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The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on 13 May 2021 at 5:00 pm (Mexico City time – CDT), 12:00 am (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is International Judicial Co-operation in Times of Pandemic and will be presented by Professor Carlos Echegaray de Maussion (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87893740067?pwd=L0w4cThOVkFzQ04rZUZvT0lnNGpHZz09

Meeting ID: 878 9374 0067

Password: BMAAMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

As reported by Pietro Franzina last January, the Standing International Forum of Commercial Courts (SIFoCC), which brings together the commercial courts of several countries across the world, launched the second edition of its Multilateral Memorandum on Enforcement of Commercial Judgments for Money.  Last April, SIFoCC’s Second International Working Group, co-chaired by Sir William Blair and Judge François Ancel, has produced a Commentary to accompany the Multilateral Memorandum setting out an understanding of the procedures for the enforcement of a money judgment by the courts of one jurisdiction obtained in the courts of another jurisdiction, written by judiciaries from across the world.

The Multilateral Memorandum with the commentary is available here. The non-binding character of the Memorandum is highlighted from the outset; so is its purpose , which does not intend to “signal” the enforceability of the judgments of commercial courts, but to explain to how the courts which have contributed to the Memorandum approach requests for the enforcement of judgments of other courts. In turn, the commentary added to the second edition does not purport to state common principles arising form the contributions (see the statement in para. 31, “this seems unnecessary now that the Hague Conference has concluded its work on the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters”); it rather describes common themes that arise from the contributions, identifying significant differences of approach and indicating how far the contributions appear to show a tendency towards convergence.

An interesting reading by all means.

The Hague Conference Experts’ Group on the electronic Apostille Programme (e-APP) and New Technologies met last week (3 to 6 May 2021). The Group endorsed key principles and good practices for Contracting Parties in the implementation of the e-APP. They may be found in Annex 1 to the Report from the Chair on the Experts’ Group on the e-APP and New Technologies, made available today at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/b94fadf7-ba82-42d9-bdbb-f8088b040273.pdf

In February 2021, the European Commission launched a study to assess the need for more effective legal protection of vulnerable adults within the European Union. As part of this study, a survey has now been published online for all legal practitioners working in the area: judges, lawyers, notaries, and other relevant authorities. Input from practitioners will be important in shaping any future legislative initiative.

The survey is open until 4 June 2021 and available at the following link: https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/vulnerable_adults_practitioners.

Although the survey is in English, respondents are welcome to submit responses in any of the official EU languages.

For more information, see the survey link above or for more specific questions contact the project team at: < crossborder.adults@milieu.be >.

On 12 April 2021, the Family Court of Namur, Belgium, applied the doctrine of renvoi under Article 34 of the Succession Regulation (the judgment and the commentary of Prof. Jean-Louis Van Boxstael – in French – are available here).

The deceased was born in 1931 in Belgium, but was living in South Korea when he died in 2019. He held both Belgian and Korean nationalities. In 2001, the deceased wrote a will in which he declared that a (Belgian?) foundation would receive all his assets after his death. The plaintiff owned a building in Belgium and had monies on bank accounts. It does not seem that he had children.

The Belgian court was petitioned by the foundation in 2021.

The court found that the deceased was resident in Korea. It retained jurisdiction, however, under Article 10(1) of the Succession Regulation, which provides that where the deceased was not habitually resident in a Member State, jurisdiction can be founded on the nationality of the deceased.

The court found that the deceased being a Belgian national, the court could retain jurisdiction.

Under Article 21 of the Succession Regulation, the applicable law should be, in principle, the law of the last habitual residence of the deceased. The court found that it was Korea. However, it noted that, under Art. 49 of the Korean Conflict of Laws Act, a Korean court would apply the law of the nationality of the deceased.

The deceased, however, was a dual national. The Belgian court referred to Art. 3(2) of the Belgian Code of Private International Law which provides that, in case of dual nationality, Belgian nationality prevails. It thus considered that the deceased was a Belgian national, and that Belgian law was applicable by renvoi from Korean law.

The most interesting issue raised by the case was that of handling the dual nationality of the deceased.

