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Responsabilité délictuelle ou quasi délictuelle

The author of this post is Giulio Monga, a PhD student at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan. The editors of the EAPIL blog encourage scholars and practitioners to share their views on the Court’s judgment and its implications. Those interested in submitting guest posts are invited to get in touch with the blog editors at blog@eapil.org. 

On 16 July 2020 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment on the Schrems II case (a press release is available here). The ruling is part of the judicial saga between Facebook and the Austrian data protection advocate Max Schrems relating to transfers of personal data from the EU to the US. It follows the judgment of 2015 whereby the CJEU invalidated the so-called ‘Safe Harbour’, later replaced by the ‘EU-US Privacy Shield’, the adequacy of which had been established by the European Commission by a Decision of 2016.

The facts

Max Schrems lodged a complaint against Facebook Ireland Ltd. before the Irish Supervisory Authority (the Data Protection Commissioner, DPC) over the transfer of personal data relating to him by Facebook Ireland to Facebook Inc., the latter’s parent company established in the US.

In particular, Mr Schrems claimed that the inclusion of the controller-to-processor Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) approved by the EU Commission through Decision 2010/87 in a data transfer processing agreement between Facebook Ireland, acting as a controller with the meaning of Article 4(7) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and Facebook Inc., acting as a processor with the meaning of Article 4(8) GDPR, did not justify the transfer of the personal data relating to him to the US. Under US law, Schrems argued, Facebook Inc. is required to make the personal data of its users available to US authorities, such as the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the context of surveillance programmes that preclude the exercise of the rights enshrined in Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter). On that basis, Mr Schrems asked that DPC suspend the transfer of data.

The DPC, as well as the referring Irish High Court, noted that it was impossible to adjudicate Mr Schrems’ complaint unless the CJEU examined the validity of the Decision 2010/87. Furthermore, the referring High Court also asked CJEU to rule on the validity of the Decision 2016/1250 establishing the ‘EU-US Privacy Shield’.

The Legal Framework

Pursuant to Articles 25-26 of the repealed Directive 95/46/EC and to Articles 44-50 of the GDPR,  transfer of personal data to a third country may, in principle, take place only if the third country in question ensures an adequate level of data protection.

According to Article 45 GDPR, the Commission may find that a third country ensures, by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments, such an adequate level of protection. With regard to the US, the EU Commission, by Decision 2000/520/EC, firstly established that adequate protection was ensured by companies joining the so-called ‘Safe Harbour’ mechanism, which was invalidated under the first Schrems ruling. Later, with the new adequacy Decision 2016/1250 the EU-US Privacy Shield has been established.

In the absence of an adequacy decision, transfers of personal data to third countries may take place only if the personal data exporter established in the EU has provided appropriate safeguards provided by for Article 46, which may arise, among others, from standard contractual clauses adopted by the EU Commission. Standard Contractual Clauses, depending on the circumstances, might be controller-to-processor SCC such as those used by Facebook Ireland or controller-to-controller SCC approved by EU Commission through Decisions 2001/497/EC and 2004/915/EC.

In addition to the adoption appropriate safeguards, Article 46 GDPR also requires that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available.

The Judgment

The Court began with considering that the GDPR applies to the transfer of personal data for commercial purposes by an economic operator established in a Member State to another economic operator established in a third country, even if, at the time of that transfer or thereafter, that data may be processed by the authorities of the third country in question for the purposes of public security, defence and State security. The Court added that this type of data processing by the authorities of a third country cannot preclude such a transfer from the scope of the GDPR.

As in Schrems I, the CJEU stated that, according to the relevant rules of GDPR, data subjects whose personal data are transferred to a third country pursuant to Standard Contractual Clauses must be afforded a level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU by the GDPR, read in the light of the Charter. The Court specified that

[t]he assessment of the level of protection afforded in the context of such a transfer must, in particular, take into consideration both the contractual clauses agreed between the controller or processor established in the European Union and the recipient of the transfer established in the third country concerned and, as regards any access by the public authorities of that third country to the personal data transferred, the relevant aspects of the legal system of that third country. (para. 105)

The Decision on the Standard Contractual Clauses

In light of the foregoing, the CJEU Court considered that the validity of Decision 2010/78 is not called into question by the mere fact that the SCC therein approved do not bind the authorities of the third country to which data may be transferred. In fact,

