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In the very recent case of Yankey v Austin (2020) LPELR-49540(CA)  the Nigerian Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of whether a court in the United State has jurisdiction to make an order affecting immovable property in Lagos, Nigeria.

The facts of the case was that the claimant/respondent previously sued the defendant/appellant before the Family Court Division, of the District of the Fourth Judicial District, County of Hennepin, State of Minnesota (“US Court”) – where they resided at the time, for dissolution of their marriage that was celebrated in Nigeria. The defendant/appellant as respondent before the US Court did not contest the dissolution of the marriage. They entered into a Mutual Termination Agreement, which is called Terms of Settlement in the Nigerian legal system. There was no trial and no evidence was adduced. Their homestead at 4104 Lakeside Avenue, Brooklyn Center, Minesota was awarded exclusively to the claimant/respondent as petitioner before the US Court. It did not end there.

The claimant/respondent subsequently instituted proceedings before the Lagos State High Court, Nigeria, and claimed joint ownership of the defendant/appellant’s property situated in Lagos, by relying on the US judgment. The lower court granted the claim.

The defendant/appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which unanimously allowed the appeal by overturning the decision of the lower court. The Court of Appeal (Ogakwu JCA) thoroughly analysed the documents which were in issue: (1) Mutual Termination Agreement, (2) Judgment of the US Court, and (3) petition for the dissolution of the parties marriage in the US Court. The Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that there was nothing in the documents in issue which suggests that the US judge granted joint ownership of the defendant/appellant’s landed property with the plaintiff/respondent. It also held that based on the principle of lex situs the US Court cannot make an order affecting immovable property in Nigeria.

The decision in Yankey  is an important decision from the perspective of public and private international law. Based on the principle of territorial sovereignty, a foreign court cannot make an order affecting immovable property in another country.  This rule as applied in Nigeria  –  often referred to as the  Mocambique  rule  –  is derived from the English case of British South Africa Company v Companhia de Mocambique [1893] AC 602. In that case, the plaintiff s’   statement of claim alleged that they were rightful owners of large tracts of land in South Africa, yet agents of the defendants unlawfully took possession of the lands and displaced the plaintiff  company and its servants, agents, and tenants. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants not only stole the plaintiff s’  personal property, but also assaulted and imprisoned some of them. It was held that an English court would not entertain an action to recover damages for a trespass to land situated abroad.

It is worth mentioning that in Nigeria, an  exception to the Mozambique rule exists where the action between the parties is founded on some personal obligation arising out of a contract or implied contract, a fiduciary relationship, fraud or other unconscionable conduct, and does not depend on the law of the  locus  of the immovable property to exist (British Bata Shoe Co Ltd v Melikian   ( 1956 )  1 FSC 100;     Aluminium Industries Aktien Gesellschaft  v Federal Board of Inland Revenue   ( 1971 )  2 ALR Comm 121   , (1971) 2 NCLR 1)

The Mozambique rule has been applied  by the Nigerian  Supreme Court only in inter-state matters such as in Lanleyin v Rufai  ( 1959 )  4 FSC 184. Yankey is the first case where it was applied in a case with truly international dimensions. Admittedly, the Court of Appeal did not explicitly mention the Mozambique rule or the Nigerian Supreme Court cases that have applied it in inter-state matters. The truth is that there was no need for the Court of Appeal to do so. Based on the facts of the case, the US Court never made an order for joint ownership of landed property in Lagos.

Yankey is a most welcome decision. If the lower court’s decision was allowed to stand, it would mean that any foreign court can generally make an order affecting landed property in Nigeria. The Court of Appeal was therefore right to hold that the US Court never made an order for joint ownership of landed property for the parties in this case. It was also right to hold that a foreign court cannot make an order of joint ownership of immovable property in Nigeria.

Written by Bastian Brunk, research assistant at the Humboldt University of Berlin and doctoral candidate at the Institute for Comparative and Private International Law at the University of Freiburg.

In April of 2020, EU Commissioner Didier Reynders announced plans for a legislative initiative that would introduce EU-wide mandatory human rights due diligence requirements for businesses. Only recently, Reynders reiterated his intentions during a conference regarding “Human Rights and Decent Work in Global Supply Chains” which was hosted by the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs on the 6. October, and asseverated the launch of public consultations within the next few weeks. A draft report, which was prepared by MEP Lara Wolters (S&D) for the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, illustrates what the prospective EU legal framework for corporate due diligence could potentially look like. The draft aims to facilitate access to legal remedies in cases of corporate human rights abuses by amending the Brussels Ibis Regulation as well as the Rome II Regulation. However, as these amendments have already inspired a comments by Geert van Calster, Giesela Rühl, and Jan von Hein, I won’t delve into them once more. Instead, I will focus on the centre piece of the draft report – a proposal for a Directive that would establish mandatory human rights due diligence obligations for businesses. If adopted, the Directive would embody a milestone for the international protection of human rights. As is, the timing could simply not be better, since the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) celebrate their 10th anniversary in 2021. The EU should take this opportunity to present John Ruggie, the author of the UNGPs, with a special legislative gift. However, I’m not entirely sure if Ruggie would actually enjoy this particular present, as the Directive has obvious flaws. The following passages aim to accentuate possible improvements, that would lead to the release of an appropriate legal framework next year. I will not address every detail but will rather focus on the issues I consider the most controversial – namely the scope of application and the question of effective enforcement.