For jurisdiction purposes, Art. 10 provides:

1.   Where the habitual residence of the deceased at the time of death is not located in a Member State, the courts of a Member State in which assets of the estate are located shall nevertheless have jurisdiction to rule on the succession as a whole in so far as: (a) the deceased had the nationality of that Member State at the time of death…

The rule does not refer to the “nationality of the deceased” in general. It refers to a person who has the nationality of a particular Member State. This resolves the issue of dual nationality where one of the nationalities is that of a third state. A rule of the forum provides taking into account the nationality of the relevant Member State. This implicitly excludes taking into account the nationality of the third state, or whether it might be more effective.

For choice of law purposes, Art. 34 provides:

1.   The application of the law of any third State specified by this Regulation shall mean the application of the rules of law in force in that State, including its rules of private international law in so far as those rules make a renvoi: (a) to the law of a Member State

The rule does not address the issue of dual nationality. It only provides to apply foreign choice of law rules if they refer to the law of a Member State.

So, the critical question is to determine the content of the foreign choice of law rule and ascertain whether the foreign rule designates the law of a Member State. It is therefore for the foreign legal system to say how it addresses dual nationality. If, under foreign private international law, local nationality prevails, this means that the foreign choice of law rule does not designate the law of a Member State.

In this case, the Belgian court should have wondered whether a Korean court would prefer Belgian nationality over Korean nationality. Instead, the Belgian court applied Belgian principles.

Maybe the Belgian court should have read the entirety of the Korean Conflict of Laws Act, a translation of which is freely available on the internet. Article 3 of the Act provides:

(1) In case the law of nationality of a party shall govern, if the party has two or more nationalities, the law of the country, which is most closely connected with the party, shall be the law of nationality: if one of the nationalities is the Republic of Korea, then the law of the Republic of Korea shall be the law of nationality…

So it seems that a Korean court would not have applied Belgian law: it would have applied Korean law. The Belgian court rewrote Korean private international law and invented a renvoi which did not exist.

Dans un avis du 28 avril rendu dans le cadre du « printemps de l’évaluation » mené par la commission des finances de l’Assemblée nationale, la Défenseure des droits s’est penché sur la question des moyens consacrés par les préfectures à l’instruction des demandes de titres de séjour : module de prise de rendez-vous en ligne et plateforme dématérialisée pour accomplir les démarches administratives. 

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Le volet procédural de l’article 3 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme serait violé si le requérant, dont le statut de réfugié a été révoqué, était renvoyé dans son pays d’origine sans une appréciation préalable, tenant compte de sa qualité de réfugié, de la réalité et de l’actualité du risque qu’il allègue encourir en cas de mise à exécution de la mesure d’expulsion. 

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In collaboration with the University of Heidelberg, the Charles University of Prague and the University of Warsaw, the University of Milan is conducting the project ‘From Diversities to Unity through Coordination (EU-DUC)’ within the framework of the 1st Call for joint educational proposal promoted by the 4EU+ European University Alliance.

In this context, from 16 to 18 June 2021, the University of Milan will host the Overcoming Challenges, Addressing Conflicts, Settling Disputes Summer School on EU Business Law. The Summer School is open to students of 4EU+ universities, and it is envisioned to take place in a hybrid (online/in person) mode.

Students can register, from 15 April until 16 May 2021, on Eventbrite. With their registration, they must submit to Prof. Francesca C. Villata (euduc@unimi.it) their CV and a letter of motivation, indicating the order of preference between the 5 interactive modules offered with the Summer School.

More information on the 4EU+ European University Alliance and the Summer School’s Programme are available here.

Just as the Commission formally announced its refusal to give consent to the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, Andrew Dickinson has provided a comprehensive overview on the state of Private International Law for civil and commercial matters in the UK and EU, which has just been published in the latest issue of Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) (IPRax 2021, p. 218).

The article sketches out this ‘realignment of the planets’ from three angles, starting with the legal framework in the UK, which will now be based on the Withdrawal Act 2018, several other statutes and multiple pieces of secondary legislation. The latter include the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations, which entail a return to the rules previously applied only to non-EU defendants, and the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations, which (by contrast) essentially carries over the Rome I and II Regulation. With regard to jurisdiction, the situation is of course complicated by some residual remains of the Brussels regime, some new provisions aiming to preserve certain jurisdictional advantages for consumers and employees, and the interplay with the Hague Choice of Court Convention, all of which the article also covers in detail. Interestingly, especially in the context of last week’s news, Dickinson concludes the section on jurisdiction (on p. 218) as follows:

One might take comfort in the fact that there is nothing in the mechanisms and rules described above that is truly novel. In large part, the effect of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will be to extend to the province formerly occupied by the Brussels-Lugano regime the conflict of law rules for situations lacking an EU connection, with which many cross-border practitioners will be familiar. Some will welcome, for example, the increased role for the doctrine of forum non conveniens or the removal of fetters on the UK courts’ ability to grant anti-suit injunctions. Others will see the transition to what is unquestionably a complex and piecemeal set of rules as a backward step, which nonetheless creates an opportunity to review, simplify and up- date the UK’s private international law infrastructure. The case for reform will grow if the UK’s application to rejoin the 2007 Lugano Convention does not bear fruit.

