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Deldits
Principes du droit communautaire
RGPD et transidentité : la rectification de données relatives à l’identité de genre ne peut être subordonnée à la preuve d’un traitement chirurgical

Shuvalov / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Guerre en Ukraine : la Cour de justice confirme les mesures restrictives adoptées contre M. Igor Shuvalov, ancien vice-Premier ministre du gouvernement russe

Louise Ellen Teitz (Roger Williams University School of Law) has posted Harmonizing Private International Law and International Private Law Through Softlaw on SSRN. The abstract of the article, a homage to Symeon Symeonides and set to be published in the Willamette Law Review, reads as follows: This article, prepared for a celebration of the career […]

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a conclu à la violation de l’article 2 de la Convention européenne (droit à la vie) dans son volet matériel à la suite du décès de Rémi Fraisse lors des opérations de maintien de l’ordre sur le site de Sivens.

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ConflictofLaws.net is happy to announce Saloni Khanderia from Jindal Global Law School as our new General Editor. Saloni joined the blog’s Editorial Board in 2019 and has been an active contributor ever since. She takes over from Jeanne Huang (University of Sydney) and will serve as the blog’s General Editor together with Tobias Lutzi (University of Augsburg).

The Editorial Board is indebted to Jeanne for her over two years of service as General Editor. During her tenure, important changes have been implemented regarding the blog’s operation, including the redesign of our frontpage with the new calendar feature. At the same time, our community has continued to grow to more than 2,5k subscribers of our e-mail newsletter and 5k followers on LinkedIn. We’re deeply grateful for the time and energy she has dedicated to the blog and are delighted that she will stay on the Editorial Board.

Semedo / Parlement
Statut des fonctionnaires
Plainte pour harcèlement visant une ancienne membre du Parlement européen : le constat de harcèlement et la sanction prononcée par la présidente du Parlement sont annulés, au motif que les droits de la défense n’ont pas été respectés

On 4 March 2025, Prof. Thomas Kadner-Graziano presented publicly on line the project of research and the achievements to date of the EAPIL’s Working Group on the Feasibility of a European Private International Law Act (to which I belong). A few days earlier, the EAPIL blog had informed about an article of Prof. K. Boele-Woelki […]

La juridiction de l’État membre du domicile du défendeur demeure compétente pour connaître de l’action principale en contrefaçon d’un brevet délivré ou validé dans un autre État membre, même si le défendeur conteste, par voie d’exception, la validité de ce titre. En revanche, l’article 24, § 4, du règlement (UE) n° 1215/2012 du 12 décembre 2012 dit règlement « Bruxelles I bis », ne s’applique pas et n’attribue aucune compétence exclusive à une juridiction d’un État tiers. Par conséquent, si la validité d’un brevet délivré dans un État tiers est contestée par voie d’exception devant le tribunal de l’État membre du domicile du défendeur saisi de l’action principale en contrefaçon, ce dernier peut, en principe, connaître à la fois de l’exception de nullité et de cette action en contrefaçon.  

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Le terme « entreprise », figurant à l’article 83, §§ 4 à 6, du règlement (UE) 2016/679 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 27 avril 2016, relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données (RGPD), correspond à la notion d’« entreprise », au sens des articles 101 et 102 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne (TFUE), de sorte que, lorsqu’une amende pour violation du règlement (UE) 2016/679 est imposée à un responsable du traitement de données à caractère personnel, qui est ou fait partie d’une entreprise, le montant maximal de l’amende est déterminé sur la base d’un pourcentage du chiffre d’affaires annuel mondial total de l’exercice précédent de l’entreprise. La notion d’« entreprise » doit également être prise en compte afin d’apprécier la capacité économique réelle ou matérielle du destinataire de l’amende et ainsi vérifier si l’amende est à la fois effective, proportionnée et dissuasive.

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Lorsque l’arrêt du Tribunal de l’Union européenne est rendu à la suite d’un débat contradictoire entre certaines parties et par défaut à l’égard d’une autre partie défenderesse défaillante, le recours en opposition n’est ouvert qu’à celle-ci, contre les seuls points du dispositif de cet arrêt qui la concernent. Les autres points du dispositif dudit arrêt qui concernent les parties défenderesses autres que cette partie défenderesse défaillante constituent une décision « mettant fin à l’instance » (…) et ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une opposition ». Dès lors, le pourvoi devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne est ouvert.

