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By Fieke van Overbeeke, Legal Counsel at the International Institute for International and Foreign Law – the Netherlands and research fellow at the University of Antwerp – Belgium.

On 31 May 2017 the European Commission launched a proposal to adopt a special conflict-of-laws rule that determines (i.a.) which minimum wages apply to the highly mobile cross-border working activities of lorry drivers (COM 2017, 278). After more than three years of heavy debate, this proposal was profoundly modified and the Council and the European Parliament still do not find each other, leaving many aspects to be still worked out (see also the Legislative Train on the European Parliament’s website). The purpose of this piece is to give an overview of the background of this proposal, the current state of affairs and the possible influence of a special conflicts-of-law rule on the sector from a conflict-of-laws perspective.

The background of this proposal can be traced back to the unfair competition that has arisen in the EU road transport sector as a result of the enlargements of the EU to central and eastern EU Member States (in 2004, 2007 and 2013). This has led to a tripled increase in minimum wage differences between EU Member States. Given that labour costs are the largest expense in the provision of transport services, this creates a major competitive advantage for providers from low-wage EU member states.

In fifteen years, this has caused a metamorphosis of the road transport sector, with Eastern EU Member States now leading the lists of the largest transport providers in the EU. Several Western EU Member States, such as Germany and France, have responded to this competitive pressure by adopting their own national minimum wage legislation to be applied to transport operations on their territory. As a result, the EU road transport sector has become severely fragmented and the social position of drivers has been put under pressure. How could this have gone so wrong?

In the EU we have always agreed that it is not sustainable or responsible to allow competition that is purely based on labour costs. To this end, we have introduced minimum wages within the national borders and EU-wide we have developed the so-called ‘Posting of Workers Directive’ (1996/71). This Directive stipulates, amongst other things, that the minimum wages of the temporary country of employment must be applied if this is more favourable for the employee. In this way, it is ensured that efficient and innovative market players can actually compete on this efficiency and innovation (and thus not only on wage costs).

However, the Posting of Workers Directive did not come about with regard to road transport, but mainly with regard to the construction sector, where various social/economic problems arose in the 1990s. As a result, the Directive is very difficult to apply to the atypical and highly mobile road transport sector and this has led to widely divergent interpretations in the Member States, in many cases simply not enforcing the Directive at all with regard to this sector. In practice, this allows for direct competition on labour costs, with all its undesirable consequences as described above.

The EU legislator now wants to put an end to this situation by developing a special conflict-of-laws rule for minimum wages in road transport, which, among other things, determines to which transport operations the Posting of Workers Directive does and does not apply. The contrasts between Western and Eastern EU Member States, but also to some extent between central and peripheral Member States, makes for a lengthy legislative process lasting more than three years.

On 12 December 2019 the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament have reached a provisional agreement about some important aspects of the conflicts-of-law rule, which was approved to a certain extent within the institutions themselves in the following months: on 21 January 2020 the Parliament’s TRAN Committee accepted the provisional agreement informally by letter to the other institutions, the Council then adopted an official position on 7 April 2020 and the Commission gave its approval to the Council’s position on 14 April 2020 (subject to a number of matters not relevant here).

This looked very promising, but on 8 June 2020 the TRAN Committee suddenly threw a spanner in the works: the TRAN Committee adopted some severely different amendments compared to the position of the Council. If the plenary approves this, the negotiations will become very difficult. Yet, in this controversial legislative procedure it would not be the first time that the plenary rejects the position of the TRAN committee. To be continued!

If we take a closer look at the official position of the Council, a number of things stand out. Firstly, it is made clear that the mere crossing of a territory by lorries, also known as ‘transit’ operations, is excluded from the scope of the Posting of Workers Directive and that therefore the minimum wages of the crossed territory may not be applied to these activities. These operations are considered to be insufficiently closely connected to this territory and by extension the application of the minimum rates of pay cannot be justified.

On the other hand, the proposal provides that activities that remain within a certain territory, e.g. transport by a Polish transport company between The Hague and Rotterdam, also referred to as ‘cabotage’ operations, do fall within the scope of the Posting of Workers Directive and must therefore be subject to the minimum wages of the country where the cabotage is carried out from the first moment of the operation and if this is more favourable for the employee. These operations are deemed to have a connection only with the territory on which the cabotage is carried out and the application for these minimum rates of pay is therefore justified. In short: green light for transit operations and red light for cabotage operations.

So far the newly adopted amendments of the TRAN committee from the European Parliament on 8 June 2020 are largely in accordance with this.

