Feed aggregator

Décès de M. Barna Berke, juge au Tribunal de l’Union européenne

The Hague Conference on Private International Law has engaged in a series of projects that, if successful, could provide the framework for critical aspects of trans-national litigation in the Twenty-first Century. Thus far, the work has resulted in the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters. Work now has begun to examine the need, desirability and feasibility of additional instruments in the area, with discussions of an instrument that would either require or prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts, and of an instrument that would channel parallel proceedings to a “better’ forum.

The authors of this brief article advance the view that a convention regulating jurisdiction is not a good approach, but that an instrument finding a “better” forum in parallel proceedings, constructed on an open-minded and non-dogmatic basis, is needed, desirable, and feasible.

The piece is located here.

Membership

On 1 July 2021, Mongolia deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Statute, becoming the 89th Member of the HCCH. More information is available here.

Conventions & Instruments  

On 3 July 2021, the HCCH 1961 Apostille Convention entered into force for Jamaica. It currently has 120 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.

On 30 July 2021, the HCCH 1970 Evidence Convention entered into force for Georgia. It currently has 64 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.

Meetings & Events

From 5 to 9 July 2021, the Experts’ Group on Parentage/Surrogacy met for the ninth time, via videoconference. The Group discussed the scope of the possible draft Convention on legal parentage and the scope of the possible draft Protocol on legal parentage established as a result of an (international) surrogacy arrangement. More information is available here.

On 27 July 2021, the Permanent Bureau announced that Edition 2021 of HCCH a|Bridged will be dedicated to the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention and held online on 1 December 2021. More information is available here.

On 28 July 2021, the Permanent Bureau launched the Advancing and Promoting the Protection of All Children (Approach) Initiative, in celebration of the 25th anniversary of the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention. As part of this initiative, the Permanent Bureau is organising two competitions: the HCCH|Approach Essay Competition and the HCCH|Approach Media and Design Competition. Submissions are due on 1 October 2021. More information is available here.

Publications & Documentation

On 2 July 2021, the Permanent Bureau announced the publication of translations, in Albanian, Macedonian, and Bosnian-Serbian-Montenegrin languages, of the Explanatory Report on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. These are the first available translations after the official publication of the Explanatory Report in October 2020. They were supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Open Regional Fund for South East Europe – Legal Reform (ORF – Legal Reform). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

The decision corresponding to case C-262/21 PPU A, will be delivered on 2 August 2021. It corresponds to a preliminary reference from the Supreme Court of Finland, with five questions on Regulation 2201/2003 and the 1980 Hague Convention, as well as on the interface between the first one and the Dublin III Regulation. Practicalities surrounding the application of Article 11(4) Brussels II bis regulation are also at stake.

1. Must Article 2(11) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (‘the Brussels II bis Regulation’), relating to the wrongful removal of a child, be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which one of the parents, without the other parent’s consent, removes the child from his or her place of residence to another Member State, which is the Member State responsible under a transfer decision taken by an authority in application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the Dublin III Regulation’), must be classified as wrongful removal?

2. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, must Article 2(11) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, relating to wrongful retention, be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which a court of the child’s State of residence has annulled the decision taken by an authority to transfer examination of the file, but in which the child whose return is ordered no longer has a currently valid residence document in his or her State of residence, or the right to enter or to remain in the State in question, must be classified as wrongful retention?

3. If, in the light of the answer to the first or the second question, the Brussels II bis Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that there is a wrongful removal or retention of the child, and that he or she should therefore be returned to his or her State of residence, must Article 13(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention be interpreted as precluding the child’s return, either

(i) on the ground that there is grave risk, within the meaning of that provision, that the return of an unaccompanied infant whose mother has personally taken care of him or her would expose that child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation; or

(ii) on the ground that the child, in his or her State of residence, would be taken into care and placed in a hostel either alone or with his or her mother, which would indicate that there is a grave risk, within the meaning of that provision, that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation: or

(iii) on the ground that, without a currently valid residence document, the child would be placed in an intolerable situation within the meaning of that provision?