The text then goes on to describe the consequent changes in EU Private International Law and the effects of these changes on third states with whom the EU has concluded international agreements.

The article links up nicely with Paul Beaumont’s article on The Way Ahead for UK Private International Law After Brexit, which has just been published in this year’s first issue of the Journal of Private International Law and which considers the steps the UK should take to remain an effective member of international institutions such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Both articles can also be read in conjunction with Reid Mortensen’s contribution on Brexit and Private International Law in the Commonwealth and Trevor Hartley’s article on Arbitration and the Brussels I Regulation – Before and After Brexit, which appear in the same issue.

This post is my tuppenny worth on the European Commission’s Assessment on the application of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention. These are my considered but of course not my exhaustive initial thoughts. For excellent review of the legal status quo, see Andrew Dickinson’s ‘Realignment of the Planets – Brexit and European Private International Law’ in IPRax 2021/3.

The background. 

In June 2020, Michel Barnier reportedly commented ‘Do we really want the UK to remain a centre for commercial litigation for the EU, when we could attract these services here?’. This illustrated what has been clear now for quite a while: legal services contribute directly to GPD, mostly as a result of law firms’ turnover and, more recently,  via the financial performance of third-party financing. More importantly, they have an impact on the reputation of a country. Courts’ know-how, speed and general performance are a particularly relevant factor here. Therefore the legal sector acts as one factor in attracting foreign direct investment, as the rise of  international commercial courts shows.

The quote also illustrates however that the European Commission and the Member States were keenly aware of the impact of Brexit on judicial co-operation. Throughout the process, this included early EU flags that, should judicial co-operation fail to be included in the EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement – TCA, it should not be assumed that the EU would support UK Lugano membership. Scholarship, too, warned of the inferiority of Lugano viz Brussels IA, and the particular weakness of Lugano States only having to take  ‘due account’ (Article 1 Protocol 2 Lugano 2007) of CJEU case-law on Lugano.

As readers will be aware, the TCA as eventually negotiated includes precious little on judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters. A Hard Brexit in this area, therefore. Amidst the many issues that needed to be discussed in the TCA, judicial co-operation did not make the grade. This was not a big surprise. As Peter Bert signalled from the start, judicial co-operation barely featured in the negotiation mandate on the EU side, and on the UK side the Government kept largely schtum about the issue.

The lack of provision in the TCA put back into the spotlights the UK’s April 2020 application to join Lugano. Of note is as I have signalled before, that the UK could accede to Lugano, bypassing EU approval , if it were to become a fully fledged EFTA Member State (A70(1)a Lugano). That of course is not the route the UK has followed in its disentanglement from the EU. Under A72 Lugano therefore accession requires consent from the current Lugano States, consent which they ‘endeavour to give’ at the latest within one year after the invitation to do so by the Depository (i.e., Switserland). 

The flip-flop? 

It is reporting in the Financial Times which subsequently put things into a bit of a spin, whether as a result of misinformation or lobbying, I cannot say. On the day of an important meeting of the relevant Working Party, the FT first reported the EC would support Lugano Membership – contrary to what the vast majority of observers had assumed. By the afternoon a U-turn in reporting was made, suggesting additionally that a split had emerged among the Member States. That split is simply not there, or not to a sufficient degree (see below re the voting procedure).

The morning’s reporting of white smoke made the lack of EC support look like a surprise or indeed a disappointment. Clearly it could not have been the former: most of us had assumed the EC would not support the application.

That leaves the feeling of disappointment. Quite aside from one’s view on Brexit as a whole, for legal practice clearly a continuing umbilical cord between the UK and the Brussels Regime in its widest form (BIa, Rome I and II etc etc) would have been most preferable. Lugano would have been a second best. I remind readers that Lugano not only lacks a unified solid judicial oversight. It also lags behind Brussels Ia in important aspects (Lugano 2007 instead mirrors Brussels I, Regulation 44/2001).