L’interprétation du contrat étant, d’abord, une recherche de l’intention commune des parties et le contrat lui-même ne contenant aucun principe de couverture intégrale, rien n’impose que l’exclusion de couverture soit interprétée strictement.
 

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Commission / Pologne (Contrôle ultra vires de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice par une cour constitutionnelle)
État de droit : l’avocat général Spielmann considère que le recours de la Commission européenne concernant la Cour constitutionnelle polonaise est fondé

The UK Supreme Court judgment in UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2024] UKSC 30, upholding an anti-suit injunction restraining Russian proceedings brought in violation of an arbitration agreement providing for a seat in France, has caused significant interest. We covered it on the EAPIL Blog in a post noting the judgment and in a […]

By Sophia Tang, Wuhan University

 

China’s New Civil Procedure Law adopted in 2023 and taking effect from 1 Jan 2024 introduces significant changes to the previous civil procedure law regarding cross-border litigation. One of the key changes pertains to choice of court agreements. In the past, Chinese law on choice of court agreements has been criticized for being outdated and inconsistent with international common practice, particularly because it requires choice of court clauses to be in writing and mandates that the chosen court must have “practical connections” with the dispute. After China signed the Hague Choice of Court Convention, there was hope that China might reform its domestic law to align with the Hague Convention’s terms and eventually ratify the Convention.

 

The New Civil Procedure Law retains the old provision on choice of court agreements, stating that parties can choose a court with practical connections to the dispute in writing (Article 35). This provision is included in the chapter dealing with jurisdiction in domestic cases, but traditionally, Chinese courts have applied the same requirements to choice of court clauses in cross-border cases.

 

The 2023 Amendment to the Civil Procedure Law introduces Article 277 as a new provision specifically addressing choice of court agreements in cross-border cases. It states that if parties in cross-border civil disputes choose Chinese courts in writing, Chinese courts will have jurisdiction. Notably, this provision does not require that the chosen Chinese courts have practical connections with the dispute. In other words, it may imply that when parties in cross-border disputes choose Chinese courts, Chinese courts will accept jurisdiction regardless of whether they have any connection to the dispute. The removal of the practical connection requirement is intended to encourage overseas parties to choose Chinese courts as a neutral forum for resolving disputes. This is a crucial step in enhancing the international reception of the Chinese International Commercial Court (CICC) and advancing China’s goal of becoming a dispute resolution hub for Belt and Road initiatives.

 

This change aligns with the Hague Choice of Court Convention, which respects party autonomy and reduces the requirements for making parties’ consent to the competent court effective. Additionally, the New Civil Procedure Law prevents Chinese courts from declining jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens (Art 282(2)) or lis pendens (Art 281(1)) when a choice of Chinese court clause exists, consistent with the duty of the chosen state under Article 5(2) of the Hague Choice of Court Convention.

 

However, controversy remains. Since Article 277 explicitly applies to situations where Chinese courts are chosen, it does not address the choice of foreign courts. The New Civil Procedure Law does not include a specific provision addressing the prerequisites for choosing foreign courts. It is likely that the prerequisites for choosing foreign courts will follow the general rule on prorogation jurisdiction in Article 35. Pursuant to this interpretation, if parties choose a foreign court, the choice is valid only if it is made in writing and the chosen court has practical connections with the dispute. This creates an asymmetric system in international jurisdiction, making it easier for parties to choose Chinese courts than foreign courts. It leaves room for Chinese court to compete with a chosen foreign court, which may demonstrate China’s policy to promote the international influence of Chinese courts and to protect the jurisdiction of Chinese courts in China-related disputes.

