Feed aggregator

In C-471/15 Sjelle Autogenbrug, Bot AG opined a few weeks ago. I find myself curiously drawn to VAT cases these days. Especially since I reported how in a VAT case, the CJEU perhaps accidentally came to a major decision on the Aarhus Convention. Also have a look for instance on how the same AG discusses ‘cultural services’ within the context of VAT (C-592/15 BFI). Or perhaps it is because I have a past (and potentially, a future) in customs duties and excise.

It is particularly interesting to ponder how terminology that is used across the board in EU law, specifically also regulatory law, is interpreted in the context of VAT. (Incidentally the Advocate General gives an excellent summary of VAT rules and why VAT can /should be set-off between traders). In the case at hand, Directive 2006/112 provides i.a. the following definition for second-hand goods: “second-hand goods” means movable tangible property that is suitable for further use as it is or after repair, other than works of art, collectors’ items or antiques and other than precious metals or precious stones as defined by the Member States; 

Sjelle Autogenbrug I/S is a vehicle reuse undertaking whose main activity is the resale of used motor vehicle parts which it removes from end-of-life vehicles. It also engages in the environmental and waste treatment of end-of-life vehicles, a service for which it charges a standard price. Lastly, a lesser part of the undertaking’s overall turnover derives from the sale of scrap metal remaining after removal of the motor vehicle parts. Sjelle Autogenbrug purchases end-of-life vehicles — which are either vehicles whose lifespan has expired or total write-offs — from individuals and insurance companies who do not declare VAT on sales made. Sjelle Autogenbrug currently declares VAT pursuant to the applicable general rules. In 2010, it asked the tax authorities to apply the special margin scheme for second-hand goods to its activity of reselling used motor vehicle parts taken from end-of-life vehicles. The authorities refused.

Since the goods are reintroduced into the distribution chain, the taxable dealer is liable for VAT when he resells the goods. However, as the taxable dealer did not pay VAT when he purchased the second-hand goods from the non-taxable individual, he cannot deduct such VAT from the amount to be paid to the State, being an amount comprised exclusively of the VAT charged upon resale of those goods. This results in a lack of VAT neutrality and in the double taxation of the goods (at 26). The margin scheme was adopted to alleviate that difficulty. It aims to harmonise the rules applicable to the acquisition of new goods subject to VAT which are later resold as second-hand goods and to prevent double taxation and the distortion of competition between taxable persons in the area of second-hand goods.

The Danish government submits that the use in that provision of the words ‘as it is’ demonstrates that, in order to be classified as ‘second-hand goods’, the goods must retain their identity, which is not the case with spare parts since Sjelle Autogenbrug acquires, first of all, a complete vehicle. Furthermore, it argues that even if those spare parts could be classified as ‘second-hand goods’, it would not be possible to apply the margin scheme because the purchase price of the spare parts cannot be precisely determined.

Bot AG disagrees:

• the EU legislature did not intend to exclude goods originating from a single whole which could be separated, such as parts taken from end-of-life vehicles (at 33)
• the key factor in the classification of goods as ‘second-hand goods’ is that the used goods must retain the characteristics they had when new (at 35). He refers in this context also tho the end-of life-vehicles Directive, 2000/53, which defined ‘reuse’ as ‘any operation by which components of end-of-life vehicles are used for the same purpose for which they were conceived’. ‘Motor vehicle parts fall squarely within that definition since, even when separated from the vehicle, they retain their original characteristics as they will be reused for the same purpose in another vehicle. The fact that those parts were removed from the vehicle is therefore of little consequence.‘ (at 35)

The Advocate General further considered that were the special margin scheme not to be applied, dealers of second hand spare parts would be disfavoured vis-a-vis those dealing in new spare parts. Hardly indeed a result that would be conducive to the circular economy.

EU waste law does not employ the notion ‘second hand goods’. In practice these goods have raised all sorts of demarcation issues. Summarising all these, if one and the same good is simply passed on to ‘a second hand’, ie the original owner no longer has a use for it but it can be passed on by someone else who will employ it for its original purpose and without there being a need for treatment or processing, it should not be regarded as waste.

It is only be looking into all nooks and crannies of EU law that  ambitious projects like the circular economy will be a real success. Current Opinion is a good illustration of such successful consideration.

Handbook of EU Waste Law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 1.

Les refus opposés par les autorités espagnoles aux demandes successives du requérant, détenu ayant fait l’objet d’une sanction disciplinaire, concernant l’envoi de son dossier constituent, selon la CEDH, une violation de l’article 34 de la Convention (droit de requête individuelle). 

en lire plus

Lors de sa séance du 17 octobre 2016, le collège de la grande chambre de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH) a accepté le renvoi de deux affaires et en a rejeté vingt-six autres. 

en lire plus

Infringement of personality rights, including invasion of privacy, is exempt from the Rome II Regulation on applicable law for non-contractual relations. TLT at the High Court shows how distinct national laws may look upon the issue of quantification of damages very differently. Robin Hopkins reviews precedent and the case itself here, and One Crown Office Row zoom in on the case itself here. This case did not involve conflict of laws, however I thought I would highlight it anyway, for it is common knowledge that national laws assess damages in cases like these very differently.

