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Affaire Vueling

I am not especially keen on celebrating anniversaries. However, as things stand now in the European Union I thought it worth a short post on the seminal decision of the Court of Justice in case 22/70, AETR (EU:C:1971:32), of 31 March 1971. My attention has been drawn to its fiftieth anniversary.

Let’s celebrate what it meant legally (no political stance here), in terms of strengthening the competences of the (nowadays) Union and, as a consequence, for the uniformity of the legal systems of the Member States.

Background

The case is named after the European Agreement concerning the work of crews of vehicles engaged in international road transport (AETR), done at Geneva on 19 January 1962. The agreement had been signed by five of the six Member States of the EEC and other European States, but could not enter into force, absent the necessary ratifications. Negotiations for the revision of the agreement were resumed in 1967. Similar work undertaken at Community level with regard to standardizing driving and rest periods of drivers of road transport vehicles resulted in Regulation No 543/69 of the Council of 25 March 1969 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport. In the course of its meeting on 20 March 1970 the Council, in view of the meeting of the sub-committee on Road Transport of the Economic Commission for Europe of  April 1970 at Geneva, discussed the attitude to be taken by the six Member States of the EEC in the negotiations for the conclusion of a new AETR.

The Member States conducted and concluded the negotiations in accordance with the proceedings of 20 March 1970. The AETR was made available by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe from 1 July 1970 for signature by the Member States. On 19 May 1970 the Commission of the European Communities lodged an application for the annulment of the proceedings of the Council of 20 March 1970 regarding the negotiation and conclusion of the AETR by the Member States of the EEC.

In essence, the Commission disputed the validity of said proceedings on the ground that they involved infringements of the Treaty, more particularly of Articles 75, 228 and 235 concerning the distribution of powers between the Council and the Commission, and consequently the rights which it was the Commission’s duty to exercise in the negotiations on the AETR.

Ruling

The Court ruled actually against the application. This notwithstanding, it also made substantial assertions on the extent of the external competence of the Community:

The Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual links with third countries over the whole field of objectives defined by the Treaty. This authority arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty, but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions. In particular, each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form they may take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules or alter their scope. With regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the system of internal Community measures may not be separated from that of external relations.

Consequences in the Domain of PIL

The consequences of the AERT decision on PIL conventions have been profusely analyzed by scholars (see, for instance, The External Dimension of EU Private International Law after Opinion 1/13, edited by P. Franzina). Two Opinions have been rendered directly focusing on the field. In the first one, Opinion 1/03 (EU:C:2006:81), delivered on February 7, 2006, the Court was requested by the Council to answer whether the conclusion of the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters falls entirely within the sphere of exclusive competence of the Community, or within the sphere of shared competence of the Community and the Member States. The second Opinion is Opinion 1/13 (EU:C:2014:2303), of 14 October 2014; the European Commission asked the Court whether the exclusive competence of the European Union encompasses the acceptance of the accession of a non-Union country to the Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction concluded in the Hague on 25 October 1980.

In both cases the Court’s ruling supports the exclusive competence of the Union. This should be enough to proceed without a further Opinion in regard to the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention, or, for that matter, to the accession of the UK to the 2007 Lugano Convention. A trickier question may be, though, whether the Member States are free to update bilateral conventions preexisting the Brussels regime, just as Norway has done (see, implicitly in favor of negative answer, Alex Layton here. I concur).

Written by Marcus Teo (Sheridan Fellow (Incoming), National University of Singapore)

Since Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470, common law courts have recognised that contracts made with the intention to commit a criminal offence in a foreign state are unenforceable, even if the contract contemplated an alternative mode or place of performance. However, recent developments in domestic law illegality have sparked debate on whether foreign law illegality too should be reformed in a similar light (see Ryder Industries Ltd v Chan Shui Woo [2016] 1 HKC 323, [36], [52]-[55]; cf Magdeev v Tsvetkov [2020] EWHC 887 (Comm), [331]-[332]). The debate, however, has thus far not considered whether foreign law illegality should expand to bar certain non-contractual claims – a question which the Singapore Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Jonathan Ang v Lyu Yan [2021] SGCA 12 raises.