 

This asymmetric system is barely compatible with the Hague Choice of Court Convention, which is based on reciprocity. If China ratifies the Hague Convention, the asymmetric system cannot function effectively. Under Article 6 of the Convention, a non-chosen court of a Contracting State must suspend or dismiss proceedings. Even if a choice of foreign court clause is invalid under Chinese law, it would not meet any of the exceptional grounds listed in Article 6. The lack of a practical connection with the chosen court cannot be interpreted as leading to a “manifest injustice” or being “manifestly contrary to the public policy” of China.

 

Of course, because the New Civil Procedure Law does not clarify the prerequisites for choosing foreign courts, alternative interpretations are possible. Article 280 provides that if parties conclude an exclusive choice of court clause selecting a foreign court, and this choice does not violate Chinese exclusive jurisdiction or affect China’s sovereignty, security, and public interest, Chinese courts may decline jurisdiction if the same dispute has been brought before them. This suggests that China does not intend to create a significant difference between the choice of foreign and Chinese courts. If this is indeed the legislative intention, one alternative interpretation is that Article 35 should apply exclusively to choice of court clauses in domestic proceedings. In the absence of clear rules governing choice of foreign court clauses in cross-border proceedings, this situation can be analogized to the choice of Chinese courts in such proceedings. Consequently, the same conditions outlined in Article 277 should apply equally to the choice of foreign courts. This interpretation would enhance the law’s compatibility with the Hague Choice of Court Convention.

 

It is not yet clear which interpretation will ultimately be accepted. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) should provide judicial guidance on this matter. Hopefully, bearing in mind the possibility of ratifying the Hague Choice of Court Convention, the SPC will adopt the second interpretation to pave the way for China’s ratification of the Convention

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a été invitée à se prononcer sur la compatibilité avec le principe d’effectivité de l’Union des dispositions d’une réglementation nationale relative à une action groupée en recouvrement, dont l’interprétation par le juge national faisait obstacle à sa mise en œuvre en matière de concurrence. À cet égard, elle considère qu’il appartient au juge national de laisser ces dispositions inappliquées seulement si, à l’issue d’une vérification par ce dernier, il apparaît : d’une part, qu’aucun autre mécanisme d’action collective n’est disponible et, d’autre part, que les conditions de mise en œuvre d’une action individuelle rendent impossible ou excessivement difficile l’exercice du droit à réparation.

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S’appuyant sur l’arrêt de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme de 2022, la Cour administrative d’appel de Paris reconnaît sa compétence pour contrôler le refus de rapatriement de Français retenus dans le nord-est de la Syrie en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles.

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On Tuesday, 11 March 2025, 12pm CET, ConflictofLaws.net will be hosting an ad-hoc virtual roundtable on the Commission’s Rome II Report.

Everyone interested is warmly invited to join via this Zoom link.

More information can be found here.

Guest post by Danilo Ruggero Di Bella (Bottega Di Bella)

This post delves into the issues stemming from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) on interim relief in relation with the judicial support of the arbitrations administered by the Patent Mediation and Arbitration Centre (PMAC).

Risks of divesting State courts of competence on interim measures 

On one hand, article 32(1)(c) UPC Agreement (UPCA) provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the UPC to issue provisional measures in disputes concerning classical European patents and European patents with unitary effect. Under article 62 UPCA and Rules 206 and 211 of the UPC Rules of Procedure (UPC RoP), the UPC may grant interim injunctions against an alleged infringer or against an intermediary whose services are used by the alleged infringer, intended to prevent any imminent infringement, to prohibit the continuation of the alleged infringement under the threat of recurring penalties, or to make such continuation subject to the lodging of guarantees intended to ensure the compensation of the patent holder. The UPC may also order the provisional seizure or delivery up of the products suspected of infringing a patent so as to prevent their entry into, or movement, within the channels of commerce. Further, the UPC may order a precautionary seizure of the movable and immovable property of the defendant (such its bank accounts), if an applicant demonstrates circumstances likely to endanger the recovery of damages, as well as an interim award of costs. Additionally, under article 60 UPCA, the UPC may order provisional measures to preserve evidence in respect of the alleged infringement and to inspect premises.

