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Le 21 novembre 2023, à Strasbourg, la résolution du Parlement européen contenant des recommandations à la Commission sur un cadre de l’Union pour la situation sociale et professionnelle des artistes et des travailleurs des secteurs de la culture et de la création (2023/2051[INL]), présentée par ses deux rapporteurs Antonius Manders et Domènec Ruiz Devesa, a été adoptée par 433 voix pour, 100 voix contre et 99 abstentions. 

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de la propriété intellectuelle 2023, Annoté et commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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In Lott & Ors v PSA Automobiles SA & Ors [2023] EWHC 2568 (KB), Fontaine SM deals with an evidential /discovery issue in one of the dieselgate cases, where the car manufacturers intend to contest the extent of the binding nature of CJEU judgments finding relevant software to constitute cheating devices within the meaning of European standardisation laws.

[22] The French Defendants are found to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the E&W courts at least in relation to the Claimants’ application for further information and specific disclosure. [26] ff discusses the relevant French ‘blocking statute’ which prohibits French nationals and certain others from providing documents and information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature to foreign public authorities or for the purposes of establishing evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings. Relevant authority on the effect of the French statute is listed [28], with [29] emphasis on

Orders for production and inspection are matters of procedural law, governed by the lex fori, here English law. Local rules apply; foreign law cannot be permitted to override this Court’s ability to conduct proceedings here in accordance with English procedures and law.

and [30] a proposal by the French defendants, asking that the application be provided only pursuant to a letter of request under the Hague Taking of Evidence Convention (as cover for the French statute, refused however [81]:

i) I have no real means of assessing how real is the risk of prosecution if the documents so ordered were provided directly by the French Defendants to the Claimants, even if protected by a confidentiality order or confidentiality ring. That might have been provided by expert evidence of French law, but I have given reasons why that was not permitted at this stage. However, I do take into account both the letter from SISSE which explains the French authority’s position, and the interests of international comity, which support the use of the Hague Convention route.

ii) The French Defendants were well aware of the difficulties caused by the FBS at the hearing on 9 February 2022, and assured the court that once their legal representatives and an engineer had been able to take instructions in France from their clients they would seek the relevant documents via the Hague Convention themselves, but that has not been done, and no explanation provided. If it had been done by the French Defendants solicitors within a reasonable time after that hearing the relevant information and documents would have been available some time ago. It was also not explained why the FBS would prohibit the French Defendants from providing information and documents to their own clients other than through the Hague Convention. It is not a reasonable approach for the French Defendants to come back to court some 17 months after that hearing and now insist that the Claimants make a Hague Convention request, without any explanation for the change of stance, and the substantial delay.

iii) The prejudice to the Claimants that will inevitably be caused to provision of information and documents by reason of that delay if these have to be provided via the Hague Convention, that is likely to impact their ability to provide a fully pleaded draft GPOC and/or GLO issues which in turn may cause delay to the hearing of the GLO application.

iv) I take account of the fact that this is group litigation where there is, as in Cavallari, “an asymmetry of information” between the parties, and the relevant technical information is held by the Defendants, primarily by the French Defendants.

An interesting judgment on evidential forum shopping.

Geert.

#Dieselgate class action, discovery
Impact of French 'blocking' statute (preventing FR defendants from handing over documents) and Hague Evidence Convention viz English lex fori as procedural law

Lott & Ors v PSA Automobiles SA & Ors [2023] EWHC 2568 (KB)https://t.co/FQken9cGG1

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 17, 2023

In Clifford Chance LLP v Societe Generale SA [2023] EWHC 2682 (Comm), Henshaw J has held on a jurisdiction challenge in a claim for professional negligence claim brought by SocGen against Clifford Chance alleging that they negligently handled a dispute between SocGen and Goldas Kuyumculuk Sanayi Ithalat Ihracat AS and other companies in the same group.

Clifford Chance’s claim is one for negative declaration of contractual liability: it seeks declarations that they are not liable to SocGen in professional negligence, and that CC Europe was not retained by SocGen at all. SocGen has subsequently commenced proceedings against CC LLP and CC Europe in the High Court of Paris, seeking damages in excess of €140 million. The first hearing in that court is due to take place in March 2024.

SocGen challenged the jurisdiction of the E&W courts with reference to its framework agreement with Clifford Chance, which includes French choice of court and French choice of law. As was to be expected, Clifford Chance argue that that agreement does not apply to the work at issue (given the interference of various Clifford Chance legal entities, it was inevitable that issues of privity would arise; see also the discussion [103] ff on agency). The judge, applying French principes of contractual interpretation, holds [90] ff that on the facts, the framework agreement does not apply to the retainer at issue. As a result of the Rome Convention (as discussed at [67], Rome I not applying ratione temporis), English law applies to that retainer as a result of E&W being the habitual residence of the service provider.

[112] ff deal succinctly with (and reject)  the subsidiary issue of forum non conveniens: [120] it is not shown

that the courts of France are clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum. To the contrary, this court is that forum.

I wonder whether Clifford Chance in the French proceedings will now be arguing Article 33-34 lis pendens, seeing as the English proceedings were instituted first, however that would depend on the exact parties to the proceedings and the basis for jurisdiction against them: if the French courts find there is a legally binding choice of court in the claim, Articles 33-34 cannot apply and we will find ourselves in an interesting post-Brexit competition between courts.

Geert.

Judgment now here. Jurisdiction challenge fails, choice of court held not to apply to specific retainer. Interestingly, will CC argue A33, 34 in FR given the alleged invalidity of choice of court?
Clifford Chance v Societe Generale [2023] EWHC 2682 (Comm)https://t.co/YCRVwiE3hL https://t.co/v58xuSXo7C

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 29, 2023

AP Assistenzprofis
L’emploi d’une assistante personnelle aidant une personne handicapée dans la vie quotidienne peut être réservé aux personnes de la même tranche d’âge

SCHUFA Holding (Scoring)
Principes du droit communautaire
Le règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD) s’oppose à deux pratiques de traitement des données de sociétés fournissant des informations commerciales

The third issue of the Revue critique de droit international privé of 2023 will be released shortly. It focuses on notarial practice in international family property law in the Ukrainian context, but contains also numerous case notes on private international law.