The reasoning.

In its Communication to the EP and the Member States, as Peter Bert reports, the EC’s core reasoning is

“For the European Union, the Lugano Convention is a flanking measure of the internal market and relates to the EU-EFTA/EEA context. In relation to all other third countries the consistent policy of the European Union is to promote cooperation within the framework of the multilateral Hague Conventions. The United Kingdom is a third country without a special link to the internal market. Therefore, there is no reason for the European Union to depart from its general approach in relation to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the Hague Conventions should provide the framework for future cooperation between the European Union and the United Kingdom in the field of civil judicial cooperation.”

The Commission specifically refers to the example of Poland as the direction of travel (closer integration with the EU), and to Lugano being a flanking measure of the Internal Market. The 1968 Brussels Convention quite clearly shows the DNA and the narrative of market integration. The development of the EU judicial area in the meantime has moved along in the direction of the EU citisen, rather than merely corporations, as consumers of EU judicial co-operation. Yet without Lugano States being part of the much wider judicial co-operation agenda of the EU proper, it is not absurd to suggest that Lugano 2007’s narrative is more closely aligned with market  integration than it is with ever deeper integration.

At the time of Poland‘s accession to Lugano, this was indeed clearly also linked to its impending membership of the EU, as also noted by David Lock QC, relevant UK Minister at the time. For current candidates, one could think e.g. of Georgia, and the Balkan countries, as stronger candidates for Lugano membership than the UK. Clearly, however, they may bump into opposition by the non-EU Lugano States.

The victims.

The general narrative, to which I subscribe, is that it is not Business to Business contracts, and the litigation by big business cases that will be much hit by this hard Brexit in judicial co-operation. They will turn to arbitration, they will agree exclusive choice of court (covered by the 2005 Hague Convention), and if need be they will simply absorb being litigated in, or having to litigate in the EU. Likewise, many UK judgments in standard business cases will find little difficulty, if some delay, in enforcement in the EU.

Rather: SMEs (lest they too enter into exclusive choice of court agreements per Hague 2005; and they will be less likely to be able to absorb the cost of parallel litigation), consumers and employees, travellers (including in direct action versus the insurer), and claimants in corporate due diligence cases will find it much harder to have a smooth judicial process between the UK and the EU. Consumers domiciled in the EU will still be able to sue UK corporations in the EU, provided they meet the Pammer Alpenhof criteria under the relevant Section of Brussels Ia; and employees carrying out their duties here, likewise will be able to sue a UK employer in the EU. Yet with the distinct possibility of parallel UK proceedings, and subsequent difficulties in having a European judgment enforced, there will be many a freezing effect on proactive judicial action by these protected groups. Clearly and mutatis mutandis, the same categories in the UK will see a major judicial protection avenue fall away, as non-EU cq non-Lugano domiciled consumers, employees and small insureds do not enjoy the protection of the relevant Sections in BIa cq Lugano.

A distinct category of claimants that will be hit, are those which recently have enjoyed the reigning in of forum non conveniens in business and human rights cases particularly under Lugano (where Owosu’s rejection of forum non rules) and even under Brussels Ia (where A33-34 does create some obstacles). Without Lugano, forum non in these cases will once again come to the fore, although recent Court of Appeal and Supreme Court authority on duty of care may alter that fear. 

The voting procedure and future options.

Greg Callus suggests a number of future options here. I have made the following admittedly lame football comparison: If BIa is the Champions League, then Lugano is the Premier League and the Hague Judgments Convention the Ruritanian Boy Scouts football conference. That is because the 2019 Convention does not impact on forum non theories of the signatory States; is a long, long way off entry into force (albeit as noted the EC signals it might speed up the accession process); has such a huge amount of exceptions, reservations and open questions, counsel will drive an entire tank company through it; and, like all Hague instruments, lacks a harmonising court with authority over interpretation.

The Lugano Convention encourages consent within a year of notification. Absence of an answer in other words simply continues a status of lack of consent.