4. If, in the light of the answer to the third question, it is possible to interpret the grounds of refusal in Article 13(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention as meaning that there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation, must Article 11(4) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, in conjunction with the concept of the child’s best interests, referred to in Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which neither the child nor the mother has a currently valid residence document in the child’s State of residence, and in which therefore have neither the right to enter nor the right to remain in that State, the child’s State of residence must make adequate arrangements to secure that the child and his or her mother can lawfully remain in the Member State in question? If the child’s State of residence has such an obligation, must the principle of mutual trust between Member States be interpreted as meaning that the State which returns the child may, in accordance with that principle, presume that the child’s State of residence will fulfil those obligations, or do the child’s interests make it necessary to obtain from the authorities of the State of residence details of the specific measures that have been or will be taken for the child’s protection, so that the Member State which surrenders the child may assess, in particular, the adequacy of those measures in the light of the child’s interests?

5. If the child’s State of residence does not have the obligation, referred to above in the fourth question, to take adequate measures, is it necessary, in the light of Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to interpret Article 20 of the 1980 Hague Convention, in the situations referred to in the third question, points (i) to (iii), as meaning that that provision precludes the return of the child because the return of the child might be considered to be contrary, within the meaning of that provision, to the fundamental principles relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms?

AG Pikamäe’s Opinion was published in French and Finnish on July 14. He proposed the Court to answer as follows (translation by the author):

Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 … must be interpreted as meaning that the situation, such as that in the main proceedings, in which a child and its mother have moved and remain in a Member State in execution of a transfer decision taken by the competent authority of the Member State of origin in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 … cannot be considered as unlawful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 2 (11) of Regulation No 2201/2003, except if it is established that, under cover of an application for international protection made for the child, the mother has de facto tried circumvent the rules of judicial jurisdiction provided for by Regulation No 2201/2003, which is for the referring court to verify in the light of all the specific circumstances of the case.

The case will be decided by the First Chamber (M. Bonichot, as reporting judge ; M. Bay Larsen, Mme. Toader, M. Safjan, M. Jääskinen).

Today (1 August 2021) the Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has entered into force. This Protocol will apply in all 47 States Parties. Although it was open for signature/ratification since 2013, the ratification of Italy only occurred until 21 April 2021.

In the past, we have highlighted in this blog the increasing interaction between human rights and private international law and the need to interpret them harmoniously (see for example our previous posts here (HCCH Child Abduction Convention) and here (transnational surrogacy))

Protocol No. 15 has introduced important amendments to the text of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). In particular, it has included the principle of subsidiary and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the preamble, which have long and consistently been adopted by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and thus this is a welcome amendment.

It will now read as follows (art. 1 of the Protocol):

“Affirming  that  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation,  subject  to  the supervisory  jurisdiction  of  the  European  Court  of  Human Rights established by this Convention”.

Of great important is the shortening of the time for the filing of an application in accordance with article 35 of the ECHR: from 6 to 4 months. This amendment will enter into force 6 months later (I assume on 1 February 2022). Articles 4 and 8(3) of the Protocol state the following:

Article 4

“In Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Convention, the words “within a period of six months” shall be replaced by the words “within a period of four months”.

Article 8(3)

“Article 4 of this Protocol shall enter into force following the expiration of a period of six months after the date of entry into force of this Protocol. Article 4 of this Protocol shall not apply to applications  in  respect  of  which  the  final  decision  within  the  meaning  of  Article  35, paragraph 1 of the Convention was taken prior to the date of entry into force of Article 4 of this Protocol” (our emphasis).

This is perhaps a reaction to the increasing workload of the Court, which seems to be of serious concern to the States Parties. In particular, the Brighton declaration has noted that “the number of applications made each year to the Court has doubled since 2004. Very large numbers of applications are now pending before all of the Court’s primary judicial formations. Many applicants, including those with a potentially well-founded application, have to wait for years for a response.” Undoubtedly, this may compromise the effectiveness and reliability of the ECtHR. Nevertheless, this reduction of the filing time may also leave out cases that are well founded but during which the parties were late in realising that such recourse / legal challenge was available.