But what about those intermediate forms of transport, such as bilateral transport operations between Member States A and B, or so-called ‘crosstrade’ operations carried out by a transport company from Member State A between Member States B and C? This is a lot more complicated and has been a hot issue in the legislative negotiations. Ultimately, the Council agreed to exempt bilateral transport operations, whether or not in combination with a maximum of two consecutive operations, from the Posting of Workers Directive, and therefore the minimum wages may not be applied to these operations. Crosstrade, on the other hand, must, according to the proposal, fall under the Posting of Workers Directive and are therefore subject to the minimum wages, from the first moment of this operation and if this is more favourable to the employee.

This does not sit well with the TRAN Committee, which states in its recently adopted amendments that: 1) on the one hand there should be much more possibilities to combine a bilateral transport with other transport operations and 2) on the other hand that a ‘certain number of cross-trade operations should be exempted from posting rules.’ The TRAN Committee thus opts for a much more liberal point of view. It seems that the Corona crisis also exerted influence on the discussions: many East-European Member States now regress to the argument that the road transport sector already severely suffers from the Corona crisis and point to the pivotal importance of the delivery of medicine and goods, which should release transport companies from the obligation to safeguard the social protection of their drivers.

Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, it is already clear that if a special conflict of laws rule for road transport will be adopted, it can be seen as a real ‘game changer’ for the sector since it would bring much more legal certainty regarding the application of the Posting of Workers Directive. Regarding some transport operations, internationally operating transport companies will have to take serious notice of the minimum wages they have to guarantee their drivers. Non-compliance with this new legislation is strongly discouraged: along with the new posting rules, the EU legislator aims to provide for a whole package of enforcement and control measures that are mandatory for the Member States and in which, for the first time, the EU legislator also keeps aspects under its own control.

New enforcement authorities should also be taken into account. In addition to possibly setting up a European road transport agency in the future, the more general European Labour Authority (ELA) has been set up in 2019, with the true mandate ‘to promote fair labour mobility within the EU’. It is expected that the ELA will be able to play a far-reaching role, unprecedented in the history of the EU, in the enforcement of social legislation; including in the road transport sector.

See for more information on this topic my recent article ‘Posting drivers in the EU road transport sector’, ERA Forum 2020 (freely available online). For those who read Dutch, see my PhD ‘Sociale concurrentie en conflictenrecht in het Europees wegtransport’, University of Antwerp 2018 (freely available online).

* The author is a member of the Hague-based ‘International Institute of International and Foreign Law’: www.iji.nl, which has been providing legal consultancy to professionals (judges, lawyers, notaries, mediators etc.) regarding private international law and foreign law for over a hundred years.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) will be holding its XLIII Seminar entitled “Private International Law in the current international climate” from 18 to 20 November 2020 for the first time online!

One of the topics to be discussed is COVID-19 and private international law. In addition, two Hague Conventions feature prominently in the list of topics submitted for discussion: the 1996 HCCH Protection of Children Convention and the recent 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention.

Potential speakers are invited to submit a paper in Spanish, English or Portuguese by 16 August 2020. Papers must comply with the criteria established by AMEDIP and will be evaluated accordingly. Selected speakers will be required to give their presentations preferably in Spanish as there will be no interpretation services but some exceptions may be made by the organisers upon request.

Participation is free of charge. The platform that will be used is Zoom and it will also be streamed via Facebook Live. For more information, please click here.

Ferdinand Bernhard, 68 ans, est jugé par le tribunal correctionnel de Marseille pour six infractions, délits de favoritisme, prise illégale d’intérêt et détournements de fonds publics. Ce mardi, il s’est expliqué sur la promotion douteuse attribuée à sa maîtresse, un délit de favoritisme et une prise illégale d’intérêts dans le cadre d’un projet immobilier.

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By a decision of 13 March 2020, the Munich Court of Appeal, having regard to the expected delay in the processing of a request for service in China, allowed a resident of Germany to effect service by publication on a person of known residence in China, after sending an e-mail for information purposes.

The claimant, a resident of Germany [G], had obtained an injunction in Germany. This was served on the respondent (a resident of China) [C] while the latter attended an exhibition in Germany.

Two months later, G filed a motion for the imposition of a fine [an Ordnungsmittelantrag] against C before the Court of First Instance of Munich. Pursuant to § 891 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, the debtor must be heard before such a decision is taken.

G requested to serve the application for the fine by publication, although he was aware of C’s whereabouts. G founded the request upon the serious delay to be expected in case of service through the Chinese judicial assistance channels, based on the Hague Service Convention. The Court of First Instance dismissed the request.

G challenged the decision before the Munich Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance. It found that G had produced sufficient evidence, presumably emanating from the Munich Court statistics, proving the delay in the processing of requests by the Chinese authorities, i.e. nearly 18 months or more, which would seriously infringe his rights.