[t]hat validity depends, however, on whether, in accordance with the requirement of Article 46(1) and Article 46(2)(c) of the GDPR, interpreted in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter, such a standard clauses decision incorporates effective mechanisms that make it possible, in practice, to ensure compliance with the level of protection required by EU law and that transfers of personal data pursuant to the clauses of such a decision are suspended or prohibited in the event of the breach of such clauses or it being impossible to honour them. (para. 137)

The CJEU found that Decision 2010/87 establishes such mechanisms. Namely, the CJEU pointed out that the decision imposes an obligation on a data exporter and the recipient of the data to verify, prior to any transfer, whether that level of protection is respected in the third country concerned and that the decision requires the recipient to inform the data exporter of any inability to comply with the standard data protection clauses, the latter being, in turn, obliged to suspend the transfer of data and/or to terminate the contract with the former. The Court concluded that nothing affected the validity of Decision 2010/87.

The Invalidation of EU-US Privacy Shield

Lastly, the CJEU examines the validity of Decision 2016/1250 establishing the EU-US Privacy Shield.

In that regard, the CJEU notes that that Decision enshrines the position, as did Decision 2000/520, that the requirements of US national security, public interest and law enforcement have primacy, thus condoning interference with the fundamental rights of persons whose data are transferred under the Privacy Shield framework.

In the view of the Court,

[t]he limitations on the protection of personal data arising from the domestic law of the United States on the access and use by US public authorities of such data transferred from the European Union to the United States, which the Commission assessed in the Privacy Shield Decision, are not circumscribed in a way that satisfies requirements that are essentially equivalent to those required, under EU law, by the second sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter. (para. 185)

The Court pointed out that, in respect of certain surveillance programmes, those provisions do not indicate any limitations on the power they confer to implement those programmes, or the existence of guarantees for potentially targeted non-US persons. The Court adds that, although those provisions lay down requirements with which the US authorities must comply when implementing the surveillance programmes in question, the provisions do not grant data subjects actionable rights before the courts against the US authorities.

The Ombudsperson mechanism

As regards the requirement of judicial protection, the CJEU focused its reasoning on the Ombudsperson mechanism provided for by the EU-US Privacy Shield Decision, which the EU Commission found as capable to ensure data subjects with level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.

The CJEU stressed that data subjects must be given an opportunity to seise an independent and impartial court in order to have access to their personal data, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data.

The CJEU observed in particular that the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson,

[a]lthough described as ‘independent from the Intelligence Community’, was presented as ‘[reporting] directly to the Secretary of State who will ensure that the Ombudsperson carries out its function objectively and free from improper influence that is liable to have an effect on the response to be provided’. (para. 195)

Furthermore, the CJEU noted that nothing in Decision 2016/1250 indicates that the dismissal or revocation of the appointment of the Ombudsperson is accompanied by any particular guarantees, which is such as to undermine the Ombudsman’s independence from the executive.

Similarly, the Court, noted that

[a]lthough recital 120 of the Privacy Shield Decision refers to a commitment from the US Government that the relevant component of the intelligence services is required to correct any violation of the applicable rules detected by the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, there is nothing in that decision to indicate that that ombudsperson has the power to adopt decisions that are binding on those intelligence services and does not mention any legal safeguards that would accompany that political commitment on which data subjects could rely.

The CJEU found that

[t]he Ombudsperson mechanism to which the Privacy Shield Decision refers does not provide any cause of action before a body which offers the persons whose data is transferred to the United States guarantees essentially equivalent to those required by Article 47 of the Charter.

In light of the foregoing, the CJEU invalidated Decision 2016/1250 on EU-US Privacy Shield.

The ruling is expected to have a very significant impact on the transfer of personal data from the EU to third countries.

Concerning the immediate effects of the judgment, the Court made the following remarks:

As to whether it is appropriate to maintain the effects of that decision for the purposes of avoiding the creation of a legal vacuum … the Court notes that, in any event, in view of Article 49 of the GDPR, the annulment of an adequacy decision such as the Privacy Shield Decision is not liable to create such a legal vacuum. That article details the conditions under which transfers of personal data to third countries may take place in the absence of an adequacy decision under Article 45(3) of the GDPR or appropriate safeguards under Article 46 of the GDPR (para. 202).