General Comments

To begin with a disclaimer, I believe the task of drafting a legal document on the issue of business and human rights to be a huge challenge. Not only does one have to reconcile the many conflicting interests of business, politics, and civil society, moreover, it is an impossible task to find the correct degree of regulation for every company and situation. If the regulation is too weak, it does not help protect human rights, but only generates higher costs. If it is too strict, it runs the risk of companies withdrawing from developing and emerging markets, and – because free trade and investment ensure worldwide freedom, growth, and prosperity – of possibly inducing an even worse human rights situation. This being said, the current regulatory approach should first and foremost be recognised as a first step in the right direction.

I would also like to praise the idea of including environmental and governance risks in the due diligence standard (see Article 4(1)) because these issues are closely related to each other. Practically speaking, the conduct of companies is not only judged based on their human rights performance but rather holistically using ESG or PPP criteria. All the same, I am not sure whether or not this holistic approach will be accepted in the regulatory process: Putting human rights due diligence requirements into law is difficult enough, so maybe it would just be easier to limit the proposal to human rights. Nonetheless, it is certainly worth a try.

Moving on to my criticism.

Firstly, the draft is supposed to be a Directive, not a Regulation. As such, it cannot impose any direct obligations on companies but must first be transposed into national law. However, the proposal contains a colourful mix of provisions, some of which are addressed to the Member States, while others impose direct obligations on companies. For example, Article 4(1) calls upon Member States to introduce due diligence obligations, whereas all other provisions of the same article directly address companies. In my eyes, this is inconsistent.

Secondly, the Directive uses definitions that diverge from those of the UNGPs. For example, the UNGPs define “due diligence” as a process whereby companies “identify, prevent, mitigate and account for” adverse human rights impacts. This seems very comprehensive, doesn’t it? Due diligence, as stipulated in the Directive, goes beyond that by asking companies to identify, cease, prevent, mitigate, monitor, disclose, account for, address, and remediate human rights risks. Of course, one could argue that the UNGP is incomplete and the Directive fills its gaps, but I believe some of these “tasks” simply redundant. Of course, this is not a big deal by itself. But in my opinion, one should try to align the prospective mechanism with the UNGPs as much as possible, since the latter are the recognised international standard and its due diligence concept has already been adopted in various frameworks, such as the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the ISO 26000. An alignment with the UNGP, therefore, allows and promotes coherence within international policies.

Before turning to more specific issues, I would like to make one last general remark that goes in the same direction as the previous one. While the UNGP ask companies to respect “at minimum” the “international recognized human rights”, meaning the international bill of rights (UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR) and the ILO Core Labour Standards, the Directive requires companies to respect literally every human rights catalogue in existence. These include not only international human rights documents of the UN and the ILO, but also instruments that are not applicable in the EU, such as the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, the American Convention of Human Rights, and (all?) “national constitutions and laws recognising or implementing human rights”. This benchmark neither guides companies nor can it be monitored effectively by the authorities. It is just too ill-defined to serve as a proper basis for civil liability claims or criminal sanctions and it will probably lower the political acceptance of the proposal.

Scope of Application

The scope of application is delineated in Article 2 of the Directive. It states that the Directive shall apply to all undertakings governed by the law of a Member State or established in the territory of the EU. It shall also apply to limited liability undertakings governed by the law of a non-Member State and not established within EU-territory if they operate in the internal market by selling goods or providing services. As one can see, the scope is conceivably broad, which gives rise to a number of questions.