An important final word on the voting procedure: it is NOT the case that the final word on the current initiative lies with the Member States under qualified majority – QMV voting. An EU yes to Switserland, the depository, requires a Council Decision with QMV. However that requires a COM proposal for such decision. This, the European Commission clearly is not willing to put forward. Article 241 TFEU enables Council to request the EC to put forward a proposal for decision. Yet to amend that proposal (which would have to be the case here, seeing as the EC will not propose consent), unanimity is required.

In conclusion

I return to my Barnier quote above: ‘Do we really want the UK to remain a centre for commercial litigation for the EU, when we could attract these services here?’ Free movement of judgments simply is too big a cherry to have the UK pick it in the absence of a more overall framework for judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters. I fear the fall-out for the categories listed above, might not be enough to make the EC and indeed enough Member States deviate from the Brexit negotiation mandate, which continues to cast a long shadow over this particular initiative.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 1.7.

The first issue of the Journal of Private International Law for 2021 was released today and it features the following articles:

Paul Beaumont, Some reflections on the way ahead for UK private international law after Brexit

Since 1 January 2021 the UK has moved out of the implementation period for its withdrawal from the European Union (EU) and it is an appropriate time to reflect on the way forward for the UK in developing private international law. This article considers the practical steps that the UK should take in the near future. There is significant work that the UK can do to progress its commitment to the “progressive unification of the rules of private international law” by improving its commitment to the effective functioning of several key Conventions concluded by the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). Some of these steps can and should be taken immediately, notably accepting the accessions of other States to the Hague Evidence and Child Abduction Conventions and extending the scope of the UK’s ratification of the Adults Convention to England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. Other things require more consultation and time but there are great opportunities to provide leadership in the world by ratifying the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 and, when implementing that Convention which is based on minimum harmonisation, providing leadership in the Commonwealth by implementing, at least to some extent, the Commonwealth Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments. Within the UK, as a demonstration of best constitutional practice, intergovernmental cooperation between the UK Government and the devolved administrations should take place to consider how intra-UK private international law could be reformed learning the lessons from the UK Supreme Court’s highly divided decision in Villiers. Such work should involve the best of the UK’s experts (from each of its systems of law) on private international law from academia, the judiciary and legal practice. Doing so, would avoid accusations that Brexit will see a UK run by generalists who give too little attention and weight to the views of experts. This use of experts should also extend to the UK’s involvement in the future work of HCCH at all levels. The HCCH will only be able to be an effective international organisation if its Members show a commitment to harnessing the talents of experts in the subject within the work of the HCCH.

Reid Mortensen, Brexit and private international law in the Commonwealth

“Brexit is a trading and commercial opportunity for the countries of the Commonwealth, as it makes it likely that, for many, their access to United Kingdom (UK) markets will improve significantly. The question addressed in this article is whether, to support more open and trading relationships, Brexit also presents opportunities for the development of the private international law of Commonwealth countries – including the UK. Focusing on Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, as well as the UK, an account is given of the relationship between the different systems of private international law in these Commonwealth countries in the period of the UK’s membership of the European Union (EU). Accordingly, consideration is given to the Europeanisation of UK private international law and its resistance in other parts of the Commonwealth. The continuing lead that English adjudication has given to private international law in the Commonwealth and, yet, the greater fragmentation of that law while the UK was in the EU are also discussed. The conclusion considers the need to improve the cross-border enforcement of judgments within the Commonwealth, and the example given in that respect by its federations and the trans-Tasman market. Possible directions that the cross-border enforcement of judgments could take in the Commonwealth are explored.”

Trevor Hartley, Arbitration and the Brussels I Regulation – Before and After Brexit

This article deals with the effect of the Brussels I Regulation on arbitration. This Regulation no longer applies in the UK, but the British Government has applied to join the Lugano Convention, which contains similar provisions. So the article also discusses the position under Lugano, paying particular attention to the differences between the two instruments. The main focus is on the problems that arise when the same dispute is subject to both arbitration and litigation. Possible mechanisms to resolve these problems – such as antisuit injunctions – are considered. The article also discusses other questions, such as freezing orders in support of arbitration.

