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Quels droits garantir aux copropriétaires minoritaires dans le cadre de la procédure de fixation de l’indemnité d’expropriation ? En particulier, doivent-ils bénéficier de la possibilité de faire appel lorsque le prix fixé ne leur convient pas ? La Cour européenne a eu à répondre à ces questions au début du mois de mai, dans une affaire concernant directement la France.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de la copropriété 2023, annoté et commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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L’article 15, point 5, du règlement Bruxelles I bis doit être interprété en ce sens qu’un contrat d’assurance sur corps de navire portant sur un bateau de plaisance utilisé à des fins non commerciales ne relève pas de ses dispositions.

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This post was written bij Helga Luku, PhD researcher at the University of Antwerp.

On 1 March 2023, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Republic of Bulgaria issued its final decision no. 2185, 01.03.2023 (see here an English translation by Nadia Rusinova) in the Pancharevo case. After an appeal from the mayor of the Pancharevo district, the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria ruled that the decision of the court of first instance, following the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in this case, is “valid and admissible, but incorrect”. It stated that the child is not Bulgarian due to the lack of maternal ties between the child and the Bulgarian mother, and thus there is no obligation for the Bulgarian authorities to issue a birth certificate. Hereafter, I will examine the legal reasoning behind its ruling.

Background

On 2 October 2020, the Administrative Court of the City of Sofia in Bulgaria requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU in the case C-490/20 V.M.A. v. Stolichna Obshtina, Rayon ‘Pancharevo’. It sought clarification on the interpretation of several legal provisions. Specifically, the court asked whether a Member State is obliged, under Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and Articles 7, 24, and 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), to issue a birth certificate to a child, who is a national of that Member State, in order to obtain the identity document. This inquiry arose with respect to a child, S.D.K.A., born in Spain, whose birth certificate was issued by Spanish authorities, in accordance with their national law. The birth certificate identifies a Bulgarian national, V.M.A., and her wife, a British national, as the child’s mothers, without specifying which of the two women gave birth to the child.

The CJEU decided that Article 4(2) TEU, Articles 20 and 21 TFEU and Articles 7, 24 and 45 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a child, being a minor, who is a Union citizen and whose birth certificate, issued by the competent authorities of the host Member State, designates as that child’s parents two persons of the same sex, the Member State of which that child is a national is obliged

• to issue to that child an identity card or a passport without requiring a birth certificate to be drawn up beforehand by its national authorities, and
• to recognise, as is any other Member State, the document from the host Member State that permits that child to exercise, with each of those two persons, the child’s right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.

The trajectory of the case within the Bulgarian courts

On the basis of the decision of the CJEU in the Pancharevo case, the referring court, i.e. the Administrative Court of the City of Sofia obliged the authorities of the Pancharevo district to draw up the birth certificate of S.D.K.A., indicating two women as her parents.

The mayor of the Pancharevo district then filed an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria, contending that the decision is inadmissible and incorrect.

Based on its considerations, the Supreme Court held that the decision of the court of first instance is “valid and admissible but incorrect”. Its rationale is premised on several arguments. Firstly, it referred to Article 8 of the Bulgarian Citizenship Law, which provides that a Bulgarian citizen by origin is everybody of whom at least one of the parents is a Bulgarian citizen. In the present case, the Supreme Court deemed it crucial to ascertain the presence of the biological link of the child, S.D.K.A. with the Bulgarian mother, V.M.A. Thus, it referred to Article 60 of the Bulgarian Family Code, according to which the maternal origin shall be established by birth; this means that the child’s mother is the woman who gave birth to the child, including in cases of assisted reproduction. Therefore, the Supreme Court proclaimed in its ruling that the Bulgarian authorities could not determine whether the child was a Bulgarian citizen since the applicant refused to provide information about the child’s biological mother. Consequently, the authorities could not issue a birth certificate and register the child’s civil status. Furthermore, in a written defence presented to the court of first instance by the legal representative of V.M.A., it was provided that S.D.K.A. was born to K.D.K., the British mother, and the British authorities had also refused to issue a passport to the child, as she was not a British citizen.

The Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria ruled that the child is not a Bulgarian citizen, and the conclusion of the CJEU that the child is a Bulgarian citizen and thus falls within the scope of EU law (Articles 20 and 21 TFEU and Article 4 of Directive 2004/38/EC) is inaccurate. According to the Supreme Court’s legal reasoning, these provisions do not establish a right to claim the granting of Bulgarian citizenship, and Union citizenship is a prerequisite for enjoying free movement rights.

In these circumstances, the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria held that the refusal to issue a birth certificate does not result in the deprivation of citizenship or the violation of the child’s best interests. It referred to the law of the host country, Spain. Article 17 of the Spanish Civil Code of July 24, 1889, provides that Spanish citizens by origin are persons born in Spain to parents:

• who are foreigners if at least one of the parents was born in Spain (except for the children of diplomatic or consular officials accredited to Spain),
• who are both stateless, or
• neither of whose national laws confer nationality on the child.

According to this Article, the Supreme Court reasoned that since the national laws of the parents named in the child’s birth certificate (i.e. Bulgarian and UK legislation), issued in Spain, do not grant citizenship to the child, baby S.D.K.A. must be considered a Spanish citizen by virtue of this provision.

The applicability of Spanish law was expressly confirmed by the Spanish Government during the hearing at the CJEU, provided in paragraph 53 of Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion, stating that if the child could claim neither Bulgarian nor UK nationality, she would be entitled to claim Spanish nationality. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the child is Spanish and averted the risk of leaving the child stateless.

Is the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria in conformity with EU law interpretation?