On the other hand, PMAC arbitrations can be seated everywhere in the world (Rule 4 PMAC Rules of Operation) and its arbitral awards can be enforced practically everywhere around the world (under the NY Convention). This means that the competent State court for the assistance and supervision of the arbitration may not necessarily coincide with a court of a UPC Contracting Member State. Such State courts play three fundamental functions in support of the arbitral proceedings, including – for what matters here – the issuance of provisional measures (the other two functions being the judicial appointment of arbitrators and the taking of evidence). Normally, the competent State court for the issuance of the provisional measures is the State court at the place where the arbitral award will be enforced or the court at the place where the measures are to be executed (e.g., article 8 of Spain’s Arbitration law which is largely based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration).

Hence, it is difficult to reconcile the exclusive competence of the UPC on interim measures with the world reach of PMAC arbitrations, since a literal interpretation of article 32(1)(c) UPC Agreement would prevent any State courts from issuing any necessary interim measures. Arguably, while such exclusivity granted to the UPC would not prevent PMAC arbitral tribunals from ordering provisional measures, it does exclude the jurisdiction of other State courts for obtaining interim relief. Thus, this may leave the plaintiff with no protection at the outset of the dispute when the panel of a PMAC arbitration is not already in place to entertain the case yet.

This raises the question whether such exclusivity on provisional measures is desirable, especially, where the interim relief is meant to be executed in a jurisdiction beyond the territory of the UPC, where the UPC provisional measure may not be enforceable at all, and the defendant may object the competence of the State court seized of the application on interim relief because of the UPC exclusivity on such measure.

For instance, in case a dispute arises between two parties who had contractually agreed to solve their differences by way of a PMAC arbitration to be seated in London, it may prove difficult for the plaintiff to apply to English courts for an urgent interim relief to be enforced in the UK (for example, to seize certain products suspected of infringing its patent that have landed at Heathrow airport) pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The defendant may indeed argue that English courts are excluded from ordering any interim relief because of article 32(1)(c) UPC Agreement giving the UPC an exclusive jurisdiction on provisional measures. Therefore, the plaintiff may apply to the UPC for such an interim measure. However, since the UK is not a Contracting Member to the UPCA, English courts may not be obliged to enforce the interim relief granted by the UPC. Consequently, the plaintiff seeking such an urgent interim measure may find itself in a situation without an effective legal protection.

In this respect, it is interesting to recall the so-called “long-arm jurisdiction” of the UPC established by article 71b(2) of the Regulation (EU) ? 542/2014 of 15 May 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 as regards the rules to be applied with respect to the UPC and the Benelux Court of Justice. This article equips the UPC with extraterritorial jurisdiction by enabling the UPC to grant provisional measures against a third-State domiciled defendant, even if the courts of a third State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. In other words, article 71b(2) shows that the UPC may attempt to retain jurisdiction with respect to provisional measures even when another court has jurisdiction on a given case. If we transpose the implications of this provision to an arbitration setting where an arbitral tribunal seated in a third State is entrusted with deciding on the merits of the case, the UPC may still seek to retain jurisdiction with respect to provisional measures pending the constitution of the arbitral panel. In essence, Article 71b(2) corroborates that in principle the UPC can grant provisional measures even when the main proceedings are taking place in a third country. The problem arises when a party seeks to enforce the UPC-ordered provisional measures in such a third country. Indeed, it remains doubtful whether the UPC provisional measure can be enforced in the relevant third State.

On this issue, some UPCA provisions on provisional measures are somehow conscious of the territorial limitations of the UPC jurisdiction. For instance, part of article 61 UPCA – dealing with on freezing orders – is expressly directed at ordering a party not to remove from the UPC jurisdiction any assets located therein (precisely, to avoid that the infringer may escape liability by moving its assets beyond the UPC jurisdiction). However, article 61.1 UPC Agreement in fine seems to intentionally neglect the territorial limits of the UPC jurisdiction by enabling the UPC to order a party not to deal in any assets, whether located within its jurisdiction or not.

Admittedly, article 32 UPCA contains a carve-out to the exclusivity of the UPC competence by providing for the residual competence of the national courts of the Contracting States for any actions which do not fall within the exclusive competence of the UPC. Nevertheless, the various provisional measures available under the UPCA as detailed in its articles 60, 61, 62 (and elaborated further in Rules 206-211 UPC RoP) do not leave much to the residual competence of the national courts of the Contracting States.