In the first article, Pierre Boisseau (University of Tours) examines the contours of the legal framework applied to receive and protect Ukrainians fleeing the fighting in their country of origin (Du droit d’asile classique à l’accueil des déplacés ukrainiens: réflexion sur la complémentarité des dispositifs de protection des réfugiés).

The abstract reads:

In Europe in general, and in France in particular, the reception of refugees is based on three complementary systems. In addition to the traditional right of asylum and subsidiary protection, there is now temporary protection. In very simplified terms, political asylum concerns those fighting for freedom; subsidiary protection protects people who have been victims of abuse by nonstate groups; and temporary protection, which stems from the geopolitical context in Europe, is currently used to receive and protect Ukrainians fleeing the fighting. Many have benefited from this, although part of them have now returned to Ukraine. But this surge of generosity towards Europeans does not seem to inspire the draft Pact on Asylum and Immigration of Thursday 8 June 2023 concerning refugees from other continents.

In the second article, Ambra Marignani (University of Tours) and Svitlana Yaroslavovna Fursa (Honored Lawyer of Ukraine & Center for Legal Research of Kyiv) study the question of property rights for couples displaced from Ukraine, under a conflict-of-laws perspective (Les pouvoirs des époux sur leurs biens : quelles problématiques pour les déplacés d’Ukraine ? Regards issus d’une comparaison franco-ukrainienne).

The abstract reads:

Displaced spouses from Ukraine may not imagine that, in some cases, French law is applicable to their rights to own, manage, enjoy and dispose of property. Notaries will be in the front line in containing this risk by informing and advising them. This work will be essential, particularly with regard to the rights that differ in content between French and Ukrainian law, which has been highlighted by the comparison of laws.

In the third article, Audrey Damiens (University of Tours) and Svitlana Yaroslavovna Fursa (Center for Legal Research of Kyiv) explore the role of notaries in dealing with the sensitive issue of cross-border separation of couples between France and Ukraine (La pratique notariale et les divorces en droit international privé : réflexion entre la France et l’Ukraine en temps de guerre).

The abstract reads:

The situation in Ukraine has led to population movements, particularly towards France. Married couples or one of their members now find themselves in a situation that comes under private international law. In their practice, French notaries are and will be faced with an increasing number of international situations relating to Ukraine, including divorce. This article looks at the practical difficulties that French notaries may encounter in divorce cases in Ukraine, and suggests some possible solutions. On the one hand, it looks at divorces in Ukraine that would come before a French notary. Secondly, it is proposed to consider divorce by mutual consent in France in an international situation linked to Ukraine.

In a fourth article, Alina Goncharova (State University of Soumy, Ukraine & Invited Fellow, University of Tours) and Fabienne Labelle (University of Tours) examine the law applicable to inheritance from a French-Ukrainian comparative perspective (Dévolution successorale et réserve héréditaire: comparaison entre la France et l’Ukraine).

The abstract reads:

The purpose of this study is to compare French and Ukrainian inheritance law. This study is particularly interesting in the event that Ukrainian law is applicable to the succession submitted to the French notary, as it provides some useful benchmarks in Ukrainian law. By studying the hypotheses of shares reserved for certain heirs, it also highlights significant differences in the internal public policy of each country. These differences could give rise to practical difficulties and discussions in both doctrine and case law.

Finally, a fifth article from the same authors, Alina Goncharova & Fabienne Labelle, deals with the question of drawing up wills in international French-Ukrainian context (Le testament, outil de planification de la succession internationale Le cas des Ukrainiens protégés temporairement en France).

The full table of contents is available here.

En application de l’article 16, § 1, du règlement Bruxelles II bis, « une juridiction est réputée saisie par la réalisation d’un seul acte, à savoir le dépôt de l’acte introductif d’instance, dès lors que le demandeur n’a pas omis de prendre les mesures qui lui incombaient pour que l’acte initial soit régulièrement notifié ou signifié au défendeur ».

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de procédure civile 2024 annoté. Édition limitée Voir la boutique Dalloz

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The Ruby Princess will be remembered by many Australians with disdain as the floating petri dish that kicked off the spread of COVID-19 in Australia. The ship departed Sydney on 8 March 2020, then returned early on 19 March 2020 after an outbreak. Many passengers became sick. Some died. According to the BBC, the ship was ultimately linked to at least 900 infections and 28 deaths.

Ms Susan Karpik was a passenger on that voyage. She and her husband became very sick; he ended up ventilated, intubated and unconscious in hospital for about four weeks.

Ms Karpik commenced representative proceedings—a class action—in the Federal Court of Australia. She asserted claims in tort and under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) in schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) against companies behind the ship: Carnival plc and its subsidiary, Princess Cruise Lines Ltd (together, Princess). She sought damages for loss and damage allegedly suffered by either passengers of the ship or their relatives.

The case has an obvious cross-border flavour. The respondents are foreign companies: Princess Cruise Lines Ltd is incorporated in Bermuda and headquartered in California; Carnival plc is a UK company which functions together with a Panama-incorporated US-headquartered company, and is dual listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. The ship is registered in Bermuda. The ~2,600 passengers on the diseased voyage included many Australians but also passengers from overseas. They contracted to travel on the cruise in different parts of the world, and according to Princess, were subject to different terms and conditions subject to different systems of law. The cruise itself departed and returned to Sydney but included time outside of Australia, including in New Zealand.

It is unsurprising then that Princess sought to defend the proceedings at a preliminary stage through litigation over where to litigate.

Princess brought an interlocutory application to stay the proceedings as they related to a Canadian passenger, Mr Patrick Ho, who entered the contract with Princess when he was not in Australia. Princess argued that Mr Ho’s contract was subject to different terms and conditions to those that governed the contracts of other Aussie passengers. These ‘US Terms and Conditions’ included a class action waiver clause, a choice of law clause selecting US maritime law, and an exclusive jurisdiction clause selecting US courts. Mr Ho was identified by Ms Karpik as a sub-group representative of those members of the class action that Princess argued were subject to the US Terms and Conditions.

In contesting the stay application, Ms Karpik relied on section 23 of the ACL, which provides among other things that a term of a consumer contract is void if the term is unfair and the contract is a standard form contract. Princess argued that s 23 did not apply to Mr Ho’s contract, given it was made outside Australia.