First off, the Directive does not define the term “undertaking”. Given the factual connection, we could understand it in the same way as the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (2014/95/EU) does. However, an “undertaking” within the scope of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive refers to the provisions of the Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU), which has another purpose, i.e. investor and creditor protection, and is, therefore, restricted to certain types of limited liability companies. Such a narrow understanding would run counter to the purpose of the proposed Directive because it excludes partnerships and foreign companies. On the other hand, “undertaking” probably does mean something different than in EU competition law. There, the concept covers “any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status” and must be understood as “designating an economic unit even if in law that economic unit consists of several persons, natural or legal” (see e.g. CJEU, Akzo Nobel, C-97/08 P, para 54 ff.). Under EU competition law, the concept is, therefore, not limited to legal entities, but also encompasses groups of companies (as “single economic units”). This concept of “undertaking”, if applied to the Directive, would correspond with the term “business enterprises” as used in the UNGP (see the Interpretive Guide, Q. 17). However, it would ignore the fact that the parent company and its subsidiaries are distinct legal entities, and that the parent company’s legal power to influence the activities of its subsidiaries may be limited under the applicable corporate law. It would also lead to follow-up questions regarding the precise legal requirements under which a corporate group would have to be included. Finally, non-economic activities and, hence, non-profit organisations would be excluded from the scope, which possibly leads to significant protection gaps (just think about FIFA, Oxfam, or WWF). In order to not jeopardise the objective – ensuring “harmonization, legal certainty and the securing of a level playing field” (see Recital 9 of the Directive) – the Directive should not leave the term “undertaking” open to interpretation by the Member States. A clear and comprehensive definition should definitely be included in the Directive, clarifying that “undertaking” refers to any legal entity (natural or legal person), that provide goods or services on the market, including non-profit services.

Secondly, the scope of application is not coherent for several reasons. One being that the chosen form of the proposal is a Directive, rather than a Regulation, thus providing for minimum harmonisation only. It is left to the Member States to lay down the specific rules that ensure companies carrying out proper human rights due diligence (Article 4(1)). This approach can lead to slightly diverging due diligence requirements within the EU. Hence, the question of which requirements a company must comply with arises. From a regulatory law’s perspective alone, this question is not satisfactorily answered. According to Article 2(1), “the Directive” (i.e. the respective Member States’ implementation acts) applies to any company which has its registered office in a Member State or is established in the EU. However, the two different connecting factors of Article 2(1) have no hierarchy, so a company must probably comply with the due diligence requirements of any Member State where it has an establishment (agency, branch, or office). Making matters worse (at least from the company’s perspective), in the event of a human rights lawsuit, due diligence would have to be characterised as a matter relating to non-contractual obligations and thus fall within the scope of the new Art. 6a Rome II. The provisions of this Article potentially require a company to comply with the due diligence obligations of three additional jurisdictions, namely lex loci damni, lex loci delicti commissi, and either the law of the country in which the parent company has its domicile (in this regard, I agree with Jan von Hein who proposes the use not of the company’s domicile but its habitual residence as a connecting factor according to Article 23 Rome II) or, where it does not have a domicile (or habitual residence) in a Member State, the law of the country where it operates.

That leads us to the next set of questions: When does a company “operate” in a country? According to Article 2(2), the Directive applies to non-EU companies which are not established in the EU if they “operate” in the internal market by selling goods or providing services. But does that mean, for example, that a Chinese company selling goods to European customers over Amazon must comply fully with European due diligence requirements? And is Amazon, therefore, obliged to conduct a comprehensive human rights impact assessment for every retailer on its marketplace? Finally, are states obliged to impose fines and criminal sanctions (see Article 19) on Amazon or the Chinese seller if they do not meet the due diligence requirements, and if so, how? I believe that all this could potentially strain international trade relations and result in serious foreign policy conflicts.

Finally, and perhaps most controversially in regard to the scope, the requirements shall apply to all companies regardless of their size. While Article 2(3) allows the exemption of micro-enterprises, small companies with at least ten employees and a net turnover of EUR 700,000 or a balance sheet total of EUR 350,000 would have to comply fully with the new requirements. In contrast, the French duty of vigilance only applies to large stock corporations which, including their French subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, employ at least 5,000 employees, or including their worldwide subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, employ at least 10,000 employees. The Non-Financial Reporting Directive only applies to companies with at least 500 employees. And the due diligence law currently being discussed in Germany, will with utmost certainty exempt companies with fewer than 500 employees from its scope and could perhaps even align itself with the French law’s scope. Therefore, I doubt that the Member States will accept any direct legal obligations for their SMEs. Nonetheless, because the Directive requires companies to conduct value chain due diligence, SMEs will still be indirectly affected by the law.

Value Chain Due Diligence

Value chain due diligence, another controversial issue, is considered to be anything but an easy task by the Directive. To illustrate the dimensions: BMW has more than 12,000 suppliers, BASF even 70,000. And these are all just Tier 1 suppliers. Many, if not all, multinational companies probably do not even know how long and broad their value chain actually is. The Directive targets this problem by requiring companies to “make all reasonable efforts to identify subcontractors and suppliers in their entire value chain” (Article 4(5)). This task cannot be completed overnight but should not be impossible either. For example, VF Corporation, a multinational apparel and footwear company, with brands such as Eastpack, Napapijri, or The North Face in its portfolio, has already disclosed the (sub?)suppliers for some of its products and has announced their attempt to map the complete supply chain of its 140 products by 2021. BASF and BMW will probably need more time, but that shouldn’t deter them from trying in the first place.