Emergency arbitration as procedural solution

To somehow downsize this procedural issue, the adoption by the PMAC of an emergency arbitrator mechanism would be a welcome amendment in line with the best modern practices of international commercial arbitration. As the need for adopting provisional measures often arises at the outset of the arbitral proceedings, an emergency arbitrator – appointed before the arbitral tribunal is constituted – is in the position to order any interim relief. Further, unlike a State court, the arbitrator would not be prevented from adopting such interim relief by the exclusive competence of the UPC on such measures, since the exclusivity is directed only at excluding other State courts. Moreover, the emergency arbitrator’s provisional measure adopted in the form of an interim award may be more likely to be enforced than UPC orders in jurisdictions beyond the territory of the UPC. For example, the Singapore High Court has confirmed in 2022 that a foreign seated emergency arbitrator award was enforceable under the Singapore International Arbitration Act 1994.

This mechanism could be implemented by the PMAC in its arbitration rules. By way of comparison, for instance, article 43 of the WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules provides for a detailed procedural framework on “Emergency Relief Proceedings.” According to such framework a party seeking urgent interim relief prior to the establishment of the arbitral tribunal can submit a request for such emergency relief to the Arbitration Institution, which within two days appoints a sole emergency arbitrator who may in turn order any interim measure it deems necessary.

Final remarks

With the view of resizing this procedural problem – which originates from the exclusive competence of the UPC on interim relief in relation to PMAC arbitrations seated in third countries where UPC provisional measure may not be enforceable – it is important to remark that the UPCA contains already a self-correcting mechanism. Namely, by providing at article 62 UPCA for the payment of a recurring penalty in case of non-compliance with a given provisional measure, the UPCA gives the applicant for an interim relief a pecuniary alternative that the UPC can order and enforce within its jurisdiction on the assets of the non-compliant defendant. However, the problem may reemerge in case of provisional measures aimed at preserving evidence located in a third country. In this case the payment of a recurring penalty may not serve its purpose and play only a mild deterrent effect. In such cases, the UPC may draw negative inferences from the lack of cooperation of the defendant, although neither the UPCA nor the UPC RoP expressly provide so.

 

I could not quite think of a catchier title conveying both the plus (claim will continue to be heard in England) and the minus (the discussion having already caused considerable delay), without resorting too obviously to football metaphors.

The claim is brought in England by a number of Liverpool fans physically and psychologically damaged by the poor security at the May 2022 Champions League Final at Paris’ Stade de France. Claimants allege that UEFA had organisational responsibilities for the match and that they owed, and were in breach of, contractual and/or tortious duties concerning the safety of the
claimants.

The case illustrates a problem highlighted by Oliver Holland (partner with Leigh Day, the law firm representing claimants however not, as far as I am aware, involved in the claim), last week at a hearing at the UK Parliament’s human rights committee. (Mr Holland did not give current claim as an example and seeing as the hearing focused on forced labour in the supply chain, he likely did not have the claim in mind at his testimony).

Defendants in personal injury claims (whether or not linked to business and human rights) have quite the series of avenues available to them to try and derail the claims in the English courts. These include (Mr Holland discusses some of these)

objections to jurisdiction, including the infamous doctrine of forum non conveniens;

the prospect of (handy for its freezing effect) very considerable adverse costs orders whether or not coupled with security for costs; and (with impact on the costs issue)

a tendency to entertain issues of both jurisdiction and applicable law at considerable length.

Other jurisdictions of course suffer from similar challenges and I for one am not going to complain about a good conflict of laws yarn. Moreover, Lord Briggs denouncing mini-trials at the jurisdictional stage in Vedanta (Turner J in current case refers to this [15]), and the Court of Appeal’s instructions on forum non in Dyson, ought to bring more discipline to at least some of this maneuvering.

Sean Abram and others v UEFA and UEFA Events SA [2025] EWHC 483 (KB) engages with another means to try and bounce the case away from England and Wales: namely the doctrine of foreign act of state.  For an excellent primer and discussion of the future of the principle see Mary Newbury here.