The primary judge refused the stay application, which was then reversed by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.

On further appeal, the High Court held that ACL s 23 does apply to Mr Ho’s contract, with the result that the class action waiver clause was void: Karpik v Carnival plc [2023] HCA 39. The Court held that there were strong reasons not to give effect to the exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause. Ms Karpik succeeded, meaning that the case may now continue in Australia, even as regards those members of the class action who are not Australian and contracted overseas.

The decision is significant not just for the litigants. It will be commercially significant for foreign businesses that contract with consumers in respect of services that have connections to Australia. For example, it may have serious implications for travel operators, including those who run cruises that stop in Australia. The decision is significant too for private international law nerds like myself, contemplating how to resolve choice of law questions in our age of statutes.

Procedural history

Princess applied to stay the proceedings relying on terms of Mr Ho’s contract with Princess. A Calgary resident, he booked his ticked on the Ruby Princess via a Canadian travel agent in September 2018. By the time the matter came to the High Court, it was not disputed that when he did so, he became a party to a contract subject to the US Terms and Conditions, which contained three clauses of particular relevance.

First, it included a choice of law clause (cl 1):

‘[A]ny and all disputes between Carrier and any Guest shall be governed exclusively and in every respect by the general maritime law of the United States without regard to its choice of law principles … To the extent such maritime law is not applicable, the laws of the State of California (U.S.A.) shall govern the contract, as well as any other claims or disputes arising out of that relationship. You agree this choice of law provision replaces, supersedes and preempts any provision of law of any state or nation to the contrary.’

Second, it included an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause (cl 15B(i)):

‘Claims for Injury, Illness or Death: All claims or disputes involving Emotional Harm, bodily injury, illness to or death of any Guest whatsoever, including without limitation those arising out of or relating to this Passage Contract or Your Cruise, shall be litigated in and before the United States District Courts for the Central District of California in Los Angeles … to the exclusion of the courts of any other country, state, city, municipality, county or locale. You consent to jurisdiction and waive any objection that may be available to any such action being brought in such courts.’

Third, it included a class action waiver clause (cl 15C):

‘WAIVER OF CLASS ACTION: THIS PASSAGE CONTRACT PROVIDES FOR THE EXCLUSIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES THROUGH INDIVIDUAL LEGAL ACTION ON YOUR OWN BEHALF INSTEAD OF THROUGH ANY CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION. EVEN IF THE APPLICABLE LAW PROVIDES OTHERWISE, YOU AGREE THAT ANY ARBITRATION OR LAWSUIT AGAINST CARRIER WHATSOEVER SHALL BE LITIGATED BY YOU INDIVIDUALLY AND NOT AS A MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OR AS PART OF A CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION, AND YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE TO WAIVE ANY LAW ENTITLING YOU TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION …’

By its interlocutory application, Princess sought an order that certain questions be heard and determined separately. The questions included whether Mr Ho was bound by the exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause.

At first instance, Ms Karpik argued that Mr Ho was not subject to the US Terms and Conditions, and so denied that the foreign exclusive jurisdiction clause and the class action waiver clause were incorporated into his contract. It was argued in the alternative that those clauses if incorporated were void or otherwise unenforceable.

In July 2021, Stewart J refused the application for a stay as regards Mr Ho on the basis that the US Terms and Conditions were not incorporated into his contract, and held further that if they were incorporated, the class action waiver was void and unenforceable under ACL s 23. Stewart J held there would be strong reasons for not enforcing the exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause even if it were incorporated and enforceable: Karpik v Carnival plc (The Ruby Princess) (Stay Application) [2021] FCA 1082; (2021) 157 ACSR 1, [331].

In September 2022, by majority, the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed the Princess appeal. The Full Court was comprised of judges who are, with respect, well known for their private international law and maritime law expertise: Allsop CJ, Rares J and Derrington J. All three agreed that the primary judge erred in holding that the exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause and the class action waiver clause were not terms of Mr Ho’s contract. Allsop CJ and Derrington J agreed that the clauses were enforceable and not contrary to the policy of Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) which regulates representative proceedings in the Federal Court. Rares J dissented in holding that it was contrary to public policy to permit contracting out of that class actions regime. The majority did not decide on the extraterritorial application of ACL s 23 but enforced the exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause by staying the proceeding as regards Mr Ho’s claim: Carnival plc v Karpik (The Ruby Princess) [2022] FCAFC 149; (2022) 294 FCR 524.

Mrs Karpik obtained special leave. The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission intervened. The appeal was heard in March 2023.

The High Court was comprised of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Gleeson and Jagot JJ. The Court unanimously allowed Ms Karpik’s appeal and re-exercised the primary court’s discretion by refusing to stay the proceedings. The decision may be distilled into three key propositions.

1. Section 23 of the ACL had extraterritorial application and applied to the contract between Mr Ho and Princess.
2. The class action waiver clause was void under ACL s 23 because it was unfair.
3. Although the exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause formed part of the contract, there were strong reasons for not enforcing the clause.

The territorial scope of ACL s 23

The first proposition turned on resolution of difficult issues of private international law, or the conflict of laws.

Princess argued that the application of the ACL in a matter with a foreign element depended first on determining that the law of the forum (lex fori) was the applicable law (lex causae) in accordance with the forum’s choice of law rules.

Where a contract selects a system of foreign law as the applicable law, as this contract did in cl 1, the relevant choice of law rule is that generally, the selected system of law supplies the proper law of the contract, which is the applicable law: see Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418.

The High Court held that ‘Princess’ submissions incorrectly invert the inquiry’: [22]. Rather, the application of ACL s 23 to Mr Ho’s contract, a contract made outside Australia, was described as ‘a question of statutory construction’: [18]. So the Court construed the ACL as part of the CCA by holding as follows at [26], [34]ff:

• The ACL applies to the extent provided by CCA pt XI: ACL s 1.
• CCA s 131(1), within CCA pt XI, provides that the ACL applies to the conduct of corporations and in relation to contraventions of certain chapters of the ACL by corporations.
• CCA s 5 extends the application of relevant parts of the ACL to conduct engaged in outside Australia, where the conduct outside Australia was by a corporation carrying on business with Australia.
• ACL s 23, as part of ACL pt 2-3, prescribes a norm of conduct. Section 23 in particular addresses adhesion contracts—that is, contracts in which one of the parties enters into a contract on a take-it-or-leave it basis. ACL s 23 protects consumer contracts and small business contracts but not others.