In this situation, the court continues, the interests of the creditor in effective legal protection outweigh the interests of the debtor in presenting his case before the Court. It ruled that the creditor must inform the debtor about the application via electronic communication channels known to the creditor and also used by the debtor. The creditor must also inform the debtor about the request for service by publication, and the possibility for the debtor to appoint a representative to receive documents on his behalf in Germany, including English-language translations.

The Court of Appeal also ruled that in view of the short limitation period of only two years provided in Article 9(1) 2 EGStGB (Introductory Law to the German Penal Code), the creditor’s right to legal protection would not be respected if she would be forced to execute the service of documents in China through judicial assistance channels, despite the known problems with this procedure. On the other hand, the debtor’s right to be heard could be violated by granting service by publication before the creditor has been informed by the debtor about the application, the request of service by publication and the possibility of appointing a representative. The final decision on the proper procedure would be left to the Court of First Instance.

The judgment has been reported (in German) by Benedikt Windau with a note here.

I have mixed feelings about the judgment. On the one hand, I would endorse the innovative idea of involving frequently used communication channels between the parties for information purposes on service of process modalities. This has been also proposed in the preparatory stages of the Service Regulation Recast (which should be published anytime soon). Regrettably, however, it has not been adopted by the competent legislative bodies.

On the other side, the Court is approaching the matter in full defiance of the Hague Service Convention, to which Germany and China are signatories. The ruling is founded upon § 185(3) of the German Code of Civil Procedure, and the interesting part here is the second scenario envisaged in the provision, i.e. when service of process does not raise hopes of success.

Prior to the application of the domestic rule, one would expect a reasoning on how the court by-passed the Service Convention. Surely the Court would have no reason to engage in a detailed analysis if the debtor was indeed of unknown residence. A sheer reference to Article 1(2) of the Convention would suffice. However, notwithstanding the fact that the debtor’s whereabouts were known to the creditor, and without even stating why Article 15 Hague Service Convention was unworthy of any reference, the court followed the course every judge prefers the most, i.e. the application of national rules.

The importance of the Service Convention has been repeatedly underlined in German legal scholarship. The Federal Republic of Germany has made a declaration concerning Article 15 (the six – months rule). In the judgment of the Supreme Court referred by the Munich Court of Appeal, the former ruled against service by publication with regard to a Russian party [BGH NJW-RR 2009, p. 855].

To sum up, the judgment raises (at least) two interesting and rather intriguing questions: If we follow this path: (a) what would be the value of Article 15 in the future? and more broadly, (b) what would be the consequences in a wider dimension? Will other contracting States follow suit?

Cinq ans après son vote, une mission d’information composée de trois députés s’est penchée sur l’évaluation de la loi renseignement du 24 juillet 2015, une loi « fondatrice ». Dalloz actualité a pu consulter ce rapport. Tout en livrant un bilan positif, la mission parlementaire esquisse plusieurs pistes pour la modifier.

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Place of Performance – A Comparative Analysis is the title of a book authored by Chukwuma Samuel Adesina Okoli. It recently appeared in the Studies in Private International Law series of Hart Publishing.

The blurb reads:

This book provides an unprecedented analysis on the place of performance. The central theme is that the place of performance is of considerable significance as a connecting factor in international commercial contracts. This book challenges and questions the approach of the European legislator for not explicitly giving special significance to the place of performance in determining the applicable law in the absence of choice for commercial contracts. It also contains, inter alia, an analogy to matters of foreign country mandatory rules, and the coherence between jurisdiction and choice of law. It concludes by proposing a revised Article 4 of Rome I Regulation, which could be used as an international solution by legislators, judges, arbitrators and other stakeholders who wish to reform their choice of law rules.

The table of contents and more information are available here.

The University of Lausanne (LL.M. Programme in International Business Law and CEDIDAC), along with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Connection Science Lab and the AI Transparency Institute are inviting abstracts on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Dispute Resolution, or Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) and Private International Law (PIL).

Papers of interest on AI and Dispute Resolution might discuss: the impact of AI on decision-making; the impact of AI on access to justice; transparency of arbitral data; control over arbitral data; potential risks to confidentiality in view of AI; personal data protection in arbitration; and, AI and arbitral uncertainty.

Papers of interest on DLT & PIL might discuss: the law applicable to crypto assets; the law applicable to transfers on a blockchain; the law applicable to transfers outside a blockchain; the law applicable to smart contracts; the law applicable to decentralised autonomous organisations; and, jurisdiction and choice of court.

The latter list of topics follows the headings listed in Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. 28 of February 2020, Proposal for the Allocation of Resources to Follow Private International Law Implications relating to Developments in the Field of Distributed Ledger Technology, in particular in relation to Financial Technology.