In light of the ruling of the CJEU on the Pancharevo case, certain aspects might have required further scrutiny and more attention from the Supreme Court. Paragraph 68 of the Pancharevo judgment provides:

“A child, being a minor, whose status as a Union citizen is not established and whose birth certificate, issued by the competent authorities of a Member State, designates as her parents two persons of the same-sex, one of whom is a Union citizen, must be considered, by all Member States, a direct descendant of that Union citizen within the meaning of Directive 2004/38 for the purposes of the exercise of the rights conferred in Article 21(1) TFEU and the secondary legislation relating thereto.”

According to this paragraph, it can be inferred that Bulgaria and other Member States must recognize a child with at least one Union citizen parent as a direct descendant of that Union citizen. This paragraph has important implications as regards the establishment of the parent-child relationship. The CJEU, in its case law (C-129/18 SM v Entry Clearance Officer), has firmly established that the term “direct descendant” should be construed broadly, encompassing both biological and legal parent-child relationships. Hence, as a family member of the Bulgarian mother, according to Article 2 (2)(c) of Directive 2004/38, baby S.D.K.A., should enjoy free movement and residence rights as a family member of a Union citizen. In its decision, however, the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria did not conform to the CJEU’s expansive understanding of the parent-child relationship. Therefore, its persistence in relying on its national law to establish parenthood exclusively on the basis of biological ties appears to contradict the interpretation of EU law by the CJEU.

The Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria seems relieved to discover that the child probably has Spanish nationality. It can be doubted, however, at what conclusion the court would have arrived if the child were not recognized as Spanish under Spanish nationality laws, especially considering that the child was not granted nationality under UK legislation either. In such a scenario, the Supreme Court might have explored alternative outcomes to prevent the child from becoming stateless and to ensure that the child’s best interests are always protected.

This post was written by Carlos Santaló Goris (Lecturer at the European Institute of Public Administration in Luxembourg).

On 20 April 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rendered its second judgment on Regulation 655/2014, establishing a European Account Preservation Order (‘EAPO Regulation’). In C-291/21, Starkinvest, the Court assessed whether an EAPO could be used to secure a claim resulting from a penalty payment, and if so, under what conditions.  

Background of the Case

C-291/21, Starkinvest, has its roots in a 2016 judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals of Liège (Cour d’appel de Liège) rendered in favor of Starkinvest SRL ordering Soft Paris and Soft Paris Parties, ‘to cease all sales of their goods and services under the word mark SOFT PARIS in the Benelux countries’ (para. 18). The judgment established a periodic penalty payment in the event the order to cease sales was not respected.

In 2021, Starkinvest SRL applied for an EAPO to attach Soft Paris’ French bank accounts for € 86 694.22. Of that amount, € 85.000 corresponded to the penalty payments resulting from Soft Paris’ infringement of the order to cease the sale of goods. Starkinvest used the referred judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals of Liège (Cour d’appel de Liège) as the title to obtain the EAPO.

At this point, it should be noted that the regime to obtain an EAPO varies depending on whether the creditor has an enforceable judgment or not. All creditors have to prove that ‘there is a real risk that, without such a measure, the subsequent enforcement of the creditor’s claim against the debtor will be impeded or made substantially more difficult’ (Article 7(1) EAPO Regulation. This first prerequisite corresponds to the periculum in mora. Creditors without an enforceable judgment ‘shall also submit sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that he is likely to succeed on the substance of his claim against the debtor’ (Article 7(2) EAPO Regulation). This second condition corresponds to another common prerequisite for obtaining a national interim measure, the fumus boni iuris.

For the Court of Appeals of Liège (Cour d’appel de Liège), it was not clear whether the judgment establishing the penalty payment but not specifying the amount the claim arising from that penalty payment was valid a judgment that would exempt creditors from satisfying the fumus boni iuris. In this regard, Belgian legislation does not require the prior quantification of the claim arising from a penalty payment to request a preservation order ‘provided that the decision ordering penalty payments is enforceable and has been serving’ (para. 23). Conversely, the Belgian court also acknowledges that Article 55 of the Brussels I bis Regulation establishes that ‘a judgment that ”orders a payment by way of a penalty” can only benefit from the simplified scheme of enforcement the amount of the payment has been finally determined by the court of origin.’ Having no answer to such inquiry, the Court of Appeal of Liège (Cour d’appel de Liège) decided to submit the following questions to the CJEU:

(1) Does a judgment which has been served, ordering a party to make a penalty payment in the event of breach of a prohibitory order, constitute a [judgment] requiring the debtor to pay the creditor’s claim within the meaning of Article 7(2) of [Regulation No 655/2014]?

(2) Does a judgment ordering a party to make a penalty payment, although enforceable in the country of origin, fall within the meaning of “judgment” in Article 4 of [Regulation No 655/2014] where there has been no final determination of the amount in accordance with Article 55 of [Regulation No 1215/2012]?

The CJEU’s Answer

In essence, the CJEU was asked whether the judgment that established the penalty payment was a valid judgment that would exempt the creditor from proving the fumus boni iuris. More concretely, whether or not the claim amount had to be specified in the judgment as a condition to consider the judgment a valid title. In this regard, neither Article 4(5), which contains the definition of judgment, nor Article 7(2), the provision on the fumus boni iuris, does not state anything about the quantification of the claim in the judgment (paras 42 – 43). Nonetheless, other provisions do so. Article 6 refers to the ‘amount specified in the judgment’, while Article 8(2)(g) states that creditors can apply for an EAPO in ‘the amount of the principal claim as specified in the judgment’ (paras 46 – 47). Therefore, a systematic interpretation suggests that the judgment would have to contain the precise amount of claim.