[5] The principal basis for UEFA’s jurisdiction challenge is that the claims would require the English Court to adjudicate on the lawfulness or validity of acts of a foreign state (France) performed within its own territory, which, UEFA argue, would be impermissible under said “Foreign Act of State Doctrine”.

I have posted quite a few times on the doctrine: see among others

Crane Bank Ltd & Ors v DFCU Bank Ltd & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 886 which [13] defined the doctrine as courts “will not adjudicate or sit in judgment on the lawfulness or validity under its own law of an executive act of a foreign state, performed within the territory of that state” and which entertained a number of exceptions to the doctrine, as well as in my opinion leaving a potential incompatibility of (some of the implications of) the doctrine with Article 6 ECHR underdiscussed;

SKAT [Skatteforvaltningen v Solo Capital Partners Llp [2022] EWCA Civ 234] in which both the Court of Appeal and later the Supreme Court focused on the substance rather than the context of the claim (in my post I flag the echos of the Brussels /Lugano ‘civil and commercial’ discussions);

Reliance v India  [2018] EWHC 822 (Comm) where Popplewell J (as he then was) held on whether the doctrine applies to arbitration tribunals;

Servis-Terminal LLC v Drelle [2025] EWCA Civ 62 which flags the need to seek formal recognition of a foreign judgment before its enforcement with Newey LJ suggesting the similar roots of this requirement as the foreign act of state doctrine.

There is certainly merit in holding on jurisdictional issues separately, before extensive engagement with the merits, at least where these objections are not obviously spurious and cannot be summarily addressed. Even in those States where civil procedure rules (CPR) give defendants a procedural right to hear the jurisdictional objections first (the E&W means is Part 11 of the CPR), and despite Turner J’s appreciation that the matter must be dealt with concisely (and note [17] his rejection of defendants’ request to delay even further and squeeze this jurisdictional objection even more), I think continental rules would not have allowed the discussion in current case to take on the extensive nature that it has, with all the costs and time delay this has already caused. And there is potential for an appeal I imagine.

The foreign act of state element of the discussion at issue, if of any relevance at all, clearly in my view is entirely incidental or ‘contextual’ and not substantial, per UKSC SCAT above and therefore simply cannot lead to rejection at the jurisdictional stage. The summary [65] in my view is poignant:

claimants make no direct allegations of unlawfulness in their Particulars of Claim in respect of the conduct of the French police or any other state entity. The defendants contend, however, that the issue of the lawfulness of such conduct is nevertheless bound to arise as an important issue
in the proceedings if the case were to be permitted to proceed further.

There is no suggestion that the way in which the claim has been formulated is designed as it were to circumvent the Foreign Act of State doctrine and that the real object of the proceedings as it were is to hold on the validity of actions by a French state entity. The pleaded case as is clear from Abram v UEFA [2024] EWHC 1518 and as summarised here [64] focuses genuinely on UEFA and consorts’ (in)actions.

Defendants contend, however, that the issue of the lawfulness of such conduct is nevertheless bound to arise as an important issue in the proceedings if the case were to be permitted to proceed further, ([126] ff they point to issues of French law to support this argument) and (ia [77]) argue that there cannot be a ‘threshold requirement’ below which the assessment of a foreign act of state becomes de minimis and does not engage the doctrine.

The judge, after having made a thorough and clear overview of both the principle (including [82] ff the absence of established authority on what amounts to an act of state) and its exceptions (much more entertained in case-law) as applied by the authorities,

[91] notes that the principle must not extend beyond the natural bounds required to fulfil the aims which it is intended to achieve (international comity, GAVC);

[106] accepts that “some aspects of the conduct of the French government and the other listed public bodies through its higher officials may (and I stress may) amount to acts of state”; however that “the task of determining which, if any, of these acts do engage the Doctrine cannot be confidently carried out on the present incomplete state of the pleadings and evidence”.