Mapping the complete supply chain is one thing; conducting extensive human rights impact assessments is another. Even if a company knows its chain, this does not yet mean that it comprehends every potential human rights risk linked to its remote business operations. And even if a potential human rights risk comes to its attention, the tasks of “ceasing, preventing, mitigating, monitoring, disclosing, accounting for, addressing, and remediating” (see Article 3) it is not yet fulfilled. These difficulties call up to consider limiting the obligation to conduct supply chain due diligence to Tier 1 suppliers. However, this would not only be a divergence from the UNGP (see Principle 13) but would also run counter to the Directive’s objective. In fact, limiting due diligence to Tier 1 suppliers makes it ridiculously easy to circumvent the requirements of the Directive by simply outsourcing procurement to a third party. Hence, the Directive takes a different approach by including the entire supply chain in the due diligence obligations while adjusting the required due diligence processes to the circumstances of the individual case. Accordingly, Article 2(8) states that “[u]ndertakings shall carry out value chain due diligence which is proportionate and commensurate to their specific circumstances, particularly their sector of activity, the size and length of their supply chain, the size of the undertaking, its capacity, resources and leverage”. I consider this an adequate provision because it balances the interests of both companies and human rights subjects. However, as soon as it comes to enforcing it, it burdens the judge with a lot of responsibility.

Enforcement

The question of enforcement is of paramount importance. Without effective enforcement mechanisms, the law will be nothing more than a bureaucratic and toothless monster. We should, therefore, expect the Directive – being a political appeal to the EU Commission after all – to contain ambitious proposals for the effective implementation of human rights due diligence. Unfortunately, we were disappointed.

The Directive provides for three different ways to enforce its due diligence obligations. Firstly, the Directive requires companies to establish grievance mechanisms as low-threshold access to remedy (Articles 9 and 10). Secondly, the Directive introduces transparency and disclosure requirements. For example, companies should publish a due diligence strategy (Article 6(1)) which, inter alia, specifies identified human rights risks and indicates the policies and measures that the company intends to adopt in order to cease, prevent, or mitigate those risks (see Article 4(4)). Companies shall also publish concerns raised through their grievance mechanisms as well as remediation efforts, and regularly report on progress made in those instances (Article 9(4)). With these disclosure requirements, the Directive aims to enable the civil society (customers, investors and activist shareholders, NGOs etc.) to enforce it. Thirdly, the Directive postulates public enforcement mechanisms. Each Member State shall designate one or more competent national authorities that will be responsible for the supervision of the application of the Directive (Article 14). The competent authorities shall have the power to investigate any concerns, making sure that companies comply with the due diligence obligations (Article 15). If the authority identifies shortcomings, it shall set the respective company a time limit to take remedial action. It may then, in case the company does not fulfil the respective order, impose penalties (especially penalty payments and fines, but also criminal sanctions, see Article 19). Where immediate action is necessary to prevent the occurrence of irreparable harm, the competent authorities may also order the adoption of interim measures, including the temporary suspension of business activities.

At first glance, public enforcement through inspections, interim measures, and penalties appear as quite convincing. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms may be questioned, as demonstrated by the Wirecard scandal in Germany. Wirecard was Germany’s largest payment service provider and part of the DAX stock market index from September 2018 to August 2020. In June of 2020, Wirecard filed for insolvency after it was revealed that the company had cooked its books and that EUR 1.9 billion were “missing”. In 2015 and 2019, the Financial Times already reported on irregularities in the company’s accounting practices. Until February 2019, the competent supervisory authority BaFin did not intervene, but only commissioned the FREP to review the falsified balance sheet, assigning only a single employee to do so. This took more than 16 months and did not yield any results before the insolvency application. While it is true that the Wirecard scandal is unique, it showcased that investigating malpractices of large multinational companies through a single employee is a crappy idea. Public enforcement mechanisms only work if the competent authority has sufficient financial and human resources to monitor all the enterprises covered by the Directive. So how much manpower does it need? Even if the Directive were to apply to companies with more than 500 employees, in Germany alone one would have to monitor more than 7.000 entities and their respective value chains. We would, therefore, need a whole division of public inspectors in a gigantic public agency. In my opinion, that sounds daunting. That does not mean that public enforcement mechanisms are completely dispensable. As Ruggie used to say, there is no single silver bullet solution to business and human rights challenges. But it is also important to consider decentralised enforcement mechanisms such as civil liability. In contrast to public enforcement mechanisms, civil liability offers victims of human rights violations “access to effective remedy”, which, according to Principle 25, is one of the main concerns of the UNGP.

