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Tribunal correctionnel de Montpellier, 17 octobre 2016

The European Association for Data Science (EuADS) will hold the first European Data Science Conference in Luxembourg on 7-8 November 2016. This interdisciplinary event is the inaugural conference of EuADS and aims to provide a setting for fostering communication among all stakeholders of Data Science in Europe. You may download the flyer of the conference here. Conference topics include, among others, the question of trust, transparency and provenance of data including where data come from and by which mechanisms trust in data might be achieved, as well as legal aspects of data science such as data protection, data privacy and data access. The conference will feature a symposium on “Legal dimensions of Data Science” with contributions by Burkhard Hess (MPI Luxembourg), Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón, Gerald Spindler (University of Göttingen), Mark D. Cole (University of Luxembourg) and Jan von Hein (University of Freiburg). The full programme is available here.

When I reviewed Szpunar AG’s Opinion in C-195/15 Mulhaupt /SCI Senior Home, I predicted (it’s a safe prediction, nothing whiz-bang about it) that the Court would probably come to the same conclusion in less words and with less references to the overall context.

It did. It cherry-picked the AG’s arguments and came to the same conclusion. Of particular note is its insistence, with the AG, that even though a derogation must be interpreted strictly, it is nonetheless appropriate to ensure that the exception is not deprived of its effectiveness.

Please refer to my review of the AG’s Opinion for more detail. Final conclusion: security created by virtue of a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by which the real property of a person owing real property taxes is, by operation of law, to be subject to a public charge and that property owner must accept enforcement of the decision recording that tax debt against that property, constitutes a ‘right in rem’ for the purposes of that article.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.7.1 ).

 

On 23 October 2016, AG Szpunar delivered his opinion in the case of Agro Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV (C‑507/15). He suggested the Court to rule as follows.

 

Article 17 of Directive 86/653/EEC on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents requires mandatory protection of a commercial agent who carries out his activity in the internal market. It does not preclude a law of a Member State according to which such protection is not afforded for a commercial agent who carries out his activity outside the internal market.

Neither the 1963 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, nor the 1972 Additional Protocol thereto, preclude a law of a Member State according to which protection under Directive 86/653 is only afforded where a commercial agent carries out his activity in that Member State and not where a principal is established in that Member State and a commercial agent is established in and carries out his activity in Turkey.

L’Avvocato generale Szpunar ha presentato il 23 ottobre 2016 le sue conclusioni nella causa Agro Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV (C‑507/15). A suo avviso, la Corte dovrebbe statuire quanto segue.

L’art. 17 della direttiva 86/653/CEE relativa al coordinamento dei diritti degli Stati Membri concernenti gli agenti commerciali indipendenti esige in termini imperativi la protezione dell’agente che svolge la propria attività nel mercato interno. Come tale, esso non è di ostacolo a una legge di uno Stato Membro che riconosca una simile protezione a un agente la cui attività si sviluppi al di fuori del mercato interno.

Né l’Accordo di associazione del 1963 tra la Comunità economica europea e la Turchia né il suo Protocollo addizionale del 1972 sono d’ostacolo a una legge di uno Stato Membro in forza della quale la protezione garantita ai sensi della Direttiva 86/653 opera solo nell’ipotesi in cui l’agente svolge la propria attività in detto Stato Membro e non invece nell’ipotesi in cui il preponente sia stabilito in tale Stato Membro e l’agente svolga la propria attività in Turchia.

The EBS Law School in cooperation with Clifford Chance will host the EBS Law School Arbitration Day on 18 November 2016 organized by Professor Dr. Matthias Weller and Dr. Alexandra Diehl.

The event will focus on the quest for improved systems of arbitration. Topics will be:

• Dispute Resolution in Asia: Dominated by the Singaporean Merlion?
• The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: a role model for international arbitration?
• TTIP and CETA: On a Road to Nowhere or to Success?