There was no dispute before the High Court that Princess was carrying on business in Australia. (On the role of that jurisdictional hook in Australian legislation, see Douglas, ‘Long-Arm Jurisdiction over Foreign Tech Companies “Carrying on Business” Online: Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner’ (2023) 45(1) Sydney Law Review 109).

The High Court clarified that ACL s 23 should not be considered a generally worded statutory provision: [43]–[44]. Rather, the statute expressly provided for the territorial scope of the ACL via CCA s 5. The Court held that there was no justification to only apply s 23 to situations where the proper law of the contract is Australian law. The Court considered the CCA’s policy objective of consumer protection (CCA s 2) as supporting a construction which would extend protection to Australian consumers with companies even where the contract was for services wholly or predominantly performed overseas: [47], [49].

The class action waiver clause was an unfair term

The US Terms and Conditions were therefore subject to s 23 of the ACL. Was the class action waiver clause ‘unfair’ for the purposes of s 23(1)(a)? The Court applied the definition in ACL s 24(1), which provides:

‘(1)  A term of a consumer contract or small business contract is unfair if:

(a)  it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract; and

(b)  it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term; and

(c)  it would cause detriment (whether financial or otherwise) to a party if it were to be applied or relied on.’

The Court considered that the clause had the effect of preventing or discouraging passengers from vindicating their legal rights where the cost to do so individually and not as part of a class action would be economical. The clause therefore caused a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations: [54]. The Court held that Princess had not proved that the clause was reasonably necessary in order to protect their interests: [55]–[56]. Further, being denied access to the representative proceedings regime was considered a sufficient detriment: [58].

The Court recognised that courts in the United States have held differently, but considered that the class action waiver clause was unfair, and therefore void under ACL s 23: [60].

The Court further opined in obiter that the class action waiver clause would not be inconsistent with the Federal Court’s representative proceedings regime: [61]–[64].

Strong reasons not to enforce the exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause

Australian courts give effect to the norm of party autonomy by enforcing exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses in the absence of strong reasons to not enforce such clauses. The primary judge held that there were strong reasons in this case to not enforce the party’s exclusive choice of foreign fora. The High Court agreed.

The Court held that the following ‘strong’ reasons justified denying the application for the stay, as a matter of discretion: first, the class action waiver clause was an unfair term, which corresponded to Mr Ho’s juridical advantage in litigating in Australia in circumstances where he could be denied participation in a class action in the US; and second, the enforcement of the exclusive jurisdiction clause would fracture the litigation: [67]–[69].

Conclusion

The High Court’s decision is significant for its consideration of the territorial scope of ACL s 23. It means that many companies outside of Australia that operate in a way that touches on Australia will have difficulty in contracting out of Australia’s consumer protection regime as regards standard contracts with consumers and small businesses. The decision will be a big deal for businesses like Princess, who operate travel services that involve Australia.

Theoretically, the Australian consumer protection regime could apply to regulate contracts between persons who are not Australian, with limited connection to Australia, and in respect of transactions with subject matter with a closer connection to places other than Australia. But as the High Court recognised at [50], the practical significance of this possibility should not be overstated. Forum non conveniens should operate to limit the prosecution of those kinds of claims.

On the other hand, Australia’s parochial approach to that doctrine via the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test could mean that in some cases, it is worth it for foreigners to have a crack in an Australian forum over subject matter with a tenuous connection to Australia. Strong consumer protection may provide the ‘legitimate juridical advantage’ by reference to which a court may decline a stay application in a matter with a foreign element: see generally Garnett, ‘Stay of Proceedings in Australia: A “Clearly Inappropriate” Test?’ (1999) 23(1) Melbourne University Law Review 30.

The case is similarly significant for its treatment of class action waivers within the framework of the ACL. Contracts with consumers are the kind in which such clauses have the most work to do: these are contracting parties who may not sue at all unless they are part of representative proceedings. Australia’s plaintiff-focuses class action lawyers should be licking their lips.

For me, the case is most significant for its approach to choice of law. The High Court has now expressly endorsed an approach that has been applied in a number of cases and described by some as ‘statutist’. I’ve previously argued that the statute-first approach to choice of law should be orthodox in the Australian legal system: Douglas, ‘Does Choice of Law Matter?’ (2021) 28 Australian International Law Journal 1; an approach which now appears right, if I do say so myself. Australian private international law may seem incoherent when viewed within the theoretical framework of multilateralism espoused by the likes of Savigny. But it makes sense when you approach matters with foreign elements with regard to our usual constitutional principles.

In Australian courts, all Australian statutes are ‘mandatory’, even in matters with a foreign element—there is no such thing as ‘mandatory law’. In every case where a forum statute is involved, the question is whether the statute applies. Statutory interpretation is the primary tool to resolve such questions.

Under Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”), a court shall refer the parties to arbitration “if a party so requests not later than when submitting his first statement in the substance of the dispute.” This Model Law rule, upon which the equivalent provision of the Norwegian Arbitration Act is based, was the subject of a recent Norwegian Supreme Court decision over a dispute between a Danish and a Norwegian company regarding a distribution contract containing an arbitration clause referring disputes to arbitration in Denmark.

Before the dispute was initiated, the Danish company claimed for preservation of evidence in Norwegian courts, in accordance with the Norwegian Procedural Code. In connection to the claim for preservation of evidence, the Norwegian company stated that the matter was subject to arbitration and the court procedure should therefore be dismissed. This issue – whether the arbitration clause was a procedural impediment to the preservation of evidence – was rejected by the court of first instance. When this decision was appealed, both the court of second instance and the Supreme Court joined the conclusion of the court of first instance.

