliament’s detailed recommendations for drawing up a Regulation on liability for the operation of AI systems.

Overview of the Proposed AI Regulation

On 21 April 2021, the EU Commission published its much-awaited Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on AI, following explicit requests from the Council and the Parliament (see, in particular, the AI-related resolutions of the Parliament of October 2020 on ethics, civil liability and intellectual property). The proposed Regulation’s goal is to promote the free movement of AI-related goods and services, while ensuring the protection of fundamental rights.

If enacted, the Regulation would create a horizontal regulatory framework for the development, placement on the market and use of AI systems in the Union, depending on the risks that those systems generate for people’s health and safety or fundamental rights. In particular, Article 5 forbids AI practices which create an unacceptable risk (some exceptions may nevertheless apply). The prohibition extends to AI systems deploying subliminal techniques beyond a person’s consciousness to induce a particular behaviour and to those exploiting the vulnerabilities of a group of people (e.g., a doll integrated with a voice assistant that encourages children to play dangerous games in order to maximise their fun).

Real-time remote biometric identification (e.g., facial recognition) and social scoring are deemed to create an unacceptable risk as well. As regards high-risk AI systems (Title III), they must undergo an ex ante conformity assessment in order to be placed on the EU market (Articles 19 and Title III, Chapter 5).

The proposed Regulation imposes a series of requirements in relation to data, documentation and recording keeping, transparency and information to users, human oversight, robustness, accuracy and security (Articles 8 to 15). Examples of high-risk AI systems include medical assistants (e.g., IBM’s Watson assistant), chatbots and automated recruitment applications. Lastly, AI systems which create a low or minimal risk are permitted.

For a general assessment of the Proposal, see the CEPS Think Thank with Lucilla Sioli (DG CONNECT) available here, as well as the Ars Boni podcast available here.

The Extraterritorial Reach of EU law

As Article 2 of the proposed AI Regulation would confer the Regulation an extraterritorial reach, PIL questions emerge. In particular, the EU rules on AI are meant to apply to (1) providers placing AI systems on the EU market or putting them into service there, irrespective of their place of establishment; (2) users located in the EU; (3) providers and users located in a third state, when the output produced by the AI system is used – but not marketed – in the EU.

Remarkably, Article 2 bypasses the traditional choice of law methodology and unilaterally delineates the Regulation’s territorial scope of application.

This legislative technique has been used on other occasions: the most recent example is perhaps Article 3 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Literature on the latter provision shows that the extraterritorial application of laws creates a fertile ground for overlaps and high compliance costs. The same observation could apply to AI if other states chose to exercise their (legislative) jurisdiction extraterritorially. How private (or public) international law will tackle that concern remains to be seen.

Moreover, interpretative issues are likely to arise, as the wording of Article 2 is vague. In particular, when is a user “located” in the EU – does the temporary presence on the territory trigger the application of the Regulation? What is the “output” of an AI system? And finally, when is an AI system “placed on the EU market” or “put into service” there?

The Law Applicable to Civil Liability

It is acknowledged that the misuse of AI systems may be harmful, despite the great potential of technologies to significantly improve our lives in many sectors. Traffic accidents involving either autonomous – i.e. driverless – or driver-assist vehicles are a telling example in that regard.

Currently, the law applicable to civil liability in such a scenario essentially depends on the actors involved – the driver, the manufacturer of the car, the designer of the software, etc. Several PIL systems applying different connecting factors might come into play, namely the Rome II Regulation, the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents and the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. Considering the fact that national civil liability regimes vary (sometimes significantly) from one state to another, the outcome of a case might be different depending on the court seized.

For a thorough PIL analysis, see T. Kadner Graziano, “Cross-Border Traffic Accidents in the EU – The Potential Impact of Driverless Cars” (Study for the JURI Committee, 2016), available here.

The EU Commission announced that a new piece of legislation addressing civil liability should soon complement the proposed AI Regulation, following the EU Parliament’s detailed recommendations for drawing up a regulation on liability for the operation of AI systems. If followed by the Commission and adopted, the text would partially harmonise national laws on civil liability in the EU. These shall however not be replaced; only adjustments would be provided.

