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Another day and another application for a stay on the basis of Article 30 Brussels Ia. Lopesan Touristik SA v Apollo European Principal Finance Fund III (Dollar A) L.P. & Ors [2020] EWHC 2642 (Comm) engages a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) between Lopesan as seller and Spanish company Oldavia as buyer, for Lopesan’s interest in the Buenaventura hotel in Spain. The Hotel is owned by Creative Hotel Buenaventura SAU.

Oldavia is a special purpose vehicle through which Apollo, who are private equity interests, acquired the Hotel for c.€93 million. That funding commitment was reflected in the terms of an Equity Commitment Letter (ECL), under which Apollo promised Oldavia, on the terms and conditions set out in the ECL, to provide it with the funding required to complete the SPA, which obligation was expressly made enforceable by Lopesan under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.

The SPA is governed by Spanish law and contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Spanish courts. The ECL is governed by English law and contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts.

Completion did not take place, and there are disputes between Lopesan and Oldavia as to whether Oldavia was or is obliged to complete under the SPA.

On 12 August 2020, Lopesan commenced proceedings against Oldavia in Madrid seeking specific performance of Oldavia’s obligation to complete under the SPA. Parties agree that those proceedings will not be determined for at least 12 months. On 20 August 2020, Lopesan wrote to Apollo seeking confirmations and undertakings intended to ensure that, if the specific performance claim against Oldavia succeeded, Apollo would provide the funds to Oldavia to allow completion to occur. Apollo disputed that Oldavia was under any obligation to complete, and as a result that it was under any corresponding obligation to put Oldavia in funds to enable it to complete.

On 15 September 2020 Lopesan then issued proceedings seeking to enforce its rights as a third party beneficiary under the ECL by way of an order for specific performance of Apollo’s obligation to put Oldavia in funds. Lopesan also issued an application for a speedy trial of that action to ensure judgment was delivered before 1 January 2021: there is a potential argument that Apollo’s obligations will lapse on 1 January 2021, even if, before that date, Oldavia came under a legal obligation to complete the SPA.

Apollo seek a stay of the proceedings under A30(1) BIa.

At 47 Foxton J refers to the Privatbank /EuroEco discussion which he summarises as ‘whether actions are related for the purposes of A30 only when the actions can in fact be heard and determined together, or whether actions are related where they would be heard and determined together but for some external factor (such as exclusive jurisdiction agreements or subject-matter limits on the jurisdiction of a particular court) which prevents this.’ Effective v theoretical hearing together, in other words. He sides with Privatbank but also accepts, with reference to Privatbank, that a practical inability to achieve an outcome where both cases are heard and determined together will be a factor which weighs against granting a stay as a matter of the discretion which Article 30 grants the judge, and that “absent some strong, countervailing factor, the fact that proceedings cannot be consolidated and heard together will be a compelling reason for refusing a stay”.

Further, and with reference to The Alexandros and to Generali v Pelagic Fisheries, where the factor which prevents the two actions being heard together is an exclusive jurisdiction clause, that of itself will constitute a powerful (although not insuperable) factor against staying proceedings which have been brought in the parties’ chosen jurisdiction pending the determination of proceedings elsewhere. At 50 he holds that this is a factor even when the other proceedings have themselves not been commenced in breach of contract.

At 57 Foxton J points that neither the relatedness of the actions nor that the Spanish court is first seised, are disputed. Relatedness exists given that any issue arising in the English proceedings which concerns the issue of whether Oldavia was obliged to complete the SPA necessarily arises in Spain. He then holds that the degree of relatedness is high and that the Spanish courts have much closer proximity to the subject matter of the case, involving, as it does, issues as to the effect of Covid-19 and the Spanish government’s response to it on a Spanish hotel, and the legal effects of those and other matters on a contract governed by Spanish law. However, at 58, if the English proceedings are stayed, it will not be possible to hear and determine the claims in the English and Spanish proceedings together, given the conflicting exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the ECL and the SPA. The decision (whether on issues of law or fact) in the Spanish proceedings would not be binding in the English proceedings, although if Lopesan fails in the Spanish proceedings, that will in practice be determinative of the English proceedings. Findings of law in the Spanish proceedings will also have a strong evidential value in the English proceedings.

Nevertheless, the significance of the English jurisdiction clause and the practical impossibility to hear the claims together in the Spanish courts, make him decide at 60 ff against a stay. His judgment displays the characteristic support of the English courts and English law for party autonomy: parties have deliberately structured the transaction so that claims under the ECL would be heard in a different jurisdiction to claims under the SPA. Consider his reasoning at 61:

That choice having been made, no doubt for good commercial reasons, and the events which have transpired being a scenario which must have been squarely within the parties’ contemplation, it would take a very strong case to justify staying proceedings brought as of right here pending the outcome of proceedings in another jurisdiction. The closer proximity of the Spanish courts to the dispute, nor its status as the natural forum to determine issues of Spanish law, are not sufficient to justify a stay, both because this must have been obvious to the parties when they put this arrangement in place, and because the parties expressly agreed not to raise any objections to proceedings in England on the ground that proceedings have been brought in an inconvenient forum. I do not suggest that this last factor is determinative or that it precludes an Article 30(1) stay. There is a public, as well as a purely private, interest in avoiding irreconcilable judgments within the Brussels Recast regime. However, the factor that the parties wanted the dispute to be determined in their chosen forum regardless of whether another court might be a more convenient forum is a factor which weighs in the balance against a stay.