It is worth pointing out in this respect that infringement of personality rights is exempt from Rome II not because it is irrelevant. Rather the contrary: it is very relevant indeed and no agreement could be found on an applicable law rule.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4.

The program of the conference Politics and Private International Law (?) is now available. As announced on this blog, the conference will be held on 6 and 7 April 2017 at the University of Bonn. The registration deadline is February 28th 2017. Further information are available here.

È disponibile il programma della convegno Politics and Private International Law (?) che, come segnalato in un post precedente, si svolgerà il 6 e il 7 aprile 2017 presso l’Università di Bonn. Il termine per la registrazione è il 28 febbraio 2017. Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Le Conseil des barreaux européens (CCBE) vient d’éditer un guide, en français et en anglais, destiné aux barreaux sur la libre circulation des avocats dans l’Union européenne.Le guide recense les règles applicables (textes et décisions) ainsi que les réponses aux questions fréquemment posées par les avocats en la matière.

en lire plus

Irrecevabilité

Décision du Conseil constitutionnel n° 2016-583/584/585/586 QPC du 14 octobre 2016
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel....

Décision du Conseil constitutionnel n° 2016-583/584/585/586 QPC du 14 octobre 2016
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel....

Décision du Conseil constitutionnel n° 2016-583/584/585/586 QPC du 14 octobre 2016
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel....

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Nîmes, chambre sociale, 24 novembre 2015

Cour d'appel d'Amiens, chambre de l'instruction, 11 octobre 2016

Tribunal d'instance de Montreuil, 19 octobre 2016

In a judgment of 25 July 2016 (No 15343), the First Chamber of the Italian Court of Cassation held that the application of the law of Pakistan, specifically, the application of the rules that allow marriage proceedings to be conducted over the telephone or by telematic means (subject to certain conditions, such as the presence of witnesses), is not incompatible with the Italian public policy.

Nella sentenza 25 luglio 2016 n. 15343, la Prima Sezione della Corte di cassazione ha escluso che produca effetti contrari all’ordine pubblico italiano la norma pakistana, resa applicabile in forza del richiamo di cui all’art. 28 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, che ammette — a certe condizioni, come la presenza di testimoni — che uno dei coniugi possa prestare il proprio consenso non già personalmente di fronte all’autorità officiante ma per via telefonica o telematica.

The EUFam’s Project’s Consortium is glad to announce that the first version of the EUFam’s case-law database, filled in the past months by all partners of the project, is now available for public consultation.

Currently, the database contains data concerning over 400 decisions applying the European Union Regulations on cross-border litigation in family matters, issued by the courts of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Spain.

The consortium will keep the database up to date and publish new versions of the file in the upcoming months in the section ‘Public Database’ of the EUFam’s website, in order to keep it up-to-date with the new cases that all partners will classify until December 2017, date of the end of the project.

Website: www.eufams.unimi.it

Facebook page: www.facebook.com/eufams

On the project:

The Project ‘Planning the future of cross-border families: a path through coordination’ (EUFam’s – JUST/2014/JCOO/AG/CIVI/7729) aims at analysing is the practice of several Member States concerning the application of EU Regulations No 2201/2003, No 1259/2010, No 4/2009, and No 650/2012, as well as the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, and the 2007 Hague Recovery Convention.

The purpose of the research activity is to identify the difficulties met by courts and practitioners in applying the rules laid down in the regulations, and to collect and share the solutions and best practices adopted by them in order to overcome such issues.

Partners of the Project are: the University of Milan (coordinator), the University of Heidelberg, the University of Osijek, the University of Valencia, the University of Verona, the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law, the Italian Family Lawyers Association (AIAF), the Spanish Family Lawyers Association (AEAFA), the Italian Judicial Academy (SSM), and the Croatian Judicial Academy.

The EUFam’s Project is co-funded by the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the European Commission, within the programme ‘Projects to support judicial cooperation in civil or criminal matters’ (Justice Programme).

The e-mail contact for further information is: eufams@unimi.it

On 26 October 2016 the University of Macerata will host a conference on the Digital Single Market. The programme is available here.

Il 26 ottobre 2016 l’Università di Macerata ospiterà un convegno sul mercato unico digitale. Il programma è disponibile qui.

Massimo V. Benedettelli, Five Lay Commandments for the EU Private International Law of Companies, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 2015/2016, p. 209-251.