The speakers are:

• Claudia Annacker, Cleary Gottlieb, Paris
• Simon Greenberg, Clifford Chance, Paris
• Elan Krishna, Clifford Chance, Singapore
• Dr. Cristina Hoss, Legal Adviser to Judge Bruno Simma, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Den Haag
• Prof. Dr. R. Alexander Lorz, Secretary for Public Education, German State of Hesse, Wiesbaden
• Representative from US Consulate General Frankfurt
• Prof. Dr. André Schmidt, EBS Business School/University Witten-Herdecke
• Prof. Dr. Mathias Wolkewitz, General Counsel Legal, Taxes, Insurances, Wintershall AG

The lectures as well as the panel discussions will be in English. The event will start at 1.30 p.m. in Lecture Room “Sydney” at EBS Law School in Wiesbaden.

For further information and registration see here.

Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law, Oxford University Press, 2016, ISBN 9780190496722, pp. 840, USD 225.

Choice of Law provides an in-depth sophisticated coverage of the choice-of-law part Conflicts Law (or Private International Law) in torts, products liability, contracts, forum-selection and arbitration clauses, insurance, statutes of limitation, domestic relations, property, marital property, and successions. It also covers the constitutional framework and conflicts between federal law and foreign law. The book explains the doctrinal and methodological foundations of choice of law and then focuses on its actual practice, examining not only what courts say but also what they do. It identifies the emerging decisional patterns and extracts predictions about likely outcomes.

As my review of Szpunar AG’s Opinion in Nikiforidis highlighted, on the issue of temporal applicability to continued contracts, the AG suggested along the lines of Rome I Article 10’s regime (the von Munchausen or the ‘bootstrap’ principle) that the lex causae has to determine the moment of ‘conclusion’.

The employment relationship at issue is conducted in Germany and subject to German law, which does not permit reductions in remuneration similar to those to which the Hellenic Republic had recourse (as a result of austerity).

The Court held last week and points out (at 20) that if the Rome I Regulation did not apply to the main proceedings, Article 34 of the EGBGB (the relevant provisions  of residual German private international law concerning contractual relationships) would permit it to take into account the overriding mandatory provisions of another State. Provisions like those are exactly why the UK and Luxembourg in particular (concerned about financial services contracts subject to their laws) insisted on Article 9 Rome I seriously constraining the room for manoeuvre of the forum.

Different from its AG, the Court squarely rejects (at 30) any role here for Article 10. In support, it refers to the original proposal of the European Commission with a view to the adoption of what eventually became Rome I. COM(2005) 650 referred to ‘contractual obligations’: ‘‘contractual obligations arising after its entry into application’; as opposed to the Regulation’s eventual use of ‘‘contracts’ concluded as from 17 December 2009.

At 34: ‘Whilst the reference, proposed by the Commission, to contractual obligations arising after the entry into application of that regulation covered, in addition to contracts concluded after its entry into application, the future effects of contracts concluded before then, that is to say, obligations arising from the latter after then, this is not so in the case of the wording of Article 28 of the Rome I Regulation, which covers exclusively contracts concluded on or after 17 December 2009, the date on which that regulation became applicable pursuant to Article 29 thereof. It follows that, contrary to what the referring court envisages, any agreement by the contracting parties, after 16 December 2009, to continue performance of a contract concluded previously cannot have the effect of making the Rome I Regulation applicable to that contractual relationship without thwarting the clearly expressed intention of the EU legislature.’

Now, I have admittedly only quickly scanned the travaux preparatoires in writing up this post, yet I do think the Court’s conclusion on this point may be misguided. It was Parliament which introduced ‘contracts’ as opposed to ‘contractual obligations’. It did so in response to the EC’s proposed sentence which read in full

‘It shall apply to contractual obligations arising after its entry into application. However, for contractual obligations arising before its entry into application, this Regulation shall apply where its provisions have the effect of making the same law applicable as would have been applicable under the Rome Convention of 1980.’

Parliament proposed lifting the first sentence into a separate Article and to drop the second sentence altogether, citing ‘Unlike in the case of torts and delicts, contracts are entered into deliberately and voluntarily. It is essential for the parties to know that the provisions on applicable law contained in this Regulation will apply only to contracts concluded after its date of application. Therefore proceedings brought after the date of application concerning contracts concluded before that date will apply the Rome Convention.’