A relevant judgment.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law – 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5. Third edition forthcoming February 2021

 

I.a. application (dismissed) for a stay under A30(1) Brussels Ia.
Foxton J holding that the proceedings in Spain are related however no risk of irreconcalibility. https://t.co/gAeqYZNeEI

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 8, 2020

On 20 October 2020, the European Parliament adopted a resolution with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence. These recommendations include a suggested regulation on liability for the operation of Artificial Intelligence-systems. Article 9 confirms the previous JURI Report (see this blog on 12 May 2020): “Civil liability claims brought in accordance with Article 8(1) shall be subject, in relation to limitation periods as well as the amounts and the extent of compensation, to the laws of the Member State in which the harm or damage occurred”.

Unfortunately, the exact nature of some key provisions such as Article 2, or the relationship between the suggested regulation as a whole and Rome II, remain unclear and different interpretations could usefully be clarified. It remains to be seen whether the European Commission will shed some light on this point when drafting the official proposal for the regulation.

See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0276_EN.pdf

La CJUE ne qualifie pas automatiquement d’aides d’État le dispositif  français de responsabilité élargie des producteurs pour la gestion des déchets issus de produits textiles, du linge de maison et des chaussures. La filière REP, qui retenait son souffle, peut respirer.

en lire plus

En cas de sortie volontaire de la personne visée par un premier MAE du territoire de l’État d’émission, suivie du retour forcé de cette personne sur la base d’un second MAE, la protection conférée par la règle de spécialité au titre du premier MAE s’avère inopérante.

en lire plus

A rather strange ‘amendment’ to the French version of Brussels II ter was published two days ago at the OJEU: Rectificatif au règlement (UE) 2019/1111 du Conseil du 25 juin 2019 relatif à la compétence, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière matrimoniale et en matière de responsabilité parentale, ainsi qu’à l’enlèvement international d’enfants, OJEU L 347, 20.10.2020, p. 52–160 (FR), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2020.347.01.0052.01.FRA&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2020%3A347%3ATOC

In reality, a new version of the entire Regulation is provided, far from the single amendment the title may suggest. As the readers from this blog will know, a few days ago, a corrigendum to Brussels I bis in some linguistic versions has been published. What’s next and why are the corrections only published now, even if later is better than never?

Rejet

Bail commercial

Bail commercial

On 20 October 2020, the European Parliament adopted – with a large margin – a resolution with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence (AI). The text of this resolution is available here; on other issues of AI that are part of a larger regulatory package, see the Parliament’s press release here. The draft regulation (DR) proposed in the resolution is noteworthy from a choice-of-law perspective because it introduces new, specific conflicts rules for artificial intelligence (AI) (on the general issues of AI and PIL, see the conference report by Stefan Arnold here). With regard to substantive law, the draft regulation distinguishes between legally defined high-risk AI systems (Art. 4 DR) and other AI systems involving a lower risk (Art. 8 DR). For high-risk AI systems, the draft regulation would introduce an independent set of substantive rules providing for strict liability of the system’s operator (Art. 4 DR). Further provisions deal with the amount of compensation (Art. 5 DR), the extent of compensation (Art. 6 DR) and the limitation period (Art. 7 DR). The spatial scope of those autonomous rules on strict liability for high-risk AI systems is determined by Article 2 DR, which reads as follows:

“1.        This Regulation applies on the territory of the Union where a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by an AI-system has caused harm or damage to the life, health, physical integrity of a natural person, to the property of a natural or legal person or has caused significant immaterial harm resulting in a verifiable economic loss.

2. Any agreement between an operator of an AI-system and a natural or legal person who suffers harm or damage because of the AI-system, which circumvents or limits the rights and obligations set out in this Regulation, concluded before or after the harm or damage occurred, shall be deemed null and void as regards the rights and obligations laid down in this Regulation.
3. This Regulation is without prejudice to any additional liability claims resulting from contractual relationships, as well as from regulations on product liability, consumer protection, anti-discrimination, labour and environmental protection between the operator and the natural or legal person who suffered harm or damage because of the AI-system and that may be brought against the operator under Union or national law.”