So, what does the Directive say about civil liability? Just about nothing. Article 20 only states that “[t]he fact that an undertaking has carried out due diligence in compliance with the requirements set out in this Directive shall not absolve the undertaking of any civil liability which it may incur pursuant to national law.” Alright, so there shouldn’t be a safe harbour for companies. But that does not yet mean that companies are liable for human rights violations at all. And even if it were so, the conditions for asserting a civil claim can differ considerably between the jurisdictions of the Member States. The Directive fails to achieve EU-wide harmonisation on the issue of liability. That’s not a level playing field. This problem could be avoided by passing an inclusive Regulation containing both rules concerning human rights due diligence and a uniform liability regime in case of violations of said rules. However, such an attempt would probably encounter political resistance from the Member States and result in an undesirable delay of the legislative process. A possible solution could be to only lay down minimum requirements for civil liability but to leave the ultimate drafting and implementation of liability rules to the Member States. Alternatively, the Directive could stipulate that the obligations set out in Articles 4 to 12 are intended to determine the due care without regard to the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. At least, both options would ensure that companies are liable for any violation of their human rights due diligence obligations. Is that too much to ask?

Published in the BRICS Law Journal by Dr Saloni Khanderia, Associate Professor – OP Jindal Global University, India; and Visiting Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 or the coronavirus disease 2019 has severely impacted the performance of several contracts across the globe. In some situations, the outbreak may render the performance of contracts impossible as a result of governmental restrictions in the form of national lockdowns to curb its spread. Likewise, the pandemic may adversely impact the execution of the contractual obligations by dramatically affecting the price of the performance and, thus, resulting in hardship or commercial impracticability. At other times, the pandemic will be legally construed to not affect the performance of a contract. In domestic contracts, the consequences of such non-performance would depend on the principles of national law.

In comparison, agreements with a foreign element (international contracts) are likely to increase the complexity of deciding claims arising from the non-performance of contracts due to the COVID-19 outbreak. The rights and liability of the parties would chiefly depend on the law that will govern the agreement – which differs across the globe. Several contracts would include a force majeure clause to exonerate the parties from performance on the occurrence of an event such as a pandemic. The courts’ interpretation of such force majeure clauses similarly differs across the globe. The laws of some countries would excuse the parties from performing their contractual obligations even if the pandemic resulted in hardship. Others would strictly construe the terms of such clauses and would invalidate them if the occurrence of the pandemic did not make the performance impossible. The purpose of this paper is to examine the non-performance of transnational contracts due to the COVID-19 outbreak when they are governed by Indian law. It highlights the situations when an international contract for the sale of goods or services whose performance has been allegedly hindered due to COVID-19 would a) frustrate and b) breach the agreement under Indian law. The paper provides a comparative analysis of Indian law with several jurisdictions such as France, Germany, Austria, China, the United Kingdom [UK], Australia and the United States [US] to demonstrate that the law of the former is not well-equipped to deal with complex lawsuits arising due to the non-performance of contracts as a result of the pandemic.

The article may be accessed here.

A collection of essays edited by Florian Heindler (Sigmund Freud University, Vienna) has recently been published by Jan Sramek Verlag, in its Interdisciplinary Studies of Comparative and Private International Law series. The book celebrates the 40th birthday of the Austrian Private International Law Act.

The essays collected are authored by scholars for various countries and focus on the possible reform of the Act and its current value.

Authors include Andrea Bonomi, Axel Flessner, Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Thomas John, Caroline Sophie Rupp, Thomas Bachner, Ena-Marlis Bajons, Wolfgang Faber, Edwin Gitschthaler, Florian Heindler, Helmut Heiss, Brigitta Lurger, Martina Melcher, Andreas Schwartze, and Bea Verschraegen.

More details available here.

The Russian Legal Information Agency has announced that Russia’s Justice Ministry, acting jointly with the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, proposed that the Government pass a recommendation to sign the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (the ‘Convention’).

Although there were previously fake news circulating on the internet in this respect, it seems that Russia may well ratify the Convention or, at the very least, that Russian elites are contemplating doing so.

But why would Russia do that?

According to the Russian Agency, the answer seems to be that Russia would want to “create conditions for the recognition and enforcement of decisions taken by Russian courts in all [contracting States] of the new Convention.”

So, Russia hopes to improve the enforcement of Russian judgments abroad. This seems quite logical. Improving the enforcement of the forum’s judgments abroad is a common rationale for entering into bilateral treaties on the enforcement of foreign judgments and for having a reciprocity requirement in the forum’s law of foreign judgments.

There is, however, a downside: by entering into a treaty on the enforcement of foreign judgments, the contracting States also commit themselves to enforcing judgments rendered by other contracting States. In other words, if Russia ratifies the 2019 Convention, it will also promise to enforce in Russia judgments rendered by the courts of other contracting States.