The object of the future Regulation is to hold the operators of high-risk AI systems strictly liable, while operators of other AI systems would be subject to a fault-based liability regime. Finally, the drafting of the future Regulation should go hand in hand with the necessary review of the Product Liability Directive in order to build up a consistent liability framework in the EU.

According to Article 2 of the Parliament’s Draft Proposal, the liability rules enacted at the EU level would apply “on the territory of the Union where a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by an AI system has caused harm or damage to the life, health, physical integrity of a natural person, to the property of a natural or legal person or has caused significant immaterial harm resulting in a verifiable economic loss”.

I find the wording of this provision unclear: shall the future Regulation apply where a court of a Member State is seized with a dispute involving damages caused by AI systems (as the terms “on the territory of the Union” suggests) or must the damage, the operator, the activity or the victim additionally be located in the EU?

Additionally, even though the future Regulation bypasses the Rome II Regulation according to Article 27 of the latter, traditional choice of law rules would still be needed to designate the law applicable to questions falling out of the future Regulation’s scope (such as the law applicable to multiple liability where non-operators are involved, just to mention one example). Fragmentation would therefore not be completely avoided.

For an analysis of the Draft Proposal from a PIL perspective, see J. von Hein, “Liability for Artificial Intelligence in Private International Law” (online presentation, 25 June 2020), available here.

Conclusion

The interaction of AI with the PIL field brings interesting research questions on the table for legal scholars. As things currently stand, however, the EU’s legislative initiatives do not overcome the sempiternal difficulties experienced in PIL, namely the fragmented application of laws, and the difficulty to manage interactions between multiple legal texts because of their overlapping and extraterritorial effect.

The last issue of the Revue Critique de Droit International Privé has been released. It contains eight articles and several case notes.

The editorial (authored by Horatia Muir Watt, Dominique Bureau and Sabine Corneloup) and five of the articles deal with the reserved share (réserve héréditaire) in international successions. These five articles are authored by: Paul Lagarde (« Une ultime (?) bataille de la réserve héréditaire »), Cécile Pérez (« Quelques observations relatives à la réserve héréditaire dans le projet de loi confortant le respect des principes de la République »), Diane Le Grand de Belleroche (« Contre le retour du droit de prélèvement en droit français : une vue de la pratique du droit international »), Suzel Ramaciotti (« Le prélèvement compensatoire du projet d’article 913 du code civil à l’épreuve des exigences européennes et constitutionnelles »), and Nathalie Joubert (« Droit de prélèvement, réserve héréditaire, protection des héritiers contre les discriminations, quelle méthode ? »).

The sixth article, authored by Christelle Chalas and Horatia Muir Watt deals with the international jurisdiction of courts in matters relating to the environnemental responsibility of multinational companies.

In the seventh article, Vincent Richard presents the recast of the regulation on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents.

The eighth article, by Christine Budzikiewicz, discusses the reform of international adoption law in Germany.

A full table of contents is available here.

In recent years, the debate surrounding consensual justice and party autonomy has received increasing attention in the national and international arenas and has raised a broad array of questions. In the pressing need to observe this phenomenon from different perspectives lies the rationale behind a newly founded biannual journal, Giustizia consensuale. The journal, founded and directed by Prof. Silvana Dalla Bontà and Prof. Paola Lucarelli, features contributions in both Italian and English.

By adopting an interdisciplinary and holistic approach, the journal aims to investigate the meaning of consensual justice, its relation with judicial justice, and the potential for integrating – rather than contrasting – these two forms of justice. This investigation is premised on the relationship between justice and private autonomy as well as forms of integrative, participatory, and restorative justice. By being particularly suited for meeting the needs of an increasingly complicated and multi-faceted society, these forms of justice ultimately promote social cohesion and reconciliation. Against this backdrop, Giustizia consensuale strives to make a valid contribution to the discourse on conflict and the meaning of justice by fostering an interdisciplinary dialogue which encompasses both theory and practice.