When evidence had been preserved, the Danish company initiated a procedure for a Norwegian conciliation council. Under Norwegian procedural law, a conciliation council serves as a court of first instance in civil matters but with a limited adjudicative competence. As its name implies, the idea behind the conciliation council is to settle civil disputes through conciliation. However, a conciliation council shall refer complicated matters to the ordinary courts. The conciliation council in the case in question referred the matter to the ordinary district court. Only then, in the procedure at the district court, did the Norwegian defendant state that the matter should be subject to arbitration. The district court dismissed this objection, referring to the decision by the Supreme Court, which had held that the arbitration clause did not impede the preservation of evidence. The court of appeal also came to the conclusion that the arbitration clause was not an impediment for the procedure, albeit with a completely different legal analysis underlying this conclusion. The court of appeal argued that the defendant had based its objection on the substance of the matter before the conciliation council, without invoking the arbitration clause. Hence, the right to invoke the arbitration clause as a procedural impediment was precluded under the Norwegian Arbitration Act.

As this decision was also appealed, the issue for the Norwegian Supreme Court was whether the right to invoke the arbitration clause was precluded. In its decision, the Supreme Court first held that a Norwegian conciliation council, despite its limited competence, is a national court for the purposes of the Norwegian Arbitration Act. Consequently, the next issue for the court to ponder was whether the defendant had requested the conciliation council to refer the parties to arbitration in the way that Article 8 of the Model Law requires. Under this article, a request shall be made “not later than when submitting [the] first statement on the substance of the dispute.” Holding that the wording of Article 8 is ambiguous and that there seems to be no clear international case law on the issue, the Supreme Court made its own interpretation of the critical point in Article 8. Here, the Court held that the Norwegian Procedural Act requires that a defendant party in a dispute before a conciliation council gives notice on whether it accepts or contests the claim. Norwegian law does not require the defendant to justify its position on the plaintiff’s claim. Taking a stance on whether a claim is accepted or contested is, regardless of whether this is justified, a statement on the substance of the dispute, according to the Supreme Court’s decision. Further, the court held that the opposite interpretation would risk creating unnecessary procedural delays. The right of the defendant to invoke the arbitration agreement was therefore precluded.

In summary, a party that wants to invoke an arbitration agreement as a procedural impediment must do so no later than at the first occasion when the party has a chance to submit a statement on the substance of the dispute.

Below in simple format and here in easier lay-out, is the program for our conference on the Tangier Statute Centenary Conference, 18 December next in Tanger.

We are very excited.

 

The Tangier Statute Centenary Conference, 18th December 2023

Colloque international à l’occasion du centenaire du Statut de Tanger, 18 décembre 2018

 

Programme

 

Local time/heure locale : UTC+1 (= Central European Time/Heure normale d’Europe Centrale)

Morning/Matinée: Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Économiques et Sociales de Tanger

09:00-09:30:         Registration/Inscriptions

09:30-10:30:         Welcome speeches/Discours de bienvenue

• Welcoming words by the organizers/Mots de bienvenue des organisateurs
• Address by Mr Mounir Lymmouri, President of the Tangier City Council/Allocution de M. Mounir Lymmouri, Président du Conseil de la Ville de Tanger
• Address by a Representative of the Presidence of Abdelmalek Essaâdi University/Allocution d’un.e représentant.e de la présidence de l’Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi
• Address by Prof. Toufik Essaid, Dean of the Tangier Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences/Allocution de M. le Professeur Toufik Essaid, Doyen de la Faculté des sciences juridiques, économiques et sociales de Tanger.

 

10:30-10:45: Keynote speech by Prof. Hamid Aboulas, Vice-Dean of the Tangier Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences/Discours d’ouverture de M. le Professeur Hamid Aboulas, Vice-Doyen de la Faculté des sciences juridiques, économiques et sociales de Tanger

• Quelques aspects de la transformation de la ville de Tanger de 1923 à après l’indépendance

10:45-11:00:         Coffee break/Pause café

 

11:00-12:00:         Panel 1: Between Internationalism and Colonialism: Contextualizing the Tangier Statute/Entre internationalisme et colonialisme : le Statut de Tanger dans son contexte (Chair/Présidence: Fouzi Rherrousse)

• Ambivalences de la souveraineté, impérialisme et droit international : réflexion à partir du statut spécial de la Ville de Tanger (1923-1956) (Oumar Kourouma)
• La souveraineté marocaine à l’épreuve du statut international de Tanger de 1923 (Antoine Perrier)
• The International Situation of the City of Tangier During the Protectorate (Adil Rajaa)

 

12:00-13:00:         Panel 2: The International City as a Product and a Precedent: Connecting Tangier to Other International Spaces/La Ville internationale comme produit et comme précédent : les liens entre Tanger et d’autres espaces internationaux (Chair/Présidence: Michel Erpelding)

• The theory and practice of international administration: Comparison between Tangier and territories administered by the League of Nations (Philip Burton)
• The Statute of Tangier as the inspiration for the Draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem (Fulvio Bontempo and Alessia Tortolini)
• The International Zone of Tangier, 1924-1956: the European Union’s Accidental Incubator? (Willem Theus)

 

13:00-15:00:       Lunch break/Pause déjeuner

 

Afternoon/après-midi : Palace of Italian Institutions/Palais des Institutions Italiennes

15:00-15:20:       Welcome speeches/Discours de bienvenue

• Adress by Mr Marco Silvi, Consul General of Italy in Casablanca/Allocution par M. Marco Silvi, Consul général d’Italie à Casablanca
• Address by Mr Riccardo Finozzi, representative of the association Dimore Storiche del Mediterraneo/Allocution par M. Riccardo Finozzi, représentant de l’association Dimore Storiche del Mediterraneo

 

15:20-16:20:       Panel 3: Implementing the Tangier Statute: The Administration of the International City in Practice/La mise en œuvre du Statut de Tanger : Enjeux pratiques de l’administration de la Ville Internationale (Chair/Présidence: Rachid El Moussaoui)

 

• Tanger : la dimension méditerranéenne de l’économie marocaine (Sersar El Mahdi)
• Structuration et évolution de l’enseignement dans Ville de Tanger (Faiza El Alaoui)
• Les enjeux politiques et juridiques de la planification urbaine et architecturale de la zone internationale de Tanger (1925-1956) (Romain Micalef)

 