The CJEU found that the specification of the amount of the claim is also a guarantee to maintain an adequate balance between the creditor’s and debtor’s interests in the EAPO procedure (para. 50). If a judgment establishing the penalty payment without having specified the amount of the claim is considered a valid title to circumvent the fumus boni iuris, that would undermine the debtor’s position. The court’s examination of fumus boni iuris is both a condition for creditor to access the EAPO and a guarantee for the debtor against abusive applications when there is no title acknowledging the claim. When the amount of penalty payment is not quantified, courts should have the discretion to assess whether there is a basis for the amount the creditor requested the EAPO for. Interestingly, AG Szpunar added, in his opinion, that while the judgment establishing penalty payment would not constitute a valid title, it is not ‘is meaningless for the creditor’. Creditors could use it, along ‘with documents provided by a court official in which the court official declares the breaches of the prohibitory order’, to prove the fumus boni iuris (paras. 82 – 83). Creditors willing to secure a penalty payment through an EAPO can find a practical tip here.

Lastly, the CJEU addressed the enforcement regime of judgments ordering penalty payments under the Brussels I bis Regulation. In this regard, the Court clarified that even if the EAPO does not have an equivalent provision, that does not imply that the ‘intention of the EU legislature was to exclude penalty payments from the scope of that regulation’ (para. 55). Therefore, the EAPO could be used to secure penalty payments. However, the judgment ordering the penalty payment without quantifying the claim is insufficient to overcome the fumus boni iuris.

Overall Assessment of the Judgment

The main contribution of the C-291/21 judgment is that it shows that the EAPO can be used to secure penalty payments. In this regard, it aligned the EAPO Regulation with the Brussels I bis Regulation, which expressly acknowledges the possibility of recognizing and enforcing penalty payment judgments. Creditors can combine both instruments. While using the Brussels I bis Regulation to enforce the penalty payment, they can rely on the EAPO to secure its enforcement. Whether the EAPO can be used to secure a penalty payment might seem for many pretty obvious, the Cologne Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht Köln) once rejected an EAPO request on the basis of a penalty payment under German law (Zwangsgeld), because it considered that such kind of claim fell outside the scope of the EAPO Regulation. The creditor requested a preliminary reference be submitted to CJEU, but the German court rejected such a possibility. This case came to the author’s knowledge through an interview with a German lawyer in the empirical conducted in the context of his Ph.D. dissertation.

This decision also sheds light on the autonomous notion of judgment under the EAPO Regulation (in this regard, see also Tobias Lutzi’s post on this judgment), more precisely, concerning the prerequisite that the claim has to be quantified.

As in C-555/18, the first CJEU judgment on the EAPO, the Court’s reasoning of this second judgment again pivots on the need to ‘strike an appropriate balance between the interest of the creditor in obtaining an Order and the interest of the debtor in preventing abuse of the Order’ (Recital 14). This is a recurring hermeneutic tool used by the CJEU when it comes to interpreting the EAPO and the EPO. It seems that the CJEU’s approach is to counterweight the pro-creditore spirit that underpinned the creation of the EAPO and EPO, reinforcing the debtor’s position.

La Cour de cassation transmet à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne des questions préjudicielles relatives à la détermination de la règle applicable pour apprécier la validité des clauses attributives asymétriques.

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Posted at the request of Shiva Patil, Technical Editor at Trade, Law and Development.

Trade, Law and Development

Call for Submissions

Special Issue

“Sustainability and Inclusivity: Evolving Paradigms of the Global Economy”

Founded in 2009, the philosophy of Trade, Law and Development (TL&D) has been to generate and sustain a constructive and democratic debate on emergent issues in international economic law and to serve as a forum for the discussion and distribution of ideas. Towards these ends, the Journal has published works by noted scholars such as the WTO DDG Yonov F. Agah, Dr. (Prof.) Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, Prof. Steve Charnovitz, Prof. Petros Mavroidis, Prof. Mitsuo Matsuhita, Prof. Raj Bhala, Prof. Joel Trachtman, Dr. (Prof.) Gabrielle Marceau, Prof. Simon Lester, Prof. Bryan Mercurio, and Prof. M. Sornarajah among others. TL&D also has the distinction of being ranked the best journal in India across all fields of law for several years by Washington and Lee University, School of Law.

Pursuant to this philosophy, the Board of Editors of TL&D is pleased to announce “Sustainability and Inclusivity: Evolving Paradigms of the Global Economy” as the theme for its next Special Issue.

It is indisputably true that sustainability which comprises the three interdependent pillars of “economic growth, social equity, and environmental protection”, is increasingly gaining traction among governments, businesses, research organisations, scholars and the general populace. Discussions in international economic law, including those surrounding world trade, cross-border investment, and development, have abundantly focused on this. Economic benefits of trade ultimately decline while the social and environmental costs rise to unbearable levels, if sustainable trade rules are not in place. Whereas, a more sustainable trade strategy would recognise the need for a more varied export mix, invest in technology, and have minimal trade barriers while balancing long-term resilience with short-term ambitions. Since TL&D’s objective is to provide a forum of exchange of ideas and constructive debate on legal and policy issues, the above-mentioned factors arguably constitute some of the biggest issues for international economic law discourse this year.

While the theme is broad enough to cover a wide range of issues, an indicative list of specific areas is as follows:

• Trade Rules and Environmental Interactions
• Environmental Protection Clauses in International Investment Agreements
• Trade and Human Rights
• Promoting Entrepreneurship/ Trade Facilitation
• Trade and Gender Justice
• Transparency and Good Governance Obligations
• Sustainable Agriculture
• Sustainable Fisheries
• Indigenous Peoples Interaction with International Trade and Investment
• Sustainable Development Goals

These sub-issues are not exhaustive, and the Journal is open to receiving submissions on all aspects related to sustainability and inclusivity in the global economy.