I reviewed Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-73/19 Belgische Staat v Movic BV et al here. The CJEU held this morning. At the time of posting an English version of the judgment was not yet available. The case at issue concerns enforcement of Belgium’s unfair trading act by the public authorities of the Member State. Movic BV of The Netherlands and the others defendants practices ticket touting: resale of tickets for leisure events.

The court is more succinct than the AG in its analysis yet refers repeatedly to points made by Szpunar AG without itself therefore having to refer to so extensive an analysis.

The fact that a power was introduced by a law is not, in itself, decisive in order to conclude that the State acted in the exercise of State authority (at 52). Neither does the pursuit of the general interest automatically involve the exercise of public powers (at 53). With respect to the authorities’ powers of investigation, it would seem that the Court like the AG reads (at 57) C‑49/12 Sunico as meaning that to exclude proceedings from the scope of ‘civil and commercial matters’, it must be determined, in concreto, whether the public authority uses evidence which it has in its possession as a result of its public powers of investigation, hence putting it in a different position as a person governed by private law in analogous proceedings. Collecting evidence in the same way as a private person or a consumer association could, does not fall within that category (at 58).

Neither the request for penalty payments nor an application for an injunction makes the proceedings drop out off Brussels Ia: both instruments are available to private parties, too. That is not however the case for the observation of continued infringement by mere civil servant oath as opposed to bailiff certification. This, the Court holds like the AG, does amount to exercise of public authority (at 62) however (at 63) that element alone escapes BIA, it does not so taint the other part of the proceedings.

As I noted in my review of first Advocate General Szpunar’s Opinion, the need for highly factual considerations sits uneasily with the Regulation’s expressed DNA of predictability. However this squares with the CJEU case-law on ‘civil and commercial’. 

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Heading 2, Heading 2.2.

Back in February we reported on the Opinion presented by Advocate General Tanchev in case C-249/19, JE. Today the Court of Justice rendered its Judgment in which it confirms the interpretation provided in the Opinion.

As a reminder, the question referred to the Court of Justice originated in the proceedings pending before the Romanian courts dealing with a petition for divorce. The parties to these proceedings are Romanian nationals, habitually resident in Italy.

In these circumstances, under Article 8(a) of the Rome III Regulation, it is a priori Italian law that governs the grounds of divorce. According to Italian law, the dissolution of marriage can be pronounced only where there had been a legal separation of the spouses and at least three years have passed between this separation and the time at which the court have been seized by the applicant.

Seized of a petition for divorce, the first instance court considered that since no provision is made for legal separation proceedings under Romanian law, such proceedings must be conducted before the Italian courts and therefore any application to that effect made before the Romanian courts is inadmissible.

Yet, seized of an appeal lodged by the applicant, the second instance court focused on Article 10 of the Regulation that states, inter alia, ‘[w]here the law applicable […]  makes no provision for divorce […], the law of the forum shall apply’. That court referred a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court asking, in essence, whether Italian law could be disapplied under Article 10.

In his Opinion presented this February, AG Tanchev held that Article 10 of the Rome III Regulation calls for a strict interpretation. The expression ‘where the law applicable pursuant to Article 5 or Article 8 makes no provision for divorce’ relates only to situations in which the applicable foreign law does not recognize the institution of divorce. Italian law should therefore be applied by the Romanian courts. Despite the lack of procedural rules in relation to legal separation, these courts have to verify whether the requirement relating to separation was met.

The Judgment is in line with the Opinion: it confirms that a foreign law can be disapplied on the basis of Article 10 only when that law does not provide for any form of divorce.

As discussed in the initial post, at points 64 to 66, the Opinion seems to qualify the requirement provided for in the Italian law as a ‘procedural condition’. That qualification does not appear explicitly in the Judgment. At paragraph 43, the Judgment convincingly confines itself to stating that the substantive requirement at issue consists on a three years’ separation of the spouses and that the lack of procedural rules in relation to legal separation cannot prevent the Romanian court from verifying whether that requirement is met.