The Russian law of foreign judgments is not liberal. The basic rule is that Russia only enforces judgments on the basis of a treaty. While Russian courts have sometimes accepted to enforce foreign judgments in the absence of treaty under the principle of comity, Russian law remains conservative in this respect.

In contrast, many other States have a very liberal law of foreign judgments, and have enforced Russian judgements on the basis of their common law of foreign judgments, without caring for any form of reciprocity. These liberal States include, among many others, the United States and France. In the US, in particular, courts have enforced Russian judgments on numerous occasions (in 2018, Russian judgments were enforced by New York and California courts, for instance). The 2019 Convention will not improve the prospects of enforcement of Russian judgments in those states.

So the main effect of entering into the 2019 Convention may well be that Russia will commit to enforce judgments that it would not enforce today. In other words, the 2019 Convention would certainly liberalize the Russian law of foreign judgments, but it is unclear to which extent it would improve the enforcement of Russian judgments abroad.

Surely, there are other States with a conservative law of foreign judgments. If these other States ratify the Convention, Russia will have improved the prospects of enforcing its judgments in these states. But who are these states and are they planning to sign the 2019 Convention? And are these states Significant trading partners of Russia? Otherwise, why should Russia care?

Germany is no doubt one of the biggest trading partners of Russia, and there is a reciprocity requirement under the German law of foreign judgments. Maybe German courts have denied enforcement to Russian judgments, but maybe they have considered that the prospects of enforcement of German judgments in Russia were such that German courts should enforce Russian judgments. Our German readers will tell.

A major judicial partner of Russia has been, lately, England. The English common law of judgments is pretty conservative, in particular with respect to the assessment of the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Because of Brexit, England is likely to sign the 2019 Convention. By entering into the Convention as well, the enforcement of Russian judgments in England would then improve. This might be enough of an incentive for Russia to enter into the Convention.

It would be great news for the rest of the world if Russia ratified the 2019 Judgments Convention. Whether it would be good news for Russia remains to be seen.

Today (25 October 2020) is the 40th Anniversary of the HCCH Child Abduction Convention. With more than 100 Contracting Parties, the HCCH Child Abduction Convention is one of the most successful Conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). As indicated in the title, this is a time for celebration but also a time for reflection. The Child Abduction Convention faces several challenges, some of which have been highlighted in this blog. The most salient one is that primary carers (usually mothers) are now the main abductors, which many argue was not the primary focus of the deliberations in the late 70s and that the drafters assumed that primarily (non-custodial) fathers were the abductors. See the most recent statistical analysis by Nigel Lowe and Victoria Stephens (year: 2015 applications), where it shows that 73% of the abductors were mothers (most primary or joint-primary carers) and 24% were fathers.

A related issue is that custody laws continue to change and are granting custody rights to non-primary carers (e.g. unmarried fathers, ne exeat clauses, etc.), which expands the scope of the Child Abduction Convention. There is also a growing trend of joint parenting.

Another challenge is the increasing importance of human rights law and its interaction with the Child Abduction Convention (see our previous post Opening Pandora’s Box); in addition, the implementation and application of article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention also poses challenges (see our previous posts on the HCCH Guide to Good Practice on the grave-risk exception under article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention through the lens of human rights: Part I and Part II).

Moreover, other challenges have arisen in these difficult times of pandemic. In this regard, Nadia Rusinova wrote a post on the “Child Abduction in times of Corona” and another one on “Remote Child-Related Proceedings in Times of Pandemic – Crisis Measures or Justice Reform Trigger?”

Last but not least, there is much uncertainty surrounding Brexit and the new legal framework of the UK. How about all the UK case law regarding Brussels II bis and the related issues regarding the Child Abduction Convention?

Such obstacles are not insurmountable (at least, I hope). Nevertheless, much reflection is needed to continue improving the operation of the Child Abduction Convention in this ever-changing world. Undoubtedly, the Child Abduction Convention is a must-have tool for States to combat internationally removal and retention of children by their parents or someone from the inner family circle in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

For those of you who are interested in getting more information about this Convention: In addition to the Guides to Good Practice published by the HCCH (open access), some of the leading works in this area are (I will concentrate on books as there are countless articles, see also bibliography of the HCCH here. Some of the books are from Hart, click on the link on the top of the banner for more info):

Monographic works:

Schuz, Rhona. The Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis. Studies in Private International Law; Volume 13. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013.  Former Secretary General of the HCCH, Hans van Loon, wrote a very helpful book review. See Van Loon, Hans, “R. Schuz, the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis.” Netherlands International Law Review, 62, no. 1 (April, 2015): 201–206.

Beaumont, Paul R. and Peter E. McEleavy. The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. Oxford Monographs in Private International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Garbolino, James D. and Federal Judicial Center. The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges, 2015 (open access).