Lyu Yan wanted to transfer money from China to Singapore. Her bank in Singapore introduced her to Joseph Lim for assistance. Joseph proposed that Lyu transfer Renminbi from Lyu’s Chinese bank account to the Chinese bank accounts of two other individuals, Jonathan Ang and Derek Lim. Jonathan and Derek would then transfer an equivalent sum in Singapore Dollars from their Singapore bank accounts to Lyu’s Singapore bank account. Lyu performed the transfer in China, but received no money in Singapore. She then sued Joseph for breach of contract; and sued Joseph, Jonathan and Derek in tort and unjust enrichment. At first instance, the Singapore High Court ruled against all three defendants. Joseph did not appeal, but Jonathan and Derek did, arguing, inter alia, that Foster barred Lyu’s non-contractual claims against them because Chinese law prohibited their transaction.

Andrew Phang JCA, who delivered the Court’s judgment, dismissed Jonathan and Derek’s appeal. It was undisputed that the transaction, if performed, would have violated Chinese law (See Lyu Yan v Lim Tien Chiang [2020] SGHC 145, [15]-[16]). However, Lyu did not intend to break Chinese law – the facts at their “highest” showed that she thought the transaction contravened Singapore law rather than Chinese law (Jonathan Ang, [18], [20]). Thus, since Foster does not apply if the claimant does not intend to contravene a specific foreign law, it was inapplicable.

Of interest, though, were Phang JCA’s obiter comments: if Lyu had known the transaction contravened Chinese law, would her non-contractual claims be barred? Foster, he noted, was “not applicable in relation to non-contractual claims” ([26]). This was contrasted with the position in domestic law illegality, where an illegality affecting a contract could sometimes also bar other non-contractual claims arising from the contractual relationship ([27]-[28]). Here, Phang JCA referenced Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363, where the Court of Appeal had held that claims in unjust enrichment (and, potentially, tort) arising from a contractual relationship would be barred if it stultified the policy underlying the law which rendered the contract unenforceable (Ochroid Trading [145]-[159], [168])

Phang JCA then considered whether Foster and Ochroid Trading could be “read together” (Jonathan Ang, [30]) – i.e., whether foreign and domestic law illegality, as separate doctrines, could apply on the same facts. This could only happen when Singapore law was the lex contractus, because, while Foster barred contract claims “regardless of their governing laws”, Ochroid Trading barred only claims governed by Singapore law. If indeed Foster and Ochroid Trading were “read together”, however, “possible difficulties” arose, because it would put a plaintiff with a Singapore law contract in a worse position than a plaintiff with a foreign law contract: the former would potentially have both his contractual and non-contractual claims barred, while the latter would have only his contractual claim barred ([33]). To Phang JCA, this was undesirable, because there was “no principled reason” for this distinction ([34]). While Phang JCA did not attempt to resolve these “difficulties”, he concluded by noting that for both foreign law and domestic law illegality “the concept of policy serves as a limiting factor to ensure that the illegality involved does not inflexibly defeat recovery where such recovery is justified” ([34]) – presumably, then, Phang JCA was noting tentatively that recourse to public policy arguments might help ameliorate the differences between the two classes of plaintiffs he identified.

Phang JCA’s comments in Jonathan Ang raise more questions than answers; this was of course by design, given their tentative and exploratory nature. However, with respect, the correctness of some of the assumptions Phang JCA relied on may be doubted. First, one may only conclude that there is no “principled reason” for treating plaintiffs with Singapore law contracts differently from plaintiffs with foreign law contracts if one accepts that domestic and foreign law illegality share the same “principled” basis. However, Foster’s principled basis remains shrouded in uncertainty: courts and commentators have variously called it a doctrine of public policy, comity and international jurisdiction, but only the first conception of Foster aligns it with domestic law illegality. Second, while it is true that the public policies of the forum limit both domestic and foreign law illegality, those public policies perform that function in different ways in those two contexts. In domestic law illegality, courts ask whether barring the plaintiff’s claim would give effect to the forum’s public policies; but in foreign law illegality, courts ask whether denying recognition of the relevant foreign law, and thus allowing the plaintiff’s claim, would give effect to the forum’s public policies. It follows that public policy arguments may not consistently resolve differences between the two classes of plaintiffs identified by Phang JCA.