Lastly, I would like to highlight the removal of the right of the parties to object to the relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber in certain circumstances, such as when a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the ECHR or its protocols (art. 3 of the Protocol and art. 30 ECHR). In my view, this is an improvement and avoids delays as it allows the Chamber to make that call. It also provides consistency to the case law of the ECtHR. As to its entry into force, article 8(2) of the Protocol sets out the following:

“The amendment introduced by Article 3 of this Protocol shall not apply to any pending case in which one of the parties has objected, prior to the date of entry into force of this Protocol, to a proposal by a Chamber of the Court to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber”

 

 

Since 2000, the European Legal Forum informs about developments in various areas of the European ius commune. Special emphasis is placed on private international law, European and international civil procedure, family law and successions. The EuLF is directed at an international readership and provides researchers and legal practitioners with in-depth information on current developments in case law and legislation.

The Board of Editors is pleased to invite manuscripts in English on the above topics, but also other areas of international law and European Union law, in the form of articles, case summaries and book reviews.

Papers submitted by 1 October 2021 will be reviewed for publication in the autumn/winter editions 2021/2022.

Papers may be submitted via e-mail. Please feel free to contact us for any queries and additional information: redaktion@unalex.eu

Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Versailles du 16 février 2021

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Versailles du 16 février 2021

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Versailles du 16 février 2021

Pourvoi c. décision Cour d'appel de Versailles du 16 février 2021

Pourvoi c. décision Cour d'appel de Versailles du 16 février 2021

Tribunal judiciaire de Douai

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Riom du 12 janvier 2021

Puigdemont i Casamajó e.a. / Parlement
Le vice-président du Tribunal de l’Union européenne rejette la demande de suspension de la levée de l’immunité parlementaire de MM. Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó et Antoni Comín i Oliveres ainsi que de Mme Clara Ponsatí i Obiols

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Paris du 3 mars 2021

“Comment concilier, au vu notamment de la décision n° 2010-8 QPC du 18 juin 2010 du Conseil constitutionnel :

les dispositions localement toujours en vigueur du décret modifié n° 57-245 du 24.02.1957, promulgué par l'arrêté n° 2079 du 25.11.1957 (JONC des 9 et 16.12.1957, p. 672) ?” sur la réparation et la prévention des accidents du travail et des maladies professionnelles dans les Territoires d'Outre-Mer, et notamment ses articles 34 et 35,

les dispositions des articles 6-1 et suivants de l'ordonnance n° 92-1146 du 12 octobre 1992 portant extension et adaptation dans les territoires de Nouvelle-Calédonie, de Polynésie Française et des îles Wallis et Futuna, de certaines dispositions de la loi n° 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 tendant à l'amélioration de la situation des victimes d'accidents de la circulation et à l'accélération des procédures d'indemnisation,

et les dispositions de l'article 7 de l'ordonnance n° 2013-516 du 20 juin 2013 portant actualisation du droit civil applicable en Nouvelle-Calédonie et dans les îles Wallis et Futuna, qui créent une nouvelle sous-section étendant à la Nouvelle-Calédonie et aux îles Wallis et Futuna les règles relatives aux tiers payeurs de la loi du 5 juillet 1985,
Au regard des demandes formulées en Nouvelle-Calédonie par la caisse des allocations familiales et des accidents de travail (CAFAT), dont les missions sont comparables à la caisse primaire d'assurance maladie (CPAM), à l'encontre de l'employeur dont la faute inexcusable a été établie, tendant au remboursement des débours correspondant généralement aux préjudices patrimoniaux temporaires décomposés en :

dépenses des santé actuelles (frais d'hospitalisation, de radiologie, de pharmacie, de kinésithérapie, de laboratoire et de prothèses),
pertes de gains professionnels actuels (indemnités journalières) ?”

Pourvoi c. déc. Cour d'appel de Lyon du 26 janvier 2021

Tribunal judiciaire de Paris

Tribunal judiciaire de Boulogne-sur-Mer