Deadline for papers: 1 February 2021.

More information here.

Graham Woloff eaor Calzaturificio Zengarini eaor re Akkurate Ltd, [2020] EWHC 1433 (Ch) concerns the question whether the court has the power under section 236(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to require persons resident in the EU to produce books and papers and an account of their dealings with a company being compulsorily wound up in England and Wales (it is not disputed that Akkurate’s centre of main interests (“COMI”) was in England and Wales under the European Insolvency Regulation EIR).

EIR 2000 applies to this case, because the winding up of Akkurate was before 26 June 2017, however the issue is not materially different in the new Regulation. There are inconsistent first instance decisions which Vos C reviews ia at 27 ff and at 54 after consideration, he considers s236(3) does not have extraterritorial effect on the basis of what he considers to be the binding authority of Re Tucker (a bankrupt) [1990] Ch. 148. however that following the EIR 2000 (unchanged in EIR 2015) the European regime can and does extend the territoriality of purely domestic insolvency provisions. CJEU authority cited is in particular C-339/07 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium (at 58 ff) – which I find may be a bit optimistic. Vos C also decides that he can and should apply his discretion to grant orders as formulated at 68.

Clearly, post Brexit, the situation will revert to Tucker. Which would make the English courts less attractive than their continental counterparts – although of course one would have to wait for CJEU authority to confirm the issue less equivocally.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5,

EU #Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000. Whether EN court has power to require persons resident in EU to produce documents re company with COMI in EN.

Held, considering CJEU authority: Yes. https://t.co/0dcgtOc7fF

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 4, 2020

Le maire de Sanary-sur-Mer, dans le Var, est jugé par le tribunal correctionnel de Marseille de lundi à mercredi, pour six délits : favoritisme, détournement de fonds publics, prise illégale d’intérêt.

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Par cet arrêt de cassation sans renvoi, la chambre criminelle reproche à la chambre de l’instruction d’avoir confirmé un placement en détention provisoire sans avoir constaté que la personne mise en examen avait méconnu les obligations du contrôle judiciaire auxquelles elle était astreinte. 

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Mad Atelier International BV v Manes [2020] EWHC 1014 (Comm) engages among others Articles 29-30 BIa on lis alibi pendens and its relation with issue estoppel. Stewart Chirnside has analysis here and  I am happy to refer. The judgment itself is not straightforward for Bryan J had much to decide – I agree with his conclusion at 124 on A29-30 BIa related issues that he is

‘satisfied that the French Civil Proceedings does not give rise to any issue estoppel because, for the reasons that I have given: (1) The decision of the Paris Commercial Court on such issues is not final or conclusive; (2) The parties to both proceedings are not privies; (3) The issues identified by Mr Manès were not issues concluded by the court, but rather comments on the state of the evidence, and (4) The issues in the English Proceedings are significantly broader than the issues in the French Civil Proceedings. Each of these is, in and of itself, fatal to the contention that an issue estoppel arises from the Paris Judgment, and I find that no issue estoppel arises.’

Geert.

Recognition and enforcement. Res judicata. Issue estoppel. https://t.co/yJDw3uHMD6 https://t.co/ACwZWMB6Wg

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 1, 2020

The author of this post is Vincent Richard, Senior Fellow at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law.

On 14 May 2020, the CJEU gave a preliminary ruling in Bouygues travaux publics, a case regarding the binding effect of social security certificates issued by the social security authority of a Member State on the courts of another Member State where workers are posted. The judgment was rendered in the context of French criminal proceedings against Bouygues travaux publics for infringements of labour law during the construction of the EPR nuclear power plant in Normandy.

EPR nuclear reactors represent the new generation of nuclear power plants conceived to be safer than current reactors. Construction have started in Finland and France fifteen years ago but both projects ran into costly delays. So far, two reactors have been completed in Taishan, in the Guangdong province of China while the European nuclear plants are still under construction.

The EPR nuclear plants constructed in Olkiluoto in Finland is scheduled for 2021 after a dispute that was concluded with a settlement whereby the Areva-Siemens consortium agreed to pay 450 million euros to the Finnish utility company TVO. Two more reactors are being built at Hinkley Point in England with a starting date scheduled between 2025 and 2027.

Construction of the French EPR reactor started in 2007 in Flamanville in Normandy with a projected cost of 3.3 billion euros. According to French newspapers, completion is now expected for 2023 with a total cost of more than 12 billion euros. The project has faced technical difficulties but it has also run into legal troubles surrounding employment contracts of Eastern European workers.