Accordingly, the Board of Editors of TL&D is pleased to invite original, unpublished manuscripts for publication in the Special Issue of the Journal in the form of ‘Articles’, ‘Notes’, ‘Comments’ and ‘Book Reviews’, focusing on the theme of “Sustainability and Inclusivity: Evolving Paradigms of the Global Economy”.

In case of any queries, please feel free to contact us at: editors[at]tradelawdevelopment[dot]com.

PATRON: P.P. Saxena | ADVISORS: Raj Bhala | Jagdish Bhagwati | B.S. Chimni | Glenn Wiser | Daniel B. Magraw, Jr. | Vaughan Lowe | Ricardo Ramirez Hernandez | W. Michael Reisman | M. Sornarajah | FACULTY-IN-CHARGE: Dr. Rosmy Joan | BOARD OF EDITORS: Swikruti Nayak | Aastha Asthana | Rashmi John | Ria Chaudhary | Ananya Awasthi | Jahnavi Srivastava | Yashvi Hora | Sunchit Sethi | Shiva Patil| Rishi Pareek | Anoushka | Himanshu Sharma| Priyanshu Shrivastava | Simran Bherwani | Yana Gupta | Alka Mahapatra | Anandita Srivastava | Ishaan Pant | Krishna Ravishankar | Neel Rao | Samiksha Lohia | Shambhavi Uniyal | Sonali P. Raju

In 2014, Adrian Briggs published his own comprehensive account of English Private International Law, taking stock of centuries of English case law and decades of growing European influence. Other than the author’s unique ability to present even the most complex concepts with both clarity and style, the book’s strongest selling point arguably was his conscious decision to put the European instruments at the front and centre of the book, presenting English private international law as the hybrid system that it had long become. As Adrian Briggs later admitted, though, the timing of this project could be described as sub-optimal.

Indeed, in light of the UK’s subsequent departure from the EU and the resulting ‘realignment of the planets’, the second edition required changes that went far beyond a mere update. While some parts of the first edition that engaged with European sources and materials could be preserved as historical background (see, eg, pp. 18-21; 123) or even as descriptions of what has now become ‘retained EU law’ (mainly the Rome I and II Regulations, and with important caveats), other parts had to be rewritten almost entirely. This is most notable in the chapter on Jurisdiction (ch. 3), which according to the author, is now subject to ‘a corpus iuris which is a shambles’, ‘a mess in urgent need of reform’ (p. 129).

It is all the more commendable that Adrian Briggs has undertaken this difficult and presumably depressing task to paint, for the second time, a full picture of English private international law as it stands, again drawing heavily from his decades of experience as an author, teacher, and practitioner. It seems fair to say that most of the apparent coherence of this picture is testimony not to the ease with which European instruments, rules and thoughts could be removed from English law but to the author’s ability to patch up what was left.

(As a footnote, it is a pity for the reader that not only much European law but also the paragraph numbers have been lost between the first and second edition.)

The Belgian Court of Cassation found in a judgment of 10 March 2023 (in Dutch) that the Brussels Court of Appeal was wrong to refuse the granting of a cautio iudicatum solvi against a US company, with principal seat in Colorado.

As previously reported, the cautio iudicatum solvi as stated in the Belgian Code of Civil Procedure (or Judicial Code), Article 851 was declared unconstitutional by the Belgian Constitutional Court in 2018. The Constitutional Court found that the criterion of nationality as basis for the granting of the cautio was not relevant to reach the goal pursued by the legislator, namely to ensure payment of procedural costs and possible damages if the plaintiff loses the suit. The Court called on the legislator to amend the article, but this never happened.

The Brussels Court of Appeal refused to issue the cautio requested by a Belgian defendant as against the US plaintiff, on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the provision. The Court of Cassation, however, stated that Article 851 does not in general infringe Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; the Constitutional Court’s finding of unconstitutionality was based on the principle of non-discrimination, in so far as a Belgian defendant could not use the cautio against any plaintiff without property in Belgium, but only against a non-Belgian plaintiff. As long as the legislator has not rectified the provision, it must according to the Court of Cassation be interpreted in line with the Constitution. This means that the cautio may be granted against any plaintiff with insufficient property in Belgium, irrespective of the plaintiff’s nationality. The Court reiterated that the cautio is outlawed by several international conventions, but none of these conventions applied in the present case.

Just yesterday, Hart Studies in Private International Law officially published an edited book titled: T Lutzi et al, Jurisdiction over Non-EU Defendants: Should Brussels Ia Regulation be Extended?  The blurb reads as follows:

This book looks at the question of extending the reach of the Brussels Ia Regulation to defendants not domiciled in an EU Member State. The Regulation, the centrepiece of the EU framework on civil procedure, is widely recognised as one of the most successful legal instruments on judicial cooperation. To provide a basis for the discussion of its possible extension, this volume takes a closer look at the national rules that currently govern the question of jurisdiction over non-EU defendants in each Member State through 17 national reports. The insights gained from them are summarised in a comparative report and critically discussed in further contributions, which look at the question both from a European and from a wider global perspective. Private international lawyers will be keen to read the findings and conclusions, which will also be of interest to practitioners and policy makers.

The latest Volume (Vol. 65, 2022) of the Japanese Yearbook of International Law – published by the International Law Association of Japan – has been recently released. It features the following articles, case notes as well as English translation of some relevant court decisions relating to private international law.