Maksymilian Pazdan & Maciej Zachariasiewicz, The EU succession regulation: achievements, ambiguities, and challenges for the future

The quest for uniformity in the private international law relating to succession has a long history. It is only with the adoption of the EU Succession Regulation that a major success was achieved in this field. Although the Regulation should receive a largely positive appraisal, it also suffers from certain drawbacks that will require a careful approach by courts and other authorities as to the practical application of the Regulation. The authors address selected difficulties that arise under its provisions and make suggestions for future review and reform. The article starts with the central notion of habitual residence and discusses the possibility of having a dual habitual residence. It then moves to discuss choice of law and recommends to broaden further party autonomy in the area of succession law. Some more specific issues are also addressed, including legacies by vindication, the relationship between the law applicable to succession, the role of the legis rei sitae and the law applicable to the registries of property, estates without a claimant, the special rules imposing restrictions concerning or affecting succession in respect of certain assets, as well as the exclusion of trusts. Some proposals for clarifications are made in that regard.

Stellina Jolly & Aaditya Vikram Sharma, Domestic violence and inter-country child abduction: an Indian judicial and legislative exploration

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction aims to prevent the abduction of children by their parents by ensuring the child’s prompt return to his/her place of habitual residence. At the time of drafting the Convention, the drafters believed that non-custodial parents who were fathers perpetrated most of the abductions. However, the current statistics reveal the overwhelming majority of all abductors as primary or joint-primary caretakers. Unfortunately, it is unknown what exact proportion of these situations includes abductions triggered by domestic violence. In the absence of an explicit provision of domestic violence against spouses as a defence against an order of return, for a parent who has abducted a child to escape domestic violence, the relevant defence is of “grave risk of harm” to and “intolerable situation” for the child under Article 13(1)(b) of the Convention. However, the lack of guidance on what constitutes “grave risk” and “intolerable situation”, at least in the past, and its operationalisation in the context of domestic violence brings in pervasive indeterminacy in child abduction. In 2012, the Hague Conference on Private International Law identified “domestic violence allegations and return proceedings” as a key issue and recommended steps for developing principles on the management of domestic violence allegations in return proceedings leading to the adoption of a Good Practice Guide on this issue in 2020.

The Ministry of Women and Child Development (WCD) and the Ministry of Law and Justice, India, cite that most Indian parents who abduct their children happen to be women escaping domestic violence abroad. Thus, they are victims escaping for themselves and their children’s safety. This research has summed up the judgments delivered by High Courts and the Supreme Court of India on child abduction between 1984 and 2019. Through judicial mapping, the paper discusses the cases in which battered women have highlighted and argued domestic violence as a reason against their children’s return. The paper evaluates whether the reason given by the two ministries against India’s accession to the Hague Convention is reflected in cases that have come up for judicial resolution and what are the criteria evolved by the judiciary in addressing the concerns of domestic violence against a spouse involved in child abduction. The paper analyses India’s legislative initiative, the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Bill, 2016 and assesses the measures proposed by the Bill for considering domestic violence against a spouse in abduction cases.

Kittiwat Chunchaemsai, Legal considerations and challenges involved in bringing the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements into force within an internal legal system: A case study of Thailand

Thailand must consider two vital elements, namely its internal legal system and environment before signing the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (Hague Convention). This paper investigates whether the law of Thailand in its current form is inconsistent with the Hague Convention. Articles 1–15 are examined to identify areas of inconsistency and to suggest appropriate solutions. This study finds that the internal legal system of Thailand is not quite in line with the Hague Convention. This conclusion leads to analytical recommendations to suit the needs of the current Thai legal system. Implementing these recommendations is necessary for Thailand if it intends to become a Party to the Hague Convention. Thailand must not only have a specific implementation act but must also review and revise the relevant laws appropriately.

Saeed Haghani,  Evolution of lex societatis under Iranian law: current status and future prospects

There has been a growing attention to applicable law to companies (lex societatis) in Iranian legal research. A brief study of relevant legal literature leads us to a list of both disagreements and complexities on the subject. Meanwhile, a recent parliamentary effort on the issue, illustrates the importance of lex societatis in the eyes of the Iranian legislature. A comparative approach would be of great help in the analysis of the formation and evolution of relevant Iranian legal rules. This paper tries to provide the reader with a comprehensive view of the current transitory state of Iranian law regarding lex societatis.

“Si l'article L 213-6 du code de l'organisation judiciaire donne compétence au juge de l'exécution pour connaître des contestations qui s'élèvent à l'occasion de la procédure de saisie immobilière et des demandes nées de cette procédure ou s'y rapportant directement, même si elles portent sur le fond du droit, un débiteur est-il recevable à solliciter du juge de l'exécution, devant statuer sur sa demande d'autorisation de vente à l'amiable du bien saisi, l'autorisation, sur le fondement des articles 815-5 et 1235-1 du code civil, de procéder seul à la vente du bien en indivision saisi pour laquelle le consentement du coïndivisaire est nécessaire ?”