16:20-17:20:       Panel 4: Administering Justice in the International City: The Mixed Court of Tangier/Rendre la justice dans la Ville internationale : le Tribunal mixte de Tanger (Chair/Présidence : Geert van Calster)

 

• Capitalism as Juridical Creed: The Uneasy Relationship of the Tangier Mixed Court with Public International Law (Dimitrios A. Kourtis) (online/en ligne)
• Divergence et convergence juridiques: analyse de deux décisions des Tribunaux mixtes de Tanger et du Caire (Aya Bejermi and Adam Belkadi) (online/en ligne)
• Jewish Law in the Mixed Court of Tangier, 1925-1956 (Jessica M. Marglin)

 

17:20-17:40:       Coffee break/Pause café

 

17:40-18:20: Panel 5: Lawyering in the International City: Selected Portraits of ‘Mixed Lawyers’/Pratiquer le droit dans la Ville internationale : Portraits choisis de « juristes mixtes » (Chair/Présidence : Francesco Tamburini)

• Le fabuleux destin de deux bâtonniers tangérois : Alphonse Ménard et Daniel Saurin (Fouzi Rherrousse)
• Incunable d’Europe : Nicola Catalano et la Zone internationale de Tanger (Marco Fioravanti)

 

18:20-19:20:       Panel 6: Flooding the Airwaves from the International City: Tangier as a Broadcasting Platform/Remplir les ondes à partir de la Ville internationale : Tanger comme plate-forme de radiodiffusion (Chair/Présidence : Willem Theus)

• A Case of Strategic Litigation: the 1938-1939 ‘Radio-Tanger’ Case and the Liberalization of Tangier’s Airwaves (Michel Erpelding)
• The Italian Radiotelegraphic Service in the International Zone, 1931-1956: Shattered Dreams for a Mediterranean Power (Francesco Tamburini)
• Radio Frontier: Tangier as the Mediterranean’s Radio Hub, 1939-1963 (Arthur Asseraf) (online/en ligne)

 

19:20-19:30:       Closing remarks/Conclusions

 

NORDIC INFO
Citoyenneté européenne
Covid-19 : la Cour valide certaines interdictions de voyage et obligations de dépistage ainsi que de quarantaine pendant la crise sanitaire

Nacionalinis visuomenės sveikatos centras
Seule une violation fautive du règlement général sur la protection des données peut conduire à l’infliction d’une amende administrative

Luxembourg / Commission
Aide d'État
L’examen par la Commission européenne des tax rulings accordés au groupe Engie par le Luxembourg a méconnu le droit de l’Union

Caroline Sophie Rapatz, Professor at the Christian-Albrecht University of Kiel, has accepted the invitation of the editors of the blog to present her recent book, titled ‘Das Internationale Privatrecht der EU – Vorbild oder Vormacht? Abgrenzungen und Wirkungen im Verhältnis zum nationalen und völkerrechtlichen Kollisionsrecht’ (European Union Private International Law – Role Model or Hegemony? Delimitations and Effects in Relation to National and International Conflict of Laws), published by Mohr Siebeck.

The relationship between the EU Regulations on private international law and the conflict-of-laws rules and instruments of other regulatory levels – national traditions and codifications on the one hand, bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions on the other – is at first glance a straightforward one. Within their scope of application, European rules take precedence with regard to national ones; the continued application of pre-existing treaties is guaranteed by exceptions in the EU Regulations. In fact, however, the interplay between the different regulatory levels is much more complicated.

This is evidenced by the increasing number of ECJ decisions which have to deal with the exact scope of application the EU Regulations and their delineation vis-à-vis national and international PIL rules. At the borderline between European and Member States’ PIL, characterisation issues are frequently solved in favour of the EU Regulations’ far-reaching application, displacing national conflicts rules (e.g. ECJ 12 October 2017 – C-218/16 (Kubicka); ECJ 1 March 2018 – C-558/16 (Mahnkopf)). However, when it comes to politically sensitive issues – for example, non-judicial divorces or non-heterosexual marriages – there is a remarkable tendency to leave more or less clearly defined gaps in the European instruments (e.g. ECJ 20 December 2017 – C-372/16 (Sahyouni)) and require the Member States to provide their own solutions. As a recent ECJ decision has demonstrated, questions of the EU Regulations’ scope of application are becoming virulent also with regard to treaty PIL (ECJ 12 October 2023 – C-21/22 (OP)). Naturally, such decisions on the scope of the European instruments can only be taken on the European level – but they leave the other regulatory level with the burden of adapting to them and solving the resulting coordination problems.

Furthermore, the influence of European PIL is not limited to the European instruments’ actual – and often broadly interpreted – scope of application. Although formally unaffected, national and international PIL rules increasingly have to adjust to the ever-growing domination of European regulatory concepts and values. Apart from the practical need for the Member States to adapt their remaining national PIL rules to their new European context in order to keep them functional, the demands of EU primary law put further pressure on the Member States. Again, the ECJ plays a central role, especially when questions of cross-border (status) recognition are at stake and national values are confronted with the fundamental freedoms (e.g. ECJ 2 June 2016 – C-438/14 (Bogendorff von Wolfersdorff); ECJ 5 June 2018 – C-673/16 (Coman)). In the interaction of treaty and convention conflict-of-laws rules with the EU Regulations, deviations from the European model prove to be practically and conceptually detrimental; combined with the political power of the EU, the development of treaty PIL is threatening to become dangerously dysbalanced.

As a German Habilitationsschrift, the monograph provides an in-depth analysis of the current state of the European harmonisation of PIL and shows that the approach to Europeanisation by individual EU Regulations has failed. EU PIL needs to reorient itself – either through self-constraint in a continued multi-level system, or through the courageous step towards a complete European Conflict-of-Laws Code.

The New Zealand High Court recently granted a permanent anti-enforcement injunction in relation to a default judgment from Kentucky in Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley Family Trustee Limited [2023] NZHC 3260. The plaintiff, a British Virgin Islands company, claimed that the defendants had committed a tortious conspiracy against it because the Kentucky default judgment was based on fabricated claims intended to defraud it. The defendants were a New Zealand company, Wikeley Family Trustee Ltd (WFTL), and persons associated with the company.

