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Pour lutter contre le vol des avions à vide, appelés vol fantôme, l’Union européenne a adopté le 30 mars un règlement modifiant les règles concernant l’attribution des créneaux horaires dans les aéroports de l’Union. 

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Sánchez-Bordona AG issued his opinion in C‑343/19 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Volkswagen last Thursday. He relies heavily of course on CJEU authority almost all of which is reviewed on the blog – with Tibor Trans making a star appearance given its recent nature as well as its focus, like in Volkswagen, on financial damage.

Not long after, yesterday, the High Court in England in [2020] EWHC 783 (QB) held on a first preliminary issue in the class action suit pending there. Matthias Weller has already reviewed that judgment here. In that judgment, a lex causae argument on the binding authority of a German public body’s decision was advanced by claimants in subsidiary fashion. This was not entertained by the High Court for it had already found a binding effect on other grounds. Incidentally, the nature and timing of the High Court’s ruling suggest that there is no contestation of jurisdiction being brought forward by Volkswagen – I am enquiring with counsel in the case.

Returning to CJEU C-343/19, though: Raphael de Barros Fritz has analysis here and I am happy to refer, for timing for the release of my own ponderings on the Opinion suffered from a Friday afternoon call on injunctive relief and jurisdiction. A few additional notes of interest and subject to further pondering:

Firstly, the AG is too kind when he suggests that the Brussels Convention had left open the (now) Article 7(2) question. The Court’s locus damni /locus delicti commissi distinction was not at all required by then Article 5(3). Much as the distinction may have been clear to make in the Bier case itself, it was not at all advanced by the text of the Brussels Convention. Many of us have been pointing out the fallacy, including Cruz Villalon AG in his Opinion in Pez Hejduk, case C-441/13 which I reviewed here and Szpunar AG in his Opinion in Universal Music reviewed here. As Sánchez-Bordona AG points out in Volkswagen, the distinction has become a paradigm (at 2); ‘obstinance’ might also be a good word for it. The result of the CJEU refusing formally to reverse its Bier distinction, means itself and the national courts have been having to conjure up all sorts of distinguishing to respect both the Handlungsort /Erfolgort distinction, and the predictability of Brussels Ia as well as the need to interpret special jurisdictional rules restrictively.

Raphael makes a most valiant effort to do justice to the AG’s attempt at systemisation, yet the reality remains that most certainly on the locus damni front, the ever unclearer distinction between direct and indirect aka ‘ricochet’ damage is a Valhalla for reverse engineering – and we have not even thrown Lazar into the mix.

The AG suggests that not only the first purchasers of the vehicle may be direct victims, but also downstream purchasers of second-hand vehicles, however in each case constrained (if I understand the Opinion properly) to those purchasers, first or not, where the loss of value of the vehicles did not become a reality until the manipulation of the engines was made public: at 41; ‘ The loss of value of the vehicles did not become a reality until the manipulation of the engines was made public. In some instances, the applicants may be end users who obtained the vehicle from another, previous buyer; however, the latter did not experience any loss because, at that time, the damage was latent and was not disclosed until later when it affected the then owner. Therefore, it is not possible to describe the damage as being passed on from the original buyers to successive buyers.’

Further, given that the location of the vehicle is unforeseeable, the Advocate General considers that the place where the damage occurred is the place where that transaction was concluded, pursuant to which the product became part of the assets of the person concerned and caused the damage. However even for these cases other elements (per Universal Music) will have to be shown to avoid forum shopping and for these other elements, the AG suggests in particular a minimum contacts rule such as in US conflict of laws: at 75: ‘the defendant’s intention to sell its vehicles in the Member State whose jurisdiction is in issue (and, as far as possible, in certain districts within that State).’

On locus delicti commissi, the AG suggests at 34 that the event giving rise to the damage in this case consists of the installation, during the vehicle manufacturing process, of software which alters the vehicle’s emissions data. I do not think that is the only possible Handlungsort: other events in the Dieselgate chain arguably may qualify as Handlungsort, too: the executive decision to go ahead with the program, for instance. Or the regulatory steps (including type approval under EU law such as discussed in [2020] EWHC 783 (QB), above; or other steps required under EU or national law) needed to market the product in the country.

The last words on this Opinion have far from been said.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.7

A free webinar on Force Majeure and Hardship under Cross-border and Comparative Perspectives will take place on 8 April 2020 at 17.00 BST, organised by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.

Speakers include Alice Decramer (avocat, Signature Litigation Paris), Nicole Langlois (Barrister, XXIV Old Buildings) and Tom Sullivan (partner & attorney, Shook Hardy Bacon, Philadelphia). The webinar will be chaired by Duncan Fairgrieve (Senior Research Fellow in Comparative Law & Director, Product Liability Forum). 