The unilateral conflicts rule found in Art. 2(1) DR would prevail over the Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual relations pursuant to Art. 27 Rome II, which states that the Rome II Regulation shall not prejudice the application of provisions of EU law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to non-contractual obligations. Insofar, it must be noted that Art. 2(1) DR deviates considerably from the choice-of-law framework of Rome II. While Art. 2(1) DR reflects the lex loci damni approach enshrined as the general conflicts rule in the Rome II Regulation (Art. 4 Rome II), one must not overlook the fact that product liability is subject to a special conflicts rule, i.e. Art. 5 Rome II, which is considerably friendlier to the victim of a tort than the general conflicts rule. Recital 20 Rome II states that “[t]he conflict-of-law rule in matters of product liability should meet the objectives of fairly spreading the risks inherent in a modern high-technology society, protecting consumers’ health, stimulating innovation, securing undistorted competition and facilitating trade”. In order to achieve these purposes, the Rome II Regulation opts for a cascade of connections, starting with the law of the country in which the person sustaining the damage has his or her habitual residence when the damage occurred, provided that the product was marketed in that country (Art. 5(1)(a) Rome II). If that connection fails because the product was not marketed there, the law of the country in which the product was acquired governs, again provided that the product was marketed in this state (Art. 5(1)(b) Rome II). Finally, if that fails as well, the Regulation returns to the lex loci damni under Art. 5(1)(c) Rome II, if the product was marketed there. This cascade of connections is evidently influenced by the desire to protect the mobile consumer from being confronted with a law that may be purely accidental from his point of view because it has neither a relationship with the legal environment that he is accustomed to (his habitual residence) nor to the place where he decided to expose himself to the danger possibly emanating from the product (place of acquisition). The rule reflects the presumption that most consumers will be affected by a defective product in the country where they are habitually resident. Insofar, Art. 2(1) DR is, in comparison with the Rome II Regulation, friendlier to the operator of a high-risk AI system than to the consumer.

Even if one limits the comparison between Art. 2(1) DR and the Rome II Regulation to the latter’s general rule (Art. 4 Rome II), it is striking that the DR does not adopt familiar approaches that allow for deviating from a strict adherence to lex loci damni. Contrary to Art. 4(2) Rome II, where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, Art. 2 DR does not allow to apply the law of that country. Moreover, an escape clause such as Art. 4(3) or Art. 5(2) Rome II is missing in Art. 2 DR. Finally yet importantly, Art. 2(2) DR bars any party autonomy with regard to strict liability for a high-risk AI system, which deviates strongly from the liberal approach found in Art. 14 Rome II.

Apart from the operator’s strict liability for high-risk AI systems, the draft regulation would introduce a fault-based liability rule for other AI systems (Art. 8 DR). In principle, the spatial scope of the latter liability rule would also be determined by Art. 2 DR as already described. However, unlike the comprehensive set of rules on strict liability for high-risk systems, the draft regulation’s model of fault-based liability is not completely autonomous. Rather, the latter type of liability contains important carve-outs regarding the amounts and the extent of compensation as well as the statute of limitations. Pursuant to Art. 9 DR, those issues are left to the domestic laws of the Member States. More precisely, Art. 9 DR provides that

“Civil liability claims brought in accordance with Article 8(1) shall be subject, in relation to limitation periods as well as the amounts and the extent of compensation, to the laws of the Member State in which the harm or damage occurred.”

Thus, we find a lex loci damni approach with regard to fault-based liability as well. Again, all the modern approaches codified in the Rome II Regulation – the cascade of connecting factors for product liability claims, the common habitual residence rule, the escape clause, and party autonomy – are strikingly absent from the draft regulation.

Moreover, the draft regulation, in principle, limits its personal scope to the liability of the operator alone (as legally defined in Art. 3(d)–(f) DR). Recital 9 of the resolution explains that the European Parliament “[c]onsiders that the existing fault-based tort law of the Member States offers in most cases a sufficient level of protection for persons that suffer harm caused by an interfering third party like a hacker or for persons whose property is damaged by such a third party, as the interference regularly constitutes a fault-based action; notes that only for specific cases, including those where the third party is untraceable or impecunious, does the addition of liability rules to complement existing national tort law seem necessary”. Thus, for third parties, the conflicts rules of Rome II would continue to apply.

At first impression, it seems rather strange that a regulation on a very modern technology – artificial intelligence – should deploy a conflicts approach that seems to have more in common with Joseph Beale’s First Restatement of the 1930’s than with the modern and differentiated set of conflicts rules codified by the EU itself at the beginning of the 21st century, i.e. the Rome II Regulation. While the European Parliament’s resolution, in its usual introductory part, diligently enumerates all EU regulations and directives dealing with substantive issues of liability, the Rome II Regulation is not mentioned once in the Recitals. One wonders whether the members of Parliament were aware of the European Union’s acquis in the field of private international law all. In sum, compared with Rome II, the conflicts approach of the draft regulation would be a regrettable step backwards. It remains to be seen how the relationship between the draft regulation and Rome II will be designed and fine-tuned in the further course of legislation.