While praising European company law as a “cornerstone of the internal market”, the EU institutions have devoted limited attention to issues of competent jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition of judgments which necessarily arise when companies carry out their business on a cross-border basis. This is a paradox, especially if one considers that in this area the EU often follows a policy of “minimal harmonization” of the laws of the Member States and that this policy leads to the co-existence of a variety of different rules and institutions directly or indirectly impinging on the regulation of companies, thus to possible conflicts of jurisdictions and/or laws. The European Court of Justice’s “Centros doctrine” fills this gap only partially: this is due not only to the inherent limits of its case-law origin, but also to various hidden assumptions and corollaries on which it appears to be grounded and which still need to be unearthed. Hence, time has come for a better coordination of the legal systems of the Member States in the field of company law, possibly through the enactment of an ad hoc instrument. To be properly carried out, however, such coordination requires a preliminary clarification of what the EU private international law of companies really is and how it should be handled at the current stage of the European integration. This article tries to contribute to such clarification by proposing five main guidelines, in the form of “commandments” for the European legislator, courts and practitioners. It is submitted that, first, one should understand the different scope of the three legal disciplines (EU law, private international law and company law) which interact in this field so as to assess when and to what extent the lack of coordination of the Member States’ domestic laws may affect the achievement of the objectives pursued by the EU. As a second analytical step, the impact that the EU constitutional principles of subsidiarity and proportionality may have on the scope of the relevant regulatory powers of the EU and of the Member States should be determined. Third, the issue of “characterization” should be addressed so that the boundaries of company law vis-à-vis neighbouring disciplines (capital markets law, insolvency law, contract law, tort law) are fixed throughout the entire EU legal space in a uniform and consistent way. Fourth, the Member States’ legal systems should be coordinated on the basis of the “jurisdictional approach” method (which de facto inspires the ECJ in Centros and its progenies) by granting a role of prominence to the Member State under the laws of which a company has been incorporated. Fifth, any residual conflict which may still arise among different Member States in the regulation of a given company should be resolved, in principle, by respecting the will of the parties to the corporate contract and the rights “to incorporate” and “to re-incorporate” which they enjoy under EU law. In the author’s opinion, an EU private international law of companies developed on the basis of these guidelines not only would achieve a fair balance between the needs of the integration and the Member States’ sovereignty, but would also create a framework for a European “market of company law” where a “virtuous” forum and law shopping could be performed in a predictable and regulated way.

In its judgment of 18 October 2016 regarding the case of Nikiforidis (Case C‑135/15), the Court of Justice ruled as follows.

(1)      Article 28 of Regulation No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) must be interpreted as meaning that a contractual employment relationship that came into being before 17 December 2009 (the date on which the Regulation became applicable) falls within the scope of the regulation only in so far as that relationship has undergone, as a result of mutual agreement of the contracting parties which has manifested itself on or after that date, a variation of such magnitude that a new employment contract must be regarded as having been concluded on or after that date, a matter which is for the referring court to determine.

(2)      Article 9(3) of Regulation No 593/2008 must be interpreted as precluding overriding mandatory provisions other than those of the State of the forum or of the State where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed from being applied, as legal rules, by the court of the forum. The Regulation, however, does not preclude the court from taking such other overriding mandatory provisions into account as matters of fact in so far as this is provided for by the national law that is applicable to the contract pursuant to the regulation. This interpretation is not affected by the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU. 

Regarding the opinion delivered by SG Szpunar in this case, see here.  

Nella sentenza del 18 ottobre 2016 relativa al caso Nikiforidis (causa C-135/15), la Corte ha affermato quanto segue.

(1)      L’art. 28 del regolamento n. 593/2008 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali (Roma I) dev’essere interpretato nel senso che un rapporto contrattuale di lavoro sorto prima del 17 dicembre 2009 (la data di applicabilità del regolamento) rientra nell’ambito di applicazione di tale regolamento solo nei limiti in cui detto rapporto ha subito, per effetto di un consenso reciproco delle parti contraenti che si sia manifestato a decorrere da tale data, una modifica di ampiezza tale da dover ritenere che sia stato concluso un nuovo contratto di lavoro a decorrere dalla medesima data, circostanza che spetta al giudice del rinvio determinare.

(2)      L’art. 9, par. 3, del regolamento n. 593/2008 deve essere interpretato nel senso che esso esclude che norme di applicazione necessaria diverse da quelle dello Stato del foro, o dello Stato nel quale gli obblighi derivanti dal contratto devono essere o sono stati eseguiti, possano essere applicate, in quanto norme giuridiche, dal giudice del foro. Esso non osta, tuttavia, a che il giudice prenda in considerazione siffatte altre norme di applicazione necessaria in quanto elementi di fatto nei limiti in cui ciò è previsto dal diritto nazionale applicabile al contratto in forza delle disposizioni di tale regolamento. Detta interpretazione non è rimessa in discussione dal principio di leale cooperazione enunciato all’articolo 4, paragrafo 3, TUE.

Vedi qui una sintesi delle conclusioni presentate in questa causa dall’Avvocato Generale Szpunar.

Le for désigné par l’article 6, point 3, du règlement Bruxelles I est compétent pour connaître d’une demande reconventionnelle tendant au remboursement, au titre d’un enrichissement sans cause, d’une somme correspondant au montant convenu dans le cadre d’un règlement extrajudiciaire.

en lire plus