 

GLOBALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW IN JAPAN

Takami Hayashi, Introductory Note (p. 167)

Ryoko Yamaguchi, Interests of the Child in Child Abduction and Visitation Cases — Differences Between Japan’s Domestic and International Criteria— (p. 169)

Takami Hayashi, Transboundary Child Protection in Japan (p. 191)

HAYAKAWA Shinichiro, Japanese Perspective on Legal Issues of International Surrogacy (p. 213)

Moonsook Kim, International Adoption in Korea (p. 231)

Manabu Iwamoto, International Recovery of Maintenance in Japan (247)

 

CASES AND ISSUES IN JAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Chisato Nakamura, Failure of Service of Judgment Documents and Public Policy Control at The Stage of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (p. 336)

Miho Shin, Habitual Residence in Japanese Private International Law (p. 348)

 

JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN JAPAN (Private International Law)

 

Supreme Court (3rd Petty Bench), Judgment, May 25, 2021 (p.423)

Enforcement of Foreign Judgment — Punitive Damages — Contrary to Public Policy

 

Intellectual Property High Court, Judgment, September 29, 2021 (p. 426)

Applicable Law — Copyright — Employee Work — Copyright Transfer

 

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, February 12, 2020 (p. 430)

Lawsuit for State Redress — Conduct of a Public Employee Outside of Japan

 

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, November 20, 2020 (p. 433)

Applicable Law — Characterization — Succession to Immovables Abroad — Unjust Enrichment

 

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, January 21, 2021 (p. 438)

Nationality Law — Case Requesting Confirmation of Japanese Nationality — Loss of Japanese Nationality due to the Acquisition of Foreign Nationality

 

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, March 9, 2021 (p. 443)

Enforcement of Foreign Judgment — Service of Documents During the Litigation Proceedings — Contrary to Procedural Public Policy

 

More information on the Yearbook (former Annual) and the content of its past volumes are available at http://www.ilajapan.org/jyil/.

The Full text of Vols. 1~62 (1957-2019) is accessible on HeinOnline.

At the request of the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament, the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs commissioned  a study titled Cross-Border Legal Recognition of Parenthood in the EU. It is available here.

Authored by Alina Tryfonidou (Neapolis University of Pafos), the study examines the problem of non-recognition of parenthood between Member States and its causes, the current legal framework and the (partial) solutions it offers to this problem, the background of the Commission proposal for a regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood and on the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood, and the text of the proposal. It also provides a critical assessment of the proposal and issues policy recommendations for its improvement.

Following successful collaborations in 2021 and 2022, the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI) and the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) are teaming up again for their third joint webinar this year on Tuesday 27 June between 4 to 5:10pm (Singapore time) or 10 to 11:10am (CEST).

Titled Cross-border Commercial Dispute Resolution – HCCH 1965 Service Convention, the webinar is expected to discuss, among others, the operation of the Service Convention in practice, how the Service Convention works with the other HCCH Conventions for cross-border dispute resolution, and Singapore’s accession to and upcoming implementation of the Service Convention.

Invited speakers include Sara Chisholm-Batten (Partner, Michelmores LLP), Melissa Ford (Secretary, HCCH), Delphia Lim (2Director, International Legal Division, Ministry of Law, Singapore), Professor Yeo Tiong Min (Singapore Management University), and Professor Yun Zhao (University of Hong Kong and Representative of Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, HCCH).

For more information or to register, click here. Early bird discount is available till 28 May.

More about the webinar and its speakers can be found in the flyer.

Queries about the webinar can be directed to ABLI at info@abli.asia.

 

From 22 to 27 May 2023, the 2023 edition of the Milan Arbitration Week will take place, online and in presence. It encompasses a series of events dedicated to domestic, international commercial and investment arbitration, with the participation of renowned Italian and foreign experts from academia and legal profession.

 

The Milan Arbitration Week is jointly organized by Università degli Studi di Milano and the European Court of Arbitration, in collaboration with DLA Piper-Milan, Comitato Italiano dell’Arbitrato, the Centre of Research DEuTraDiS and the Erasmus + Programme of the European Union.

 

In particular, this edition will focus on the recent Italian reform of arbitration law; the mechanism of the mandatory mediation; the status quo and future perspectives of surfing on pledges in international arbitration; the umbrella clauses; the recent developments of the relationships between EU Law and investment arbitration. In addition, the MiAW, always attentive to the relationship between university education and arbitration, will host a chat with the winners of the 30th edition of the Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot, as well as the Frankfurt Investment Pre-Moot (Conference and hearings), organized by DLA Piper, Milan.

 

All information (including how to register) can be found at this link.

The UK Supreme Court ruled that the cause of action in the aftermath of the 2011 Bonga offshore oil spill accrued at the moment when the oil reached the shore. This was a one-off event and not a continuing nuisance. The Nigerian landowners’ claim against Shell was thus barred by the limitation periods under applicable Nigerian law (Jalla and another v Shell International Trading and Shipping Company and another [2023] UKSC 16, on appeal from [2021] EWCA Civ 63).

On 10 May 2023, the UK Supreme Court has ruled in one of the cases in the series of legal battles started against Shell in the English courts in the aftermath of the Bonga spill. The relevant facts are summarized by the UK Supreme Court as follows at [6] and [7]:

6. (…) The Bonga oil field is located approximately 120 km off the coast of Nigeria. The infrastructure and facilities at the Bonga oil field include a Floating Production Storage and Offloading unit (“FPSO”), which is linked to a Single Point Mooring buoy (“SPM”) by three submersible flexible flowlines. The oil is extracted from the seabed via the FPSO, through the flowlines to the SPM, and then on to tankers. The Bonga Spill resulted from a rupture in one of the flexible flowlines connecting the FPSO and the SPM. The leak occurred overnight during a cargo operation when crude oil was being transferred from the Bonga FPSO through the SPM and onwards onto a waiting oil tanker on (…) 20 December 2011. The cargo operation and the leaking were stopped after about six hours.
7. As a result of the Bonga Spill, it is estimated that the equivalent of at least 40,000 barrels of crude oil leaked into the ocean. The claimants allege that, following its initial escape, the oil migrated from the offshore Bonga oil field to reach the Nigerian Atlantic shoreline’.