To complete such a massive project, Bouygues travaux publics formed a limited partnership with two other undertakings and it subcontracted the contract to an economic interest grouping that included, among others, Welbond, a company domiciliated in France. This grouping itself used subcontractors, including Elco, a company established in Romania to supply Romanian workers and Atlanco Ltd, a temporary employment company established in Ireland with a subsidiary in Cyprus and an office in Poland to supply Polish workers.

An investigation by the French nuclear safety authority and then the French police revealed that, between 2008 and 2012, there had been more than one hundred unreported workplace accidents on the construction site, as well as several other infringements of French labour law. Subsequently, Polish workers sued the above-mentioned companies before the labour court of Cherbourg, France, and French prosecutors initiated criminal proceedings against Bouygues, Welbond and their subcontractors before the criminal court in Cherbourg (all decisions in French can be found here).

On appeal, the court of appeal of Caen held that the companies were guilty of the offences of concealed employment and unlawful provision of workers. It ruled that Elco, the Romanian company, could not rely on the European legislation on posting of workers because it had a stable and continuous activity in France. Therefore, the contracts should be characterised as French employment contracts and the company should have complied with French labour law and declared the workers to French authorities prior to their recruitment. Workers were hired in Romania for the sole purpose of working in France and some of them had worked there for more than 24 months. Similarly, Atlanco had hired temporary Polish workers to work in France through its Cypriot branch by making them sign a contract drawn up in Greek. Atlanco never appeared in court but Bouygues and Welbond were held guilty of concealed employment offences for the workers supplied by Atlanco, by not declaring the workers to French authorities. This “declaration prior to recruitment of employees” aims to register workers officially so that the offence of concealed employment be easier to prove in the absence of such declaration.

The main argument of the defendants was to rely on the legal value of the E101 and A1 certificates that they had provided to French authorities. These certificates were required by regulations n. 1408/71 and 574/72 (replaced respectively by regulations n. 883/2004 and 987/2009) on the coordination of social security systems. These forms, issued by the social security authority of the Member State of origin, certify that the worker is covered by the social security of that Member State and thus exclude the application of another social security legislation.

According to CJEU case law in Herbosch Kiere and A-Rosa Flussschiff GmbH, the certificates are binding on both the social security institutions and on the courts of the Member State where the work is carried out. If the authority of this Member State raises doubts as to the correctness of the certificate, the issuing authority in the Member State of origin must re-examine the grounds on which the certificate was issued (Fitzwilliam). In Altun, the CJEU provided for a limited exception whereby a court can disregard the certificate when evidence supports the conclusion that a certificate was obtained fraudulently and only if the issuing authority fails to take that evidence into consideration for the purpose of reviewing the certificate.

In the present case, French lower courts have applied French labour law, whereby employers have to make a declaration to social security authorities prior to recruiting employees. This declaration allows to complete several administrative formalities at once. It aims to register workers officially not only to the social security scheme but also to the occupational health services or retirement schemes. Before the Cour de cassation (which is the French Supreme Court for civil and criminal disputes) the defendants argued that this declaration was not necessary because French authorities were bound by the foreign certificates, and therefore French social security and labour laws do not apply. Unsure about the scope of these certificates, the French Supreme Court asked the CJEU whether the binding effect of the certificates regarding the affiliation to social security extends to the law applicable to the labour obligations of the employer, such as the French declaration prior to recruitment. For the CJEU, the question is tantamount to deciding whether the certificate binds the court of the Member State where employees are working not only in the area of social security, but also in the area of employment law.

In its decision, the CJEU stresses that the certificates are designed to facilitate freedom of movement for workers and that Member States should apply the principle of sincere cooperation, laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, which also entails the principle of mutual trust. Consequently, the certificates create a presumption that workers are properly affiliated to the social security scheme of the issuing Member State and this declaration is binding on the Member State where the work is carried out. However, because the certificates are prescribed by the European regulations on the coordination of social security systems, their scope is limited to social security matters, and they do not have a binding effect in employment law matters.

The Court held:

Article 11(1)(a), Article 12a(2)(a) and (4)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of 21 March 1972 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to their families moving within the Community, in the version amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005 and Article 19(2) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, must be interpreted as meaning that an E 101 Certificate, issued by the competent institution of a Member State, under Article 14(1)(a) or Article 14(2)(b) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to their families moving within the Community, in the version amended and updated by Regulation No 118/97, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1606/98 of 29 June 1998, to workers employed in the territory of another Member State, and an A 1 Certificate, issued by that institution, under Article 12(1) or Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 465/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012, to such workers, are binding on the courts or tribunals of the latter Member State solely in the area of social security.