In an undefended judgment, the High Court granted the injunction, awarded damages for the costs incurred in the foreign proceedings (referring to cases such as Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller [2001] EWCA Civ 1755, [2002] 1 WLR 1517 by analogy), and issued a declaration that the Kentucky judgment would not be recognised or enforceable in New Zealand. As noted previously on this blog (see here), the case is an interesting example of “the fraud exception to the principles of comity” (Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215 at [192]).

In this post, I want to focus on the trans-Tasman element of the case – and, in particular, the interpretation of s 26(1)(b) of the Australian Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010. One of the defendants was Mr Wikeley, a Queensland resident, who apparently sought to evade or contravene the New Zealand Court’s interim orders by purporting to assign the Kentucky judgment from WTFL to a new (Kentucky) company. The New Zealand Court responded by placing WFTL under the control of a provisional liquidator. However, because Mr Wikeley was located in Queensland, the Court had limited powers to make its restraining orders effective against him.

Kea therefore applied to the Supreme Court of Queensland under s 25 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010. Under this section, a party to a New Zealand proceeding may apply to the Australian courts for interim relief in support of the New Zealand proceeding. More specifically, the Australian court may give interim relief if “the court considers it appropriate” to do so (s 26(1)(a)). The court must be satisfied that, “if a proceeding similar to the New Zealand proceeding had been commenced in the court”, it would have had power to give – and would have given – the interim relief in that similar proceeding (s 26(1)(b)(i) and (ii)). The equivalent provisions in the New Zealand Act are ss 31 and 32.

Following an ex parte hearing, the Queensland Court granted the application and made an order restraining Mr Wikeley from leaving Australia (Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley [2023] QSC 79). The Court accepted that the assistance sought was “consistent with the beneficial nature of the Act” (at [32]). It was also satisfied that it would have had power to grant the relief if Kea had commenced a similar proceeding in Queensland, and that it would have granted the relief, satisfying s 26(1)(b)(i) and (ii) (at [39]-[60]). This decision was largely confirmed in Kea Investments Ltd v Wikeley (No 2) [2023] QSC 215.

The case provides a good example of the value of ss 25 and 26 (and its New Zealand equivalents): the power to provide prompt and effective support of the other country’s proceedings, in circumstances where the court asked to grant the support will not – and should not – be taking jurisdiction over the merits. However, the jurisdictional requirements for granting interim relief under these provisions appear to be causing some confusion.

• In its first decision, the Queensland Court noted that it had “reservations” about “transposing relevant facts, including the respondents’ connections with the jurisdiction to a Queensland setting” when determining whether it would have given relief in the hypothetical similar proceeding (at [43]-[44]). The Court’s preference seemed to be to assess the question of jurisdiction on the basis of the facts as they were. Either way, it was clear that the Court would have had jurisdiction (at [44]). The Court “plainly” had jurisdiction over Mr Wikeley, due to his presence in Queensland. Moreover, Mr Wikeley’s conduct to avoid or contravene the New Zealand orders took place in Queensland, with the result that Queensland would have been “an appropriate forum if a similar proceeding had been brought in this court” (at [45]).
• In its second decision, the Court considered that it also had to be satisfied that the Australian court would have been the clearly appropriate forum for the hypothetical similar proceeding (at [85]). It rejected a submission from Kea that the question of appropriate forum did not arise in the context of ss 25 and 26 (at [84]). The Court was satisfied that it had personal jurisdiction over Mr Wikeley, that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the issues raised by Kea’s proceeding by virtue of the steps taken by Mr Wikeley in Australia to obtain or enforce the Kentucky judgment, and that it was not – or would not have been – a clearly inappropriate forum.

It is not clear why the supporting court should ask itself whether it could – and would – have exercised jurisdiction over the substantive proceeding, especially where this question is determined without transposing the relevant geographical facts. The whole point of the power to provide interim relief in support of the foreign proceeding is that the supporting forum may not be the right place to determine the proceeding, albeit that it is a place where (interim) orders can be made effective.

This does not necessarily mean that the relevant geographical connections ought to be transposed. When followed strictly, this approach could render ss 25 and 26 unavailable in circumstances where they would be most useful because the original court does not have the jurisdiction to make the necessary orders. Here, the New Zealand Court did not have enforcement jurisdiction over Mr Wikeley, in the sense that it could not make an order preventing him from leaving Australia or an order for his arrest.

In most cases, a straightforward interpretation of s 26(1)(b) is that it is concerned with the court’s jurisdiction in a hypothetical domestic case (see Reid Mortensen “A trans-Tasman judicial area: civil jurisdiction and judgments in the single economic market” (2010) 16 Canterbury Law Review 61 at 71). In other words, the question of jurisdiction (in an international sense) is determined mainly on the basis whether the court considers “it appropriate to give the interim relief in support of the [substantive] proceeding” (s 26(1)(a)). But in the context of anti-suit or anti-enforcement injunctions, it is impossible to shoehorn the cross-border implications of the relief into a hypothetical proceeding that is purely domestic. The case is inherently international. This may explain the Queensland Court’s decision to play it safe by asking, effectively, whether Kea could have brought the proceeding in Queensland. Ultimately, the Court thought that it would have been inappropriate for the Australian court “to simply replicate injunctive orders granted by a New Zealand court in order to secure compliance with the New Zealand orders” (at [260]).

It is likely that future courts will continue to grapple with this issue. The legislative history of s 26 suggests that the section was not intended to be weighed down by jurisdictional considerations, and that Cooper J’s approach may have been unduly restrictive. The original version of the section provided, in subs (2), that an Australian court may refuse to give the interim relief if it considered that it had no jurisdiction, apart from s 26, in relation to the subject matter of the New Zealand proceeding and for that reason it would be inexpedient to give the interim relief (see [84]). The Explanatory Memorandum to the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Amendment and Other Measures Bill 2011 (Cth), which repealed subs (2), noted that “[a]n unintended consequence of subsection 26(2) may be to give greater significance to issues of jurisdiction and expediency than is necessary, resulting in applicants for interim relief facing an unintended additional hurdle” (at [21]). The proper place to consider “issues of jurisdiction and expediency” was when assessing whether it was appropriate to grant relief under s 26(1)(a). Section 26(2) was borrowed from s 25(2) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (UK), which apparently responded “to the jurisdictional conditions of the Brussels I Regulation” (see Mortensen, cited above, at 71).