At issue in Skatteforvaltningen (The Danish Customs And Tax Administration) v Solo Capital Partners LLP & Ors [2021] EWHC 974 (Comm)  is ‘Dicey Rule 3’ which states that “English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action: (1) for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign State; or (2) founded upon an act of state“. The assertion of such claims is an extension of a sovereign power of taxation and, per Lord Keith of Avonholm in Government of India v Taylor [1955] A.C. 491, 511: “an assertion of sovereign authority by one State within the territory of another, as distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignties“.

By its claims, SKAT (Danish customs and excise) seeks the return of amounts it says it was wrongly induced to pay out as tax refunds.

Brussels Ia and Lugano (the latter viz a number of defendants domiciled in Lugano States) feature in the discussion because SKAT argue that [22] ‘: (i) this is a ‘civil and commercial matter’, not a ‘revenue, customs or administrative matter’, under A1(1) BIa; and (ii) it is therefore not possible to invoke Dicey Rule 3 to dismiss its claims against Brussels-Lugano defendants, because to do so would be to decline to exercise a jurisdiction conferred by the Brussels-Lugano regime otherwise than in accordance with its rules.’

If the argument were upheld, any claims falling within Dicey Rule 3 would proceed against Brussels-Lugano defendants while being dismissed against other defendants. 

Dicey Rule 3 is not a jurisdictional rule: it is a substantive rule of English law. Yet SKAT’s argument in my view essentially means that an application of Dicey Rule 3 to the matter, would deprive A1(1) BIa of its effet utile.

Logically the BIa /Lugano argument would have had to have been considered first. Baker J does the opposite (his thinking process, unlike writing up, may of course first have considered the BIa argument) and holds at 120 after thorough consideration of the authorities on Dicey Rule 3, that the rule applies: SKAT’s claims seek indirectly to enforce in E&W, Danish revenue law.

In an interesting Coda at 121 ff, he also considers obiter the argument that, in essence, was that in line with a long public international law history, the cross-border recovery of tax refunds wrongfully procured is seen as or assumed to be a matter of revenue law requiring to be dealt with (if at all) by supranational legal instrument. Refence here is made ia to 1925 League of Nations reports.

Justice Baker starts [132] the BIa /Lugano argument along familiar lines: need for autonomous interpretation. QRS 1 ApS et al v Frandsen [1999] EWCA Civ 1463 is English authority under the Brussels Convention, and CJEU C-49/12 Sunico (to which both the AG and the CJEU refer in C-73/19 Belgische Staat v Movic BV et al) CJEU authority.

[142] In Sunico, the CJEU considered claims brought by HMRC alleging missing trader VAT carousel frauds. The substantive claims, for damages at common law for an alleged tortious conspiracy to defraud, were pursued in E&W against defendants domiciled in Denmark. HMRC also brought ancillary  proceedings in Denmark to attach assets with a view to enforcing any damages judgment obtained in England. Those Danish proceedings were objected to on the basis that they were a ‘revenue [etc] matter’ excluded from BI.

[144] The CJEU concluded at [41]-[43], essentially, that because the claim was framed in tort and not as a claim under a tax law, the proceedings were a ‘civil and commercial matter’ and not a ‘revenue [etc] matter’ for the purpose of Article 1(1) of the Brussels Regulation, so long as “the commissioners were in the same position as a person governed by private law in their action against Sunico and the other non-residents sued in the High Court of Justice” (ibid at [43]).

At 149 Baker J concedes that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Frandsen was incorrect per Sunico, however then holds that the result would be the same: the classification of proceedings as a ‘civil and commercial matter’ or a ‘revenue [etc] matter’ for the purpose of applying the Brussels-Lugano regime does not touch the question whether Dicey Rule 3 applies so as to defeat the claim. He suggests [149] a search for the lex causae under Rome II would be largely irrelevant for per A16 Rome II Dicey Rule 3 qualifies as lois de police, and finds support for his view that despite scholarly suggestion (i.a. by prof Briggs), Frandsen must not be displaced, in The Law Debenture Trust Corporation [2017] EWHC 655 (Comm) [and in Andrew Dickinson’s reporting on same], in which the English Act of State doctrine was upheld despite Rome II’s classification of the matter as civil and commercial.