This decision is not ground-breaking but it will help the French authorities in their fight against social dumping. If the French Supreme Court considers that the effect of the declaration prior to recruitment are broader than social security legislation, French prosecutors will be able to sue employers before criminal courts for offences of concealed employment if companies do not submit this declaration to French authorities. That being said, in the EPR case, the court of appeal ordered defendants to pay fines ranging from 15.000 to 60.000 euros while the loss to French social security is estimated by French newspapers to be between 10 and 12 million euros.

Overall, the reasoning of the CJEU in this case and in Altun will be familiar to specialists of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Here, the principle of mutual trust is derived from the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU rather than from the principle of mutual recognition of judgments of Art.67(3) TFUE but its function as an interpretative imperative is the same. Similarly, the CJEU accepted in Altun that mutual trust is not without limit and that there may be exceptional circumstances in which a court is allowed to disregard a legal document issued in another Member State.

Written by Mayela Celis – The comments below are based on the author’s doctoral thesis entitled “The Child Abduction Convention – four decades of evolutive interpretation” at UNED

As mentioned in a previous post, after many years in the making, the Guide to Good Practice on the grave-risk exception (Article 13(1)(b)) under the Child Abduction Convention (grave-risk exception Guide or Guide) has been published. Please refer to our previous posts here and here. This Guide to Good Practice deals with a very controversial topic indeed. The finalisation and approval of this Guide is without a doubt a milestone and thus, this Guide will be of great benefit to users.

For ease of reference, I include the relevant provision dealt with in the Guide. Article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention sets out the following: “Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – […] b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. […]” (our emphasis).

The comments on the grave-risk exception Guide will be divided into two posts. In the present post, I will analyse the Guide exclusively through the lens of human rights. In the second post, I will comment on some specific legal issues of the Guide but will also touch upon on some aspects of human rights law. These posts reflect only my personal opinion. Given the controversial nature of this topic, there might be other different and valid opinions out there so please bear that in mind.

At the outset, it should be noted that this Guide is only advisory in nature and thus nothing in the Guide may be construed as binding upon Contracting Parties to the 1980 Convention (and any other HCCH Convention) and their courts (paras 7 and 8 of the Guide) Therefore, courts have enough leeway to supplement it and take on board what they see fit.

Human rights law is gaining importance every day, also in private international law cases. However, apart from some fleeting references to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (pp. 16 and 56), there are no references to human rights case law in the Guide. Indeed, the increasing number of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is not mentioned in the Guide, even though dozens of these judgments have dealt with the grave-risk exception (Art. 13(1)(b)) under the Child Abduction Convention; thus there appears to be an “elephant in the room”. We will try to respond in this post to the following questions: what has been the contribution of the ECtHR on this topic and what are the possible consequences of the absence of references to human rights case law in the Guide.

In this regard, I refer readers to our previous post regarding the interaction of human rights and the Child Abduction Convention here and my article entitled: The controversial role of the ECtHR in the interpretation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, with special reference to Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland and X v. Latvia (in Spanish only but with abstracts in English and Portuguese in the Anuario Colombiano de Derecho Internacional). To view it, click on “Ver artículo – descargar artículo”, currently pre-print version, published online in March 2020.

Before going into the substance of this post, it is perhaps important to clarify why the case law of the ECtHR in child abduction matters is of such great importance in Europe and beyond, perhaps for the benefit of our non-European readers. First, in addition to being binding upon 47 States party to the European Convention on Human Rights, which represent about half of the total number of Contracting Parties to the Child Abduction Convention (45%), the case law of the ECtHR not only applies to child abduction cases between European States. It will also apply, for example, if the requested State in child abduction proceedings is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and the requesting State is not. Indeed, the geographical location of the requesting State and whether it is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights are not relevant. See for example, Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (Application No. 41615/07), Grand Chamber, where the requesting State was Israel, and X v. Latvia (Application No. 27853/09), Grand Chamber, where the requesting State was Australia, both of which are not a party to the European Convention. Secondly, not only European citizens can launch proceedings before the ECtHR. All of this is nicely summarised in Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which sets out that “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention” (our emphasis).

In X v. Latvia, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR has established a legal standard in the handling of child abduction cases where the 13(1)(b) exception has been raised (and indeed other exceptions of the Child Abduction Convention such as Articles 12, 13(1)(a), 13(2) and 20), which is the following:

“106. The Court [ECtHR] considers that a harmonious interpretation of the European Convention and the Hague Convention (see paragraph 94 above) can be achieved provided that the following two conditions are observed. Firstly, the factors capable of constituting an exception to the child’s immediate return in application of Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention, particularly where they are raised by one of the parties to the proceedings, must genuinely be taken into account by the requested court. That court must then make a decision that is sufficiently reasoned on this point, in order to enable the Court to verify that those questions have been effectively examined. Secondly, these factors must be evaluated in the light of Article 8 of the Convention (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 133).” (our empahsis)