In the context of freezing injunctions, an explicit rationale for granting interim relief in aid of foreign proceedings has been that the relief preserves the assisting court’s ability to enforce the foreign court’s final judgment (see Broad Idea International Ltd v Convoy Collateral Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, [2023] AC 389). This is consistent with the function of freezing injunctions more generally, which are designed to facilitate the enforcement of a judgment for the payment of a sum of money by preventing the dissipation of assets against which the judgment could potentially be enforced. Interim anti-suit injunctions are not, of course, the same as freezing injunctions. But there may be value here, too, in looking ahead to the enforcement stage. Under the TPPA, any final judgment from the New Zealand court was likely to be registrable in Australia, including a judgment for a final injunction. In a way, it might be ironic, therefore, if the jurisdictional requirements of s 26 somehow prevented the Australian court from preserving its ability to give meaningful relief at the enforcement stage.

Une administration communale peut interdire, de façon générale et indifférenciée, aux membres de son personnel le port visible, sur le lieu de travail, de tout signe révélant, notamment, des convictions philosophiques ou religieuses, juge la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE).

Sur la boutique Dalloz Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Le droit pénal européen vise à renforcer la coopération entre les États membres pour garantir une réponse collective à la criminalité transfrontalière dans l’Union européenne. La création d’un espace de justice pénale européen favorise la confiance mutuelle entre les systèmes judiciaires des États membres. Cet épisode aborde entre autres, le Mandat d’Arrêt Européen, les garanties procédurales dans les procédures pénales de l’UE, le nouveau règlement relatif à la preuve électronique, le Parquet européen, etc.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit pénal international Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Singapore acceded to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (‘Service Convention’) on 16 May 2023. It has now entered into force in Singapore on 1 December 2023. Two declarations were lodged: first, against Article 8(1) objecting to the direct service of judicial documents upon persons in Singapore through foreign diplomatic or consular agents unless the documents are to be served upon a national of the State from which the documents originate; and secondly, objecting to service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in Singapore by the methods of transmission set out in Article 10. These methods are:

‘a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,

b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination,

c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.’

The enactment was accompanied by amendments to the Rules of Court 2021, Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021 and Family Justice Rules 2014.

Service of Singapore process through the Convention will help ease the procedure in civil law countries, which may view service of foreign process as raising sovereignty issues. It will also ensure that enforcement of the resulting Singapore judgment in that country may not be challenged on the ground that process was served in a manner which breached that country’s fundamental principles on service of documents (eg, Art 9(b)(ii) of the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention).

In other aspects though, the procedure is now more cumbersome under the Convention. Parties may agree on service by post in most common law countries, including Singapore. Thus, it is unclear why the declaration of objection against postal service was lodged. Now, service of process of a Contracting State in Singapore will all have to be channelled through the Central Authority.

 

The last month of 2023 will be a quiet one at the Court of Justice (in PIL terms). As of today, just a hearing and the delivery of an opinion are scheduled.

The hearing in the German case C-35/23, Greislzel, will take place on Thursday 7 December at 9.30 am. The request for a preliminary ruling, lodged in January 2023, addresses the interpretation of Articles 10 and 11 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (Brussels IIa). The Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main (Higher Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main, Germany) is asking:

To what extent is the regulatory mechanism provided for in Article 10 and Article 11 of the Brussels IIa Regulation limited to proceedings conducted in the context of relations between EU Member States? More specifically:

1. 1. Does Article 10 of the Brussels IIa Regulation apply, with the effect that the jurisdiction of the courts in the former State of residence is retained, if the child had his or her habitual residence in an EU Member State (Germany) before his or her removal and the return proceedings under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (‘the HCAC’) were conducted between an EU Member State (Poland) and a third State (Switzerland) and, in those proceedings, the return of the child was refused?

If question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

1. 2. In the context of Article 10(b)(i) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, what requirements are to be imposed for the purposes of establishing continuing jurisdiction?
   3. Does Article 11 (6) to (8) of the Brussels IIa Regulation also apply in the case of return proceedings implemented under the HCAC in the context of relations between a third State and an EU Member State, as a State of refuge, in so far as the child had his or her habitual residence in another EU member state before the removal?

In the case at hand, a child, born to a German-Polish couple in Switzerland, had been living in Germany with her mother since she was some months old before the two moved to Poland. The father, who remained in Switzerland, had consented to the relocation, but (so he claims) only for some time. Afterwards he applied via the Swiss Central Authority (Federal Office of Justice in Bern) for the return of the child to Switzerland under the 1980 Hague Convention. The District Court for Krakow-Nowa Huta in Krakow, Poland, rejected the application. At a later stage, he lodged a new claim for the return of the child to Switzerland with the German Federal Office of Justice in Bonn, although he did not continue to pursue it. Finally, he applied in Germany for the transfer of sole parental custody of the child and, in the alternative, for the right to determine the place of residence. He also requested that the mother be ordered to return the child to him in Switzerland as of the effective date of the decision.

The request has been allocated to a chamber of five judges, with Mme L.S. Rossi reporting. AG M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona will deliver an opinion beginning of next year.

In addition, AG N. Emilou’s opinion in C-90/22, Gjensidige, expected some time ago, will most probably be published on 14 December.

On Wednesday, 13 December 2023, the comité de redaction of the Revue de droit international et de droit comparé will be hosting a webinar to celebrate the 100th issue of the journal. It will be dedicated to Les relations entre le droit comparé, l’identité nationale et le colonialisme and have the following programme:

• 17h30 : Accueil, par Guy Keutgen, directeur de la Revue 
• 17h40 : Présentation du numéro spécial et des orateurs, par Wim Decock et Henri Culot, coordinateurs du numéro spécial
• 17h50 :  « Pour un droit comparé décolonial », par Lena Salaymeh, professeure, University of Oxford et École Pratique des Hautes Études (Paris Sciences et Lettres)
• 18h10 : « L’ethnoconstitutionnalisme : signification et limites », par Éric M. Ngango Youmbi, professeur, Université de Garoua (Cameroun)
• 18h30 : Conclusion, par Henri Culot, rédacteur en chef de la Revue

The event will be open to all participants and free of charge, but registration is required.