Some 27,830 Nigerian individuals and 457 communities stated that the spill had a devastating effect of the oil on the fishing and farming industries and caused damage to their land. They sued Shell in English courts. The claim was instituted against International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd (an English company, anchor defendant) and Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Co Ltd (a Nigerian company, co-defendant).

The English courts have accepted jurisdiction, as it had happened in several cases based on a comparable set of facts relevant for establishing jurisdiction, as reported earlier on this blog here, here, here, here, and here. The jurisdiction and applicable law in the specific case of Bonga spill litigation have been closely followed inter alia by Geert van Calster here.

The case at hand is an appeal on a part of an earlier rulings. However, unlike some earlier claims, this is not a representative action, as the UK Supreme Court explicitly states at [8]. The crux of the ruling is the type of tort that the Bonga spill represents under Nigerian law, applicable to that case (on applicable law, see Jalla & Anor v Shell International Trading and Shipping Company Ltd & Anor [2023] EWHC 424 (TCC), at [348] ff.).

According to the Nigerian party, the spill gave rise to ‘a continuing cause of action because there is a continuing nuisance so that the limitation period runs afresh from day to day,’ as some oil has not been cleaned up and remained on the coast. Shell submitted, on the contrary, that the spill was a one-off event, that the cause of action accrued with the coast was flooded, and that the claim was time barred under the relevant limitation statutes. The lower courts and the UK Supreme court agreed with Shell. They rule that the cause of action had accrued at the moment when the spilled oil had reached the shore. This occurred some weeks after the spill. As a result, at the moment of instituting the proceedings, the claim was time barred.

Noteworthy is the detail in which the UK Supreme Court discusses the authorities on the tort of nuisance under the heading ‘4. Four cases in the House of Lords or Supreme Court’ at [17] ff. This degree of detail is certainly not surprising, due to the relevance of English law for the Nigerian legal system. In the meantime, it contrasts with the approach that would be adopted by a civil law tradition’s court, if the case was brought under their jurisdiction. Firstly, in the civil law traditions, a claim governed by foreign law reaches the highest judicial authority only in exceptional cases. Secondly, if – as in this case – there were ‘no prior case in English law that has decisively rejected or accepted the argument on continuing nuisance put forward by the claimants in this case,’ a continental court might have come to the same conclusion, but finding the law would perhaps be much less business as usual for a continental court than for the UK Supreme Court.

The footage of the hearings that the UK Supreme Court makes available on its website is most enlightening on the Court’s approach and reasoning.

Regular readers will be aware that disciplining the use of the anchor defendant mechanism is not an easy task for a court to undertake (I have linked to one post yet the search tag ‘anchor’ will take you to plenty). The CJEU takes a restrictive view. Although in the case at issue Article 8(1) Brussels Ia does not formally apply (the mechanism does not apply to defendants domiciled outside the EU), instruction in Dutch residual rules is that they be applied as A8(1) would.

In Stichting Claim Gran Petro v Shell Netherlands, Shell Brasil and Raizen ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2023:7099, the Hague court of first instance did though refuse jurisdiction against the one Brazilian defendant (Raisen), anchored unto two Dutch Shell entities (Shell now having moved domicile exclusively to England was held [5.2] not to have relevance on account of the perpetuatio fori principle), citing abuse of the anchor defendant mechanism.

Shell have a majority share in Raisen. The claimants in essence called upon the corporate structure of Shell and, pro inspiratio, hoped to convince the court that the presumption of involvement of mother corporations in their daughter’s anti-competitive shenanigans might be enough to justify the relatedness of the claims. Such assumption exists in EU competition law (see eg CJEU ENI) however the court finds that claimants have not been able to prove a Brazilian equivalent.

The court refers ia to CJEU CDC v Azo Nobel et al to emphasize the condition that the anchor mechanism must not be intended merely to remove the defendant at issue from its natural domicile forum. [6.7] the court reports that the claimants acknowledge that Dutch jurisdiction is sought for reasons of  general tardiness of Brazilian proceedings. There is no suggestion that Raizen will not be willing to meet any future damages. Seeing as no presumption under Brazilian law of mother corporation involvement exists, and seeing as no proof of factual involvement of the Shell mother entities was furnished, [6.16] the court concludes that the anchor mechanism at issue is an abusive application and must not lead to jurisdiction.

Geert.

1/2 Follow-on competition law damages claim, after Brazilian competition commission finding of abuse
Held no jurisdiction against BRA corp controlled by Shell
Abuse of Dutch equivalent of anchor defendant mechanism, citing CJEU authority pro inspiratio

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 17, 2023

 

Hart Studies in Private International Law officially released a book today titled: The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Cornerstones, Prospects, Outlook. The book is edited by M Weller et al. The blurb reads as follows:

This book analyses, comments and further develops on the most important instrument of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH): the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention. The HCCH Convention, the product of decades of work, will have a transformative effect on global judicial cooperation in civil matters. This book explores its ‘mechanics’, i.e. the legal cornerstones of the new Convention (Part I), its prospects in leading regions of the world (Part II), and offers an overview and comment on its outlook (Part III). Drawing on contributions from world-leading experts, this magisterial and ambitious work will become the reference work for law-makers, judges, lawyers and scholars in the field of private international law.