More specific topic:

Written by Conflictoflaws.net’s General Editor: Thalia Kruger.

Kruger, Thalia. International Child Abduction: The Inadequacies of the Law. Studies in Private International Law; Vol. 6. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011.

Works in Spanish:

Child abduction and mediation

Chéliz Inglés, María del Carmen. La sustracción internacional de menores y la mediación: Retos y vías prácticas de solución. Monografías. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2019.

Forcada Miranda, Francisco Javier. Sustracción internacional de menores y mediación familiar. Madrid: Sepín, 2015.

Within the Latin-American region

Tenorio Godínez, Lázaro, Nieve Rubaja, Florencia Castro, ed. Cuestiones complejas en los procesos de restitución internacional de niños en Latinoamérica. México: Porrúa, 2017.

Tenorio Godínez, Lázaro, Graciela Tagle de Ferreyra, ed. La Restitución Internacional de la niñez: Enfoque Iberoamericano doctrinario y jurisprudencial. México: Porrúa, 2011.

This is just a short list; please feel free to add other books that you may be aware of.

The HCCH news item is available here. The HCCH Access to Justice Convention is also celebrating its 40th anniversary. Unfortunately, this Convention is less used in practice.

Yesterday, 23 October 2020, the Republic of Serbia ratified the HCCH Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, which will enter into force for Serbia on 1 February 2021.

Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=757

INTRODUCTION
Commercial arbitration is now very popular around the globe. It forms an important part of Nigerian jurisprudence. It is regulated by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”), Cap. A18, LFN 2004.

Clauses designating an arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes between the parties are now common place in international commercial transactions. Generally, Nigerian courts respect and strictly enforce the parties’ choice to resolve their dispute before an arbitral tribunal in both domestic and international cases. This right is however not absolute. The right to resolve disputes before an arbitral tribunal could be waived by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court. Indeed, Section 5 (1) of the ACA provides that: “If any party to an arbitration agreement commences any action in any court with respect to any matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement any party to the arbitration agreement may, at any time after appearance and before delivering any pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the proceeding.” In essence, if a party to an international arbitration clause delivers any pleadings or takes any steps in the proceedings, such a party is deemed to have waived its right to an arbitration clause by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court,

What provokes this comment is that in a recent Nigerian Court of Appeal decision in The Vessel MT. Sea Tiger & Anor v Accord Ship Management (HK) Ltd. (2020) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1745) 418 (“Tiger”), the Court of Appeal held inter alia that where a party is served with a judicial claim, in breach of an international arbitration agreement, but fails to appear before the court, such a party is deemed to have waived its right to an arbitration agreement by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court. It also held that payment of an out of court settlement amounts to submission.

This comment holds that the Court of Appeal’s decision was wrongly decided in so far as it held that where proceedings are instituted in breach of an international arbitration clause, failure to appear before judicial proceedings and payment of an out of court settlement amounts to waiver by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court.

FACTS

In Tiger (supra), the 2nd plaintiff-appellant and the 1st defendant-respondent – both foreign companies before the Nigerian Court – entered into a ship management agreement on 18th of February 2012 in Hong Kong for the management of the 1st plaintiff-appellant vessel. The parties agreed that any dispute arising from their agreement shall be referred to international arbitration in London.

When a dispute arose as to the payment of the management fees between the parties, the 1st defendant-respondent instituted proceedings (suit No. FHC/L/CS/1789/2013) at the Federal High Court Nigeria for the arrest of the 1st plaintiff-appellant vessel. In that proceeding, the 1st defendant-respondent (as plaintiff) sued the plaintiff-appellants (the vessel and owners of the vessel) as the defendants in that case. The plaintiff-appellants settled the claim out of court by making payments to the 1st defendant-respondent. Subsequently, on 27th February 2014, the 1st defendant-respondent as plaintiff in suit No. FHC/L/CS/1789/2013 withdrew its suit and the vessel was ordered to be released.

In consequence of the arrest of the 1st plaintiff-appellant from 31st December 2013 to 27th February 2018, the appellants sued the defendant-respondents in the Federal High Court, Lagos for huge compensation arising from what it claimed to be the wrongful arrest of the 1st plaintiff-appellant in breach of their agreement to settle their dispute by international arbitration in London.

DECISION
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the claim of the plaintiff-appellants by holding that they had waived their right to the international arbitration clause by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian Court. The decision was reached on two principal grounds. The first ground was failure to appear and challenge the proceedings after being served with court processes. The second ground was the payment of an out of court settlement in order to release the vessel. In order to provide more clarity, the relevant portions of the decisions are quoted.