This intervention therefore I believe was targeted at avoiding debates on equality between Rome I and Rome Convention outcomes. No indication was given that the change from ‘contractual obligations’ to ‘contract’ was of any specific relevance for the debate.

However, in the end that discussion in my view does not really matter because the Court itself does subsequently admit that its observation, that the Regulation cannot mean that ‘any, even minor, variation made by the parties, on or after 17 December 2009, to a contract initially concluded before that date were sufficient to bring that contract within the scope of the Rome I Regulation’ (at 35) , should not negate that

‘the possibility remains, as the Commission has pointed out in its written observations, that a contract concluded before 17 December 2009 may be subject, on or after that date, to a variation agreed between the contracting parties of such magnitude that it gives rise not to the mere updating or amendment of the contract but to the creation of a new legal relationship between the contracting parties, so that the initial contract should be regarded as having been replaced by a new contract, concluded on or after that date, for the purposes of Article 28 of the Rome I Regulation.’ (at 37).

Whether such ‘new legal relationship’ has been formed in casu, is down to the national court to decide. The CJEU does not give any indication whatsoever of what law is to guide that court in that decision. A European ius commune? I don’t see it. Lex fori? Perhaps. But that would encourage forum shopping. Lex causae? But the Court had dismissed Article 10 of having any relevance. I am at a loss.

Now, to the question of overriding mandatory requirements (please refer again to my review of Szpunar AG’s Opinion for context): here the Court I believe misses the mark. After pointing out, justifiably (and in contrast with the AG), that Article 9 needs to be interpreted restrictively, it holds that ‘the list, in Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation, of the overriding mandatory provisions to which the court of the forum may give effect is exhaustive. (at 49).

Check.

This means Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation must be interpreted ‘as precluding the court of the forum from applying, as legal rules, overriding mandatory provisions other than those of the State of the forum or of the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed. Consequently, since, according to the referring court, Mr Nikiforidis’s employment contract has been performed in Germany, and the referring court is German, the latter cannot in this instance apply, directly or indirectly, the Greek overriding mandatory provisions which it sets out in the request for a preliminary ruling.’ (at 50).

Check.

But then, at 52:

‘On the other hand, Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation does not preclude overriding mandatory provisions of a State other than the State of the forum or the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed from being taken into account as a matter of fact, in so far as this is provided for by a substantive rule of the law that is applicable to the contract pursuant to the regulation.‘

And in conclusion, at 53:

Accordingly, the referring court has the task of ascertaining whether Laws No 3833/2010 and No 3845/2010 are capable of being taken into account when assessing the facts of the case which are relevant in the light of the substantive law applicable to the employment contract at issue in the main proceedings.

Err, here I really do not follow. Surely such de facto circumvention of Article 9’s restrictive scope, negates its effet utile. If and when a law other than the lex causae may be taken into account ‘as a matter of fact’, the Rome modus operandi is to say so: see in this respect in particular Article 17 Rome II. And what would ‘taking into account as a matter of fact’ mean for the case at issue?

Now you see it, now you don’t. In West Tankers the Court took effet utile to extreme length. Here it arguably entirely negates it. I am not convinced.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016. Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.3, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5 , heading 3.2.8.

Un demandeur d’asile turc, qui attendait depuis plus de douze ans la réponse à sa demande de protection déposée en Grèce, a obtenu gain de cause devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH). Dans un arrêt du 13 octobre 2016, cette juridiction a jugé que l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale) avait été violé.

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L’action en annulation de mariage introduite par un tiers postérieurement au décès de l’un des époux relève du champ d’application du règlement (CE) 2201/2003 du 27 novembre 2003, relatif à la compétence, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière matrimoniale et en matière de responsabilité parentale.