[…]

“118. As to the need to comply with the short time-limits laid down by the Hague Convention and referred to by the Riga Regional Court in its reasoning (see paragraph 25 above), the Court reiterates that while Article 11 of the Hague Convention does indeed provide that the judicial authorities must act expeditiously, this does not exonerate them from the duty to undertake an effective examination of allegations made by a party on the basis of one of the exceptions expressly provided for, namely Article 13 (b) in this case.” (our emphasis)

In addition, the ECtHR indicates that domestic courts must conduct “meaningful checks” to determine whether a grave risk exists (paragraph 116 of X v. Latvia), and to do so a court may obtain evidence on its own motion if for example, this is allowed under its internal law.

Importantly, this case also underlines the need to secure “tangible” measures of protection for the return of the child (paragraph 108 of X v. Latvia).

Moreover, there are at least two issues in the Guide that could have benefited from a human rights analysis, namely the incarceration of (mainly) the abducting mother upon returning the child to the State of habitual residence and the separation of siblings.

With regard to the first issue, it should be noted that the fact that the mother will be incarcerated upon returning the child to the State of habitual residence could have serious consequences for the child. The Guide has correctly explained the different ways in which such an outcome could be avoided. However, the Guide concludes with the following: “The fact that the charges or the warrant cannot be withdrawn is generally not sufficient to engage the grave risk exception” (paragraph 67).

In my view, where objective reasons have been raised by the mother to refuse to return to the State of habitual residence, such as incarceration, there should be a human rights analysis in the light of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While there might be some cases where incarceration may not be sufficient to refuse a return, there might be other cases were this would place the taking parent and the child in grave risk of harm or intolerable situation. By way of example, objective reasons for not returning could include a long incarceration or a disproportionate sanction, the fact the other parent cannot take care of the child upon the incarceration of the other parent, the inability to contest custody while imprisoned, etc. According to the ECtHR, an analysis should be undertaken as to whether these actions are necessary in a “democratic society”. Accordingly, the decision of the mother not to return based on a whim should not be considered seriously. See, for example, the ECtHR cases, Neuliger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (Application No. 41615/07), Grand Chamber (as clarified by X v. Latvia (Application No. 27853/09), Grand Chamber)), and B. c. Belgique (Requête No. 4320/11). Arresting and handcuffing the mother at the airport has undoubtedly a tremendous impact on children; so all efforts should be geared via judicial co-operation and direct judicial communications to make sure that charges are dropped as mentioned in the Guide (first part of paragraph 67 of the Guide).

As regards the second scenario, it is important to note that the separation of siblings when one of them has successfully objected to being return under Article 13(2) under the Child Abduction Convention may inflict harm on the children and may be difficult to enforce. The Guide noted that every child should be considered individually and concluded that “Consequently, the separation of the siblings resulting from the non-return of one child (regardless of the legal basis for the non-return) does not usually result in a grave risk determination for the other child” (paragraph 74).

According to article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the views of the child should be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. By ordering the return of usually the younger sibling(s) and forcing the mother to make a choice between returning with one child and staying with the child who objected, a judge could not be giving enough weight to the views of the child objecting to being returned. This is especially the case when we are dealing with full siblings and all are subject to return proceedings. In my view, and given that the reason for not returning are the views, in particular, of the older child, this should be factored in when the judge exercises his or her discretion.  See, for example, the ECtHR case, M.K. c. Grèce (Requête n° 51312/16). Obviously, if the separation of siblings is due to the action of the mother by not wanting to return, then a separation of the siblings would most likely not be a ground for refusing the return.

The underlying basis of the above is that the Child Abduction Convention is for the protection of children and not to vindicate the position of adults who are immersed in a legal battle or to merely sanction the abductor.

The standard in X v. Latvia should be kept in mind when dealing with international child abduction cases. Given that the grave-risk exception Guide is silent on this, practitioners would need to supplement the Guide with relevant literature and case law on human rights if they are dealing with a case in Europe. Practitioners outside Europe having a child abduction case which is being resolved in Europe may need to do the same in order to know what their possibilities of success and options are.

In this day and age, and as mentioned by the honorable Eduardo Vio Grossi, judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in a recent virtual forum (“Challenges to Inter-American Law”), the focus should not only be on sanctioning States for violations of human rights but we should assist States in not getting sanctioned by providing the necessary guidance and if possible, paving the way.

The Court of Justice delivered this week, on 4 June 2020, its judgment in case C‑41/19 (FX v GZ, represented for legal purposes by her mother), which is about the Maintenance Regulation.

Context: “By decision of the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Krakow, Poland) of 26 May 2009, FX was ordered to make monthly maintenance payments of around EUR 100 for the benefit of his daughter GZ, a minor, retroactively from June 2008.