First, Garba JCA in his leading judgment held that: “The failure or refusal by it (plaintiff-appellants) to appear in reaction to the originating processes to enable the appellant challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground of the arbitration clauses in the Ship Management Agreement…left no other reasonable presumption in law and option to the lower court than that the appellants had submitted to the jurisdiction of that court to adjudicate over the suit since the only challenge to the suit by the appellants was entirely and completely predicated and founded on the arbitration clauses in the Ship Management Agreement and not on the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, in any event, entertain the suit on any cognizable ground of law. The failure or refusal to enter an appearance and be represented in the suit constituted and amounted to a muted but clear submission to the jurisdiction of the lower court in the case.”

Second, Garba JCA held that: “…the lower court is right that the appellants submitted to its jurisdiction in the suit no:FHC/L/CS/1789/2013 by the payment and settlement of the 1st respondent’s claim in order to secure the release of the 1st appellant from the arrest and detention it was placed under in the case thereby not only taking a step in the case, but actively and effectively so, in the circumstances of the case.”

COMMENTS
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Tiger (supra) is very important from the perspective of private international law and international commercial arbitration. The implication of Tiger (supra) is that where proceedings are instituted in a Nigerian court in breach of a foreign arbitration clause, the party requesting arbitration would be wise to appear before the court and immediately request the court to stay its proceedings in favour of a foreign arbitration clause. If this is not done, an international arbitration clause is ineffective in Nigerian law on the basis that the party requesting arbitration would be deemed to have waived its right by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. In addition, payment of an out of court settlement would amount to waiver by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court.

Prior to Tiger (supra), waiver to an arbitration clause by submission to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court could only be established where the defendant entered an unconditional appearance or defended the case its merits.

It is submitted that Tiger (supra) is a wrong extension of the principle to the extent that it holds that failure to appear before proceedings which breach an international arbitration clause constitutes waiver by submission to the jurisdiction of a court. A defendant that did not appear before court proceedings cannot be deemed to have waived its right by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court. In other words, failure to appear to proceedings upon being duly notified is the very antithesis of submission to the jurisdiction of a court. It is illogical to hold that such a defendant has “delivered pleadings” or “taken steps in the proceedings” in the eyes of Section 5 of the ACA. A defendant is entitled to ignore court proceedings by sticking to the arbitration clause. This should also be seen as a pro-arbitration stance that is consistent with Nigeria’s approach of upholding the sanctity of arbitration agreements. Indeed, as stated in the introduction, Nigerian courts generally enforce arbitration agreements strictly.

The truth is that Tiger’s case reflects the attitude of Nigerian judges to absentee defendants. Nigerian judges regard it as impolite for a defendant not to appear to court proceedings. The preferable approach in Nigerian jurisprudence is to enter a conditional appearance and then challenge the jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, in Muhammed v Ajingi (2013) LPELR-20372 (CA), the Court of Appeal (Abiru JCA) unanimously held that a defendant who has been duly notified of proceedings but fails to appear to promptly challenge the jurisdiction of the court is deemed to have waived its right by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court. Though, Muhammed v Ajingi was not an arbitration case, it demonstrates the attitude of Nigerian courts to absentee defendants.

The Court of Appeal was also wrong to have regarded the payment of the settlement sum by the plaintiff-appellants to release the vessel as waiver by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an approach does not amount to delivering pleadings or taking steps in the proceedings in the eyes of Section 5 of the ACA. Indeed, in the earlier case of Confidence Insurance Ltd v The Trustees of the Ondo State College of Education Staff Pension (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 591) 373, 386, the Court of Appeal (Achike JCA as he then was) unanimously held that: “effort made out of court to settle the matter in controversy between the parties” does not amount to submission. Nigerian courts should be seen to encourage out of court settlement. If the law is that efforts made out of court settlement amounts to submission, this might discourage a potential defendant from making out of court settlements, where there is the presence of a foreign arbitration clause.

Tiger (supra) properly so called was an action in damages for breach of an international arbitration clause. Since it has been argued in this case that the plaintiff-appellants did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court, damages should have been awarded for breach of the international arbitration clause. If the Court of Appeal had adopted this approach, it would have honoured Nigerian judiciary’s approach to generally and strictly enforce the sanctity of arbitration agreements. It was obvious in this case that the plaintiff-appellants suffered loss from the arrest of its ship in breach of an international arbitration clause. It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal did not award compensation in this case.

CONCLUSION
It remains to the seen whether Tiger (supra) will go on appeal to the Nigerian Supreme Court. If it does go on appeal, it is proposed that the Supreme Court overturns the Court of Appeal’s decision. If it does not go on appeal to the Supreme Court, it is proposed that the Nigerian Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in future holds that the failure to appear to proceedings in breach of an international arbitration to arbitrate and the payment of out of court settlement does not constitute waiver by submission to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian court.

Non lieu à renvoi