[108] ff Two relevant exceptions to the rule are further discussed obiter. The second exception is discussed [122] ff: where challenges to foreign acts
of state are merely ancillary to the claim or by way of collateral aspersion. I know this exception has been so determined by the authorities yet in my opinion would be better formulated not as an exception but as a substantive limitation to the rule.

As a side-note, there appears to be some confusion on the law that will apply to the merits of the case: see [18] ff

18. Until very shortly before the hearing of the application before me,
the claimants had been proceeding under the assumption that
French law applied to the claims of all the claimants. Experts in
French law were duly instructed to report on behalf of the
claimants and defendants respectively.
19. However, it transpires that the position may have been less clear
cut because only some of the claimants had purchased tickets
from the UEFA online ticket portal. Others had bought them
directly from Liverpool FC. Owing to the lateness of the
realisation of the true position, the claimants’ skeleton arguments
deployed for the purposes of the hearing before me had been
drafted on the premise that all of the claims were governed by
French law.
20. The position of the claimants, as now articulated in a letter dated
2 October 2024, is that their claims in tort are subject to French
law regardless of their provenance and so too is any contractual
claim in respect of those tickets purchased from the UEFA online
ticket portal. However, contractual claims brought by claimants
who received their tickets from Liverpool FC involve the
imposition of an English contractual duty to take reasonable skill
and care to be considered in regard to French health and safety
laws and regulations as applicable to the stadium. No purpose
would here be served by articulating their reasons for reaching
this view.

No doubt the cross-over between contractual claims (subject to assimilated Rome I) and non-contractual claims (Rome II, ditto assimilated) and, I imagine, the application of the consumer section of Rome I, will be made clearer in the continuation of the claims.

Geert.

 

The Riga Graduate School of Law will host on 7 and 8 June 2025 a conference to discuss the current weaknesses of EU private international law and share suggestions for improvements. The event aims to cover all areas of EU private international law. Those interested at making a presentation at the conference, are invited to […]

 

As was mentioned before on this blog, increasing the participation of African states in the HCCH appears to be the most promising avenue to strengthen judicial cooperation on the African continent in the context of intracontinental, interregional as well as global judicial integration. Following several unsuccessful attempts to establish a physical presence on the African continent,[1] the HCCH Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) has now warmly welcomed the Kingdom of Morocco’s proposal to host and, perhaps most importantly, entirely fund a HCCH Regional Office for Africa (ROAF) in Rabat.[2] While the capital of multilingual Morocco, at the crossroads of North Africa with both Europe and the Arab world, seems to be an ideal location for such an endeavor, the proposal does not (yet?) appear to also include the Arabian Peninsula. However, as the Moroccan Ministry of Justice is explicitly seeking to play an active role in the framework of the League of Arab States (LAS) as well,[3] it is not unlikely that the ROAF will follow the example of the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) in Buenos Aires and the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) in Hong Kong and cover a broader regional spectrum.

 

The excerpt from the HCCH CGAP 2025 Conclusions and Decisions (C&D) reads as follows:

A. Proposal for the Establishment of a Regional Office for Africa

83 CGAP warmly welcomed the proposal of the Kingdom of Morocco to host a Regional Office for Africa (ROAF) and decided that the office may be opened in accordance with the 2020 Rules for the Establishment of Regional Offices (2020 Rules). The Regional Office, which will be located in Rabat, shall operate continuously for a period of five years. CGAP will conduct a Performance Review, in accordance with Rules 6 to8 of the 2020 Rules.

84 CGAP noted with satisfaction, and thanks, the Kingdom of Morocco’s commitment to fund the entire operation of the Regional Office. CGAP also reaffirmed that the Representative shall report exclusively to the Secretary General of the HCCH. The Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Secretary General will finalise the Host Seat Agreement in light of the comments made by Members at CGAP 2025. The final version of the Agreement shall be shared with Members for information.

 

The full HCCH CGAP 2025 C&D are now available on the HCCH Website (here).

[1] See HCCH Prel. Doc. No. 6 of 2015 – Africa Strategy, paras 7 and 10.

[2] HCCH CGAP 2025 C&D, paras. 83 et seq.

[3] Press Release of the Kingdom of Morocco’s Ministry of Justice of March 2025.