The first issue of Giustizia Consensuale has just been released and it features:

Silvana Dalla Bontà (University of Trento), Giustizia consensuale (‘Consensual Justice – A Foreword’; in Italian)

Paola Lucarelli (University of Firenze), Mediazione dei conflitti: una spinta generosa verso il cambiamento (Conflict Mediation: A Push for Cultural Change; in Italian)

From the Italian Recovery and Resilience Plan to the guidelines of the Italian Ministry of Justice, the urgency of a reform to strengthen out-of-court dispute resolution procedures clearly emerges. Recovery and resilience become fundamental objectives. Conflict mediation is the path chosen to achieve social cohesion and reconciliation. Promoting and strengthening this dispute resolution mechanism is important not only to reduce the judicial backlog, but also to empower the parties to self-tailor the solution of their conflict with the assistance of their attorneys. By fostering responsibility, self-determination, awareness and trust, mediation makes citizens and professionals protagonists in the process of change that combines judicial and consensual justice.

Francesco P. Luiso (University of Pisa), La «proposta» del mediatore (The Mediator’s ‘Dispute Settlement Offer’; in Italian)

The Italian Legislative Decree No. 28 of 4 March 2010 – implementing the Directive 2008/52/EC – enables, in certain conditions, the mediator to submit a settlement offer to the conflicting parties. In the case that the mediation fails, the judge, in the subsequent court proceedings, might sanction the non-accepting party when allocating procedural costs. Nonetheless, the aforementioned Legislative Decree does not compel the mediator to submit such a settlement offer. However, the mediation rules of some institutions oblige the mediator to make a settlement offer to the parties. Against this background, when ordering the parties to attempt mediation, some courts require them to file their mediation application with a mediation institution allowing the mediator to submit a settlement offer to the parties. In this article, the author argues that these court orders are against the above-mentioned Legislative Decree. In fact, this does not permit the judge to make any particular determination regarding the mediation procedure, the parties, or the mediator themselves. Furthermore, the author underlines how the judge could never take the mediator’s settlement offer into consideration in the pending proceedings. While the judge grounds their decision on what is right and what is wrong, the mediator’s settlement offer revolves around the needs and interests of the conflicting parties, thus impeding any comparison between their contents.

Antonio Briguglio (University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’), Conciliazione e arbitrato. Conciliazione nell’arbitrato. Appunti sparsi fra diritto, psicologia e prassi (Conciliation and Arbitration. Conciliation in Arbitration. Notes on Law, Psychology, and Practice; in Italian)

The article deals with the relationship between conciliation and arbitration within the overall ADR system. It first analyses the conceptual, legal and systematic differences between conciliation and arbitration, with references to some areas of partial overlap (such as, for example, the one now opened by the Singapore Convention of 2019). The author then takes into consideration the parties’ and adjudicators’ different approaches to conciliation both in in-court proceedings and arbitration. Subsequently, the attention is focused on the attempt of conciliation in the course of the arbitral proceedings; on the so-called multi-step clauses that provide for a mandatory attempt of conciliation before the commencement of arbitration; and on the ‘award by consent’ in the practice of international arbitration.

Neil Andrews (University of Cambridge), Procedure, Party Agreement, and Contract (in English)

In this piece the author considers three points of interaction between agreement and procedure. (1) The parties might consensually choose the applicable procedure, notably the choice between (a) judicial proceedings and (b) arbitration. If they have chosen (a), the parties might stipulate which court and in which jurisdiction the matter will be litigated. Having chosen instead (b) arbitration, the parties will normally make explicit the ‘seat’ (London, Milan, New York, etc) and the size of the arbitral tribunal (one, three, five, etc). Also falling within (1), there is possibility that the parties will agree to impose on themselves preliminary ‘negotiation agreements’ and/or mediation agreements. (2) The parties can take a further step and specify or modify the elements of the relevant formal process (whether that process is court proceedings or arbitration). This modification of the default elements of the procedure will involve a ‘bespoke’ or ad hoc agreement, rather than simply adopting national or institutional procedural rules. However, this is less common. Most parties adopt without modification the relevant procedure ‘off the peg’. (3) Settlement is the consensual disposal or narrowing of the dispute. In practice, this is the most important way in which agreement and procedure interact. Settlement can occur before or after court or arbitration proceedings have commenced. It is also possible that settlement might occur even after the first-instance judgment has been obtained, for example, when appeal or enforcement proceedings are pending.