On 15 May an Antwerp justice of the peace (effectively a first instance judge in ia neighbourly disputes) has issued a common sense, no nonsense judgment against 3M’s pollution for its PFAS pollution of the soil around its manufacturing site at the Port of Antwerp. (For background to PFAS aka per and polyfluoroalkyl substances see also my earlier post on applicable law). PFAS produced there were mainly used in fire extinguishing foam.

Bypassing the sluggish criminal law and public law investigations and enquiries, and in view of alarming levels of PFAS found in the family’s blood, two immediate neighbours at the site claim against 3M on the basis of what is effectively common law nuisance. Such a claim is one of strict liability: it does not seek to establish fault or negligence, rather it aims at addressing the imbalance in proprietary enjoyment.

The judgment reminds us that the historic roots of many an environmental law (think Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 and later Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 1 All ER 53 ) are still good law despite the overwhelming body of local, regional, federal, EU and international environmental statutory laws.

3M (other than to internal civil procedure rules on the court’s jurisdiction) referred ia to its environmental permit and to its use of ‘state of the art environmental technologies; to the distinction between the statutory remediation duty on the one hand and the liability for pollution, on the other; to its voluntary phasing out of PFAS at the site, and to the soil remediation (negotiated with /imposed by the Flemish authorities) it will carry out ia on the claimants’ property ; to the inconclusiveness of data on long-term health impact; and to the need to at the least stay the case in light of ongoing criminal and public law investigations.

The judge held that claimants’ individual rights exist independently of public and criminal procedures and may be enforced separately, and that all four elements for the laws of nuisance are present:

Neighbourliness (the only element not contested by 3M);

Nuisance. For the existence of nuisance, the judge referred ia to statements aka ‘extrajudicial confessions’ made by 3M executives during hearings in the Flemish Parliament;

Excessive nuisance. The nuisance is also held to be excessive, with simple reference ia to clearly abnormal PFAS readings in claimants’ blood;

Attributable to 3M. Here, too, the judge holds straightforwardly: ia mapping ordered by the Flemish Government shows a clear concentration of PFAS on the sites run by 3M.

The judge concludes with a provisional statement of €2,000 damages for the reduced enjoyment by claimants of their property.

The judgment does not indicate the parameters to be used for final determination of damages. Early commentary on the judgment indicates a number of open questions, such as the parameter within which claimants can be considered to be ‘neighbours’, etc. It is clear that 3M will not just appeal, but will generally continue its approach of litigating each and every claim (of note is that Belgium’s collective proceedings provisions are not optimal, and moreover difficult to apply to common law nuisance cases) with convoluted legal reasoning and much distinguishing. Yet the judgment is appealing in its straightforwardness and no doubt inspiring to the many proceedings which, sadly, are en route in this sad episode of industrial ‘innovation’.

Geert.

Vereerd me in het gezelschap van @omgevingsrecht te vinden in @vrtnws berichtgeving over #3M https://t.co/sXXjZq0rYh

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 17, 2023

 

A group of German scholars, consisting of Christine Budzikiewicz (University of Marburg), Konrad Duden (University of Leipzig), Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), Tobias Helms (University of Marburg) and Claudia Mayer (University of Regensburg), collectively the Marburg Group, reviewed the European Commission’s proposal of 7 December 2022 for a regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood and on the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood.

The Group, while welcoming the initiative of the Commission issued a paper to suggest some fundamental changes, apart from technical amendments.

The Group’s comment can be found here.

Last July, I posted about a joint webinar between the Singapore-based Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI) and the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) on the Choice-of-Court and Judgments Conventions. The two organizations return this year with their third joint session, this time on the 1965 Service Convention.

Titled Cross-border Commercial Dispute Resolution – HCCH 1965 Service Convention, the webinar will take place on Tuesday 27 June between 4 to 5:10pm (Singapore time) or 10 to 11:10am (CEST), and is expected to discuss, among others, the actual operation of the Service Convention in practice, how the Service Convention works with the other HCCH Conventions for cross-border dispute resolution, and Singapore’s accession to and upcoming implementation of the Service Convention.

Invited speakers include Sara Chisholm-Batten (Partner, Michelmores LLP), Melissa Ford (Secretary, HCCH), Delphia Lim (2Director, International Legal Division, Ministry of Law, Singapore), Professor Yeo Tiong Min (Singapore Management University), and Professor Yun Zhao (University of Hong Kong and Representative of Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, HCCH).

For more information or to register, click here. Early bird discount is available until 28 May.

Queries about the webinar can be directed to Catherine of ABLI at info@abli.asia.

Geert.

 

The United States legal system is immensely complex. There are state courts and federal courts, state statutes and federal statutes, state common law and federal common law. When I imagine a foreign lawyer trying to explain this system to a foreign client, my heart fills with pity.

This feeling of pity is compounded when I imagine this same lawyer trying to advise her client as to whether a choice-of-court clause will be enforced by a court in the United States. The law on this subject is complicated. It is, moreover, not easy to determine how it is applied in practice. Are there differences in clause enforcement rates across the states? Across federal circuits? Do state courts enforce these clauses at the same rate as federal courts? Until recently, there was no data that would allow a foreign lawyer – or a U.S. lawyer, for that matter – to answer any of these questions.

Over the past several years, I have authored or co-authored several empirical articles that seek to answer the questions posed above. This post provides a summary of the data gathered for these articles. All of the cases referenced involve outbound choice-of-court clauses, i.e. clauses that select a jurisdiction other than the one where the suit was filed. Readers interested in the data collection process, the caveats to which the data is subject, or other methodological issues should consult the articles and their appendices. This post first describes state court practice. It then describes federal court practice. It concludes with a brief discussion comparing the two.