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Helmerich & Payne International v. Venezuela

On Wednesday, November 2, 2016, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in the case of Helmerich & Payne International v. Venezuela.  The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding the proper pleading standard needed to allege an expropriation claim for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) expropriation exception.  The FSIA provides that a foreign state and its agencies and instrumentalities “shall be immune from the jurisdiction” of federal and state courts except as provided by international agreements and by exceptions contained in the statute.  28 U.S.C. § 1604; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605-§ 1607.  The exception involved here is the expropriation exception.  That exception provides that a “foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue” and there is a specified commercial-activity nexus to the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).  The Court will resolve whether a plaintiff needs only to plead some non-frivolous facts that could show an expropriation to survive a motion to dismiss or does a plaintiff need to plausibly allege that an expropriation occurred in violation of international law.

Venezuela, the Petitioner, and the United States, as amicus curiae in support of Venezuela, argue that for a case to come within the scope of Section 1605(a)(3), the complaint must assert a claim that is legally sufficient to satisfy the provision’s substantive requirements. According to the United States, “[w]hen the foreign state challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint’s jurisdictional allegations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the district court must determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, actually describe a ‘tak[ing] in violation of international law’—that is, conduct that is prohibited by international expropriation law—and identify ‘rights in property’ that were impaired as a result of the foreign state’s conduct.  If those substantive requirements are not satisfied, the foreign state is immune from suit both federal and state courts, the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and the claim must be dismissed.”  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-8.

Helmerich, the Respondent, argues that “nothing in the FSIA displaces the longstanding, widespread practice that the possibility a claim might fail on its merits does not defeat the court’s jurisdiction to decide the merits, at least where the claim is not ‘clearly . . . immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ or ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Brief of Respondent at 14.

This case has the potential to be a blockbuster, as it will define when suits against foreign governments get through the courthouse door. The Court’s interpretation of the pleading standard for the expropriation exception will also impact the pleading standards for the FSIA’s other exceptions, such as the commercial activity exception and noncommercial tort exceptions.  The fact that the U.S. Government will participate in oral argument as amicus curiae in support of Venezuela will also be noteworthy, given that the Obama Administration recently suffered its first override of a presidential veto when the House and Senate voted against the President’s objection to a bill that amended the FSIA to allow family members to sue Saudi Arabia over claims it aided or financed the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

In its judgment of 7 July 2016, in the case of Hőszig Kft. v Alstom Power Thermal Services (case C-222/15), the Court of Justice ruled as follows.

Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) must be interpreted as meaning that a jurisdiction clause which, first, is set out in the client’s general terms and conditions, referred to in the instruments witnessing the contracts between those parties and forwarded upon their conclusion, and, secondly, designates as courts with jurisdiction those of a city of a Member State, meets the requirements of Article 23 relating to the consent of the parties and the precision of the content of such a clause.  

Nella sentenza del 7 luglio 2016 relativa alla causa Hőszig Kft. c. Alstom Power Thermal Services (causa C-222/15), la Corte di giustizia ha affermato quanto segue.

L’art. 23, par. 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I), dev’essere interpretato nel senso che una clausola attributiva di giurisdizione che, da un lato, sia stata stipulata nell’ambito delle condizioni generali di contratto del committente, menzionate negli atti contenenti i contratti inter partes e trasmesse all’atto della loro conclusione, e che, dall’altro, designi quali giudici competenti quelli di una città di uno Stato membro, soddisfa i requisiti del suddetto art. 23, relativi al consenso tra le parti ed alla precisione del contenuto di tale clausola.

 

L’article 9, § 3, du règlement Rome I exclut que des lois de police autres que celles de l’État du for ou de l’État dans lequel les obligations découlant du contrat doivent être ou ont été exécutées puissent être appliquées, en tant que règles juridiques, par le juge du for.

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Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 7, 2e chambre de l'instruction, 16 juin 2016

Escroquerie ;
Convention européenne des droits de l'homme

Blanchiment ; Chose jugée

On 2 December a Conference on Family law and Moroccan nationals living abroad will take place in Brussels. This conference will be in French.