Against this background, at paragraph 40, the Judgment makes a point in the context of effectiveness of the Rome III Regulation. If the application of the requirement provided for in Italian law leads to the situation where the petitions for divorce are being rejected without their examination, the practical effectiveness of the uniform conflict of laws rules on divorce is undermined. I deem the references to the effectiveness/effet utile to be highly interesting. See paragraph 20 of the Judgment in Bier for one of the earliest occurrences of such reference. The Judgment in JE is yet another example: it presents a noteworthy take on the interaction between effet utile and conflict of laws rules. It will be interesting to see whether and how that specific line of argument will be developed in the future.

Région de Bruxelles-Capitale / Commission
Agriculture
L’avocat général Bobek préconise une interprétation plus ouverte des critères de l’affectation directe

YouTube
Liberté d'établissement
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, en l’état actuel du droit de l’Union, les exploitants de plateformes en ligne, telles que YouTube et Uploaded, ne sont pas directement responsables de la mise en ligne illégale d’œuvres protégées effectuée par les utilisateurs de ces plateformes

État belge (Regroupement familial - Enfant mineur)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La date à prendre en compte, pour déterminer si un membre de la famille d’un regroupant familial est un « enfant mineur », est la date de présentation de la demande d’entrée et de séjour

Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Les États membres doivent accorder une indemnisation à toute victime d’une infraction intentionnelle violente, y compris à celles résidant sur leur propre territoire

AFMB e.a.
Sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants
L’employeur de chauffeurs de poids lourds salariés dans le transport international routier est l’entreprise de transport qui exerce l’autorité effective sur ces chauffeurs, supporte leur charge salariale et dispose du pouvoir effectif de les licencier

Commission / Roumanie (Lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux)
Ressources propres des Communautés
La Roumanie et l’Irlande sont condamnées à payer à la Commission, respectivement, une somme forfaitaire d’un montant de 3 000 000 euros et de 2 000 000 euros

Facebook Ireland et Schrems
Rapprochement des législations
La Cour invalide la décision 2016/1250 relative à l'adéquation de la protection assurée par le bouclier de protection des données UE-États-Unis

Bundeszentralamt Fur Steuern (Being the Federal Central Tax Office of the Federal Republic of Germany) & Ors v Heis & Ors [2019] EWHC 705 (Ch) was held in March 2019 bit only came unto BAILII recently and had not caught my attention before.

The primary question raised is whether appeals by the applicants, the German Federal Tax Office (“the GTA”) and by Deutsche Bank AG (“DB”) against the rejection by the Joint Special Administrators (“the Administrators”) of MF Global UK Limited (“MFGUK”) of their respective proofs of debt, to allow the underlying claim which forms the subject of the proof to be resolved by the specialist German tax or fiscal courts, which both the applicants (for different reasons) contend are the natural forum for the determination of the claims and the forum in which they can be resolved most efficiently.

The underlying issue concerns German withholding tax.

The GTA has at all times maintained that its claim should be determined in Germany by the German tax courts, per the UK-Germany double taxation Treaty, based on the OECD model convention (for those in the know: it is Article 28(6) which the GTA has suggested exclusively reserves its GTA Claim to the German Courts). However it felt compelled to submit a proof in MFGUK’s UK administration proceedings in order to preserve its rights.

Under German law, it is within the GTA’s power to give a decision on MFGUK’s objection to relvant Amended Tax Assessment Notices. If and when it did so, it would then be for MFGUK, if it wished to pursue the matter further, to file an appeal against that decision by the GTA with the Fiscal Court of Cologne. The Fiscal Court of Cologne is one of the 18 fiscal courts in Germany which are the courts of first instance for tax matters. That seems a natural course to take however here the GTA is caught in a conundrum: at 18: the GTA has not yet formally rejected MFGUK’s objection. This is because such objection would establish proceedings in Germany, and there is a procedural rule of German law that, in order to prevent parallel proceedings, a German court will automatically defer to the court first seized of a matter. Accordingly, it seems likely that if the GTA were to reject MFGUK’s objection before the Stay Application has been decided by the UK Court, on any appeal by MFGUK, the Fiscal Court of Cologne might as a matter of comity defer to this Court in order to avoid parallel proceedings.

At 57: Brussels Ia is not engaged for the case concerns both the insolvency and the tax exclusion of Articles 1.1 and 1.2.b. At 56 Hildyard J considers the issues under English rules on the power to stay, with a focus on the risk of irreconcilable judgments.