At base, the questions posed in Jonathan Ang (and the assumptions they relied on) were only relevant because of Phang JCA’s continued acceptance of one central proposition: that foreign law illegality bars only contractual claims. Yet, this proposition is doubtful; in Brooks Exim Pte Ltd v Bhagwandas Naraindas [1995] 1 SLR(R) 543, Singapore’s Court of Appeal considered Foster in relation to a claim for “money had and received”, and found it inapplicable only because parties there did not intend to breach foreign law (Brooks Exim, [1], [14]). Moreover, the justification for limiting Foster’s rule to contractual claims remains unclear: in Jonathan Ang Phang JCA cited the English High Court’s decision in Lilly Icos LLC v 8PM Chemists Ltd [2010] FSR 4 for it, but there that proposition was simply accepted without argument (Lilly Icos, [266]). A possible justification might be that only in contract claims may parties, by virtue of their ability to choose the governing law, avoid the applicability of the (criminal) law of a foreign state objectively connected to their relationship. This, however, would be a poor justification, since parties have the autonomy to choose the governing law for various non-contractual claims as well. An expressly chosen law, for example, may govern not just parties’ contract, but also claims in unjust enrichment arising from that contractual relationship by virtue of a characterization sub-rule, and potentially also tort claims under an exception to the lex loci delicti rule (or, in Singapore’s context, the double actionability rule). If foreign law illegality exists to prevent parties from avoiding the law of a state objectively connected to their contractual relationship, it should bar all claims arising from that contractual relationship governed by parties’ chosen law, regardless of whether those claims are “contractual” or “non-contractual”.

 

Par deux ordonnances du 27 mars, le juge des référés du Conseil d’État a précisé les règles régissant la perte du statut de réfugié, fondée sur l’article L. 711-6 du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile. 

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The European Commission (EC) is preparing a legislative initiative on the recognition of parenthood between the EU Member States. The EC is now in the process of setting up an Experts’ Group on the topic and has issued a call for Experts which, together with more information, can be found here.

On Tuesday, April 6, 2021, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its ninth monthly virtual workshop in private international law at 11:00-12:30. Since January of this year, we are alternating between English and German language. Burkhard Hess (Max Planck Institute Luxemburg for Procedural Law)  will speak, in German, about the topic

„Comparative Procedural Law and Justice – neue Wege in der Prozessrechtsvergleichung
(“Comparative Procedural Law and Justice – New Avenues for Comparative Civil Procedure”

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here. This is the ninth such lecture in the series, after those by Mathias Lehmann in June, Eva-Maria Kieninger in July, Giesela Rühl in September, Anatol Dutta in October, Susanne Gössl in November, Marc-Philippe Weller in December, Macjiej Szpunar in January,  Dagmar Coester-Waltjen in February, and Horatia Muir Watt in March. In May we will again have an English language event – stay tuned! If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de

Droits de la défense

Information and text provided by Niklaus Meier, co-head of the Private International Law Unit at the Swiss Federal Office of Justice

The Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (FAPIL), adopted in 1987, has had – and still has – a huge influence throughout the world. It is “possibly the most complete codification of private international law worldwide” (Kadner Graziano, Journal of Private International Law. 2015, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 585: “Codifying European Private International Law: The Swiss Private International Law Act – A Model for a Comprehensive European Private International Law Regulation?”) and has influenced PIL codifications in many countries (Kadner Graziano, p. 589-90).