Here is the background:
In 2004 Morocco adopted a new Family Code (MFC). On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the MFC (2004-2014) a comparative research on the application of the MFC in Europe and Morocco has been undertaken under the direction of Professor Marie-Claire Foblets (Max Planck Institute Halle and KULeuven). For five European countries with the largest population of Moroccan residents (Belgium, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) an in-depth analysis of the case law available since 2004 has been made. This analysis provides a more concrete idea of the problems raised by the application of the MFC since 2004 and especially of the legal problems affecting the family lives of Morrocan nationals living abroad (MNAs). Besides the analysis of the case law of the European countries, a study of the Moroccan case law concerning MNAs and a field study at three Moroccan consulates in Europe have been undertaken.

The full programme and enrolment information are available here (link at the bottom of the page).

The Academy of European Law (ERA) will host a conference on the new Regulation (EU) 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO), which will become operational from January 2017. The conference, which will take place on 1–2 December 2016 in Trier (Germany), will focus on the practical implications of the new instrument for commercial parties, including banks.

Key topics will be:

• The EAPO and its interplay with other EU Regulations and national law
• Obligations of the banks operating in the Member States
• Scope and procedure for obtaining an EAPO
• Enforcing and resisting enforcement of an EAPO
• Maintaining surprise vs protecting the debtor
• EAPO, US and UK (worldwide) freezing orders

The conference language will be English. The event is organized by Dr Angelika Fuchs (ERA). The programme is available here.

The confirmed speakers are:

• Gilles Cuniberti, Professor at the University of Luxembourg
• Joseph Delhaye, Head Legal and Senior Vice President at the State and Savings Bank, Luxembourg
• Pietro Franzina, Associate Professor at the University of Ferrara
• Sarah Garvey, Counsel and Head of Litigation KnowHow and Training, Allen & Overy LLP, London
• Burkhard Hess, Professor and Director of the Max Planck Institute for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law, Luxembourg
• Clara Mara-Marhuenda, Counsel Dispute Resolution, Arendt & Medernach, Luxembourg
• Fernando de la Mata, Partner, Baker & McKenzie SLP, Barcelona
• Brandon O’Neil, Senior Associate, Allen & Overy LLP, London
• Philippe-Emmanuel Partsch, Partner, Arendt & Medernach, Luxembourg
• Katharina Raffelsieper, Avocate, Thewes & Reuter – Avocats à la Cour, Luxembourg
• Daniel Staehelin, Professor, Attorney and Notary Public, Partner, Kellerhals Carrard, Basel
• Heinz Weil, Avocat & Rechtsanwalt, Chairman of the European Committee of the German Federal Bar (BRAK), Weil & Associés, Paris

Registrations before 1 November 2016 will benefit from an “early bird” rebate. After this deadline, however, discounts will be available for young lawyers and academics. For further information and registration, please see the conference website.

DEI / Alouminion tis Ellados et Commission
Aide d'État
La prolongation de la durée de validité d’une aide d’État existante doit être considérée comme la modification de cette aide et donc comme une aide nouvelle

Orange / Commission
Aide d'État
La Cour rejette le pourvoi de France Télécom dans l’affaire de la réforme du financement des retraites des fonctionnaires rattachés à cette entreprise

By a judgment of 21 June 2016 (No 19599), the First Chamber of the Italian Court of Cassation held that the recognition of a child as the son of two mothers (the woman who gave birth to the child, and the woman who donated her ova for the purposes of the medically assisted procreation), as indicated in a birth certificate issued abroad, is not incompatible with the Italian public policy. In the Court’s view, the recognition is in fact necessary to guarantee the right of the child to the cross-border continuity of his personal and social identity.

Nella sentenza 21 giugno 2016 n. 19599, la Prima Sezione della Corte di cassazione ha ritenuto che non sia contrario all’ordine pubblico italiano il riconoscimento dello stato di figlio di un bambino che, secondo un certificato di nascita rilasciato all’estero, risulta nato da due madri (l’una avendolo partorito, l’altra avendo donato gli ovuli necessari alla procreazione medicalmente assistita). Ciò in considerazione dell’interesse del minore alla continuità della propria identità personale e sociale attraverso le frontiere.