At 84 Hildyard J holds that the GTA read too much into A28(6) and that there is no exclusive jurisdiction, leaving the consideration of whether a stay might be attractive nevertheless (at 89 ff the issue is discussed whether German courts could at all entertain the claim). This leads to an assessment pretty much like a stay under Brussels Ia as ‘related’ (rather than: the same, to which lis alibi pendens applies) cases. Note at 87(6) the emphasis which the GTA places on the actual possibility of consolidating the cases – similar to the arguments used in BIa A33-34 cases such as Privatbank and later cases).

At 115 the impact of this case having public law impacts becomes clear: ‘It seems to me that, despite my hunch that there will also be considerable factual enquiry, and a factual determination of the particular circumstances may determine the result …, the legal issues at stake are not only plainly matters of German law, but controversial and complex issues of statutory construction of systemic importance and substantial public interest in terms of the legitimate interests of the public in the protection of its taxation system from what are alleged to be colourable schemes.’

And at 116, referring ia to VTB Capital v Nutritek, ‘the risk of inconsistent decisions in concurrent proceedings in different jurisdictions, is the more acute when in one of the jurisdictions the issue is a systemic one, or may be decided in a manner which has systemic consequences. Especially in such a context, there is a preference for a case to be heard by the courts of the country whose law applies.’ Reference to VTB is made in particular with resepect to the point that Gleichlauf (the application by a court of its own laws) is to be promoted in particular (at [46] in VTB per Lord Mance: “it is generally preferable, other things being equal, that a case should be tried in a country whose law applies. However, this factor is of particular force if issues of law are likely to be important and if there is evidence of relevant differences in the legal principles or rules applicable to such issues in the two countries in contention as the appropriate forum.’

At 117: ‘even if the factual centre of gravity may be London, the jurisdiction likely to be most affected by the result is Germany: and even if the US approach of ‘interest analysis’ is not determinative in this jurisdiction it does not seem to me to be an impermissible consideration.’

Held, at 121, there is here ‘a sufficiently “rare and compelling” reason for granting the stay sought by the GTA, provided that the German Fiscal Court are an available forum in which to determine the substance of the disputes.’ At 122 Hildyard J seeks assurances ‘insofar as the parties’ best endeavours can secure it, resolution of both the GTA Claim and the Later MFGUK Refund Claim as expeditiously as possible. That seems to me necessary in order to safeguard this jurisdictions’ insolvency processes and for the protection of the interests of the body of creditors as a whole.’

Then follows at 131 ff extensive analysis of the impact of this stay decision on the related case of Deutsche Bank, with at 190 a summary of the issues to be decided. Held at 218: ‘By careful selection of potentially dispositive issues, I consider that there is some prospect of that process enabling a determination without recourse to the intricacies of German tax law which are to be decided in the context of the GTA Claim; whereas an immediate stay guarantees a long delay before this court can determine the matter, based on presently hypothetical claims, after a long wait for non-binding guidance from the German court which may result from other cases to which DB is not a party.’ However at 219 the prospect of a stay after all is held out, should a quick resolution of those issues not be possible.

Most interesting.

Geert.

 

A fine example of the public /private divide, and forum conveniens in international litigation.
Application for a stay to allow underlying claim to be resolved by DE fiscal courts.
BIa not engaged: tax and insolvency exemption.
Engages OECD rules and double taxation treaty. https://t.co/Z4WA1h4Dtq

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 15, 2020

On 14 July 2020, Austria ratified the 1965 Hague Service Convention. The Convention is set to enter into force for Austria on 12 September 2020. All EU Member States will then be be bound by the Convention. In practice, the latter will apply in  the relationship between the (Members States of the) EU, one the one hand, and some fifty more States worldwide, on the other.

The Austrian ratification comes more than four years after the Council of the European Union issued a decision authorising Austria to sign and ratify, and Malta to accede to, the Convention ‘in the interest of the European Union’.

The Council decision reflects the fact that, as stated in the preamble, the Union ‘has external competence with regard to the Convention in so far as its provisions affect the rules laid down in certain provisions of Union legislation or in so far as the accession of additional Member States to the Convention alters the scope of certain provisions of Union legislation’, such as Article 28(4) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Still, the Convention ‘does not allow for participation by regional economic integration organisations such as the Union’, meaning that, to make sure that the Convention is in force for all Member States, the Union had no other option but to authorise (and in fact request) the Member States that had not yet done so, to ratify – or accede to, depending on the circumstances – the Convention in the interest of the Union itself.