The global relevance of the Swiss Federal Act on PIL led to numerous translations, testament of its international character. Complete translations have been published by Prof. Andreas Bucher (last updated 2021): www.andreasbucher-law.ch; Umbricht attorneys (2017): www.umbricht.ch/de/schweizerisches-internationales-privatrecht-iprg; Gehri/Walther (2010): www.schulthess.com/verlag/detail/ISBN-9783280072509/Gehri-Myriam-A.-Walther-Fridolin/Swiss-Laws-on-Civil-Procedure; the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce (2nd edition 2004, 1st edition 1989); and Karrer/Arnold/Patocchi (1994): Switzerland’s Private International Law (Schulthess/Kluwer). In addition, chapter 12 on arbitration has been translated by actors active in the field, such as the Swiss Arbitration Association (www.arbitration-ch.org/en/arbitration-in-switzerland/index.html).

Translation is a difficult task: “Mastery of the languages involved is necessary, but not sufficient, particularly where the user of a translation expects a literal translation, the legal systems of the starting languages and target language differ fundamentally and the subject matter is highly abstract.” (Walter König, 11 Mich. J. Int’. L. 1294 (1990), 1295, “Translation of Legal Texts: Three English Versions of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law”). Indeed, a civil law codification usually “contains many legal terms which either do not exist in common law jurisdictions or have different connotations in the case of literal translations”.

In recent years, the importance of English versions of the Swiss legal texts has grown. To give just one example: Article 4.4 of the Swiss-Chinese Free Trade Agreement (page 23) explicitly states (under the heading “transparency”) that “Each Party shall promptly publish on the Internet, and as far as practicable in English, all laws, regulations and rules of general application relevant to trade in goods between China and Switzerland.” It goes without saying that the FAPIL is relevant for international trade.

Against this background, and in view of the growing demand for the availability of Swiss legal texts in English, the official publication platform for Swiss law (Fedlex) has now released the “official non-official” translation of the FAPIL: www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1988/1776_1776_1776/en. It is up to date as per February 2021 and includes the most recent DLT-related PIL amendments.

The character of the translation is “official” because it’s published on the official publication platform for Swiss law, which speaks for itself; but it nevertheless is of “non-official” nature only because “English is not an official language of the Swiss Confederation. This translation is provided for information purposes only and has no legal force.” In can perhaps best be described as “officially non-official, but unofficially official”.

The translation is in large parts based on the translation published by Prof. Andreas Bucher, with the kind permission of the author. The translation does not aim to be (and is not) better than the various existing private translations of the FAPIL, which have provided useful guidance during the past decades. The translation simply wants to render the FAPIL more accessible to the international public, and in order to do so and in order to get approval for publication on the official publication platform for Swiss law, certain adaptations were necessary:

Where several choices of wording were possible, preference was given to expressions that are already in use in other translations of Swiss legislation (e.g. translations of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, the Swiss Civil Code, or the Swiss Code of Obligations), in order to ensure coherence and consistency.

Due account was also given to the wording used in international conventions ratified by Switzerland (such as the numerous Hague Conventions).

In addition, the translation takes into account language requirements applicable to texts published by the Swiss federal administration, such as the use of gender-neutral language where appropriate and where possible; this led to the use of the “singular-they”, applicable to both female and male persons.

People who work in different languages and who have compared the different language versions of the FAPIL will have noted some differences between the French, German and Italian versions of the texts. For example, art. 151 para. 3 in the German version, translated with deepl, states that “This jurisdiction cannot be excluded by a choice of court agreement.”, whereas the French version starts the paragraph (again according to deepl) with “Notwithstanding a choice of court, …” In such circumstances, preference was given to the wording that seemed clearer and more in line with the interpretation given to the text by the Federal Supreme Court.

Traduire c’est trahir – translation is treason. Those who coordinated the translation (the Private International Law Unit at the Swiss Federal Office of Justice) are fully aware that critics will find areas for improvement. Feedback can be sent to ipr [at] bj.admin.ch. The translation will continue to be improved and updated in the years to come, in order to respond to new developments such as the upcoming revision of the chapter on succession law.