 

State Courts

Most state courts have held that choice-of-court clauses are presumptively enforceable. These courts will not, however, enforce a clause when it is unreasonable or contrary to public policy. A clause may be deemed unreasonable when enforcement would result in duplicative litigation, when the plaintiff cannot obtain relief in the chosen forum, when the plaintiff was never provided with notice of the clause, or when the chosen forum lacks any relationship to the parties. A clause is contrary to public policy when a statute or a judicial decision declares that enforcement is inconsistent with the policy of the state.

The chart below lists the enforcement rate in state courts with at least fifteen judicial decisions between 1972 and 2019 and at least ten judicial decisions between 2010 and 2020. These rates were calculated by dividing (1) the total number of cases where a clause was enforced by (2) the total number of cases where the court considered the issue of enforceability.

 

State Enforcement Rate

1972-2019 Enforcement Rate

2010-2020 California 80% 78% Connecticut 71% 88% Delaware 89% 100% Florida 78% 100% Georgia 67% 54% Illinois 74% 83% Louisiana 78% 70% Michigan 78% 82% New Jersey 63% 64% New York 79% 76% Ohio 78% 73% All States 77% 79%

Between 1972 and 2019, state courts enforced choice-of-court clauses in 77% of cases. Between 2010 and 2020, they enforced them in 79% of cases. The state courts in Florida and Connecticut have become more likely to enforce in recent years. The state courts in Georgia have become less likely to enforce in recent years. The state courts in California, New Jersey, and New York have been relatively consistent in their enforcement practice over time.

These data indicate that while there are significant differences in enforcement rates in state court across the United States, choice-of-court clauses are given effect in most cases.

Federal Courts

Like state courts, federal courts take the position that choice-of-court clauses are presumptively enforceable. Like state courts, federal courts will not enforce these clauses when they are unreasonable or contrary to public policy. Unlike state courts, federal courts do not apply state law to decide the issue of enforceability. They apply federal common law. This means that the federal courts are free to adopt their own view of whether a clause is unreasonable or contrary to public policy without considering prior state court decisions.

In theory, the fact that the federal courts apply federal common law to this question should produce uniform results across the nation. In fact, there are notable variations in enforcement rates across federal district courts sitting in different circuits, as shown in the chart below.

 

 

Circuit

  Enforcement Rate

All Federal Cases

2014-2020 Eleventh Circuit 95% Third Circuit 92% Second Circuit 91% Sixth Circuit 91% Fifth Circuit 90% Fourth Circuit 90% All Circuits 88% Seventh Circuit 87% First Circuit 84% Eighth Circuit 85% Tenth Circuit 83% Ninth Circuit 81%

The federal district courts sitting in the Eleventh Circuit, which includes Florida, have the highest enforcement rate. The federal district courts sitting in the Ninth Circuit, which includes California, have the lowest enforcement rate. On the whole, a plaintiff arguing that a choice-of-court clause is unenforceable would rather be in federal court in California than in Florida. Even in California, however, these clauses are still enforced by federal courts in the overwhelming majority of cases.

Comparing State and Federal Courts

Federal courts sitting in diversity enforce choice-of-court clauses at a rate that is equal to or greater than the rate of geographically proximate state courts in every federal circuit. In the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, the enforcement gap is particularly large, as shown in the chart below.

 

Circuit Enforcement Rate

State Cases

(2010-2020) Enforcement Rate

Federal Diversity Cases

(2014-2020) Difference Fourth Circuit 67% 96% 29% Eighth Circuit 64% 88% 24% Sixth Circuit 73% 93% 20% Third Circuit 76% 95% 19% Eleventh Circuit 78% 96% 18% Second Circuit 78% 94% 16% First Circuit 79% 94% 15% Overall 79% 90% 11% Ninth Circuit 78% 85% 7% Tenth Circuit 86% 91% 5% Fifth Circuit 90% 90% 0% Seventh Circuit 85% 85% 0%

These data suggest that a defendant seeking to enforce a choice-of-court clause should try to remove the case to federal court. These courts are, on average, more likely to enforce a clause than their state counterparts. The data further suggest that plaintiffs seeking to invalidate a choice-of-court clause should strive to keep the case in state court. These courts are, on average, less likely to enforce a clause than their federal counterparts. The incentives for forum shopping as between state and federal court when it comes to choice-of-court clauses raise serious concerns under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, as discussed at greater length here,

There are two main reasons why the enforcement rate is higher in federal court. First, some federal courts applying federal law refuse to give effect to state statutes that invalidate choice-of-court clauses. When these invalidating statutes are applied by state courts and ignored by federal courts, the result is a sizable enforcement gap. The Supreme Court recently denied cert in a case that would have resolved the question of whether federal courts should give effect to state statutes that invalidate choice-of-court clauses.

Second, federal courts applying federal law are less willing than state courts applying state law to conclude that a clause is unreasonable. Over many cases decided over many years, state court judges have shown themselves to be more sympathetic to plaintiffs seeking to avoid choice-of-court clauses. Federal courts, by comparison, have enforced clauses in a number of instances where state courts probably would have refused on unreasonableness grounds.

Conclusion

The law of choice-of-court clauses in the United States is sprawling and complicated. Until recently, there were no empirical studies addressing how the courts applied this law in practice. The information presented above is the product of hundreds of hours of work reading thousands of state and federal cases in an attempt to identify patterns and trends.

Readers interested in learning more about state court practice should look here and here. Readers interested in learning more about federal court practice should look here. Readers interested in learning more about the differences between state and federal practice – and the Erie problems generated by these differences – should look here.

[A version of this post is cross-posted at Transnational Litigation Blog.]