20 Further to GZ’s application of 20 July 2016, the Amtsgericht Köln (Local Court, Cologne, Germany), by order of 27 July 2016, decided that an order for enforcement was to be issued in respect of the aforementioned decision of the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Krakow).

21 On the basis of that order declared enforceable, GZ, represented for legal purposes by her mother, initiated enforcement proceedings against FX in Germany. Challenging those proceedings, FX lodged before the Amtsgericht Köln (Local Court, Cologne) on 5 April 2018 an application opposing enforcement, pursuant to Paragraph 767 of the ZPO.

22 In support of his application, FX submits that the maintenance debt at issue in the main proceedings was discharged either directly until 2010 or, since December 2010, through the Maintenance Fund (Poland), to which FX claims to have reimbursed the sums paid to GZ to the extent of his financial capacity. FX maintains that, in any event, the debt has been predominantly settled”.

Issue: “The referring court has doubts, in the first place, as to whether the application opposing enforcement that FX lodged before it falls within its international jurisdiction.

24 On the one hand, the referring court states that if that application is to be treated as a matter relating to maintenance obligations within the meaning of Article 1 of Regulation No 4/2009, it has no international jurisdiction under that regulation and accordingly the Polish courts would have exclusive jurisdiction to examine FX’s objection that the maintenance debt at issue in the main proceedings has been discharged.

25 In that regard, the referring court notes that part of the German literature takes the view that an application opposing enforcement under Paragraph 767 of the ZPO is in fact to be treated as a matter relating to maintenance obligations within the meaning of Regulation No 4/2009 in so far as the objections raised in such an application, in particular those relating to the fulfilment or subrogation of that claim, are ultimately directed against the order for enforcement as such rather than the manner of the enforcement, which is to be assessed purely under enforcement law. Similarly, the referring court points out that that application opposing enforcement functionally corresponds to an application seeking reduction of the maintenance claim in respect of which an order for enforcement has been issued, which modification application, under Article 8 of Regulation No 4/2009, is subject to the jurisdictional principles set out therein. In the referring court’s view, that interpretation, which is supported by part of the German literature and which the referring court is inclined towards, is the only one compatible with the objective pursued by that regulation, namely guaranteeing the protection and jurisdictionally privileged status of the maintenance creditor, without, accordingly, the creditor having to defend himself, before the courts of the Member State of enforcement of the claim for which an order of enforcement has been issued, against an application opposing enforcement concerning substantive objections to that claim.

26 On the other hand, the referring court observes that the German legislature, conversely, is evidently of the opinion that the courts of the Member State of enforcement of a maintenance claim have jurisdiction to adjudicate on an application opposing enforcement, such as that provided for in Paragraph 767 of the ZPO, in which the debtor is authorised to raise objections to the claim itself. According to the referring court, the prevailing view in Germany is furthermore that such an application opposing enforcement does not come under matters relating to maintenance obligations within the meaning of Regulation No 4/2009 on the ground that, inter alia, the legal protection objective sought is directed solely against the enforcement of the claim, whereas the continuance of the original order remains untouched.

27 If that second position is to prevail, the referring court asks, in the second place, whether FX’s application opposing enforcement is then to be treated as ‘proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments’ within the meaning of Article 24(5) of Regulation No 1215/2012.

28 According to the referring court, the judgments of 4 July 1985, AS-Autoteile Service (220/84, EU:C:1985:302) and of 13 October 2011, Prism Investments (C‑139/10, EU:C:2011:653) are not capable, by themselves, of providing an answer to that question. Indeed, they were delivered in the regulatory framework preceding the entry into force of Regulation No 4/2009. In addition, pursuant to Article 1(2)(e) of Regulation No 1215/2012, that regulation does not apply to maintenance obligations”.

Question: “By its questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether an application opposing enforcement lodged by a maintenance debtor against the enforcement of a decision given by a court of the Member State of origin and which established that claim falls within the scope of Regulation No 4/2009 or that of Regulation No 1215/2012 and the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of enforcement”.

Response from the Court of Justice: “Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 […] is to be interpreted as meaning that an application opposing enforcement brought by the maintenance debtor against enforcement of a decision given by a court of the Member State of origin and which established that debt, which has a close link with the procedure for enforcement, falls within its scope and is within the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of enforcement.

Pursuant to Article 41(1) of Regulation No 4/2009 and to the relevant provisions of national law, it is for the referring court, being a court of the Member State of enforcement, to adjudicate on the admissibility and the validity of the evidence adduced by the maintenance debtor, seeking to support the submission that he has predominantly discharged his debt”.

Source: here