The objective of this webinar is to examine the legal consequences of a party’s inability to perform a contract due to events outside their control, by comparing and contrasting a series of different juridictions including the US, France and the UK. An analysis will be made of the issue of force majeure / and hardship in comparative perspective, looking at the impact of contractual force majeure clauses, and their interpretation by the courts in a series of different juridictions. The seminar will look at supply of goods contracts, as well as commercial contracts more generally. An analysis will be given of the position where there is no specific contractual provision, and reliance is instead placed on frustration / hardship or impracticability. What are the conditions of these doctrines and what is the remedy that might be awarded? Distinguished speakers will examine the issues with a particular focus on the impact of the current circumstances.

More details and advance registration here.

Yesterday, the High Court of London decided two preliminary issues in a large group action, certified as a Group Litigation Order (sub no. 105), brought by about 91,000 owners or lessees of VW, Audi, Skoda and SEAT cars. The claim is brought, against the manufacturers of the affected vehicles (VW, Audi, Skoda, and SEAT), against the relevant VW financial services arm and against a variety of authorised UK based VW dealers. Article 8 no. 1 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation will have been of relevance to the foreign ones amongst the defendants. No express explanations are offered how claimants eligible for the UK group litigation are determined – presumably it depends on where the car was bought.

The precise personal/territorial scope of the respective mass litigations would have been interesting, since the proceedings in the UK are just some of many by disaffected VW owners around the world, and the outcomes for the claimants seem to differ quite substantially. As early as in 2015, a class-action similar to the UK one was commenced against VW in the Federal Court of Australia, on behalf of around 100,000 VW owners, which was settled for up to AusD 87 million. The total amount may go up to AusD 127 million, depending on the ultimate number of claimants. On 1 April 2020, the Federal Court of Australia approved the settlement of the Australian class actions. The settlement was approved on the basis of a Settlement Scheme developed by the solicitors for the applicants and made public here, that sets out the process by which claims can be registered, assessed and paid, and the Deed of Release and Settlement that was agreed between the parties, made publicly available by those solicitors here. In Germany, proceedings under the (quite restrictive) collective redress mechanism of the “Musterfeststellungsklage” were settled recently as well, in this case for up to € 830 Million in total in relation to around 400.000 claimants. These claimants still need to accept individually the offered sums until 20 April 2020 after receiving offers from VW based on the remaining value of their cars these days. Individual litigations outside the Musterfeststellungsklage about the influence of the amount of kilometres that the respective car has already run (amongst other issues) are reaching the German Federal Court of Justice these days (the hearings will take place on 5 May 2020). In addition, the Court of Justice of the European Union is dealing with other aspects of the VW case, see on CoL here.

The claim in the UK proceedings alleges a variety of causes of action against the Defendants, including fraudulent misrepresentation in relation to the sale of the affected vehicles. A number of those causes of action proceed upon the basis that the software function of the Engine amounts to a “defeat device” within the particular meaning of Article 3 (10) of EU Parliament and Council Regulation 715/2007 dated 20 June 2007. If so, then one consequence is that its use in the engine and thus, the sale of the affected vehicles, was unlawful, being prohibited by Article 5 (2) of the Regulation.

Thus, the question arose whether Brexit altered anything in this respect. This question is easy to answer at the moment, see para. 12: “Brexit makes no difference here because EU Law (including the jurisdiction of the CJEU) will continue to have effect as if the UK was still a Member State until the end of the transition period which is 31 December 2020”.

A further issue relates to the Claimants’ reliance on formal letters to VW, issued by the “competent authority” in Germany for these purposes, being its Federal Motor Transport Authority, the German “Kraftfahrtbundesamt” (“the KBA”) dated 15 October, 20 November, and 11 December 2015 (“the KBA Letters”). The Claimants contended that these letters constitute decisions that the software function is a defeat device, that those decisions bind the courts in Germany as a matter of German law, that they also bind other authorities in other Member States, including English courts, either as a matter of EU law or as a matter of German law and by reason of EU and/or English law, there is a conflicts rule to the effect that the question as to whether they bind the UK court must be decided by reference to their binding effect or otherwise under German Law, being the law of the seat of the KBA.

For a number of reasons, including analogies to competition law, the Court decided that the KBA’s finding binds all Member States (including their courts) as a matter of EU law. This is why the Court abstained from taking a decision on the alternative grounds advanced by the Claimants.

At the same time and independently from the binding effects of the KBA’s finding, the Court found on its own account that the affected vehicles did contain defeat devices. Another bad day for VW.

The full text of the judgment is available here.