Margherita Ramajoli (University of Milan), Per una giustizia amministrativa alternativa con particolare (anche se non esclusivo) riguardo alle transazioni pubblicistiche (For an Alternative Administrative Justice: Focusing on Public Dispute Settlements; in Italian)

The use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in public interest litigation brings both substantial and procedural advantages. They may improve the quality of public decision-making, foster the adoption of shared solutions, re-establish dialogue between parties whose relations are bound to last over time, contribute to moralisation by making clear agreements otherwise not intended to emerge, and finally, make the administrative judicial review more efficient by directing the demand for justice elsewhere. In addition, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are in tune with the current changes in administrative law; there is a deep link between droit souple and justice douce, between soft law and ADR, between non-traditional substantive law and alternative administrative judicial review. However, alternative justice is a phenomenon not yet sufficiently developed in public litigation, because of some debated issues in its use. Specifically, it is not easy to harmonise the very purpose of ADR to definitively settle a dispute with the perpetual protection of public interest institutionally entrusted to administrative authorities, as demonstrated by how the latter use the settlement. The introduction of a framework law on ADR in public interest litigation could solve some of the most dramatic issues, naturally maintaining the indispensable flexibility.

Teresa Arruda Alvim (Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo) and Márcio Bellocchi (Universidade de São Paulo), Mediazione. Il frutto di un buon esercizio del diritto (Mediation. The Result of a Mindful Exercise of Rights; in Italian)

In the last few decades, even civil law jurisdictions have witnessed an increase in the promotion of alternative dispute resolution. Among various reasons for its adoption, ADR affords the parties the possibility to self-tailor a solution to their conflict while significantly diminishing the case overload of the judiciary. Nevertheless, just as varied are the obstacles to the diffusion of ADR, ranging from the lack of preparation of mediators to the traditional adversarial approach of attorneys. The authors examine each of these profiles in the perspective of the Brazilian legal system, analysing the reasons behind the promotion of ADR, its practical implications, and the future outlook on a multi-door justice.

Colin Rule (University of Stanford), Reinventing Justice with Online Dispute Resolution (in English)

Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is the study of how to use technology to help parties resolve their disputes. Originally created to help e-Commerce companies build trust with their users, ODR is now being integrated into the courts to expand access to justice and reduce costs. With the expansion of artificial intelligence and machine learning, ODR has the potential to play a major role in the justice systems of the future, but there are many questions that still need to be answered. This article outlines the need for ODR, provides a short history of its development, and describes some of the challenges that could accompany its expansion.

Silvana Dalla Bontà (University of Trento), Una giustizia «co-esistenziale» online nello spazio giuridico europeo? Spunti critici sul pacchetto ADR-ODR per i consumatori (‘Co-Existential’ Online Justice within the EU Judicial Area? Some Constructive Criticism on the Consumer ADR/ODR Package; in Italian)

Since the 1990s, the European Community, now the European Union, has shown particular regard to the matter of extra-judicial settlement of civil and commercial disputes. The European Union recognized the added value brought by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in answering the problems posed by cross-border litigation and thus facilitating the creation of the Single Market. The Community’s attention first focused on consumer disputes (Recommendations 98/257/EC and 2001/310/EC); it subsequently extended its reach to all civil and commercial disputes (Directive 2008/52/EC); ultimately, it reverted its focus back to consumer disputes with the Directive on consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and the Regulation on consumer Online Dispute Resolution (ODR),  both adopted in 2013. This article proposes an in-depth analysis of the objectives, the scope, and the application of the two above-mentioned legal acts composing the so-called ADR/ODR package for consumers, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. In particular, the discussion focuses on the ODR Platform for the resolution of consumer-to-business disputes launched by the European Union in 2016. In reviewing its functioning through the statistical data collected by the European Union, the author inquires whether the ODR Platform provides for the creation of a ‘co-existential justice’ in the European legal area or whether other complementary instruments should be implemented to grant a high standard of protection for consumers as the European Treaties impose.