At 165 ff he, somewhat superfluously still considers the more recent CJEU authority of Buak and the aforementioned Movic, and decides at 174 that per BUAK and Movic (on the use of evidence etc.) that SKAT was neither attempting nor able to change the rules of the litigation game, either as to the substantive rules of law that would apply in determining its claims, or as regards the procedural rules applicable in the litigation, or as regards the status or effect of any of the evidence it might deploy or disclose. SKAT was not by this litigation pursuing public law proceedings, in which liabilities are determined as if this were a judicial review of SKAT’s actions, decisions or exercise of public law powers.

Yet that the matters are of a civil and commercial nature, in the end does not matter at all: [176]

To the extent that SKAT relied on the Brussels-Lugano regime as the basis for this court having jurisdiction over the Brussels-Lugano defendants that have been sued, including it may be for serving proceedings out of the jurisdiction, in my judgment it was right to do so. But its having been entitled to do so did not oust or disapply Dicey Rule 3 in respect of those defendants.

Using prof Dickinson’s words (26-27), there is a dissonance here between Brussels Ia and the applicable law. One that, I would suggest, endangers the effet utile of Brussels Ia. Dicey Rule 3’s character as a substantive rather than a jurisdictional rule, does not to my mind save that.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.28 ff.

Skatteforvaltningen (Danish HMRC) v Solo Capital Partners eaors [2021] EWHC 974 (Comm) (27 April 2021)
Whether qualification as 'civil and commercial' under BIa, Lugano, displaces Dicey Rule 3 (foreign revenue claims are not entertained by E&W courts) https://t.co/vGFGel6RSw pic.twitter.com/7txUPRx90U

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 29, 2021

In a judgment dated 10 December 2020, the German Federal Court restricted the provision tax advice on German soil. The court ruled that advice to German clients cannot be rendered on a permanent basis through a subsidiary unless the partners possess the necessary qualifications under the German Code on Tax Consultancy. Although the case in question concerned a British LLP, it is not limited to them but applies to all partnerships from EU Member States.

The ruling is especially remarkable given that the Commission had not only criticized the German Code in a letter for limiting the freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU), but even started legal proceedings against Germany for violation of the Treaties. The Federal Court was unmoved. It saw no incompatibility with EU law, nor a need to submit a preliminary question on its interpretation to the CJEU.

In the Federal Court’s view, a tax adviser seeking to offer consultancy services on German tax law must have the qualifications required under German law. Such restriction of the freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) was justifiable by the public interest in the quality of such advice. German law would not violate Art 5(2) of the Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications either, given that the provision of services through a subsidiary is not merely “temporary and on an occasional basis”.

The Federal Court considered the German rules to be coherent and systematic, despite the many exceptions it provides for other professions, such as German notaries or banks. The Federal Court saw the latter as justified because of their limitation to ancillary services, whereas the provision of tax advice through a subsidiary would amount to a main service that required a specialisation in German tax law.

From the point of view of private international law, the most remarkable part of the judgment concerns liability. The suit was brought by one of the LLP’s German competitors against one of the partners personally and sought injunctive relief in the form of ceasing and desisting from advertisements for the LLP’s subsidiary’s tax consultancy services, including its entry into the German partnership register. The Federal Court ruled that the partner could indeed be personally liable under sec. 8 of the German Act Against Unfair Competition given that he was one of the applicants of the entry into the register and had publicly advertised with it.

The Federal Court’s ruling on EU law is to be criticised. The compatibility of the German rules on tax advice with the freedom to establishment is not as clear as outlined by the Federal Court, as highlighted by the Commission’s action against Germany. The least the Federal Court should have done is to submit a preliminary question to the CJEU.

The conflict-of-laws component demonstrates the danger partners of LLPs or similar entities run in Germany and other EU Member States. They may be personally liable for the breach of regulatory duties and the resulting violations of the law of unfair competition. In particular, this is not excluded by the limitation of liability provided under the applicable partnership law and agreed in the articles of the partnership.

The case is also interesting from a doctrinal perspective. It demonstrates that the law of unfair competition and corporate law use different connecting factors. Moreover, the issue whether regulatory duties have been violated is a “preliminary question” which is subject to a wholly different conflicts approach.