The Convention is already applicable to Malta as of 17 July 2018.

This Call for Paper is for an edited volume, the working title of which is: Public International Law and Private International Law: Charting a blurry boundary – towards convergence or still divergence?

The editors, Dr Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit (of the University of Tasmania) and Dharmita Prasad (of Jindal Global Law School), are in negotiation with Springer Nature Pte Ltd for this edited volume.

Both editors would like to invite you to contribute a chapter in this edited volume focusing on addressing intersectionality between public international law and private international law. Further details are provided in the concept note below.

 

Tentative Timeline:

• 5 August 2020 – A proposed title of your paper along with a 300-word abstract are to be sent to editors – sooksripaisarnkit@utas.edu.au; dprasad@jgu.edu.in
• 10 August 2020 – Editors will be in touch with selected authors advising each of them of the decision that their proposed paper is accepted for this edited volume.
• 31 August 2020 – Editors will finalise their proposal to Springer Pte Ltd
• 17 July 2021 – First draft of the chapter to be sent to editors
• August 2021 – Editors review all drafts and provide comments / request respective authors to review their chapter
• September 2021 – Editors are to submit manuscript to Springer
• December 2021 / January 2022 – Tentative release of the book

 

Editors:

Dr Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit – Lecturer in Maritime Law, Australian Maritime College, University of Tasmania, E-mail: poomintr.sooksripaisarnkit@utas.edu.au

Dharmita Prasad – Lecturer, Jindal Global Law School, E-mail: dprasad@jgu.edu.in

Concept Note

International law has a long history which can be traced back to over thousands of years ago with developments of modern international law took their starting point from the consequence of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 whereby the concept of nation state emerged. Along with the rise of legal positivism, international law became perceived as the body of law dealing with external aspects of States or, in other words, with relationships between States. Private disputes with foreign elements were gradually taken out of the scope of international law and students of private international law subject have since been taught of it as a domestic private law dealing with cases or disputes involving foreign elements. Public international law and private international law seemingly diverge.

Still, relationships and interactions between public international law and private international law have led to endless debates. Courts in considering what seemingly private international law cases from time to time have to touch on public international law issues. For example, the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Democratic Republic of Congo and Others v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] HKCFA 41; (2011) HKCFAR 95 had to deal with the concept of sovereign immunity in a case which was essentially an enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Likewise, the issue of sovereign immunity is likely to come up again in a class action lawsuit brought against the People’s Republic of China by thousands of American citizens claiming damages following the COVID-19 outbreak. Relevant to the COVID-19 outbreak, different countries have adopted different measures in an attempt to contain the virus, including closing borders, travel bans, compulsory quarantine, etc. Applying some or all of these measures will bring further complication in terms of potential issues or arguments involving possible frustration of international contracts. Within the scope of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), this involves the consideration of the scope of the force majeure and hardship provision in Article 79. Indeed, international instruments like the CISG present examples of attempts at avoiding private international law issues via public international law instruments. European experiences in negotiating instruments such as the Brussels Regime or wider international experiences in negotiating instruments under the auspices of international organisations such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law only point to the turning of conflict of law matters into international relations. These are some of the issues which highlight the blurry line between public international law and private international law.

This book seeks to contribute to existing debates by focusing its study on the boundary / intersectionality between pubic international law and private international law. In doing so, it seeks contribution for any work which falls within one of the following themes:

• Historical and Theoretical consideration of the boundary between public international law and private international law
• Harmonisation of private international law by public international law instruments – evaluation of process, problems, and effectiveness
• Practical consideration / Case Study of public international law consideration in private international law cases
• Future trends on relationships and interactions between public international law and private international law: towards convergence or still divergence?

Dix millions d’euros par semestre de retard, l’astreinte la plus élevée qu’aura à payer l’État pour le contraindre à exécuter une décision de 2017 en matière d’environnement. Ce faisant, lie Conseil d’État crée un mécanisme novateur d’affectation de l’astreinte.

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Par cette décision de non conformité totale à effet différé, le Conseil constitutionnel reproche au législateur d’avoir permis le maintien à l’isolement ou en contention en psychiatrie au-delà d’une certaine durée sans contrôle du juge judiciaire.

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